Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Historical Turn in Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Taking a cue from remarks Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in
philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within the
British philosophical context of the 1950s and early 1960s when ordinary language
philosophy’s influence was at its peak. Specifically, I make the case that the ordinary
language philosophers’ methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice
influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific
explanation and that these criticisms are related to the historical turn in philosophy of
science. I think such connections are especially clear in the work of Stephen Toulmin, who
taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on
explanation under Gilbert Ryle in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse’s appeal to an ordinary
language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models in scientific
reasoning. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of
the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies
of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of
philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception.
Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also
had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why