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    <front>
        <journal-meta>
            <journal-id>TMR</journal-id>
            <journal-title-group>
                <journal-title>The Medieval Review</journal-title>
            </journal-title-group>
            <issn pub-type="epub">1096-746X</issn>
            <publisher>
                <publisher-name>Indiana University</publisher-name>
            </publisher>
        </journal-meta>
        <article-meta>
            <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">24.02.03</article-id>
            <title-group>
                <article-title>24.02.03, Donavin, John Gower’s Rhetoric</article-title>
            </title-group>
            <contrib-group>
                <contrib contrib-type="author">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Andrew Galloway</surname>
                        <given-names/>
                    </name>
                    <aff>Cornell University</aff>
                    <address>
                        <email>asg6@cornell.edu</email>
                    </address>
                </contrib>
            </contrib-group>
            <pub-date publication-format="epub" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2022">
                <year>2024</year>
            </pub-date>
            <product product-type="book">
                <person-group>
                    <name>
                        <surname>Donavin, Georgiana</surname>
                        <given-names/>
                    </name>
                </person-group>
                <source>John Gower’s Rhetoric: Classical Authority, Biblical Ethos, and Renaissance Receptions</source>
                <series>Disputatio</series>
                <year iso-8601-date="2023">2023</year>
                <publisher-loc>Turnhout, Belgium</publisher-loc>
                <publisher-name>Brepols</publisher-name>
                <page-range>Pp. 432</page-range>
                <price>$150 (hardback)</price>
                <isbn>978-2-503-59577-1 (hardback)</isbn>
            </product>
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright 2024 Trustees of Indiana University. Indiana University provides the information contained in this file for non-commercial, personal, or research use only. All other use, including but not limited to commercial or scholarly reproductions, redistribution, publication or transmission, whether by electronic means or otherwise, without prior written permission of the copyright holder is strictly prohibited.</copyright-statement>
            </permissions>
        </article-meta>
    </front>
    <body>
        <p>This study of a range of personae, “voices,” registers, and genres that John Gower
            adopts--all found in the capacious category of “rhetoric”--is a magisterially conceived
            and literarily sensitive <italic>summa</italic>, tracking those notions through a wide
            span of Gower’s considerable oeuvrein his three languages (a very proper French, a
            generally classical Latin, and a distinctively unusual dialectically hybrid English),
            with particularly welcome attention to his French lyric cycles and uses of the
            epistolary form. </p>
        
        <p>The pursuit starts by examining Gower’s unusual--indeed probably unique--claim for the
            fundamental importance of “rethorique,” to which he subordinates both logic and grammar;
            to explain this Donavin offers the bold claim that Gower knew not only Aristotle’s
            (rather thinly circulated)<italic>Rhetoric</italic> but also the large commentary on it
            by Giles of Rome, which emphasizes Aristotle’s opening claim that rhetoric is
            “successive” to logic and amplifies Aristotle’s focus not on tropes but on the passions
            that rhetoric can stir (and manipulate) in particular groups. Donavin’s larger, and I
            think more important, claims concern the shifting voices or modes of rhetoric Gower
            uses. Having adopted for his excoriating voice of social satire the “strident, male”
            mode (150) of John the Baptist, preacher of repentance, and John of Patmos, author of
            the book of Revelation, Gower regularly modulates throughout his oeuvre into a saintly
            “feminine” mode of limpidly pithy rhetoric associated with the purity yet fecundity of
            the Virgin: a “chaste rhetoric” that governs his French lyrics as it does the surviving
            (atelic) end of his French <italic>Mirour de l’Omme</italic> (c. 1378). A final chapter
            notes how Gower’s attention to a simple and plain rhetoric by women speakers, and his
            general interest in the use of repetition as a marker of the “plain” style, are both
            visible in the Renaissance responses of Shakespeare’s <italic>Pericles</italic> (1609)
            and Ben Jonson’s <italic>English Grammar </italic> (c. 1620, 1640-1641). </p>
        
        <p>This is really three books in one--foundations; modes and voices; innovations and
            reception--and that in itself makes a point about the absence of prior comprehensive
            attention to Gower’s wide use of as well as his thought about rhetoric. Such scope means
            that, although I find a few claims unconvincing, and some elements rough-hewn, the net
            effect is transformative, particularly for a subfield that has had many sideline
            contributions but no similarly comprehensive treatment. </p>
        
        <p>My substantive, and manageably specific, demurrals are all in the “foundations” part.
            Everyone must start by examining Gower’s unusual--indeed probably unique--claim for the
            fundamental importance of “rethorique” as one of the three primary “sciences” that
            constitute philosophy. Gower derived this view from his reading of Brunetto Latini’s
                <italic>Livres dou Tresor</italic> (c. 1260), but displaced Latini’s supercategory
            of “Logic” with “Rhetoric,” under which Gower locates grammar and logic. This is a
            remarkable reordering, and I think Donavin diffuses its originality with the argument
            that Gower knew Aristotle’s <italic>Rhetoric </italic> (or some scrap of its reception,
            such as a stray list she mentions that includes the passions Aristotle names, under ‘P’
            [47]). I’m persuaded that Gower, like Aristotle, is attentive to the passions of
            different kinds of audiences, and I am at least receptive to Donavin’s view that this
            becomes, for Gower, a basis for him showing the wandering path of the emotionally
            volatile “will” (in the form of Amans, the Lover of the <italic>Confessio
                amantis</italic>) to align, in the end, with higher and more ethical (and ultimately
            more Augustinian Christian) reason, when Amans is reduced again to old John Gower, maker
            of moral books. I don’t, however, see the necessity of positing Aristotle’s relatively
            rare work or Giles’ massive thirteenth-century commentary as essential direct bases for
            all this, which is, after all, a general goal in “moral” poetry. </p>
        
        <p>Not that Donavin is wrong to draw attention to this Aristotelean tradition. For the
            narrower reason I’m skeptical is what Latini provides. The great early twentieth-century
            editor G. C. Macaulay first identified Latini’s <italic>Trésor</italic> as Gower’s main
            source for his discussion of rhetoric; with characteristic authority, Macaulay added
            that the <italic>Trésor</italic> “is very largely based upon Aristotle, with whose works
            Latini was exceptionally well acquainted, and it is from this that Gower takes his
            classification of the sciences, though in regard to the place of Rhetoric he does not
            quite agree with Latini.” [1] Latini cites Aristotle at least twenty-three times,
            including ten times from the <italic>Rhetorica</italic>. Would Gower have needed
            Aristotle’s <italic>Rhetoric</italic>, much less Giles of Rome’s massive commentary, to
            attribute his definition of Rhetoric to “the Philosophre” who “amonges alle / Forthi
            commendeth this science / Which hath the reule of eloquence” (qtd. 40)--since Latini
            also opens by defining “rectorique” as “une science ki nous ensegne bien plainement et
            parfitement dire es choses communes et es privees” (‘a science which teaches us to speak
            very plainly and perfectly about things both public and private’), which he goes on to
            say is classified under “la science de cité governer” because of “ce q’Aristotles dist
            en son livre, ki est translaté en romans ça en ariere” (‘what Aristotle says in his
            book, which was translated into Latin at one time or another’)? [2]</p>
       
        <p>Latini was among a small group of massively learned intelligentsia, including Roger
            Bacon, who were well aware of Aristotle’s <italic>Rhetoric </italic> but also felt it was
            often overlooked; Latini even seems aware (correctly) that there were multiple Latin
            translations by the late 1260s. As textbook foundations for Gower’s commitment to “tale
            plein,” a <italic>Leitmotif</italic> of Donavin’s study, we might look no further than
            Latini’s “science ki nous ensegne bien plainement et parfitement dire.” </p>
        
        <p>I’m also unpersuaded--to conclude my objections--by Donavin’s early claim, proffered to
            establish Gower’s depth of thought about rhetoric, that Gower made a rhetorically
            meaningful distinction between “Tullius” and “Cicero.” In a gaffe that hardly needs much
            excusing, Gower, setting the stage for the famous ancient debate over the fate of
            Catiline, declares, “at Rome also / Was Tullius with Cithero” (IV.2633-634). The usual
            explanation is simple error, suggesting Gower was perhaps not so very learned in
            rhetorical traditions. Donavin, however, argues Gower was making a cunning distinction
            between, on the one hand, ornate speech, via “Tullius’” <italic>Rhetorica ad
                Herennium</italic>, the anonymous ancient text universally attributed to Cicero
            (but, we now agree, clearly by some follower or contemporary) which includes a range of
            tropes for embellishment, and, on the other, a more restrained, spare, “plain” speech by
            “Cicero,” embodied and demonstrated in Cicero’s (actual) <italic>De inventione</italic>
            and his speech against Catiline, first quoted and summarized by Sallust (translated and
            reproduced by Latini, who everyone assumes was Gower’s proximate source there). </p>
        
        <p>Any prospect of situating more accurately Gower’s thought about rhetoric and rhetorical
            traditions merits consideration, but it is special pleading to think it “nearly
            impossible” for Gower not to realize that “Tullius” is the same as Cicero (64) on the
            grounds that it is “Cicero’s” speech about Catiline that Latini conveys (but almost
            always as “Tullius”). Presumably that would be nearly impossible because it would mean
            Gower missed something in Latini, who, Donavin claims, uses Cicero’s <italic>tria nomina
            </italic> “more than once to describe the orator’s participation in the Catilinarian
            debates” (64). In fact, Latini uses Cicero’s three names in that context exactly once
            (III.34.2). Of the 112 other times Latini mentions or paraphrases Cicero in the
                <italic>Trésor</italic>, he uses the three names only one other time, far from the
            final, rhetoric section, in the first book on ethics (I.36.5); all other times he uses
            only “Tulles,” apart from once mentioning “Cicero nostre consoles” (III.35.6)--precisely
            the political role that Gower asserts for his ghostly double of “Cicero.” </p>
        
        <p>Donavin observes that Gower’s London associate Chaucer correctly used all three names of
            “Marcus Tullius Scithero” (64, 67), but we might recall that Chaucer did so in order to
            poke fun at a Franklin who pedantically claims his complete ignorance of textbook
            rhetoric while dropping classical allusions as wantonly as Petrarch--perhaps, as I have
            suggested elsewhere, needling the classicizing, autodidact, “freeman” Gower, whose
            ignorance Chaucer (a far lesser Latinist) for once had the pleasure of pointing out. [3]
            If we find it unbelievable that someone in England, innocent of Italy’s Cicerophilia,
            might commit so rank an error, we might consider the anonymous fifteenth-century
            translation of Ranulph Higden’s <italic>Polychronicon</italic> preserved in Harley MS
            2261: misled by Hidgen’s interposition of “tamen” (‘nonetheless’) between “Tullio” and
            “Cicerone,” the translator wrote that Caesar was “expulsede from the cité by Tullius and
            Cithero consulles.” [4]</p>
        
        <p>Philological acumen does not automatically make a great poet, and the real stakes of
            Gower’s rhetoric, and <italic>Gower’s Rhetoric</italic>, are elsewhere. No one has
            treated Gower’s Marian lyricality as well as Donavin, and not only in the chapters
            explicitly dedicated to that topic. Perhaps the greatest of the book’s triumphs is to
            show that Gower’s lifelong dedication to a “plain” style is ultimately a pursuit of a
            “full” (<italic>plena</italic>) style, as in <italic>gracia plena</italic>.
            Extraordinarily fine readings emerge of nested, “enclosed,” and implicitly Marian
            imagery in the love lyrics of the <italic>Cinkante Balades</italic> (e.g., 271-273).
            Such “chaste speech” and “pure language,” a “concept of a bare text” manifested in a
            “simple, abbreviated style” in which any “rhetorical flourishes” are used only insofar
            as they present “the whole truth” (142, 145, 143), fully emerges, Donavin fascinatingly
            proposes, only when Gower’s caustic biblical personae of John the Baptist and John of
            Patmos recede. “Marian rhetoric” offers “a simple and lovely eloquence that captures
            reasonable thought and avoids the faults of Gower’s strident male voices, whether they
            be in the Roman senate, by the Jordan, or in Patmos” (150). </p>
        
        <p>Sweeping as it is, the plan of <italic>Gower’s Rhetoric </italic> engages with a very
            large range of critical and scholarly commentary, and there is abundant evidence of
            Donavin’s diligent attention to many, especially and appropriately more recent, views.
            One failing in formal execution--ultimately to be lodged with the publisher--is how many
            footnoted references are missing from the final bibliography. Neither Jonson’s collected
            works nor Manzalaoui’s edition of the <italic>Secretum secretorum </italic> appears, to
            mention just two (I stopped counting after thirty). The problem is exacerbated by the
            skeletal index, which omits all scholarship. Not all references are found complete
            anywhere (“Elizabeth J. Bellamy” [305n]); truncations or errors appear in some
                (“<italic>Heroines</italic>” [409]); references to secondary works intrude in the
            Primary Works bibliography (Matthews; Smalley [398-399]). The contributions by Robin
            Hass Birky, to whom Donavin offers particular gratitude for Birky’s seminal essay on
            “chaste rhetoric,” undeveloped because of Birky’s untimely death (143), is separated in
            the bibliography from works by Robin Hass. Many critics included in the bibliography
            have only some of their essays there that Donavin elsewhere discusses. Generous mentions
            of some scholars’ ideas can be repetitious (views by Thomas Bestul are repeated verbatim
            at 329n, 333n, and 336), and at least one of mine is incomplete. What I (perhaps
            intemperately) once wrote, in characterizing Gower’s paradoxical attention to a range of
            sometimes fungible, sometimes not fungible goods, people, and languages,</p>
        
        <p><disp-quote></disp-quote>"the verbal tropes by which such economies are made to seem natural and
        inevitable emerge, when isolated as “rhetorik,” as themselves an unnatural
        force. This is so even though the [<italic>Confessio amantis</italic>] continually denies
            its 
        use of rhetoric... However impossible such unchanging transmission, the 
        pretense of commutability is pervasive, registered in its English narrator’s 
        earnest ‘plainness’ of communicating, ... Yet despite those claims to rude 
        words and plain, the poet admits that rhetoric is necessary and unavoidable. 
        Its ungovernable power, in spite of the poet’s protestations, is patent 
        throughout...” [5]</p>
        
        <p>Donavin summarizes as my taking “Gower’s protests against overly embellished language to
            be a denial of rhetoric” (16n). That leaves half my claim, at most, rather prominently
            in the book’s second footnote, where so naive an assertion richly deserves the
            demolition that the following tome offers: “I shall argue that Gower makes distinctions
            concerning the kinds of rhetoric he can ethically embrace” (16n). </p>
        
        <p>Beating my breast for spite, in retrospect I might add that I was pursuing the paradoxes
            of Gower’s definitions of “rethorique,” as, on the one hand, that which “perornat”
            (‘highly embellishes’) the words of “Grammatica et Logica,” as Gower’s Latin prose
            marginalia states, and on the other, as “the word” as such, which God “hath yove”
            (‘given’) to humanity alone, as the English poetry directly beside that marginalia
            declares (VII.1509 and marg.). I was certainly not denying Gower’s self-conscious and
            often elaborate uses of rhetoric, as the rest of my essay shows. And just as I pursued
            his contradictory rhetoric of rhetoric down to the point that the poet implausibly
            denies his own manifest and potent use of it, so (I might reply) Donavin dwells on
            Gower’s “ideal of a plain, ethical rhetoric” (161), “a concept of a bare text” (144),
            what might be called an impossible ideal of naked or transparent rhetoric, fraught with
            “the possibility of wordlessness” (161, quoting Patrick Gallacher). I now prefer her
            explanation, but we are looking at similar phenomena.</p>
        
        <p><italic>Gower’s Rhetoric</italic> provides crucially important attention to Gower’s
            commitment to a highly crafted plainness; this leads both to the voice of complaint and
            to the Marian mode that, Donavin shows, constituted what we might call his lyricality.
            That strand is visible in the discussion of the formal poetic enclosures and ideas of
            maternal creativity pervading Gower’s love lyrics in the <italic>Cinkante
                Balades</italic> as they are in her views of how his <italic>Traitie
            </italic> conveys the “disordered” passions, down to Donavin’s attention to how, in the
            incompletely preserved <italic>Mirour</italic>, Mary throws herself on the deposed body
            of her son, mingling her tears with his blood in an exchange of bodily fluids “as if in
            sex and wanting to melt into the beloved” (338). </p>
        
        <p>That Gower has begun receiving significant attention only in recent decades as a major
            English writer of lyric--by R. F. Yeager, Ardis Butterfield, Matthew Irvine, and myself,
            among others--is surely due to the fact that he was not a major writer of
                <italic>English</italic> lyric.Donavin provides a broad and powerful new basis for
            reassessing this. That his works were influential in the Renaissance for their
            sensitivity to women’s subjectivities, their use of epistolary forms to elaborate dense
            and allusive figurality, and their demonstration of the “chaste” rhetoric of repetition
            reminds us that the Reformation’s dismissal of Mariolatry along with non-English poetry
            by English poets imposed a high cost on their, and ultimately our, range of poetic and
            rhetorical understanding and appreciation. In many ways Donavin’s study substantially
            redeems that loss.</p>
        
        <p>--------</p>
        <p>Notes: </p>
        
        <p>1. G. C. Macaulay, ed., <italic>The English Works of John Gower</italic>, Early English
            Text Society e.s. 82 (London: Oxford University Press, 1901), vol. 2, p. 522.</p>
        
        <p>2. Francis J. Carmody, ed., <italic>Li Livres dou Tresor de Brunetto Latini</italic>
            (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), III.2.2.</p>
        
        <p>3. Andrew Galloway, “Gower’s Ovids,” in <italic>The Oxford History of Classical Reception
                in English Literature, Volume I: 800-1558</italic>, ed. Rita Copeland (Oxford:
            Oxford University Press, 2016), 437.</p>
        
        <p>4. Joseph Rawson Lumby, ed., <italic>Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis,
                together with the English Translations of John Trevisa and of an Unknown Writer of
                the Fifteenth Century</italic>, Roll Series 41 (London: HMSO, 1872), vol. 4, pp.
            180-81.</p>
        
        <p>5. Andrew Galloway, “The Account Book and the Treasure: Gilbert Maghfeld’s Textual
            Economy and the Poetics of Mercantile Accounting in Ricardian Literature,”
                <italic>Studies in the Age of Chaucer </italic> 33 (2011), 109-110.</p>
    </body>
</article>
