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    <front>
        <journal-meta>
            <journal-id>TMR</journal-id>
            <journal-title-group>
                <journal-title>The Medieval Review</journal-title>
            </journal-title-group>
            <issn pub-type="epub">1096-746X</issn>
            <publisher>
                <publisher-name>Indiana University</publisher-name>
            </publisher>
        </journal-meta>
        <article-meta>
            <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">21.12.20</article-id>
            <title-group>
                <article-title>21.12.20, Moore, Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement</article-title>
            </title-group>
            <contrib-group>
                <contrib contrib-type="author">
                    <name>
                        <surname>Benjamin Morgan</surname>
                        <given-names/>
                    </name>
                    <aff>Worcester College, Oxford</aff>
                    <address>
                        <email>ben.morgan@worc.ox.ac.uk</email>
                    </address>
                </contrib>
            </contrib-group>
            <pub-date publication-format="epub" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2021">
                <year>2021</year>
            </pub-date>
            <product product-type="book">
                <person-group>
                    <name>
                        <surname>Moore, Ian Alexander</surname>
                        <given-names/>
                    </name>
                </person-group>
                <source>Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement</source>
                <series>SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy</series>
                <year iso-8601-date="2019">2019</year>
                <publisher-loc>Albany, New York</publisher-loc>
                <publisher-name>State University of New York Press</publisher-name>
                <page-range>Pp. xviii, 332</page-range>
                <price>$95.00 (hardback) $33.95 (paperback)</price>
                <isbn>978-1-43847-651-3 (hardback) 978-1-43847-652-0 (paperback)</isbn>
            </product>
            <permissions>
                <copyright-statement>Copyright 2021 Trustees of Indiana University. Indiana University provides the information contained in this file for non-commercial, personal, or research use only. All other use, including but not limited to commercial or scholarly reproductions, redistribution, publication or transmission, whether by electronic means or otherwise, without prior written permission of the copyright holder is strictly prohibited.</copyright-statement>
            </permissions>
        </article-meta>
    </front>
    <body>
        <p>Moore’s book presents both a thought-provoking argument and a wealth of material for
            scholars interested in exploring further the ways in which the thinking of Meister
            Eckhart shaped that of Heidegger.</p>
        <p>The main argument is that Heidegger has in common with Eckhart an approach which
            presupposes a certain lived attitude in its readers, or what Moore, following the
            Dominican turned philosopher Reiner Schürmann (1941-1993), calls a “practical apriori”
            (xiv). If you aren’t at some level already living the attitude which Eckhart and
            Heidegger analyse, then you won’t be in a position to comprehend what they preach and
            teach, or as Meister Eckhart puts it in the famous sermon on spiritual poverty (number
            52 in Quint’s critical edition) from which Moore quotes: “[I]f you are unlike this truth
            of which I speak, you cannot understand me” (quoted xiii). But it is not just a question
            of individual attitude. The world itself shares this practical apriori. The attitude we
            need already to have cultivated is itself the very essence of how, to use a Heideggerian
            turn of phrase, the world worlds. For Eckhart the “Godhead,” for Heidegger “Being,” lets
            things be, and we come to participate more knowingly in this letting-be to the degree
            that we ourselves can be let to let be. The confusion of activity and passivity is not
            unintentional but, rather, central to the argument: the process, as Moore insists, is
            “middle-voiced” (97). The term that Heidegger uses for this middle-voiced state of
            openness, <italic>Gelassenheit</italic>, is borrowed directly from Eckhart:
                <italic>gelâzenheit</italic>; or at least from the milieu of late medieval spiritual
            writings in the vernacular, but more on that later.</p>
        <p>The point of an Eckhart sermon, or a lecture course by Heidegger, is then to prompt you
            to notice what you already unwittingly experience. In the case of Eckhart, the
            realization is assisted by his hyperbolic use of paradoxes and his wilfully wayward
            translations of familiar passages from the Vulgate: “Rather than exclusively employing
            reason to convince us of the truth of his claims, or even trying to persuade us into
            believing them, Eckhart attempts to cultivate us for the experience of
                <italic>gelâzenheit</italic>. As soil must be broken up in preparation for planting,
            so too must our habits and expectations be broken up if we are to become released” (87).
            One of the productive aspects of Moore’s argument is the way that, to emphasize the
            parallel between Eckhart and Heidegger, he particularly focuses on Heidegger’s teaching:
            on lecture courses from 1928/29 and 1935, and a philosophical dialogue which seems to
            have been the basis for Heidegger’s teaching during the displaced and interrupted summer
            semester of 1945 (124-125). The infamous 1935 <italic>Introduction to
                Metaphysics</italic> features as an exception which proves the role of the deep
            argumentative structure that Heidegger shares with Eckhart. In the early years of the
            Third Reich, violent imposition has replaced letting-be as the main form of both
            individual identity and the unfolding of Being. We thus find the same “practical
            apriori,” only now with a violence that needs to be acknowledged. Moore summarizes: “The
            human being comes to see himself as essentially violent by way of his very activity of
            violence” (117). But this violence is also part of being: “In order to let being be,
            [the human being] must let it be overpowering, and this means letting it overpower his
            creations, his customs, and his thoughts” (120). Such a letting-be acknowledges the
            contingency and fragility of human institutions. But, spoken by someone who was recently
            the Nazi rector of Freiburg university, the argument that violence is the very structure
            of Being is chilling. In Moore’s view, this shouldn’t blind us to Heidegger’s
            fundamental debt to Eckhart. We should note instead how, in the 1930s, the philosopher
            “failed to follow through on the Eckhartian, an-archic undercurrent in his thought”
            (142).</p>
        <p>Moore’s case that Heidegger returns repeatedly to Eckhart is convincing, and the material
            collected in the appendices--the editions of Eckhart that Heidegger owned, the markings
            he made in his own copies, the places he cited which passage of Eckhart, and the reports
            of personal discussions with various interlocutors--all help to put the study of the two
            thinkers on a new footing. However, to show that Heidegger repeatedly consulted and
            discussed Eckhart need not make Heidegger an Eckhartian, nor Eckhart a Heideggerian.
            Moore confesses towards the start of his argument: “I will naturally read Eckhart in a
            somewhat Heideggerian vein” (37) and acknowledges towards the end that he has not
            focused on “divergences” between the two figures (140). The result is that we can see
            how Eckhart’s texts lend themselves to a Heideggerian gloss. But what does this miss?
            One important aspect is the differing tone. To return to the famous passage from Sermon
            52 that Moore uses to establish the idea of a practical apriori: “Whoever does not
            understand these words, should not be troubled. For as long as someone is not themselves
            akin to this truth, they will not understand my words, since this is an unconcealed
            truth which has come directly from the heart of God.” [1] Moore reads the comment as an
            “imperative”: “The primary task of this book is twofold: to explore how this imperative
            functions in Eckhart’s philosophy and to show how Martin Heidegger creatively
            appropriated it at several stages of his career” (xiii). But the assumption that Eckhart
            is issuing orders can be questioned. He may instead be saying: if you don’t get it, so
            be it, it’s not the end of the world. This tolerant attitude is evident elsewhere in
            Eckhart. [2] It is accompanied by an attentiveness to the concerns of different
            audiences. As Moore noted, Eckhart uses hyperbole and other forms of rhetorical surprise
            to unsettle preconceptions. At the same time, he does not seem to be arguing for any
            single position. He can focus on questions of exchange (Sermon 1), attitudes to
            maidenhood and womanhood (Sermon 2), the value of the intellect (Sermon 9), the value of
            love (Sermon 60 or 103), the value of activity and/or contemplation (Sermon 86), and in
            each case one can imagine a particular audience who might have been especially intrigued
            by what he says: merchants, Dominican friars with a particular attachment to
            intellectual pursuits, female religious with a particular attachment to forms of
            contemplation or visionary experience. In the vernacular sermons, we find an
            audience-focused attention to the specificities of the situations in which he preached;
            we find provocations, but also a tolerance for listeners who don’t (yet) get it. The
            same idea might be extended to Eckhart’s Latin writings, raising questions about the
            audiences to which they were addressed and the debates in which they disruptively
            intervened.</p>
        <p>Not all of Eckhart’s readers were happy with what they read, as we can see from the
            various redactions, re-writings and misprisions in the manuscripts transmitting the
            texts. But these cases of mis-copying can themselves enhance our sense of the spiritual
            milieu with which Eckhart’s preaching and writing was in dialogue. [3] Moore himself
            draws on one such re-writing. His case for the importance of
                <italic>gelâzenheit</italic> in Eckhart, despite the fact, as he admits, that the
            noun only appears once in the corpus (65), is bolstered by a manuscript transmitting the
            Eckhartian treatise “On Detachment.” In this version, the word “detachment”
                (<italic>abegescheidenheit</italic>) is repeatedly glossed as letting-be or
            “releasement” (<italic>gelâzenheit</italic>) (77-79). The manuscript in question is in
            the Nuremberg Stadtbibliothek, Cod. Cent. VI, 55, copied by various nuns and stemming
            from the Dominican convent of St Katharina c. 1440-1450. [4] The noun Moore particularly
            emphasizes thus belongs in the context of piety in reformed Dominican houses in the
            mid-fifteenth century. Eckhart texts tend to prefer verb forms derived from
                <italic>lâzen</italic> (65). In drawing on the noun, Heidegger is following the
            practices of post-Eckhartian piety more than Eckhart himself. Would Heidegger, had he
            also been interested in the manuscript transmission of Eckhart’s texts, have written of
            an anonymous Dominican nun excerpting, adapting ad re-writing Eckhartian texts, that she
            was “the first <italic>German</italic>...philosopher” (17) as he did of Eckhart?</p>
        <p>Eckhart’s vernacular texts seem to be situation- and audience-specific, and their
            transmission provides a window onto the differing practices with which they came into
            contact and the degree to which the texts re-shaped or were themselves shaped by the
            contexts of their reception. Heidegger’s private library and his habits of underlining,
            themselves form part of this history of reception. Moore reproduces Heidegger’s
            underlining in his copy of a 1914 translation of Eckhart texts by Joseph Bernhart
            (168-177). The text in question is the “Talks of Instruction,” which consists in
            paragraphs of spiritual advice that were likely delivered to novices at the Dominican
            friary in Erfurt in the 1290s. One of the passages Heidegger highlights, with a red
            pencil which means he found it especially important (168) reads in Oliver Davies’s
            translation: “Examine yourself, and wherever you find yourself, then take leave of
            yourself. This is the best way of all.” [5] Following the Middle High German closely,
            Davies uses reflexive pronouns and reflexive verbs. Bernhart is not so circumspect:
            “Wache über dich, und wo du dein Ich [r] am Werke spürst, da laß es fahren” (171), which
            can be translated as “Watch over yourself, and where you feel your ego at work, let it
            go.” A noun has been introduced (“dein Ich”) which wasn’t in the Middle High German
            (“und swâ dû dich vindest”/ “wherever you find yourself”). And it is this “Ich” that
            Heidegger underlines in red. The Heideggerian term <italic>Gelassenheit</italic>,
            awkwardly translated as “releasement,” seems thus to be adopted as a response to a suite
            of human actions (learning habits of self-monitoring) congealed into a noun:
                <italic>dein Ich</italic>, your ego, your Self. With this Self established,
            paradoxes appear which did not especially plague Eckhart’s text: for instance, how can a
            Self overcome itself without always coming back to bite itself? “How can I will myself
            beyond the will?” (130). By contrast, Eckhart focuses on actions and habits, and
            explicitly suggests, later in the “Talks of Instruction” in a passage that wasn’t marked
            by Heidegger: “Intend only [God] and have no thought as to whether it is you or God who
            performs things in you.” [6] For Eckhart, the question of agency is a distraction.
            Attitudes and habits can be changed without disabling presuppositions about a unitary
            self behind them. Both Heidegger and Moore seem to have been led astray, in this case,
            by a translators’ contestable interpretation. </p>
        <p>There are thus various ways in which Eckhart is not a Heideggerian. The tone is
            different. There seems to be an assumption that the preacher goes to meet his audience
            and works with their problems without system building. And there’s no need for a
            critique of the Self because Eckhart’s attention is on habits, actions, ways of living,
            which aren’t assumed to need a distinct agent ‘behind’ them. Viewed from this
            perspective, a number of Heidegger’s favorite themes--overcoming subject/object
            divisions, and the philosophy of metaphysics--emerge as products of his attachment to a
            particular philosophical tradition of which he wants to be the heroic transcender. But,
            viewed alongside Eckhart, the heroic effort to transcend, and the more aggressive (1935)
            or more resigned (1944/45) tones with which the effort is propounded, emerge as
            themselves artifacts of an attachment to a tradition to which, both in the fourteenth
            century context in which Eckhart wrote, and in the first half of the twentieth century,
            there were alternatives: heterodox mystical writers such as Eckhart, Hadewijch or
            Marguerite Porete in the late medieval period; the pluralism of William James or John
            Dewey, to name only two obvious examples, in the twentieth-century century.</p>
        <p>Moore gives a clear-headed, insider’s account of how the world looks to a Heideggerian
            grappling with the appeal and challenge of Eckhart’s texts. But Eckhart, thankfully, was
            not a proto-Heideggerian; nor was the twentieth century solely a Heideggerian century.
            So even if we share Heidegger’s interest in re-imagining forms of agency in search of a
            “middle voice,” reading Eckhart might point us in different directions to those
            Heidegger envisaged, and so may perhaps release us from the paradoxes of
            releasement.</p>
        <p>-------</p>
        <p>Notes:</p>
        <p>1. Meister Eckhart, <italic>Selected Writings</italic>, edited and translated by Oliver
            Davies (London: Penguin, 1994), 208-209.</p>
        <p>2. “Then whatever kinds of devotional practice come to you, be content with those”
                (<italic>Selected Writings</italic>, 191). “Whoever has understood this sermon, I
            wish them well. Had no one been here, I would still have had to preach it to this
            collecting-box” (<italic>Selected Writings</italic>, 234).</p>
        <p>3. Ben Morgan, “Rhetorical Transformations: The Meaning of Scribal Errors in Munich
            Manuscript Staatsbibliothek Cgm 133,” <italic>Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch</italic> 9
            (2015): 179-194.</p>
        <p>4. Karin Schneider, <italic>Die deutschen mittelalterlichen Handschriften: Beschreibung
                des Buchschmucks Heinz Zirnbauer</italic> (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965),
            179-183.</p>
        <p>5. <italic>Selected Writings</italic>, 7.</p>
        <p>6. <italic>Selected Writings</italic>, 51.</p>
    </body>
</article>