In recent historiography there is no lack of publications on the Second Crusade and its contexts, neither in English nor in other scholarly languages. Since Crusades 5 (2006): 85-97, Roche himself has published several papers with important findings, concerning especially the crusaders marches through Asia Minor. Seen against this background Roche’s claim to liberate both the twelfth century sources and the modern historiography from their ingrown myopia (315) may be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the present monograph is an important contribution to the general problem why this holy enterprise ended in failure and disappointment: Passing through the Balkans and through Asia Minor cost a lot of combatants. The much-reduced numbers of crusaders that reached the Levant attacked not Edessa whose capture by Nur ad-Din’s father Zengi in 1144 had ushered on the whole movement but Damascus that had been a Frankish ally and now fell itself to Nur ad-Din in 1154. On the whole the book provides us with a fresh, comprehensive and critical assessment of the medieval sources, especially of Greek texts that ordinary Western historians sometimes neglect. A good example is the anti-Latin attitude of Kinnamos. Following Warren Treadgold, The Middle Byzantine Historians (2013), Roche argues that Kinnamos does not usually reflect positions of the late 1140s but has been heavily influenced by strained relations between the Emperors Manuel Komnenos und Friedrich Barbarossa during the 1160s.

Another strongpoint of the book is its realistic and plausible re-assessment of the numerical strength of the crusaders. From the Empire north of the Alps, i.e., from Germany, as Roche calls it, there may have been some 12,000 people, led by at least 32 known ecclesiastical, princely and noble magnates, not 30-35,000 fighters plus thousands of non-combatants as earlier scholars hypothesized. These “Germans” included what would nowadays be called Dutch, Swiss, and Austrian participants, and of course Slavic speakers from the east and Romance speakers from the west of Central Europe. They formed two groups, one in favor of Conrad III, one in favor of Welf VI. They often failed to cooperate. Their rivalry contributed to the ultimate failure of the Second Crusade. According to Roche, the major factor, however, was bad logistics both of the Germans under Conrad III and of the French under Louis VII. There can indeed be no doubt that the crusaders--although much fewer in numbers than previously assumed--were beset by their lack of food and water for both men and horses. This was true already in the Balkans, and it became even more serious in Asia Minor. In both cases Western contemporaries accused the Byzantines, the greedy people who did not want to sell victuals at reasonable prices and the emperor whom they accused of more or less secret collaboration with Muslim powers both in Asia Minor and in the Near East. Sources such as Kinnamos seemed to prove Greek aversions against the Western crusaders. But Roche reads them as not showing Greek attitudes of the late 1140s. Moreover, he thinks that Byzantium was not unwilling but incapable of meeting the crusaders demands. For Asia Minor these arguments are convincing. The Westerners just followed the routes of the Frist Crusade in 1097/98. They did not take notice of the social and economic changes in Asia Minor during the last fifty years. When the Greeks suggested that they should follow the coast and not march through the interior, they refused to listen to this good counsel. Roche thinks the logistical problems on the Balkans had similar reasons. The Western armies arrived there at relatively short notice. Byzantium had had not enough time to collect sufficient victuals. However, Roche does not discuss possible consequences of Roger II of Sicily’s attacks on Greece in 1147/48. Byzantium may have had other and more pressing needs and preoccupations in Greece and on the Balkans.

Concerning events in the Levant, Roche thinks that the alleged love-affair between Eleanor of Aquitaine, at that time married to Louis VII of France, and Raymond of Poitiers, Prince of Antioch, had fewer consequences as previously thought. According to him this affair was not the reason why Louis and Conrad gave up the plan to attack Edessa. The re-conquest of Edessa and other successes in northern Syria would have strengthened Raymond but much more so Manuel Komnenos. This might have diminished the political autonomy of all Frankish rulers in the Levant. So it seemed wiser to attack Damascus. True, Damascus was not a friend of Nur ad-Din. But its conquest would have removed a potential weakness and increased considerably the Frankish hold on southern Syria and Palestine, without providing new opportunities for Byzantine intervention. The failure of the attack on Damascus is explained by Roche again primarily with logistical problems. Yet Roche himself reduces with great plausibility the exaggerated figures in earlier historiography. According to him the Frankish siege of Damascus was conducted by only 12,000 men, including 3,000 knights. This raises the question whether Roche here merely repeats his explanation for the events in Asia Minor. There are no convincing reasons why divergent ideas about the future of Damascus should not have played an important role to explain the final Frankish failure at the walls of that city. Welf VI left the crusader camp even before the attack on Damascus commenced. He had reasons to return to the West that had nothing to do with logistics or politics in the East but everything with Roger II of Sicily and with politics in Germany. Furthermore, many Franks in the Levant surely coveted Damascus for one of their own leaders, whereas the two western kings supported Count Thierry of Flanders as the new ruler of Damascus. So William of Tyre may be right: Why should the Oriental Franks shed their blood in order to establish an unwelcome newcomer in Damascus?

In sum, the book provides scholars with a consistent discussion of both the sources, including many non-Western sources, and of modern historiography. This is remarkable, and the book can only be recommended. In the title, the phrase “King Conrad III of Germany” may be a bit misleading for general readers because Conrad never was king of Germany, except for some of his enemies. True, he was never crowned emperor by the pope. But undoubtedly he was King of the Romans, or, as he sometimes claimed, he ruled the Roman empire. A German empire did not exist in the Middle Ages. For a comprehensive new history of the Second Crusade it would be necessary to consider much more fully the situation in Italy, Germany, and France. But Roche focusses primarily on military logistics. This is both a strength and a weakness. As a topic for future research Roche asks (332): Why did Conrad and the other German princes precipitously embark on crusade just five months after becoming crucesignati? That is a remarkable statement. Usually one reads reproachful comments why western rulers delayed so long between taking the cross and actually departing to the East. Roche apparently thinks that this was indispensable for adequate logistical preparations. No doubt he has a point in insisting on enough food and drink. Yet by implication he seems to argue that with better logistics the crusades might have been successful. Is that true? Could the path of history be changed solely and simply by better military logistics?