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Plurinationality and citizenship in Bolivia: an examination of a long process of change and the current situation

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Abstract:

This text is the fourth in a series of attempts to illustrate the process of sociopolitical redefinition that is currently taking place in Bolivia, attributed to the participation of indigenous people in national politics and an implicit popular insurrection against the traditional political structure, both of which have motivated the recomposition of Bolivia's political system. Bolivia's situation holds particular interest in discussions of citizenship in Latin America because, as in no other country in the region up to this point, the arrival to power of political leaders and intellectuals who proudly assert their differentiated ethnicity and/or their adhesion to the indigenous cause questions the liberal concept of citizenship, reassesses and deepens the meaning of equality in a country of profound asymmetries, and questions the very meaning of country and of state.

Introduction

A nation that oppresses another nation cannot be free, said the Inca Yupanqui to the Spaniards. We the Quechua and Aymara people of the countryside, the same as the members of the other indigenous cultures of the country, say the same. We find ourselves economically exploited and culturally and politically oppressed. In Bolivia there has not been an integration of cultures, but rather a superposition and domination, with the indigenous peoples remaining in the lowest and most exploited stratum of the social pyramid. Bolivia has lived through, and continues to live through, terrible frustrations. One of these, perhaps the most important one, is the lack of true participation by the Quechua and Aymara peoples in the social, economic and political life of the country. We believe that without a radical change with regard to this issue, it will be absolutely impossible to create national unity and the dynamic, harmonious political development that is adequate to and merited by our reality and necessities.

Manifesto of Tiahuanacu, July 30, 1973

We find ourselves in a foundational moment, of which Bolivia has had many, but the current one may be definitive. After thirty years of democracy, and submerged in the current and historic cleavage of the relationships of power, Bolivian society has decided to commit to change.

Our structural deficiencies have yielded to the impetus of the excluded and marginalized peoples, who should be taken account of in the name of reason, peaceful coexistence, and the general good of society. Poverty, discrimination, inequality and injustice have placed us at the limits of tolerable existence, but have also served as a recipe for the cultivation of fanaticism and intolerance, sentiments that we cannot allow to pass.

Manifesto of the Group Sì Bolivia,2007

This text is the fourth in a series of attempts to illustrate the process of sociopolitical redefinition that is currently taking place in Bolivia, due to the participation of indigenous groups in national politics and an implicit popular insurrection against the traditional political structure, both of which have led to the recomposition of Bolivia's political system. The initial studies were completed by the author in conjunction with Luz Jiménez, an Aymara anthropologist, and Guido Machaca, a Quechua pedagogue, between 2003 and 2005. From 2006 on we have continued our reflection, along with Guido Machaca, through our work in the training and empowerment of indigenous leaderships in the Training Program in Bilingual Intercultural Education for the Andean Nations, at the Universidad Mayor de San Simón in Cochabamba, Bolivia. It was my responsibility to systematize the conceptual framework, which is the product of discussions and analyses carried out as a team (López, Jiménez and Machaca, 2004; Machaca and López, 2007, 2008), while Guido Machaca formed the pedagogical model that we produced and validated together (Machaca and López, 2008). He also created, with the team working under him, a set of models for an educational management training program for indigenous leaders that are currently in use in Bolivia (www.proeibanes.org). The studies and publications mentioned here were developed in the context of the regional project "Intercultural Civic Education for the Indigenous peoples of Latin America in the Context of Poverty" (2003-2007), coordinated by our colleagues at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, with the participation of researchers from six Latin American countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru (Alfaro, Tubino and Ansión, 2008)[1].

Bolivia's situation holds particular interest in discussions of citizenship in Latin America because, as in no other country in the region up to this point, the arrival to power of political leaders and intellectuals that proudly assert their differentiated ethnicity and/or their adhesion to the indigenous cause questions the liberal concept of citizenship, reassesses and deepens the meaning of equality in a country of profound asymmetries, and questions the very meaning of country and of state. The process has not been free of contradictions, making further analysis imperative in order to shed light on the limits of a number of liberal notions, such as tolerance, and also on the necessity of revisiting the critical logic through which the notion of interculturality came about throughout the continent. It has challenged ideas, primarily of Saxon tradition, of neoliberal multiculturalism, and, along with the political and epistemological recuperation of the notion of decolonization and of the adoption of a postcolonial stance, has permitted us to envision the creation of intercultural citizenship as a construct that allows for egalitarian, equitative democratic encounters and the negotiation of the differences inherent to multiethnic and profoundly unequal realities such as Bolivia's. It would not be feasible to consider this possibility if the cultural and political hegemony in Bolivia were not in dispute, and if Bolivian indigenous groups had not assumed their otherness and subaltern status in society as political resources in the process. That in Bolivia the indigenous person has passed from negated to permitted and now to protagonist (Albó, in the press), and that the very people involved have become critically conscious of the necessity to change the situation of social and political oppression (Rivera, 1986) that they were subjected to under the traditional order assumed by society as a whole, has opened the doors to the radical transformation of the social imaginary, as well as the most important political transformation

that the country has experienced since its creation in 1825. In order to see evidence of this transformation, one need look no farther than the country's new Political Constitution and the recovery found in it of symbols, beginnings and proposals of reinterpretation of reality and of change, made by the indigenous leaders and intellectuals that participated in its construction.

Points of Departure

Bolivia, along with Guatemala, is one of the two countries with the greatest indigenous presence in Latin America. According to the last population census, the percentage of the population identified as indigenous is between 62% and more than 66%, depending on whether persons of at least 15 years of age are included in the census, as was the case in 2001, when citizens self-identified as indigenous; or whether minors are also included, as was the case in the counts of CELADE and CEPAL (CEPAL, CELADE and BID, 2005), included in the findings of the National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia.

The indigenous presence in Bolivia transcends rural areas and extends to practically all Bolivian cities, including department capitals or intermediate cities, areas that today contain the highest concentration of the population (63%). Various urban indigenous settlements have resignified their methods of organization and social practices according to the urban reality, using their indigenous cultural matrices as a starting point[2]. This has resulted in the growing indigenization of Bolivian cities, including Santa Cruz, Tarija and Trinidad, department capitals where the predominant spoken language is Spanish (Molina and Albó, 2006).

In Bolivia the self-identification of indigenous peoples and their identification with indigenous culture is an ongoing process that in recent times dates back at least to the 1970's, when a group of thinkers and young indigenous university students, mainly of Aymara ethnicity, created and gave their support to the Tiahuanacu Manifesto. This manifesto, based on the recuperation of the Aymara historical memory of Tupaq Katari's expressions of liberty in 1780-81[3], contains the origins of notions of intraculturality, interculturality and decolonization that are common today in Bolivian cultural and political life. Furthermore, this movement also contained a relative questioning of the Bolivian nation-state model, especially with regard to the administrative structure and proceedings of the State, which were seen to exclude and obscure indigenous viewpoints. The demand to "transcend old-fashioned paternalisms and cease consideration of indigenous persons as second-class citizens" and the affirmation that "We are foreigners in our own country," shows the singularity of the prophetic approach of the Tiahuanacu Manifesto, created in 1973.

From that moment, but with greater force due to the return of democracy at the beginning of the 1980's, many grassroots organizations began to form that sought to revalidate cultural differences in Bolivia. In contemporary Bolivia there is an ever-growing consciousness among indigenous peoples that their own culture, along with its revindication, constitutes a powerful political resource; thus, essentialist postures are at times adopted in political discourse. There is no doubt that Bolivia is undergoing a process characterized by the "return of the Indian" (Albó, 1991), which has deepened with indigenous political ascension, influencing the redefinition of identities and reaching the point where people who used to be defined as, or define themselves as cholos, now define themselves as indigenous. Facts such as these may well have occurred in relation to the growing ethnic self-identification mentioned above, although this also may have

occurred as a result of the growing openness and solidarity of diverse sections of the creole-mestizo population with respect to rural, indigenous and originary peoples' demands and revindications.

Along with this, it is important to consider the growing democratic liberalization of the government, as well as the greater organization of the diverse indigenous peoples that make up Bolivia. These occurrences have facilitated the construction of political platforms of common indigenous interest, such as land rights, dignity, intercultural and bilingual education, political participation and, more recently, indigenous autonomy in a new, plurinational state. In this context, Bolivian indigenous groups, through mechanisms such as the 2004 Pact of Unity (Pacto de Unidad), have begun to form a new political community, distinct and often opposed to the community formed by the traditional political parties, mostly composed of the creole-mestizo population, although in times of indigenous reemergence these groups often opt to incorporate indigenous professionals and leaders into their ranks.

In less than four decades, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia and their organizations have grown from a situation of practical invisibilization to become political actors of the first order, and are currently in frank and permanent dispute of the hegemony previously controlled in an exclusionary manner by the white and mestizo minority, which held Bolivian political power in usufruct during its more than 180 years of existence as a republic. In January, 2006, for the first time in Bolivian history, an indigenous leader firmly entrenched in the social movements of the country assumed the presidency. Apart from the form in which current president Evo Morales presented himself to the country, indigenous organizations, their leaders and their community base saw him as the indigenous leader that Bolivia needed in order to organize demands for profound political transformations, which might even lead to the refoundation of the country on the basis of its undeniable indigenous roots. But the present moment might not have arrived if not for the confluence of visions regarding the profound changes that were necessary in Bolivia seen among social movements, the middle class and a large sector of intellectuals. This coincidence of interests was the result of an accumulative process of changes in governmental structures, stemming from the already-mentioned increased openness with respect to the positive recognition of the multiethnic, pluricultural and multilingual character of the country.

It is worth noting that in 1994, Bolivia reformed its State Political Constitution to explicitly recognize, for the first time in its history as a republic, its multiethnicity. The reformed constitution also established specific laws that recognized a basic group of indigenous rights (Postero, 2004), including: the right to land, through the Original Community Lands formula (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, or TCO); the right to their own forms of social organization and to relatively autonomous community governance, through the legal recognition of indigenous customs and traditions[4]; the right to Intercultural Bilingual Education (Educación Intercultural Bilingüe, or EIB); as well as the right to active political participation in local government, through the Popular Participation formula. It is evident that these changes, in many ways motivated by the ratification of Agreement 169 of the International Labor Organization and the effect in Bolivia of the participatory methods used in the gestation of this international norm, marked the initial shift in Bolivia from a legislative system solely recognizant of individual rights toward one that recognizes some collective rights. This initial recognition of collective rights

formed an important opening that, as will be later illustrated, would be well-exploited by indigenous leaders and organizations.

The facts mentioned here have helped to cause a considerable increase in the percentage of the population self-identified as indigenous in the ten years between census periods, above all in the case of the peoples of the Western, Chaco and Amazonía regions of Bolivia (Molina and Albó, 2006). There has also been a significant growth in the development of processes of ethnogenesis among the distinct indigenous populations of Bolivia, including cases such as that of the Tacanas, who today claim their indigenous status and assert their territorial rights after fifty years of rural marginalization that carried with it the nearly total loss of their language (Herrera, 2005). Today there are more than 36 different indigenous peoples in Bolivia, many of whom continue to speak their ancestral languages[5].

Currently, Bolivia is passing through a never-before-seen political stage in which a minimal political consensus has been reached within the still-present system of liberal representative democracy, thanks to indigenous demands and pressures, as well as the initiative shown by their organizations and mobilizations. This consensus has permitted the convocation of a constitutional assembly with the mission of transforming, or even reforming, the country in a way that reflects its multiethnic, plurinational and multilingual character. In order for this to take place, a number of changes are being considered: the revision of the multicultural policies of a neoliberal nature that have been in place since the 1980's (Postero, 2004); the deepening and radicalization of the interculturality fundamentally adopted by the social sector, achieved through changes in education (Albó and Anaya, 2003; López, 1994, 1996, 2005b); and the modification of neoliberal economic policies that have been in place in Bolivia since 1985. Even within the adverse context of the neoliberal economic policy regime, indigenous groups continued to push from the political-administrative standpoint for a plurinational state legally recognizant of the 36 originary nations that make up the country, with the consequent assignation or consolidation of indigenous lands under a special autonomous regime. Also, from the economic standpoint, indigenous groups have sought to restore the rights to both above-and below-ground natural resources to the state and/or to the originary peoples of Bolivia. This would necessitate the recuperation of several strategic and productive activities that are currently controlled by the private sector and transnational corporations. With all this in mind, indigenous groups have rejected the openings that have been presented to them in the traditional political system, and have instead taken advantage of increased political opportunities in order to advance and even radicalize their proposals and demands. In contraposition to this process, an important sector of the non-indigenous population has instead focused on proposals for a profound decentralization of the country, which would result in the formation of regional autonomous regimes. This decentralization would carry not only administrative implications, but also economic and financial ones, based on respect for private businesses and the role that these businesses should have in the new State. Nonetheless, this sector also recognizes the urgency of policies of greater inclusion, measures of compensation and solidarity with regions that have fewer resources, and even the necessity of deepening the current regime of intercultural education (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2006).

In reference to the current Bolivian government (2006-present), there is evidence of a notable tension between two political currents that flow through the governing party: one marked by a national-popular political tradition inherited from the National Revolution (Revolución Nacional, or RN) of 1952[6], although partially revised with the stamp of the indigenous movement; and another motivated by the desire for indigenous access to various levels of government, and by the conviction that the indigenous peoples' time has come. This idea has generated a kind of cultural-symbolic revolution, restituting indigenous themes and beliefs to the national imaginary. In the case of the latter political current, ideas of utopia reside in the notion of a plurinational state, today consecrated in the new Political Constitution of the State, passed through referendum in January of 2009.

Undoubtedly, the economic policies adopted by the new regime may cause the balance to shift more in one direction than in the other. At times, the signals that are given of a return to a state-based nationalism and a recomposition of the national economy through a greater and more deliberate state intervention in the productive sector have caused the national-popular tendencies to take precedence over the continued indigenous demand for a plurinational state (CIPCA, 1991; Nacional-PEIB Technical Team, 1990; Rivera, 1986). Such tensions from within the regime have been well-used by the creole-mestizo opposition, which resists losing its hegemony in the areas of politics, economics and culture. Nonetheless, it is clear that all sectors of Bolivian society and politics are in agreement that the Bolivian indigenous peoples, in the position they are in today, are here to stay.

Within this general context, and subject to contradictions and diverse conflicts, natural and understandable in the recomposition of political hegemony, interculturality and a new sense of citizenship in Bolivia are being constructed through everyday experiences, practices, marches and demonstrations; constructed, above all, through the power held today by those members of indigenous groups who have made themselves citizens, claiming more and more ground from the hegemonic creole-mestizo sectors. These groups have, in the words of the very people involved, continuously adopted intercultural strategies that have allowed them to survive and retain their indigenous identity (Froilán Condori, National Representative, personal communiqué, 2007). It is worth noting that interculturality is being constructed today in Bolivia in the measure that the historically subaltern sectors of society are exercising their rights and striving to transcend the unequal citizenship (Patzi, 2006) instituted by the state. This process is contributing to the permanent modification of the liberal conception of citizenship, which only recognized a portion of indigenous prerogatives. In this way, seen through the pluriethnic and neocolonial character of the country, it becomes practically impossible to separate interculturality from citizenship, and therefore the exercise of interculturality supposes permanent negotiation for active indigenous participation in greater and greater social and political realms. Thus, Bolivian indigenous groups carry a firm belief that interculturality means access to power (Walter Gutiérrez, as cited by López, 2005b) and active participation in decision-making processes with respect to national life in general.

However, interculturality in Bolivia does not fit the harmonic and relatively sterile form hoped for and desired by some people, including those who see tolerance as the only solution with respect to the diversity of Bolivia and the necessity of openness to that which has always been obvious: that Bolivia is a mostly

indigenous country (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2007; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2007; Toranzo, 2006; Roca, 1999; among others). Rather, Bolivia faces a conflictive form of interculturality, present in context with the resurgence of open discrimination and antidemocratic racism —apparently wiped out by the RN in 1952— revived through the gradual processes of hegemonic dispute and the displacement of power that are currently taking place in the country.

The dispute over hegemony is led by two sectors representing the subaltern community: one made up of self-denominated indigenous groups, most clearly represented by the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, or CIDOB), although also by The National Confederation of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu (Confederación Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qollasuyo, or CONAMAQ), both of whose demands came together in lowland Bolivia to form the Indigenous March for Land, Dignity and Life of 1990. In highland Bolivia, these demands led to the growing process of ethnogenesis that is occurring in diverse regions of Bolivia where organizational forms characteristic of the Ayllu and what were in colonial times referred to as Republics of Indians continue to endure. The other sector is made up of intellectuals and indigenous leaders, mostly Aymara, who have openly harnessed Andean culture as an explicit political resource, instituting an epoch of reinvention of Andean social history and of identitary recomposition, through which they have proposed a new type of state, supported by diverse NGO´s and a number of university programs. It is worth noting, however, that the divergences between the two sectors are marked by great differences in ethnicity and class, as well as by distinct politico-cultural interests: while the first group poses diversity as a challenge to the foundations of plurinationality, the other sector appears to be influenced by a proposal of Andinization of the whole Bolivian socio-geographic area.

The creole-mestizo sectors, for their part, appear to focus on an interculturality related more closely to the neoliberal multiculturalism of Saxon heritage already in place in many industrialized countries (Kymlicka, 1996). This multiculturalism has been appropriated by the dominant classes of some countries of the region in order to rescue the ideals, strategies and practices of the assimilating mestizaje (miscegenation) that took precedence in Latin American political ideology, particularly in the form of policies of State Indigenism, which took root in countries such as Mexico and Peru, although with greater force in the former (Marzal, 1993). As has been emphasized, this form of neoliberal multiculturalism even recurs to the figure of the "indio permitido" (Hale, 2007) in order to co-opt indigenous leaders and intellectuals, incorporating them into positions of state and thus stopping or delaying reclamations for a refoundation of the state and the conformation of a political community separate or distinct from the established one.

Without a doubt, the current process of reinvention of the country provides the necessary arena for a new intelligentsia in Bolivia, arisen from the grassroots context and of indigenous origins, which seeks new channels of expression and communication for its approaches and proposals. The Constitutional Assembly established the exceptional stage from which this new intelligentsia, in its majority formed cumulatively through protests in the countryside, in the highways and in the streets, could expound its proposals and give guidelines for the transformation of the country.

In this context, cholo Bolivia, represented by in the idealized mestizo of the RN, often finds itself in confrontation with indigenous Bolivia, strengthened by the multicultural and intercultural policies of the 1990´s; although it is also important to note that some members of the cholo sector have opted to redefine themselves as indigenous. In this manner, the current national-popular conception of Bolivia at times also acquires a cholo tint that is more mestizo than indigenous in nature[7], whereas the plurinational conception of Bolivia appears to be more firmly indigenous. These facts contribute to the reinsertion of debates over the role of mestizaje into the national agenda, as well as the appearance of currents of thought that tend to establish parallels between mestizaje and interculturality (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2007; UNDP, 2007; Toranzo, 2006; among others).

The dominant Spanish-speaking white-mestizo sectors, which hold significant control of the economic and productive sector and are particularly powerful in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando, are opposed to the proposal of plurinationality, although they do accept interculturality in the realm of education and in sociocultural arenas, based on the multicultural neoliberalism also adopted in other countries, such as Guatemala, by the hegemonic sectors of society (Hale, 2007). In response, indigenous groups consider interculturality a part of the larger project of decolonization of the country, and thus remain firmly attached to the notion of plurinationality rejected by the white-mestizo sectors. This discordance, according to some authors, places the country in a state of catastrophic stalemate, which in practice has debilitated the work of the Constitutional Assembly and diminished the legitimacy previously conferred to it by a great majority of the population in August 2006. This stalemate was again evidenced in the referendum of January 2005, and it is probable that it will repeat itself in general elections at the end of 2009.

This apparent equilibrium causes the opposing forces to drift more toward one pole or the other, depending on the actors involved in a particular issue and the regional significance of its enunciation. It remains certain, though, that notions such as intraculturality, decolonization and, above all, interculturality, are tuned and redefined to the extent that visions of democracy and understandings of the concept of citizenship are reconfigured in the negotiation between two civilizing models that seek to complement each other in contemporary Bolivia: the rural-indigenous communitary model, which has been reconstructed with a foundation in the collective historic memory; and the creole-Western model of colonial roots. In the struggle for hegemony, those who have seen their historically privileged position begin to crumble also recur to ethnocultural categories, as is the case in the "Camba" nation, or seek to defend the undeniable process of biological and cultural mestizaje that the country has experienced in the course of its history, without sufficiently realizing the processes of ethnogenesis taking place. Today Bolivia as a multi-nation finds itself more than ever at a crossroads in the construction of a national unity based in diversity. The new Political Constitution of the State reaffirms the unitary and indivisible character of the country.

From assimilation to cultural pluralism: a short historical excursion

As in the rest of Latin America, the political-semantic comprehension and reconfiguration of citizenship and interculturality in Bolivia is closely tied with the history of its conformation as a state and as a nation (Zegada, Farah and Albó, 2006). In this context, and due to the composition of its indigenous

ethnic majority, it is also necessary to keep in mind the evolution of civic consciousness in the country with regard to the historical base of social relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous groups: the former excluded from any access to leadership positions and the functioning of the state, and the latter in virtual possession of the state.

Like its Latin American counterparts, ethnic, sociocultural and linguistic complexities were ignored in the formation of the Bolivian republic (Klein, 1982). Between 1825 and 1994, the creole-mestizo minorities in power opted to view the country as a uniform and homogenous entity: the Uni-nation (UNDP, 2007). This ideology was widely reinforced by the RN in 1952, which supported a homogenous and singular citizenship, in conformity with its proposal to integrate the country through the consolidation of Spanish as the national language, as well as through the processes of cultural mestization and Cholification already in progress. The ideology of a Bolivian national culture, directly tied to the project of national modernization, guided the construction of the new educational system of that period, begun in 1955 with the establishment of the Code of Bolivian Education (Contreras, 1999, 2002; López, 2005b).

The RN brought with it transcendental changes such as agrarian reform, universal voting rights, the nationalization of mines, and educational reforms that extended access to basic education to the indigenous population, which until then had been largely excluded from this right. The agrarian reform of 1953 was the most important step taken during that period, due to its promotion in the imaginary of some social sectors of a sense of the accomplishment of a "true integration of the country" and of its consolidation as a "nation" (Mesa, 1998). In summary, the RN contributed to:

1. The gestation of a national market, with the incorporation of two million indigenous producers and consumers, at a time when the country had an approximate total population of only three million individuals (Mesa, 1998).
2. The recognition of universal voting rights, overcoming the concept of exclusive citizenship, which was until then only granted to married and literate men who held a profession or occupation and earned an income (Klein, 1982).
3. The nationalization of mines and oil and natural gas reserves in the framework of an economic policy of nationalization.
4. The introduction of a military-rural pact, a condition which guaranteed the governability of the country (Albó and Barnadas, 1985).

The military-rural pact, although destined to control the indigenous masses once they handed over the arms with which they fought in the RN, sought to make the armed forces a central mechanism in the construction of a mestizo nation. From that point, obligatory military service has attained a fundamental importance among indigenous groups, to the point that military service is considered an integral part of indigenous sociocultural organization, and has even come to constitute a key stage in the transition from adolescence to adulthood[8].

Nonetheless, the measure that appears to have had the greatest impact on Bolivian society's collective psyche is the transformation of the educational system that occurred during the revolutionary period, with the significant extension of educational coverage, especially in rural areas, and the policy of universalization of basic education that still exists today. Historically, the explicit objective of the Bolivian educational system was the cultural and linguistic homogenization of the country (Cárdenas, 1991; Contreras, 1999; Choque, Ticona, Soria, Mamani

and Conde, 1992; López, 2005b). The education of the indigenous population, especially during the forty years during which the ideals of the RN remained in effect (1952-1992), was oriented toward the idea of a mestizo nation, inspired in the process seen before in the Mexican Revolution, with the conversion of indigenous people into rural producers of surplus goods and laborers contributing to the creation of national industry and a national market.

As a part of the RN, the denomination of "campesino" (country person or peasant) replaced that of "Indio" or "indígena," impacting the national consciousness in general, as well as the self-perception and self-identification of indigenous groups. The ruralization, or campesinization, of indigenous peoples was destined to contribute to their citizenization, for which the liberal notion of citizenship in Bolivia was amplified in order to apply it also to indigenous people, women and illiterate people (Kelley and Klein, 1981; Klein, 1982). Contradictorily, in this period municipal democracy, initiated in the beginning of the 20th century by the liberal regime, was eliminated, to be recuperated only in 1987 (Mesa, 1998); although it is worth noting that this municipal democracy was under the legal authority of literate whites and mestizos due to the fact that it did not recognize active indigenous participation, inasmuch as indigenous people did not fulfill the requirements of citizenship (literacy and possession of a salary).

The nationalism of that time period included other noteworthy sociocultural changes, such as the extension of the system of syndical organization to practically every indigenous community in the country, with the aim of replacing the ancestral indigenous sociocultural mode of organization with that of the syndicate, modernizing the country and indigenous societies in the process. The collective citizenship that today would complement individual citizenship thus may be seen as a product of the long tradition of association and corporatization of Bolivian society, which dates back to the decisive influence of syndicalism in the post-revolutionary reconstitution of Bolivian society. As a product of this influence, the conquest of civil rights would also be associated with the permanent restoration of rights in the countryside, the highways and the streets of the country (UNDP, 2007)[9].

The governing party (The National Revolutionary Movement, or MNR, which assumed leadership of the revolutionary process), in its intent to control all social sectors, linked the rural syndicates to the power structure of the party. In this way it sought to construct a wide-based political community that would include indigenous groups through their cholification, in order to consolidate the mestizo nation and construct a Bolivian identity.

The institution and massive diffusion of rural syndicalism, most significantly among the Quechua and Aymara groups that constituted the largest part of the national population, had at least four important effects on indigenous societies:

1. Their already-mentioned ideological conversion into "campesinos," which sought to eliminate ethnic ascriptions.
2. The replacement of traditional forms of indigenous organization, and the intent to replace them with the new syndical structure.
3. Their incorporation into the established political community, resulting from their adhesion or affiliation to the hegemonic party.
4. The appropriation by indigenous people of the concept of the formally educated and, above all, literate individual.

Such effects on rural indigenous groups' self-perception took place in a context where, due to their exclusion and virtual isolation, these groups had been given the opportunity to construct autonomous forms of social organization and even self-government in the territories that they inhabited.

At the beginning of the RN, the Bolivian Worker's Center (Central Obrera Boliviana, or COB) was also formed as a political-organizational wing of the revolutionary movement. The COB only began to weaken from 1985 on, with the introduction of neoliberal policies in Bolivia. Due to its power and national presence, the COB was able to share power in distinct moments of Bolivian history[10].

However, the MNR was not able to create the national bourgeoisie that it sought, and while its initial program was in place (1952-1961), it was also not able to carry out all of the proposed changes favoring the rural population and the public sector, nor was it able to overcome the existing inequalities associated with the ethno-racial variable (Patzi, 2001, 2006). This fact resulted in the weakening of the relationship between the hegemonic party of that time period and the syndicates; and, consequently, between the governing class and indigenous people. The MNR was nonetheless able to maintain power due to its strategic link with the armed forces.

During the two decades after the fall of the democratic regime (1961 to 1982), Bolivian military leaders in government, in close relation with the agrarian syndicates, gave continuity to some of the ideas and methods employed by the RN and the MNR. In this way, in the second half of the 70's, president-general René Barrientos, who was very familiar with rural culture and spoke fluent Quechua, utilized the cultural instrument of compadrazgo to promoted alliances with the agrarian syndicates, and presented himself as a benefactor and protector of rural indigenous groups. The government co-opted some intermediate leaders, placing them as representatives, mayors and customs officers, among other government posts (Rivera, 1986). Despite the continuity of the MNR program, the military leadership was also unable to achieve the construction of a single and uniform civic consciousness, and was even less successful in the universalization of Spanish.

At the end of the 1960's, an anti-colonial, Indianist current of thought emerged, led by Fausto Reinaga (1967 and 1969), who called on university students and educated indigenous leaders to promote a radical change in the established hierarchies between creole-mestizos and Indians in Bolivian society. Contrary to what was then considered politically appropriate, Reinaga criticized mestizaje and revindicated his condition as an Indian, seeking to develop a utopian, Tawantisuyan ideology[11], and from that basis appealed for a profound mental and structural change. Reinagan Indianism coincided with the emergence of similar, albeit weaker, movements in Peru, Ecuador and Northern Argentina, which in turn led to the creation of the South American Indian Council (Consejo Indio Sudamericano, or CISA). Reinaga and his supporters may be considered as precursors to interculturality in Bolivia, because, in their strategic essentialism and self-identification with the subaltern community (Spivak, 1988), they unleashed processes of indigenous self-identification—in that time more a case of Aymarization and Quechuization—and of re-indigenization of urban Cholo sectors, forming the basis for the reexamination of social relationships between Indians and non-Indians, as well as exhibiting the necessity of greater

degrees of indigenous political participation. From that point, the indigenous issue was extended to the urban sphere as well.

In the 1970's, rural populations in disagreement with the military-rural pact organized various anti-establishment organizations in highland and lowland Bolivia. The reconfiguration of identies by those people considered by the RN as "campesinos," who began to denominate themselves as "indígenas" in lowland Bolivia and as "originarios" in highland Bolivia, also dates back to this era. In western Bolivia, Aymara leaders promoted Aymara political organizations inspired in the thinking of Tupaq Katari, and thus came to be called Katarists. Stemming from a vision that was controversial considering the reality of the situation in Bolivia, Katarism questioned the syndicates born through agrarian reform and the MNR and initiated political organization from within the indigenous communities themselves, in order to later conquer higher political spheres until finally gaining control of the rural movement on the national level, which was at that time under the influence of the military (Rivera, 1986). The National Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia was formed during the Rural Congress of 1971; it would later give birth in 1979 to the United Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, or CSUTCB), which was the product of an alliance of diverse rural, Katarist and Indianist sectors (Rivera, 1986). In the same period, Katarist political parties emerged made up of Aymara leaders and university students. The predominant perspective at that time was that of class, influenced to a large extent by RN and also Marxist ideologies. The Katarists were the only ones to begin to employ a different category of analysis: that of ethnicity, built from a strongly cultural base.

The return to democracy of the 1980´s, with the emergence of the Democratic and Popular Unity Party (Unidad Democrática y Popular, or UDP), marked with greater clarity the ascension of the indigenous movement as a new social and political actor in the country, whose demands included greater social participation and higher-quality education, the latter understood both in terms of cultural and linguistic pertinence, and of economic, social and political relevance. These proposals were fundamentally the product of grassroots, syndical and indigenous organizations on the national and regional level (López, 2005b) and were inscribed into the long fight by indigenous people to take control of schools and transform them.

In this form, from the perspective of the state and, for the first time, civil society, the multiethnic and pluricultural character of the country was recognized, and the government of the UDP adopted the idea of interculturality (López, 1994; Ticona, 2002). From its position of power, the UDP implemented various social measures that tended toward the interculturalization of the country, such as literacy programs in indigenous languages (Aymara and Quechua) and in a variety of Spanish spoken mostly by the largely rural population of southern Bolivia, as well as the formulation of proposals for intercultural and bilingual education. These measures would later be implemented and continued by successive administrations.

Between 1985 and 1997, The MNR introduced profound structural reforms under the influence of neoliberalism, radically changing the Bolivian economy and Bolivian society. These reforms included a program of fiscal adjustment, the privatization of public companies, and the liberalization of the job, credit and goods markets[12]. Neoliberal policies were sustained

for two decades, and they have not yet been completely dismantled. While the economy adopted a singular and fixed model, Bolivian society and culture exhibited the beginnings of a new situation: the reemergence and visibilization of the inherent diversity of the country and the growing power gained by indigenous organizations contributed to the weakening of traditional grassroots organizations. This change in the relationship of power within the social and cultural movements of the country showed that indigenous people had begun to understand the powerful role that their own cultures could take in the political redefinition of the country. The appropriation of ethnic cultures as a political resource in Bolivia (Amadio, 1989; Varese, 1987) represented the collective construction of postcolonial theories and positions, built from the ground up.

For its part, the new Bolivian democracy (1982-2005) sought to perfect its functional model, reforming the state and implementing transformations aimed at the recognition of collective and individual rights, such as the recognition of indigenous land rights, the promotion of civic participation, education reform through EIB, and the reform of the penal code to include oral proceedings and extend the right to use one's own language in court, through an interpreter when necessary. The government also put in place specific opportunities for the analysis of indigenous issues as part of the structure of the administration of the state. The results of these programs, nonetheless, were not meant to question liberal democracy, but rather to perfect it and make it adequate to the specific context in which it was being used. From this perspective, the implemented structural reforms laid down the basis for the refoundation that would be considered in the dismantling of neoliberal policies.

The reemergence of cultural diversity and feelings of pertinence gave rise to the constitutional reform of 1994, which in its first article recognized the multiethnic and pluricultural character of the country, influenced by ILO Convention 169 and the tolerant international conception of diversity. This opening has been classified as a "multicultural adornment of neoliberalism" (Rivera, 2006, p. 6), although strictly speaking, it differed from other contexts in which intents were made to transition to a neoliberal, Saxon multiculturalism under the concept of interculturality formed in South America. This is because, since the 1970's, the adoption of interculturality as state policy in Bolivia was initiated parallel to the emergence of indigenous people as social and political actors demanding inclusion in the political community (Tiahuanaco Manifest, 1973), as has been described above. Furthermore, Bolivian administrations would not have adopted interculturality and attempted to respond to the challenges that its adoption presented if not for periodic pressures placed on it by indigenous leaders. The education reform of 1994 was itself an intent to respond to the demands concerning education voiced by the social, rural and indigenous organizations of the country (CSUTCB, 1991).

The measures listed in Table I were the result in part of the necessity of a response to growing indigenous demands for structural changes, as well as the influence of Saxon-inspired liberal multiculturalism in the international context (Postero, 2004). As demonstrated previously, the alternative proposal to interculturality emerged much earlier, from within field of education and in relation to the paths followed by other Latin American countries of comparable sociolinguistic characteristics (López, 2005a, b).

Table 1

New Legal developments in the recognition of Bolivian pluriculturality

Date	Type of regulation	Content
1990	Supreme Decree	Legal recognition of the first seven indigenous territories in the Bolivian lowlands. Permanent regulation that establishes the possible granting of ancestral territories to groups that constitute and recognize themselves as indigenous peoples.
1991	Law	Ratification of Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
1992	Supreme Decree	Creation of the Central Office of Bilingual Intercultural Education (never implemented).
1993	Law	Law of Ministries. The creation of the position of Undersecretary of Ethnic Relations in the Ministry of Human Development.
1994	Law	Law of Popular Participation. Recognizes diverse forms of community organization and systems of self-governance. For the first time, twenty percent of national resources are designated to rural municipalities, instead of only going to municipalities in the principle cities of the country.
	Law	Law of Education Reform. Takes on interculturality and popular participation as central tenets of a new education system based on principles of diversity and equitable development.
	Law	Reform of the Political Constitution of the state. Recognizes the multiethnic and pluricultural character of the country and the right to ethnic and culturally representative social institutions.
1995	Law	Convocation of municipal election in 331 municipalities, the majority of which for the first time are rural districts, making possible the local election of a high percentage of indigenous mayors and town council members.
1996	Law	Forestry Law. Guarantees indigenous peoples the exclusive right to the management of forested lands within their territories.
	Law	Law of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, or INRA). Accepts the legal notion of indigenous territory with "Original Community Territories" (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, or TCOs) formed as the basis of local government, installing a first level of de facto indigenous autonomy.
1997	Law	Reorganization of Executive Power. Conversion of the SAE into the Vice Ministry of Indigenous Affairs and of Native Peoples (Viceministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios, or VAIPO).
1998	Supreme Decree	Creation of the National Advisory Board of Indigenous and Native Development.
1999	Law	Law of Organic Municipalities. Recognizes the possibility of the creation of indigenous districts and commonwealths, with the goal of optimizing public management in indigenous territories.

2000	Supreme Decree	Official status granted to all indigenous languages spoken in the country. Recognizes the rights of speakers to use, preserve and develop their languages, as well as the necessity of their use in the national education system.
	Ministerial Resolution	Founding of indigenous educational projects of territorial coverage in cooperation with Indigenous municipalities. This permitted that in the indigenous zones where this policy was implemented, educational administration and policy could be determined according to the particular logic of the people, rather than according to that used in the national education system.
2004	Law	Law of the Reform of the Electoral Code. Makes possible the participation of civic organizations in municipal and national elections, extending the right previously held solely by the political parties. Opens a channel for the conformation and participation of civic groups of indigenous character.
2005	Law	Constitutional reform to make possible referendums and the convocation of a constitutional assembly.
2006	Law	Community-based reorganization of the Agrarian Reform Law. Modification of the INRA law of 1996 that seeks to accelerate the process of territorial reorganization as well as break with latifundism, above all in the lowlands of Bolivia, reverting ownership of lands considered unproductive and issuing new TCOs as property titles to small-scale producers without land.
	Law	Convoking the Constitutional Assembly. Augmentation of the number of seats given to rural-indigenous districts, eliminating the primacy held in this respect by the ten principal cities of the country.
	Supreme Decree	Granting of land rights to various indigenous peoples of lowland Bolivia.
2007	Draft Law	Avelino Siñani and Elizardo Pérez Draft Law. Radicalizes the regime of intercultural bilingual education and its operation, extending it to all levels of the education system, as well as bringing it to urban areas. Situates the national education system within the context of the decolonization of the country.

Source: Author, based on Albó (2002b); Lema (2001); Lopéz (2005b) y Postero (2004),

In the years 2002 and 2003, the MNR showed ambivalence with respect to the measures of sociocultural change promoted by the previous MNR administration of 1993-1997, and was forced to confront a difficult and hostile political climate, which in the end led to the victory of the popular-indigenous regime of Evo Morales.

The indigenous re-emergence

The indigenous march for land, dignity and life of 1990, which resulted in the first large-scale encounter of highland and lowland indigenous settlements, marked a significant and enduring change in Bolivia: manifestations of cultural diversity even reached the supposedly homogenous urban societies, and left a permanent mark on the national imaginary. The demand for an EIB was an integral part of

lowland reclamations, coinciding with further demands formulated in the western highlands of the country.

The central matter of the indigenous struggle, now most visibly latent in the lowlands, is that of indigenous land rights. It is important to note that agrarian reform never reached eastern Bolivia, which led to the consequent growth of family-based and commercial latifundism under the protection of some of the military regimes. Despite all the legal reforms of the 1990s, lowland indigenous mobilizations were reinitiated in the year 2000, reclaiming the fulfillment of the 1990 compromise to grant titles of ownership of twenty million hectares to the indigenous peoples of eastern and southeastern Bolivia. According to Marcial Fabricano (the Moxeño leader of the first indigenous march, later Minister of State and former vice presidential candidate), in ten years only three percent of the total of twenty million hectares had been legally transferred to indigenous people (personal communiqué, 2006). In June of 2000, lowland indigenous people once again began to organize in support of land titling by way of TCOs through their "Pluriethnic Bolivia" platform.

Between 2000 and 2005, governing administrations faced social protests of a distinct nature, which reached their climax with the Aymara rebellion of October, 2003, which concluded with the resignations of two successive presidents in a span of two years and the institution of a transitional presidency that organized general elections at the end of 2005. Between 2002 and 2005, indigenous people from lowland Bolivia permeated the national scene with their demand for a constitutional assembly aimed at re-founding the Bolivian state on a plurinational base. This ideology was later co-opted by social and rural organizations in highland Bolivia as well.

Due to the series of public demonstrations and indigenous demands for social justice, the Bolivian identitary imaginary entered into crisis. In the first place, the inroads made by indigenous peoples in the lowlands gave occasion to a rupture of the Andes-centric and cholo historical image of the country. For its part, democratic liberalization and the creation of civic-indigenous political organizations helped many leaders from diverse indigenous backgrounds to gain access to positions of local authority (in municipalities and prefectures), and at times national authority, in the parliament and a variety of ministries and vice ministries. As an example, by 2005, 42 of 157 members of parliament were indigenous. It is furthermore worth noting the existence of locally-managed indigenous municipalities, products of growing consciousness of self-government and the openings provided by liberal legislation. Also, indigenous visibility on the national spectrum, whether in ministries, vice ministries or prefectures, has continued to grow until reaching the situation of 2007, when indigenous leaders held important positions in the Ministries of Justice, Water and Foreign Relations. In this general context, the gestation of differentiated ethnic citizenship began to be seen in multiple areas of the country, and Bolivia entered into contemporary debates and disputes between denominations of liberal citizenship and communitary citizenship[13].

Toward Bolivian plurinationalism

The administrations that followed the crisis of October, 2003 were faced with the sole possibility of convoking a constitutional assembly in order to quiet growing indigenous demands and restore the established political order. The Constitutional Assembly was another victory for popular-indigenous sectors, whose democratic demands questioned the political order of the country, endangering the political parties and

the political system in place since the return of democracy in 1982. Through the Constitutional Assembly, indigenous people also sought to take advantage of the political opportunity to secure real and active indigenous participation in the day-to-day issues of the country. With this approach, indigenous Bolivians placed in question the politico-cultural hegemony that was until then the exclusive domain of the minority white-mestizo sector, which held control of the economic and political power of the country. Their demands transcended specifically indigenous issues, outlining a new vision of the country. In this context, active indigenous participation in the reconfiguration of the Bolivian democracy and in claims for a plurinational Bolivia certainly contributed to the reaffirmation of a sense of collective citizenship that, in the words of some analysts, would best represent the Bolivian reality (INDP, 2007). At the same time, sentiments of ethnically differentiated citizenship also appeared to gain popularity (Zegada et al., 2006).

The handling of civic and indigenous demands, along with the convocation and possession of the Constitutional Assembly, fell to Evo Morales Ayma, who won the presidential election of December, 2005 in the first round of voting with an unprecedented majority of 54% of the vote. As previously mentioned, the delegates that made up the assembly were split between two distinct visions of the country: the indigenous vision proposed a unitary, plurinational state; while the other vision, initially proposed by sectors in defense of business interests, postulated a unitary national state, although intercultural in nature and with autonomous regions. It is worth mentioning that while the indigenous proposal was articulately presented and backed by the social and indigenous movements, the opposition was not able to clearly define their proposal, nor was it able to formalize the support of all of the sectors it claimed to represent. Nonetheless, opposition protests against the hegemonic advance of the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS) continue to be frequent and can result in the paralysis of day-to-day business and activity in the five or six capital cities that are opposed to the regime.

How are feelings of citizenship perceived in this context of implicit ethno-racial conflict, at times symbolic and philosophical, but also representative of the open dispute of hegemony? Will the idea of Bolivian identity, or liberal Bolivian citizenship, be reaffirmed in the form described by educated sectors of Bolivia and members of the international community as the pluri-nation, which in the end is still a nation (UNDP, 2007)? Or rather, do we face a stage of consolidation of communitary or differentiated ethnic citizenships, formed in the past decade, which even go so far as to show the beginnings of subjective conformation of differentiated national citizenships within the framework of a plurinational Bolivia? These are a few of the questions that have motivated endless debate in Bolivia. Opposition to the plurinational vision appears to stem from the threat to the oneness of the country and the Bolivian state presented by the resurgence of such national sentiments (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2007).

The plurinational proposal, however, creates divisions in Bolivia not only between indigenous and non-indigenous people, but also between departments with greater economic growth and a majority creole-mestizo population, and those regions and sub-regions with a greater indigenous presence. It even goes so far as to divide the indigenous sector itself. Controversies stemming from plurinationalism from time to

time threaten indigenous unity, first achieved through the Indigenous Bloc (Bloque Indígena) in 2003 and 2004, and later through the Pact of Unity of 2004.

As we understand it, the differences between groups have to do with two competing visions: the indigenous vision and the mestizo vision. These differences can be diluted when it is necessary to reaffirm indigenous unity in the face of the creole-mestizo opposition, as was the case during the approval of the New Political Constitution, first in the Constitutional Assembly (2008), and later through national referendum (2009).

There is no doubting, however, that the successful formation of the Constitutional Assembly was a clear sign of democratic advances in Bolivia, because for the first time in its existence as a republic, sectors that were secularly secluded from the decision-making process took part in the re-conception of the country, not through their party association but through their ethnically differentiated condition. Furthermore, discussions began in the Constitutional Assembly transcended the environment of the assembly, with debates extending to the mass media and to a variety of forums on different levels and of different natures, where discussion took place as much in Spanish as in the various indigenous languages spoken in Bolivia. These never-before-experienced occurrences promoted the greatest degree of political participation in Bolivian history. Another unique characteristic of this process was the constant oversight of the assembly exercised by the Bolivian social movements, including all the indigenous movements of the country, whose leaders periodically congregated in Sucre, the site of the assembly, in order to express their points of view and proclaim their historic proposals, which included: an affirmation of the plurinational character of the country and of indigenous autonomy, indigenous land and territory rights, the defense of natural resources through a mixed economy, the right to judicial autonomy, and indigenous rights within their territories to an alternative economic model, along with an appropriate and adequate education that is at once intra-and intercultural, plurilingual and decolonizing.

It is nonetheless surprising that in debates concerning citizenship, contradictions between liberal citizenship and the budding concept of ethnic or communitary citizenship were not made explicit. The constitution only explicitly approaches the subject on a formal level, but it does contain significant advances in the recognition of both collective and individual rights, and recuperates symbols and principles from a distinct philosophical standpoint than that of the traditional hegemonic perspective.

In Bolivia, as a part the current questioning of the ideas under which the country was founded more than 180 years ago, a sector of the Aymara population, inheritor of the initial ideas of Reinaga, has taken a central role in the national debate. At present, an educated Aymara bourgeoisie is challenging the cultural and political hegemony of the country, both in academic circles and within the Bolivian government itself. This places Bolivia at the beginning of a true cultural revolution, based in the recuperation of the collective memory and the fight to overcome the colonial condition that marks the country (Ticona, 2002, 2004). From this perspective, history is reinvented, with events and locations symbolically recuperated to later be given new meanings and values; a discourse of indigenous essentialism is strategically adopted; an effort is made to convert indigenous issues into national issues through the identification or construction of what can be called indigenous universalisms,

tenets that seek to bridge the gap in forms of being and points of view between eastern/ Amazonian peoples and Andean peoples; and racism and atavistic discrimination are condemned in renunciation or refusal of liberal policies of positive discrimination, or affirmative action, generated in the 1990s under the influence of neoliberal multiculturalism. Through these currents of thought, the indigenous movement in general, and particularly the indigenous leaders that occupy positions in the current government and the Constitutional Assembly, are ideologically building on their own platform in an effort to re-signify indigenous civic participation in the refoundation of the state and the re-signification of democracy in Bolivia. The indigenous movement in this way exhibits a clear will to assume more and more duties in the central administration of the state, even when this will stands in disagreement with some of the measures taken by the current regime. To support their stance, some indigenous leaders have appropriated the notion of decolonization introduced in Bolivia in the 1970s and 80s by Reinaga, the Katarists, the COB and other similar groups (CSUTCB, 1991; Choque et al., 1992), and have also adopted contemporary approaches derived primarily from cultural studies, such as those concerning the colonial aspects of knowledge and power, brought to Bolivia by researchers from Duke University[14]. Notions such as these can be clearly seen in the new "Avelino Siñani y Elizardo Pérez" education draft law, proposed by Aymara sociologist Félix Patzi when he occupied the Ministry of Education during the first year of the Evo Morales administration (2006-07). Patzi (2006) has questioned the sincerity of Bolivian policies of multicultural liberalization of the 1990s, classifying them as state-sponsored attempts at ethnic deconstruction given that they were solely implemented among the indigenous population, and did not affect the non-indigenous population. From this point of view, the official policy of EIB, by emphasizing the linguistic dimension of education, would have impeded the development and empowerment of indigenous thought and knowledge bases (Saavedra, 2007) in a context where "…the conjunction of anti-systemic organizations and movements is born of the necessity to overcome European epistemologies of knowledge and the general panorama of modernity" (Saavedra, 2007, p. 7)[15].

The Aymara ideological emergence and the mark it has left on national life have generated an interesting process of theoretical revision and strategic realignment in Bolivian politics and academia. This process is most clearly seen in Eastern Bolivia, particularly in the city of Santa Cruz, where theoretical and ideological support for proposals of regional autonomy is being sought, utilizing the history of the region, some shared aspects of Bolivian culture, and analyses of the current situations of a variety of societies around the world. In this process, symbolic dimensions are also recuperated through the reassessment of regional manifestations of culture, the dialect of Spanish spoken in Eastern Bolivia, and the spirit of entrepreneurialism associated with its people.

It is clear that the gestation of a plurinational Bolivia appears to have brought with it diverse processes of cultural reaffirmation in a variety of social sectors, reviving or strengthening regional, cultural, ethnic and social identities. These processes make it difficult to clearly comprehend how the country will be able to achieve the cohesion that, strictly speaking, it never had. The challenge of social cohesion introduced in the 1950s by the RN remains alive, although there are currently more feelings of opposition than of complementarity, making it difficult to imagine the distant possibility of unity in diversity. In the field of politics, this

situation has carried the country to the already-mentioned catastrophic stalemate (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2007) between the predominantly Spanish-speaking, self-denominated "Bolivian crescent" (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando), and western, "Colla" Bolivia and its large Aymara and Quechua presence (La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cuquisaca and Cochabamba)[16]. Considering the manner in which the new constitution was approved, cohesion amongst the distinct and dissimilar parts that make up Bolivia appears to be lessening. It is the case that:

> [...] The current political powers are not in a position to find a comprehensive exit to the national drama [...] In the absence of options, a dynamic of polarization arises, concentrated in one pole (the officialist pole) but fragmented in the other (the opposition), which thus impedes the convergent and articulated reconstruction of a pluralist political system (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2007, p. 7).

Interculturality as a guiding notion

As mentioned, the roots of the notion of interculturality date back to the initial stages of the return of democracy in 1982 when, during the government of the UDP, the National Service of Literacy and Popular Education (Servicio Nacional de Alfabetización y Educación Popular, or SENALEP) formed the basis for what is now known as EIB (Albó and Anaya, 2003; López, 2005b; Ticona, 2002). That is to say, the adoption in Bolivia of this basic concept sought to illustrate the necessity of a new type of society, not only forming a foundation for the recognition of sociolinguistic and sociocultural diversity, but also breaking away from the culturally homogenous vision of the nation-state and the consequential uniformization of education. Interculturality, perhaps due to its emergence in a context of democratic reaffirmation, neither remained anchored in pedagogy nor tended toward the abstraction of the context of historical oppression, domination and exclusion of the Indigenous national majorities (Rivera, 1986). This is due to the fact that, from the beginning, the notion of interculturality has been linked to concepts and revindications such as territory, political participation and dignity; it is therefore also linked to the conquest of rights and the fight against social injustice (Albó, 2002; López, 1994, 1996).

From the government´s perspective, transcending the educational sphere has not been entirely easy, and it took more than a decade for it to translate the notion of interculturality into judicial norms, making possible the transformation of social practices and relationships in schools and in other areas of society. Until the laws of the country were modified in the 1990s, progress was seen in a variety of institutions and organizations involved in primary, secondary, adult and civic education, and also in university lecture halls and areas of social and historical research. The state began the process in the years 1988-1994, focusing on the first five years of primary education, and instituting programs of community participation in decisions concerning the day-to-day and general operations of schools and the education system (Albó and Anaya, 2003; López, 2005b). It also formed a team within the Ministry of Education specifically responsible for EIB policy, formed not only by functionaries who self-identified as Aymara, Guaraní and Quechua, but also by representatives of indigenous ethno-political organizations and by members of the teachers' union. In civil society, numerous NGOs and uncountable civic radio broadcasts contributed their views, revaluing indigenous languages by using them widely in broadcast media and in radio-transmitted education programs. The

Catholic Church contributed in its educational work to the process of interculturization of Bolivian society, by recognizing the importance of using indigenous languages in education. Specific research centers were also formed, such as the Workshop of Andean Oral History (Taller de Historia Oral Andina, or THOA), which, with the participation of indigenous young professionals, took on the challenge of redefining Bolivian history through the recuperation of ancestral memories and indigenous knowledge, values and beliefs (Ticona, 2002). In each one of these cases, interculturality presupposed bilingualism, and ancestral Amerindian languages took on an importance never-before-seen in Bolivia's history as a republic (López, 2005b). Unlike in other countries where notions of interculturality took root, this was all due to the fact that in Bolivia the recognition of multiculturality, as well as the possibility of interculturality, occurred as a part of the political process, alongside the indigenous movement and at the precise moment when Bolivia returned to a democratic system (López, 2005b).

The transition from projects to public policies proved difficult and conflictive, due to the fact that the adoption of interculturality implied, in accordance with demands made by the indigenous movement, a rupture with the colonial legacy and a desire to recognize Bolivia´s other history, which had previously been negated, hid, and even considered embarrassing and backwards by the hegemonic society. This brought forward a series of paradoxes, characteristic of all processes of transition from monocultural, mestizo-centered states to multicultural and multiethnic ones that reaffirm diversity and individual differences (Hornberger and López, 1997). These paradoxes transcend the plane of technical-operational decisions to present true ideological dilemmas, from the perspective of both those who formulate the demands and those who design and seek to put in place changes destined to satisfy them. The panorama was further complicated by suspicions from within the social movement that the same exclusionary state as had always existed in Bolivia would claim popular reclamations for itself and its own ends, in a moment in which Bolivia was learning to live in democratic society, having not yet overcome the association between government, authoritarianism and dictatorship constructed by the history of the republic. With this backdrop, between 1992 and 1994, a multiethnic team, formed by the government and composed mainly of young professionals committed to a new project of country-building, designed a program of structural changes in education, recurring to two new principles and strategies that would govern the national education system: interculturality and civic participation[17]. Paradoxically, this occurred in the context of the traumatic application economic neoliberalism. Nonetheless, and as mentioned previously, the resurgence of Bolivian liberal democracy was marked by top-down, centralized neoliberalism on the one hand, and bottom-up, grassroots indigenous movements on the other (López, 2005b).

It seems necessary to clarify that, while interculturality inspired and motivated changes in education, both through state policy and in civil society, liberal multicultural ideas, originally developed in the industrialized countries of the northern hemisphere, appeared to have more influence in other areas (Kymlicka, 1996; Hale, 2007). This is fundamentally due to the influence of agencies of international cooperation, which joined in the Bolivian process of recognition of its multiethnicity, and the reinterpretation of society and the Bolivian state, in order to construct new, more-inclusive forms of democracy. These agencies at the same time suggested and advised a deepening of neoliberal economic policy. All of

these factors contributed to make the situation in Bolivia neither easy nor comfortable, and also contradictory for those directly concerned[18].

From 1994 on, the application of state-based EIB was slow. Despite this fact, by the end of 1997 four Educational Councils of Native Peoples (Consejos Educativos de Pueblos Originarios, or CEPOs) had been formed, beginning the development of a new educational process in which parents and community leaders were able to voice their opinions and concerns (Bloque Indígena, 2004; CENAQ, 2001, 2003)[19]. Distinct practices in Bolivian education were inaugurated, with the de facto emergence of possibilities of interculturality through negotiation —not free of conflict, certainly— between rural and indigenous parents and professionals in the field of education, who were products of the same education system that was being investigated and changed. This investigation involved the confrontation of different visions, not only regarding the role and work of teachers in rural communities, but also concerning the role of the school itself and the education offered to students. It is clear that Bolivian teachers did not fully realize that all of this would occur when they voiced the necessity of an intercultural, participatory education. This is due to the fact that the intercultural perspective supposes the abandonment of asymmetric relationships, and of benefits and prerogatives, in teacher-parent and family-community contact[20]. As mentioned, one of the biggest obstacles to interculturality resides in the mental colonization of individuals that produces negative stereotypes of indigenous people (Ticona, 2002).

Throughout the 1990s, interculturality also made inroads in other areas of governmental action, as reflected in the government measures identified in Table 1. The Bolivian process was significantly marked by the fact that reforms to executive power included the creation of a high-level department specifically directed to the implementation of programs of popular participation, and another dedicated to the incorporation of indigenous themes onto the daily slate of affairs of the state and into plans for government action, from the macro-perspective and also in terms of human development and sustainable development.

At the beginning of this period, for the first time in Bolivian history, a well-known indigenous leader, who explicitly introduced the need to interculturalize Bolivian democracy, occupied the position of Vice President of the Republic, generating processes of indigenous reaffirmation and, at the same time, increased political interest and demands on the part of indigenous organizations and the rural population. Indigenous leaders of diverse nations of the world attended the inauguration of Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, and during the ceremony, which took place in the National Congress, the second-most important representative of the government spoke in Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní. This event added emphasis to the fact that, during the entire period, the indigenous question was a major theme of political discussion and decision-making. In this sense, Bolivian interculturality began to be felt in everyday life and to transform itself into a possibility for concrete action.

In summary, for more than two decades (1982-2005), interculturality, from the point of view of governmental action, implied:

a. Deliberate visibilization of indigenous issues and their legal recognition.
b. Positive discrimination and affirmative action in social policy.
c. The creation of specific authorities

created to bring attention to indigenous issues, and the appointment of indigenous functionaries to various positions in the administration of the state.

d. The definitive inclusion of EIB in the national education platform, eliminating its anterior condition as a limited-time project.
e. The creation of forums for dialogue between members of the government and indigenous organizations.
f. The legal recognition of indigenous territories through the legal formula of the TCO.
g. Redistribution of State resources through programs of civic participation, dividing resources according to the number of residents of each municipal district.
h. And, finally, yet not for that reason less important, indigenous political participation.

Interculturality was chiefly perceived by civil society as an opportunity for the reaffirmation and revindication of both individual and collective indigenous rights; even though the ideal of a plurinational Bolivia underlied much of the intercultural approach, it wasn't specifically stated by all of its actors. Indigenous people, for their part, took advantage of their gained ground to internationalize national debates, as well as discuss and analyze Bolivian proposals and actions. The creole-mestizo sectors that made up the hegemonic discourse, from the perspective of academia and also that of the very state that was opening up to indigenous discourse, took on interculturality from a tolerance-based perspective and saw in it the possibility of reinforcing the political project of mestizaje in place since the RN[21].

At present, and from the indigenous point of view, the old application of interculturality to education has spearheaded transformations of a much greater magnitude that seek to radically reform the country, taking systematic advantage of the cracks that periodically appear in the foundation of the state. From this perspective, a link between interculturality and policy can be seen, in that interculturality is understood as access to political power. Also seen are the reemergence, re-appropriation and re-signification of the concept of the collective (projects of civilization, ways of life, knowledge, curriculum, etc.), which has permitted the affirmation of the concept of interculturality (Condori, 2003); and the intimate and consecutive relationship that is established between concepts of inter- and intra-, which serves as a base for the proposed foundation of current-day decolonization in Bolivia (Fernández, 2006; Ticona, 2006; among others). This approach brings with it a questioning, not only political but also epistemological, of the relationship between elements of indigenous life and national-hegemonic life in Bolivia (Machada and López, 2008). In this context, intra-and interculturality are complementary notions that pertain to the area of civil rights, and that can be seen as necessary dimensions of the survival and continuity of Bolivian multiethnicity.

From the non-indigenous point of view, interculturality is instead seen as an escape valve for the growing pressure felt from the indigenous movement (Sí Bolivia Collective, 2006), with an emphasis placed on the relational dimension of the concept, with its area of application reduced to education and a handful of other social sectors. This concept of interculturality is based in the liberal perspective of positive discrimination, or affirmative action, without necessarily leading to social reconstruction and the refoundation of the state reclaimed by

indigenous people. To a variety of spokespeople representative of the white-mestizo sector being displaced, interculturality for all would not only highlight cultural mestizaje, but also reinforce it as a manner of consolidating Bolivian citizenship.

As a result of the conflicts experienced by Bolivian societies, the association between mestizaje and interculturality has been reinforced, especially in the cities and among the members of sectors that are seeing their hegemony gradually slip away. For some, interculturalism can be seen today as:

> [...] as a vehicle for the democratic integration of ethno-cultural diversity, accenting shared and complementary aspects, instead of promoting the differences, particularisms and localisms that separate us. The construction of the nation and of the Bolivian state requires the recuperation and promotion of an essentially mestizo society —because we, the great majority of Bolivians, are mestizos—, fruit of the dynamic encounter and permanent mix of races, cultures and ethnic identities (Sí Bolivia collective, 2007, p. 13).

But indigenous people strive to reaffirm themselves as different through interculturality and intraculturality, and to be recognized as subjects of law; whereas the dominant sectors, currently in a state of displacement, see them only as subjects of public interest in a society into which they should be included. In other words, for some, interculturality is synonymous with access to political power, while for others it is a mechanism of social inclusion and national integration. The difference between the liberal concept of interculturality and the radical and critical comprehension of it by indigenous people resides in the reading that the ones and the others have of the colonial condition of Bolivian society.

In the indigenous discourse, current notions of intraculturality and interculturality go together with, and are articulated by, the indigenous notion of "the good life" or "good living" (suma quamaña, allin qawsay and ivi marai in Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní, respectively), which is currently being revindicated by various indigenous peoples and their leaders across the American continent (MAS-IPSP, 2007), and which has been incorporated in the new constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia. Thus, the notion of interculturality is currently considered part of a civilizing project, serving as an alternative to the hegemonic one. This is cause for belief that Bolivian society will retake with renewed vigor the path taken in 1982 during the return of democracy. The indigenous voice, heard in October, 2003 in streets and plazas, as well as in the general elections of December, 2005 and in the constitutional referendum of 2009, continues to echo in the ears, hearts and minds of the people. It contributes to the consciousness that interculturality and bilingualism are not only pedagogical ingredients, but are also, most importantly, political tools for the reconstruction of the state, leading to the recuperation of dignity, overcoming inequality, and combating racism and discrimination as products of the enduring colonial mentality.

But, in order to dispel any doubts, it should remain clear that through interculturality, indigenous Bolivians do not long for a return to the past, nor to ignore the challenges of the future; rather, they seek to gain strength and encouragement from their ancestral customs and practices in order to, from a position of power, propose the refoundation of Bolivia. As interpreted by Rivera:

> The indigenous approach to modernity is centered in a notion of citizenship that emphasizes differences rather than homogeneity. But at the same time, in dealing with a project of hegemonic vocation that can be translated into practical terms in the spheres of politics and the state, it supposes a capacity to organize society in our image and likeness, and to create lasting interculturality and a conjunction of legitimate and stable norms of coexistence. This implies a country for every woman and man [...]. The way of thinking, based in decolonization, that allows us to construct this renovated, genuinely decolonized and multicultural Bolivia, comes from the affirmation of our bilingual, multi-colored, chhixi sense of ourselves, projected as culture, theory, state policy, and also as a new definition of well-being and 'development' (Rivera, 2006, p. 12).

Steps toward an intercultural citizenship?

The incapacity for reconciliation with respect to interculturality between the two sectors struggling for hegemony in Bolivia makes it practically impossible to foresee the outcome of debates concerning the character of the nation and the Bolivian state, as well as if the recently approved constitution will achieve legitimacy in society across the distinct and varied regions that make up Bolivia. Two different conceptions of the country are in conflict, and it is difficult to predict what will come next. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the political process of the years 2002 to 2009, from initial demands to the formulation of new policies, has taken place in an arena of active learning and democratic construction by all participants, but especially by indigenous people. In the process, indigenous men and women have had to learn about the management of the Bolivian state and its public affairs. Indigenous representatives have also had to learn how to construct a hegemonic discourse negotiated in terms of interculturality, and even how to fight for this discourse in a context that remains adverse, in which cultural and political hegemony remain firmly in dispute. These processes have taken place through the exercise of citizenship, although from a conception of citizenship that differs from the currently valid, liberal-legal, still-exclusive conception. In other words, they have discovered how a political community is formed and consolidated in practice. As we have shown here, in this process, the indigenous men and women of the Constitutional Assembly and of the government itself have discovered the profound political character of one's own culture, when that culture is retaken and used as a resource.

In this work we have sought to highlight the sociohistorical processes that have molded one and another sense of citizenship in Bolivia. Subalternity, which has historically marked indigenous societies, has shaped the current discourse between national and indigenous leaders and made necessary that citizenship be analyzed with a historical perspective. This situates us today in front of a continuum of perceptions and self-ascriptions, which have changed and will continue to change with the passage of time, given the history of multiculturality that characterizes Bolivian society, the transformations that this society has suffered through in the past two decades due to the adoption by the Bolivian state of neoliberal multiculturalism, as well as a radical interculturality, and the effect that both multiculturalism and interculturality have had on the state itself and the functioning of society. Instances of indigenous reaffirmation and the cultural-ideological fight for hegemony have also surely influenced feelings of citizenship among

the Bolivian population as a whole, in a similar way as occurred the 1950s at the birth of the RN. Contributing to all of this, alternative proposals espoused by the creole-mestizo sectors that have controlled the government and held political power throughout the history of the Bolivian republic have not been consolidated, and their principal demand—that of regional autonomies—has been accepted by the official proposals of the government, although revised to group regional autonomies together with indigenous autonomies.

The New Constitution defines indigenous autonomy as "the expression of self-governance as an exercise in self-determination of rural communities and originary, indigenous peoples and nations, whose populations share territory, culture, history, languages and forms of social organization, as well as unique legal, political, social and economic institutions" (AC, 2007, Art. 289). It therefore stipulates that the conformation of autonomous indigenous territorial entities be "based in the consolidation of their ancestral lands and the will of their populace, expressed through consultation, respecting their unique norms and procedures and in agreement with the Constitution and the law" (AC, 2007, Art. 290). In this way, the Bolivian state has re-addressed historic indigenous demands and at the same time granted indigenous peoples the legal tools to advance toward self-determination. We can thus ask if this process will contribute to the gestation of a new intercultural Bolivian citizenship inclusive of all Bolivian men and women, or whether it will lead to the consolidation of differentiated ethnic citizenships. The latter option could make Bolivia more of a multicultural state, containing in its interior insufficiently articulated nations, rather than the intercultural state that the Constitution itself recognizes upon declaring that:

> Cultural diversity is the essential base of the Communitary Plurinational State. **Interculturality is the instrument that makes possible the harmonic cohesion and coexistence of all peoples and nations. Interculturality will exist with respect to individual and collective differences and in conditions of equality** (AC, 2007, Art. 100, bold text not present in actual text).

Once more, the complexity of Bolivia, the diverse colors of its society (Zavaleta, 1983) and its unique republican history, all come together to place us in a new situation that merits careful monitoring and analysis. By monitoring the implementation of the Bolivian plurinational state, we will be able to see to what degree indigenous and creole-mestizo Bolivians are able to cohabitate a single territory and construct common projects for the future, without abandoning the cultural ties and differentiated linguistic systems that are unique to each one of the nations that compose the Bolivian state. The recognition of ancestral territories, of all of the various languages spoken in Bolivia, and of the existence of different systems of government and civilizing projects, all under the umbrella of a single state, once again makes Bolivia an excellent social laboratory. By studying events in Bolivia, we can perhaps learn how interculturality is constructed socially and politically, and how the notion of citizenship evolves and transforms in order to represent the Bolivian peoples' will to reaffirm their differences.

Will Bolivia achieve the complementarity amongst different peoples sought for in its New Constitution, even though at first glance the country appears to reaffirm only the indigenous perspective? Future events in Bolivia will help shape the future of indigenous peoples throughout Latin America. It is not

for nothing that this country has become an arena of privileged observation for ideologues, politicians and academics, both indigenous and non-indigenous, from all over the world. This is because, in Bolivia:

> [...] each valley is a homeland, in a compound where different peoples dress, sing, eat and produce in unique modes, speaking in different languages and with different accents, such that no language can be called, even for an instant, the universal language of all (Zavaleta, 1983, p. 16).

Endnotes

1. I would like to thank Guido Machaca and Luz Jiménez for taking part in a beneficial period of shared analysis and reflection, as well as the students in the Masters of Bilingual Intercultural Education program, who analyzed and discussed these approaches on numerous occasions, contributing to a regional vision of the indigenous question in Bolivia, with perspectives ranging from the Lacandona jungle to the high Colla plateaus of Argentina. I would like to specially thank the Bolivian indigenous leaders, with whom we were fortunate enough to collaborate, and with whom we studied the meaning that democracy assumes in a multiethnic, pluricultural and multilingual context, through the analysis of the always-challenging reality of Bolivia.

2. Thus, for example, in the Bolívar neighborhood of the city of Santa Cruz, composed of Ayoreo migrant workers, the neighborhood space is considered a part of their dispersed and discontinuous territory, where the president of the Ayoreo people has as much authority as he does in their rural communities. Or, as is the case in the city of El Alto, which is eminently Aymara and forms the stage for a variety of Aymara cultural manifestations, considerations of the neighborhood space may vary generationally among its inhabitants, with older generations maintaining a greater relationship with rural families and communities. Despite the ethnic diversity characteristic of El Alto, which makes it the quintessential pluriethnic and multicultural space in Bolivia, there exists there a strong identification with Aymara culture. This situation is reinforced by a variety of neighborhood leaders, who in some cases have reproduced forms of rural leadership.

3. Tupaq Katari rebelled against the Spanish Crown in 1780 and 1781, as did his counterpart Tupaq Amaru of Cuzco. Katari besieged the city of La Paz over the course of multiple weeks, cutting the connection between the city and the countryside and impeding the provision of food to the inhabitants of the city. This act has been remembered in distinct moments of contemporary life in La Paz, and various Aymara indigenous leaders have tried to emulate it.

4. The fact that indigenous people were not recognized in the construction of the Bolivian state contributed to their continued use of customs and traditions, either ancestrally indigenous or of colonial origin, but in both cases autonomous in form and marginalized from the official institutions of the state. In many places, the Bolivian state's presence in rural areas was only felt from the middle of the twentieth century onward.

5. The majority ethnolinguistic conglomerations are the Aymara (1.6 million people) and Quechua (2.5 million people) groups, who mostly inhabit the western or Andean region (representing 36% of the Bolivian territory) along with the Uru-Chipaya, an Andean minority population of 1,500 people. However, the greatest ethnolinguistic diversity is found in the 33 native peoples of the lowlands, who together represent a demographic minority. All together they are comprised by approximately 300,000 people that inhabit the regions of Oriente, Chaco and Amazonía (representing 64% of the Bolivian territory), also referred to as the "tierras bajas" (lowlands) (López, 2005b; Albó, 2006

6. Worker-rural-military movement which removed the liberal-aristocratic governments from the political scene. These governments negated the possible endurance of indigenous cultures, and their hegemony was based above all in the feudal regime of the hacienda and in the exploitation of mineral wealth. The ideals of the RN have marked Bolivian political life since 1952 and today appear to once again play a determinant role, after a gap of twenty years during which the party leadership of the RN instituted a neoliberal economic policy upon its return to power.

7. I do not want to risk oversimplification, and given the limited space of this article, I want to make clear that use of the mestizo categorization does not fully reflect the situation in Bolivia, because in order to do so it would be necessary to recur to racial and class categorizations as well. The mestizos who led the RN and many of those who today reclaim Bolivian mestizaje do not see themselves as cholos, but rather as the only inheritors of modernity in Bolivia.

8. Among the Aymara, for example, the jaqi (person or human being) condition currently includes, along with other sociocultural considerations unique to the Andean sense and meaning given to life, the completion of military service, which is an indispensable rite of passage. For this reason, this stage is recognized, celebrated and valued by indigenous families and communities. It goes without saying that their time in the military barracks causes indigenous people to also see themselves as Bolivian citizens.

9. "It can truly be said that the subaltern classes of Bolivia, wherever they are located, are organized par excellence, and thus when control or access to natural and social resources of public benefit comes into dispute, they form with relative ease lasting 'mobilization companies' with a great capacity to exert pressure." (Orozco, García Linera and Stefanoni, 2006, p. 27).

10. Today, with the resurgence of the social movements and the power that they hold in the government of Evo Morales, the COB has preferred to distance itself from the compromise that its bases have adopted with respect to the current government regime, with the COB running the risk of losing its pertinence. It is also true that indigenous political advances have also contributed to the weakening of its historic platform fundamentally based in concepts of class

11. Tawantinsuyu, or the territory of four regions, is the Quechua name used to refer to the pre-Hispanic Incan state, or the Incan empire.

12. The process of privatization began in the mining sector, resulting in the layoff in 1986 of 21,000 of the 27,000 miners of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia).

13. Consult Villafuerte (2005) and López, S. (1997) in this respect for a discussion of the global debate, applied to the Mexican and Peruvian contexts, and by extension to Latin America in general. Kymlicka (1996) also analyzes and discusses these two ideas.

14. Influential references in the current Bolivian conceptual re-elaboration include: Lander, E. (comp.) (2000). La colonialidad del saber: eurocentrismos y ciencias socials. Perspectivas latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: CLACSO y UNESCO; Mignolo, W. (2000). Local Histories/Global Designs. Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton Press; Quijano, A. (1997). Colonialidad del poder, cultura y conocimiento en América Latina. Anuario Mariateguista, IX/9. 113-121; as well as the seminal approaches to decolonization presented by Franz Fannon in 1963 in his work Los condenados de la tierra (The Wretched of the Earth), published in Mexico by the Economic Culture Fund (Fondo de Cultura Económica). A volume was published in 2007 in Bolivia that illustrates the influence of Fannon's work, under the title of Educación superior, interculturalidad y descolonización (Saavedra, 2007).

15. We can consider indigenous people's reading of interculturality as an environment for the revival of indigenous cultures to be a contributing factor. It was along these lines that, in the EIB, the resource of native languages in a pedagogy that promoted dialogue with parents and local authorities, as well as their active participation in education policy, generated an unforeseen focus on indigenous knowledge and learning, and their inclusion in school curriculums (López, 2005b).

16. The situation is in reality more complex, because the alliance of Chuquisaca and Cochabamba with the predominant sentiments of the other three Colla departments is not always clear. On the one hand, some middle class and elite sectors of Cochabamba identify at times with Santa Cruz's position. On the other hand, the demands of Sucre and La Paz for singular status as national capital have reopened wounds from the Federal War of the beginning of the 20th century, which determined the transfer of the seat of government to La Paz (Klein, 1982). This has resulted in the unification of popular, middle class and upper class sectors of Sucre in strategic alignment with Santa Cruz and, as a result, generated opposition to the government of Evo Morales. Ethnic and class identities have at moments been superseded by regional identity, as has also occurred in the lowlands, a fact that has not always been understood by government authorities.

17. For this, it was necessary for the Technical Team in Support of Education Reform (Equipo Técnico de Apoyo a la Reforma Educativa, or ETARE) to sometimes work outside of the education sector and situate itself under the initial rectory of what was then the Ministry of Planning and Coordination (Albó and Anaya, 2003).

18. In the field of education, for example, the derogation of the old Bolivian Education Code of 1955, the result of the approval of a new education law in 1994, brought with it protests and unrest, despite the fact that the new legislation co-opted many of the most important reclamations of grassroots organizations, such as the COB, the CSUTCB and the CONMERB, as well as those of NGOs and the institutions tied to the Catholic Church, which have demanded interculturality and bilingualism since 1983.

19. Today there are seven councils of this nature: three more representing minority peoples of the lowlands have been added to the initial four, and there is news of three more councils in formation (Walter Gutiérrez, personal communiqué, 2009).

20. Between 1990 and 2002, educational materials were published in Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní—the three most widely spoken native languages in the country—; pedagogical advisors and more than 10,000 teachers were trained in the production and use of texts in their native languages; and, as perhaps never before in the history of the nation, hundreds of thousands of pages were printed in these languages. Nonetheless, not all of the children that required educational attention in their native language and through their own culture felt the benefits of an EIB, although the total number of students affected by this modality was the highest in the history of Bolivian education (Albó and Anaya, 2003; López, 2005b). The successful implementation of the EIB would have necessarily been accompanied by greater levels of communication than the Bolivian government was able to provide, due to the fact that the arrival of new resources in some localities generated protests from community members and teachers; the former, fearful that the implementation of an education in native languages would make difficult or impede the learning of Spanish by their children, and the latter, insecure with respect to new techniques of writing in what had previously been solely spoken languages, but also inheritors of the ideological legacy of assimilation and the government functionaries responsible for its fulfillment (López, 2005b). The study of Luykx (1998) on the ideological-identitary training of teachers being trained in a normal school in La Paz is revealing with respect to the form of civic training of the teachers; it is thus possible to conceive the teacher training centers as "makers of citizens." The disciplining effect of teacher training causes future teachers, with exceptions, to assume and appropriate the hegemonic political vision: bourgeois, diversity-negating, Hispanist and statist; and on this base construct a Bolivia more imaginary than real, as well as an equally imaginary citizenship. For this reason, it is not odd that in many of their classrooms, parting from this imaginary ideal, teachers may replicate with their indigenous students the training that they received, which could even negate any possibility of EIB

21. With respect to mestizaje in Bolivia, see Sanjinés (2002, 2005) for a critical reading of the hegemonic sense that this concept always contained, as well as a de-veiling of the "illusion" of mestizaje. Javier Sanjinés sees mestizaje as an imagined construction that sought to unite, but through the negation and uniformization of indigenous people. This follows the same sense by which Sinesio López sees, in the case of Peru and of Latin America in general, imaginary citizens in comparison with other real citizens (1997). For his part, Toranzo (2006) revindicates the project of mestizaje and the mestizo condition as a reality and a possibility for Bolivia. There also currently exist movements led by middle class sectors of Bolivia that, questioning the data from the 2001 census that resulted in an overwhelming majority of self-identified indigenous persons, promote and carry out studies to document the number of mestizos and "overcome" the apparent error of the census in recurring to the criteria of self-identification with a native people. Such currents of thought exist, with nuances, in educated sectors in both the highlands and the lowlands, as is shown in the following extract from the bulletin "Temas de Debate" (Topics for Debate) concerning "Mestizaje in times of Indigenism" (PIEB, 2007, p. 1): "The intent to quantify the indigenous population of the country has been, without a doubt, one of the most controversial statistical initiatives of recent times. The fact that

the National Census of Population and Housing of 2001 registered that 62 percent of Bolivians of at least fifteen years of age identified with an indigenous or originary people has reopened poorly-stitched old scars of centuries of race and power. Mestizaje reappears here in a preventative form during moments of great excitement in the indigenous movement." Conveniently forgotten, whether intentionally or not, is the fact that self-identification is not only a claim but also a right of subaltern peoples universally recognized in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Today, self-identification is a tool used by indigenous peoples in nearly every country of the region to make themselves "visible" in official figures after centuries during which this visibility was negated, and their visibility was simply not desired.

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