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Diplomatic Coercion: Eisenhower, Chiang Kai-shek, and the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement

BRADLEY J. PIERSON

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office on January 20, 1953, he inherited a directionless military commitment to East Asia that was generating an increasingly negative public perception. American progress on the Korean Peninsula had stagnated, and repeated attempts to reach an armistice with the communist belligerents had proven unsuccessful. Eager to expedite progress towards a conclusion to the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration sought to apply pressure on Communist China by developing Taiwan into an American satellite. Though unwilling to establish a formal military commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, the removal of the U.S. Naval quarantine of Taiwan and the provision of American military support reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the defense of Nationalist China. Through the lens of documented communication between the United States and the Chinese Nationalist government, this paper will analyze the Eisenhower Administration's use of increasingly assertive language and behavior to both support and constrain Nationalist China during the final months of the Korean War. While the Eisenhower Administration publicly promoted the Republic of China as a sovereign partner, it did so only to the extent that it satisfied American objectives. The United States repeatedly used its military aid and support to Taiwan as leverage to privately coerce Chiang and his government into aligning themselves with American interests.¹

Having been elected on a commitment to bring an honorable end to the Korean War, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower dedicated the months preceding his inauguration to the development of an effective military approach towards East Asia. Eisenhower's visit to the Korean Peninsula in December of 1952 validated his concern that the United States was being drawn into an endless war of attrition with Communist China. Eisenhower wrote that his visit to Korea had persuaded him that American forces "could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible results...the United States would have to prepare to break the stalemate."² The result of the President-elect's observations was the creation of an American military strategy emphasizing deterrence as opposed to conventional warfare. By projecting a seeming willingness to expand the conflict beyond Korea, the United States could effectively apply pressure to Communist China and hasten the war's conclusion.³

Eisenhower's pre-inaugural tour of the Korean warfront was in itself a statement of commitment to American success on the peninsula. The President's actions, statements, and behaviors were all components of an elaborate projection of what would be his Administration's approach towards the Korean War. In an interview with reporters following his return from Korea, Eisenhower publicly communicated the United States' military readiness, saying, "We face an enemy...whom we cannot hope to impress by words, however eloquent, but only by deeds—executed under circumstances of our own choosing."⁴ The President-elect's comment was not a political talking point; it was a premeditated statement of his intentions to the government of Communist China. Eisenhower's verbal military threats soon translated into actions with his inauguration on January 20, 1953. Reversing the policies of the previous administration, President Eisenhower lifted the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, threatening the creation of a second warfront for Communist China. The Eisenhower Administration utilized Taiwan as a mechanism to expand the Sino-American confrontation and induce pressure upon Communist China to agree to an armistice.⁵

While the deneutralization of the Taiwan Strait was a means to threaten Communist China, it facilitated the creation of a military relationship between the United States and the nationalist government of Taiwan. President Eisenhower's State of the Union address on February 2, 1953 publicly endorsed Chiang Kai-shek's government and permitted the Republic of China to re-enter the international community. Speaking before the American Congress, Eisenhower rescinded neutralization saying, "In June of 1950, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland...I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China."⁶ While the President's speech certainly condemned Communist China's involvement in Korea, it also underscored the United States Navy's existing charge to protect the island of Taiwan. The Eisenhower Administration's partial revision of the Seventh Fleet's mission in the Taiwan Strait was intentionally ambiguous.

¹ Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, *The Cold War: A Global History With Documents*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2011), 95-99.

² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 91-95.

³ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 148-180.

⁴ Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, 96-108.

⁵ Hugh Deane, *The Korean War* (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, Inc., 1999), 132-151.

⁶ Message from the President to the Congress, Feb. 2, 1953, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 14:140-141.

While it asserted no direct military threat towards the Communist mainland, it did remove a preexisting assurance of security along the Strait.

The deneutralization of the Taiwan Strait publicly reaffirmed the United States' military commitment to the defense of Taiwan. While President Eisenhower's address failed to include any formal military commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's government, the removal of a U.S. Naval quarantine of Formosa did provide Nationalist China with a new degree of state autonomy. Having been largely ignored by the United States during the Truman Administration, Chiang welcomed President Eisenhower's decision calling it, "a judicious step of great moral significance" and further expressed his hope that deneutralization would be followed by closer "organized cooperation" between the governments of Nationalist China and the United States.⁷ Though Eisenhower and Chiang were in agreement that suffocating Communist China was beneficial to global interests, they each desired distinctly different outcomes. The United States sought to apply pressure to Communist China as a means to generate peace, while Nationalist China saw it as an invitation to initiate its long-planned re-conquest of the mainland. Deneutralization of the Taiwan Strait and the establishment of military coordination with the Chinese Nationalist government were events central to the broader American objective of exerting pressure upon the Communist mainland.

While Chiang Kai-shek and his government interpreted the deneutralization of the Taiwan Strait as the creation of a diplomatic partnership with the United States, the Eisenhower Administration understood it as a political transaction that purchased Chinese cooperation. Washington acted quickly to assert its involvement in Chinese affairs under the guise of military coordination. In what began as a congratulatory letter to Chiang's military leadership regarding Washington's newfound relationship with Taiwan, General William Chase asserted American interests and expectations requesting that Nationalist China "make no significant attacks on Communist-held territory" without first consulting the United States. General Chase's letter concluded with an urgent request that "plans be made at once to increase the frequency of raids...to obtain prisoners and worry and confuse the Communist coastal defenses."⁸ The United States' interaction with Chiang's government following deneutralization was not that of a mutual partnership between two allied nations. The American requests of Nationalist China displayed an expectation of fealty rather than of mutual cooperation. While deneutralization had returned sovereignty to Nationalist China, it awarded far more control of Taiwan to Washington than it did to Chiang Kai-shek or his government.

Though the Eisenhower Administration positioned its involvement with Taiwan as a weapon against Communist China, it resisted the establishment of a formal military commitment with Chiang or his government. The Eisenhower Administration had been very careful to avoid any binding pledges to American intervention in the Taiwan Strait and it intended to maintain the political flexibility granted by an ambiguous military commitment. At an ambassadorial meeting with the Republic of China on March 19, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles fielded Nationalist China's request for the creation of a mutual security pact with the United States. Communicating the Eisenhower Administration's hesitation, Secretary Dulles stated that "the United States would not want to make a treaty which would result in a commitment for the United States to go to war on the mainland."⁹ The maintenance of an ambiguous commitment satisfied President Eisenhower's objectives while a formal agreement would threaten the Administration's ability to detach itself from a situation that was potentially unproductive to American interests. A formal military commitment would have undermined the Eisenhower Administration's exploitation of the strategic advantage granted them by militarizing Taiwan.

Seeking to maintain diplomatic flexibility in its relationship with Taiwan, it was essential that the Eisenhower Administration manage the allocation of military aid to Nationalist China in a manner conducive to American objectives. The same distrust that prevented the Eisenhower Administration from committing to a formal military agreement with Chiang Kai-shek also influenced the United States' policy of militarizing Taiwan. At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 27, 1953, the American military leadership discussed the diplomatic risks associated with providing military equipment to Nationalist China. With a delivery of long range bombers en route to Taiwan, the United States was directly providing Chiang with what General James Collins called "offensive capability in the form of jet aircraft."¹⁰ The question now before the Joint Chiefs was whether the United States was "prepared to defend Formosa against Chinese Communist attack if the attack was in response to Chinese Nationalist action."¹¹ The consensus of the meeting was that the solution to the problem lay in the provision of the aid itself. Because Nationalist China was dependent on American military assistance, the United States could maintain "control over Chiang Kai-shek by

⁷ Rankin to Dulles, Feb. 1, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:135-136.

⁸ Chase to Chow, Feb. 5, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:136-137.

⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles to Koo, Mar. 19, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:157-160.

¹⁰ Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Collins to Department of State – Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Mar. 27, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:164-169.

¹¹ Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Vandenberg to DOS – JCS Meeting, in *Ibid.*

reason of the paucity of his capabilities.”¹² The United States used its military aid and support to Taiwan as leverage to coerce Chiang and his government into aligning themselves with American interests.

While militarizing Chiang’s Nationalist government was necessary to the Eisenhower Administration’s application of pressure to Communist China, maintaining control over the equipment’s use was essential. Given that both the United States and the Republic of China pursued different outcomes, the Eisenhower Administration was justifiably concerned with how Chiang would allocate American military aid. This concern was communicated to Secretary Dulles in a letter from the Joint Chiefs on March 31, 1953 stating, “Chiang Kai-shek will be very unhappy if an armistice is achieved in Korea: he wants to broaden the conflict, not end it. He may well be tempted to undertake some adventures with his F-84’s either with or without a deliberate intention of involving the US in a broader war with Communist China.”¹³ Chiang’s unpredictability now posed a diplomatic challenge to the Eisenhower Administration. While the success of American interests required the United States to support Nationalist China militarily, it also necessitated a private constraint of Chiang’s aggressive behavior. The result was the creation of a diplomatic policy that utilized American military aid as a form of diplomatic currency. While the Eisenhower Administration had publicly promoted the Republic of China as an independent partner, it simultaneously restrained the Nationalist government from engaging in aggressive and potentially compromising military ventures by repeatedly threatening to withhold military assistance.

Recognizing the risks associated with providing offensive capability to Nationalist China, the Eisenhower Administration used its military aid and support to Taiwan as leverage to coerce Chiang and his government into aligning themselves with American interests. At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 8, 1953, President Eisenhower ordered the delivery of all shipments of American jet aircraft to be halted until Chiang agreed to what the President called, “a commitment to play ball with the United States.”¹⁴ The Eisenhower Administration issued Chiang a formal ultimatum on April 17, 1953 stating, “Chinese Nationalist forces will not engage in offensive operations considered by the United States to be inimical to the best interests of the United States...Jet aircraft now scheduled early delivery Formosa cannot be delivered until commitment obtained.”¹⁵ The Eisenhower Administration’s experiment in diplomatic extortion proved successful. On April 23, 1953, the United States received a formal commitment from Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government agreeing to American terms. With the receipt of Chiang’s agreement in hand, the United States resumed delivery of military aid to Taiwan, and so continued its application of pressure upon the Communist mainland. The United States’ restraint of Chiang Kai-shek was an overt demonstration of the Eisenhower Administration’s turn to “heavy-handed” diplomacy. The mutual partnership forged from deneutralization was exposed as nothing more than a façade.¹⁶

As diplomatic talks between the United States and Communist China had resumed by June of 1953, the creation of an armistice in Korea appeared to be increasingly probable. The Eisenhower Administration tactfully employed Nationalist China as a threat to the Communist mainland and was successful in preserving American interests. At a meeting to determine the nature of Sino-American cooperation post-Korean War, Chiang Kai-shek expressed his frustration to American military personnel saying, “The strategic and political importance of China in the Free World struggle against Communism was still being overlooked in the United States.” He further expressed his hope that the United States “would recognize this principle in developing a positive policy towards the Far East.”¹⁷ When the Korean War ended with the Panmunjom Armistice on July 27, 1953, the United States had established a sustainable presence throughout East Asia. While the Republic of China had been a beneficiary of American military aid, the Eisenhower Administration prioritized American objectives at the expense of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government.

The Eisenhower Administration’s implementation of an increasingly assertive posture towards East Asia signaled a dramatic shift in the direction of American foreign policy. The deneutralization of the Taiwan Strait and the establishment of military coordination with the Chinese Nationalist government were essential investments towards achieving the broader American objective of applying pressure on the Communist mainland. Though the Eisenhower Administration publicly promoted the Republic of China as a sovereign partner, it simultaneously restrained Chiang’s military capabilities within the confines of diplomatic negotiations. The United States repeatedly used its military aid and support to Taiwan as leverage to privately coerce Chiang and his government into aligning themselves with American interests. President Eisenhower’s effective use of public hostility and private restraint in the final months of the Korean War introduced what would eventually become American Cold War strategy, with emphasis being placed on military deterrence as opposed to conventional warfare.

¹² Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Fechteler to DOS – JCS Meeting, in *Ibid.*

¹³ Matthews to Dulles, Mar. 31, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:169-170.

¹⁴ Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Eisenhower to National Security Council, Apr. 8, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:180-183.

¹⁵ Dulles to Rankin, Apr. 17, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:191-192.

¹⁶ Jones to the Department of State, Apr. 23, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:193-194.

¹⁷ Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Chiang to Radford, Jun. 18, 1953, in *FRUS 1952-54*, 14:205-210.

The Soldiers at Home: Reconciling the Ideals and Realities of Gender Relations in Nazi Germany

CARLA GEGLIO

The Nazi regime took control of Germany in 1933.¹ At this pivotal moment in history, Berlin was the cultural and intellectual center of Germany. One of the great European capitals, Berlin was home to museums, concert halls, the famous Tiergarten. A mere fifteen years later, the city was a virtual wasteland, diminished to rubble and smoke. The once majestic Berlin was ravaged by the violence and destruction of the Second World War. Beyond just the ruination of the physical landscape, the people of Berlin were utterly devastated, reduced to “mere shadows of human beings.”² While war may conjure images of tanks and guns, soldiers and generals, another side of combat exists. The home front is a universal element of war: a realm dominated by women, children, and the elderly. Berlin was no exception, overwhelmingly populated by women during World War II. Although their gender spared them from the horrors facing soldiers on the battlefields of Europe, women too witnessed a heavy barrage of wartime atrocities. The Second World War was a conflict that was indiscriminate in the reach of its brutalities.

World War II has all but faded from immediate memory, drifting instead to the pages of history books. Amongst these texts exists a special breed more rich, more compelling, than the rest. Personal accounts of the war, narratives composed from diaries and recollections, are uniquely adept at conveying the realities of war; they resonate more deeply than a timeline or secondhand version of the war possibly could. Helga Schneider, Christabel Bielenberg, and a woman known only as Anonymous, each published an account of her experiences living in Berlin during the war. These three women hailed from entirely different backgrounds: their age, education, employment, and social status all varied. The unique vantage points represented in these women’s stories offer glimpses of a Berlin marred by war and violence; a Berlin where politics lost meaning, food became a rarity, and sex, a currency born of desperation. Perhaps most significant, these women reveal a Berlin whose traditional cultural values were in a state of upheaval. The women this paper will study witnessed and participated in a wartime transformation of gender relations. Each woman saw traditional German gender ideals – ideals that were eventually espoused by the Nazi regime – universally give way to the daily demands of the home front and the more pressing fight to survive. German women were forced to reconcile prewar gender expectations with the unavoidable adoption of war-specific roles. Furthermore, war demanded that these women reexamine the meaning of masculinity in the context of a feminine home front. Anonymous, Schneider, and Bielenberg represent three distinct examples of women who acquired new wartime roles and witnessed other women do the same. This paper will present a brief history of twentieth-century German gender relations in order to evaluate the transformation of gender relations seen within these women’s personal narratives. The collective experiences of these women demonstrate the limits of the traditional German gender ideals of a male breadwinner and a female housewife in a wartime environment where survival demanded women’s acquisition of supplementary and nontraditional roles.

Prior to World War I, German culture tended towards a traditional perspective on gender relations. A woman’s place was in the home; her primary role was as a mother. Nancy Reagan explained in *Sweeping the German Nation*, “The evolution of gender roles in German society during the late nineteenth century produced an ideal of the ‘German’ housewife, household, and domestic practices that became interwoven with Germans’ national identity.”³ The feminine ideal was dependent on men’s ability to earn money and support their families. This “breadwinner-housewife” relationship defined Germany’s ideal family dynamic.⁴ Conventional gender relations went largely unchallenged until World War I. The First World War began during an age of industrialization and rapid technological advancement.⁵ This climate facilitated an unprecedented amount of destruction in a short amount of time. Germany was inadequately prepared for the intensity of total warfare.⁶ As the war progressed, it was evident that any hope of success on the battlefield required the cooperation of the home front. In order to utilize the home front’s resources, the German government set the doctrine of domesticity aside and encouraged women to participate in the war effort. Women took positions in factories, in hospitals, and even “behind the lines,” as communications operators.⁷ The First World

¹ Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Shuler-Springorum, eds., *Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 2.

² Helga Schneider, *The Bonfire of Berlin* (London: Random House, 2005), 96.

³ Nancy R. Reagan, *Sweeping the German Nation: Domesticity and National Identity in Germany, 1870-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5.

⁴ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

War demanded a temporary realignment of gender roles as women were asked to assume positions that removed them from the home and contradicted the established prewar expectations for females.

The wartime agitation of gender roles was promptly quieted following Germany's brutal defeat. After World War I, the newly instated Weimar Republic sought to right a broken nation. One of the key methods employed by the postwar government was a conscious realignment of gender roles. Germany's loss had taken a toll on the returning troops. These men had failed to live up to the masculine ideals associated with soldiers; they had failed to protect and secure victory for their homeland. In her article "Home/Front: The Military, Violence and Gender Relations in the Age of World Wars," Karen Hagemann explained, "After the war, the gender order, which had been disrupted by the particular requirements of total war, was reestablished with a vengeance [...] because of its central significance for stabilizing the entire social order."⁸ While the First World War may have offered German women some flexibility with their previously ascribed gender roles, the Weimar Republic aimed to regress to prewar gender dynamics. In a seemingly contradictory move, the Republic granted women legal equality in 1919.⁹ However, the intimidating political climate of the time meant that women were unlikely to publicly demand acknowledgement of their newly won rights.¹⁰ The Republic's attitude was centered on the idea that, as Reagin explained, "Only a prewar standard of German domesticity could restore family life and thus, save the nation."¹¹

The Weimar Republic's emphasis on a restoration of a traditional gender order in German society endured even after the fall of the Republic. The Nazi regime replaced the Weimar Republic in 1933, a power shift that marked a monumental turning point in the history of Germany. However, in the context of gender relations, this shift was less perceptible. Interwar Nazism generally extolled the same gender ideals as the Weimar Republic had previously.¹² In *Gender Relations in German History*, Lynn Abrams outlined the Nazi perspective: "Men's heroic, intellectual natures fitted them for a life of work, politics and courageous struggle, while women's maternal, sentimental natures fitted them for motherhood and self-sacrifice in support of husband [and] family."¹³ Nazism employed propaganda extensively to reinforce gender ideals in the continuing attempt to reestablish the prewar gender order. This propaganda included female-targeted radio programs that aimed "to nurture the idea of motherhood and the family."¹⁴ Abrams wrote, "many of these [propaganda] techniques had been pioneered [...] during the Weimar Republic and now came to inform the practices of a great deal of the Nazis' broadcast propaganda."¹⁵ The Nazi propaganda asserted women's patriotic duty to revert to their prewar position in German society. Central to this idea was the pervasive attempt to charge women and other home front proprietors with the loss of the First World War. Placing the blame on women was a defensive measure: it allowed for the avoidance of postwar doubts concerning German ideals of masculinity and the integrity of the German army. By suggesting that the home front had let down German soldiers during the war, the returning men could more easily reinsert themselves into the societal hierarchy that unanimously placed men above women.

The efforts of the Nazi regime and gendered propaganda were largely successful in reasserting a gender hierarchy in interwar Germany. However, the nation's entrance into the Second World War once again brought ascribed gender roles into question. As in World War I, German women were asked to contribute to the war effort. In a 1943 speech, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, specifically "called upon all 'German women' to make a 'sacrifice.'"¹⁶ However, the Nazi regime deviated from Germany's approach to women's wartime employment during the First World War. Hagemann explained:

The Nazi state filled the gap left by the male breadwinner's military service far more successfully than the imperial German government had done. In so doing, it sought to preserve even in wartime the model of the 'breadwinner-housewife' [...] Accordingly, Nazi propaganda clung to the pre-war model of womanhood, which permitted unmarried but not married 'German women' to work outside the home. The latter was relegated to their duties as housewives and mothers.¹⁷

Despite Nazi endeavors to retain a sense of domestic normalcy in Germany, the war soon permeated the home front and subverted prewar gender expectations.

⁸ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Reagin, *Sweeping the German Nation*, 104.

¹² *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³ Lynn Abrams, *Gender Relations in German History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 190.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁶ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

During World War II, women's survival on the female-dominated home front became increasingly dependent on their assumption of nontraditional responsibilities. In *The Bonfire of Berlin*, Helga Schneider wrote about her experience as a child in Berlin during World War II. Schneider's narrative provides examples of women who took positions of leadership on the home front to compensate for the absence of men. Although Schneider was very young during the war, she was able to recognize a dramatic dismissal of previous German gender ideals. Schneider witnessed the women around her take on formerly masculine duties and responsibilities in order to survive in a war-torn Berlin, abandoning previously held gender expectations. Schneider's age meant that she wholly relied on others to take care of her. In her account, women stepped forward to feed, protect, and comfort the children, the elderly, and the men deemed unfit to fight. These women effectively functioned as the primary breadwinners, protectors, and leaders of the home front.

At the very start of the war, Schneider was confronted with shifting gender roles. Both of her parents left Berlin to contribute to the war effort. Her father was conscripted by the German army in 1941.¹⁸ Although he was "a fervent antimilitarist," his gender and health signified an implicit duty to participate on the front lines.¹⁹ Schneider explained that she had trouble comparing her pacifist father, an artist, to the heroic soldiers of Nazi propaganda: "It was difficult for me to reconcile him with my ideal."²⁰ While Schneider's father was required to leave his family for the sake of the war, Schneider's mother did so voluntarily. With blatant resentment, Schneider explained that her mother "convinced herself that serving the Führer's cause was more honourable than raising her own children."²¹ Her mother's behavior is interesting because in order to serve the Nazi cause, she completely went against the Nazi ideal; she abandoned her role as a wife and mother entirely. Schneider's mother and father both took on new roles in the context of war. Her father was forced to adhere to prescribed wartime gender roles. As a soldier, he was assigned the singularly male task of protecting the home front and serving his country in battle. Schneider's mother, in contrast, used war as a means of obtaining a position outside of the home, thus defying gender expectations and abandoning her prewar domesticity.

Schneider's parents divorced during the war, drifting further from the prewar model of the ideal German family. Her father remarried just a few months later. Schneider's stepmother, Ursula, became responsible for Schneider and her younger brother, Peter, while their father was on the front. Ursula was an adamant supporter of the Nazi regime. Her sister worked for the Ministry of Propaganda and, through this connection, Ursula arranged for Schneider and Peter to meet Hitler. Peter saw Hitler as a heroic figure; Schneider wrote, "It is his great dream to see the Führer. For him [...] the Führer is God."²² In contrast, Schneider was very much opposed to Hitler and Nazism. This is rather amazing considering that both of her parents were involved in the war and her stepmother was vocally very supportive of the Nazi regime. However, Schneider's school headmistress proved to be a strong influence in shaping her political views. Schneider described her headmistress as a "passionate anti-Nazi [who] made no secret of it."²³ While Schneider modeled her headmistress's beliefs; her younger brother wholeheartedly modeled their stepmother's and seemingly bought-in to Nazi propaganda. Although her stepmother and headmistress held entirely different political beliefs, both women had to assume war-specific responsibilities. Schneider's stepmother was expected to support Schneider and Peter, two children she had only known for a short time. Schneider's headmistress was responsible for the well-being of an entire boarding school full of children, many of whom were orphans and had nowhere else to go once the war began. In this way, the war functioned as an equalizer for those left behind on the home front. Schneider's narrative demonstrates that women of all ideological and social backgrounds took on new roles to survive in an environment of war.

Schneider spent most of the war – most of her early childhood – confined to the cellar of her apartment building. This cellar offered protection to Schneider's family as well as many of her neighbors. With the exception of her brother and her stepmother's father, nearly everyone with whom Schneider associated during the war was female. Schneider noted that women took on the roles of leadership within her cellar. She wrote, "Women [...] had to assume the task of supplying water and food."²⁴ Females acted as the breadwinners in the environment of her cellar. They were tasked with waiting in the queues and organizing supplies; they protected and consoled their children and the elderly inhabitants of the cellar. Hagemann explained that this female leadership was not unique to Schneider's experience: "Women left behind were forced more and more to replace the men [...] by assuming responsibility for the livelihood and survival of their families."²⁵ Women's survival on the home front was universally linked to their

¹⁸ Schneider, *The Bonfire of Berlin*, 7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

²² Schneider, *The Bonfire of Berlin*, 77.

²³ *Ibid.*, 39.

²⁴ Schneider, *The Bonfire of Berlin*, 121.

²⁵ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 3.

adoption of responsibilities formerly associated with men.

One of the more traumatizing aspects of Schneider's childhood was her exposure to sexual violence. Schneider had never heard the word "rape" before the war. When Soviet soldiers began to occupy Berlin, Schneider wrote, "Although I didn't actually know what it meant, there was much talk of rape."²⁶ She saw the rape of several girls in her cellar by Soviet soldiers. Schneider eventually witnessed the death of one of these girls, a result of the significant blood loss she sustained. As a child and as a female, these experiences had an intensely negative effect on Schneider's feelings towards men. She wrote, "I decided that no man would ever touch me, men were nothing but ferocious beasts."²⁷ Schneider noted that only the female occupants of the cellar attempted to defend the young girls from the Soviet soldiers; the male occupants failed to offer protection.

Schneider's age during the war may have affected her response to Nazi propaganda. The images she was bombarded with at the start of the war, images of heroic soldiers, the ideal protectors, simply did not hold up to the realities of her experience. Virtually orphaned by the war, Schneider faced the trauma of growing up, underground, in a Berlin where men were nearly absent. Both the men on the front and the men at home failed to protect German women from the horrors of war. Schneider witnessed a diminishment of German masculinity as a whole. She, however, also bore witness to strong-minded women, like her stepmother and her headmistress. These women functioned as Schneider's protectors when the men could not. Schneider saw an entire city of women step up to fill the void left by men on the front. Even as a child, Schneider could recognize the significant changes that occurred in terms of gender roles and expectations during the war.

Schneider witnessed women around her take on wartime roles rather than acquiring a new role herself. Christabel Bielenberg, in contrast, took on a supplementary wartime role and also witnessed other women assume uniquely war-related responsibilities. In *When I Was a German*, Bielenberg wrote about her experiences as a woman involved with the Resistance during World War II. Bielenberg was a housewife before the war, although she opposed the idea that a woman's place should necessarily be confined to the home. During the war, Bielenberg remained a housewife but additionally assumed a war-specific role as a member of the Resistance. Her involvement with the Resistance was motivated by both her opposition to Nazism and her desire to expedite the end of the war. On the surface, Bielenberg personified the Nazi ideal of a woman and mother. Privately, in terms of her political ideology, she represented quite the opposite.

Bielenberg, her husband Peter, and their three children lived in Berlin from 1939 to 1943.²⁸ When Bielenberg married Peter, a German lawyer, she was forced to forfeit her British citizenship and become a German citizen. This was not an identity that Bielenberg accepted with enthusiasm. In fact, her narrative is peppered with pointedly disparaging comments about Nazism and the values that the regime held as paramount. At one point, Bielenberg referred to Nazis as "crackpots."²⁹ Germany's traditional views on gender relations were particularly hard for Bielenberg to swallow. Bielenberg wrote, "Independence, financial or otherwise, was not a state of affairs to be encouraged in a German woman; it might arouse and set in motion quite a number of disturbing phenomena which had up to date slumbered peacefully in the German social scene."³⁰ Bielenberg believed that the Nazi ideals concerning a woman's place in society were archaic. However, as a woman living in Germany, she was expected to adhere to the Nazi's female paragon. Because Bielenberg had a family and, thus, was "not a free agent," she had to tread carefully, balancing a public identity as an upstanding German mother and another as an active member of the Resistance.³¹ One scene from her narrative perfectly demonstrates her ability to navigate between these contrasting spheres. One evening, Bielenberg played the role of a gracious hostess for some neighbors. She donned an apron, prepared a crayfish dinner, and politely attended to her guests. However, upon discerning that they too were against Nazi politics, the shutters were closed as English dancing music was put on and her husband performed unflattering impressions of Hitler.³²

The war acted as an avenue for women to take on political roles that were not necessary during peacetime. Through her connections with the Resistance, Bielenberg found herself in the company of many like-minded women who were similarly trying to toe the line between their public roles as wives and mothers and their private roles as resisters. These women each assumed war-specific roles that subverted their prewar identities as model German housewives. In another scene from her narrative, Bielenberg attended a luncheon with a handful of fellow Resistance women and, conspicuously, one very pro-Hitler woman. A resister named Mary, unaware that she was not entirely in the company of comrades, made several negative comments about Hitler. Mary's comments were reported to the

²⁶ Schneider, *The Bonfire of Berlin*, 147.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁸ Christabel Bielenberg, *When I Was a German, 1934-1945: An Englishwoman in Nazi Germany* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 47.

²⁹ Bielenberg, *When I Was a German*, 76.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 113.

³² *Ibid.*, 79.

authorities by the pro-Hitler woman. In the subsequent investigation, the other women all lied to protect Mary. Bielenberg wrote, “Nothing could seem more natural than for eight respectable ladies to commit perjury most willingly and to swear that the fatal words complained of were just not spoken.”³³ This instance presents a prime example of the shift in gender relations that Bielenberg witnessed during World War II. These “perjurers” were not concerned with fulfilling their duties to the Nazi regime by turning in Mary. Women resisters similar to Bielenberg conformed to Germany’s ideal gender roles before the war. However, during the war, these women acquired nontraditional roles by contributing to a movement that specifically aimed to obstruct Nazism, thus demonstrating the failure of the regime’s gender expectations to take precedence in a wartime environment.

The final narrative this paper will discuss presents perhaps the most dramatic example of shifting gender roles in Berlin. The narrative’s author, known only as Anonymous, experienced a near absolute reversal of gender roles. Her diary, an extraordinarily eloquent record of her wartime experience, was published in 1954 under the title *A Woman in Berlin*. Anonymous was a German woman in her early thirties when war broke out in her native Germany. Unlike Bielenberg and Schneider, Anonymous’s fight to survive led her to assume the role of the breadwinner and protector of her adopted wartime family: a widowed neighbor and the widow’s ailing male tenant. Anonymous resembles many of the women described in Schneider’s narrative, women who took on traditionally masculine roles during wartime. Like Schneider, Anonymous spent a fair amount of the war in the basement of her apartment building. This underground shelter was shared by both men and women. In Anonymous’s experience, women nearly exclusively took on the roles of leaders within her shelter community. She compared her shelter-mates to soldiers, the females acting as commanders. It is in this context of women’s wartime leadership that she wrote, “I have to relearn everything I’ve been taught about women in war.”³⁴

Anonymous’s recognition of the abandonment of prewar gender ideals is perhaps most clear in her descriptions of German soldiers. After it had become clear that Germany was nearing defeat, she encountered a number of soldiers to whom she referred as “miserable and powerless.”³⁵ She later went as far as to call men in general “the weaker sex.”³⁶ Her descriptors illustrate not a master-race army, but a group of men exhausted by the trials of war. Indicating her disappointment in Nazism and its notions of the heroic male ideal, Anonymous wrote, “the Nazi world – ruled by men, glorifying the strong man – is beginning to crumble, and with it the myth of ‘Man.’”³⁷ Anonymous witnessed German men, still licking their wounds from the first Great War, struggling to recognize yet another loss. Illustrating their demoralization, she wrote, “Losing two world wars hits damned deep.”³⁸ Once painted as heroes by Nazi propaganda, the men Anonymous saw were “all fought out.”³⁹ Anonymous’s portrait of German men stands in stark contrast to the legion of German women that collectively rose to the occasion and took up wartime responsibilities that Nazi values would never have ascribed to them. Unlike Schneider and Bielenberg, Anonymous began the war supporting the Nazi regime. By the end of the war, Anonymous fully acknowledged the Nazi government’s failure to live up to its promises of an ideal Germany. Anonymous felt abandoned by the government that had subjected her to the grim realities facing women on the home front.

Sexual violence played a central role in the Anonymous’s wartime experience. She was the victim of rape by Soviet soldiers occupying Berlin. Eschewing any shred of self-pity, Anonymous eventually used sex as a way of obtaining food and protection; sex enabled her to fulfill her wartime role as the head of her pseudo family unit. This is certainly not what Goebbels had in mind when he called for women to make sacrifices at the beginning of the war.⁴⁰ According to Anonymous, rape was a “collective experience” for German women.⁴¹ Women asked each other about their encounters with rape as they would ask each other about the weather. This extreme normalization of sexual violence is a testament to the degree of suffering women on the home front endured. Anonymous relayed one conversation with a friend of hers in which, before the word “rape” could even escape her lips, her friend hastily responded, “Only once, the first day.”⁴² When comparing the Nazi feminine ideal to a body of women that openly discussed their experiences with rape, the limitations of prewar gender ideals are obvious.

Anonymous expressed a universal concern that German women had for keeping knowledge of their rape experiences from their husbands on the front. There was a general agreement amongst these women that their men would view them as tainted if they knew that they had been raped. This was a reality that Anonymous faced upon her

³³ Bielenberg, *When I Was a German*, 93.

³⁴ Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City* (New York: Harcourt, 1954), 29.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁸ Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin*, 255.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁰ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 1.

⁴¹ Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin*, 147.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 163.

fiancé's return from the front. He treated Anonymous with disgust; she wrote, "For him I've been spoiled once and for all."⁴³ This reaction might best be attributed to returning soldiers' reluctance to acknowledge their failure to defend the home front. Hagemann addressed this sentiment: "The conscripted men no longer functioned as 'breadwinners.' As the war went on they also became increasingly ineffective as 'protectors.'"⁴⁴ Rather than respond with guilt to the acts of sexual violence experienced by German women, German men outwardly responded with repulsion. Men like Anonymous's fiancé failed to admit their inability to live up to their gender ideal while criticizing German women for the same deficiency.

Anonymous, Bielenberg, and Schneider each witnessed a dramatic shift in gender expectations during the Second World War. Anonymous assumed the role of a breadwinner, Bielenberg balanced her duties as a housewife and a resister, and Schneider depended on the women around her to protect and support her. Their individual experiences, when taken together, illustrate the extensive effect World War II had in altering gender relations on the home front. Although Germany's longstanding gender traditions and ideals were tested by the First World War, the Weimar Republic and the successive Nazi regime reintegrated gender ideals into interwar German society. However, as these narratives demonstrate, even the seemingly indestructible Nazi regime could not maintain a strict gender order in Germany during wartime. Women were forced to assume formerly masculine roles in order to survive the harsh realities of the home front. The Second World War was a conflict that affected people of all ages, family situations, and nationalities. Beyond individually altering the people of Berlin, the war disrupted the entire social structure and gender order of German society. Male soldiers may have carried guns and walked battlefields, the women on the home front faced a war of their own, a war of survival, that necessitated a departure from traditional German gender ideals.

⁴³ Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin*, 259.

⁴⁴ Hagemann and Shuler-Springorum, *Home/Front*, 3.

‘Gens Anglorum’ & ‘Normanitas’: The Bayeux Tapestry and the Effects of the Norman Conquest on Language and the Arts

SARA ELAINE JACKSON

In the Bayeux War Cemetery, within the département of Calvados in northwestern France, the largest contingent of Commonwealth casualties on French soil in World War II is interred. Immediately opposite the graveyard, a white stone memorial pays tribute to all those who perished in the Allied forces’ invasion of Normandy (including approximately 1,800 troops for whom no grave is known) which took place during Operation Overlord in early June 1944.¹ At the top of this memorial, an inscription in Latin reads, “NOS A GLIELMO VICTI VICTORIS PATRIAM LIBERAVIMUS.” In translation, the quotation is at once revealing and poignant: “We, [once] conquered by William, have freed the conqueror’s country.”² Nearly a millennium has passed, and yet the watershed events of 1066 continue to inspire sentiment, instigate scholarship, and invite scrutiny.

Less than a mile from the aforementioned cemetery, there survives a textile chronicle of William the Conqueror’s successful invasion of England. This work, the Bayeux Tapestry, commences its tale of the Norman Conquest with the portrayal of events that took place more than a decade prior to William’s departure from the coast of France and precipitous arrival in Pevensey.³ Edward the Confessor, having returned from exile to rule as king of the Anglo-Saxons for more than two decades, reigns in absence of a successor. Uneasy lies the crown, one might observe; he is shown here in a meeting – perhaps with advisors, perchance in secret – in the opening scene. Could this signal the existence of prevailing concern about a likely succession crisis? A few panels later, Earl Harold Godwineson of Wessex, one potential heir, is depicted sailing (possibly dispatched at the behest of Edward) to meet with another: William, then Duke of Normandy.⁴ What happened thereafter, as recounted in the Tapestry, has been the subject of scholarly investigation and debate almost since the events occurred: Harold swears an oath of fealty to William while in France, ostensibly to secure his own release from the custody of Count Guy of Ponthieu, and sails home to inform the king. In failing health, Edward makes a deathbed promise or “*verba novissima*” gift of the throne to Harold, which supercedes (in both of their minds at least) Edward’s earlier “*post obitum*” promise to William, as well as Harold’s own oath. Godwineson is then crowned King Harold II in the consecrated yet incomplete Westminster Abbey on 6 January 1066.⁵ And thus begins a pivotal year in which armies clash, leadership changes, and identities merge.

While the effects of the conquest on contemporary conceptions of identity manifest themselves in a variety of ways, there are compelling reasons to examine the consequences of the invasion exclusively as they were manifested within language and the arts. First, the amalgamation and assimilation that took place between the cultures of the defeated Anglo-Saxon denizens of Britain and their victorious Norman counterparts is, on the whole, best illustrated through extant textual works, including non-literary sources such as the Bayeux Tapestry. Although there is substantial textual bias inherent in any primary source from this period (the substance of which depends primarily upon an author’s origin), academics seem to agree that the contextual value of the works produced in the aftermath is paramount. The selection of words and phrases that signal subtle shifts in the accepted linguistic mores of the post-Conquest era in England yield some of the most revealing insights into the prevailing attitudes of both the victims and the

¹ Official statistics from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) show that, of the 4,648 total burials within the Bayeux War Cemetery, a total of 4,143 are for troops holding citizenship status within the Commonwealth of Nations. For purposes of contrast, the largest CWGC cemetery in France in terms of total Commonwealth burials (Étaples Military Cemetery, near Calais) dates from World War I and holds 10,115 dead from that conflict alone (further casualties were interred during World War II – a total of 119).

² Translation provided by Dr. Damian Fleming, Medieval Studies Program Coordinator and Assistant Professor of English, Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne.

³ The Bayeux Tapestry is so named because of its status as a holding of Bayeux Cathedral, which can be traced back to as early as 1476 via an inventory of the church’s possessions. In point of fact, the work is not tapestry but embroidery of wool thread on a linen surface. Andrew Bridgeford, *1066: The Hidden History in the Bayeux Tapestry* (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), 27, 4, 3; R. Allen Brown, “The Norman Impact,” *History Today* 36 (February 1986): 9–16.

⁴ The son of Earl Godwine of Wessex, Harold possessed vast wealth and power thanks to his family’s close yet tenuous connections with the royal house of Edward the Confessor. While this connection was important politically, the Godwineson family nevertheless proved an almost constant challenge to the king’s sovereignty, and many of Godwine’s offspring were exiled along with their father in 1051. Harold’s claim to the throne was predicated upon his sister Edith’s marriage to Edward, as well as the Danish lineage he shared with several of Edward’s predecessors, including Cnut, Harold I, and Harthacnut. Richard Huscroft, *The Norman Conquest: A New Introduction* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2009), 89–101.

⁵ Owing to his own kind treatment by relatives during his exile in Normandy, as well as his ill feelings towards the family of Earl Godwine, Edward the Confessor seemingly favored the young Duke of Normandy for succession at an earlier point, and it is suggested by contemporary chroniclers William of Jumièges and William de Poitiers that Robert de Jumièges was sent by Edward in 1051 to offer the crown to William. Bridgeford, *1066*, 109, 94–95, 115.

victorious.⁶

Second, there is a wealth of artistic and architectural examples that expose the mingling and merging of disparate styles, reflective of both Anglo-Saxon and Norman tradition. As with the literary output of this period, there are often cultural biases to overcome; the Bayeux Tapestry, with its seemingly pro-Norman stance, is an excellent example of this phenomenon. Despite the fact that, at the time of the Conquest, the vast majority of the residents of England likely had no direct concern regarding the eventual replacement for Edward the Confessor, there does seem to be a propagandist slant to certain contemporary sources in favor of each of the “candidates.”⁷ While the Bayeux Tapestry was viewed for many years as being a Norman creation that perpetuates strictly Norman accounts of the invasion, recent scholarship suggests that the Tapestry was, in fact, created in England by artisans of both continental and insular descent; consequently, some historians believe it offers a somewhat subversive take on the whole affair, if examined within the proper scope.⁸ It may be tempting to argue for the existence of a contemporary dichotomy that would align with the current trend towards binary comparison; however, the mingling of artistic styles and linguistic developments that took place in England after the Norman Conquest reflect that synthesis, rather than subjugation, was the primary effect of the Conquest. Further, this cultural fusion seems to have been the case whether the artifact or person in question was of Anglo-Saxon or Norman origin.

The Bayeux Tapestry, one of the best-known relics of William’s age, bears out this theory of cultural synthesis, which is now enthusiastically embraced within more recent scholarship. The concepts of identity and individuality, as understood by those living in this period, have been a subject of contention among scholars for many decades. The crux of the debate seems to reside in whether these ideas were “re-discovered” (in the post-Classicism sense) in the Middle Ages, or whether that development was “the prerogative of Renaissance Europe.”⁹ One of the most compelling arguments for synthesis refers to the English, or “gens Anglorum,” as possessing a strong Anglo-Saxon identity that successfully resisted obsolescence in the face of the “Normanitas,” or distinct medieval Norman identity, of their conquerors. Instead, one sees both change and continuity, argue many scholars; the English were “willing and able to work with, absorb, and integrate the invaders.”¹⁰ Because of the arguable heterogeneity of the Normans themselves and their lack of a “strong ideological association with being a Norman,” it was easy for this merger to occur over a relatively short period of time.¹¹ The absence of fundamental religious differences also proved instrumental in this process.

Having already discussed its opening sequence, it seems fitting to examine the Bayeux Tapestry’s content, relevant context, and the many speculations regarding its purpose and provenance; this is especially pertinent given that close analysis reveals a strong correlation between the Tapestry and the overarching concepts of identity in this period. The work was long thought to be a Norman commission, embroidered by Norman artisans, and rife with Norman self-aggrandizement; one popular local legend held that Queen Matilda, William’s wife, was herself responsible for its design as a commemorative souvenir of her husband’s triumph, and that her ladies-in-waiting had been the

⁶ As one might imagine, “the surviving sources for the Conquest still present a far from complete picture.” One must contend with a very different sense of historicity with regards to the primary sources from this age; objectivity was not of paramount concern (perhaps, for some, it was not a concern at all). Comparison of any available work with others covering the same events or time period is necessary steps in determining credibility. Huscroft, *New Introduction*, 3; see also Antonia Gransden, *Historical Writing in England c. 550 to c. 1307* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 92-104, 136-65.

⁷ In addition to William of Normandy and Harold Godwinson, there was a third ‘dark horse’ potential heir to Edward the Confessor: Edgar Ætheling, the teenaged grandson of King Edward’s half-brother Edmund “Ironside,” who had been living in exile with his father in Hungary. Although he was elected by the *Witenagemot* (aristocratic assembly) to the throne following Harold’s defeat at the Battle of Hastings, he was never crowned. Just before William’s coronation, Edgar was taken to submit to him formally at Berkhamsted, ending his brief and unconsummated reign. Huscroft, *New Introduction*, 96–109; see also Antonia Gransden, “1066 And All That Revised,” *History Today* 38, no. 9 (September 1988): 47-52.

⁸ In his authoritative and exhaustive examination of the Norman Conquest, Freeman maintained and furthered the accepted scholarly opinion that the Tapestry told the tale from a decidedly Norman perspective, yet allowed for its creation on English soil. Edward A. Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its Causes and Its Results* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1876), 3:563-75. Many historians, led by the pioneering studies of David Bernstein (*The Mystery of the Bayeux Tapestry*) and Richard D. Wissolik (“The Saxon Statement: Code in the Bayeux Tapestry,” in *Annuaire Mediaevale*, Volume 19), have begun to question the previously unchallenged view that the Tapestry is a solely pro-Norman piece of sentimental propaganda. Bridgeford, 1066, 311, 334, 341; Brian Golding, *Conquest and Colonization: The Normans in Britain, 1066-1100* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 28; Elizabeth van Houts, “The Trauma of 1066,” *History Today* 46, no. 10 (October 1996): 9-15.

⁹ Alcuin Blamires, “Individuality,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Literature in English*, ed. Elaine Treharne, Greg Walker, and William Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 479; Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England*, 4:16-17, 326; Marjorie Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England, 1066-1166* (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986), 208; John Hutchinson, “Debate on Krishan Kumar’s *The Making of English National Identity*,” *Nations & Nationalism* 13 (April 2007): 182-86; Ann Williams, *The English and The Norman Conquest* (Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press, 1995), 1-6.

¹⁰ Hugh M. Thomas, *The English and The Normans: Ethnic Hostility, Assimilation, and Identity 1066-c.1220* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 20-45.

¹¹ Thomas, *The English and The Normans*, 53.

embroiderers.¹² The Tapestry's past has been shown through focused scholarship, however, to be just as intertwined with the English side of the Channel as the French.¹³ In the last century, scholars of the Conquest have examined the possible patronage of the Bayeux Tapestry, looking at those who might be termed 'the usual suspects' within the debate.¹⁴ The historical 'winner' of this contest has been William's half-brother, Bishop Odo of Bayeux (made, post-conquest, Earl of Kent), but several new theories exist which offer Count Eustace II of Boulogne as another likely candidate.¹⁵ The idea of a non-Norman patron would have been dismissed as ridiculous until just a few years ago, given the ostensibly one-sided narrative provided by the Tapestry. Today, however, it is thought of as a logical possibility given what is now known about (and what one can interpret within) the work itself.

Intended to serve as a wall hanging, possibly around the walls of a castle's dining hall, the Bayeux Tapestry itself – its physical properties – are some of the best clues to its origin. Embroidery was a skill attributed to many an Anglo-Saxon woman; the best of their products were collectively described as "*opus Anglicanum*" or "English work," and the custom of hanging the results was particularly insular.¹⁶ Further, since the pioneering research of art historian Francis Wormald in the 1950s, the notion that has been established and reinforced within the scope of the textile arts contends that the designer of the Tapestry took inspiration from several contemporary illuminated manuscripts that were amongst the holdings of two monasteries in Canterbury: Christ Church Abbey and St. Augustine's Abbey.¹⁷ And while "the letter forms themselves cannot date or localize the Tapestry," the Latin inscriptions within the Tapestry "indicat[e] a strong likelihood that it was made in England."¹⁸ Some art historians have also attempted to show differences in method that might indicate insular (English) versus continental (Norman or French) workmanship, but while techniques are too similar to reveal definitive evidence, the vegetable dyes used to tint the eight colors of woolen yarn used within the Tapestry are also found in cloth traditionally woven in England at that time.¹⁹ While there is no absolute certainty on the subject given the time that has elapsed since, it seems reasonable to infer that the tangible evidence of the Bayeux Tapestry favors an English origin.

¹² Some scholars continue to support the notion that the Bayeux Tapestry "allege[s]" the facts of the conquest from an exclusively Norman viewpoint. Golding, *Conquest and Colonization*, 28. In *Monuments de la monarchie française*, published in 1729, Benedictine historian Bernard de Montfaucon recounted the traditional tale alongside a sketch of the Tapestry in its entirety; even today, many French residents can recount the 'myth' of "La tapisserie de la reine Mathilde." Bridgeford, *1066*, 30-31.

¹³ Thomas, *The English and The Normans*, 152-153; Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England*, 20; M. K. Lawson, *The Battle of Hastings, 1066* (Stroud, England: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2003), 75-85.

¹⁴ One interesting theory suggests that the monks at St. Augustine's Abbey in Canterbury (one of the richest abbeys in England, if not Christendom) commissioned and oversaw the creation of the Tapestry in an attempt to foster allegiance between themselves and another more powerful secular authority – perhaps Bishop Odo of Bayeux, possibly Count Eustace II of Boulogne. Bridgeford, *1066*, 160-61, 305-6.

¹⁵ Eric John, *Reassessing Anglo-Saxon England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 173; Golding, *Conquest and Colonization*, 32-33; Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, 103-4. The importance of Odo having been made Earl of Kent by his half-brother the King is directly linked to an alternate theory surrounding the same provenance. This explanation certainly makes sense, even though it has merely circumstantial evidence lending support: Odo, who was granted extensive landholdings in many English counties (including Kent), could have commissioned the work from an abbey within his purview. His landholdings according to the Domesday Book include lands adjacent to the aforementioned St. Augustine's Abbey, in what was then a town on the outskirts of Canterbury, known as Garrington / Warwintone. John J. N. Palmer and George Slater, "Canterbury," in *Open Domesday* (Kew, England: Anna Powell-Smith); Richard M. Tansey and Fred S. Kleiner, *Gardner's Art Through The Ages*, 10th ed. (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 407-8. Given that both Odo and Eustace appear as characters within the Bayeux Tapestry, in addition to their relative influence and wealth at the time, either seem plausible as one who might choose to commission such a work. Both are featured, and although Odo receives greater focus (he is depicted four times, while Eustace appears only once), there has been some suggestion that the commission was intended as a "peace offering" for Eustace's old allies, the Normans, following several years of estrangement. This provenance would also work to explain, in part, any perceivable undercurrent of pro-English and pro-French sentiment. Bridgeford, *1066*, 304-5.

¹⁶ In his *Gesta Guillelmi*, William of Poitiers describes the Anglo-Saxon women as being "very skilled at needlework and weaving gold thread." Embroidery as a peculiarly English art is also held up within the Domesday Book, wherein certain needleworkers were not only "esteemed for their art" but also "in possession of land." Bridgeford, *1066*, 157-58. In the Anglo-Saxon epic poem *Beowulf*, a potentially related form of wall hanging is described as a "web of beauty" that "gleam[s] on the walls"; these types of room decoration are referenced in other texts of the Anglo-Saxon period as far more sumptuous than the comparatively ordinary Bayeux Tapestry would have seemed. However, it is imperative to consider the size of the Tapestry: at nearly 230 feet long, it "could hardly be considered practicable" to utilize gold thread and expensive silks for such a hanging. Dick Ringler, trans., *Beowulf: A New Translation for Oral Delivery*, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), lines 1988-1989; Bridgeford, *1066*, 11; David M. Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry: The Complete Tapestry in Color with Introduction, Description and Commentary* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 201; Gransden, *Historical Writing in England*, 103-4.

¹⁷ Elizabeth Coatsworth, "Stitches in Time: Establishing a History of Anglo-Saxon Embroidery," in *Medieval Clothing and Textiles I*, ed. Robin Netherton & Gale R. Owen-Crocker (Woodbridge, England: Boydell Press, 2005), 25. These works include the *Old English Illustrated Hexateuch*, the *Canterbury Miscellany*, and *The St. Augustine's Gospels*. Bridgeford, *1066*, 159-61; Henry Loyn, *The Norman Conquest* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 91-93.

¹⁸ Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, 204.

¹⁹ The colors used (russet, dull gold, sage green, olive green, blue-green, blue, dark blue, and black) are very common in medieval usage on both sides of the Channel, but the methods for dyeing the skeins of wool (and therefore the tinting agents used) seem to be unique to England. Coatsworth, "Stitches in Time," 6, 14; Bridgeford, *1066*, 158.

Further support of an English provenance can be derived from the artistic style in which the Tapestry was embroidered. The work is a unique example of Romanesque art, a mélange of Hiberno-Saxon (Insular), Carolingian, Byzantine, and classical Roman styles that informed the architecture as well as the arts on both sides of the English Channel in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries.²⁰ A precursor to the Early Gothic, Romanesque successfully synthesized fundamental concepts from the “Channel School” of manuscript illumination (which owed significant debts to late Anglo-Saxon art), the narrative illustration traditions popular throughout the reign of Charlemagne, the figural representations of the Byzantine, and the distinctly Roman round-headed arches and use of acanthus leaves as decorative features.²¹ Each of these elements seem to be found within the Bayeux Tapestry; while this fact alone fails to absolutely convince one of its English origin, given the popularity of Romanesque both on the island and the continent, it does speak to the same type of assimilation that was underway within England at this time.²² This suggests, perhaps, a concert of influence; the idea that neither side of the Anglo-Norman divide desired to create the Tapestry as needlework invective, but instead intended the work to serve only as a pictorial record, seems to have been neglected thus far.

In terms of the content of the Tapestry’s narrative, some of its rhetorical choices have already been discussed within this paper. What cannot be denied is that the decision to use the first half of the work to show events leading up to the invasion must have been intentional. Until recent scholarship suggested the possibility of non-Norman patronage, many academics retained the belief that this opening section of the Bayeux Tapestry simply put forth William’s claim to the throne, Edward’s assent to William’s succession, Harold’s oath in support of said plan, and his subsequent perjury, all as evidentiary support for the legitimacy of William’s reign.²³ This pro-Norman reading makes sense; history is, in most cases, written by those who prevail. But in light of the consensus surrounding the creation of the Tapestry on English soil, and its having been potentially commissioned by a person not of Norman descent, the fact that these events are shown from a distinctly English perspective cannot be ignored.

The first third of the Bayeux Tapestry shows, from an unequivocally English perspective, the groundwork being laid for the Conquest. The Tapestry requires the audience to see the action through the viewpoints of those depicted; in order for one to see Norman shores, it is necessary to ‘travel’ alongside the Anglo-Saxon characters. This is accomplished with the portrayal of Harold’s visit to Normandy. The viewer follows him as he sails for and lands on French soil, and is soon after seized by Count Guy of Ponthieu; next, he is seen being brought before William before accompanying him to Bayeux by way of Mont-Saint-Michel, Rennes, and Dinan (amongst other locales); and then returns with him to Edward’s side in England following his oath.²⁴ After the king’s death and Harold’s coronation, this conceit is employed once again, as the observer benefits from taking “an English ship . . . to Duke William’s land.”²⁵ Upon landing, the viewer sees William’s preparations for his invasion, later crossing the channel with him to Pevensey.²⁶ Finally, back on English soil, the ensuing conflict is depicted at a remove, almost as though one might be watching an eleventh-century newsreel: with equal weight, one sees the actions undertaken by both King Harold II

²⁰ Tansy and Kleiner, *Gardner’s*, 407-408; Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England*, 5:598-603; Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England*, 216-17.

²¹ Within the Bayeux Tapestry, one sees what may be early suggestions of the “Gothic S-curve;” selected examples of this can be found in panels 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, *ff* (according to the Tapestry’s circa-1800 numberings written in ink upon its circa-1724 linen backing cloth). Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 1-2, scenes 3-10); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 3-11. Michelle P. Brown, “The Triumph of the Codex: The Manuscript Book before 1100,” in *A Companion to the History of the Book* (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2007), 179-93; Tansy and Kleiner, *Gardner’s*, 380-413. Specific manuscripts of the “Channel School” which may have provided inspiration for the Tapestry were listed earlier (see footnote 17, page 7). The renovation of the Latin alphabet encouraged by Charlemagne and undertaken by Alcuin of York is featured via the *tituli* (the inscriptions which caption many of the scenes within the Bayeux Tapestry), while the spontaneity and vivid imagery of the narrative content reveals further Carolingian influence. Tansy and Kleiner, *Gardner’s*, 361-64. One can see the use of what may be acanthus flowers within the final third of the Tapestry; special reference can be made to the upper border approximately one quarter of the way along panel 52 (as marked on the Tapestry itself). Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 63.

²² The somewhat fanciful yet formal style of the Byzantine period aids the Tapestry in overcoming the necessary Archaic flatness of the medium. Placement of the figures is of paramount concern; the selection of what action within the narrative should be featured in the center register of the Tapestry versus the upper or lower borders seems carefully deliberated. Further, the animated gestures of the subjects reflect a distinctly Byzantine mode. Tansy and Kleiner, *Gardner’s*, 286-317, 407-8; Thomas, *The English and The Normans*, 372-73.

²³ Historian Wolfgang Grape (author of a competing account, *The Bayeux Tapestry*) is a vocal proponent of the theory that the Tapestry was created as conquest propaganda. Bridgeford, *1066*, 311, 336.

²⁴ This sequence of events is borne out in panels 4 through 25. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 1-3, scenes 4-24); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 4-28, 172, 174-82.

²⁵ Translated from the Latin *titulus*, which reads: “*hic navis Anglica venit in terram Willelmi ducis.*” This inscription appears in panel 34. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plate 5, scene 31); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 34, 173, 183.

²⁶ These events appear in panels 35-39 within the Tapestry itself. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 4-5, scenes 32-36); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 35-43, 173, 184-87.

and the Duke of Normandy as the Battle of Hastings commences.²⁷ Rather than being relegated to positions of subordination, the key insular players at the time of William's invasion are portrayed as integral actors within this sphere. The Normans displace much of the Anglo-Saxon nobility in the years after their arrival, but one can infer an understanding of the significance of the 'gens Anglorum' from this inclusion of the Anglo-Saxon perspective within the historical narrative of the Tapestry itself. After all, this hardly seems a likely choice if the purpose of the Tapestry is to promulgate an exclusively pro-Norman version of the events.

Similarly, when looking at the *tituli*, the inscriptions that caption many of the scenes within the Bayeux Tapestry, one can find linguistic evidence that the artists' Latin word choice was influenced by Old English, French, and the Norman dialect.²⁸ This makes sense, given the extensive scholarship that discusses the multilingual history of the British Isles, as well as the prevalence of studies that specifically address the varied etymological underpinnings of the inscriptions featured within the Tapestry.²⁹ As a population previously at ease with a blend of linguistic influences, the pre-conquest inhabitants of England were well primed to facilitate such a collective endeavor.³⁰ Without knowing anything definitive about the individual artisans who worked on the Tapestry, one can, with restraint, make certain inferences in order to discern their linguistic identity. The use of Latin itself is unremarkable here, however, given the supremacy of that tongue in matters of church and state.

The possible influence of Old English upon the Bayeux Tapestry is best argued by the presence within the inscriptions of specific letters from the Anglo-Saxon alphabet that were utilized almost exclusively within the insular vernacular, as well as spellings that seem to be unimpeachably English. The character 'eth' (Ð / ð), which represents voiced or voiceless fricative 'th' sounds within several Scandinavian dialects as well as Old English, is used in the *titulus* that captions the deaths of King Harold's brothers, one of whom was named Gyrrh.³¹ Further, the character 'ond' (ŋ), a Tironian note used in Old English both as the conjunction 'and' as well as a morphological placeholder to form words, can be found in the Tapestry to replace the Latin 'et' early on, "where Harold *and* Guy speak."³² In addition, several proper nouns that appear within the Bayeux Tapestry reflect distinctively Anglo-Saxon spelling conventions. Edward the Confessor is "Eadwardi," which utilizes the harmonic diphthong 'ea' that is prevalent in Old English.³³ Hastings, site of the decisive Norman military victory, takes the Latinized Anglo form "Hestengacestra," which employs the same diphthong.³⁴ An enigmatic scene featuring a woman named "Ælfgyva" refers to someone who must be a female of royal Anglo-Saxon descent, given what can be inferred from the construction of the name.³⁵ All of these suggest that those responsible for the embroidery of the *tituli* included persons for whom 'English' was a native tongue.³⁶

While there are clear influences of Old English throughout, it should be noted that the Bayeux Tapestry also reflects, as has been stated, a synthesis of multiple linguistic backgrounds. The usage of vernacular elements within the Latin inscriptions here follows the upsurge in a mixed vernacular writing within the late Anglo-Saxon period, where letters and words were retained from Old English, but prevailing grammar and syntax was increasingly of either Latin or French derivation.³⁷ In close analyses of the Tapestry, scholars have recently posited a high likelihood that one or more of the artists responsible for the embroidered inscriptions spoke French as a native language.

²⁷ The Battle of Hastings is shown in panels 48-58. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 7-8, scenes 45-59); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 52-73, 173, 188-95.

²⁸ Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, 203-4.

²⁹ Speaking directly to the existence of linguistic communities in medieval Britain, it has been noted that the historian Bede, writing in the early Middle Ages, "identified five languages and four nations" occupying the British Isles. Several scholars assert that language was, in fact, the single greatest indicator of cultural identity during this time. Helen Fulton, "Regions and Communities," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Literature in English*, ed. Elaine Treharne, Greg Walker, and William Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 532-33.

³⁰ Francis James West, "The Colonial History of The Norman Conquest?" *History* 84, no. 274 (April 1999): 219-36.

³¹ The name "Gyrrh" is seen in panel 52 of the Tapestry itself. René Lepelley, "A Contribution to the Study of the Inscriptions in the Bayeux Tapestry: *Bagias* and *Wilgelm*," in *The Study of the Bayeux Tapestry*, ed. Richard Gameson (Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press, 1997), 45; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 64, 203; Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plate 7, scene 51), 170.

³² See panel 9. Lepelley, "*Bagias* and *Wilgelm*," 45; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 9, 204; Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 1-2, scenes 7-8), 170.

³³ "Eadwardi" appears in panel 26 within the Tapestry. Lepelley, "*Bagias* and *Wilgelm*," 45; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 29, 204; Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plate 3, scene 25).

³⁴ See panel 45-46 for "Hestengacestra." Lepelley, "*Bagias* and *Wilgelm*," 45; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 49-50, 204; Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plates 5-6, scenes 41-42).

³⁵ See "Ælfgyva" in panel 15 of the Tapestry. Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 17; Bridgeford, *1066*, 146-47 (plate 3, scenes 17).

³⁶ Lepelley, "*Bagias* and *Wilgelm*," 39-45; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, 203-4.

³⁷ Jacqueline Stodnick, "Emergent Englishness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Literature in English*, edited by Elaine Treharne, Greg Walker, and William Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 498-99.

The choice of Latin cognates that correspond more closely to French rather than English vernacular is supportive of this conclusion.³⁸ In the same scene used earlier to illustrate the use of the Old English ‘ond,’ one sees Earl Harold converse with Guy of Ponthieu using “parabant”; this is a natural selection for a native French speaker who would have used the verb ‘parler’ as opposed to the more common Latin ‘loqui.’³⁹ Later, when the horses disembark after the landing at Pevensey, they are not ‘equis’ but “caballi,” which has an Old French counterpart: ‘chevaus.’⁴⁰ (The Old English ‘friphengest’ again offers no clear cognate.) After passing Mont-Saint-Michel, the notorious quicksand of the surrounding marsh is called “arena,” a cognate of ‘areine’ in the Old French dialect, rather than ‘sabulo,’ which might be considered a closer fit for ‘sand’ in Old English.⁴¹ All of these facts have led medieval linguistic specialists to theorize that the person responsible for the overall content (if not the fabrication) of the *tituli* was an artist “whose first language was French.”⁴²

While one must remember that ‘French’ does not necessarily equate to ‘Norman’ or vice versa, there exists a distinctively Norman flavor brought to the work through the use of the letter ‘W’ in several names seen in the Bayeux Tapestry. If one returns to the spelling and construction of King Edward’s name within the work, a new salient point emerges: the usage of ‘W’ rather than the more Anglo-friendly ‘wynn’ (ƿ / p) in the Tapestry reflects the Norman dialect’s retained Norse and proto-Germanic characteristics.⁴³ Other examples of this are seen in the usage of the ‘W’ within the names of the Conqueror’s brother, Leofwine (“Lewine” within the Tapestry), as well as in every appearance of the Conqueror’s own name within the text.⁴⁴ One particularly interesting observation with respect to ‘William’: representing a similar phoneme to the Old English ‘wynn,’ the ‘W’ was especially employed within Latin to render Germanic names.⁴⁵ Were all the artisans involved of French descent, the likeliest Latin cognate would have been ‘Glielmo,’ which closely corresponds to the French equivalent, ‘Guillaume,’ and is seen in the aforementioned Bayeux War Memorial frieze. Hence, the argument is made that from the hands of many demographically divergent artists came a single masterpiece of embroidery and amalgamation.

Perhaps the most effective argument in favor of this collaborative origin of the Bayeux Tapestry is a single word, used only once within the work to represent the place that would eventually become its home. During the ‘visit’ that Earl Harold pays to Duke William prior to the death of Edward the Confessor, the two travel through the Normandy countryside, visiting multiple locales. They end their journey in a place called, according to the corresponding *titulus*, “Bagias.” It is here, the Tapestry alleges, where Harold makes his oath to William; it is here, one might observe, where the Tapestry would find its name: “Bagias,” or Bayeux.⁴⁶ An examination of the construction of “Bagias” brings to light just how intermingled the languages of the conquered and their conquerors became, the layers of linguistic meaning that developed, and how relatively quickly this was accomplished. First, the name ‘Bayeux’ is a French word that evolved from the name of the Celtic tribe, known as the Baiocasses, who once occupied the area when it was part of the Roman province *Gallia Lugdunensis* in the first and second centuries BCE. The Latinization of the name is “fairly arbitrar[y],” according to one scholar, and is a linguistic “veneer” rather than a true translation. The final piece of this etymological puzzle involves the use of the letter ‘G.’ As one can quickly ascertain, this seems to replace the ‘Y’ in ‘Bayeux;’ why? The ‘yod,’ or sound one might understand as being represented by the letter ‘Y’ in both modern English and French (and is true in Old French, as well) would have found its closest Anglo-Saxon counterpart in the ‘yogh,’ or what is now known as the letter ‘G.’ Fittingly, the Bayeux Tapestry’s eponymous home, as designated within its own text, is “an Anglo-Saxon spelling of a fairly arbitrarily Latinised version of a word which was certainly French” in origin.⁴⁷

The Bayeux Tapestry offers a remarkably vital (although likely flawed) record of the events surrounding the Norman Invasion of England in October 1066, both through its content and context. After centuries of progressive scholarship, it seems that a consensus has built around the notion that there still exists the possibility for revelation, enlightenment, and wonder where the Tapestry is concerned. While it was once suggested that everything that could be said about the Bayeux Tapestry had already been published, recent scholarship (especially research pertaining to

³⁸ Bridgeford, *1066*, 170–171; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, 204.

³⁹ This is seen in the Tapestry, panel 9. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146–47 (plate 2, scenes 8–9), 171; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 10, 204.

⁴⁰ “Caballi” can be found in panel 39. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146–47 (plate 5, scene 36), 171; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 43, 204.

⁴¹ As seen in panel 17 of the Tapestry itself. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146–47 (plate 3, scene 18), 170–71; Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 19–20.

⁴² Bridgeford, *1066*, 171.

⁴³ Helen Fulton, “Regions and Communities,” 524–28; Lepelley, “*Bagias* and *Wilhelm*,” 45.

⁴⁴ “Leowine” is seen in panel 52. Bridgeford, *1066*, 146–47 (plate 7, scene 51); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plates 63–64.

⁴⁵ Brown, “The Triumph of the Codex,” 186–90.

⁴⁶ Panel 25 shows the usage of “Bagias.” Bridgeford, *1066*, 146–47 (plate 3, scene 22); Wilson, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, plate 25, 204.

⁴⁷ Lepelley, “*Bagias* and *Wilhelm*,” 40–43.

the identity of the ‘author’ of the Tapestry) shows the opposite to be true. This work also provides clear artistic and linguistic evidence of the fusion of two cultures that each appear comfortable with their own complex heterogeneity. Perhaps the greatest lesson one can take from further analysis is that human expression transcends compartmentalization. Indeed, human existence in general resists reduction into expedient classification and narrow definition, despite our attempts to the contrary. The tale told in this 230-foot-long textile is one of a Norman victory, and yet it is conveyed from an English point of view, through a medley of languages, and within a blended artistic style. The Bayeux Tapestry is a profound testament to the synthesis of the ‘gens Anglorum’ and those possessed of ‘Normanitas’ – not evidence of the subjugation of one group by the other.

Combating the Myth of Racial Democracy in Brazil

REBECCA PATTILLO

While Brazil and the United States share a history of slavery, the changes to race relations in Brazil following emancipation differ greatly from the African American experience in the United States. The United States continuously enacted discriminatory laws against people of color such as Black Codes and Jim Crow Laws. From this emerged a society with government-institutionalized racism. In contrast, Brazil did not experience the same type of institutionalized racism and did not have overtly racist discriminatory laws. This is not to say that Afro-Brazilians did not struggle for social and racial equality following emancipation; rather, Brazil saw substantial differences in their racial social hierarchy due to their unique reasons for emancipation. Out of this emerged the opinion that racial prejudice and stratification existed more along the lines of wealth and class as opposed to the color of one's skin. Sociologist Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães wrote in his essay "The Misadventures of Nonracialism in Brazil" that "in Brazil racism developed in a different way, present in social practice – a racism of attitudes – but unrecognized by the legal system and denied by the nonracialist discourse of nationality."¹ Hence, a myth of racial democracy and inclusion emerged regarding Afro-Brazilians. Namely, this myth propagates that racism and inequality were not as prevalent in Brazil as they were in the United States and that blacks experienced little to no racial oppression.

The 1920s saw the second rise of the Ku Klux Klan during which violence against black Americans increased dramatically. In the 1930s and 1940s, as a means to better understand and contrast the growing racial disorder in the United States, researchers turned their focus to race relations in Latin America. From these studies emerged the myth of racial democracy in Brazil. One such book by sociologist Donald Pierson entitled *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia*, published in 1942, examines the racial and social status of Afro-Brazilians following emancipation in 1888. Pierson attempted to show that racial discrimination and social hierarchies based on race did not really exist in Brazil; instead, Brazilian social hierarchy was based upon class and wealth. Furthermore, Pierson claimed that those of African descent and mixed blood were better off in Brazil than in other countries, specifically the United States, due to the lack of institutionalized racism. Accordingly, while there may have been social inequality among different races, this inequality was largely based on one's standing among social class.

Pierson conducted a two-year field study in Brazil from 1935 to 1937, twenty-two months of which were spent in the seaport town of Bahia.² His book gives a general overview of the history of Bahia and describes the social hierarchy of the town as well as the local blended population of Portuguese, Indians, and Afro-Brazilians, and gives a brief overview of the Brazilian slave trade as well as relations between the white and slave populations. The weight of Pierson's study is in the chapter "Miscegenation" in which he examines the mixing of races through intermarriage and procreation. Pierson asserted that when the color lines broke down, so too did racial stratification in Brazil. In the next part of the book, "Race and Social Status," Pierson continues his study of crumbling race lines by focusing on the social climb of those of mixed race to powerful and prestigious levels. Writing his book a mere fifty years after emancipation, Pierson examined how the following generations of mulattoes were able to attain certain levels of political and social successes. While it asserted no direct military threat towards the Communist mainland, it did remove a preexisting assurance of security along the Strait.

By comparing it to other parts of the world with racial hierarchies resulting from European colonization, specifically India and South Africa, the final part of *Negroes in Brazil*, entitled "The Bahian Racial Situation," focuses on Pierson's main claims summarizing race relations in Bahia. Pierson contends that in India, intermarriage and mixture was frowned upon, and those of mixed races were cast out by both parental groups. Likewise, in South Africa, Pierson explained that as more Dutch women came to the colony, they attempted to minimize the mixing of races by "preserving the integrity of their racial stock."³ Pierson argued in contrast that Brazilians celebrated miscegenation and sought to absorb and blend ethnic identity. He made this bold statement without much evidence, to which he readily admits: "the reasons for this deviation in Brazil are not quite clear, and it continues, therefore, to be a problem."⁴ Although Pierson was unable to explain this deviation, other historians have offered up their own claims, to be discussed later in this paper.

Another major weakness of Pierson's study is that he focused on the seaport city of Bahia, yet often used his findings to generalize for all of Brazil. This led to inaccurate conclusions for other major cities that are demographically unlike Bahia. Furthermore, many of the conclusions his study offers lack significant data to support them.

¹ Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães, "The Misadventures of Nonracialism in Brazil," in *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 165.

² Donald Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1942), xxi.

³ *Ibid.*, 324.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 325.

Pierson often makes claims and then goes on to contradict them. For instance, while he believed that racial prejudice is far less prevalent than class prejudice, especially in comparison to the United States, he stated that this does not mean that racial prejudice did not exist at all in Brazil.⁵ However, he then goes on to claim that racial identity has little influence on Brazil's social and governmental institution, and that racial prejudice is an individual problem, not a societal one. He goes on to claim that a major reason for Brazil's lack of racial stratification is due to its desire and success at assimilation and acculturation. Yet he fails to provide much corroborative evidence as to why this took place.

The 1950s saw an even greater interest in Brazil as an example of harmonious race relations. The hope was that if other countries could understand the unique racial democracy of Brazil, then they could improve their own strained racial situations. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) gathered a team of historians, anthropologists, and sociologists to conduct an in-depth and comprehensive study of race relations in Brazil in 1951. Marcos Chor Maio's article "UNESCO and the Study of Race Relations in Brazil: Regional or National Issue?" in the *Latin American Research Review* looks at this study in detail and how the initial UNESCO proposal sought to showcase Brazil's supposedly harmonious racial relations by studying three major Brazilian cities: Bahia, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.⁶

Maio's article is a thorough and extensive historiography of race relations in Brazil from the early nineteenth century to the 1950s. Maio stated, "the belief in Brazil as an exemplar in race relations dated back to the nineteenth century, when reports from travelers, scientists, journalists, and politicians from Europe and the United States registered surprise at the peaceful coexistence in Brazil among whites, blacks, and natives."⁷ Specifically, from the 1920s to the 1940s a more positive view of a "racial paradise" emerged and "relations between blacks and whites in Brazil came to be perceived instead as an indicator of tolerance and harmony" and the idea of a Brazilian racial democracy became "an ideological cornerstone of racial integration."⁸ Due to this reputation, UNESCO and fellow scholars looked to Brazil as an example of racial democracy and desired to emulate it through understanding the history of Brazilian race relations.

Maio went on to discuss the findings of the report, which advanced ideas that were aligned with Pierson's notion that true discrimination was based upon social hierarchy, not the color of one's skin. However, the report also showed that social mobility was much more difficult among the colored peoples of Brazil. Afro-Brazilians were generally of a lower, poorer class and opportunities to advance socially were scarce. The UNESCO study showed that non-biological qualities such as class, education, and status affected racial classifications, showing that racial democracy in Brazil was not as simple and firm as previously thought.⁹ Maio asserted that the UNESCO research findings "did not deny the importance of the myth of racial democracy. Rather, they revealed the tensions between the myth and the Brazilian style of racism."¹⁰ Thus, while Brazil was seen as a country that is relatively harmonious when it comes to race relations this does not mean it is without any color prejudice. Yet, the general consciousness of Brazil as a racial democracy, an idea promoted by foreigners and Brazilians alike, was not altered.

The 1960s saw an increase in black activism in the United States and consequently the study of slavery began to focus more on the individual experiences of slaves, rather than just the institution of slavery. Many historical studies had previously ignored the complex implications that the institution of slavery, abolition, and the subsequent African American struggles had on American society as a whole. Consequently, many historical studies of this time looked at comparative studies between the United States and other former slave colonies where scholars felt little racial prejudice was experienced. Brazil was a natural and obvious choice to use as comparison, due to its supposed racial democracy.

One such study by Carl N. Deglar entitled *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*, published in 1971, sought to compare race relations in Brazil and the United States in order to better understand race relations, specifically why and how they differed. Deglar's study of race relations in Brazil challenged the Brazilian myth that people of color did not experience severe racial discrimination by taking on the popular theory proposed by historian and sociologist Frank Tannenbaum in his 1947 book *Slave and Citizen*. Tannenbaum made the claim that the lack of racial prejudice in Brazil was due to the institutional differences of slavery as compared to the United States. Tannenbaum alleged that a major difference between slavery in the United States and Brazil was that there never emerged a racist defense of slavery in Brazil. This led to a society with less racial discrimination than the United States; however, Brazil was not free from prejudice. Deglar pointed out that race relations and class

⁵ Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil*, 328.

⁶ Marcos Chor Maio, "UNESCO and the Study of Race Relations in Brazil: Regional or National Issue?" *Latin American Research Review* 36 no. 2 (2001): 120.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 134.

¹⁰ Ibid.

standing are intricately linked in Brazil. The most important factors in determining a citizen's privileges were their wealth and class, as opposed to race. While race does play a role in national identity and upward movement, the influence of wealth is far more integral to inclusion in dominant society.

Deglar relied heavily on previous historiographical studies of Brazil and most of his book is spent discrediting claims of racial democracy put forth by other historians and sociologists. Deglar not only denounced the idea of Brazilian racial democracy, but also discredited the idea put forth by Tannenbaum by presenting an alternative thesis for the differences in racial prejudice between the United States and Brazil. Deglar claimed, "The key that unlocks the puzzle of the differences in race relations in Brazil and the United States is the mulatto escape hatch."¹¹ In the United States if you contain "one drop" of African ancestry, you are considered black. According to Deglar:

In Brazil, as in Latin America in general, this simple, biological definition of the Negro never developed. Instead, a special place was reserved for the mixed blood – the mulatto – a development that opened up much wider possibilities for social mobility.¹²

In Brazil, the mulatto was an entirely different racial group; thus, Brazil was a multiracial country, while the United States was biracial.¹³ Mulattoes existed in much greater numbers in Brazil, and due to this unique definition of a separate mulatto race, they were able to achieve social mobility. Those in the United States who perceived Brazil as a racial democracy at times failed to realize that mobility is reserved for those of mixed race, people who otherwise would be classified as black in the United States due to the "one drop" rule. When Americans saw mulattoes who were achieving social mobility as black, they were using the American definition, failing to see the separate black and mulatto identities in Brazil.

Although Deglar made striking claims and his "mulatto escape hatch" theory is supported with contextual evidence, his final argument is somewhat pessimistic and defeatist: "The evidence presented here can only make the achievement of full racial equality seem more difficult than many may now anticipate...some people may even conclude that equality is illusory."¹⁴ Deglar asserted that the United States might never be able to achieve racial equality, especially if it does not happen in Brazil, where institutionalized racial discrimination barely exists. Rather, racial discrimination is more ambiguous and informal in Brazil, leading to the emergence of the myth of racial democracy. Additionally, writing the book with a specific agenda in mind, especially considering it was written during the Civil Rights movement, Deglar's objectivity was perhaps too rooted in his own time period. George M. Fredrickson commented on this type of problem among historical studies in the introduction to *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States*:

Like all history, comparative history is influenced by the location of the historian in time and space. When Americans write about race in Brazil or South Africa, even if they do not make explicit comparisons with the United States, their work often searches implicitly for analogies or contrasts with the current state of black-white relations in their own country... To varying degrees, it reflects current interests and ideologies in its search for a 'usable past.'¹⁵

This anachronistic approach to historical and sociological studies, specifically as it relates to race, may lead to incorrect or problematic conclusions. This is not to say that these conclusions are without merit, but rather that one must look at the study's contemporary political and social environment to determine how a possible bias might have evolved.

A rather unique study on the myth of racial democracy is Kim Butler's 1998 book *Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-Abolition São Paulo and Salvador*. Butler did a comparative study of Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo and Salvador from 1880 to 1930. By comparing a city with a large black population to one with a small black population, Butler was able to define how racial, social, and political involvement (or lack thereof) formed black identity following abolition. What makes Butler's study unique is her use of sources that lends itself to a comprehensive and alternative approach to the topic of racial democracy. She placed a heavy emphasis on oral histories through interviews with surviving activists and examined neighborhood census records to point out local segregation and stratification. Butler also studied black activism newspapers from the early 1900s to 1930s, as well as records of black

¹¹ Maio, "UNESCO and the Study of Race Relations in Brazil," 224.

¹² *Ibid.*, 203.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xii.

¹⁵ George M. Fredrickson, "Race and Racism in Historical Perspective: Comparing the United States, South Africa, and Brazil," in *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 1.

brotherhood societies. The emergence of these black activist societies contradicted the notion that Afro-Brazilians did not feel marginalized or discriminated against. Thus, the idea of a racial democracy begins to break down.

Butler studied two separate areas of Brazil, yet she did not over generalize in the way that Pierson did. She effectively maintained a difference between the areas studied and was specific when making claims regarding one or the other. Through her use of oral histories, which are often overlooked in historical research, Butler brought a personal Brazilian voice to her study. Furthermore, her introduction is especially strong. She discussed the challenges of a racial history of Brazil because race began to disappear from census and other statistical records after emancipation in 1888.¹⁶ This lack of race on census records, some have argued, is evidence that a citizen's race was not important, which works to further perpetuate the idea of a racial democracy in Brazil.

Butler maintained that Afro-Brazilians fell into the following three categories: integrationists, alternative integrationists, and separatists. Those who wished to become active members of the political realm in order to forge a place in mainstream society were integrationists. Conversely, alternative integrationists wanted political representation while maintaining their black identity. Lastly, separatists wished to detach themselves from the mainstream and form their own black communities.¹⁷ By examining black activism of the early twentieth century, Butler demonstrated that racial inequality was prevalent and how some Afro-Brazilians fought against it. Butler further discussed how class discrimination coincides with racial discrimination and thus cannot be portrayed as two separate issues as had been done in previous scholarship. Regarding the emergence of distinct racial identities, Butler wrote:

Elites [wealthy whites] were taking advantage of the malleability of ethnicity and using it as a strategy to protect the insularity of their group. Afro-Brazilians also began to manipulate imposed identities as a strategy of their own. Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians as 'blacks' or 'Africans' provided them with both common cause for protest and a collective identity that would foster ethnic solidarity.¹⁸

Butler demonstrated that Brazil's reputation as a functioning racial democracy was not shared by all Afro-Brazilians, many of whom who sought to carve out specific political identities. Had these groups not felt marginalized they would seemingly not have worked together to form organizations, such as the Frente Negra Brasileira (Black Brazilian Front), to improve their social and political standing.

Perhaps the most effective and convincing study on Brazil and the myth of racial democracy lies in a series of essays from the 2001 book *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States*. Similar to previous studies, it looks at racism and social hierarchy as a symbiotic relationship, rather than two independent issues. An essay in the book, "Dance of Deception: A Reading of Race Relations in Brazil" by Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento, provided substantial and solid statistical evidence to prove that Brazil is not the racial paradise it and others perceive it to be. The authors write, "Traditionally, analysts have been so enamored of the idea of harmony among races in Brazil as to largely ignore racial inequalities."¹⁹ This essay effectively pointed out racial inequalities through the use of statistical data.

Recall that Pierson was unable to account for the deviation among miscegenation and intermarriage following emancipation, but Nascimento and Larkin Nascimento made a claim that Pierson admittedly could not explain. Immediately following emancipation in 1888, blacks far outnumbered the white population (6.1 million blacks to 3.7 million whites) and the white elite sought ways to decrease the black population of Brazil.²⁰ "Abolition brought panic to the ruling elite, which hurried to set about constructing public policies aimed at rubbing out the 'black stain' and 'purifying the nation's racial stock.'"²¹ These policies that encouraged European immigration and miscegenation were not as direct as the Jim Crow laws and Black Codes of the United States that visibly suppressed and marginalized African Americans. Rather, they were covertly aimed to decrease the population gap between blacks and whites in Brazil. Pro-immigration policy can be seen as its own form of institutionalized racism, although it is in no way as damaging as what African Americans experienced in the United States by way of legalized segregation, coerced labor systems, and often judicially ignored violent hate crimes.

Unfortunately, the authors' most significant and condemning claim lacks sufficient corroborative evidence. When seeking out the added quotes of "black stain" and "purifying the nation's racial stock," one sees that they are

¹⁶ Kim Butler, *Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-Abolition São Paulo and Salvador* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 218.

¹⁹ Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento, "Dance of Deception: A Reading of Race Relations in Brazil" in *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 111.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 113.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 121.

quoting a 1672 document and a nineteenth-century work by a Cuban historian, making them seem largely out of context. This is not to say that all of their evidence and sources are lacking; on the contrary, their essay provides extremely in-depth statistical evidence. Rather than focusing on Brazil in the past (such as Butler, Pierson, and Deglar), the authors pointed out the current disparities among Afro-Brazilians by looking at different statistical sources on income, education, and living conditions. Specifically, they examined census records to look at race, as well as economic studies to observe how wealth is unequally distributed, leading to severe class stratification between elite and poor. These statistical reports showed that white Brazilians are far better off in terms of wealth, education, health, and general living conditions. Afro-Brazilians are among the poorest and under-educated in Brazilian society, demonstrating that race and class are interwoven.²²

The final sections of Nascimento and Larkin Nascimento's essay discuss the national policies put into place beginning in the late 1980s to help alleviate the great divide between the poor and wealthy, specifically aimed at the poor Afro-Brazilian population. These policies are a reluctant admittance to the idea that Brazil could no longer cling to its national identity of a racial democracy "that has acted as a smoke screen to mask very stark racial inequities."²³ Nascimento and Larkin Nascimento also touched upon the lack of a widespread political activist movement: "in contrast to the United States and South Africa, where explicit racial oppression gave legitimacy to black peoples' organized struggles, the racial-democracy ideology deprives the dominated population of its base for collective self-defense and self-uplifting."²⁴ In other words, the lack of a large political civil rights movement in Brazil is not proof that racial democracy exists, rather that the need for such movements was not felt as strongly due to the lack of explicit government sanctioned discrimination. While Butler pointed to some political black activism early in the nineteenth century, it was short lived and failed to accomplish drastic changes among Brazil's black population and their class standing. Furthermore, maintaining the idea of racial democracy in Brazil worked to preserve the status quo of the majority of Afro-Brazilians belonging to the lowest class, resulting in a subversive form of racism.

The issue of racial democracy in Brazil has been a thoroughly studied and debated topic. Through all of the research, it can be asserted that while there may not necessarily be government-institutionalized racial discrimination in Brazil, this does not mean that racial prejudice does not exist. While it is true that there were no laws to suppress blacks (such as the Jim Crow laws of the United States), the government enacted subversive policies in an attempt to control the newly freed black population. Frederickson wrote in the introduction to *Beyond Racism*, "the Brazilian state sought to 'whiten' its population after the end of slavery by the encouragement of European immigration but did not extol race purity and seek to promote it by banning intermarriage and regulating interracial social contacts as did many of the North American colonies or states."²⁵ These policies were not as harsh or detrimental to the Afro-Brazilian population as the obviously discriminatory policies of the United States, but rather they set the ground work for a country where blacks still struggled for social and political equality by fostering the development of mulattos through miscegenation and a strict social hierarchy based on wealth and class. Frederickson continues:

Currently the insistence of some conservatives that racism has ended in the United States, thus making affirmative action unnecessary, may be performing a function similar to the myth of 'racial democracy' in Brazil. Denying racial prejudice and discrimination when they in fact exist is sometimes called 'the new racism' in the United States. In Brazil, it might be better described as the same old racism.²⁶

Consequently, racial stratification and discrimination was just as widespread in Brazil as it was in the United States, although it manifested in alternative ways. These less obvious manifestations of racism went unnoticed and Brazilians and non-Brazilians began to see the country as a racial democracy.

The idea that social standing provides more opportunity to be discriminated against is valid; however, when one looks at the state of Afro-Brazilians today, the evidence points to overwhelming inequalities. Lynn Huntley writes in the preface to *Beyond Racism*:

The people and government of Brazil are just beginning to publicly acknowledge that appearance or racism contribute to the nation's color-coded power hierarchy and help to sustain disparities and inequality... Still largely invested in its image of itself as a 'great racial democracy,' and awakening from a period of military governance that ended in 1985, Brazil has only recently begun to look

²² Nascimento and Larkin Nascimento, "Dance of Deception," 109.

²³ *Ibid.*, 106.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

²⁵ George M Fredrickson, "Race and Racism in Historical Perspective: Comparing the United States, South Africa, and Brazil," 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

outward and recognize that, like its companions South Africa and the United States, it must find ways to expand opportunities.²⁷

Brazilians may want to appear as racially indifferent, however, upon closer examination one can see how racism has manifested in the social hierarchy of Brazil. Unless Brazil is able to step back from the myth of racial democracy, her people will continue to be restricted from progressive upward mobility and racial conciliation.

When comparing the United States with Brazil, many historians have mistakenly looked at the issues specifically as black and white, without taking into account the multiracial identity of many Brazilians. Studies from the early nineteenth century up to the 1970s tended to focus on the mulattoes of Brazil and to apply conclusions to the black Afro-Brazilian population without taking into account that the mulatto is seen as a separate race in Brazil. These interpretations often led to an over-generalization of Brazilian race relations that in turn perpetuated the myth of racial democracy. By comparing different studies over a wide range of time, one can identify the strengths and weaknesses surrounding this myth and can work to refute it.

²⁷ Lynn Huntley, preface to *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), xi.

From Forest to Field: Nature, the State, and the New Deal in Rural Wisconsin

COLIN TAYLOR HIGGINS




Figure 1: An aerial photo of the outskirts of Montello in Marquette County taken in 1938 (left), and an aerial photo of the outskirts of Coon Valley in Vernon County (right) illustrate the topographical and land use differences between the areas; Left: United States Department of Agriculture, “Marquette County Wisconsin 1938, AIX-10-845” [aerial photograph] 1:20,000, Salt Lake City UT: Aerial Photography Field Office, 1938; Right: United States Department of Agriculture, “Vernon County Wisconsin 1938, B11-15-12” [aerial photograph] 1:20,000, Salt Lake City UT: Aerial Photography Field Office, 1939. Courtesy of Wisconsin Historic Aerial Image Finder.

The Great Depression in America prompted massive upheavals in citizens’ relationships with employers, aid giving institutions, and the government. The Depression’s impacts were especially severe for the rural populace, which at the time constituted 47.1% of Wisconsin’s 2,939,006 residents.¹ Franklin Roosevelt’s administration was acutely aware of the plight of rural America during the Depression and provided economic relief through legislation such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act and Rural Electrification Act. Though these policies resulted in significant landscape and economic changes in rural Wisconsin, they were reflective of an even more dramatic shift in rural Wisconsinites’ relationships with both nature and the federal government. Specifically, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) drove a political shift in the Driftless Region of the state. They helped build a new rural-Midwestern Democratic coalition that was not averse to a large federal government regulating markets and giving aid. Additionally, the CCC helped to systematize the philosophies of Nature² that linked human and natural welfare, thus propelling the popular rise of ecology.

This essay seeks to explain how and why these ideological changes occurred and will only hint at their complex implications, which stretch much further into the modern era. In so doing it will first contrast changing attitudes towards the federal government between the Driftless and Central Sands Regions of Wisconsin (figure 2), focusing on agricultural and rural relief programs. Second, it will examine the role of the CCC in transforming ideas of Nature through conflicts between governmental, popular, and scientific views of conservation. Ultimately, this paper aims to locate Wisconsin in the debates around conservation and the welfare state, as well as to show the implications of these disputes, both statewide and nationally.

We shall begin our narrative with a general sketch of the national and statewide socio-economic contexts that fashioned the New Deal, a necessary prelude to fully comprehend its impacts. The Great Depression struck rural America much earlier than the urban areas, beginning in 1920 with a price slump in agricultural commodities as a result of post-World War I overproduction.³ During that era, 49% of the country met the census definition of rural, a statistic that is skewed by the more urbanized Northeast region.⁴ The dominant form of economic activity in rural

¹ U.S. Census of Population, *Urban and Rural Population: 1900 to 1990* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995).

² When I refer to Nature with a capital ‘N’ I am referring to ideas of wilderness and the environment.

³ R. Douglas Hurt, *Problems of Plenty: American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 42-45.

⁴ U.S. Census of Population: *Urban and Rural Population*.

America differed countrywide, but for the most part constituted various forms of agriculture or forest cultivation; regionally, cotton dominated the South, grain cultivation the Midwest and West, vegetable production on the West Coast, and dairying in the upper Midwest.⁵ These cash crops accordingly impacted the severity of the Depression by locale. The South, with massively depressed cotton prices, a large percentage of sharecroppers and a population that was 65.9% rural, felt some of the harshest impacts.⁶ The Depression was so severe in the South that a section of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was devoted solely to cotton, which was not the case for any other commodity.⁷ The rest of the country, though not in as dire straights as the South, was still faring poorly and the Agricultural Adjustment Act served the purpose of much needed support.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act was a key piece of relief legislation proposed in Roosevelt's "Hundred Days," which was signed into law on May 12, 1933. The act created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), an organization whose purpose was "to establish and maintain such a balance between production and consumption of agricultural commodities and [...] give to such commodities sold by farmers their pre-war purchasing power."⁸ In practice, this objective resulted in an attempt to reduce the amount of land in production by paying farmers not to plant seven basic commodities – cotton, wheat, corn, rice, tobacco, hogs, and dairy – using revenue generated by a tax on commodity processors. A radical departure from previous agricultural policy, the AAA (unconstitutionally) placed the government in the role of directly paying farmers to alter production choices instead of repeating prior attempts to manipulate tariffs or calling for voluntary production controls.⁹ The act was born within the ideological framework of progressive principles of societal and land use planning, and with good reason. Many of the policymakers who were central in forming the AAA, such as Lewis C. Gray, studied at University of Wisconsin–Madison's Land Economics Department under progressive professors like Richard Ely, Henry Taylor, and Benjamin H. Hibbard.¹⁰ Because of this, the AAA was also formed with a distinctively Midwestern worldview, which led it to favor successful commodity growers and displace many sharecroppers and tenant farmers.¹¹ While detrimental in the South, this policy actually proved fairly successful in Wisconsin, as many of the farmers were landowning cultivators.

The most significant impacts of the AAA in Wisconsin, however, were not brought to bear on the physical landscape or in agricultural markets, but rather in the ideological realm, by eroding rural suspicions towards the federal government. Distrust of the state, and similarly of scientific experts, was embodied by the Wisconsin Society for Equity (WSE), an organization founded in 1903 whose membership peaked in the twenties. It was fairly ambivalent towards government, but included members who had a strong dislike of the UW–Madison College of Agriculture's scientific "Book Farming."¹² The rural distaste for a controlling government is also apparent in state voting records. In Vernon County, the conservative Republican Warren Harding won the 1920 election with an 89% majority. Likewise, in Marquette County, Harding took the election with a 79% majority.¹³ Harding's landslide victories were in character with rural Wisconsin's voting record. Though Wisconsin was a Republican stronghold, rural Wisconsinites typically supported populist, progressive Lafollette Republicanism, which, granted, was still grassroots-based.

With the onset of the Depression, this aversion towards government began to deteriorate as rural Wisconsinites looked to government to solve their economic distress. Though this shift was evident across Wisconsin, it differed



Figure 2: Map of Wisconsin's Driftless and Central Sands Regions. Vernon and Marquette Counties are illustrated as well. Courtesy of Colin Taylor Higgins.

⁵ U.S. Census of Agriculture 1935: Chapter VI: *Crops, Field Crops, Fruits, and Vegetables*. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1939.

⁶ Hurt, *Problems of Plenty*, 68.

⁷ Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, H.R. 3835, 73rd Congress (1933).

⁸ Conference Report to accompany the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, H.R. 3835, 73rd Congress (1933).

⁹ Hurt, *Problems of Plenty*, 68-71.

¹⁰ Jess Gilbert and Ellan Baker, "Wisconsin Economists and New Deal Agricultural Policy: The Legacy of Progressive Professors," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 80, no. 4 (Summer, 1997): 304.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 284.

¹² Paul W. Glad, *The History of Wisconsin Volume V: War, a New Era, and Depression, 1914-1940* (Stevens Point, WI: Worzalla Publishing Company, 1990), 175-176.

¹³ James R. Donoghue, *How Wisconsin Voted: 1848 – 1972* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1975), 73.

markedly between the Driftless and Central Sands Regions of the state. By and large, the Driftless Region viewed the federal government more favorably than did the Central Sands. The key driver of this desire for government involvement, as we shall see, was the relative severity of the Depression, especially with regard to agricultural markets. The variance in markets resulted from regional differences in crop production, since some commodity prices declined more steeply than others.

Economic hardship took a large toll on farmers in Wisconsin, with statewide farm ownership dropping by 15,000 families (roughly 9%) between 1925 and 1930.¹⁴ Importantly, declining farm ownership was not distributed evenly across the state. Vernon County's farm tenure decreased 10% over this period, while Marquette County's fell only 6%.¹⁵ Though rates were high in both counties, Vernon County's situation was comparatively worse since it had triple the population of Marquette County, and thus more families losing their farms. This further increased Vernon County's need for aid on a scale that could not be provided on a state level. These figures likewise help explain why Marquette County was not receiving any federal relief in 1935, but do not divulge any factors for its reduced farm loss.¹⁶

Agricultural practices underlay the disparity in farm ownership between the two counties during this period. Vernon County's top farm products in the thirties were dairy, tobacco, corn, and oats, whereas the top crops in Marquette County were corn, potatoes, oats, and rye.¹⁷ Of these crops, the AAA directed its efforts at only three – dairy, tobacco, and corn – all of which were more vital to Vernon County's economy than Marquette County's. The AAA targeted commodities with the most intense price slumps. Thus we can see that Vernon County's economy suffered more from the agricultural depression, as it relied largely on AAA-targeted cash crops. Marquette County relied on other commodities partially because of its residents' planting choices, but these were mostly influenced by the slightly shorter growing season and sandier soils of the region.¹⁸ By shaping chief agricultural products, the environmental factors of soil and climate affected the degree with which the federal government involved itself in the agricultural markets of the county.

Furthermore, the comparatively larger dairy economy of Vernon County – a product of hilly topography unfriendly towards grain cultivation – allowed farmers to have increased input on how the AAA operated, since the dairy branch of the AAA had one of the most democratic bureaucracies.¹⁹ Finally, Vernon County had a larger population, which increased the sheer amount of federal aid entering the county. To reiterate, the volume of aid reaching each county hinged upon the local severity of the depression, which was influenced in many ways by each counties' physical environment.

In addition to the AAA, the federal government made pathways into rural Wisconsin through public works projects, especially through the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). At its height, the CCC operated 45 different camps throughout the state in 1938. Many of the camps, however, were located in the north and west.²⁰ This resulted largely from federal conservation priorities favoring soil and forest management. The CCC never had a camp in Marquette County, as its flat topography, sandy soils, and reliance on agriculture did not result in the soil and forest degradation problems present in the north and west of the state. This was yet another way the county remained removed from federal operations, stemming mainly from geography and conservation ideals. Vernon County, on the other hand, housed the nation's first soil conservation site in the Coon Creek Watershed in 1934.²¹ The steep unglaciated hills combined with thin soil, numerous streams, and its residents' row-crop style farming made the Coon Creek Watershed ripe for soil erosion.²²

The Coon Creek project was exemplary of many CCC projects, involving the CCC boys working as federal employees, with UW–Madison experts and local farmers to control the landscape and conserve the soils. This involvement, though not originally welcomed, ended up spreading rapidly throughout the valley.²³ It not only yielded a massive shift in land use, changing the farming practices to contour plowing and foresting the steep slopes (figure 3),

¹⁴ U.S. Census of Agriculture – Wisconsin, 1935: *Farms, Farm Acreage and Value, by Color and by Tenure*. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1939.

¹⁵ Ibid. Calculated by taking the difference in the population of full owners between 1930 and 1935 and then dividing by the 1930 population.

¹⁶ Ellis Lore Kirkpatrick and Agnes M. Boynton, *Wisconsin's Human and Physical Resources: A Graphic Presentation of Conditions Affecting Rural Rehabilitation* (Madison, WI: Research Station, Resettlement Administration Region II, 1936), 23-24.

¹⁷ U.S. Census of Agriculture – Wisconsin 1935: *County Tables*. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1939.

¹⁸ Wisconsin Cartographers Guild, *Wisconsin's Past and Present: A Historical Atlas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 43.

¹⁹ Hurt, *Problems of Plenty*, 80.

²⁰ Glad, *The History of Wisconsin Volume V*, 494; Civilian Conservation Corps, U.S. Sparta District, WI, *Sparta CCC District, Sixth Corp Area Annual* (Baton Rouge, LA: Direct Advertising Co., 1937), 1.

²¹ Neil M. Maher, *Nature's New Deal: The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Roots of the American Environmental Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press), 119-123.

²² John B. Marks, "Land Use and Plant Succession in Coon Valley, Wisconsin," *Ecological Monographs* 12, no. 2 (April 1942): 115; Aldo Leopold, "Coon Valley: An Adventure in Cooperative Conservation," *American Forests* 41, no. 5 (May 1935): 206.

²³ Leopold, "Coon Valley," 207-208.

but also made formerly private land a public resource.²⁴ It did this by involving private landowners in practices conserving shared resources, linking each individual farmer's agricultural practices to the commons, which in this case were the soils and streams. Along with slowing erosion, this program ultimately benefited the farmers' crop yields and property values, and thus economic standing.²⁵ Because of its large successes and benefit to farmers, the Coon Creek project combined with the agricultural aid of the New Deal to create regional support for the Democratic Party. Moreover, the nature soil conservation helped lead to an acceptance of university experts who were historically seen as suspicious figures in rural Wisconsin. This manifests itself most clearly through the Coon Creek community's continued involvement with federal soil conservation services, and its 1939 decision, passed by popular vote, to become a federal soil conservation district.²⁶ Additionally, the electoral behaviors of Coon Creek and thus Vernon County's residents evidence this change. Though Vernon County did not in fact vote for Roosevelt in the 1940 or 1944 elections, the increased federal presence resulted in an increased Democratic constituency in the area. The 1940 and 1944 elections saw Roosevelt receive 46% and 49% of the popular vote, contrasted to the county's overwhelmingly Republican trends in the twenties and to the 28% and 27% Democratic vote in Marquette County.²⁷ While this inter-county partisan polarization did occur, Wisconsin held a unique political position because of Robert La Follette's legacy. Though the counties had large disparities in their presidential voting patterns during this era, they both overwhelmingly elected Progressive party candidates for Senate.²⁸



Figure 3: The photo on the left is the town of Coon Valley in 1934, with a CCC camp in the middle of the photo. The hills in the background illustrate the extent to which farmers were cultivating on very steep slopes. Also illustrated is the strip cropping on the hills.²⁹ The picture on the right is an areal photo of Coon Valley in 1955. The contour plowing promoted by the Soil Conservation Service, which continues to this day, is visible in this picture.³⁰

Nonetheless, by engaging rural Wisconsin in locally specific and economically beneficial ways, the New Deal was able to address the rural community's needs and bring about a favorable view of federal government and the Democratic Party. Vernon and Marquette counties provide a good illustration of this contrast. Vernon County experienced large amounts of aid from the government in the form of subsidies and public work that noticeably improved the quality of life. Marquette County on the other hand did not experience either of the beneficial federal involvements. The changes in party support were mostly influenced [by the economic benefits that rural Wisconsinites received from the government, and only pertained to presidential elections. The material consequences of this shifting acceptance of the state are illustrated in the ways that the counties voted in the 1940 and 1944 elections and split along geographical boundaries. This political division is one that would have persisting consequences, both electorally and ecologically.

Environmental changes certainly occurred in Wisconsin during the Great Depression, especially as a result of CCC-style conservation. These significant changes were also drivers of larger shifts in people's concepts of Nature. The ideological changes transpired in three broadly defined arenas: the governmental arena, the scientific arena, and

²⁴ Maher, *Nature's New Deal*, 124-125.

²⁵ Maher, *Nature's New Deal*, 128.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 131. Admittedly, another reason for this was likely the access to federal funds but the regulation by locals as opposed to bureaucrats.

²⁷ Percentages calculated from Donoghue, *How Wisconsin Voted*, 74.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 103.

²⁹ Unknown, *A Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) Encampment in Coon Valley, Wisconsin 8/19/34, 1934*, [Database on-line] (USDA – NRCS, accessed April 9, 2013); available photogallery.usda.nrcs.gov, image ID NRCSWI01006.tif

³⁰ Irwin C. Cole, *An Areal View of Farmland in Coon Valley Wisconsin, 1955*, [Database on-line] (USDA – NRCS, accessed April 9, 2013); available photogallery.usda.nrcs.gov, image ID NRCSWI01002.tif

the popular culture arena. Though each field influenced the other to some degree in the period before WWII, their interaction became particularly important in creating the postwar environmental movement. Because of the entanglement of viewpoints, it is difficult to directly follow the changes in ideas of Nature on a specific, statewide level over the Great Depression.

To properly understand changes in attitudes towards Nature, a philosophical context for New Deal conservation policy is necessary, as the policies had progressive ideals at their heart. The AAA, as previously discussed, was influenced heavily by the progressive UW–Madison Land Economics Department. The CCC, however, had much less glaring progressive ties. Though still an issue of debate, the corps' conception was undoubtedly influenced by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) values. His beliefs, familiar to the world of environmental thought, harkened back to the turn of the century. Roosevelt's views generally followed the philosophy of progressive forester Gifford Pinchot in providing "the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run."³¹ Pinchot was the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service from 1905 to 1910 and advocated for the scientific conservation of forest resources. Pinchot, like many progressive conservationists, conceptualized the natural world as composed of resources. A utilitarian, he was not opposed to the harvesting of these natural resources for human use, but rather opposed to their unscientific – synonymous, he would say, with unwise – use. We may note that these views have humans at the center.

The CCC, too, operated within this anthropocentric framework, and promoted itself in a 1941 publication as fighting "a war on unemployment and a war on natural disorder."³² Two ideals central to the CCC's predilections are evident in the pamphlet's phrasing. First, the militaristic rhetoric illustrates that the Roosevelt administration viewed unemployment as a national security issue. More relevant to this paper, the rhetoric applied equally to natural disorder. From this language, two fundamental Depression era ideals of nature can be gleaned. Most clearly manifested is the Promethean ideal of human superiority to nature, melded with Pinchot's progressive quest for efficiency and scientific improvement of nature.³³ An environmental construct remaining from the propaganda of the WWI Committee on Public Information is also evident. This paradigm portrayed nature as savage and disorderly, so as to transform killing from a moral into a natural issue.³⁴ These two constructs resulted in the CCC's attempt to provide order to nature and had tangible consequences. The CCC delivered this stability by fighting forest fires, stocking fisheries, damming rivers, controlling tree insect pests, and managing mosquitos, the last requiring newly developed organic pesticides.³⁵

The second essential belief demonstrated by the CCC in their publication is the linkage of human and natural resources. This idea, too, is rooted in early twentieth century progressivism with strands tracing back to eighteenth century Jeffersonian ideals. Exemplified by late nineteenth century urban planner Frederick Law Olmstead, this view asserts that unindustrialized environments created model citizens; Olmstead's proposition for an ideal society was one in which Nature and town were synthesized, and he created the conceptual framework for the suburb.³⁶ Moreover, President Theodore Roosevelt held a similar ideal, that of "the strenuous life," whereby men, and thus the nation, get their vigor from time in the wilderness.³⁷ Olmsteadian and Rooseveltian lines of logic both linked a non-urban environment with the creation of the ideal American citizen and are examples of the deeply engrained national agrarian myth that romanticizes independent farmers as the source of American democracy.³⁸ The echoes of this ideology are also seen in the CCC. This is because FDR weaved the progressive version of the romantic agrarian myth into Pinchot-style conservation to form a concrete program to solve the nation's unemployment crisis. In so doing, he linked human to natural welfare while paradoxically expanding government and appealing to the Jeffersonian cultural currents of the agrarian myth.

Though the philosophical underpinnings of the CCC were important, popular views were more integral to the resulting change. Many Wisconsinites during this time period shared views of nature with the Roosevelt administration, but with some nuances. The predominant view of nature in Depression-era Wisconsin was of people civilizing a savage nature. A 1936 article in the *Wisconsin State Journal* about Monroe, Wisconsin, writes "starved in a soil made sterile by too much usage [...] and tortured by drouths [*sic*] these industrious, thrifty Swiss were hard put to make a bare subsistence."³⁹ Likewise, an article in the *La Crosse Tribune* from two years earlier provides a scenic description

³¹ Maher, *Nature's New Deal*, 20–27.

³² Civilian Conservation Corps, *The CCC at Work: A Story of 2,500,000 Young Men* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 30.

³³ Donald Worster, *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 267.

³⁴ Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 46.

³⁵ National Association of Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni (NACC), *Civilian Conservation Corps: The way we remember it 1933-1942* (Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 1990), 10.

³⁶ In fact, he planned one of the first suburbs in Riverside, IL. For a more in-depth discussion of this see: Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of The United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 79–82.

³⁷ Maher, *Nature's New Deal*, 32–33.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 158.

³⁹ State Journal News Service, "Nature's Whim Ruined a Crop and Started a Five Million Dollar Industry," *Wisconsin State Journal*, February 09, 1936. Accessed online at www.wisconsinhistory.org, on April 10, 2013.

of the environment and then proceeds to describe the village of Coon Valley as “entrapped as in a Kettle,” continuing with “there seems to be no escape [except] for one winding road.”⁴⁰ These articles, though from different areas of Wisconsin, both present a menacing and unforgiving nature that with human industriousness has been made more livable. This mindset taps at once into the agrarian myth and the frontier myth of wilderness. In short, the frontier myth romanticizes American frontier life, and most important, sets up a boundary between civilization and wilderness.⁴¹ The CCC contained many ideals of the frontier myth of wilderness as well, both in its advertisements and in its aims to “help more people enjoy the most awe inspiring scenery in the world.”⁴²

There was, nonetheless, a primary divergence between public and governmental imaginings of nature. The government believed in a more progressive form of conserving resources – both human and natural – so it focused conservation efforts on soil, forests, and national parks. However, Wisconsin’s rural population used nature to make a living and was more concerned with making the land profitable and less about conserving resources. Though these goals were sometimes reconcilable, as in the case of soil conservation, they set a precedent of people conserving resources only when it was in their economic interest.⁴³ Additionally, both the governmental and public views were predicated upon humans controlling nature, a view echoing the calls of Pinchot-style conservation, and tracing their way back to early Christian doctrine and the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus.

Though, by and large, progressive conservation was the era’s dominant ideology, there was pushback against this viewpoint. This dissent stemmed from Thoreau’s romantic views of nature and the preservationism of John Muir. This biocentric perspective was profoundly opposed to the anthropocentric view of nature, and maintained that the natural economy was not created exclusively for man’s benefit.⁴⁴ This biocentric understanding combined with the burgeoning science of ecology to form a field that was more than just natural resource management, an idea that was spearheaded by Aldo Leopold.

Though Leopold did not create this new ideology of a combined conservationist and preservationist ecology, he was certainly one of the most ardent and most visible advocates. Leopold was a forester by training, going to the progressive Yale School of Forestry and working in Pinchot’s forest service. At this point, he subscribed to the progressive conservation mindset and viewed nature as a resource. In his book *Game Management*, he wrote “game management produces a crop by controlling the environmental factors which hold down the natural increase, or productivity, of the seed stock.”⁴⁵ The goal he sought, as articulated in this book, was to make nature more efficient at producing game for humans. Though published in 1933, the book was the product of his earlier days in New Mexico’s Gila Forest, and by 1934 he became increasingly uncomfortable with some of his written ideas.⁴⁶

The discomfort with progressive conservation that Leopold began to feel was influenced by his experiences with the CCC. Leopold moved to Wisconsin in 1924, eventually becoming a professor at UW–Madison and working with the CCC in Coon Valley. In his essay “Conservation Economics,” a lecture ironically first given at the Taylor-Hibbard Economics Club, he was critical of the CCC’s progressive conservation. Mentioning “the ecological and esthetic limitations of ‘scientific’ technology,” he goes on to critique the CCC’s inability to integrate the multiple aspects of conservation, instead taking a “single-track approach.” He points out the flaws in this approach with an example of Congress “[taxing] duck hunters to restore the marshes which its own agents have caused to be drained.”⁴⁷ Though his remarks may be hyperbolic, they illustrate an important shift in his opinion away from progressive conservation. Leopold began to see the importance of viewing ecological phenomena in a systemic light, and not as atomized factors. Implicit in this strain of thought is the fusion of Muir’s breed of biocentric naturalism to resource conservation. Additionally, Leopold was critiquing the placement of economic value on individual aspects of nature without looking at the systemic consequences. This lecture was a watershed moment for Leopold’s career, as it made visible the new systemic view he would continue to apply to nature, which would profoundly influence future ecological thought. It was mainly through his experiences partaking in and watching the implications of New Deal progressive conservation that he developed these strong critiques and began to look towards a new view of nature. It was thus the dissent that resulted from the CCC’s actions, particularly those in Wisconsin, which planted the seeds for a new facet of environmental thought.

⁴⁰ Mrs. Edwin Evans, “Coon Valley Lies in the Heart of a Great Watershed, ‘entrapped as in a kettle,’” *La Crosse Tribune and Leader-Press*, February 09, 1934. Accessed online at www.wisconsinhistory.org, on April 10, 2013.

⁴¹ William Cronon, *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), 73-75.

⁴² Civilian Conservation Corps, *The CCC at Work* (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1941), 54.

⁴³ Sarah T. Phillips, *This Land This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 9-11.

⁴⁴ Worster, *Nature’s Economy*, 185.

⁴⁵ Aldo Leopold, *Game Management* (New York: Scribner, 1933), 21.

⁴⁶ Worster, *Nature’s Economy*, 284-85.

⁴⁷ Aldo Leopold, “Conservation Economics,” *Journal of Forestry* 32, no. 5 (May 1934): 540-541

While Leopold's addition to ecology laid important groundwork for the postwar environmental movement, he was only one expert – not representative of society-at-large. The mass acceptance of new ecological thought also stemmed from the CCC and federal government. The corps made millions of trails in the new federally owned national parks, which, combined with the miles of roads they laid, allowed for democratic access to nature. In addition, the CCC brought millions of urban youth the positive experience of laboring in nature, and formed a new mostly working-class demographic of wilderness appreciators.⁴⁸ Most important, though, the CCC popularized the linkage of human and natural welfare. Further research, including oral histories and especially those from minority viewpoints, is needed to comprehensively assess the ways the New Deal impacted environmental thought in Wisconsin. However, it is likely that changes in thought followed the borders of the political divisions; the Driftless Region was more likely to accept scientific experts' views, and when those became ecological it is probable that residents followed suit.

To some extent, the political splits in rural Wisconsin stemmed from New Deal relief programs, primarily the CCC and AAA. It was the locally specific public and economic aid provided by these programs that drove the Democratic Party's regional support. Moreover, it was the New Deal's emphasis on particular commodities and resources that caused the support to fall, if unintentionally, along geographical contours. Furthermore, the CCC fused two previously disparate strains of progressive environmentalism, linking human and natural welfare. The corps' extreme "single-track" approach towards conservation in Wisconsin pushed Aldo Leopold to propose a new systemic approach to ecology, and in so doing started to bridge the gap between preservation and conservation. However, initial tensions within New Deal rural policy had not been resolved. During and after WWII the federal government put increasing pressure on farmers to industrialize their operations and "get big or get out."⁴⁹ In Wisconsin, this resulted in an average increase in farm sizes in the Central Sands Region, almost double the magnitude of that in the Driftless between 1940 and 1950.⁵⁰ This was once again a result of the Central Sands' relatively flatter topography providing a greater ease of expansion. Ideologically, this pressure upheld the precedent of encouraging farmers to practice conservation only when it was profitable. At best it maintained the "single-track" conservation of which Leopold was so critical, and at worst it discarded rural conservation aims entirely. It would not be until the late 1950s that the ideas of ecology and interlinked human and natural welfare would resurface in a grassroots challenge to this paradigm.

⁴⁸ Maher, *Nature's Economy*, 113.

⁴⁹ Phillips, *This Land, This Nation*, 236-237.

⁵⁰ U.S. Census of Agriculture 1954 - Wisconsin: Statistics for Counties: *Farms, Acreage, Value and Farm Operators* Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1958.

Citizens of No State: Daily Life of Shanghai White Russians, 1920s-1930s

HAOCHEN WANG

Since the late imperial era, Shanghai has enjoyed the enduring reputation of a cosmopolitan metropolis, thanks to the significant numbers of foreigners belonging to a diverse range of nationalities, ethnicities, and cultures. One of the most visible émigré groups was the White Russians, who fled to Shanghai due to political and economic factors after the Russian Revolution, during which they had opposed the communist Bolshevik Red Army; however, the White Russian community receives very little attention from historians. Scholarly work that details their lives and experiences is rare and fragmentary; for instance, both Hanchao Lu¹ and Frederic Wakeman, Jr.² briefly mention White Russians in their respective works, depicting them as a monolithic, destitute, and marginalized group surviving on the fringe of Shanghai society and playing a minor role in the day-to-day running of the city. This view of the White Russian community is narrow and does not fully flesh out their experiences abroad. Various forms of primary sources, including newspapers, police reports, and memoirs, reveal that the community was an extremely diverse group reflecting various origins, ethnicities, occupations, beliefs, and values. The White Russians of Shanghai were only united by a “hatred of the Bolsheviks who had dispossessed them and forced them to flee from their native land and to depend on foreigners.”³

My paper intends to present a more comprehensive and balanced account of the daily lives and experiences of Shanghai’s White Russian community. I plan to highlight their arrival, composition, plight, and the resources and methods they utilized to overcome these difficulties, as well as their eventual achievements. As for the time period, I will focus on the 1920s and 1930s, since there was a radical change in the White Russians’ conditions following the outbreak of World War II and the Japanese occupation of Shanghai. I will demonstrate that despite the initial hardships and discrimination, some of the Russian expatriates managed to achieve economic prosperity and upward social mobility, eventually forming a cohesive and vibrant community. Moreover, during this same time period, White Russians played an important role in the development and transformation of Shanghai as an industrial, commercial, and entertainment center. Indeed, no general history on Republican Shanghai would be complete if the experiences of the Russian émigrés were to be omitted. While it asserted no direct military threat towards the Communist mainland, it did remove a preexisting assurance of security along the Strait.

Before diving into their daily lives in Shanghai, it is necessary to discuss the Russian community in Shanghai prior to the arrival of the war refugees and to chronicle the social upheaval in early twentieth-century Russia that stimulated their mass exodus. Russians had resided in Shanghai since the 1860s. On the eve of World War I, the Russian community was small, yet relatively stable and prosperous. Some served as diplomats and merchants, while others were employed by Russian-owned banks, railroads, shipping firms, and export-import companies.⁴ Naturally, almost all of the earlier émigrés were startled and unprepared to deal with such a large influx of refugees.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 overthrew the dictatorial Romanov monarchy and established a provisional government⁵ subsequently replaced by the Bolshevik communist regime.⁶ Some foreigners in Shanghai welcomed the revolution with enthusiasm; one Protestant journal applauding it as “epoch-making” and that it was “the last spike to the coffin of autocracy.”⁷ Shortly afterwards, the bloody civil war between the Bolshevik (red) and Czarist (white) forces led to massive human relocation. When the situation became clear that the White regime was doomed, those who disagreed or resisted communist policies were labeled as reactionary and ruthlessly persecuted by the fledgling Communist government. Opponents of the new system were faced with the confiscation of property, imprisonment, exile, and even death.⁸ As a result, a large number of White Russians were forced to move southward across the Sino-Russian border in search of a better life,⁹ with approximately 25,000 to 50,000 of them settling in Shanghai during the Republican era.¹⁰

¹ Hanchao Lu, *Beyond the Neon Light: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 39.

² Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 111-112.

³ John B. Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 59.

⁴ Marcia R. Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 27.

⁵ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 505-506.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 511-512.

⁷ “Russia,” *Chinese Recorder* 48, no. 5 (May 1917): 276-277.

⁸ George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 258-259.

⁹ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 34-35.

¹⁰ Lu, *Beyond the Neon Light*, 39.

The Russian Revolution was an event that affected every segment of Russian society. In terms of their social composition, the refugees were spread out among every social class. A small elites segment was composed of affluent aristocrats, officials, clergy, military officers, landowners, merchants, professionals, intellectuals, and bourgeoisie.¹¹ The vast majority, however, were impoverished White soldiers blindly following their superiors' orders to retreat to China, and peasants escaping from famine and farm collectivization in the early 1920s.¹² Besides ethnic Slavs, a number of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews also joined the exodus.¹³

A large number of Russian refugees arrived by sea. In December 1922, Shanghai residents were amazed by the unexpected arrival of an odd fleet, or more specifically, a motley collection of warships, mail ships, tugs, and icebreakers.¹⁴ Most of the fourteen vessels were small and battered, with some on the brink of disintegration.¹⁵ When John Powell, an American journalist, boarded one of the warships, he encountered a crowd of ill-fed and ill-clothed refugees and found the deck "literally jammed with household equipment, ranging all the way from pots and pans to baby cribs."¹⁶ It was later learned that the flotilla had set sail from Vladivostok. Right before the port fell to the hands of besieging Bolsheviks, Admiral Oskar Victorovich Stark, the flotilla commander, had gathered all available vessels and had evacuated the soldiers, sailors and their families, and civilians who remained loyal to Czar Nicholas II. The voyage was arduous and several ships sank during a storm.¹⁷ Other refugees followed a different but equally grueling land route, entering China through the northwestern Xinjiang region and trekking across the immense and barren Gobi Desert.¹⁸

Refugees chose Shanghai as their final destination for several reasons. The primary reason was that the city was known for its status as a free port, allowing free entry even for those who did not possess a passport or visa.¹⁹ However, the challenges were formidable even for those who made it to Shanghai. Upon their arrival, most refugees were desperately hungry and ragged, with the most urgent task being to feed, clothe, and find proper accommodation for them. In response, the Russian Emigrants Committee (REC) was established as the semi-official executive center for Russian refugees²⁰ under the leadership of Viktor Fedorovich Grosse, a diplomat sent to Shanghai by Imperial Russia in 1911 and a prominent member of the Russian émigré community.²¹ Grosse was a reasonably competent administrator; however, due to scarce financial and human resources, the REC offered only limited assistance, to the great disappointment of the refugees. The League of Nations, the predecessor to the United Nations, dispatched a commission to investigate the living conditions of war refugees and to collect donations. After conducting a survey among White Russians, the commissioners concluded that the only feasible solutions would be repatriation or emigration. Few, however, wished to return to Russia out of fear of possible persecution, and the Soviet government outright denied any possibility of repatriation for those who desired to return.²² Additionally, most of them were too poor to pay for the transportation costs and almost all nations were reluctant to accept them.²³ Thus, their fate as stateless citizens was virtually sealed.

In addition to the loss of their citizenship, a considerable number of expatriates were unable to secure a decent job due to their inability to speak English, the "lingua franca of the foreign community."²⁴ In general, Republican Shanghai was dominated by a rigid hierarchical system in which prejudice and distrust of foreigners persisted in the various émigré groups. For example, when a well-paid position was available, the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and British firms were only willing to consider British people who were born and educated in England due to the engrained belief that British people who were brought up in Shanghai would inevitably be contaminated by the negative traits of the Chinese, and that therefore their integrity and honesty were to be doubted.²⁵

¹¹ Tatiana Schaufuss, "The White Russian Refugees," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 203, (May 1939): 45.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 74-81.

¹⁴ Ibid., 39.

¹⁵ "The Russian Ships at Woosung," *North China Herald*, December 16, 1922.

¹⁶ Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China*, 57.

¹⁷ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 39.

¹⁸ "Origin and Future of the Local Russian Community," *Shanghai Sunday Times*, July 19, 1936.

¹⁹ Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China*, 58.

²⁰ Marcia R. Ristaino, "White Russian and Jewish Refugees in Shanghai, 1920-44, As Recorded in the Shanghai Municipal Police Files, National Archives, Washington, DC.," *Republican China* 16, no. 1 (November 1990): 54.

²¹ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 37.

²² Schaufuss, "The White Russian Refugees," 47.

²³ "Origin and Future of the Local Russian Community," *Shanghai Sunday Times*, July 19, 1936.

²⁴ Marie-Claire Bergere, *Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 86.

²⁵ Sergeant, *Shanghai*, 156.

As a result, many White Russians faced bleak prospects in the job markets and subsequently entered into the low-paid, unskilled workforce. Some veterans worked as dockworkers, janitors, guards, chauffeurs, watchmen, or bodyguards for Chinese dignitaries due to their strong physique and military experience.²⁶ Others, especially women, found less physically demanding job at cafés, cabarets, and dance halls serving as musicians, waiters, waitresses, and dancers.²⁷ In order to support themselves and their families, some desperate females engaged in prostitution, either voluntarily or because they were forced by unscrupulous traffickers. By the 1930s, approximately 8,000 Russians worked in the sex industry.²⁸

One 1929 police report tells the poignant story of a Russian woman by the name of Mary Kuksova and offers a glimpse into the harsh realities that many Russian émigrés faced. Originally from Vladivostok, Kuksova was hired as a nurse by a Russian family and came to Shanghai in 1917. Two years later she was allegedly raped by her master. After that, she took refuge in a shelter and gave birth to her child there. As her social status fell, she was forced to work as a dancer in several cafés and bars, eventually contracting an unspecified disease. Eventually, her health rapidly declined to a point where she was sent to a country hospital in an unconscious state. When the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) informed Grosse, he said that he could not do anything for Kuksova except buy her a steamer ticket to have her sent away from Shanghai.²⁹

The presence of the White Russians, especially the beggars and prostitutes among them, became a nuisance to the tranquility of other foreigners in the community. More important, they challenged the foreigners' entrenched ideology of white superiority, which claimed that Westerners were morally and intellectually superior to the Chinese. The foreign community, therefore, felt entitled to a higher and more prestigious status. The very sight of Caucasian vagrants begging side by side with Chinese ones unsettled and alarmed other foreigners, who regarded them as the parasites who undermined the established social order and ought to be eliminated. As a result, the White Russian was collectively regarded as "emotional, untrustworthy and usually drunk."³⁰ The hostility felt towards some was sometimes unfairly directed against the entire community of White Russians.³¹

Nonetheless, some organizations did make a genuine effort to help lift Russian émigrés out of their misery. One of these attempts to relieve the oversupply of labor and the chronic unemployment in the community can be found in a 1929 SMP file. According to the report, forty White Russian artisans departed for Brazil on April 6. They were masons and carpenters hired by a Brazilian company to construct a railway. Their contracts and trips were arranged by a representative from the League of Nations and coordinated by the REC. Funds from League of Nations temporarily covered their travel expenses, which were deducted from their own salaries once they started working.³² The file also contained a letter from Grosse to the secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council in which he explained the recruitment and selection process of prospective workers. It is curious to note that the employment opportunities in Brazil attracted a considerable number of White Russian workers. Although only forty craftsmen were eventually selected, the first day of recruitment attracted more than two hundred applicants.³³ The chaotic political and social conditions in contemporary Shanghai were a likely reason for the abnormally high number of applicants.

Despite poverty, discrimination, and language barriers, many Russian expatriates displayed a remarkable degree of determination and resilience. As time passed, some émigrés managed to achieve upward social mobility through personal effort and initiative. This trend was illustrated by the experiences of Gregory Potapoff, a cadet who followed Admiral Stark to Shanghai at the age of eighteen. The SMC housed Potapoff and his fellow cadets in a park shortly after their arrival. One day he met a Russian woman and expressed his desire of finding a job, with the woman replying that there was a vacant assistant position in her husband's construction firm. He applied for the job and was hired. Later on, Potapoff rose to a prestigious position in the SMC, enjoying a handsome wage, a decent house, and a group of Chinese servants.³⁴ Similarly, many expatriates reached white-collar position, while highly educated and skilled Russians found their niches in various positions, often working as physicians, professors, lawyers, journalists, and engineers.³⁵ For example, Georgi Sapojnikov, a talented caricaturist, reached the prestigious position of cartoonist

²⁶ Nicolas R. Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1991), 41.

²⁷ Stella Dong, *Shanghai: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 132.

²⁸ Gail Hershatter, "The Hierarchy of Shanghai Prostitution, 1870-1949," *Modern China* 15, no. 4 (October 1989): 473.

²⁹ D. S. Ovsianikoff, "Report on Miss Mary Kuksova," September 24, 1929, SMP, reel 79, File D-522.

³⁰ Harriet Sergeant, *Shanghai* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 39.

³¹ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 15.

³² D. I. Robertson, "Report on Russians Leaving for Brazil," September 13, 1929, SMP, reel 57, File D-195.

³³ Viktor Grosse to S. M. Edwards, Shanghai, April 26, 1929, in SMP, reel 57, File D-195.

³⁴ Sergeant, *Shanghai*, 44-45.

³⁵ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 84.

for the *North China Daily News*. A man endowed with the “gift of reducing the complexities of Chinese politics to a single image and of capturing the ebullient, chaotic nature of Shanghai without sentimentality or cynicism,” Sapojnikov worked for the newspaper for more than two decades.³⁶ In a predominately patriarchal society, educated women possessing practical skills found occupations that were respectable, if not well-paid, including shop assistant, school teacher, governess, nurse, milliner, or hairdresser.³⁷

Following in the footsteps of Potapoff, other White Russians accumulated enough wealth through hard work and prudent investment to enjoy a prosperous and middle-class lifestyle. According to contemporary newspaper accounts, Russian émigrés participated in a surprisingly wide range of business and industry, including but not limited to clothing stores (both ready-made and made-to-order), shoe stores, haberdashery, furriers, hair salons, grocery stores, bakeries, dairy sales, butchery, confectionary, brewing, distilling, pharmacy, music shops, and tanning.³⁸ By doing so, they brought “an elegant European atmosphere”³⁹ to Shanghai. Some also worked as skilled carpenters, stonemasons, goldsmiths, cobblers, printers, watchmakers, locksmiths, barbers, mechanics, and painters.⁴⁰ The ingenuity and entrepreneurship of Russian artisans was warmly lauded by the *North China Daily News*:

Russians made jam, salted vegetables and fruits, smoked fish, sausages; by their own special method they salt and smoke ham ... Russians draw ikons, make wax-candles, wafers and all the other necessary paraphernalia of the Orthodox church; they hew their own gravestones and monuments, have their own funeral bureaux, are famed in the field of floriculture, maintain hospitals for animals ... in short there is no breach of any artisan or factory labour in which Russians have not made use of their knowledge, experience and energy.⁴¹

Most extraordinarily, Russian craftsmen and factory owners usually lacked enough capital, thereby forcing them to use more primitive and crude methods of manufacturing than the foreign companies with which they competed. These foreign companies possessed efficient and advanced production and distribution systems. Nonetheless, the Russians continued to “struggle on, and if they do not actually conquer the competition, they would live off of their businesses.”⁴²

From a cultural perspective, the 1930s “became a rich period”⁴³ for the White Russians. Once settled, the Whites took a special interest in celebrating and promoting their proud heritage, thereby enriching Shanghai culture through various channels. A wide variety of popular art clubs, ranging from ballets and orchestras to jazz and dramas, were founded.⁴⁴ The literary activities were quite vigorous as well, thanks to the large number of poets and novelists.⁴⁵ By 1937, Shanghai had become one of the largest publication centers of Russian books, newspapers, pamphlets, and textbooks, surpassing both Paris and Berlin. Additionally, religion became a crucial way to preserve their traditions and forge a sense of unity and belonging among an otherwise loose social group. The grand and magnificent Orthodox churches, once constructed, provided landmarks across Shanghai that served as essential meeting grounds for local Russian immigrants. Some deeply devout Russians found consolation from Orthodoxy and saw it as a powerful shield against the pains of homesickness and a crucial bond that reinforced cultural uniformity and knitted together the social fabric of the White Russian community.⁴⁶ John Powell noted the rich religious lives of White Russians:

I do not think I ever visited a Russian home without seeing at least one sacred ikon, and often there would be one in every room and usually with a small incense burner and oil lamp attached which was kept burning. Almost the entire foreign community turned out to observe the colorful Russian services at Christmas and Easter.⁴⁷

³⁶ Sergeant, *Shanghai*, 34-35.

³⁷ Ristaino, “White Russian and Jewish Refugees in Shanghai,” 55.

³⁸ “In the Russian Colony: Russian Traders,” *North China Daily News*, August 9, 1937.

³⁹ Lu, *Beyond the Neon Light*, 39.

⁴⁰ “In the Russian Colony: Russian Traders,” *North China Daily News*, August 9, 1937.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 81.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁴⁶ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort*, 85.

⁴⁷ Powell, *My Twenty-five Years in China*, 60.

In general, White Russians shaped Republican Shanghai history in remarkable ways. In spite of financial hardship, deep trauma originating from dislocation, and the enduring humiliation of low social status and discriminatory treatment, the refugees not only survived but also prospered, revealing their astonishing tenacity and flexibility. Today, a visitor to Shanghai will find few physical relics of the White Russians except for the remains of the graceful Orthodox churches and a monument featuring the bust of Pushkin. The rest was destroyed either by the Sino-Japanese war or the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, based upon scrutiny of the vigorous social, economic, and cultural lives enjoyed by the expatriate community, it can be safely concluded that the White Russians did leave a long-lasting mark and bestowed an indelible legacy upon the city that once accepted and sheltered them.

⁴⁸ James Irwin, "The Ghosts of Russia That Haunt Shanghai," *New York Times*, September 21, 1999.

The Power of Presence: Nixon, Israel, and the Black September Crisis

BRADLEY J. PIERSON

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention in recent years, the 1970 Black September Crisis remains one of the most understudied and misunderstood events of the Cold War era. The existing scholarship on “Black September,” which predominantly views the Crisis as an extension of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, fails to analyze the Crisis’ significance within the broader struggle between the Nixon administration and its Soviet counterparts. While the outbreak of civil war in Jordan was certainly the product of unresolved hostility in the region, the conflict’s escalation to an international confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was actually the result of a broadening struggle for influence. What began as a regional crisis quickly transformed into what National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger would later call, “a test of the American capacity to control events in the region.”¹ This paper will analyze the Nixon Administration’s use of increasingly assertive language and behavior to interpret its strategic methodology. Though the United States was hesitant to commit troops to Jordan due to its cumbersome military commitments in Southeast Asia, the Nixon Administration employed a composite of firm diplomatic posturing and the display of overt military signals to publicly demonstrate an uncompromised military capability in the Middle East. The United States’ handling of the crisis was consistent with the Nixon Administration’s affinity toward heavy-handed diplomacy. By publicly demonstrating a seeming willingness to intervene militarily, the United States effectively asserted its commitment to Jordan and deterred a potentially serious military altercation in the Middle East.

The indeterminate end to the Arab-Israeli War in June of 1967 set the stage for a state of perpetual conflict in the Middle East. Though Israel had achieved a decisive military victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the failure to reach a formal peace resolution created an ideological polarization in the region that presented three lasting implications. First, the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War welcomed an enhanced Soviet presence in the region. Soviet advisers and arms shipments flooded to the area to strengthen the governments of Egypt and Syria against the threat of Western incursion. The United States responded to the increased Soviet presence by substantially increasing its military assistance to Israel and Jordan. The outcome was the creation of a regional arms race that entrenched the Arab and Israeli positions along the Sinai Peninsula. Second, Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula instigated a massive militarization along the Suez Canal. Both Egypt and Israel used military aid to reinforce their respective banks along the Canal, thus creating a military stalemate not unlike the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula. Third, Israel’s continued occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights created a massive displacement of the Palestine people. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees fled deep into Jordan and left the Hashemite king with the task of managing a national population comprised of a Palestinian majority. Left-leaning militant groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Fedayeen established an influential presence in Jordan that gradually eroded King Hussein’s national authority. The combination of these elements destabilized an already tense environment and introduced a three-year period of isolated fighting known as the War of Attrition.²

Having been elected on a commitment to serve as a global leader in promoting international peace and security, President Richard Nixon made the establishment of stability in the Middle East an American priority. In June of 1970, Secretary of State William P. Rogers introduced a proposed peace agreement that claimed to effectively address both Arab and Israeli concerns. The Rogers Plan called for an immediate ceasefire and a resumption of negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Despite intense Palestinian opposition to such a resolution, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan formally agreed to the United States-sponsored ceasefire on August 7, 1970. Just as the establishment of a formal Arab-Israeli peace had begun to appear possible, Secretary Rogers’ efforts were abruptly undermined by the discovery of substantial Egyptian ceasefire violations with the apparent complicity of the Soviet Union. The Nixon Administration interpreted Soviet collusion in the ceasefire violations as evidence of communist efforts to disrupt the peace process. Though the Nixon Administration rushed to prevent the Rogers initiative from unraveling, the Palestinian hijacking of four commercial aircrafts in September of 1970 thrust the peace process into utter turmoil. The hijackings presented the first in a series of escalations that together constructed an international crisis and threatened to bring the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of war.³

On the morning of September 6, 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine seized control of three commercial aircraft and set off a regional crisis with international implications. Among the hostages were people of fourteen nationalities, though the majority were Israeli and American citizens. Seeking to maintain a united front

¹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 594-600.

² William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 106-110.

³ Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, *The Cold War: A Global History with Documents*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2011), 198-201.

in the face of global terrorism, the International Committee for the Red Cross assumed control of the ransom negotiations. The Palestinians sought to draw international attention to Israeli injustice and their group's intense opposition to the Rogers peace plan by publicly communicating an intent to exercise extreme violence. In exchange for the release of the hostages, the hijackers demanded the release of so-called Fedayeen freedom fighters incarcerated in prisons across the globe. As the Red Cross worked to secure the release of the hostages, the Nixon Administration used the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen its strategic position in the Middle East. If the United States were to return stability to the region, it would first have to bolster regional alliances by eliminating anti-Western opposition.

On September 9, 1970, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger convened a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group to discuss the need for a military response to Palestinian radicalism in Jordan. Kissinger began the meeting by stating, "If we do not get the Fedayeen in Jordan under control, the peace initiative will go by the board. The President's instincts are to crush the Fedayeen now."⁴ Though President Nixon favored an American military response to the hostage crisis, logistical restraints in the Middle East and a burdensome financial commitment to the Vietnam War had severely constrained the United States military's interventionary capability in the region. Furthermore, the use of American troops on Jordanian soil threatened to further discredit the authority of the already embattled Hashemite King. Having ruled out the use of American troops as "militarily impractical," the Nixon Administration instead settled on a course that supported Jordanian military action by providing sustained funding and moral encouragement to the Hashemite king.⁵

Though the United States believed the Jordanian army capable of defeating the Fedayeen militants, the Nixon Administration was not confident that King Hussein would risk the political repercussions that such a move would prompt from the Arab community. Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, expressed his doubt to Kissinger, saying, "He wants to avoid fighting. . . He is simply not willing to take on the Palestinians in his Kingdom with the possible help they would receive from the Iraqis, possibly the Syrians."⁶ The determined solution was to use the visibility of American military power as a means to bolster King Hussein's confidence and dissuade the prospect of foreign intervention. This pointed to the Nixon Administration's developed strategy in Jordan. By maintaining an element of public and private encouragement for King Hussein's campaign against the Fedayeen, the United States could effectively communicate an unyielding commitment to the Middle East and, in effect, influence the outcome of events in the region.

The Nixon Administration's policy towards the Middle East in September of 1970 was to recognize Egypt, Syria, and Iraq as Soviet subordinates. Though this may have been an oversimplification, Soviet complicity in the Egyptian ceasefire violations had convinced the Nixon Administration that the Russians maintained direct and constant control over the actions of their clients. For the United States to effectively deter Syrian and Iraqi intervention, it would have to send a clear message to Moscow. At a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group on September 10, the President's advisers met to discuss the United States' capacity to "assume an intimidating posture" that could be "visible and vigorous."⁷ The outcome of the meeting was a consensus that while the Nixon Administration was restricted in its capacity to respond militarily, there was an immediate need for a public reminder of the United States' presence in the Middle East. Admiral Thomas Moorer agreed, saying, "We should establish a deterrent. We can't do it half-way; we have to be convincing. . . We should tell the Soviets we mean business and show them by augmenting the 6th Fleet."⁸ Having decided on a means to support King Hussein in a military campaign against the Fedayeen, the Nixon Administration now needed to persuade him to do so.

The detonation of three empty airliners on September 12, 1970 gave the Nixon Administration the leverage it needed to persuade King Hussein to mount a massive military campaign against the Fedayeen. Professing a desire to prevent the continuance of Palestinian violence and terrorism, Secretary Rogers communicated to the Jordanian Embassy an immediate need for King Hussein and the Jordanian government "to demonstrate to all concerned that they are able take control of the internal Jordanian situation." The Secretary expressed the Nixon Administration's concern that Fedayeen activity in Jordan had weakened the international community's confidence in the King's ability to "exercise clear-cut authority throughout the kingdom."⁹ The King responded with a public display of military force on September 16, 1970. Apparently receptive to American encouragement, King Hussein and the Jordanian army launched an aggressive military campaign against the Fedayeen and drew immediate criticism throughout the Arab community.

⁴ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Kissinger to Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Sep. 9, 1970, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), Doc. 214.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Helms to WSAG Meeting, Sep. 10, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 222.

⁷ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Kissinger to WSAG Meeting, in *Ibid.*

⁸ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Moorer to WSAG Meeting, in *Ibid.*

⁹ Rogers to Sharaf, Sep. 13, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 234.

King Hussein's entrance into an all-or nothing showdown with the Fedayeen thrust the region into further turmoil. As civil war erupted in the streets of Amman on the morning of September 17, the governments of Syria and Iraq issued strong public statements warning Jordan against the potential consequences of continued military action. Syria, which still possessed considerable military capability in the region after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, was particularly adamant in its condemnation of Jordanian behavior. In a public statement that seemed to imply a willingness to respond militarily, the Syrian government announced that it "would not sit idly by while the Fedayeen were massacred."¹⁰ The increasingly hostile Arab reaction to the Jordanian Crisis underscored the need for an American military response. With tensions in the Middle East on the verge of exploding, Kissinger communicated to the Washington Special Actions Group that "the time has come to show US strength in the area. A US show of force might even fuel the peace initiative."¹¹

Seeking to deter foreign intervention in Jordan, the Nixon Administration exercised a composite of firm diplomatic posturing and overt military signals to publicly demonstrate a powerful military capability in the Middle East. The Administration responded to military threats from Syria and Iraq by providing a visible demonstration of the American naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition to moving the entire Sixth Fleet less than 100 miles from the shores of Lebanon, the Nixon Administration also redeployed the USS *John F. Kennedy* and the USS *Guam* from the Atlantic to assist in operations around the island of Crete. Speaking with Kissinger about how to best employ the Fleet as a deterrent, President Nixon said, "I want them to know we're moving. I want everything that can be done to be done in the open. The wear and tear on the nerves between the Syrians and Iraqis is very important. . . I want them to know we are hell bent on action."¹² In conjunction with the American military demonstration in the Mediterranean, President Nixon issued a stern statement to the *Chicago Sun Times* on September 17, 1970, which read, "If the Syrians or Iraqis intervene in Jordan there are only two of us to stop them, the Israelis or us. The Russians are going to pay dearly for moving the missiles in. . . We are embarking on a tougher policy in the Middle East. The Sixth Fleet is going to be beefed up. We will intervene if the situation is such that our intervention will make a difference."¹³ Nixon's comment was not a political talking point; it was a premeditated statement of intention to the governments of Syria, Iraq, and the USSR. The Nixon Administration's firm posture was soon tested with the Syrian invasion of Jordan on September 19, 1970.

The Jordanian Crisis exploded into an international conflict with the Syrian invasion on September 19, 1970. Disguised as soldiers of the Palestinian Liberation Army, Syrian ground forces crossed into Jordanian territory and began directly assisting the Fedayeen militants in repelling the advance of the Jordanian Army. The United States promptly released a statement condemning Syrian involvement and called for the "immediate withdrawal of Syrian forces" from Jordanian territory.¹⁴ Syrian forces quickly captured the large northern cities of Irbid and Ramtha and threatened Jordanian control of the capital city of Amman. Facing a rapidly deteriorating situation, King Hussein communicated a frantic plea for military assistance. In a personal message to President Nixon on September 21, 1970, the Hashemite king stated, "Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. . . I request immediate physical intervention both air and land. Immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter are imperative."¹⁵ The Syrian occupation of Jordan created a unique problem for the Nixon Administration. King Hussein's request for assistance tested the United States' regional credibility and challenged the Nixon Administration's capacity to control events in the region.

Though Kissinger and the rest of the President's advisers had been averse to an American military response to the hijackings, the invasion of an American ally by a Soviet confidant left the Nixon Administration with very few options. A Jordanian defeat would undermine more than the success of the Rogers peace process: it would tarnish American credibility in the eyes of the world. The determined solution was to employ Israel as a regional enforcer of American interests. Unlike the United States, Israel was not constrained by an enormous military commitment to Southeast Asia. While the United States lacked the manpower, the bases, the supply lines, and the public support to effectively intervene in Jordan, Israel was ready and willing. The defense of King Hussein and the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan were considered vital to long-term Israeli interests. Communicating the Nixon Administration's support of Israeli intervention if the situation "deemed it necessary," Kissinger conveyed to Israeli Ambassador Rabin that the United States

[W]ould look favorably on your actions and the President has asked me to tell you if you undertake

¹⁰ Jordanian Situation Report, Haig to Kissinger, Sep. 17, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 253.

¹¹ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Kissinger to WSAG Meeting, Sep. 17, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 254.

¹² Nixon telecon with Kissinger, Sep. 17, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 262.

¹³ Shakespeare telecon with Kissinger, Sep. 17, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 261.

¹⁴ Department of State, telegram 1514413 to the U.S. Embassy Amman, Sep. 20, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 276.

¹⁵ U.S. Embassy Amman, telegram 4988 to the Department of State, Sep. 21, 1970, *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 284.

such action we would of course make good any materiel problems that might arise as a result of these actions and we are cognizant of the fact we would have to hold the situation under control vis-à-vis the Soviets.¹⁶

The result of this arrangement was the groundbreaking establishment of a partnership that fitted the United States and Israel into separate roles. With the Nixon Administration on the verge of a violent confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States demonstrated its naval power as a visible deterrent while Israel served as a regional enforcer.

Though the Nixon Administration took steps to minimize the visibility of its collusion with Israel, their arranged partnership appeared increasingly evident as the two powers moved closer towards intervention in Jordan. The looming pressure of an aligned American and Israeli military presence in the region applied sustained pressure to the governments of both Syria and the Soviet Union. The Nixon Administration's assumed posture in the crisis was to recognize Syria, Iraq, and the Soviet Union as a single entity. Speaking to the National Security Council on September 22, 1970, President Nixon reiterated that his Administration's approach to the conflict had been constructed to "underline our determination to maintain a U.S. presence and to strengthen our credibility with respect to the Soviets."¹⁷ The Nixon Administration's decision to augment the Sixth Fleet, the maintenance of its firm diplomatic posture, and its public support for the Jordanian government had all been in pursuit of this objective. As King Hussein and the Jordanian army gradually began to gain the upper hand in the fighting, Syria failed to commit additional forces to the conflict. The combined presence of the United States and Israel effectively deterred Syria from ever fully committing militarily. Speaking before a Congressional panel on September 22, President Nixon stated, "If the Syrians do, in fact, disengage, it will be because of the strong posture taken by the U.S."¹⁸ The effectiveness of the Nixon Administration's policy was reaffirmed with the Syrian withdrawal from Jordan on September 23, 1970. By having publicly demonstrated a seeming willingness to intervene militarily, the United States was able to effectively assert its commitment to Jordan and thus deter a potentially serious military altercation in the Middle East.

The Nixon Administration's implementation of an increasingly assertive posture towards the Middle East signaled a dramatic shift in the direction of American foreign policy. While the Jordanian Crisis was certainly the result of unresolved hostilities in the Middle East, its escalation to an international crisis was a product of American construction. The Nixon Administration utilized the hijacking of four commercial airliners in the fall of 1970 as an opportunity to weaken the anti-Western Fedayeen and to strengthen the United States' strategic position in the Middle East. Though the United States was hesitant to commit troops to Jordan due to its cumbersome military commitments in Southeast Asia, the Nixon Administration employed a composite of firm diplomatic posturing and the display of overt military signals to publicly demonstrate an uncompromised military capability in the Middle East. By publicly projecting a willingness to expand the conflict beyond Jordan, the United States was able to effectively communicate an unyielding commitment to the Middle East and, in effect, influence the outcome of events in the region. The Nixon Administration's effective handling of the crisis is a resounding demonstration of American brinkmanship during the Cold War.

¹⁶ Kissinger telecon with Rabin, Sep. 20, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 287.

¹⁷ Minutes of the Substance of Discussion, Nixon to NSC Meeting, Sep. 22, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 313.

¹⁸ Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion, Nixon to NSC Meeting, Sep. 23, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-76*, Doc. 318.