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Roland, Charlemagne, and the Poetics of Illumination

A VARIANT TITLE OF THIS PAPER might have been, "The Chanson de Roland: From the Poetics of Illumination to the Opacity of the Sign." For my intention here is to draw upon medieval theories of illumination in order to suggest that there is a deep epistemological tension in the Chanson de Roland which involves a crisis in fundamental modes of seeing, of knowing, and communicating reality.[1] For the moment, let me speak simplistically and say first, that this tension implicates what may be called (with Eric A. Havelock[2] and F. Edward Crantz) a changing relationship between the knower and the known, and secondly, that the crisis signaled by this change coincides with a certain dualism in the cultural status of the Roland, an epic which is quite obviously both a preeminent vestige of an oral tradition that reaches back at least to the year of Rencesvals that we are celebrating in 1978, and a precious written monument inaugurating nothing less than a new order of vernacular literacy in France. The Chanson de Roland may be considered, therefore, as a threshold to a culture of the text which in some deep way is very much our own today. Moreover, the textualization of vernacular culture is but one index of a much larger transformation of social relationships which occurred but which I cannot attempt to describe here. Suffice it to say, then, that I am speaking of a crisis whose true violence is hardly that of bright red blood spilt on green grass (indeed, for chivalric heroes such outpourings are fulfillments of their being rather than its denial), but is located in the very order of speech in which heroic hemorrhages are declared.

The notion of illumination is not specifically Christian but was transformed and integrated into Christian thought by Saint Augustine. If I favor Augustine's theory of illumination, I do so hardly with the purpose of the intellectual historian questing after sources and influences, but rather with the purpose of isolating a lucid description of a model of mind which was broadly prevalent in the middle ages until the twelfth century, in particular until the generation of Anselm and Abelard. This was also the moment not only when nominalism began to rise but when the Chanson de Roland was most probably set down in writing. I shall propose, moreover, that the psychic experience of illumination that Augustine describes is very much characteristic of an oral culture, even though the experience is described by Augustine himself in writing. Such a paradox of method, I hasten to add, is entirely defensible on more than one ground. First, an oral culture cannot

possibly come into consciousness of itself except through its negation in writing: secondly, even in a culture of writing, oral models of human intellection may continue to inform and determine experiences which are set down in writing après coup: indeed, it is a commonplace of Augustinianism that the written text functions basically as a supplement to the spoken sound.[3] In short, I do not believe that the polarity of orality and textuality, by which so many medievalists continue so doggedly to earn their bread, is at all a clearcut one, and in the light of Eric A. Havelock's claims that there were "oral sources of the Hellenic intelligence,"[4] I would hold similarly that oral models continued to inform even the literate minds of medieval culture until the twelfth century, at which time these models were disrupted by a renewed epistêmê of the text during the generation of Anselm and Abelard.

As a Christian Neo-Platonist, Augustine aspired above all to know himself and to know God, the two goals being, finally, identical, since nothing—not even the self—can be known truly except in God. Augustine held that there are three basic faculties of the soul: memory, intelligence, and love, and that the combined operations of these faculties allow men to transcend the knowledge of sensible or created things and to know intelligible things (res intelligibiles), that is, to know permanent, invisible substances that do not exist in time or space, among which God himself is of course supreme. These three faculties of the soul correspond to the three persons of the Holy Trinity:

> The memory of a man, and especially that memory which animals do not have, that is the memory in which intelligible things are so contained that they do not come into it through the senses—this memory has in its own small measure in its image of the Trinity a likeness, incomparably unequal, but nevertheless some sort of likeness, to the Father. In the same way, a man's intelligence (intelligentia), which is formed from the memory as the intention of cogitation is directed to it when what we know is spoken and is a word of no language—this intelligence has in its great disparity nevertheless some likeness of the Son. Finally the love of man, proceeding from his knowledge and joining together memory and intelligence . . . has in this image some likeness, even though extremely unequal, of the Holy Spirit.[5]

Intelligible things exist within the mind of God. but are manifested to man directly through his memory: to experience knowledge (sapientia) is basically to recollect what is already planted in our memory by God, but forgotten because we have been distracted by the inferior knowledge (scientia) of sensible things (sensibilia).[6] The knowledge of intelligible

substances occurs as a kind of vision, as a "seeing" which takes place when the mind's eye of the intelligence is directed by the will toward the substance which is to be intellected. Like the bodily eye which emits a "point" (acies) of vision that allows itself to be informed by the object that it sees, so too, within the soul, the "point" of thought that issues from the mind's eye allows itself to be informed by the inner light of intelligibles which are incumbent in the memory as realities, and not as similitudes of these realities. It is important for my purposes that I emphasize the point, so well made by F. Edward Crantz, that Augustine believes that when the mind is informed by an intelligible thing, the mind of the knower finally assumes that form as its own: true knowledge is ultimately a conjunction of the knower with the known. It follows that such conjunctive knowledge, which is a reunion of the "father" and "son" of the soul thanks to the binding capacity of love, is the only proper goal of the soul, just as an unmediated union with God, of salvation, is the only proper goal of man's existence in the creation: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc, autem, facie ad faciem (I. Cor. 13,12).

Although Augustine often privileges the faculty of inner sight in depicting the illumination of the mind in the process of knowing, Augustine believes in a faculty of inner speech which is no less intimately implicated in this same process. Just as there is an exterior, corporeal language constituted which is not external and verbal, hence, which is capable of resembling or representing perfectly the thing known:

> The human mind accordingly keeps all these things that it knows, whether it acquired them through itself or through the senses of its body or through the testimony of others, stored away in the treasury of the memory. From them is born a true word when we speak what we know. For when the word is exactly like (similli-ma) the thing known (rei notae), from which it is born, then the vision of cogitation is born from the vision of knowledge. Such a word is of no language, a true word from a true thing, having nothing of its own but being entirely from that knowledge (scien-*tia)* from which it was born.[7]
>
> The divine light shows you that there is a true word in you when it is born from your knowledge, that is when we say what we know, even though we do not speak or cogitate a signifying word in the language of any nation. The true word is there when our cogitation is formed from what we know, when there is in the point (acie) of cogitation an image exactly like (simillima) that knowledge which the memory contained, and when the will or love joins these two as parent and offspring.[8]

Ideal knowledge, then, is the conjunction of an inner signifier with an unequivocal, universal signified also within us, and such a conjunction is experienced as an illumination, or, as Augustine puts it elsewhere, as a "sudden flash which floods the soul" (quasi rapida coruscatione perfundit animam),[9] and such a reunion within the mind is like that of a son with his father. It is interesting that such reunions—whether missed (as in the Iliad) or achieved (as in the Odyssey) seem to be a privileged goal in the life of an epic hero in the oral tradition from Homer onward: is it not, perhaps, because such a reunion consummates and validates in some way the "truth" of everything in the oral narrative that has led up to it? By contrast, separation of the knower from the known, or of the son from the father, is an experience of darkness, of the abyss, of the Val Tenebrus. If one will concede that the epistemological model that I am describing is more than a set of abstract ideas or poetic "themes" and that it amounts to a program of human experience that can determine man's basic perception of the realities of his world, we may now pass to the more important question as to how such a program is manifested in the events of the Chanson de Roland, that is, in a poem that is both a history (historia) of Christian warriors struggling to serve and to know God and a narrative performance (historia) which is in some artistic sense "true." It is with this question in mind that I shall discuss several important passages in the Oxford version of that poem.

I would first like to comment upon the passage in the Roland where the poet describes that dramatic moment—one crucial to any story about heroic warfare—when armed adversaries stand poised for combat. As we might expect of *a* poem which had no doubt enjoyed a long pre-history as an archaic, oral legend serving the ideology of a warrior class centered for several centuries upon a cult of military excellence, this passage is laced with formulas invested with a truth-value that is not only historical (who does not believe in Charlemagne?) but artistic as well. More economically than any others, these formulas tell us exactly what it is like to be on the verge of the great fight of one's life: the terrible exquisiteness of the enemy's weapons, the jittery eagerness of all those who yearn to deal the first blow, the clamor and brightness of weapons brandished in the sunlight, and the blaring of trumpets whose music could not fail to resound in the voice of any good singer of tales. This is a moment when the hero, the poet, and the formulas of oral epic are perfectly at one with each other in a world of glorious transparency—to such a degree that Roland himself not only proclaims, for all of eternity, the "moral" of his own tale, but he even points to his legend as the stuff of future songs, good ones, especially our

own. This is an instance, then, of the "monologic" of the purest sort, in the sense that Bakhtin has given to that term:

> LXXIX
> Paien s'adubent des osbercs sarazineis,
> Tuit li plusur en sunt dublez en treis;
> Lacent lor elmes mult bons, sarraguzeis.
> Ceignent espees *de* l'acer vianeis;
> Escuz unt genz, espiez valentineis,
> E gunfanuns blancs e blois e vermeilz.
> Laissent les muls e tuz les palefreiz,
> Es destrers montent, si chevalchent estreiz.
> Clers fut li jurz *e* bels fut li soleilz;
> N'unt guarnement que tut ne reflambeit.
> Sunent mil grailles por ço que plus bel seit.
> Granz est la noise, si l'oïrent Franceis.
> Dist Oliver: "Sire cumpainz, ce crei,
> De Sarrazins purum bataille aveir."
> Respont Rollant: "E! Deus la nus otreit!
> Ben devuns ci estre pur nostre rei.
> Pur sun seignor deit hom susfrir destreiz
> E endurer e granz chalz e granz freiz,
> Sin deit hom perdre e del quir e del peil.
> Or guart chascuns que granz colps i empleit.
> Que malvaise cançun de nus chantet ne seit!
> Paien unt tort e chrestïens unt dreit.
> Malvaise essample n'en serait ja de mei." AOI.[10]

In every sense, then, this is a moment of truth in a world of might, light and right. Heroic language and heroic action (logos and ergon) are perfectly adequate to each other and reciprocally beget and serve one another in the action that follows, and time after time the violence of heroic combat will erupt into flashes of light and color as weapons clash and pagan gems are shattered by Christian steel. Such violence is not, however, the "subject" of oral narrative: rather, it is an aide-mémoire, a mnemonic device thanks to which good narrative is generated. Violence is a kind grammar of the oral intelligence and is fulfilled in the light of human intuition, whether joyful, as now, or anguished, as later. If flashes of light and color mark privileged instances of heroic intelligence in the Roland, it is possible to see the violence of Roland's passion at Rencesvals as a narrativization of a Christian's struggle to achieve such light. Indeed, violence of some sort, however it is thematized, almost always attends the experience of illumination, from Saint Paul and Saint Augustine onward through the middle ages and the renaissance.

Let us pursue this idea in more detail. One will recall that Roland's last moments culminate in his apostrophe to his sword Durendal, which he has just attempted to break on a stone in order to prevent its falling into the hands of a pagan. As the acies of Roland's sword rebounds from the stone unbroken, it suddenly flashes in the sunlight one final time. Just as suddenly, the acies of Roland's inner vision is galvanized and he begins to declaim, in capsule form, a song of songs about this sword of swords. One may surmise that the torrent of conquests that Roland recites constituted a compressed encyclopaedia of Carolingian "history" as it was understood in the ideology of twelfth century Capetian France. Surely each item in Roland's list of conquests corresponds to an epic of its own, or perhaps even a whole cycle of epics, all well known to chivalric audiences of the time. Roland may be said to know by memory truly, and from within, the poetic history that he himself has performed, first as a soldier in the service of Charlemagne, now as a poet reminiscing. Paradoxically, the whole trajectory of Roland's story has worked a kind of strange reversal in the process of poetic mimesis in this poem. For if, at the beginning of the Chanson de Roland, the poet, in singing his tale, appropriates the voice and gestures of his heroes, by this point in the narrative Roland is now imitating the poet. The poetic performance, in other words, has moved to the surface of its own story: oral epic is staging, here, the violence of its own begetting:

CLXXII
Rollant ferit el perrun de sardonie.
Cruist li acers, ne briset ne s'esgrunie.
Quant il ço vit que n'en pout mie freindre,
A sei meïsme la cumencet a pleindre:
"E! Durendal, cum es bele e clere e blanche!
Cuntre soleill si luises e reflambes!
Carles esteit es vals de Moriane,
Quan Deus del cel li mandat par sun angle
Qu'il te dunast a un cunte cataignie:
Dunc la me ceinst li gentilz reis, li magnes.
Jo l'en cunquis e Anjou e Bretaigne,
Si l'en cunquis e Peitou e le Maine;
Jo l'en cunquis Normandie la franche,
Si l'en cunquis Provence e Equitaigne
E Lumbardie e trestute Romaine;
Jo l'en cunquis Baiver e tute Flandres
E Burguigne e trestute Puillanie,
Costentinnoble, dunt il out la fiance,
E en Saisonie fait il ço qu'il demandet;
Jo l'en cunquis e Escoce e Vales Islonde
E Engletere, que il teneit sa cambre:

> Cunquis l'en ai païs e teres tantes,
> Que Carles tient, ki ad la barbe blanche.
> Pur ceste espee ai dulor e pesance;
> Mielz voeill murir qu'entre paiens remaigne.
> Deus! perre, n'en laiser hunir France!"

Roland's final moments are a convergence, then, of two performances of historic, one by a soldier, one by a singer of gestes. Both are true, yet in neither case may Roland be considered the true "author" of his performance in any ultimate sense. To the contrary, it was God who, through successive mediations—first of an angel, next, of Charles—gave Roland the steely wherewithal to "make" and reveal true history, whether in actions or in words. The language and deeds of oral epic are, together, the living logos of the Father "spoken" first through Charlemagne, a vicarius Christi (as his legend called him), and then through the presence of Roland, a nephew and spiritual son of a spiritual son. However, spiritual though it is, Charlemagne's "paternity" is only an earthly paternity, so if Roland's death is Charlemagne's "right hand" being cut off, such a disjunction is inevitable in this world of mortal affairs. Now, however, a son who has served as a worldly agent of the logos is on the verge of crossing the threshold of death to return to God as "true father who never lied," that is, to a God who is no longer to be known either through the arbitrary signs of mortal speech or through the no less equivocal visibilia of the creation, but face to face: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tune, autem, facie ad faciem. An epistemological rapture that began with Roland's illumination and with a recitation of those historical memories which have been his destiny, ends in a direct invocation of God.

But knowledge of God is to be had only from within and only with the simultaneous knowledge of self, and, as in Saint Augustine's inner trinity, such an act of knowledge may occur only as a conjunction through an act of love. The Oxford text signals the moment (CLXXVI) very clearly when Roland's self-knowledge (one that takes the ritualized form of confessing those worldly sins that separate the worldly son from his unworldly father) finally leads to a knowledge of God that is unmediated: Saints Gabriel and Michael, patrons each of chivalry, perform this pleasant pentecostal favor by bearing Roland's soul to the ineffable kingdom of the father.

It is in no way contradictory to suggest that this high moment in the history of the feudal imagination is at the same time a drama of conjunctive knowledge that is proper to a long medieval spiritual tradition: indeed, the latter is perhaps an epistemological pre-condition of the former. However,

it would be a denial of the astonishingly rich complexity of the Roland to suppose that such idealism is allowed to prevail unperturbed in the poem, and in the short space at my disposal I should like to try to describe a strangely beautiful but tragic counterpoint of darkness that begins to infiltrate this poem very early and which comes, by the end, to dominate the worldview that it imparts. From the start of the Roland, Charlemagne is a man of temperamental shadows, of equivocal dreams and of ineffable torments: Charlemagne is clearly not at ease with a logos of history which was once univocal (or monologic) but which is now in the process of contradicting itself, of making absolute truths into relative ones—in short, of becoming terribly mortal. But Charlemagne's dark night of the soul must remain in abeyance until the second half of the poem, which will be his half; and so, during Roland's drama only Oliver seems to threaten, if ephemerally, the archaic presuppositions of oral epic discourse. Indeed, for Oliver, the glint of pagan steel in the sun is hardly an occasion for joyous outcries, but rather, for rational objective analysis: there are too many pagans, he deduces, so Roland must sound his horn and summon Charlemagne for help. Oliver est sage, which means in the context of this poem that he both sees the world and uses language (and presumably horns) differently from Roland. Oliver is on the verge of carrying dialogue to the dialogic (again, in Bakhtin's sense of the term), hence, of threatening the consecrated discourse of history itself. If it is true, as scholars surmise, that Oliver is a later interpolation into the Roland legend, we should perhaps be willing to recognize that Oliver is also the forerunner of a "disjunctive" historiographie mentality in which events will come to be understood more and more as being distinct from the mind that knows and the voice that predicates them. But sage, rational Oliver is not allowed to cloud for long the anticipation of glorious martyrdom in a soldier whose moral transparency is inseparable from the efficacy of formulaic epic language itself. To the contrary, Oliver becomes almost more Rolandian than Roland himself when Roland at last decides to sound his horn and summon Charlemagne. Olivier est preux. Charlemagne, by contrast, must inherit all of the darkness of the created world: Halt sunt li pui e li val tenebrus is a chorus-like verse whose potentially tragic antinomy is finally borne out by Charlemagne alone. If, for Roland, battle trumpets herald the joy of heroic fulfillment and future songs, for Charlemagne the distant winding of Oliphant is a music of mortality and of the abyss. The very eyes of Roland, which in life shone with a light, with a sharpness (acies), which seemed invincible, are now, in death, a locus of darkness and opacity: Turnez ses oilz, mult li sunt tenebros (CCVII). At the moment of his death did the sun itself not momentarily forsake the world and plunge it into darkness and

incomprehension? Cuntre midi tenebrus i ad granz./ N'i ad clartet, se li ciels nen i *fent* (CX). But this is a dark night of the poetic world as well, for, after Charlemagne exacts his joyless revenge upon the pagan forces, the earlier formulas of sunlight flashing upon weapons become painfully reversed as the tired emperor collapses with fatigue in a darkness relieved only by the cold and deathly pallor of the moon. With these painful anti-formulas, poetic language assumes an almost elegiac stance with regard to its former power both to evince and to celebrate heroic glory. Language is becoming disjoined from itself:

CLXXXII
Li emperere ad prise sa herberge.
Français descendent en la tere deserte,
2490 A lur chevals unt toleites les seles,
Lé freins a or e metent jus les testes,
Livrent lur prez, asez i ad fresche herbe...

CLXXXIV
Clere est la noit e la lune luisant.
Carles se gist, mais doel ad de Rollant
E d'Oliver li peiset mult forment,
2515 Des .XII. pers e de la franceise gent.
En Rencesvals ad laiset morz sanglenz;
Ne poet muër n'en plurt e nes dement
E priet Deu qu'as anmes seit guarent.
Las est li reis, kar la peine est mult grant;
2520 Endormiz est, ne pout mais en avant.
Par tuz les prez or se dorment li Franc.
N'i ad cheval ki puisset ester en estant:
Ki herbe voelt, il la prent en gisant.
Mult ad apris ki bien conuist ahan.

Moreover, it is precisely at this moment that we learn of a torturesome paradox, which is that Charlemagne's sword *Joiuse is* so named not because he has thrust back the boundaries of paganism, as his legend held, but rather because the sword contains the tip of the spear with which Longinus pierced the side of Christ on the cross. How far we have come from the ideology of the Christ in majesty of the romanesque tympanum, and how far from the joy of the swordblow that splits the pagan's flesh in two! This is the paradox of salvation through loss, suffering, humiliation, death to the world, and charity which belongs to a later stratum of medieval Christianity, one whose keynote was compassion rather than judgment and revenge. Such is the overwhelming message of the line Mout ad apris ki bien conuist ahan. Charlemagne's memory expands into a comprehensive experience of knowledge through disjunction, one that begins as a meta-

phor of dismemberment and ends in a vision of triple alienation: from the world of created things, from the society of his fellow man, and from his own "honor," which is in essence his own image of himself:

> CCVII
> "Ami Rollant, Deus metet t'anme en flors,
> En pareïs, entre les glorius!
> Cum en Espaigne venis a mal seignur!
> Ja mais n'ert jurn de tei n'aie dulur.
> Cum decarrat ma force e ma baldur!
> N'en avrai ja ki sustienget m'onur
> Suz ciel ne quid aveir ami un sul..."

Though Charlemagne languishes to be conjoined with Roland and the twelve peers in heaven—to a point where he is ready to join them bodily in the grave—he remains a prisoner of his rôle of emperor of this world, a prisoner of both language and history:

> CCX
> "Ço duinset Deus, le filz seinte Marie,
> Einz que jo vienge as maistres porz de Sirie,
> L'anme del cors me seit oi departie,
> Entre les lur aluee e mise
> E ma car fust delez els enfuïe!"

Charlemagne's is an altered world which can no longer abide fierce, autistic heroism in its leaders, as God himself makes clear by promulgating the defeat of a splendid Pinabel by a less-than-average knight named Thierry: Heingre out le cors e graisle e eschewid . . . (CCLXXVII). Human force is now shown to carry the seeds of its own destruction. With the execution of Ganelon, one last time bright red blood spews formulaically onto the green grass (Sur l'erbe verte en espant li cler sanc. CCLXXXIX), but it is the unheroic blood of a traitor spilled for the greater glory of none. The Chanson de Roland is not only a tragedy in poetic language, it is a tragedy of that language as well.

Indeed, as Charlemagne withdraws from the daylight into the darkness of his vaulted chamber at night, only to be summoned anew by Gabriel to new exploits in the land of Bire, we sense a sharp discrepancy between a narrative legend which must start anew and a narrative language that is now as used up as its two hundred year old hero. Charlemagne can only grieve helplessly at his own terrible otherness, for he has access to no discourse which might bring him the relief of an alternative consciousness:

CCXCI
Li emperere n'i volsist aler mie:
"Deus, dist li reis, si peneuse est ma vie!"
Pluret des oilz, sa barbe blanche tiret.
Ci falt la geste que Turoldus declinet.

I should like to conclude by commenting briefly, as I promised at the beginning of this paper, on the cultural status of the Roland as a written text whose legendary material stems, whether directly or not, from a long oral prehistory. I would like to suggest that the epistemological tension between conjunctive and disjunctive knowledge that I have described reflects a tension between interfering modes of communication, those of voice and letter. This is a tension older than Christianity itself, but is amply described by Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. On the one hand, it is proposed that the letter supplements the voice, as it did, for instance, when Moses set down God's revelation on Mount Sinai; on the other hand, it is proposed that the law of the unvoiced, dispirited letter kills. I scarcely need elaborate upon such an antithesis here. I merely wish to propose that the Chanson de Roland constitutes, by virtue of its epistemological tension, a kind of cultural threshold into modernity, understood as an epistêmê of the text. Thus, the two halves of the Roland clearly convey to us two opposed notions of monumentality, one oral, one textual. Roland, one will recall, died with the certainty that the memory of his legend would live on in good songs that would be sung by future bards. Charlemagne, by contrast, whose army now teems, we are suddenly told, with "bishops, abbots, monks, canons and tonsured priests" (CCXII), after uttering his oral planctus lamenting the loss of Roland, immediately proceeds to make plans for supplementing that memory with monuments of stone, that is, with inert signifiers that belong to the world of tablets, inscriptions and of the letter. The substitution of heroes that occurs in the Roland corresponds, then, to two modes of experiencing language, one that is proper to an oral culture, the other to a culture of writing, and surely the violence of such a transition was in some ways more profound than the violence of the sword: the cut of the pen was deeper. The acies of Durendal rebounding from the stone at Rencesvals could illuminate the acies of heroic mind with a heroic word, but the acies of the pen would leave only traces of darkness on the parchments of the world.

However, the black hemorrhage of ink that began with the Digby manuscript would not only flow on in epic, it would seek out redeeming illuminations of its own, those of rubric, of pigment and of pictures on the page. Moreover, just as in the Oxford version of the Roland the oral performance

staged itself around an oral hero, a generation later, in the Latin chronicle of the Roland legend called the Pseudo-Turpin (because it was purportedly written by Archbishop Turpin), we discover a new and strange feminine presence in this world of chivalric heroes, that of Lady Grammatica herself: for when Charlemagne returns to Aachen, we are told in the chronicle, he builds a splendid basilica and a castle, and on the castle walls are painted not only the stories of his wars in Spain, but the allegorical figure of Grammar appearing alongside the very same heroes whose memory she monumentalizes:

> Bella namque, quae ipse in Hyspania devicit, et VII liberales artes, inter cetera, miro modo in eo depinguntur.
>
> Gramathica scilicet quae est mater ominum artium, per quam omnes scripturae et celestia et terrestria noscunt ur, quae docet quot et quales litterae debent asscribi..[11]

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[1]In this essay I am returning to certain questions about the function of oral discourse in cognition that I raised briefly in an earlier study entitled Reading the Song *of* Roland (Englewood Cliffs, 1970). I indicated, at the time, the classical scholarship which had influenced my reading of the medieval poem. Since that time I have read several unpublished essays by F. Edward Crantz, of Connecticut College, which have greatly strengthened my appreciation of the problem of the relationship between the knower and the known as a problem of epistemology which is of major importance to the early twelfth century and to Western culture as a whole. I wish to express my deep indebtedness to these unpublished materials, whose central thesis has also become my own, and to their author for his kindness in sharing his knowledge with me.

[2]Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass.), 1963, esp. ch. 7 and 8.

[3]St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I. iv. 6; De ordine, 12. 35.

[4]Havelock, ch. 7.

[5]The translated passages by St. Augustine that appear in my text, as well as the points that they illustrate, have been drawn, except where indicated, from Crantz's unpublished monograph, "New Dimensions of Thought in Anselm and Abelard as against Augustine and Boethius." The first passage is from De trinitate XV .xxiii. 43.

[6]St. Augustine, De trinitate XII. xv. 25.

[7]De trinitate XV .xii. 22.

[8]De trinitate XV .xxvii. 50.

[9]St. Augustine, De catechizandis rudibus ii:3; tr. mine.

[10]I use the edition of the Chanson de Roland by Gérard Moignet (Paris, 1969).

[11]Historic Karoli Magni et Rotholandi, ou Chronique du pseudo-Turpin, ed. C. Meredith-Jones, Paris and Geneva, 1936, p. 223; see also, The Song *of* Roland, ed. Gerald Brault, University Park, 1978, vol. I, pp. 32, 354-355, n. 188. I am grateful to Professor Brault for his suggestions about this and other points in this paper.