


LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL



LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

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Amos J. Beyan, Editor
Liberian Studies Journal
Friedmann Hall, Department of History
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008
E-mail: amos.beyan@wmich.edu
Phone: 269-387-2664

All Book Reviews should be mailed to:

Phyllis Belt-Beyan, Associate Editor
Liberian Studies Journal
College of Education, Teaching, Learning & Leadership
3418 Sangren Hall
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008
E-mail: phyllis.belt@wmich.edu
Phone: 269-387-3898

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An Indigenous Liberian's Quest for the Presidency: Momolu Massaquoi and the 1931 Election

Raymond J. Smyke*

Born of a warrior queen on a Liberian battlefield, Momolu Massaquoi (1870-1938) was heir to two African royal families and reigned as the youngest-ever King of the Vai people. Educated in the United States of America, he held key positions in the Liberian government, becoming Africa's first indigenous diplomat. He served in Hamburg, Germany during the 1920s. Popular among ordinary Liberians and about to become the nation's first tribal African president in the early 1930s, he was betrayed by his boyhood friend, another contender for the presidency. Massaquoi was barred from holding public office and the Massaquoi name was expunged from official Liberian history. Exclusion from politics was characteristic of Liberia's First Republic, 1847 to 1980, when a repatriate minority dominated the indigenous majority. However, exclusion from public memory as a punishment was unique to Massaquoi.

The full story covers two hundred years of Massaquoi family history from his great, great, grandfather Siaka, well known on the West Coast of Africa during the 18th century, to his great, grandson, a Harvard trained physician with a Ph.D. in bio-technology. A genealogical study of this depth has rarely been done in Africa.¹

Massaquoi bridged the wide gap between traditional African life and the Western-dominated industrialized world. At one level his life is a testimony to a formidable African personality. At a deeper level Massaquoi can be seen as a victim of the politics of exclusion, a system in which a minority-controlled government uses state power to subjugate the majority. The politics of exclusion is prevalent in many places today. South Africa was fortunate in 1994 to make a peaceful transition to majority rule. Elsewhere around the globe population pressure and the frustrations of exclusion combine to generate violence of the kind witnessed on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America.

* American-born Raymond Smyke worked for over 30 years as Assistant Secretary General of the Swiss based World Confederation of Teachers and head of its African Program. Smyke oversaw the training of national teacher organization leaders in English and French language speaking countries, including the Republic of South Africa. Dr. Smyke later taught African Studies and Third World Politics, at Geneva's Webster University, serving as Department Chair. He authored *The First African Diplomat: Momolu Massaquoi, 1870-1938* (Xlibris, 2004) and several articles before he passed away in December 2004.

Massaquoi's exclusion from national politics in the 1930s was a harbinger of the violent birth of the Second Republic fifty years later, when the majority seized power. Under new leaders who lacked selfconfidence and experience in national governance, the state imploded. Into the Third Millennium Liberia is a shaky political entity.

During his years on three continents-Africa, Europe and North America-Massaquoi met and maintained contact with a host of interesting people. Outgoing, a good listener, and an excellent diplomat for his country and for Africa, he was a neophyte in Liberian party politics. Confident that honesty and personal integrity would prevail during the critical 1931 presidential election, he was unprepared for his downfall and the vengeance that followed.

Arguably, had Massaquoi become president, and remained true to his life-long ideals, his leadership would have integrated the majority and minority cultures, gradually harmonizing relations and paving the way for measured change in Liberia.

Birth and Early Years

Oral tradition tells us that the Massaquoi name is linked to the arrival of the Vai, a Manding people, on the Atlantic coast in the 16th century after a long migration from an area near the upper bend of the Niger River. Led by Prince Kamara, they came looking for salt and when he finally saw the ocean he rode his horse into it. His followers shouted, "Mans a mu ita goi, Mansa mu ita goi" (truly you are a leader or a ruler) which later, for the sake of euphony, became "Massaquoi".

The story takes on validity in light of the 1578 battle of Alcazar Kebir, in which the Portuguese lost most of their 25,000-man army to the Moroccan defenders. Averting European overland expansion into Africa made this a world-class battle. The Moroccans, forced to fill their depleted treasury, moved south across the Sahara to take Songhay an area equivalent to Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Songhay contained gold that for several hundred years had been bartered for salt already under Moroccan control. Momolu believed that the destabilization in this vast area threatened the supply of salt vital to Songhay survival, prompting the westward movement of his ancestors towards the sea. Massaquoi was steeped in this tradition. His great-grandfather King Siaka was a prominent slaver on the coast who managed to evade the British navy for a quarter of a century. At his town, Gendema, he employed English clerks. Momolu's grandfather was prince Manna, Siaka's son, who succeeded to the business in 1840.

From the early 1860s, when slave trading ended, much of the Galinhas countryside was beset with turmoil as promised British development aid never materialized. A lethal mix of imported alcohol and firearms, poor business prospects and boredom set one chief against another for lack of anything better to do. The Vai straddled the ill-defined Anglo-Liberia border, today defined by the Mano River. Momolu's mother, Queen Sandimanni (c.1841-1890), was a powerful woman living in this area. Swiss naturalist Biittikofer's estimated her to be forty-five years old in 1886.²

On one occasion in the late 1860s, King Lahai Kayaaba was summoned with his war boys to help the Queen and her people put down an attack. He remained for a time after the victory and in due course sired Momolu. Later, while leading her own soldiers in a skirmish Queen Sandimanni gave birth to Momolu at the foot of a hill alongside a creek. The occasion gave the village "Kpasalo" its name it did not exist before this time. "Kpa" means, "spot mark." A kola tree was planted over the child's umbilical cord, as was often done after a notable birth. The date was 6 December, most probably in 1870, but certainly between 1869 and 1872.

About 100 years later, in 1973, I visited the village of Kpasalo, a 30-minute walk on a forest path from Njagbacca. The 15 to 20 dwellings were about 75 meters from a creek inlet. Our party consisted of Chief Momo Goo from Njagbacca; Momolu's son Uncle Abe; a relative from Sulima, Cousin Francis Moininh Ellis; and Momolu's granddaughter, Vivian Fahnbulleh. Her mother Fatima remained in Njagbacca. After we had met Chief Jusu of Kpasalo and our purpose had been explained by Chief Momo Goo, the Kpasalo elders retired to consult the oldest living person in the village. Uncle Abe served as our linguist-interpreter describing precisely what was going on so that I could record it. The old man, now blind, recalled that he had met Momolu in Njagbacca and passed through this place with him. He could fix the time as when one Gola leader by the name of Boyma Quee was being commissioned Paramount Chief. Massaquoi was on his way to Gola country for the ceremony. He stopped in this place, the old man related, sat on the large rock still seen in the centre of the village and told the people, "Here I was born." A discussion began as to the date of that visit. The elders determined that it was in 1917 or early 1918. Momolu was a traveling commissioner in the Department of Interior. The old man referred to him as "Momofo" his familiar name.³

In June 1881 Biittikofer made his first visit to Njagbacca and a second visit in November 1886. His most significant observation was that the town was still not fortified. He had systematically tramped through a large part of coastal and hinterland Liberia, going up every creek, river and stream looking for animals, making observations. He notes specifically that all of the villages were strongly fortified, surrounded by two, three or sometimes four palisade fences.

To come upon Njagbacca unfortified and without a fence, suggests that Queen Sandimanni lived without fear of being invaded, unlike neighboring villages. Her reputation as a strong ruler, backed up by well-known military exploits, seemed sufficient to let her live in peace. Her physical appearance, the stability of her reign during the period between the visits, and the fact that she had wrested control from one of her husbands suggest that she was an extraordinary woman. It was from his mother that Momolu drew his strength, self-assurance, and adaptability, describing her as "a woman of rare intellect, energy and power and ambition-qualities which promoted her to the position which no other woman has occupied in the Vai territory."⁴

From Mission to Consulate

His early formation by Muslim tutors was the norm. Reluctantly and against the advice of these holy men his mother, pressured by the missionaries, sent him to St. John's school in Robertsport for "white man's education." Later he matriculated at Central Tennessee College in the United States of America, but was forced to return to Liberia when his mother died in 1890. He never completed a degree. In 1893 he visited America again to participate in the Columbian Exhibition at the Chicago World's Fair, and to attend the Congress and Parliament of Religions. Recalling this period in May 1937 Momolu wrote: "Returning to England I studied a while at Oxford and London, toured through Europe and three years later returned home."⁵

From 1896 to 1899 he taught and served as principal of St. John's, leaving to become the traditional head of the Vai people on the Sierra Leone side of the Mano River. He was entitled to wear the Massaquoi crown.⁶ An American educated innovative leader was suspect to British colonial officials. After ruling five years, 35-year-old Momolu was driven out by his own people. A humiliating blow to his great pride, it served as a maturing experience. For the next few years, until returning to Liberia in 1911, he traded in Sierra Leone and established several traditional families.

The two men responsible for his return to Liberia, and who became his closest friends, were former Presidents Arthur Barclay (1854-1938) and Daniel E. Howard (1861-1935). They arranged employment leading to the job of Chief Clerk in the Department of Interior. After making suitable arrangements for his traditional wives, in 1915 Momolu married Rachel E. T. Johnson (1893-1986), the granddaughter of the first Liberian-born President Hilary R. W. Johnson (1837-1901). Given the Vai name of honor-Ma Sedia-she was his equal in many ways and a stabilizing influence on his life. He finished the decade serving in President Howard's cabinet during the difficult years of World War I, 1914-1918.⁷

In 1920 newly elected President C.D.B. King (1875-1961) asked Momolu to visit Europe as a private citizen to assess the climate for Liberia's resumption of post war trade and commerce, the main source of revenue. A year later on 26 July, Momolu gave the Independence Day Oration, a significant honor, perhaps the first indigenous person to do so.⁸ His hard-hitting overview of what was wrong with the body politic made President King uncomfortable because the close friendship between his Secretary of State Edwin Barclay (1882-1955) and Momolu could work against him. In the event, it was not a total surprise when in early 1922 Momolu was among a select group appointed to the fledgling diplomatic service established two years earlier: Others were businessman Charles Edward Cooper (1885-1951) Consul General to Great Britain based in Liverpool; King's son-in-law, Gabriel Moore Johnson (1870-1935) who was also Momolu's father-in-law, to Fernando Po; and Momolu as Consul General to Germany stationed in Hamburg throughout the 1920s. He and his family sailed in June 1922.

The first indigenous black African accredited to Germany, he held the post for eight rewarding years for himself and his family. Massaquoi's home, which also served as the Consulate, became an informal meeting place for visitors like W.E.B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, and Africans, Americans and Europeans transiting Hamburg during the heady 1920s. Official duties included serving with Baron R.A. Lehmann (1870-1928), Liberia's Ambassador to France and the League of Nations when the Baron was in Geneva. It was Momolu who recruited that resourceful Swiss-Italian, lawyer-diplomat-linguist Dr. Antoine Sottile (1883-1971). After the Baron's death in 1927 Sottile became Liberia's permanent representative to the League serving for a decade.

1927 - Gathering Tensions

The USD 5 million loan from the Finance Corporation of America, a Firestone arrangement, came into effect on 1 July 1927, providing fiscal solvency. Liberians had spendable income and many chose to travel to Europe via Hamburg. It was also an election year. Challenging President King, the candidate for the entrenched True Whig Party, (TWP) was businessman and former mayor of Monrovia Thomas J. R. Faulkner (c1884-1945). An American born naturalized Liberian, Faulkner revived the old Peoples Party (PP) to champion reform, immigration, native rights and the elimination of taxes on the tribes. For his election bid Faulkner needed Massaquoi, the most prominent indigenous person in government, to show that he meant business on native rights. Pressure on Massaquoi to side with the Peoples Party began early in 1927 while he was on home leave. Nevertheless, he remained loyal to King and Edwin Barclay who trusted him. The pressure continued. Postmaster Samuel A. "Sammy" Ross (1870-1929), a powerful national figure from Sinoe and a Faulkner ally, visited Europe to order postage stamps and took Momolu with him as he traveled to and fro. In the summer of the same year Ross worked hard to convince him to side with the Peoples Party, hinting at the vice presidency.

Faulkner lost the brutally fought November election and after fraud charges against him were dismissed he left for America, propelled by anger and resentment, to promote change in Liberia. In the United States of America, meanwhile, what was popularly called "the slavery issue" was moving centre stage following the hesitant ratification of the League's 1926 Anti-slavery Convention. A powerful domestic constituency, the International Missionary Association, cajoled the government into action. The IMA, informed by a vast missionary network in Africa, expressed deep concern about the treatment of indigenous people in the colonial world. Thus, Faulkner's message in America—that Liberian officials profited from forcefully sending plantation labor to the Spanish island of Fernando Po—fell on willing ears, eventually contributing to a constitutional crisis in Liberia.

Through it all Momolu became infatuated with politics and thought of running four years hence. He flirted with the Peoples Party partly out of respect for its founder Daniel Howard who brought him into government twenty years earlier, and partly out

of vanity. The glitter of occupying the Mansion was so appealing that gradually prudence gave way to ambition, turning into a nerve-racking experience.

The Massaquoi family correspondence, always brimming with life and movement, tenderness and exasperation, noble sentiments and petty tensions, began to show the stress of it all with hints of his short temper, strange behavior and physical illness. In December 1928 Momolu wrote to his daughter Fatima that he needed an operation to close up "a hole between the arteries of the stomach" (suggesting an esophageal hiatus hernia).

Early the same month he received word that Baron Lehmann had died. As the senior Liberian representative in Europe, Momolu rushed to Paris and went directly to the Legation, where the Baron was lying in state. The funeral service was held two days later and reported in *Le Figaro* of 21 December. Dutch-born Baron Lehmann was 58 years old when he died. Representing Liberia in Paris since 1922 with his American wife, the Baron was not only popular in the diplomatic corps but a fixture on the Paris Geneva scene. Predictably, his funeral was a grand one befitting his rank and honors. One suspects that the need for the Baron to defend Liberia on the slavery issue, in front of his many friends and colleagues, was simply too much to bear since every sensible person at the League believed that the charges were valid.

The week in Paris further strained Momolu's nerves. President King's goodwill tour to Europe 18 months earlier had brought only a temporary respite from international pressure on Liberia. Though Momolu was not directly involved in political decision-making his special relationship with Sottile informed him on the gravity of the situation. By the spring of 1929 it was certain that there would be a League investigation into the charges of forced labor. The uppermost questions: would it be imposed on Liberia or welcomed; if not welcomed, then accepted?

Every conceivable rumor, story and speculation circulated among the Liberian community at home and abroad. No matter how one assessed the situation, whether from Hamburg, Geneva or Monrovia, things looked bad for the Lone Star Republic and questionable for the Peoples Party. Faulkner's visit to the United States stirred up a hornet's nest in Monrovia because of his charges that slavery was endemic and national leadership responsible. He did not cause the League to investigate; nevertheless, many Liberians accused him of just that, and of fomenting the subsequent tribulation that befell the nation.

Momolu's closeness to the Peoples Party was evident. At times he had tried to discuss it with his wife Ma Sedia but to no avail. In addition to everything else the marriage was unraveling; it seemed satisfactory for formal occasions but there was little love left. Perhaps this was why he kept traveling and why he transferred his affection to Fatima. He had much love to give but on his own terms. Although he was not easy to live with, particularly in physical and political indisposition, there was more to it. The correspondence suggests that his philandering began to annoy Ma Sedia, normally tolerant to the extreme. More importantly, how could someone with her lin-

eage-the granddaughter of the first Liberian-born president-be expected to have anything to do with the political opposition? Ma Sedia, a self-assured and competent woman, did not need to be tutored on Liberian politics by "her man." She knew her own people so well that she could, and ultimately did, predict a disaster for him if he sided with the opposition. Fatima and Ma Sedia discussed all this from time to time and the two of them agreed not to help Momolu in his political flight but to work for the existing structure. I met and interviewed Ma Sedia several times at her home on Mamba Point in Monrovia. Then in her eighties she was alert, active and engaged, walking daily to Waterside to shop.

Momolu had cut short his 1929 home leave when he learned that he would be recalled. Hastening to complete unfinished personal and family affairs, he entered the hospital for the operation, informing Fatima that he had waited too long and that the hole had enlarged, though "under ether" all went well. In the same letter he mentioned "Mr. Faulkner of Monrovia, who ran against President King last time, went to Geneva last Friday."

At the end of June 1929, a crowd of Liberians arrived in Hamburg on the S.S. Wadia, making life busy at the Consulate. Increased travel was linked to more spendable income from the loan agreement that doubled national revenue between 1925-1926 and 1928-1929, from USD 859,464 to USD 1,654,869. Salaries had increased, trade was firm and the prevailing mood was to spend rather than to save or, as is sometimes heard in the hinterland, "to wash in the first water you come to."

Liberia's 820d Independence Day, 26 July 1929, was celebrated in proper style at Hamburg's Hotel Esplanade with the event reported on the society pages of the main newspaper. In addition to the diplomatic corps, trading firms and visiting Liberians, friends who had helped the family during their stay were also invited.

Sottile wrote on 13 September 1929 of his fear that once Momolu returned to Liberia he would forget him and never write. He wanted Momolu to come to Geneva: "I have much to tell." Liberia had not ratified the 1926 slavery convention and Sottile was obliged to speak frequently on the subject. In the same letter he informed Momolu that the "British Government has proposed a supervisory Commission of the League. I was opposed. France, Belgium, Portugal, and Abyssinia supported me. Our Government had decided to set up an international commission of enquiry for slavery and forced labor. For this matter I am negotiating with the League." He added that the Consulate in Geneva had been raised to a Legation. Apparently responding to an inquiry from Momolu about Marcus Garvey, he wrote that, "Garvey is not come in Switzerland."

Before returning it was decided that Momolu should take a three week German rest cure in late September at the Hohenzollern-Hof at Bad Oeynhausen, about an hour from Hanover. The family decided that after Momolu left, Ma Sedia and the children would stay until the end of the 1930 school year. Meanwhile, Fatima would

complete French language study in Geneva, with Mrs. Sottile, and return to Hamburg to help her stepmother with the children.⁹

Return to Monrovia

The Hohenzollern-Hof rest cure and the journey from Hamburg to Monrovia took the last two months of 1929. For Massaquoi it was a time for introspection, something he had not done since leaving Sierra Leone almost 20 years earlier. The abrupt recall from Germany followed an interview with president King when Momolu had admitted his interest in entering politics. He did not disclose this talk to anyone at the time, including his wife and daughter; in later life he informed his children about this crucial period.

Fifty-nine year old Momolu had held the post in Germany for seven and a half years. One served at the pleasure of the Chief Executive, whose confidence he enjoyed. He could also count on a rock solid friendship with "Eddie" Barclay, the man behind the throne. Yet nothing is clear-cut in Liberian politics. While recall is normal he also knew the risk of flirting with the Peoples Party. In acknowledging his interest in politics he had been discreet as to detail; still word gets around and he could be misunderstood. So whatever fate-including political execution-he would meet on reaching Monrovia he was prepared for it with a settled conscience. If necessary, he would simply go into business with his sons and be free to travel to Europe, or even to the United States of America to visit old school mates. He had been reading about some economic upset in the big countries, but newspapers always tend to exaggerate; Liberia, now secure under the Firestone agreement, could hardly be effected by the New York stock market "crash" a few weeks earlier.

The S.S. Lividia passed through the stormy English Channel and headed south into balmy tropical waters, the sun, and warmth providing a special tonic. The contrast with Europe's cold November makes one giddy, almost free from anxiety. In this new and relaxed mood Momolu's complacency grew. Yet, he remained a realist: he knew why he was being recalled.

The powers that be in Liberia had never had an intelligence service like other nations. In the first place, they could not afford one and, in the second place, they did not need one to learn what was going on. The instinct for survival, whether in a nation state or in an individual, brings forth rare, sometimes hidden talents. Human antennae among those responsible for survival pick up signals unnoticed by others. So it has been with every Liberian leader from President Roberts on. When the country did get into trouble, it was often a case of the leadership exceeding its grasp or, as Liberians say, "eating the money." This was the proximate cause of the slavery crisis.

In addition, European powers were annoyed with Liberia because an independent black republic was a bad example for neighboring colonies, threatening colonial hegemony. In the texts of the League of Nations Liberia was not behaving according to *international standards*. In effect, the internally sponsored slavery issue led to an exter-

nal threat against the very existence of the state. Liberia's constitutional crisis of the 1930s was probably the first internally generated, all others having come from outside. Internal in the double sense that an adopted son, Thomas J. R. Faulkner, exposed reckless elected officials who used the military, called the Frontier Force, to round up laborers for shipment to Fernando Po; internal too, because national governance including the president and other responsible officials viewed the practice with a blind eye.

The moral question of slavery was not the whole story. Labor was needed at home for the extensive Firestone rubber plantations, an issue analyzed by W.E.B. DuBois (1868-1963): "The eventual investigation of the trade was the product of a desire to conserve Liberian labor for use on the Amca mainland, rather than an attempt to relieve its abuse." As ultimately revealed by the nation's first census in 1962, population estimates were grossly overstated and the labor pool required for the Firestone rubber operation was not in fact unlimited.¹⁰

As Momolu arrived in Monrovia in December 1929, he planned to reacquaint himself with friends and to assess local conditions for several business ventures put on hold while in Germany. He needed income and this meant logging camwood in the hinterland for shipment to European markets. While in the interior he would meet traditional leaders to learn about conditions.

The Political Climate

Few of the above plans materialized, as he was unprepared for his own popularity. A few weeks after arrival he wrote to Fatima: "*Politics* There has been great excitement here. The Peoples Party have asked me to permit my name to be used on their ticket for the candidacy for the presidency of this Republic. For nearly a month my name has been in the mouth of the people, the chiefs and people of the Interior as well as the Americo-Liberians - people want me to run against Mr. King; but I have declined. First of all King is my friend and family, second, I cannot leave you children in Europe and come out here to live. You can see that my reason is correct."¹¹ His reasons mix posturing and longing, as if he wanted someone to tell him not to run so that he could live as he wished, a private citizen with money enough to travel to Europe and America visiting family and friends. Instead, vanity gradually drew him to politics, compromising a private life.

Arguably, Momolu was among the best informed on the seriousness of the slavery issue. Sottile's 13 September 1929 letter, mentioned earlier, informed him that the big powers were out for Liberian flesh and almost had it. Sottile implied, that Liberia was headed for big trouble and Momolu should be aware of it.¹² In a sense it was too late, a 4 January 1930 note informed Fatima, "I am now the Postmaster General of the Republic.... Mama's letter will give you all the news of the dreadful way our friend Mr. Ross ... passed away."

The unfolding drama in Liberia stemmed from an 8 June 1929 diplomatic note from the American government to Liberia and the League, condemning slavery and slave-like practices, and urging President King to invite a Commission of Inquiry to examine the charges. He accepted and on 7 April 1930 a three person group began work in the country: British chairman Dr. Cuthbert Christy, requested by Liberia and appointed by the League of Nations; distinguished African-American educator, Dr. Charles S. Johnson (1893-1956), nominated by the United States of America; and former Liberian President Arthur Barclay (1854-1938). The Commission Secretary was Plenyono Gbe Wolo (c1883-1940), an indigenous Liberian (Kru) and 1917 Harvard graduate.

The Commission's integrity was generally accepted; nevertheless, as their five-month task began they noted "the extraordinary force of rumors." Subsequently they had "difficulty in disentangling evidence of fundamental economic and social conditions from an extravagant emphasis upon politics in the Republic; an emphasis accentuated by the nearness of the Presidential elections with numerous factions active."¹³

Clarence L. Simpson (1896-1969), Liberian statesman and a participant in events, tells of a June 1930 mass meeting in Monrovia, where the crowd demanded drastic changes in administration and aimed personal attacks against President King. By August, when the Commission's work ended and report writing began, the charged political atmosphere, oppressive climate, travel and work difficulties took a toll, particularly on the two non-Liberians. On 8 September the official submission was made to the government-undoubtedly word got out. Three weeks later on 2 October 1930 another mass meeting took place, this time under the auspices of the influential Woman's League, "demanding the immediate resignation of the entire Government."¹⁴ Later the same month, on the 30th, President King addressed the legislature, generally accepting the findings and explaining what was taking place to implement the Commission's recommendations. In many respects he and his colleagues thought that this was the end of the matter; they had done what was expected of them. Two weeks later the American Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson sent a stinging diplomatic note casting official doubt on "the sincerity of Liberia's intention of instituting reforms." Harvey S. Firestone, Sr. congratulated the Secretary of State for "the firm stand that our Government is taking," a stand prompted and orchestrated by Firestone himself.¹⁵

Massaquoi as Candidate

Shortly after he returned from Europe in December 1929 Momolu had met King, who wanted confirmation of his intention to run for the presidency. He gave essentially the same answer as the last time they met, that he was still interested. King told Edwin Barclay who, in confidence, offered Momolu any position in government in exchange for his support.

The president and secretary of state were preparing for the next regular election in May 1931. King could not succeed himself so the True Whig Party chose Edwin Barclay,

who desperately coveted the nomination. Historically, no one had seriously challenged the TWP until Faulkner's try in the last election, and while everyone expected him to run again no one truly believed he would win. Massaquoi in the race would be a different story; he posed a serious threat to established order. Any authentic alternative to TWP hegemony, particularly an indigenous head of state, would be expected to change long embedded practices.¹⁶

The bitter atmosphere from revelations in testimony to the Commission generated a move for total political change. The focus on Massaquoi was obvious. His long absence in Germany made him the only clean candidate, untouched by the slavery issue and the Christy findings. King and Barclay were apprehensive—they could not control this election. The PP had strong points, calling for administrative reform and unlimited immigration from America. Some believed the party had the unofficial blessing of the American government as a result of Faulkner's visit.

Momolu liked Ross, a possible running mate, but was little more than cordial to, and probably distrusted Faulkner for his involvement in the Kru Coast campaign. C. L. Simpson writes, "Hoping to get the support of the better organized and more bellicose tribes on the sea board, such as the Krus, he (Faulkner) set himself up as the champion of native rights, pledging his party to abolish the taxation of the tribes and making other promises which he knew no Government could keep."¹⁷ Both Liberian government and League reports charged the Peoples Party with inciting mutiny among the Krus leading to loss of life.

On 3 December 1930 President King unexpectedly resigned—his Vice President, Allen Yancy, had done so several weeks earlier. National turmoil ensued with pressure on the entire cabinet to do the same in a vain effort to get rid of Edwin Barclay. Although Barclay was constitutionally in line of succession, neither Stimson in Washington, nor well placed Liberians wanted Barclay in the Mansion.

Massaquoi's role in all these events is based on extensive interviews with two of his children and his widow.¹⁸ Their father told them that his two strongest supporters for the presidency were Ross, and party leader Daniel Howard. Samuel A. Ross (1870-1929), known by all as Sanuny, was a graduate of Lincoln University in the United States of America and a power in Liberian politics. Superintendent of Sinoe County in the South of the country, he was also influential in the capital, Monrovia, and Montserrado County. A senator, attorney general, and vice president in the first King administration (1920-24) he knew the political byways.

He and Momolu were the same age, enjoyed each other's company and shared similar views on politics. Ross had visited Hamburg the summer before in 1929 shortly after Faulkner to tell Momolu, "I rather have you in the Mansion than any of those others—you know me—I'm my own man. I got Sinoe and Montserrado behind me so go back and don't worry. I'm going to cap them all with this slavery business." Ross was ill when Momolu returned from Germany but he loaned him his car and driver to get around, so people would know that he was back in the country. Ross' death was a great

blow. Shrouded in questionable circumstances the times were too unsettled and the rumors too rife to believe that fifty-nine year old Ross had died of natural causes.

In recounting all this to his children, Momolu said that he had been non-committal to Edwin Barclay's request for all-out support in exchange for a job. But when Ross died and King offered him the Postmaster Generalship it was a relief, first, because he knew he was still acceptable to the power structure and, second, because he needed the money. The correspondence shows that Momolu enjoyed his new role: one month worrying about political exile, the next a cabinet officer. Still, every indication suggests a keen interest in the presidency.

Family separation put him under additional pressure. His decision to return to Liberia while they stayed on in Germany was sensible, but it brought an abrupt change to the household. Despite his crankiness, due in part to the inability to discuss presidential ambition with anyone, he was still the very centre of the family. Over the years Ma Sedia had been steady, loving to the children, trying to run the household on a tight budget, putting up with lazy maids, coping with German, and still being bright and cheery for the many diplomatic occasions. Though her husband was not an easy person to live with, part of the problem seemed to be that 37-year-old Ma Sedia was just plain exhausted from her routine. Momolu did not understand, and worst of all, probably held up his Queen Mother as an example for her to emulate. Through it all, Momolu was sorely missed at home in Hamburg in early 1930; the place lacked its old spirit and soon became dull and humdrum. He had a way of sizing up a mood instantly and saying the right thing to urge on a flagging soul-always full of hope and dreams that, though impractical, were infectious.

On 11 July 1930, Momolu wrote briefly like most communications since his return: "Being one of the aspirants for the Presidency, it will be difficult for me to remain in Europe long." In a handwritten note at the bottom, "Times are hard and bad. Have never seen the like. I know those who come will soon get tired. The schools are poor of supply and for that reason I really would have liked Arthur to remain and have mother and the babies come with me." This letter was dictated to his son Nathaniel and typed by family friend, Kofli Sallah Tamba (1907-1959), whose initials appear at the bottom. The Massaquoi children and mends were rallying around his election bid.

On 11 August, he wrote asking for Fatima and Ma Sedia's opinion about running for the presidency. His wife's opposition to the whole notion, his experience that Liberian politics is not for the faint hearted, and health problems-he was recovering from malaria that struck him regularly during the rainy season-were all involved in his query. Weak, lonely and depressed, self-interrogation made him wonder how he could handle the awesome burden of the presidency.

However, another more intriguing reason for his doubt may be considered. Momolu had rented his house in Monrovia to the American member of the Christy Commission, Dr. Charles S. Johnson, head of the Social Science Department at Fisk University in Nashville, later its president. They became close mends. The above letter, written

three weeks before the 8 September submission of the Christy Commission Report raises the following possibility. Johnson, without divulging details to his landlord, may well have hinted that Commission findings would mean very serious problems for Liberia and its future leader, making the presidency far less appealing.¹⁹

The Christy findings were not made public until the president's 30 October annual report to the legislature. In the meantime, Momolu wrote on 10 September that he had to remain "until November as the Legislature meets in the second week in October and the Caucus and Convention to decide on the Presidential candidate for May convenes in November." He planned to sail during the last week in November and spend Christmas with the family. His wife was vexed, anxious to return with the children.

King's 3 December forced resignation shocked everyone. Momolu had to change his travel plans. Writing in early January 1931, he described events in this way: "Yes, the President was asked by the Legislature to resign because the country claims he was responsible for the shipment of native laborers to Fernando Po, where boys were treated like slaves and for forced labor... The findings of the Commission show that the President and his entire Cabinet were more or less connected with these evils. The people of the country therefore petitioned to the Legislature to impeach the President. The Legislature, not willing to disgrace the President, asked him to resign, which he did. He is now in his beautiful farm near Careysburg Momolu went on, "It is the belief of the people that some of the high officials of Government will yet be tried or put out. Of course, all these evils were committed while I was in Germany concerning the family, he wrote, "Your mother is a strong political opponent of mine and spoke boldly to people that she will not support me. All the slaves are free! No more pawn. Everybody works for himself and personally, I am glad."

Towards the end of the six-page letter, he wrote, "The resignation of President King and Vice President Yancy naturally and according to law made Secretary of State Barclay the acting President until May 1931, when we shall have an election for the permanent President. The order of things gave Mr. Barclay a sort of upper hand over the other presidential aspirants, including myself. As Barclay and I are in the same party and not so unfriendly, we might compromise before Mayor I run on an independent ticket or on the ticket of the opposition party...Presently, I am still the Postmaster General. If I run against Mr. B. I must resign first".

Ma Sedia, now back in Liberia, wrote to Fatima on 10 January 1931 that, "Your father is now trying to start a business, for he has resigned from the Government." She noted that many changes were taking place in all departments and soon a new Consul General would be appointed to Hamburg. She herself had opened an ice cream parlor with her cousin Anna.

On 6 February, Momolu wrote an important letter to Fatima, the key to his political future. Politics have so far gone on badly. The behavior of our former officials of Government as revealed by the Report of the "International Commission on Forced labor and slavery" was so bad as to subject our country to the severest criticisms and

censure. Perhaps Professor Sottile can send you a copy of this Report as he had already sent me one... The present Tegime has adopted the most unfriendly attitude against me because I have been the one to support the report on the International Commission in the Cabinet. As a member of the Cabinet Committee [to consider the Report] I held that all Government officials implicated in slavery and forced labour investigation should be put out of office and put on trial. The Liberian legislature ratified this position and all high officials of Government who were implicated in the above concern are being tried. Because of this position I took, enemies were created by the hundreds. One of them reported shortages in the General Post Office to be embezzlement. In all of the departments, there is always some shortages. In my department was really the smallest. I am personally not a financial officer. I do not handle stamps nor money of any kind, but I am responsible for losses in the Bureau in my department. The expenditure in the money order Bureau was done by my order and therefore I am willing to refund all unauthorised payment ordered by me, but this is not embezzlement. I have only paid or ordered to be paid [those] whom the Government owe for five months. The enemies on the other hand claim that I have no right to order payment or part payment to the poor young men whom the Government owe. The department of Justice having sued me, the matter is in court and consequently I have resigned the Cabinet as Postmaster General and will not care to return even if I win the case, and win I must. Do not be worried over any matter. Do not come over here as Abraham did without finishing.

He went on about politics, "Most of my friends who came over to Hamburg proved enemies. Your mother is just commencing to see the great injury she has done me with her tongue and jealousy." On the economic side, he revealed that conditions were worse than he had ever seen. The British Bank of West Africa, now succeeded by a commercial bank, gave no opportunities to private citizens. "One cannot get a cent of money for a £3,000 building as guaranty. For produce-palm kernel, etc.-one gets only merchandise from stores." He was distraught at being unable to support Fatima in her medical studies, and chagrined that she might fail because of him.

The Post Office incident effectively precluded contesting the presidency, for as one court cleared him the government brought the same charges to the next higher court. Ultimately they found no cause, but then entirely new charges were filed keeping him from politics for a long period. What he wrote to Fatima was essentially true, but in later years he shared with his children the detailed background.

Momolu was undoubtedly the strongest candidate for the 1931 election. Edwin Barclay recognized this when he offered him any position in government not to run. The Christy Commission did not implicate Barclay and in ordinary times he would win automatically. It was different in 1931. The mood of the country demanded total change, giving Massaquoi a significant edge. When he was barred, Faulkner leapt into the breach to contest. Years later, informed of Faulkner's death, Dr. Charles S. Johnson wrote: "The very intemperance of his zeal to destroy the enemies of good government,

more than anything else, kept him out of the presidency. His death was a loss Liberia could ill afford."²⁰

Massaquoi in the Executive Mansion: What If?

It is tempting to imagine how the history of Liberia might have been different if Momolu had run and been elected in 1931. Massaquoi as President would have influenced the First Republic, though his character and temperament suggest no dramatic changes. Helped by pillars of repatriate legitimacy like Arthur Barclay and Daniel Howard, the repatriate grip on the levers of power would have been loosened, diluting TWP control. Massaquoi would have made an effort to recruit some of the talented indigenous persons he knew, such as: Nete Sie Brownell (1894-1979), F.E.M. Morais (1870-1964), Senyo Juah Nimley (1869-1937), Benjamin W. Payne (c.1875-1940), Kolli S. Tamba, Didhwo Twe (1879-1961), Henry Too Wesley, P. G. Wolo (1883-1940)-there was no shortage. Public recognition of indigenous talent, along with increased social status for tribal leaders, would show their importance in the political economy and highlight the need to improve indigenous access to education. Increased social status for tribal leaders would not necessarily have implied immediate voting rights, an extremely sensitive issue at the time. Nevertheless, it would have been his medium-term objective.

The League of Nations and the American response to Liberia's international crisis might well have been softened based on domestic policy changes and the influence of Massaquoi's personal network of American friends. Sottile would have been unleashed to charm the League in five languages and to ward off Great Britain's attempt to convert Liberia to Mandate status.

Though not a League member the United States' reaction would have been crucial. Massaquoi's American network included: classmates from Central Tennessee College, many in leadership positions; Protestant Episcopal Church leaders; and wealthy friends who visited him in Hamburg. W.E.B. DuBois and Charles S. Johnson, both well known in Washington, might have been asked to influence Secretary of State Stimson to give the new government breathing space. It was no secret that Stimson disliked Edwin Barclay so he might well have been open to the views of DuBois, Johnson and others.

Underpinning the transition to power would be Arthur Barclay as principal adviser. When they first met in Chicago in 1893, twenty-three year old Momolu Massaquoi and Postmaster General Arthur Barclay started a lifelong friendship. They died a month apart in the summer of 1938. From their meeting in Chicago until the end of World War I in 1918, Barclay had personally groomed Massaquoi.²¹

After Chicago Arthur Barclay and Massaquoi were together in London during the 1897 Queen Victoria Jubilee, when Barclay negotiated with the Council of Foreign Bondholders. While President he gave a crucial 1904 address on hinterland policy that was influenced by Massaquoi. A year later, in February 1905, Barclay convened a

sixteen day "palaver" of indigenous chiefs in Grand Cape Mount while Momolu was serving as traditional ruler there. Influenced by the "palaver" in 1907, he led his country's team to Sierra Leone to settle boundary disputes. A few years later he and Daniel Howard convinced Momolu to return to Liberia where they integrated him into government and society.

A kind and intelligent man honestly seeking solutions to the hinterland problems plaguing Liberia, Arthur Barclay used his immense and unquestioned influence to involve Momolu in the formulation of hinterland policy, unofficially during his own Presidency, but officially during the term of Howard, his hand-picked successor. Barclay was Momolu's personal attorney from 1912 until his death. His presence in the Mansion advising the new president would have been welcomed domestically by the repatriate community, and internationally, among those who knew him. Alas, it was not to be.

Momolu Massaquoi and Edwin Barclay

Momolu's recall to Liberia in late 1929 put him in confrontation with an erstwhile close friend. Under political pressure both exposed a core-self. Edwin Barclay lived for power: pure, unadulterated political power fed him as electricity feeds an appliance. He needed it to live, and he used people to serve this end. Clever, uncompromising, broaching no opposition, he held life-long resentments against his many enemies. This contrasted with Momolu's deep concern for the race and a near obsession to use resources, wits and influence to uplift young people through education. He sincerely believed that the greatness of Africa's past could be rekindled to influence the modern world. The two men—the realist and the Africanist—were maneuvered into a political struggle in which Barclay used all of his power to destroy Momolu's spirit, but without success.

For a decade C. L. Simpson had daily contact with Edwin Barclay, he wrote a valuable assessment: "He was a single-minded man with an almost fanatical belief in the destiny of his country and an amazing capacity for hard work. He had practically no outside interests except reading and playing the piano." An intellectual and professor of mathematics, Simpson was impressed with Barclay's ability to penetrate calmly and logically to "the heart of a question, discard extraneous matter and give complete concentration while always thinking ahead.

"Aristocratic...haughty with no common touch nor care for people, a strict disciplinarian, he listened with an open mind but was determined without being stubborn or despotic." Admiration rather than personal affection drew people towards him. His impassive face "seldom betrayed his thoughts or emotions" although he showed "great charm to visitors, particularly when the interests of the country demanded it." When President Tubman decided to stand for a third term of office in 1955, Barclay protested by opposing him in the election. A symbolic gesture, "ex-President Barclay died later in the year at the age of 73, a bitter and disappointed man."²²

Honest and trusting to a fault, Momolu was a novice in Liberian politics and a relative stranger to party-political intrigue. Although President King's resignation placed Barclay in a strong position for the presidency, national frustration with the TWP began to coalesce behind Massaquoi. A mighty push by the invigorated PP could gain victory. He had to be neutralized!

The incident causing bad blood between Barclay and Massaquoi happened early in 1930 with King still in office, immediately after Momolu confirmed his interest in the presidency. According to the family, King informed Barclay, who admitted that Momolu was the strongest candidate but said that he could not become president of Liberia because he was a British subject. At the next Cabinet meeting King inquired, "What you say, man, I told Barclay about this and Barclay say you are British subject you can't become President." Momolu replied, "I think Barclay is crazy because he was Secretary of State and issued my Passport signing Momolu Massaquoi is a Liberian citizen." He turned around, but Barclay was not present, and said again for all to hear, "I'm a British subject, he's crazy!" Word got back to Barclay as it was meant to. At the next full Cabinet meeting when they met Momolu greeted him, "Well, how is your Excellency?" "Crazy as usual," came the clipped reply. Momolu retorted, "Well, I knew you were crazy, Eddie, but I've been away for years and I thought you'd been cured!" Barclay's pride could never accept this humiliating public challenge.²³

Momolu told his children this meant war between them. Later in the year, as a member of the three-person cabinet committee dealing with the Christy Commission, Momolu took the position that anyone implicated by the Commission should be prosecuted. This shocked King, Barclay and others; they felt he was not tempering justice with mercy after all they had done for him. Besides, being "holier than thou" was easy when out of the country and not involved. To the inner circle Momolu was a liability defiantly striking out on his own.

The Post Office incident described in Momolu's letter occurred after his run-in with Barclay. Arrears in salary for public servants were constant due to the Depression and the heavy debt servicing on the Firestone loan. Only the Post Office had some blocked funds. When four senior staff begging him to pay their arrears approached Momolu, he went to King to ask about it. According to Momolu the President said "Momolu old man, you in charge of your department, go and do what you can but put a receipt there." The four staff members were partially paid and they left receipts. King, hurt by Momolu's stance on the cabinet committee told Barclay "the only way to down that man is to send an auditor, forthwith, to check the accounts of the Post Office."

The irony that Momolu and his cousin Sandy Roberts built the executive mansion and were owed ten years of rent by government swayed no one. As Momolu wrote, it may not have been embezzlement but the funds were not there, only receipts. Instructed by Barclay, the Department of Justice prosecuted Massaquoi and kept prosecuting through all the courts, ultimately losing in the Supreme Court of Liberia.

While under indictment he could not contest the presidency. Barclay won handily over Faulkner in the 1931 election for the term beginning January 1932.

Barclay and the League

In early 1931, while Barclay was serving as acting head of state, diplomatic notes arrived from Germany, Great Britain, and the United States containing the same operative phrase: "His Majesty's Government give their fullest support to the suggestion which has been made that the Government of Liberia should be committed for a time to an International Commission."

This extraordinary proposal to the only black-governed republic in Africa had precedent. Almost everyone at the League and many in Liberia knew that a few years before, on 28 July 1915, United States Marines landed unannounced in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, an independent black republic, ostensibly to quell domestic disturbances. The Americans simply stayed, with civil servants from Washington controlling national finances, the police, public health and public works. The occupation ended on 21 August 1934.²⁴

In his reply to the diplomatic notes Barclay expressed "his sincere appreciation of the interest which these Governments manifest in the welfare of the Republic" but said that the suggestion "would be tantamount to a surrender of its sovereignty and autonomy" and he hoped they would not intentionally insist upon it." To stave off a precipitous move Barclay had Sottile negotiate with the Council of the League to appoint some experts to serve in an advisory capacity in economics and finance, judicial organization and procedure, sanitation and native administration.

Subsequent research revealed that-unknown to Liberia-Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were pressing for the takeover, France and Italy were not keen. while Liberia, Poland, Spain, and Venezuela were like-minded in opposition. Simpson points out that in the same week that Barclay made the proposal for advisers, "the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and Secretary of State Stimson discussed an International Commission assuming control of Liberia and white officers being sent to take command of the Liberian Frontier Force."²⁵

A year later, British and American representatives again discussed the International Commission, but circumstances had changed. Ideally, the two governments wanted Liberia to willingly accept their recommendation, which Barclay had no intention of doing. In the event, Great Britain hesitated to force the issue without support from Germany, France, Italy and Japan.

This went on without Liberia's knowledge so the request for advisers and Sottile's behind-the-scenes activities in early 1931 proved crucial. The Special Committee discussing Liberia had Lord Cecil of Great Britain as chair, Poland as rapporteur, Sottile and newly appointed Secretary of State Louis A. Grimes representing Liberia. A most sympathetic member, according to Simpson, was Senor Carlos Zumeta, the Venezuelan representative, who "constantly reminded the Committee that any measure of

assistance must be taken in agreement with the Liberian Government and could not infringe Liberian Sovereignty." Sottile previously represented Venezuela at the League of Nations.

The Special Committee decided to send a three-member expert commission to study the situation.²⁶ They remained for six weeks in the summer of 1931 and identified the source of the problem. The Firestone loan was strangling the country; no reforms were possible without changing the terms of the agreement; Firestone refused. Ultimately Liberia declared a moratorium on payment.

Barclay's tenacity and the work of Sottile in Geneva precluded national humiliation. He used his intelligence, consuming pride, and passion for power to ensure his country's survival. Ruthless rogue in the eyes of many, Barclay was instrumental in saving the nation. Concerning this constitutional crisis Simpson wrote: "I for one, never doubted that he was the only Liberian who could possibly lead us safely out of the difficulties which were then besetting the country."²⁷

The Struggle to Survive

From 1932 until Massaquoi's death six years later, contact between father and daughter was less frequent but the sons wrote more often with family news. Fifty-five letters including correspondence in French with Madam Sottile, show that Momolu's predicament dawned gradually on the family. One moment he was in the cabinet contesting the presidency-the next moment facing prison. Son Ciaka wrote on 14 February 1931, "The Old man has almost neglected me, saying that I am a young man and should fight for myself. He is doing nothing again for any of us..." Momolu's changed fortune was not understood by the extended family partly because his immense pride covered it up.

Friends and relatives in Vai country were perhaps the least surprised that Momolu would not be president. Tribal people in Liberia and neighboring Sierra Leone, not just the Vai, strained for him to be elected. Though they were voiceless, a momentary flicker of hope permitted dreams of past greatness which Momolu often spoke of-even as they knew it would never happen. They were living in a world controlled by strangers.

On 27 February 1931 Momolu writes, "I am glad to say the charge the Department of Justice made against me was found so far groundless, but this Department has renewed the charge and it will come in the next court in the month of May." Times were still bad. He built a small office near the house hoping to arrange his business so he could spend six months a year in Europe. Life ground on, getting harder every day, with no money circulating. Salaries were first cut, later paid sporadically, a situation that prevailed for a long time.

"Politics have somewhat abated" he wrote on 27 May "...personally, after I withdrew from the field, I voted for Barclay because we are of the same political party... Your mother did not support me politically but went entirely for the Barclay group, so any hint from her will be considered quicker than from me! A queer world, eh?" While

"my wife did and said everything she told you she would...I am the same person, only perhaps better respected by my fellow citizens for fortitude and will."²⁸

Nete Sie Brownell, a close family friend and distinguished jurist, wrote to Fatima on 10 November 1931 that her father looked better than when he left Europe and that he had refunded the whole amount he was charged with. "Yet, instead of dismissing the case, they are going on with it and commenced yesterday." He hoped that the jury would clear him and mentioned that her mother gave evidence against Momolu in court "simply to get him in jail. .. The city looks like the hand of death has seized it."

Ma Sedia wrote to Fatima on 20 November: "The case of the Old Man came up in this court and the jury brought him guilty. I have never written to you on this matter for I thought he would keep you posted. I am today taking a petition signed by a few relatives and friends of mine to be handed to the President next to avoid imprisonment which may be serious for us." Following this up in January 1932 Ma Sédia wrote that it was nearly all right with her father because after the petition he and the President had a chat. Meant to comfort Fatima, it surely didn't. She knew her father better than anyone. He would not bow to Barclay or to any man-and this is exactly what the President wanted-so the court cases went on.

Later in January Momolu sent a brief, typewritten letter: "...the cruel case of embezzlement instituted against me by wicked political enemies, ostensibly to destroy my great influence and prestige in this country, is at an end...both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of this Republic have decided said cases in my favor." He reported the joy among native people and well-disposed Americo-Liberians over the victory. It was short lived.

On 29 June he informed his daughter: "It is regrettable to state that the political attacks on me continue. No sooner victory was achieved by me in the embezzlement case than the government filed another case against me for sedition." It alleged that he instigated some former soldiers with claims against the government to make war on Monrovia. "Such a charge is simply ridiculous...I have thousands of dollars worth of property in this city and could not destroy this city without a great financial loss to myself and children. "

Although the sedition charges ordered by Barclay did not hold up, Momolu learned later that his sons employed in the public service lost their jobs at the order of the President. Towards the end of 1934, Kolli Tamba returned from study in Russia and lost no time in helping Momolu with another charge brought against him in the Supreme Court.²⁹

The Last Years

Momolu's preoccupation for the remainder of his life was to have Fatima leave Germany and study in America.³⁰ Concern with the racial policies of National Socialism hid his chagrin at not being able to support her. The surviving girl in a family of boys, she was his pet and he her "Ritter"-a knight in shining armor, albeit powerless.

Although skin color alone made her vulnerable, another complication was her brief love affair with Richard Heydorn (1910-1943): After Ma Sedia returned to Monrovia with the small children, Fatima moved into a boarding house run by Frau Piemoller where Richard also stayed. He was the oldest son of Pastor Wilhelm Heydorn (1873-1958), a close friend of the Massaquoi family.³¹

Richard and Fatima, near the same age, were students at the institute for native languages and linguistics where she later taught Vai. Shared interests in classical music, sports, and the study of Vai, brought them closer together. Fatima's daughter relates "during the winter they would go sledding, with Fatima wearing men's clothing to avoid being arrested by the Gestapo. I still have the picture."³² Frau Piemoller enabled this relationship that had the tacit support of both families. Indeed, Momolu liked the boy. A gifted linguist, Richard made three visits to Liberia, staying in the Massaquoi home while in Monrovia. Under Momolu's supervision he visited the hinterland to study Vai, Mende and Gbande, writing a grammar for the last.³³

A footnote to the Heydorn-Massaquoi romance is the intriguing contention that the Germans used Vai as a code language in World War II. This has been suggested in print, on academic list-servers and in meetings of African linguists, and a current (2004) investigation by Vai scholar Dr. Konrad Tuchscherer is underway. The concept is not unusual. The American military in World War II used Navajo Indian speakers in the Signal Corps for oral message transmission. A circumstantial case can be made that Vai played a similar role in the German military. Fatima mentions this in her autobiography and in oral interviews that I recorded. She became suspicious when German soldiers in uniform attended her Vai courses. Believing sincerely that she was aiding and abetting the enemy, Fatima regretted her part in language training for this purpose.³⁴

Penniless, Momolu launched a charm offensive on his network of American friends looking for a scholarship. He contacted: W.E.B. DuBois, Charles Spurgeon Johnson, President W.W. Dogan of Wiley College, Bishop H. M. Turner, Dr. James F. Lane, and others. This networking succeeded when a college classmate, Dr. Mattie Howard-Coleman, Woman's Medical Director at Lane College, Jackson, Tennessee, arranged tuition help for the academic year 1937/1938, and graciously promised to meet Fatima in New York. Momolu was delighted; he continued to resurrect old contacts as part of the effort to ensure that she could complete her studies in the United States. To this end, in May 1937, a year before he died, he wrote a long letter to a college sweetheart whom he had not seen since the turn of the century. Summarizing his life, sensing perhaps that it was ebbing, this melancholy letter is a fitting obituary. Some extracts follow:

My esteemed Maude,

I am at a loss, a great loss, how to commence this letter. For many years I have given up the hope of ever hearing from or having the rare pleasure of writing you again. My College days' poems - "Two birds in the tower", writ-

ten after I escorted you to the tower of the Capitol at Nashville, "Farewell Paducah," written as my train moved away from the station in that city, "Angelica, my heart," etc. [Rereading] them were my only source of consolation untill heard from our mutual friend and college mate Dr. James F. Lane, who gave me an encouraging account of your existence and the spiritual life you are living....

Your life is straight and regular. Mine, most irregular because of country of origin, customs and hardships which confront those who dare to accept a Crown. But I will try.

My mother and my father were rulers of separate kingdoms in their own respective rights. Mother's death caused me to leave America sooner than I anticipated in '92. I was invited the following year to speak before the congress of African Ethnology and Parliament of Religions in connection with the world Colombian Exposition, Chicago, 1893, which I accepted and served. I was disappointed not to have seen you then... Returning to England I studied a while at Oxford and London, toured through Europe and three years later returned home. Just then my father died and I became candidate for two thrones. Wishing to educate my tribe through Anglo Saxon channel, I refused the Crown in preference to the Principalship of St. John's School at Grand Cape Mount, Liberia, which position I held for six years. All this time my wishes were to contact one of my old school days girl friends in America, who might join me in the task of directing the affairs of my tribe. Dr. Payne returned from America then, but could give me no hopeful account of the particular girl I had in mind. I then ascended the throne of my illustrious ancestors a single man!...

I have ten sons and three daughters. Besides the last three, all the others were educated in Liberia and Europe. Fatima whom you admired went with us to Germany when she was a child and graduated at the German Female Seminary at Hamburg and a French Superior School in Geneva, then subsequently studied three semesters at the University of Hamburg, where I also lectured on African languages and Coranic, Arabic and jurisprudence.

Fatima's desire to visit America where her father was a boy caused me to make arrangement for her to go thither.

I have held the portfolios of the Government of Liberia for twenty-five years in the capacities of Commissioner General of the Interior, Secretary of the Interior, Consul General to Germany for nine years and Postmaster General of the Republic - at the same time still holding my hereditary place as head of the ruling family of my tribe.

Your request to "will" Fatima my daughter to you as her spiritual mother, cannot be denied because if my prayers had been answered in the way I wished, you might have been her natural mother.

You see how God works and answers prayers? For all intents and purposes Fatima shall be your daughter and I know neither Dr. and Mrs. Lane nor Mrs. Massaquoi will disagree with this.

Now, I have written' too long and yet could sit here the whole night to write if only to my once dearest girl; but I must not tire you out.

Do not give another thought over your affliction. Your friends admire you only more and we shall pray for you that you might realize that what ever God sees fit to do with His children it is always for their best and spiritual welfare.

With my tenderest regards, Always your friend, Momolu Massaquoi.³⁵

In March 1938, after a bout of illness, Momolu wrote to Fatima apologizing for a long silence. Ever hopeful, he planned to attend the well-publicized 1939 New York World's Fair. He closed by saying that he had "received a letter from President W.W. Dogan of Wiley College...one of my Professors at Central Tenn. College... Affectionately, Pa." Thus ended a lifetime of correspondence between father and daughter. A radiogram from Tamba and a letter from cousin Daniellette in Cape Palmas informed Fatima of his death. Both advised her not to come back, but to finish her education. Momolu died at the Baptist Hospital following surgery for cancer on 15 June 1938. Three weeks later his lifelong friend Arthur Barclay passed away—two of Liberia's greatest sons.³⁶ The Sierra Leone Daily Mail of 19 July 1938 wrote:

We regret sincerely to record the death of the Honourable Momolu Massaquoi, KG, PhD, which took place on June 15. The deceased was born in 1869 in the county of Grand Cape Mount from royal lineage; his mother Mammy Sandimanni was queen of her clan. He was educated in the United States of America and there made a brilliant record. Returning to his native land he served as school teacher, Commissioner-General of the Interior, Liberian Consul-General to Germany and Postmaster General. He travelled extensively, was an authority on the history of his people and could trace quite easily the beginning of their migration; he was also an authority on the history of Western Civilisation and was known as one of Liberia's brilliant sons. He leaves a widow and a number of children to mourn.

Even now President Edwin Barclay would not relent. John Henry Cooper, a relative by marriage, went to the mansion to ask the president what he should do. Barclay asked, "What do you mean?" Cooper suggested that the army turn out for the normal ceremony extended to a former cabinet officer. The reply burned into the hearts of the family: "Get out of here or I'll kick you out!" He refused an announcement in the *Liberia Official Gazette*, to have flags fly at half-staff, or for offices to close so that people could go to the funeral.

Cooper next went to hire the Frontier Force Band, a common practice. He reached an agreement with the band, but this had to be cleared with the President of the Republic. When the small delegation went to the mansion, they heard, "If you pay me

in diamonds they are not going anywhere."

The following day, 16 June, a few relatives and friends attended a simple ceremony conducted at Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church by Dr. G.W. Gibson, the Superintendent of Public Instruction. With that, Momolu was buried in Monrovia, his name and record of public service to his beloved country buried with him.³⁷

In retrospect, a rereading of his 1921 Independence Day Oration [the original version is reproduced on website: www.smykeonafrica.ch] reveals a blueprint for a bridge linking the traditional and modern worlds that he straddled. In the twenty-first century it remains the most powerful statement ever delivered by a Liberian, for national unity and reconciliation.

Endnotes

- 1 Smyke, Raymond J., *The First African Diplomat: A Biography of Momolu Massaquoi (1870-1938)*. 382pp. (Xlibris, due late 2004). This *Biography* is based on a longitudinal study, consisting of oral interviews with Momolu's children and his wife; over 200 pieces of family correspondence; sixteen visits to Liberia during the First Republic; and archival corroboration of the oral tradition. In this article the phrase 'According to the family' means a fully substantiated citation found in the *Biography*. See also: Smyke, Raymond J. "Massaquoi of Liberia." *Geneve-Afrique*, v. 21, n. 1 (1983).
- 2 Johann Biittikofer (1850-1927) made two trips to Liberia while curator of the Royal Zoological Museum in Leiden. The first was from 1879 to 1882, the second from 1886 to 1887. He visited Queen Sandimanni both times and in 1886 estimated her age as 45, placing the year of birth about 1841. A Bemois Swiss, he was a botanist by training employed by the Dutch government. While in Liberia, his scientist's eye missed no detail. In his two volumes, *Reisebilder aus Liberia* (Travelogues of Liberia), he recorded observations on everything and everyone he met. Among other things, his presentation of Liberian flora and fauna are among the best up to the present time. The two volumes, together with his other published work, deserve a translation into English. In addition to this, Massaquoi's uncle, Thomas E. Besolow (1857-1948), who became Associate Justice of the Liberian Supreme Court, was brought up by Queen Sandimanni and wrote of her in an early memoir, *The Story of an African Prince*, Boston, 1890.
- 3 "Njagbacca and Kpasalo as Seen by Two Visitors in Two Centuries," Appendix IV in *The First African Diplomat*.
- 4 Massaquoi, M., "Africa's Appeal to Christendom," *The Century Magazine*, v. LXIX, n. 6 (1905) p. 927.
- 5 Letter written to Mrs. Maude P. Stewart, formerly Miss Mansfield, of Chicago, Illinois. An abridged text is found at the end of this article; the full text is in Fatima's autobiography. See note 34.
- 6 The Massaquoi crown is unusual in colonial history. Family tradition and independent research suggests that King George III, on the English throne from 1760 to 1820, had the crown and regalia presented to King Siaka in an effort to convince him to end the slave trade. Momolu Massaquoi wore the crown, being in the line of succession. Dr. M.C.F. Easmon, OBE, a distinguished Sierra Leone physician, carried out a study of the crown in the 1930s that was published in *Sierra Leone Studies*, v. XXII, 1938. The crown was hiSt used in 1973 and reported in *West Africa* (16 July 1973) as follows: "King George's Crown. Using a crown originally presented by King George III, President Siaka Stevens (of Sierra Leone) has crowned his uncle Paramount Chief Sylvester Lansana Massaquoi, Bervei of Galinhas Perri Chieftdom, at Blama Massaquoi, Pujehun District. The first

recipient of the crown was King Siaka of Gendema, a great-grandparent of -resident Stevens. The crown was recognized by King George IV in 1833, by Queen Victoria in 1839 and by successive British monarchs." This last sentence in the photo caption is an exaggeration of the known facts, perhaps in an effort to curry favor with the President of the Republic. In 1969 I visited Blama and met Chief Lansana and Paramount Chief Madam W oki Massaquoi, M.B.E. whom he succeeded. Madam W oki wore the crown from 1926 until 1 August 1971. See also "The Massaquoi Crown and Its History," Appendix V in *The First African Diplomat*.

- 7 Indigenous Liberians were rare in government service, others were: Benjamin W. Payne (c.1875-1940) a physician, born of Bassa parents, secretary of public instruction from 1912 to 1930; Henry Too Wesley, a Grebo and the first indigenous vice president during the 1924-1928 term of C.D.B. King; P.G. Wolo a Kru (c1883-1940) and Harvard graduate class of 1917. Momolu Massaquoi was the only hereditary traditional leader and recognised indigenous voice.
- 8 Massaquoi, Hon. Momolu, *Oration Delivered at the Celebration of July Twenty-Sixth. Nineteen Hundred Twenty-One*. Monrovia, Government Printer, 1922. The Oration in original form is on my website: www.smykeonafrica.ch.
- 9 Smyke, Raymond J., "Fatima Massaquoi-Fahnbulleh (1912-1978) Pioneer Woman Educator," *Liberian Studies Journal*, v. XV, n. 1 (1990).
- 10 DuBois, W.E.B., "Liberia, The League and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1933. Reprinted in: *Africa Seen by American Negroes*. Presence Africaine, Paris, (1958), pp. 83-100. See also Sundiata, I.K. "Prelude to Scandal: Liberia and Fernando Po, 1880-1930," *Journal of African History*, v. XV, no. 1, (1974), pp. 97-112; and van der Kraaij, Fred, "Firestone in Liberia" in *Dependence, Under development and Persistent Conflict On the Political Economy of Liberia*, Editors: Eckhard Hinzen and Robert Kappel, Veröffentlichungen Aus Dem Übersee-Museum Bremen, Volume 11, Series F Bremer Africa Archives, (1980).
- 11 His five page handwritten letter, mostly on family matters, replied to hers of 13 December 1929. Though undated, it was written in late December 1929, fitting sequentially as the first of a large packet of 1930 Massaquoi correspondence, all the rest dated.
- 12 In my study of the *League of Nations Official Record*, and other documentation, plus the personal career of Dr. Antoine Sottile, it was evident that his fluency in five European languages, and his reputation as founding-editor of the journal *International Law and the Science of Diplomacy*, enhanced by certain Machiavellian talents, made him an extremely effective Liberia representative. He kept the League and the big powers off balance using legal arguments, and diplomatic allies who, while not in favor of slavery, were certainly against Liberia going to the gallows for fear that they might be next. In mid-1931 Sottile was joined by Liberian jurist, Secretary of State Louis Arthur Grimes (1883-1948) as head of delegation.
- 13 Richardson, N. R., *Liberia's Past and Present*, Diplomatic Press, London (1959), pp. 139 to 146. Also Johnson, Charles S., *Bitter Canaan*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1987: Black Classics of Social Science Series, specifically the "Introductory Essay" by John H. Stanfield II. *Liberia's Past and Present* is a privately published, valiant effort to record Liberian history and biography. Its biographical content has since been enhanced by: Dunn, D. E., Beyan, A. J., Burrowes, C. P., *Historical Dictionary of Liberia*, Scarecrow Press, Lanham, MD. Second Edition. (2001).
- 14 Simpson, C. L. *The Symbol of Liberia*, pp. 152-3. Clarence Lorenzo Simpson, Sr. (1896-1969) was a respected public servant, serving as speaker of the House of Representatives, secretary general of the True Whig party, secretary of state, vice president, ambassador to the United States, and later to Great Britain. For a decade, from 1934 to 1943, he had near daily contact with President Edwin Barclay, serving as his secretary of state. *The Symbol of Liberia* is a particularly valuable memoir.
- 15 See note 14.
- 16 Dunn, D. Elwood and Tarr, S. Byron, *Liberia: A Political Polity in Transition*, Scarecrow Press,

Metuchen, NJ, (1988), pp. 50-51. The authors note that all Liberian presidents from 1884 until the 1980 coup d'état were from the repatriate community, not one from an indigenous ethnic background. The repatriate political core did everything in its power to block constitutionally qualified indigenous Liberians who seriously aspired to be president.

- 17 Simpson, C. L., *The Symbol of Liberia*, p. 150.
- 18 *The First African Diplomat*. The principle informants for this oral history were Momolu's children Prince Abraham Massaquoi (1905-1980) affectionately known as Uncle Abe, and Fatima Fahnbulleh-Massaquoi (1912-1978). Notes and tape recordings were made in Liberia during sixteen visits. Uncle Abe related the specific information on Momolu and the 1931 elections in a December 1963 recording session in his cinder block home in the Waterside section of Monrovia. I alerted him on a prior visit, asking that he refresh his memory on two aspects of the 1931 events. First, his own eye witness reaction to the public turmoil, and second, what took place privately in cabinet sessions as later recounted by his father. The object, I assured him, was to harvest the facts, the mood and the general ambiance. I recorded this and other sessions on a then current device using 7inch (18 cm) reel-to-reel magnetic tape. We usually met in mid-to-late afternoon. Abe's habit, as with many older people in the tropics, was to take his main meal promptly at noon. He then slept for several hours, bathed, and put on clean clothes ready for the cool of the evening when most socializing would go on, often out of doors. I interviewed him many times on different subjects concerning his father and each time, save for when we went to the hinterland together, he followed the above routine. It was obvious that he had seriously reflected on my request. On 3 December 1963 (by coincidence the 33rd anniversary of King's resignation) he recounted the events related here. His sister Fatima was with us during the recording session but did not contribute a great deal to this aspect of her father's history because she was in Germany at the time. In addition to his strong voice, the microphone picked up some Monrovia sounds through the open windows: children playing, chickens clucking, vehicles passing, women speaking in hushed voices followed by laughter. Fatima could not stay beyond six pm, as she was addicted to watching an American television soap opera called PEYTON PLACE and would never miss it-saying, "It was just like Monrovia."
- 19 Johnson was in close contact with the American Legation in Monrovia and with Washington. He was fully aware of the hard line that Washington was taking towards Liberia and the slavery issue. In my view, this would justify his advice to his friend Massaquoi to think twice about political involvement. See note 20.
- 20 Johnson, Charles S., *Bitter Canaan*. p.163. Johnson's rigorous analysis of Liberian governance took 20 years to write; yet *Bitter Canaan* would not be published until after his death. Stanfield attributes this to the "racial etiquette" prevalent in American scholarship at the time. See Endnote 13.
- 21 This interesting point is fully developed in: *The First African Diplomat*.
- 22 Simpson, C. L., *The Symbol of Liberia*, p. 158.
- 23 See footnote 18. The same-recorded session with Uncle Abe produced this information.
- 24 A month after the Marines arrived, Senator Sudre Dartiguenave, hand chosen by the United States, was elected President of Haiti for a seven-year term. Shortly after his election an American prepared *Convention* was proposed to the new President and promptly ratified by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Transmitted to the United States, the *Convention* was ratified by the American Senate on 2 May 1916, giving it the full force of law over a ten-year duration, later extended for an additional ten years. This *Convention* engaged the United States to maintain law and order and fiscal responsibility. Accordingly American civil servants took control of the national finances, the police (Gendarmerie d'Haiti), public health and public works. A new American sponsored constitution was quickly adopted by national plebiscite in 1918, giving foreigners the right to own property. On 21 August 1934, through the intervention of American President Franklin D. Roosevelt the United States occupation was terminated. There seems very little doubt that this successful template was to be applied to Liberia when it submitted "for a time to an International

Commission."

- 25 Simpson, c.L. (1961) pp. 164-165.
- 26 M. Brunot (French) for general administration; Mr. Lighthart (Dutch) for finance; and Dr. M.D. McKenzie (British) for health.
- 27 Simpson, c.L. (1961) pp. 165-170.
- 28 Ma Sedia's opposition to her husband after he left Germany seems more than politically inspired. I believe that it is motivated by her resentment, hurt, and chagrin that he sired a child with Elli, one of his children's nursemaids. Elli occasionally figures in family correspondence from Ma, "I had to brush Elli" (spank her). Again, I'm "getting rid of lazy Elli" but Momolu wanted to pay her. Fazia Jansen, born on 6 June 1929 in Hamburg was the last child of record that Momolu fathered. He planned to take her to Liberia when he sailed later the same year. All the children that he ever fathered were looked after and Fazia would be no exception. However, Elli did not want to part with her baby. Nine months before the birth, October 1928 is the period when Momolu's comportment noticeably changed: "The Massaquoi family correspondence. . . began to show the stress of it all with hints of his short temper, strange behavior and physical illness." This was no ordinary fall from grace. Elli lived under the same roof and he knew that his wife disliked the girl; of all his many indiscretions this went seriously overboard because it was the effective end of the marriage. Ma Sedia's never talked about it, instead she actively opposed his run for the presidency. Elli did not want an African name for the child so chose the name of her ward, Fasia Massaquoi born on 2 May 1928. Fazia's stepfather Albert and her mother protected her the best they could, growing up in Hamburg. She had musical talent (as did her grandmother Queen Sandimanni) and wanted to emulate African-American singer Josephine Baker, but as illegitimate and black she had little chance to display her talent, instead she had to hide much of the time. At age 14 she was removed from school and sent to forced labor in the Neuengamme concentration camp. There is a firm belief that she endured medical experimentation resulting in lifelong heart disease. Later Fazia cultivated her singing becoming a popular figure in the post-war political protest culture of West Germany. In 1960 Massaquoi's daughter Fatima and his granddaughter Vivian spent a day with her. After Fazia died on 29 December 1997 there are people eager to keep up her memory. A biography of her life in German is being prepared. (<http://www.fasia-jansen-stiftung.de>).
- 29 Smyke, Raymond J., "Nathaniel Varney Massaquoi (1905-1962) A Biographical Essay." *Liberian Studies Journal*, v. XVII, n. 1 (1992), p. 55, and "Fatima Massaquoi Fahnbulleh (1912-1978)," in note 9.
- 30 Hans J. Massaquoi, *Destined to Witness*, Morrow, New York, 1999. An impression of Fatima during the early 1930s is given on pages 60 to 63 in her uncle's autobiography. Hans was six years old in 1932.
- 31 Momolu and Wilhelm were contemporary in age, outlook, and temperament. The latter had been Lutheran pastor at the Stephan-Kempe-Room of St. Katharinen-St. Annen in Hammerbrookm, Hamburg from 1912 until his dismissal in 1921. A year later, at the age of 48, he and 11-year-old Richard left that church to become Rector of St. Michaelis. He later founded the Menschheits Partei in early opposition to the Hitler regime.
- 32 Ms. Vivian Fahnbulleh-Seton to Raymond J. Smyke, 7 April 2001. Email communication.
- 33 Two German scholars, Dr. Iris Groschek and Dr. Rainer Hering (Staatsarchiv, Kattunbleiche 19, D-22041, Hamburg) are preparing a biography of Richard Heydorn at the request of his brother Volker Detlev Heydorn. Abundant family correspondence has been made available for this project. The research lacuna was information on Fatima Massaquoi-Fahnbulleh whom Volker knew during the period described in the text. I provided extensive data to fill the lacuna. Drs. Groschek and Hering have published the memoirs of Pastor Wilhelm Heydorn. Both projects are written in German.
- 34 Fatima Massaquoi, *Bush to Boulevards: The Autobiography of a Vai Noblewoman*, typescript, no date,

700+ pages. In Microfilm: "Writings and Papers of Fatima Massaquoi-Fahnbulleh, Institute of African Studies, University of Liberia." Filmed in Monrovia October 1973. Fatima gave me one of the two reels that she owned.

- 35 Fatima Massaquoi, *Bush to Boulevards*.
- 36 A document on Momolu's passing was sent from the United States Legation in Monrovia to the Department of State, Washington. Copy furnished to the author on 26 July 1999, by D. Elwood Dunn, Professor of Political Science and Departmental Chair University of the South, Sewanee TN 37383.
- 37 Several family sources confirm that Momolu Massaquoi was buried in a shallow grave. The understanding among those present was that this would make it easier for the poro members who planned to take the body that same night for a full poro burial in the bush. Momolu had been a life-long poro leader.

Turning Brain Drain into a Brain Gain

Sakui W. G. Malakpa*

It has been postulated that a major impediment to Africa's socio-economic development is the incessant flow of skilled human resources from the continent to the developed world (Nyikuli, 1999; Kigotho, 2002; Mutume, 2003). The contention is that this flow (referred to as the "brain drain") depletes Africa of intellectuals/scholars, medical and health personnel, engineers, scientists, etc., who are needed to contribute to the development of the continent (Devan, & Tewari, 2001; Kigotho, 2002; Mutume, 2003). Some observers attribute this "drain" to several factors. For instance, it is alleged that the African intelligentsia are greedy gravy seekers who turn their backs on the countries that educated them although such countries need them (Shikwati, 2000; Malakpa, 2005). Other observers charge that brains flow out of Africa because developed countries are insensitive, callous, and rapacious in their bid to enhance their development further irrespective of how draining hurts the developing world. For example, some have accused Britain of poaching intellectuals and health workers from Africa (www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1173620.stm, 2001). Still, other observers argue that sometimes (if not often), brains are not "drained" but "driven" by the developing world (Nyikuli, 1999; Shikwati, 2000; Tebeje, 2005; Malakpa, 2005).

Whether Africa's skilled human resources are "drained" by the developed world or "driven" by African countries, the truth remains that the departure of skilled human resources negatively affects socio-economic development in Africa (Nyikuli, 1999; Devan & Tewari, 2001). Based on this realization, it is necessary to discuss the extent of the brain drain problem and briefly touch on its causes. Furthermore, this work will cover the Liberian situation, first arguing that the "drain" is not a total loss. Additionally, this work will show how Liberia can benefit from strategies and approaches employed in other places to turn the brain drain into a brain gain.

Magnitude of the Problem: Kigotho (2002) accentuates that the departure of skilled professionals from sub-Saharan Africa poses a serious concern because the loss of such persons to the developed world is a major threat to the region's economic development. When this topic was discussed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa, it was disclosed that in less than twenty years, sub-Saharan Africa "lost a third of its skilled professionals and had to replace them with over 100,000 expatriates from the West at a cost of US\$4 billion a year" (Kigotho, 2002, p1; Mutume, 2003). It was further disclosed that "between 1985 and 1990 Africa lost over 60,000

* Dr. Malakpa is a leading Liberian Liberianist. He has published significantly, especially in the area of education. He is a Professor of Education at the University of Toledo in Ohio.

middle-level and high-level managers to Western economies. In addition, about 23,000 lecturers from African universities emigrate each year. The biggest migratory flows are from Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana in that order" (Kigotho 2002, p2).

The flow of skilled professionals from Africa affects every sector of development. However, "The UN Development Programme (UNDP) notes that in Africa, the loss of medical doctors has been the most striking" (Mutume, 2003, p1). Along this line, Pang, Lansang, & Haines (2002) generally point out that "migration of medical professionals from developing countries has become a major concern. This brain drain worsens the already depleted healthcare resources in poor countries and widens the gap in health inequities worldwide" (p1).

The constant flow of medical doctors and health personnel out of Africa is illustrated by the finding that, although health and medical needs are humongous in Africa, a third to one-half of graduates from South African medical schools emigrate to the developed world (Pan, Lansang, & Haines, 2002). Canada offers attractive salaries and benefits in a bid to hire a large number of these doctors. Consequently, South Africa strongly appealed to the government of Canada to desist from recruiting its medical professionals. South Africa's concern and subsequent appeal were justified because, in Canada's rural province of Saskatchewan alone, "more than 50 per cent of doctors are foreign trained and at least 1 in 5 of the 1,530 doctors there earned their first medical degree in South Africa" (Mutume, 2003, p5).

In West Africa, "at least 60 per cent of doctors trained in Ghana during the 1980s have left the country" (Mutume, 2003, p1). In like manner, there are 22,000 Nigerian medical doctors in the US alone (UNCDF, 2005).

The flight of health and medical personnel out of Africa is not limited to doctors alone. This is exemplified by the finding that 18000 Zimbabwean nurses seek employment abroad (Pan et al, 2002).

In education, African schools continue to lose qualified teachers to the developed world (www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1173620.stm, 2001). However, this problem is not limited to primary and secondary schools. At the tertiary level, university professors, skilled researchers, and qualified staff members incessantly stream out of Africa for positions abroad (Shikwati, 2000; Nyikuli, Akpotu & Nwadiani, 2002). Likewise, in social work, the Zimbabwe National Association of Social Workers estimates that "1,500 of the country's 3,000 trained social workers left for the UK during the last 10 years" (Mutume, 2003, p5).

Reasons for the Continuous Flight of Human Capital: Although brain drain is a major impediment to socio-economic development in Africa, this flow of skilled human resources continues because of a number of factors. For instance, as pointed out earlier, it is alleged that the African intelligentsia and skilled individuals leave the continent (as greedy gravy seekers) in search of greener pastures abroad (Kigotho, 2002; Malakpa, 2005). Other fingers point to governments of the developed world who

poach developing countries of their skilled human resources (www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1173620.stm, 2001). However, overwhelmingly, the literature attributes the success of brain drain to problems and poor conditions in developing countries. For example, it is contended that, "limited job opportunities and education facilities, a lower standard of living and security, and lack of professional recognition are among the factors that have caused many African workers, especially those with professional skills, to seek work outside the continent" (Nyikuli, 1999, p1).

Referring to the departure of medical and health workers from Africa, Pang, Lansang, and Haines (2002) cite key causes such as "poor remuneration, bad working conditions, an oppressive political climate, persecution of intellectuals, and discrimination. Researchers cite lack of funding, poor facilities, limited career structures, and poor intellectual stimulation" (p499). Other personal reasons for skilled personnel emigrating from Africa include "security, the threat of violence, and the wish to provide a good education for their children" (Pang et al, 2002, p.499).

While personal reasons for the flight of skilled human capital from Africa are always a consideration, such reasons seem to be outweighed by the fear, threat, or possibility of political persecution (www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1173620.stm, 2001). For example, Amnesty International, a highly respected human rights organization, presents a 2001 annual report covering North Africa and the Middle-East to show that,

Gross human right violations took place throughout much of the Middle East and North Africa. They ranged from extrajudicial executions to widespread use of torture and unfair trials, harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders. Freedom of expression and association continued to be curtailed; the climate of impunity remained and the victims were still awaiting steps to bring those responsible for past human rights violations to justice (Amnesty International Report, 2001, p2).

The Amnesty International Report (2001) cites specific country examples from North Africa which are not much different (if at all) from other parts of Africa. In Algeria, the security forces enjoy impunity in the midst of violence and disappearances. Yet, no independent and impartial investigations are carried out to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. In Egypt, torturing occurs in police stations with people dying in prison under mysterious circumstances. Thousands of people are imprisoned under conditions which are tantamount to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" (Amnesty International Report, 2001, p3). At the same time, human right defenders are targeted; they are harassed and legally restricted (Amnesty International Report).

The targeting of human right defenders has escalated in Tunisia where at least a thousand political prisoners (most of them prisoners of conscience) languish behind bars. Likewise, in Libya, hundreds of political prisoners are behind bars without charges or trials, and political prisoners are routinely tortured. In Morocco, there are arbitrary

arrests and disappearances and yet, perpetrators are not brought to trial. There is constant violation of freedom of expression and consequent imprisonment of prisoners of conscience (Amnesty International Report, 2001).

In other parts of Africa, there are imprisonments, tortures, and intimidations of the intelligentsia, members of the press, and people of conscience. Additionally, wars and insurrections force skilled human resources out of their home countries (Oyowe, 1996). These reasons for leaving Africa are buttressed by other unfavorable conditions. For example, Akpotu & Nwadiani, (2002) observe that Nigerian (and presumably other African) professors leave because of poor working conditions in their universities. As academics, they enjoy greater prestige outside their universities and the country. In other words, the departure of such academics is necessitated partly by a lack of comparable career opportunities, and a lack of understanding and appreciation for their expertise (Devan & Tewari, 2001). Worse, they are paid woefully low salaries that cannot take care of their basic needs. Additionally, they do not enjoy a quiet, conducive working environment that will facilitate attainment of a healthy mind that serves as the beacon of enlightenment (Akpotu & Nwadiani, 2002). Thus, their departure is rational and justifiable especially since they emigrate to places where presumably, their productivity and worth are recognized. Akpotu & Nwadiani, (2002) liken this phenomenon to the proverbial saying that one sells gold to persons who know its value.

The preceding shows that the flight of intellectuals from Africa is caused more by African countries than the alleged greed of both African intellectuals and developed countries. Hence, Harris (2002) maintains that for the developing world, the brain drain is more of a vote of no confidence in the home countries of departed skilled human resources than theft by governments of the developed world. People whose intellects and skills are needed for development flee from conditions such as mind-boggling misgovernment, appalling working conditions and from pay rates far below the level of subsistence (Harris, 2002; Crush, 2002).

The Liberian Situation: Oyowe (1996) emphasizes that, over a thirty year period, the powerful factors associated with brain drain in Africa included the continent's low rate of growth and development. On one hand, this rate was impeded by measures imposed on African countries by the World Bank, International Monetary fund (IMF) and other lending agencies regarding structural adjustment; such measures resulted in a dramatic decline in living standards. On the other hand, the rate of Africa's growth and development was hampered by political instability. For example, there were "disturbances in Nigeria and Zaire, civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia etc." (Oyowe, 1996, p59). As a result, Oyowe (1996) points out that,

Thousands of qualified professionals have been forced unwillingly into exile, and the majority of those left behind, in these times of serious economic crisis, are engaged in unskilled pursuits - in petty trading and taxi driving - far removed from their professional training. The loss of investment associated with this situation cannot be underestimated. The effect on households who have paid taxes and made sacrifices for years

to educate their children, and on the States which have invested in educational systems, are huge (p.59).

Clearly, Liberia is not different from other African countries affected by the flow of skilled human resources to other parts of the world, especially to the developed world. Thus, it behooves Liberia, like sister African countries, not only to recognize the reality and harmful effects of brain drain but also to note that (A) despite its harmful consequences for socio-economic development, brain drain is not a total loss as positive fruits can be harvested from it, and (B) measures must be taken to turn the brain drain into a brain gain.

Positive Fruits of Brain Drain: More than poor working conditions, low salaries, dissatisfaction of workers, and other factors which precipitate a brain drain, the protracted civil war in Liberia was a key reason for the exodus of skilled and unskilled human resources from the country. While accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, most of Liberia's academics, technocrats, health and medical personnel, and other skilled human capital sought positions in developed countries, including, the United States, Canada, Australia, and nations in Europe. No doubt, these people were (and still are) needed in Liberia to enhance the nation's socio-economic development. However, their departure is not a total loss. Devan and Tewari (2001) reecho this point by admonishing governments not to view emigrants as skilled human resources totally lost. Rather, such resources abroad can be utilized for economic growth and development. "The emigrants' technical and business skills, commercial relationships, and financial capital can all be harnessed to make long-distance economic contributions through foreign direct investment, venture funding, financial investments, and commercial and educational exchanges" (Devan & Tewari, 2001, p3).

In addition to the foregoing, Pang, et al (2002) argue that benefits of brain drain to the exporting countries include "substantial financial remittances from expatriates, improved training, and long term professional networks (p.500). Furthermore, the flow of skilled human resources out of Africa is not a total loss as the emerging Diaspora movement is not only recognized by governments, but is playing an active role in the development of the continent (Tebeje, 2005).

Financial remittances by skilled and unskilled personnel who leave Africa constitute huge benefits to their home countries. Many (but not all) remittances are through Western Union which made 96.7 million consumer-to-consumer and 146 million consumer-to-business transactions in 2004, moving 21 billion dollars around the world (Canning, 2005). In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria receives the largest amount of remittances; experts now estimate this amount to exceed a billion dollars annually, and this amount ranks second only to oil exports as a source of foreign exchange (UNCDF, 2005). Most of these remittances are through Western Union offices run by First Bank which has more than 200 locations throughout Nigeria (UNCDF).

Western Union figures tell only a part of the story as this is only one medium of money transfers to Africa. For example, a World Bank study shows that in 2001,

twelve billion dollars were remitted to Africa and of this amount, four billion dollars were remitted to sub-Saharan Africa (Sander, & Munzele, 2005). Another World Bank study found that,

Until 2001, Egypt was the largest receiver on the continent for a decade. In 2001, Morocco's remittance receipts overtook those of Egypt. In sub-Saharan Africa the single largest receiver was Nigeria, which receives between 30 [percent] and 60 percent of remittances to the sub-Saharan region, followed by Lesotho, Sudan, Senegal, and Mauritius. Tunisia, Sudan, and Mozambique were also important recipients" (UNCDF, 2005, p8).

Remittances effected through official channels obviously do not include informal transfers of money to Africa. Various sources indicate that transfers through informal channels precipitously increase the total amounts remitted to Africa (UNCDF, 2005; Sander, & Munzele, 2005). Additionally, specific country amounts (although available) are difficult to obtain on account of confidentiality.

Despite difficulty of obtaining specific country amounts in remittances, it is safe to assume that of the four billion dollars remitted to sub-Saharan Africa in 2001 (Sander, & Munzele, 2005), a substantial amount went to Liberia. This assumption is based on the finding that "The world's chief sources of workers' remittances to developing countries in 2001 were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and France (UNCDF, 2005, p9). Based on a realization that there is a huge population of Liberians in the United States and Europe, this assumption is safe. Thus, it is logical to conclude that, while brain drain hurts Liberia (like other countries), remittance of funds by people who leave is one huge benefit to the country. As in other developing countries (Sander, & Munzele, 2005), Liberians who receive remittances generally tend to be better off than those who have no form of employment and yet, do not receive remittances from abroad.

Reversing the Brain Drain: No doubt, financial remittances by skilled and unskilled African workers abroad help households and families in Africa in many ways. While indirectly this help boosts the economy, in general, funds remitted to African countries are not directed to national sectors for socio-economic development purposes. Additionally, while funds are appreciated, the skills and talents of the African intelligentsia are needed sorely for national development. It therefore behooves African governments to reverse the brain drain or, if all efforts in this regard fail, to turn the brain drain into a brain gain. The awareness that the civil war and other conditions have forced Liberia's skilled human resources out of the country ought to force the country to gravitate toward this direction.

Many suggestions are offered for halting the brain drain out of Africa. Mutume (2003) suggests the imposition of restrictive policies aimed at delaying emigration. For example, the government could add an extra year to the training of medical students. Other steps include tax incentives and arrangements, and negotiations with developed countries not to recruit skilled human resources from developing countries (Mutumé,

2003). On the other hand, efforts to repatriate skilled individuals to either their home countries or other countries have proven largely unsuccessful; thus governments have settled for establishing relationships with the African Diaspora (Tebeje, 2005).

Devan & Tewari (2001) suggest that, to halt Africa's brain drain, African governments need to develop methodical plans in the same way universities tap their alumni or as nonprofit organizations develop relationships with large donors. In like manner, relative to the exodus of health and medical personnel, Pang, et al (2002) offer an array of suggestions, including, demanding compensation from departing professionals; delaying their departure through compulsory service; increasing salaries in the public health sector; permitting health professionals in the public sector to do some private practice; providing educational benefits for their children; and training paramedics who can fulfill many of the roles of doctors but whose qualifications are not recognized outside the country (p.500).

However, Liberia will do well to follow the two most popular suggestions for reversing brain drain: (A) improving conditions back home and (B) utilization of brains abroad for the benefit of the home country.

Improving conditions at Home: Pang, et al (2002) emphasize strongly that, to reverse the brain drain out of Africa, governments must address "the structural, political, and economic problems that lead to the brain drain" (p500). To accomplish this feat in Liberia, government must ensure an end to open and violent hostilities that led to the death, disability, displacement, and psychological scarring of hundreds and thousands of people. To date, thousands of skilled and unskilled Liberians still are reluctant to return home because they are not sure of their security, even after a peaceful election. To win them back home, government must institute security measures at all levels beyond the presence of international peacekeepers.

In addition to concerns about personal security, a shaky security poses concerns for Liberian (and even foreign) business owners and investors. This is equally true of health and medical personnel, university professors, technocrats and other skilled individuals who would like to return home. This hesitance can be likened to a Loma proverbial saying that, "No one (in a right mind) sees a fire and puts his/her hand in it."

Improvements in the economy, structure and infrastructure of Liberia will attract skilled human resources back to the country. However, these changes will not occur overnight; therefore, while they will be both helpful and appreciated, they should not be rigid, requirements for returning home. More than such changes, Liberia needs to demonstrate clearly and decisively that the country insists on an atmosphere of intellectual freedom, including true freedom of speech and of the press. Cognizance of a possibility of being a prisoner of conscience (even with the most responsible behavior) is likely to keep the intelligentsia out of Liberia. This "prisoner status" may not necessarily be a physical jail cell but an amalgamation of socio-political circumstances that bars one from freely practicing a profession, writing, speaking or teaching.

In addition, Liberia can allure the intelligentsia back to the country by showing appreciation and need for talents abroad. The way to this end is to seek such talents and ensure a conducive (not necessarily a luxurious) working atmosphere when they return home. Following this trend, Thailand and Ireland established reverse brain drain programmes by offering generous research funds alongside other monetary incentives, attractive services and assistance (Pang, et al (2002).

Utilizing Brains Abroad: Sometimes efforts to lure skilled human resources back home fail for a variety of personal and professional reasons. Under these circumstances, the next best thing for a government to do is to utilize for its benefits, the talents of trained personnel who left the country. Among the many approaches to this end that Liberia can follow are (A) virtual participation, and (B) encouraging the establishment of emigrant associations.

Virtual Participation: Tebeje (2005) defines virtual participation as "participation in nation-building without physical relocation (p3). Through this means, the home country can utilize the talents of the African Diaspora and thereby minimize the effects of brain drain, if not reverse it entirely.

Virtual participation is effected through virtual linkages. These are "independent, non-political, and non-profit networks facilitating skill transfer and capacity-building. These networks mobilize skilled Diaspora members' expertise for the development process in their countries of origin (Tebeje, 2005, p3).

Given the level of communication in African countries (and this is improving), and in light of the complexity of development needs, there are questions as to whether virtual linkages will contribute substantially to socio-economic development (Tebeje, 2005). In spite of this uncertainty, Mutume (2003) stresses that a number of UN agencies launched a virtual linkage network "in July 2002 as part of a resurgence of initiatives to reverse the loss of professional skills from Africa. Among those being targeted are scientists, medical doctors, engineers, university lecturers, economists, information technologists and other highly skilled people in short supply on the continent" (p.1)

Virtual linkages seem to be working as currently, experts have identified 41 virtual networks in 30 countries; six of them are African (Tebeje, 2005). The African networks include the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) which has members in 68 countries (Tebeje).

SANSA has created a detailed database that matches skill shortages in South Africa with the overseas locations of concentrations of expatriates who have those skills.

This database allows South African companies to appeal to lost talent, new emigrants to find an appropriate expatriate network, and more settled emigrants to respond to needs in their home countries. One SANSA database tracks 21,000 university graduates who have moved abroad. From June 1999, when SANSA launched its database-search capability on the Internet, to February 2000, more than 1,000 queries from South African expatriates were logged (Devan & Tewari, 2001, p.56).

Mutume (2003) adds that SANSA utilizes its website to invite South African professionals abroad to sign up with the network. Because of this solicitation, at least 22,000 people who graduated from five major south African universities and now live abroad keep in touch with their alma maters. It is estimated that "about 60 per cent of the country's expatriate graduates are located in six countries, with Australia, the UK and the US accounting for more than half of them" Mutume, 2003, p.2).

Professionals who join SANSA can offer any number and type of services. For instance, professionals abroad may offer to train their South African counterparts or assist with conducting research. Likewise, professionals abroad may initiate or expedite business contacts. They may transmit data and research results that are not available in South Africa. Furthermore, SANSA members may transfer technology; for example, they may transfer computers and software to their home country. "This is already being done in other African countries. The Africast Foundation, for instance, collects and refurbishes 'retired' computers in the US for use in schools and poor communities in Ghana" (Mutume, 2003, p.2).

Emigrant Associations: Apart from (or in addition to) virtual linkages, brains abroad can be utilized by the home government in several ways. For example, Tebeje (2005) maintains that "individuals of the Diaspora also contribute through virtual networks, as visiting scholars, by investing in companies, and assisting in joint ventures between host and sending countries (p.3).

No doubt, the use of virtual networks is a major means of utilizing brains abroad. Such efforts, however, are strengthened tremendously by the use of emigrant associations. For Liberia, these are more than county or alumni associations which, in their special ways, do contribute to the country. To be effective for national development purposes, such associations must be either business, professional, or the like, focusing on specific development sectors. Devan & Tewari (2001) argue that such associations create many advantages that can be associated with economic clusters. For instance, members of such associations have more in common than members of social organizations; consequently, they tend to make sound professional, business, or investment decisions (Devan & Tewari, 2001). It is further contended that, "professional networks also make it easier for business leaders in the home country to tap specific skills abroad. A hospital in an emerging economy, for example, might get in touch with a network of overseas doctors to recruit them for short teaching stints" (Devan & Tewari, 2001, p.56).

A number of networks of expatriate professionals already exist; these include the Colombian Network of Researchers and Engineers Abroad and the Silicon Valley Indian Professionals Association. (Devan & Tewari, 2001). Similarly, Liberians abroad are encouraged to form professional and business associations that transcend alumni associations, county organizations, ethnic affiliations, political alliances, etc.. Rather, such professional and business associations and networks will focus on development

sectors, sharing their expertise, funds, and material resources with Liberia (Malakpa, 2005).

To utilize its skilled human resources abroad, Liberia needs to ensure that these resources are harnessed to enhance socio-economic growth and development. To this end, it is proposed that a variety of professional and business associations be established with the input and participation of Liberians in various parts of the world (Malakpa, 2005). For example, an umbrella organization could be the Association of Liberian Professionals Abroad, ALPA. Within this body, there may be organizations and associations related to health and medicine, law, engineering, education, business and finance, interactive technology, and the like. To this end, the Association of Liberian Educators Abroad (ALEA) is proposed to address the education sector of Liberia. For this purpose, past, present, and prospective professors, teachers, school administrators, and supervisors of schools are encouraged to enlist with this association (Malakpa, 2005). Through ALEA, such education personnel can contribute enormously to the education sector of Liberia by, among other things, sending books and educational equipment, collecting funds to repair schools, conducting seminars and workshops for teachers and principals, offering teaching and other services freely, and lobbying the legislature for laws that positively impact the education sector. If ALEA succeeds and other professional areas do the same, Liberia will benefit monumentally from its skilled human resources abroad.

In sum, there is no doubt that Africa is losing its skilled human resources to the developed world. Explanations for this loss lean toward factors such as the alleged greed of African professionals, the insensitivity of developed countries, and the fact that political and economic situations in Africa force skilled professionals out of the continent. This flow of professionals, however, is not a total loss as skilled human resources that leave remit funds back home. Yet, African governments need to slow this flow considerably, if not halt it altogether. Alternatively, African governments need to utilize African skills and talents abroad. This can be done in several ways, including the establishment of networks and ensuring that professional and business associations are established abroad with the aim of contributing to various development sectors of the continent. It behooves Liberia to follow this trend and encourage the establishment of various Liberian professional and business associations abroad. For example, the Association of Liberian Educators Abroad (ALEA) is proposed to address the country's education sector as one means of turning Liberia's brain drain into a brain gain.

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Liberia and Containment Policy Against Colonial Take-Over: Public Health and Sanitation Reform, 1912-1953

Adell Patton*

The independent Republic of Liberia was surrounded by colonial governments in West Africa by 1900.¹ In the colonial territories the European population had grown in numbers. Because of the Germ Theory of Disease of 1880, it became known that bacteria spread disease, and the use of quinine had slowed the morbidity and mortality rates of Europeans from malaria and improved their health conditions in the region. Colonialism, however, created new urbanization clusters, and modern new disease environments. By bringing African people together from different disease environments for the first time, colonial transportation systems allowed for the unprecedented diffusion of diseases, such as yellow fever, tuberculosis, influenza, plague, syphilis, cerebrospinal meningitis, trypanosomiasis, schistosomiasis, malaria, and other infections.² In order to control the spread of these diseases, colonial governments developed medical departments, preventive and curative medicine programs, pipe-bourne water supplies, sewerage, refuse collection, hill station segregated housing, and enacted quarantines on the occasions of epidemics. Even though Liberia was founded as an American protégé and remained unofficially as an American protectorate, adjacent colonial regimes had claimed some of Liberian territory and had treated some of the indigenous people within the republic as independents. Both Francophone and Anglophone governments were constant threats to the governing Americo-Liberians, who remained vigilant and protective about their sovereignty.³

This Liberian mind-set was of long standing. It had been inherited from the intersections between slavery and racism in the US and in the African American settler disposal to Liberia. Standing past US historiography on its head, the descendants of the Americo-Liberians had come not through 'benevolent' means from the US but through their "non-benevolent" flight from slavery and racism. The American Colonization Society of Free People of Color of the United States (ACS) sponsored the freed African-American settlers, known here as the 'second Liberians' and mulatto-dominated, through the process of disposal from the US to assuage Southern slave owners. Colonization to Liberia was an alternative to the trauma that integration would bring

* Dr. Patton is a leading West Africanist and African Americanist. He is the author of *Physicians, Colonialism Racism*, and *Diaspora in West Africa* (University Press of Florida, 1996) and many other scholarly publications. He is an Associate Professor of History at University of Missouri, Saint Louis.

in America. This traumatic odyssey was transmitted through oral tradition and in written history from generation to generation in Liberia well into the twentieth century.⁴ The "founders" had no interest in the reproduction of a society based on the unique racial divide and slavery left behind in the United States, nor in their minds to allow the imposition of a colonial bifurcated state that a developed sanitation system might bring for certain.⁵ Hence, they imposed preventable measures of an exclusive nature to slow the importation of racist ideas and settler societies from the West. First, provisions in the Liberian Constitution prohibited Euro-Americans or Europeans from owning land. And Article V. Miscellaneous Provisions, Section 12th and Section 13th of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, July 26, 1847, and amended through 1955, prohibited the right of persons to hold private property unless they were of Black Liberian descent and citizens of the nation.⁶ Second, although a republic since 1847 and unlike the colonial bifurcated states,⁷ Monrovia, the capitol, remained a mere hamlet of less than 5,000 of Americo-Liberians, and without ports, transportation system, electricity, roads, and pipe-bourne running water. The rest resided in the coastal regions of Bassa, Sinoe, and at Harper adjacent to the Ivory Coast. Two intentions of these settlements were the control of custom duties of international trade and defense against French partition. Third, the Liberian government provided inadequate support to public health and allowed the threat of epidemics to fester in order to stall the presumption of European "take-Over." Some sixty years after its colonial neighbors, Liberia waited until colonial "take-over" was no longer a threat and laid its first pipe-borne water system in urban Monrovia in 1953. The central thesis of this paper is that the Liberian government intentionally feigned attempts of cooperation with the West to develop sanitation measures in order to maintain an image of the nation as undesirable to white settlement from 1912-1953.

Firestone Rubber and Tyre Company was the major foreign company in Liberia during the early 1900s and placed health needs first. Tropical expertise in medicine was indispensable for an alien work force, and Tulane University and Harvard University were the only two tropical disease centers in the United States. In 1926, Firestone donated \$20,000 to Harvard University in a medical and biological survey expedition to Liberia. The one physician and seven scientists were experts in tropical medicine and conducted the most thorough medical and social history of Liberia. The Harvard University Expedition conducted investigative efforts into the Liberian interior, which had received scant attention up to this time. The region lacked both a doctor and pharmacy with Western medicine. The Expedition omitted, however, the fact that this was the zone of the indigenous doctors known as the *Zoos*, surrounded with the location of some forty-six medicinal plants used for medical treatment of the interior people. Soko Sacko (1864-1969), who had studied in Côte d'Ivoire and became a civic minded patriot, was the most known herbalist eye doctor at Zorzor; he later served as a liaison between the Liberia Frontier Force and the towns people; and further became the first paramount Chief of the Mandingo people at Sanniquellie.⁸ The Expedition,

however, provided additional comments on the status of sanitation in Liberia and health personnel that dovetailed with later public health findings: "There is among the Liberian people no health organization of any sort anywhere in the country, no public health laboratory of any description, and no adequately trained sanitarian or physician. The government had selected a two-storied house formerly used as a residence in Monrovia, as a hospital while we were there, and had placed in it a few beds, several of which were occupied by patients in charge of a poorly qualified Liberian physician and nurse."⁹ Dr. David W. Payne of the Bassa ethnic group was the physician in reference in the report. He was the first Liberian trained doctor of the twentieth century and entered Meharry Medical School in 1901 and may have graduated in 1904.¹⁰ He actually never practiced medicine because the government made him Secretary of Education. In 1927 Firestone donated \$5,000 to the Harvard School of Tropical Medicine for an in-depth analysis of a preventive serum for yellow fever. Another \$5,000 was given to Dr. George Schwab of the Peabody Museum of Harvard to reconstruct an ethnography of the Liberian peoples. Shortly after the Harvard Expedition departed in 1927, the Liberian government established a hospital in the German cable station at Monrovia, and the Lutherans had a hospital at Muhlenburg, fourteen miles North of Monrovia. President C. D. B. King (1920-1930) of the True Whig Party began the first organized development of sanitation work activities around Monrovia in 1928 and supported measures for the treatment of the indigent sick.

Firestone expanded its infrastructure that improved health conditions around its plantations between 1926-1933. Development required laborers and health care. Firestone expended \$275,000 in the construction and maintenance of 125 miles of roads around its rubber plantations and gave the government \$63,000 to improve its road system. A public radio service was built at the cost of \$30,000 to provide communications that linked Liberia, the United States, and other countries. Even more, a trade school and farm were established for the indigenous costing \$10,000, and a German philologist was retained to write an orthography of the Kpelle language for the first time. In 1933 Firestone built a hospital at the cost of \$56,000 with an additional \$200,000 expenditure. Health care was made available for thousands of Liberians workers and even some curious Zoos or herbalist doctors came for treatment.¹¹ White American physicians were in charge of the Firestone medical establishment.

Dr. Paul Willis (M.D.) was the first Medical Director for the Company and in time had to return to America due to ill health. Dr. Justus B. Rice (M.D.) succeeded Willis; he had two assistants to help him take care of Firestone employees. Dr. W. O. Wehrle, a German doctor and medical practitioner from Tanganyika with the German forces in 1914, came to Liberia in 1924 and hired by Firestone in 1934; hence, he may have been one of Rice's assistants. Wehrle, however, served as local leader of the local Nazi group in Monrovia.¹² Hence, Wehrle's presence in Liberia added a new dimension to racist clinical practice and segregation at Firestone in his observations of Liberians, especially in his discussions with Western legations about Liberians inferior

and comparative cognitive intelligence levels in hospitals, clinics, and sundry. Liberia was now laden with multiple theories and practices about the anomalies of race on the Atlantic coastal littoral.¹³

The interplay of the unhealthy image of Liberia on both sides of the Atlantic began between 1912 and 1929. Rising anti-white sentiments among Americo-Liberians became the *raison d'être* in both years for resistance to sanitation reform. Members of the Western diplomatic corps had increased in Monrovia and without immunities to African diseases. It was not until the 1929 Yellow Fever epidemic that legates from the West demanded sanitation reform. Knowledge of the disease reached the medical establishment as early as 21 January 1929. But the Republic stalled and tactically delayed sanitation development. In February 1929, eight deaths were reported from yellow fever, and with the exception of one "American Negro child," whose family had moved to Liberia from St. Louis, Missouri, and another "American Negro" male, they were all Liberians. The Liberian government had effectively kept its silence on the disease until this time. M. E. Vinson, a white American, and Miss Amanda Phillips, a Liberian, both employed by Firestone Rubber and Tyre Company, contacted the disease; Vinson "is said to be the first white man to recover from yellow fever in Liberia" but the condition of Phillips remained unknown. Miss Maryland B. Nichols, an American missionary at Bassa, Liberia, died from symptoms suggestive of yellow fever. Miss Lucile Todd, a "Colored" from America, who worked in the government hospital, contacted the disease but recovered. Ironically, these symptoms and mortalities occurred without serum in the country for prevention. While no vital statistics were kept by the government in 1929, Dr. Justus B. Rice, Chief of the Medical Staff of Firestone Plantation Company, estimated the deaths at twenty-five from yellow fever that also included an Indian shopkeeper. Before the 110 doses of serum against yellow fever did arrive from the School of Tropical Medicine-London on a fast boat around 5 May, the Elder Dempster Steamship Line at Monrovia reported that the colonial territory of Freetown, Sierra Leone had declared a quarantine against Monrovia in March because of yellow fever. On 7 March, Sdg. T. Elwood Davis, Director of Sanitation for the Liberian government, finally distributed posters warning citizens to make their premises conform to the new sanitary regulations (Figure 1 on next page).

Mr. William T. Francis, an African American diplomat from Minnesota in Liberia from 1927-1929, and who had been forwarding dispatches to the U.S. State Department about the epidemic, died himself from yellow fever in 1929. Francis was funeralized in St. Paul and buried in Nashville, Tennessee.¹⁴ Foreign diplomats complained constantly about their sufferings from the poor health conditions of Monrovia.

The yellow fever crisis of 1929 was a major concern on both sides of the Atlantic that inspired consultation between the US and Liberian governments. Expatriates suffered illnesses and deaths but the effects on the Liberian nation as a whole remained marginal. The Liberian government accepted the offer of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) in 1930 to conduct an eighteen month survey of sanitation

**DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION,
CITY OF MONROVIA.**

NOTICE. NO. 1. 29.

The public from time to time has been warned of the consequences of the violation of the existing Sanitary Regulations, therefore **WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE** ACTION WILL BE INSTITUTED AGAINST ALL VIOLATORS.

Any yard found to contain: empty bottles, tins, water barrels uncovered, discarded dishes, or any thing in which mosquitoes may breed, or containing trash, weeds, excessive scrubby, cess pools, or a **FILLED W. C.** **OPEN** . C., from which offensive odors may escape or accessible to flies, or an **OPEN** ~~will be considered unsanitary.~~

All persons owning vacant lots which contain weeds, or excessive scrubby, are warned to clean and dispose of trash **WITHIN TEN DAYS** from date hereof, or action will be taken in accordance with "SPECIAL REGULATIONS 1927."

As no further notices, or extension of time will be given, the public is hereby warned to immediately proceed to make their premises conform to Sanitary Regulations.

By order of the Municipal Board.

Sgd. T. ELWOOD DAVIS,
Director of Sanitation.

Approved:

Sgd. S. G. HARRISON,
Chairman, Quarantine Board, R. L.

Monrovia, Liberia,

March 7, 1929.

on the spot. The USPHS sent out its assistant Dr. H. F. Smith (M.D.) to devise a comprehensive sanitation scheme,¹⁵ which was the precursor of sanitation and medical development of Liberia after WWII; and one not without conflict. On 9 January 1930, Dr. Howard K. Smith arrived on loan from the US Surgeon General in Monrovia as Chief Medical Advisor to The president of Liberia, through a Memorandum of Agreement with the Liberian government.¹⁶ The Agreement stipulated that sanitary investigations be held and after setbacks and much negotiations, fieldwork finally began on 5 March 1930. Survey cards were issued showing the location of the premises, house to house surveys of building lots in the city, name of occupant, census data, nationality, presence of roof gutters, pools of depressions, tin cans, bottles, and wells that provided mosquito breeding grounds. Violators were to be prosecuted by the court. Prominent officials, however, refused to provide proper data and to allow inspections of their premises. When names of violators of sanitary regulations were presented before the courts, the president summoned the US Chief Medical Advisor to his office and "informed that the individual against whom proceedings were being taken was a friend of the President and could not be prosecuted."¹⁷ The charges had to be withdrawn, and it became impossible to obtain a hearing of cases before the courts. By May 1930, the Liberian government refused efforts to implement sanitation reform. Dr. Smith threatened to leave if negotiations failed in compliance through diplomatic maneuvers with the League of Nations and the British on matters of slavery in Liberia. Smith moved next and held a meeting with Liberian high ranking cabinet officials about the need for medical reforms and eradication of Yellow Fever on 25 January 1930. The cabinet showed little interest in his presentation on yellow fever control; present were the president's spouse, Secretary of the treasury, secretary of state, secretary of war, and numerous other attending members of the government. The officials "openly" expressed their disbeliefs about the existence of yellow fever and in "terminating their comments" noted: "...even if such a disease did exist it cannot attack Liberians and that all of the so-called sanitary work was only for the protection of foreign residents."¹⁸

The position of the cabinet must be qualified in regard to diseases in Liberia. Between 1920 to 1945, physicians, who had been in the country for twenty-five years, listed the following major diseases common to Liberia: malaria (vector *Anopheles gambiae*), helminth infections (parasite worms), venereal diseases (syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid—ulcers), and in specific parts of the country, schistosomiasis (snail disseminated disease from water contamination), filariasis (disease spread by blood sucking anthropods—gnats, flies, mosquitos, depositing larvae), and trypanosomiasis (tsetse fly); absence or not common to Liberia were yellow fever (virus transmitted by bite of female mosquito, *Aedes aegypti*), typhus fever (epidemic louse-borne and flea-borne, unfavorable living conditions), cholera (diarrhea with severe loss of fluids and electrolytes), and typhoid fever (acute infectious disease and causative organism *Salmonella*; food handlers, body dischargers, motile bacillus).¹⁹ Beyond political reasons

for containment, this showed that the cabinet was correct on medical grounds. But the Municipal government, however, even refused Smith access to the monthly mortality records, closed off the expenditure of \$18,000, earmarked by the legislature for the "protection of foreigners," and showed little concern over the lack of Liberians trained in sanitation personnel as the inspectors' corps. With bottlenecks and frustration mounting over the lack of interest in sanitation reform, the U.S. Surgeon General through the Secretary of the Treasury ordered Dr. Smith to be released from his services to Liberia as of 21 December, 1930, and to sail at once for the US. Smith, who was on loan for eighteen months, left Monrovia in disgust after nine months for Freetown around 27 December 1930, and on to England by 8 January 1931.²⁰ For example, the Liberian government successfully resisted memorandum of agreement efforts by foreign interests to link sanitation regulations to funds sought for government usage.²¹

Samuel Rober, Jr. of the U.S. Legation at Monrovia wrote the following to the Secretary of State on 8 December 1931:

"The complete lack of interest and in many cases open hostility to the work of sanitary and yellow fever control has been repeatedly demonstrated by officials of this government and private citizens. It has also been established that this hostility has been in part due to the feeling that it was a measure primarily adopted for the safety and security of foreigners here resident, as the average Liberian both in Government Office and in private life has never seen the advantages of proper health control nor been educated as to its necessity. He merely perceives the inconvenience and personal discomfort caused by what he considers the bother and expense of it all. It would thus appear doubtful whether any successor to the former President [Charles D. B. King, 1920-1930, True Whig Party and West Indian] will be desirous of adopting and furthering an unpopular measure of this nature when his predecessor [President Daniel E. Howard, 1912-1920] was forced from office by the opposition to reforms, among which sanitary control was numbered, and when anti-foreign and anti-white sentiment seems daily to be growing stronger. This feeling is not confined to a single political group but seems to be shared by all Liberians but not the natives."²²

Americans and Europeans arrived on their career paths and departed in haste in order to escape further the virulent strain of the mosquito vector as agency for morbidity and death (*plasmodium falciparum*),²³ common to Equatorial Africa.

Liberia attracted a number of other physicians with questionable medical qualifications, most of whom may not have met the registration requirements in the neighboring Anglophone colonies with the Medical Registrar rooted in the medical reforms of 1858.²⁴ Dr. G. Bouet, who also acted as the Chargé d'Affairs and French Consul in Liberia, and Dr. Rudolph G. Fuszek, a Hungarian, were the only European doctors practicing in Monrovia in 1931. Fuszek, who had arrived in Liberia from one of the

German colonies in East Africa in 1918 and knowledgeable about tropical diseases, was known to be very autocratic with other doctors.²⁵ He was able to position himself early as consulting physician to the Liberian elite and became very influential in the True Whig Party government. Hence, Fuszek may have been responsible for the enactment of the first Medical Board certification that began through acts of the legislature in 1927 and with himself acting in the similar role of a Chief Medical Officer as had long existed in the colonies.²⁶

The infusion of foreigners into Liberia kindled public health needs. The government established a hospital in the German cable station at Monrovia, and the Lutherans had a hospital at Muhlenburg, fourteen miles North of Monrovia in 1927. President C. D. B. King (1920-1930) of the True Whig Party had begun the first organized development of sanitation work activities around Monrovia in 1928 and supported measures for the treatment of the indigent sick. Overtime Dr. Fuszek became the first Director of the Bureau of National Public Health and Sanitation in 1930-1940. Further travels of Liberian professionals abroad allowed for the recruitment of public health professionals to Liberia. This may explain the arrival of Dr. Solomon J. R. Edwards (M.D.) in September 1931, who was a "coloured Liberian ex-West Indian" medical officer but whose medical expertise lacked credibility; Dr. Leo Sajous (M.D.), a Haitian residing in Paris, France, came to Liberia in 1934 and departing only to return shortly before WWII and to heavily involved himself later in Liberian politics with the Polish government.²⁷ In 1942 Sajous opened the Liberian Government Hospital in Monrovia and served as Director of Public Health and Sanitation. A Dr. Gieskann, an Austrian Jew refugee eye specialists, was assistant to Sajous along with Firestone doctors as consultants.²⁸ Dr. George W. Harley (B.A., M.D., Ph.D.) had settled at Ganta as a medical missionary in 1934 and did outstanding work as did Dr. Arthur Schnitzer (M.D.), of Hungarian Jewish origin, who arrived in 1935. Schnitzer later became the doctor to President Tubman and others in the Executive Mansion. (When he died in 1970, the Liberian Legislature honored his widow Mrs. Christine Schnitzer with An Act Granting Annuity To the Widow of The Late Doctor Arthur Schnitzer of \$3,000.00 per annum for the rest of her life).²⁹ T. Elwood Davis, an African-American, who served as a Colonel in the Liberian army, had been in the country since 1918 as superintendent of the Zionist Mission. The British legation observations of him in 1931 was critical indeed: "He very soon turned into a fake medical officer, in which career he supported by President King, who eventually made him Director of Public Health and Sanitation....'Dr.' Davis or 'colonel' Davis—his claims to medical and military qualifications are equally slight—continued his careers as an imitation Public Health Officer and an imitation soldier under successive Administrations, and still enjoys his military rank. His career culminated in his appointment in 1931 to be special commissioner of the Liberian Government on the Kru Coast. He has acted as Superintendent of Cape Mount District since 1936, and his political influence is now of no account."³⁰ Hence, Liberia had an interesting

cohort of scientific professionals of multiple racial perspectives in addition to the United States government to co-exist with the anomalies of Firestone rubber.

The presence of the United States government, expatriates, and other foreign firms increased during WWII. Their presence further assuaged the Liberian mind-set about a possible white settler "take-Over," and Liberia gained access to imported public health knowledge and medical supervision. For example, the 25th Station Hospital from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was activated on 24 March, 1942, and arrived off Marshall, Liberia, on 16 June 1942, to treat army troops and civilian support members involved in the war effort. Some "1040 Negro" troops were present under the command of twelve white officers as part of the Lend-Lease Agreement in 1942. Mr. Ossie Davis (1917-2005)—the fame stage and Hollywood screen actor—was drafted into this unit in 1942 and served as surgical technician to both troops and indigenous inhabitants until honorably discharged in 1945. The aforementioned USPHS was also part of the agreement. In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did a refueling stop-over from Casablanca, Morocco, with his press secretary Harry Hopkins. (This was the first time that an American president set foot in Black Africa.) Thereupon, the U.S.A. agreed to Lend-Lease funds for Liberia in efforts to contain the Vichy regime and Nazi Germany operations in West Africa.³¹ Infrastructural developments began on a mammoth scale in millions of dollars. Firestone provided an additional stimulus through export taxes to the government, land rents, import duties, and through payment of "hut tax" for every employed Liberian. Some 26,000 to 30,000 daily workers made up the labor force. The Liberian government placed an original limit of Firestone white employees at 1,500 and their families at any given time and only with the permission of the Liberian government might other foreigners enter the work force. Nevertheless, as journalist Howard W. French contends, "The Firestone plantation served as America's strategic reserve of rubber supplies in World War II."³²

In 1944-1945, The American Foundation for Tropical Medicine and Harvard Medical School and its School of Public Health had conducted a very successful exploration of all phases of trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness in Liberia. As a memorial to the late Harvey Firestone, Sr. (1868-1938), Harvey Firestone, Jr., established a fund of \$250,000 for the American Foundation for Tropical Medicine (AFTM) to build a permanent institute for research in tropical diseases in Liberia. The gift stipulated that ten leading medical schools hold joint responsibilities in the supervision of its operations. In a major departure from Firestone rubber's racial policies at the times, the AFTM prohibited any restriction in regard to race, creed, or color in its operations; that all information be disseminated equally; and that the AFTM provide the appropriate funds for operating cost. The AFTM approved of these conditions, and in early 1946, Dr. Thomas T. Mackie traveled to Liberia to meet with the Liberian government for the arrangement of a suitable site. The acquisition of building materials formed a difficult task and the original plans were put on hold. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) sent some of their staff members on loan to the Liberia Institute for targeted

research. Construction moved progressively.³³ The US Department of State announced on 8 February 1945, that it was sending Lt. Col. Dr. John B. West (M.D., Surgeon) to Monrovia and other sites in Liberia to introduce new public health initiatives. The USPHSM (Mission) would operate an experimental laboratory and roving clinics in Monrovia and in the interior. Dr. West, an African American and member of the USPHSM, was also its Director and well acquainted with health conditions in Liberia and submitted a series of reports in the respective months of service. The 17 April 1945, report indicated his arrival in Monrovia on 7 March, and with an agreement from the British Colonial Office to send Liberians to British schools for laboratory training. Cooperation between the USPHSM in Liberia and British Sierra Leone began on 14 March on the control of smallpox and tubes of vaccine virus of an effected village. The USPHSM reported on other diseases in the interior of Kakata and Monrovia took measures at isolation. By 25 March, West was joined by eight other USPHSM personnel that included a dental surgeon and assistant nurse officers. Persons going abroad were inoculated for yellow fever from vaccines given by the nearby US Army. The Liberian government paid for renovation of the hospital operating room, transformers and wiring, sterilization equipment, flush running water toilets, inspection of wells, and received other sanitation reports on the entomology of mosquitos. Drugs arrive from the Mission Atlanta office and used to stock both the Monrovia hospital, and to Dr. George Harley (M.D.), Director of the Ganta Mission, in the far interior. While Liberia made progress toward a unified public health consciousness under the USPHSM, the absence of roads for transporting personnel, materials, and equipment continued to hamper remote areas to extend disease control measures. Quarterly inventories showed the absence of body fluid replacements and a letter went out to the Red Cross for assistance. Dr. West observed that only five physicians were practicing in the whole nation of estimated two million and ended with a plea to allow at least two officers from the Mission to conduct private practice.³⁴ On 2 May 1945, President William V.S. Tubman issued **"A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT"** that "notified residents of Monrovia and environs to permit representatives of the United States Public Health Mission to Liberia to enter the homes and spray or otherwise apply DDT to walls and ceilings for the purpose of killing mosquitos....To give desired effect to this Proclamation, the representatives of the United States Public Health Mission to Liberia shall be considered as the representatives of the Government of the Republic of Liberia."³⁵ This presidential change in position was a remarkable turnabout in attitude in regard to sanitation reform when compared to the government's staunch position against control measures of the yellow fever epidemic of 1929.

Dr. West submitted additional reports of USPHSM activities in 1945. On 11 April, Dr. Louis E. Middleton (Dental Surgeon) opened the first dental clinic in Liberia and saw approximately ninety patients in the first three weeks of consultation. Dr. C. L. Scarbrough, an American citizen and graduate of Howard University School of Den-

tistry, was also present, and being advised to become an understudy with Dr. Middleton. Sleeping sickness, or trypanosomiasis, was noted at Sanoquelli that effected eighty per cent of the population. The Liberian Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation agreed to dispatch a medical office to investigate the findings. A Medical Arts School for nurse training was opened on 30 April in the Government Hospital with some twenty students registered. The nursing school began with no microscopes and had to borrowed books and skeletons from the Lutheran interior mission of Phebe Hospital then located at Zorzor and moved later to Central Province, now Bong County. Dr. West delivered the opening addressed. The Health Education assistant submitted articles to the local press that printed weekly articles on "Let's Talk About Your Health."³⁶ The USPHSM had stepped up its health control measures at Monrovia and made the Liberian government aware of its public health responsibilities. More importantly, the USPHSM established communications with the British medical authorities in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with Liberia, with French Guinea at Bolshun-Kelahun, and with the US on information regarding outbreaks of sleeping sickness and smallpox in efforts to control diseases. Linkages were further established with Ganta and other interior missions hospitals. Advertisements of clinic and available drugs apprised villagers who arrived at them in increasing numbers seekin Western medicine.³⁷

The real intent of the USPHSM in the long run appeared in a letter from the Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to the US House of Representatives, Congressman Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations. The US Senate threatened to reduce the appropriation of the USPHSM in less than one year of its operation in Liberia. Grew wrote to Cannon on 26 June, 1945, in response to having deleted items in H. R. 3199 restored by the US Senate through conferees of provisions on "page 23, lines 1, 2 and 3" that related to the Labor-Federal Security appropriation Bill. These items in questions of the Bill provided for the "Development and prosecution of a program for the control of communicable diseases in Liberia in cooperation with the Liberian Government." Grew wrote:

"The United States Public Health Mission which has been functioning in Liberia for nearly a year, is designed to prevent the spread of disease and disease vectors from Liberia to the United States and to other parts of the world. Yellow Fever, malaria, and other diseases are prevalent in Liberia and organisms carrying these diseases are easily transported by air. The Air Transport Command operates a large airbase through which planes bound for Brazil and the United States pass. Pan-American Airways have a seaplane base from which aircraft to and from the United States operate. The elimination of diseases which can be carried by air is of immediate concern to this Government, and likewise to the Brazilian Government, and the Mission has undertaken such work as an important part of its program."³⁸

Grew noted further the presence of "American Negro troops" stationed in Liberia in compliance with a "Defense Agreement negotiated with Liberia." The USPHSM was charged with the prevention of diseases in places near the military base that the troops frequented on local leave. Since the Liberian government lacked both money and skilled medical technicians, Grew reported, the Mission had to provide safe water supply to both Monrovia and to hospital facilities. Grew reviewed next the legislative history of the Mission in Liberia: "This proposal obtained the strong support of the late President Roosevelt...in a memorandum addressed to General Watson on February 4, 1944, he stated 'I think we should do every thing possible to improve health conditions in Liberia. This should be taken up with the War Department and the State Department and Lend-Lease. I should like to have a report of the progress.'"³⁹ Grew noted further that the program was submitted to the Public Health Service with primary support from the State Department with the idea of strengthening the US linkages with Liberia; that the War Department supported the military interest in Liberia and that the Mission presence was needed to support the military. The State Department, Grew ended, wanted the USPHS program continued. President Harry Truman included the USPHSM in his Point Four Foreign Service Mission Assistance Program to developing countries and funded the program with a budget of about \$300,000.

In spite of the USPHSM assistance, the Liberian government continued to neglect its own health infrastructural development in Monrovia and in the nation. Dr. Joseph Naga Togba (1915-2002, M.D., MPH, FACP, FWACP), who was of Kru ethnic descent, the prime agent of change. He had departed Monrovia on a row boat, which took passengers out to the waiting ships at sea, for medical studies in the US in 1937. He graduated from the "Negro" Meharry School of Medicine at Nashville, Tennessee in 1944, completed residency at the "Negro" Homer G. Phillips Hospital—St. Louis, Missouri, and upon acceptance of an invitation to work for the Liberian government, he returned to Monrovia in February 1946 and wrote in his autobiography:

"I was surprised to find [in 1946] that conditions were about the same as when I left in 1937. There was no port; we had to travel to shore by row boat from the ship which anchored out at sea. The streets were still unpaved, there was no electricity or running water. The paved only area in the entire capital city was the block facing the Executive Mansion. There was no public radio, no public means of transportation, not even a taxi. I arrived with an automatic Oldsmobile...the first automatic car in Liberia."⁴⁰

Togba reported further the existence of only twelve physicians in Liberia upon his arrival and not one Liberian until he became a member of the group. In 1946, he became Physician to the Liberian Government, which gave him direct access to the most powerful decision-makers, namely President William V.S. Tubman. He learned what public health meant to the Liberian government upon his appointment as Acting Director of the Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation, Monrovia, Liberia, in 1947 :

"I soon observed that public health as practiced in Liberia simply applied to Monrovia and its environs. The work of Public Health was a matter of going along the streets to the homes of prominent officials in the Cabinet, Legislature and Judiciary. The grass and dirt around their homes were to be cleared. Garbage and dirt were not to be seen in certain places in Monrovia or else the Public Health was to taken to task. As head of Public Health I changed things around. I let the President know that Public Health applied to all parts of Liberia and all residents of Liberia. President Tubman agreed with whatever I recommended for the expansions of the services throughout the country...I decided to conduct a nation-wide survey...The President gave me permission to survey the country. He notified the various Superintendents of counties and Districts Commissioners...There were few roads and still few airstrips for small planes to land. The government had a D.C. 3 airplane which could fly only to the capitals of certain counties...We traveled first to Cape Palmas, Maryland County, the home of President Tubman...."⁴¹

In 1948 until 1953, Dr. Togba served as Director, Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation, and began new initiatives in sanitation reform.

Dr. Togba's three rapid appointments (1946, 1947, 1948) in the Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation occurred at a most propitious time. Dr. West, Director of USPHSM, had already conducted a study for pipe-borne water and sewage disposal in 1945. The engineering work of the Mission began in that year. A topographic survey of Monrovia and its surroundings was conducted as preparatory planning for a city water supply and the proposed port. This work resulted in a topographical map of the area, and a second survey was made to determine the best source of water for the "proposed municipal supply." The water courses near were tidal and contained salt water; the exception being at the upper extremities.⁴² Background information showed that in the rainy season, fresh water repeatedly forced its way down to points near the ocean. Monrovia was elevated from 10 feet above sea level along the lower extremities to 90 feet on Ashmun Street and to 250' atop Mamba Point.⁴³ After investigations, the St. Paul River at Harrisburg—fifteen miles from Monrovia—was selected. An additional topographic survey produced a map of "the right-of-way for the water main from Harrisburg to Monrovia. This work was done in 1946. The report was then forwarded to Washington for further action."⁴⁴

In 21 January 1947, the Liberian government inherited the Mission report. The government responded by issuing a "MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR THE FINANCING OF A WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEM FOR THE CITY OF MONROVIA" through its Consulate-General Office in New York City. The purpose was to raised the money to cover development cost, and conversations of support with the US government were ongoing. The MEMORANDUM noted that the US government had authorized its Public

Health Mission in Liberia to conduct surveys to determine "source and costs for the installation of such a system."⁴⁵

The Liberian government estimated the cost of the project to be \$1,330,000.00 and sought to secure credit for this amount on the following conditions:

- "1. Requests the Import Export Bank, U.S. A. To advance the above sum on credit to the Government of Liberia;
2. A reasonable term be allowed for the amortization of same;
3. A minimum interest be charged in view of the fact that said credit is for an essential public utility;
4. That said utility be operated by a Company to be organized for that purpose;
5. The annual amount of the principal and interest to be amortised from the amounts received from the rate payments by consumers, after operating expenses are allowed; and in case of a deficiency in any given year, of the amount of the rate payments to meet the principle and interest amortization payments, the government of Liberia will underwrite said deficiency."⁴⁶

Negotiations moved slowly but Liberia was now committed to improving municipal health conditions with a supporting cast of medical professionals.

As one may recall, Dr. West of the USPHSM initiated a modern sanitation system for Liberia as early as 1944. Overtime, the Liberian government commissioned the Malcolm Pirnie Engineers Of New York City to survey and draw up a report on the matter for Monrovia, which was conducted in the dry season of 1947-1948. The financing of the installation got underway in 1949. Dr. John B. West resigned his post in 1947 as Director, USPHSM.⁴⁷ The Export-Import Bank signed off on the agreement on 11 July 1951 with a credit line of \$1,350,000, "to assist the United States and Liberia [with] the costs of equipment, materials, and services required for the construction of a water supply and sewage system..." The West African Constructors and the Liberian government signed a contract for the construction of the water supply sanitary system for \$865,564.50. Without this construction Monrovia was becoming unbearable because of population growth. In review from 1947, the population at Monrovia was about 10,000, and rose to an estimated 17,000, in 1953. The demand for rubber, new harbor and dock facilities created activities that had swelled the population. Europeans and Americans lived in residences of foreign types with septic tanks. The rest of the population lived in "native hut villages scattered through the city. Some houses contain [ed] ceptic tanks, but foul-smelling outhouses are [were] most abundant. Frequently, unsanitary matter is removed from the huts and houses and deposited on the ground a short distance away. Cholera, dysentary, and other intestinal disorders are [were] not uncommon."⁴⁸

Dr. West selected Dr. Hildrus A. Poindexter (1902-1987) as his replacement in 1947. Poindexter had the support of Dr. George W. Harley (M.D.), head of the interior Ganta Methodist Mission, and who had been in Liberia in 1925.⁴⁹ Poindexter graduated from Lincoln University-Pennsylvania Cum Laud in 1924. He went first to Dartmouth Medical School in 1925-27 but received the M.D. from Harvard University Medical School in 1929 with certification in tropical medicine. He enrolled in such courses as Medical Zoology and Tropical Medicine, Helminthology, Protozoology, Tropical Entomology, Tropical Infectious Diseases, and students were required to read the series *Tropical Diseases Africa* written by the Harvard Medical School's two year African expedition. As one might recall, the Harvard University Expedition came to Liberia in 1926-1927 at the time of Poindexter's matriculation. Through a combined residency of graduate studies and pathology in internship at Columbia University and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation General Education Board Fellowship, he received the A.M. in Bacteriology in 1930, the Ph.D. in Bacteriology and Parasitology in 1932, and the M.S.P.H. in Public Health in 1932. Poindexter worked at Howard University from 1931-1943 and by 1935, he was promoted to professor, Head of the Department and Consultant in bacteriology and immunology to Howard's medical teaching center, the Freedmen's Hospital. In 20 January 1947, Poindexter began active duty with the United States Public Health Mission (USPHM) in Liberia at the rate of \$9,000 per annum as Senior Surgeon with the direct approval of President Harry Truman, who by this time had made the USPHM his Point Four Foreign Service Mission Assistance Program to developing countries. Poindexter became the Director of USPHM in November 1948 with a working budget of \$300,000, an experimental laboratory, and roving clinics.⁵⁰ Since he had become a Master Mason in 1922, he was able to integrate himself very quickly into Liberian society through membership into the Liberian Free Masonic Institution Of Most Venerable Order Of The Knighthood brought over by the settlers in the 1840s. The Brotherhood was a powerful and exclusionary order; only Liberia's upper class belonged and where mobility was determined, and where the one-party state of the True Whig Party made the major decisions effecting the Liberian government and peoples.⁵¹ Poindexter, however, wasted no time in the rendering of his medical and scientific expertise to Liberia. While staying away from Firestone because of its segregated facilities, his independent thinking and apparent aggressiveness seemed to have brought him into direct conflict with Dr. Togba, who makes numerous references to assistance that he received from the USHPSM but omits Poindexter in his autobiography. In the meantime, Poindexter omits Togba from his autobiography but left a paper trail in his collection on deposit at Howard University. Was the brief conflict linked to the Harvard University Medical School vs. Meharry Medical School and Togba's international visibility in the World Health Organization? Dr. Togba had approached Dr. Poindexter apparently on occasions about medical assistance for Liberia through Howard University and in each instance, Poindexter recommended to Togba that he should seek aid through Harvard University rather

than Howard. Physicians and politicians in Liberia apparently had reminded Togba at the same time that: "...I could never make it at Harvard [to study for the M.P.H. which he received in 1949] because I had gone to a Black medical school."⁵² While he did go on to study Public Health at Harvard in 1948, he did so with a first time scholarship from the government and by a rejection of the one offered by the USPHSM then headed by Poindexter at Tubman's advice. As one recalls, Tubman had also appointed Togba as Director of Public health and Sanitation (PH&S) in the same year. Tension began to rise between the two health organizations—USPHSM and PH&S) over medical jurisdiction and between "Uranus and Gaea"—the two medical titans. Togba was no longer the "upcountry Kru boy of Sasstown"—a prescriptive usage of elite settler descendants for interior peoples, and Poindexter was about to find this out, too.

On 7 November 1951, Dr. Togba began to exert the power of his office and wrote the following letter on official letterhead:

"Dear Col. Poindexter:

Since June, 1951, the Mission of Public Health which you head should have been directly placed under the Bureau of Public Health sanitation, R.L. and is no longer a separate entity, but I observe that you still direct your monthly reports to the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, U.S.A., with a copy to the Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation through the American Embassy. This practice is not agreeable with the Liberian Government and it is required that all future reports be directed to the Director of Public Health and Sanitation and directed to the Bureau instead of through Diplomatic channel [copied to "His excellency the Secretary of State, R.L.]."⁵³

Poindexter responded the next day on 8 November 1951, in longhand with the name "Togba" scratched through and written again below it:

"Dear Dr. Togba:

Your letter...in fact state that the Liberian government found it not agreeable to the practice of submitting reports on our operations to the surgeon general of the U.S. Public Health Service U.S.A. These reports to which you refer are technical reports on operations your government approved between the 2' of us and policy reports or subjective reports in which the contents are controversial. You always receive copies of these reports for [your] information and I am always ready to [agree to any] method designed to correct any public [statement containing] defects supported by corrections in these reports. If there is a Liberian regulation which is violated by my sending a report to a surgeon general by whose service I am employed please send me that regulation so that I may read it.

Yours Very Truly
Hildrous A. Poindexter"

Shortly thereafter, Togba took up a another vexing issue mixed with gender to Poindexter in a letter of 21 November 1951:

"Dear Col. H. A. Poindexter:

Until such time that female technicians would be willing to accept along with the male out-station assignments, you are to refrain from having female students technicians, as the government is interested in using all technicians in the general trained [and] in the general nation-wide health program. The two young ladies who are in your graduating class. Like others therefore trained, are not agreeable to out-station assignments; therefore do not accept any application from any female student until you are advised by us to do so."⁵⁴

Togba signed off with his signature and position. There is no extant reply known to the author. Poindexter thought of another way to ease the tension between himself and Togba. He recommended highly Togba to the Liberian Free Masonic Order, and Togba was accepted for membership in this exclusive institution. Togba wrote Poindexter a kind letter of thanks. But Poindexter went on to conduct outstanding laboratory research in the USPHSM facility on diseases useful in improving the health of Liberians and the world. He had published "A Laboratory Epidemiology Study of Certain Infectious Diseases in Liberia," *The American Journal Of Tropical Medicine*, Vol. 29:4 (July 1949): 435-442; and in the same journal "Epidemiological Survey Among the Gola Tribe In Liberia," Vol. 4 (1953):30-38, only to name a few of his many publications.

Poindexter continued in the USPHSM tradition and conducted numerous field investigative assignments in the interior that led to the reduction of epidemics:

"Prior to 1946 the records show repeated epidemics of smallpox at 5-10 year intervals, with a high continuous prevalence in the hinterland of West Africa. The United States Public Health Service Mission in Liberia became actively involved in the 1946-1947 outbreaks. The writer saw 42 cases of smallpox disease in the hinterland villages within one day with three deaths during the night. Smallpox disease was so rampant in certain villages that one could observe children who were four feet tall, but children who were three feet tall, but no children in between; and the people would say: that was the year that the epidemic came, and all the babies died, causing the gap in the height of the children....locally trained vaccinators undertook to vaccinate the entire population of Liberia against smallpox in 1946-1948....A 1950-1952 study of records showed less than one dozen cases reported for the entire country."⁵⁵

The public health system of Liberia had made progressive strides since 1945 under both the USPHSM and Liberia medical professionals.

Nevertheless, public health innovations continued on several other fronts in the early 1950s. The dedication ceremonies of the Liberian Institute Of The American Foundation For Tropical Medicine occurred on 11 January 1952, at Harbel, Liberia.

Dignitaries were numerous that included President Tubman and representatives of some fifty American pharmaceuticals, chemical, oil, other company types of contributors, and physicians. The facility naturally had a main laboratory, working wings, administrative section, animal and service buildings, bedrooms and staff houses, together with Liberian staff quarters.⁵⁶ Dr. Togba, who was mentioned earlier and a member of the "old guard" of Liberian pioneer physicians, was a member of the AFTMLI Board of Directors in 1952. As a founding signatory member of WHO, Togba globalized Liberia's medical needs and had access to funding agencies beneficial to the country. Dr. Poindexter was a member of the AFTMLI Board of Directors.

The new US diplomatic upgrade for the American Embassy occurred at time that wrought renewed public health dividends to Liberia. The existing US diplomatic consul-corps in Liberia was raised from Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on October 18, 1948. Attorney Edward R. Dudley, a non-career appointee and NAACP Legal Defense Fund member in New York City, became the first African American Ambassador in the history of the US Foreign Service during the Cold War era.⁵⁷ The US alignment with Liberia served the US interests in the East-West rivalry in West Africa as a post to monitor any left leaning African activity.

Liberia, who had purposefully delayed the development of public health control measures of disease in order to discourage colonial designs on its sovereignty and who never had an integrated water and sewage system, reversed its forty-one years of resistance in 1952. Financed by The Export-Import Bank of New York, construction began at Monrovia of its first water and sewage lines. The water distribution lines was completed in June-July 1953, and the sanitary sewage system was completed in September-October 1953 at Monrovia. Public drinking fountains and latrines were dispersed all over Monrovia. Until this time in 1953, the people drank mostly contaminated water in the wet season ("200 of annual rainfall in Monrovia"), in the dry season, trucks hauled water into the city from Duport and from the port of Monrovia. People took water from open ditches and creeks, which were also used for washing clothes and for other personal needs. The US Navy had developed in the city two wells in the US Public Health Compound, and two private water systems but this was all. The new engineering feat improved these conditions in Monrovia based on the Liberian government commissioned surveys of the Malcolm Pirnie Engineers Of New York conducted in the dry season of 1947-1948.

In 1953, it was proposed that the new water and sewage systems be placed under the management and operation charges of an independent company. The sources of the water supply for the city were two underground lakes located on Bushrod Island and augmented by pumping water from the St. Paul River. Water treatment was crucial: "At Bushrod Island, the water is chloride to 3 to 5 parts per million residual chloride. No other chemicals are added to the water." Details were added to pumping the water through "18,200 feet [trough] a 16 inch pipeline to the Mesurado River

bridge by two Smithway Deepwell Pumps of 700 gallons per minute capacity for each. From this point, water may be distributed directly through the distribution grid, or may be carried by 12" pipe into a 600,000 gallon reinforced concrete reservoir atop Mamba point. All of the pipe throughout the system is cement lined cast iron pipe. The size of the pipe in the distribution grid ranges from 4" 12". Water pressure will range from 30 to 90 lbs. per square inch throughout the system."⁵⁸ There would be forty fire outlets, twenty-six public fountains and twenty-six public latrines; both were to be located near village huts as possible. The company was responsible for making the taps, billing the customers, collection of bills, and supervision of the system and installations. Each person who have taps between the ages of sixteen to sixty was levied a water tax of \$2.00. A storm drainage was under construction as each street was paved but separate from the sewage system. The government would receive excess revenues.

The new public health measures that foreigners sought and loss for themselves over a forty-one year period, beginning in 1912, paid health dividends to Liberians of Monrovia in 1953. The US Ambassador Dudley summed up the benefits to the Department of State on 7 May 1953:

"The establishment of a modern water system on Monrovia will make the city a much more healthful and desirable place in which to live. It will be more healthful because of the reduction of cholera, dysentery, and other intestinal disorders due to polluted water. Hook worms and other parasites should be markedly reduced by employing better methods of disposing human excreta and other wastes. Marshy areas, which breed mosquitos and other larvae will be greatly reduced. Foul odors from outhouses, which cause nausea and general discomfort should be considerably reduced. These unhealthy conditions, which now effect the efficiency of the people, all add up to economic costs by loss in wealth produced to the entire community.

House construction costs can be reduced by the elimination of construction of huge water storage tanks, septic tanks, and the installation of water pumps. Much labor that was ordinarily employed in transport of water can now be diverted to other channels.

For the 'native' population of Monrovia, the installation of the water system with public water and toilet facilities available without charge (except \$2.00 Water Tax) will probably be the greatest social and economic benefit which this segment of the population has ever received other than the public health facilities. Politically, these public water and toilet facilities will add much to the entrenchment of the present administration. The convenience of a modern water supply system and the positive assurance of water will enhance considerably the ordinary amenities of life for the Liberian people."⁵⁹

Ambassador Dudley qualified his premise by acknowledging his debt to consultants Dr. George Adams, Pathologist, USPHS in Liberia, Mr. John Neave, Civil Engineer, Hazen and Sawyer Engineering Associates, and Mr. William Reynolds, Civil engineer, Liberian Government. Ambassador Dudley and Dr. Poindexter, who had

served Liberia with distinction, departed Liberia for the US in 1953. Dr. Togba continued his work as Liberian delegate and founding member of the World Health Organization, where he became the President, 7th World Assembly, Geneva, Switzerland, 1954-1955.

Conclusion

The central thesis of this paper is that the Liberian government intentionally developed containment strategies that delayed appropriate control public health measures in order to stave-off foreign settlers from 1912-1953. Liberians felt that improved public health and sanitation reform would make their nation attractive to foreigners, who shared a history of threats to Liberian sovereignty. The containment strategies of history were fourfold. First, West Africa was deemed the "White Man's Grave" in the 1850s because of its diseased environs and high mortality rates to Europeans. This undesirable image kept West African countries from becoming true empires until new medicinal prophylactics reduced the morbidity and mortality rates for Europeans in the 1880s, which paved the way for partition in 1884-1885 and colonial "take-Over" of Africa by 1900. As an independent republic since 1847 and neighbors to these faltering countries to true empire, the Liberian government understood the need of maintaining its nineteenth century image of a disease environ that was carried over into the twentieth century. The French and the British had already seized some Liberian territory and threats to take more territory were constant reminders. Hence, Liberians resisted sanitation reform at the urging of the West in 1912, 1929, and well past WWII. Secondly, Liberian resistance prevented the emergence of intraprofessional conflict between white and African physicians in the health profession that had come so dominant among its Anglophone colonial neighbors; African doctors, for example, were placed on a separate registrar or "Color Bar" from their European counterparts. Hence, intraprofessional cooperation—not intraprofessional conflict—governed the health profession in independent Liberia. Thirdly, that the Liberian government began the relaxation of its containment policy of public health and sanitation reform was due to several factors: the WWII presence of the US armed services Hospital Unit Medical Service ("HUMEDS") in Liberia in 1942, the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt's visit to Liberia in 1943, and the United States Public Health Service Mission (USPHSM)) to Liberia in 1944. The purpose of the Mission was to protect the health of the troops in the war time efforts and to control the dissemination of diseases from Liberia abroad. Dr. John B. West (M.D.), Director, USPHSM from 1944-1947, Dr. Hildrus A. Poindexter (M.D.), Director, USPHSM from 1948-1953, and Liberian Dr. Joseph Naba Togba (M.D.), from 1946 until 1990 in various capacities, were the medical "titans" who pioneered reforms of public health policy. In agreement with Liberian government and its new "Open-Door" policy of 1944 to allow foreign companies and sundry entries, the USPHSM and Firestone rubber initiated public health and sanitation reform through experimental laboratories and roving clinics into the

interior. Liberian Institute Of The American Foundation For Tropical Medicine (AFTMLI) open it doors on 11 January 1952, at Harbel, Liberia. More importantly, the pipe-borne water and sewage development in Monrovia reduced diseases for all concerned in 1953 onward and set the model for what could be done beyond Monrovia. Thereafter, Liberia was laden with a new generation of physicians and health professionals that took charge and administered the next phase of modalities in public health for the nation. Fourthly, the Africanization of politics in colonial territories—the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.) in French territories and the Convention People's Party in the British Gold Coast—quickened Liberian optimism that colonial rule was soon to be replaced by independent African countries, who would foster no designs of a Liberian "Take-Over." After all, and little known to written history, anti-colonial radicals owed the Liberian government for allowing its nation to serve as a "safe-haven of asylum" for them and for issuing to them visas for travel abroad in preparation for another round in the independence struggle.

Endnotes

1. A Research Board Award (RBA) through the University of Missouri System, and the Department of History at the University of Missouri—St. Louis (UMSL), funded this project in 2000 to the UK, Liberia, West Africa, and to The National Archives-II, College Park, Md. National Archives-II will henceforth appear with RG, numbers and title. UK sources appear as PRO/FO. I express thanks to the RBA Committee and the usual disclaimer.
1. K. David Patterson, "Disease and Medicine in African History," *History in Africa*, Vol. 1:1 (1974):141-148; Gerald W. Hartwig and K. David Patterson, eds., *Diseases in African History*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1978, pp.4, 14-19
2. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States And Africa: A History*, London: Cambridge University Press And Hoover Institute, 1984, p.80-90, 117.
3. The "benevolent" reason for colonization must be qualified and re-assessed in American historiography. The "benevolent" reason for colonization appears in the ACS bylaws of 1816, Washington, D.C., and re-stated again by President William V. S. Tubman (1895-1971) in a letter of November 8, 1956 to Charles J. Symington, Chairman of the Board, The Symington-Gould Corporation, New York, City. Tubman began with the following opening statement: 'My dear Mr. Symington: Liberia was founded by American benevolence through a philanthropic institution known as the American Colonization Society which gave assistance during the early stages of the existence of the country'. This letter appears in the popular editions of Wayne Chatfield Taylor, *United States Business Performance Abroad: The Case Study of The Firestone Operations in Liberia* (New York: National Planning Association, 1959) and read by so many people employed by the U.S. Department of State and sundry. See *African Repository and Colonial Journal*, Vol. XXXI: 4 (April 1855):186, 'From the Liberia Herald, Jan. 17, 1855' on "benevolent". This must be qualified for pedagogical reasons in U.S. history. This rebuttal can be illustrated in review of a resolution advanced by Mr. Zaccheus Collins Lee of 1836 before The American Society For Colonizing the Free people of "Colour" meeting at Baltimore, Maryland:
 "... with alarm and anxiety, the rapid spread of an anomalous free black population, carrying with them a train of evils.....[for] they are "slaves without masters," and bound to those around them by no ties of sympathy or consanguinity. To meliorate, therefore, the condition of this prostrate and outcaste race—and to give them the fruits of liberty....to afford, in the next place, security to the

slaveowners and resignation of the slaves, by removing from them the example and influence of this free black population, acting directly by their corrupting influence on the feelings and passions of the slaves.....

The report [for example] just read informs us that wealthy Planters of that section [the South] have already manumitted their slaves for the purpose of conveying, through the means of this society, to Liberia [West Africa]; while others are fast yielding their prejudices and becoming friends and patrons of the Colonization scheme.The white and black races cannot exist and prosper together...This is not the black man's country: we propose taking him to his native soil, where he may flourish and be respected.

This is a white man's home. Let us labor, therefore, to remove from it now, by mild and benevolent means, the black man, before the conqueror's sword shall, as it must, destroy and over whelm him." The Lee resolution was adopted and through time the free people of color—mostly sons and daughters who were descendants from white fathers and African mothers—were on their way to Liberia, to the 'Land of Ham' as heralded by missionaries of the times. The origins of 'non-benevolent' sentiments expressed in the Lee Resolution might be linked to the comparative demographics of whites; see Stephen J. Whitfield, *A Death In the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till* (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1988), Chapter 1 'The Ideology of Lynching', 1; Whitfield cites the comparative historian Carl Degler, who noted that since the South was located outside of the tropics: '...the South became the only slave society in the Western Hemisphere in which whites outnumbered blacks. The West Indies, Brazil, and other places in Latin America attracted relatively fewer settlers and even fewer white women; and the resultant imbalance created demographic pressure toward interracial sexual relations and marriage. Without similar incentives to cushion the shocks of the predominance of so many Africans brought in bondage, whites in the American South were more free to develop an ideology that underscored their own superiority and that imposed rigid barriers separating them from blacks'[and two separate histories in the United States]. On emigrants leaving the U.S.A. and in response to criticism, the ACS changed its name to the American Colonization Society in 1826; see George W. Brown, *The Economic History of Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers, Inc., 1941), 235; Antonio McDaniel, *Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: The Mortality Cost of Colonizing in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 23, 61, and James Fairhead, Tim Geysbeek, Svend Holsoe, Melissa Leach, eds., *African-American Explorations in West Africa: Four Nineteenth-Century Diaries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 7-30 .

4. For Jim Crow see, C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York, 1955).
5. The Declaration Of Independence and the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia as amended through May, 1955 (The Svend E. Holsoe Liberia Archives Collection, Archives of Traditional Music, Indiana University-Bloomington); Brown, *The Economic History of Liberia*, pp. 245-257; the prohibitive clause of non-citizens owning land stems from the ACS 'DIGEST OF THE LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE COLONY OF LIBERIA AUGUST 19, 1824', See Brown, law number 17, 241.
6. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and The Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
7. James C. Young, *Liberia Rediscovered* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1934, pp. 179-180; Edward S. Ayensu, *Medicinal Plants of West Africa* (Algonac, Mi.: Reference Publications, Inc., 1978); Richard M. Fox, "Tribal Medicine In Liberia," *Carnegie Magazine*, Vol. 35-36 (February 1961):41-47; D. Elwood Dunn, Amos J. Beyan, Carl Patrick Burrowes, eds., *Historical Dictionary Of Liberia*, Second Edition, #83 (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2001), pp. 286-87.

8. *The African Republic of Liberia And the Belgian Congo: Harvard African Expedition 1926-1927*, Edited By Richard P. Strong(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930, pp.199-200
9. Adell Patton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians, 1868-1978." In Joseph E. Harris, ed., *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora* (Washington, D.C., 1982, first edition), pp.142-162.
10. Young, *Liberia Rediscovered*, pp.179-180.
11. *The African Republic of Liberia And the Belgian Congo: Harvard African Expedition 1926-1927*, pp.199-200; on Wehrle at Firestone and other medical personnel see, PRO/FO 371 18042, *Outbreak of Smallpox in Liberia*, 21 August 1934; PRO/FO 371 23394, *Leading Personalities in Liberia*, July 1939.
12. Neely Tucker, "Century's first genocide, in Africa by Germans—BEFORE HOLOCAUST came '04 war," *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, Sunday, April 5, 1998, A Section:3; see Dr. Eugen Fischer, *Rasse und Rassenentstehung beim Menschen* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1927); and for the role that blood and race played in the German nation see, Adolf Hitler(Facto only entered prison April 1, 1924, *MeinKampf* (1924, German edition 1939, etc.), translated by Ralph Manheim (1943) in Allan P. Grimes and Robert H. Horwitz, *Modern Political Ideologies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp.444-448. Dr. Wehrle's Nazi-orientation brought him into direct conflict with the Liberian government in WWII. At the end of May 1942, the Liberian government ordered Dr. Wehrle to leave the country and by June, the other twenty Germans left; and in November, the German Consul and staff departed. In retrospect, the German contingent requires further elaboration regarding pseudo-scientific racism in Liberia. It is postulated here that Dr. Wehrle had already read his compatriot's book by Dr. Eugene Fischer—a prominent German scientist—titled *The Principals of Human Heredity and Race Hygiene* (1927). This publication came long after Dr. Fischer's October 4, 1904, eyewitness to the century's first Holocaust of the Herero in Southwest Africa, today Namibia. As one recalls, Lt. General Lothar Von Trotha ordered the extermination (*Auswischungsbefehl*) of the Herero, who died in the tens of thousands. He ordered the poisoning of the wells in the sandveld and surrounding the Herero with a 150 mile line German guard-posts to prevent their escape. As matters turned out in Southwest Africa, Fisher observed and analyzed mixed raced children, who were the offsprings of German and African women. In denial of their agnatic side of paternity, he reported that these children were inferior to German children. While in prison writing *Mein Kampf* (1923, German edition 1939), Hitler read Fischer's book which became the *raison d'être* for his race theories against the Jews.
13. RG 59 250 158.823/22, Box 2115, "W. T. Francis, Legation of The 'U.S. A.," Monrovia, Liberia, To The Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1929; "Yellow Fever," Francis, March 20, 1929, 158.823/23, Box 2715, RG 59 250 158.823/22, Box 2115; "Yellow Fever," Francis, April 17, 1929, 158.823/27, Box 2715; and on Francis, see Lester S. Hyman, *United States Policy Towards Liberia 1822 To 2003: Unintended Consequences*, Cherry Hill, NJ: Africana Homestead Legacy Publishers, 2003,p. 241.
14. PRO/FO 371/15437 Annual Report, Liberia, 1929-30, Confidential ; see also, Major Charles B. West (M.D., an African-American), *The First Annual Report of the U.S. Public Health Service Mission to Liberia for the Period Ending June 30, 1945*, "American Legation, Monrovia, Liberia, November 29, 1945, The Foreign Service of The United States of America, Department of State, January 21, 1946, 882. 12/A/11-2945, NA II. This document provides the foundation history of the USHPS, the first personnel under Lend-Lease assigned from the Office of the Surgeon General of the United States Health Service to Liberia, and health conditions in Monrovia—infant mortality at 50 %, etc. The USPHS began on March 28, 1944, and officers arrived in November 1944. On the ten most specific diseases see, John B. West, "United States Health Missions in Liberia," *Public Health Reports*, Vol. 63:42 (October 15, 1948):1351-1364. The Harvard African Expedition of 1926 assumed that its report on health conditions in Liberia was the first (see p. 200 of the report, endnote 22.) which is not accurate. The first report was: "Report On The Medical

- Statistics Of The Colony by Dr. Henderson," ACS "Minutes of the Board of Managers," (14 May 1832, 273ff) cited in McDaniel, *Swing Low, Sweet Chariot*, pp. 153-157, and the second report, Dr. J. W. Lugenbeel, "Late Colonial Physician and U.S. Agent in Liberia," *Sketches of Liberia: A Brief Account of The Geography, Climate, Productions, And Disease of The Republic of Liberia* (Washington: D. C. Alexander, Printer, 1850).
15. RG 59 882.124A/78 Box 7008 "Memorandum of Agreement," July 1930.
 16. RG 59 Box 10018-ID019, "Special Sanitary Regulations 1929," and "A Report On Certain Phase Of The Public Health Situation In Monrovia Liberia With Special Reference To Yellow Fever and Its Control by H.P. Smith, Surgeon, U. S. P. H. S....," 1910-20.
 17. RG 59 882.124A/128 Box 7008, "Report on the Public Health Situation in Monrovia," December 31, 1930.
 18. John B. West, "United States Public Health Mission," *Public Health Reports*, Vol.63:42 (October 15, 1948):1353-1354; Clayton L. Thomas, (M.D., M.P.H.), ed., *Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary*, Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Company, [1940], 1978 Third Printing.
 19. RG 59 882.12A/128 Box 7008, "A Resume of The Efforts Towards Sanitation And Yellow Fever Control In Liberia,[Liberian government resistance to yellow fever control]," February 7, 1931; RG 59 882.124A/109/111/114/115, "Telegram Received, Dr. Smith's Departure From Monrovia via Freetown," December 1, 1930.
 20. RG 59 882.124A/124 Box 7008, S. David Coleman to Mr. Charge d'Affaires (letter), U.S. Department of State, December 26, 1930; same RG/Box, 882.12A/78, 'Memorandum Agreement In Regard To Detail Of A Service Officer For Sanitary Duty In Liberia', December 30, 1930.
 21. RG 59 882.124A/118 Box 7007, Samuel Rober, Jr., "Sanitation Program and the work of the Chief Medical Adviser in Liberia," Legation Of The United States Of America, Monrovia, Liberia, U.S. Department of State, December 8, 1930. The Garvey Movement was quite active in Monrovia and the coastal reaches in the 1920s, and what appears here as "anti-white sentiment" may more appropriately stem from Garvey sympathizers of Pan-Africanism among the "Americo-Liberian" working class. See I. K. Sundiata, *Black Scandal: America and the Liberian Labor Crisis, 1929-1936* (Philadelphia: Institute for the study of Human Issues, 1980), pp.111-116.
 22. Douglas M. Haynes, *Imperial Medicine: Patrick Manson and the Conquest of Tropical Disease* (Philadelphia, 2001), 85-124. On issues of settler numbers and mortality in West Africa see, Philip D. Curtin, "The White Man's Grave: Image and Reality," *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 1 (1961):94-110; and Curtin, "The End of the 'White Man's Grave'? Nineteenth-Century Mortality in West Africa," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. XXI:1 (Summer 1990): 63-88; Tom W. Shick (1939-1986), "A Quantitative analysis of Liberian colonization from 1820 to 1843, with special reference to mortality," *Journal of African History*, Vol.XII:1 (1971):48-49; and Shick, *Behold The Promise Land: Afro-American Settlers to Liberia in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). Lamin Sanneh, *Abolitionists Aboard: American Blacks and the Making of Modern West Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) cites 5,700 recaptives that landed in Liberia, which is higher than the Shick number in text, but no source for this number is cited, p. 214;
 23. Adell Patton, Jr., *Physicians, Colonial Racism, and Diaspora in West Africa* (Gainesville: The University Press of Florida, 1996), p.31.
 24. PRO/FO 371/3292, Liberia: Dr. Fuszek, June 1918.
 25. *Liberian Code of Laws of 1956: Adopted by the Legislature of the Republic of Liberia, March 22, 1956*, Published under Authority Of The Legislature Of Liberia And President William V.S. Tubman, Volume III, Titles 27-37, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957). The Library of Congress Law Library holds this document, which list the prior legislations of Medical Board qualifications of Liberian doctors in 1927-1928, L. ch. XV; 1936, L. ch. VI; 1952-1953, L. ch., XXIV, pp.1109-1113. It must be noted that the True Whig Party had its watershed beginning with President Anthony W. Gardiner 1878-1883; four Republican Party administrations had governed

- before that from 1848-1883; see Abeodu Bowen Jones, "The Republic of Liberia," J. F. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa*, Vol. II (London: Longman, 1974), pp.340, 314-343.
26. PRO/FO 371 18042, *Polish Mission to Liberia- activities of Dr. Sajous*, 17 September 1934.
 27. PRO/FO 371 36355, Annual Report on Liberia, 1942.
 28. PRO/FO 371 49339, "Leading Personalities in Liberia, 1945"; Liberian Legislative Act and Resolution Honoring Mrs. Christine Schnitzer, 1970, The Louis Arthur Grimes School of Law, University of Liberia, April 5, 2000 (Fieldnotes); Mrs. Izetta Cooper, (Liberian and widow of the late Dr. H. Nehemiah Cooper , B.Sc, M..D., F.A.C.S., FICS, FWACS), Interviewed on November 1, 1997 at Columbia, Maryland (Fieldnotes: Cooper-Patton Liberian Medical History Collection).
 29. PRO/FO 371/15437, *Port Medical Arrangements at Monrovia*, September 10th, 1931.; PRO/FO 371/23394, *Africa (General):* Enclosure. Record of Leading Personalities in Liberia, Public Record Office, London; see George Way Harley, *Native African Medicine: With Special reference to its Practice in the Mano Tribe of Liberia* (London: Frank Cass & Co.,[1941], 1970); and of lesser quality see, Werner Junge, *African Jungle Doctor* (London: Panther Edition, [1952], 1956). For issues under discussion see also, D. Elwood Dunn, *A History of the Episcopal Church in Liberia 1821-1980* (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1992).
 30. RG 112 390 Box 105 "HUMEDS," Liberia, 1942; PRO/FO 371 36355, Annual Report on Liberia, 1942. The "Negro" troops camped at the now former Pan Am Field. The mess hall cooked food could be smelled by locals nearby, who named their village "Smell No Tast." It became Unity Town in 1980. For health and sanitation matters see, RG 59 882.12A/11-2945 Box 7138, Major Charles B. West (M.D.), "The First Annual Report of the U.S. Public Health Service Mission to Liberia for the Period Ending June 30, 1945," American Legation, Monrovia, Liberia, Department of State, November 29, 1945.
 31. RG 59 250, 882.697/48, Box 10038, 3,"Newspapers," *The Firestone Non-Skid*, December 1925,3; Alfred Lief, *The Firestone Story: A History Of The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company* (New York: Whitesey, pp.53, 324-25; Wayne Chatfield Taylor, *The Firestone Operations In Liberia* (New York, 1956), 52-53; French, *A Continent for the Taking*, 106.
 32. The American Foundation for Tropical Medicine and the Liberian Institute/ Doctors Employed by The Liberian Government as of September 1, 1960, (The Svend Holsoe Collection, Indiana University-Bloomington).
 33. RG 59 882. 12A/5-145 CS/EG, Box 7138, "Lt. Col. John B. West Monthly Report United States Health Public Health Service Mission, May 1, 1945."
 34. RG 59 882.12A/5-1245 CS/0, "USPHSM Health Missions Launches Campaign To Kill Mosquitos," Monrovia, Liberia, May 12, 1945.
 35. RG 59 882.12/5-2645, Box 7138, "Transmitting Report On Public Health Service Activities In Liberia For the Month of April, Monrovia, Liberia, May 26, 1945; RG 59 882.12A/5-2245, Box 7138, same title and date.
 36. RG 59 882.12A/8-645, Box 7138, "Public Health Report For June-1945," August 6, 1945," Monrovia, Liberia; RG 59 882.12A/1-1546, Box 7138, "U.S. Public Health Service Mission Report for the month of November,1945," Monrovia, Liberia, January 15, 1946.
 37. RG 59 882.12A/6-2645, Box 7138, "Letter From Acting Secretary Joseph C. Grew To The Honorable Clarence Cannon, Chair, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives," June 26, 1945.
 38. RG 59 882.12A/6-2645, Box 7138.
 39. Joseph Nagbe Togba, "How the Lord is Mighty! A Dream In the Jungle: The Autobiography of Joseph Nagbe Togba: M.D., M.P.H., FAPHA, FWACP." N.d., pp.28, 40.
 40. Togba, "How the Lord is Mighty! A Dream In the Jungle: The Autobiography of Joseph Nagbe Togba," pp.42, 44.
 41. John B. West, "United States Public Health Mission," *Public Health Reports*, Vol.63:42 (October 15, 1948):1363.

42. RG 59 876.2614/5-753, Box 7138, "The Establishments of A New Water And Sewage System In Liberia," Edward R. Dudley, AMEMBASSY, Monrovia, May 7, 1953.
43. West, "United States Public Health Mission," *Public Health Reports*, 1363.
44. RG 59 882.151/1-2147, Box 7138, "MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR THE FINANCING OF A WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEM FOR THE CITY OF MONROVIA," Consulate-General of the Republic of Liberia, New York City, 1/21/47.
45. RG 59 882.151/1-2147, Box 7138, "MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR THE FINANCING OF A WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEM FOR THE CITY OF MONROVIA."
46. George Way Harley, *Native African Medicine: With Special Reference to its Practice in the Mano Tribe of Liberia*, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, [1941]1970.
47. RG 59 876.2614/5-753, Edward R. Dudley, AMEMBASSY. Foreign Service Dispatch, "The Establishment Of A New Water And Sewage System In Liberia, May 7, 1953, Monrovia, Liberia.
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Reconstructing Liberian Political Culture: Tentative Suggestions

John C. Yoder*

Introduction

Over the last decade, scholars and policy makers have devoted a great deal of attention to the ongoing challenge of reconstructing dysfunctional states and societies. A recent flurry of articles in publications such as *The Journal of Democracy*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Journal of International Affairs* is representative of the prevailing views about rebuilding states that have experienced destabilizing stress. Although much of the discussion understandably focuses on high profile cases such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, virtually all experts express hope that their insights and observations will be relevant for other societies struggling to inch back from the chaos of collapse, whether that collapse was a result of economic failure, political mismanagement, outside invasion, or brutalization at the hands of a dictator, criminal syndicate, or warlord.

The following essay will summarize some of the current thinking on state reconstruction and comment on the relevance of those ideas for Liberia. In addition, the paper will draw my own work on Liberian civil society and popular political culture in order to make a number of specific suggestions about the future. My argument is that in addition to their emphasis on security, political reconstruction, and economic revival, scholars and practitioners must give serious attention to remedying deep-seated problems in political culture. Unless these problems are addressed, the future of countries such as Liberia may be a future in which a succession of weak, illiberal, and dysfunctional governments continue to plague suffering people.

Western Experts and Lessons for Liberia

The Consensus of the Experts

Anyone reviewing the main points in the writing about state reconstruction is struck by the many areas of agreement among the experts. Not only their general observa-

* Dr. Yoder is a leading American Africanist and Liberianist. He is the author of *Popular Political Culture, Civil Society, and State Crisis in Liberia* (New York, 2003), and many other scholarly publications. He is a Professor of History and Political Science at Whitworth College.

tions, but also their conclusions and recommendations are similar. The perspective is state-centric and security conscious, generic in character, inattentive to political culture, and pessimistic. When moving beyond description to prescription, the conclusions and recommendations of the experts contain an element of paradoxical inconsistency. Even though the experts acknowledge that the international community led by Americans and Europeans will neither restore nor extinguish troubled states, they argue that the best hope for states such as Liberia is to follow the advice of western authorities. While these outside authorities offer guidance intended to be appropriate in all cases, they admit that functional states depend upon strong domestic support from local citizens and political elite. The unstated assumption is that this contradiction will be resolved by having those citizens and elite embrace a universal, western-designed system and turn away from the rules of their own political cultures.

The emphasis of recent literature about restoring failed or severely stressed societies has been on security and national level politics. Given the enormous problems caused by lawlessness and insurrection in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus on establishing basic security is understandable and justified. Writers speak of Thomas Hobbes' admonitions about the need for a strong state and they recall Max Weber's observation that the first criterion of a successful state is the ability to monopolize the use of force and violence. Also, given the complexity of writing constitutions, training a judiciary, organizing political parties, and holding elections, it is not surprising that, after security, the next preoccupation would be on the mechanics of the political process at the national level. Here, scholars agree that some variant of democracy is required and that western democratic expertise and experience offer the best guidance to achieving security and good governance.

Scholars discussing state reconstruction tend to propose generic, one-size-fits-all solutions that are expected to be equally applicable anywhere in the world. Thus, after surveying a number of articles and books on rebuilding societies and states, the reader develops a sense of *déjà vu*. Although some authors argue against the one-size-fits-all approach, they are mainly disputing the timing and sequencing of various remedies, rather than challenging the fundamental proposition that security and constitutional democracy must be the main focus of policy-makers every place in the world.¹ This homogeneity may reflect a mature and robust scholarly consensus and the commendable desire to craft ideas that are useful in a wide variety of situations. But, it also may be a result of political and professional conformity. Whatever its cause, the uniformity suggests that expert western ideas about stabilization, good governance, and democratization have received minimal input from national citizens and domestic decision-makers, the multitude of people on the ground who most accurately mirror and best understand the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of local politics.

The homogeny of their perspectives demonstrates that most western authors are of the opinion that political culture, especially its multiple manifestations at the popular level, is relatively unimportant. Although those scholars would reject that characteriza-

tion—and in fact discuss citizen support—the reality is that they give remarkably little attention to the popular political values that are the bedrock and foundation upon which the superstructure of politics and the state rest. For example, while Larry Diamond acknowledges the importance of rebuilding and reshaping political culture, he makes that observation in an article devoted entirely to macro-level political and military topics.² Ironically, although every western expert argues strongly that democracy's superiority rests on its attentiveness to the opinions of the people, those same experts give scant attention to the values, norms, and voice of the ordinary people they hope will embrace the political system being proposed.

Authors writing about restoring collapsed states express confidence in their ideas, but the essays contain an underlying pedal tone of pessimism. For example, in claiming that the success of American efforts offers "legitimate grounds for optimism" in Afghanistan, Larry Goodson both introduces and concludes his article with the acknowledgement that violence, opium, warlords, and ethnic polarization remain the dominant realities in a country where reconstruction is more an expectation than a reality.³ Goodson is not alone. Even the most optimistic experts speak in terms of hope for the future rather than of certainty about measurable progress already achieved.

In spite of this pessimism, no expert believes that the actual existence of any state is in jeopardy, no matter how deep the crisis into which that state has fallen. This is both good news and bad news. The experts agree that, somewhat like a deeply comatose person on life support, a failed or collapsed state will be kept "alive" by the international community. Ironically, while the information flow, institutions, migrations, and norms of globalization have undermined the autonomy of all states, the international political system has a vested interest in treating all states as sovereign entities. Thus, even a weak, dysfunctional government will be accorded diplomatic recognition, membership in the U.N., and protection from external invasion. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that any state, however feeble or abusive, will cease to exist.

Lessons for Liberia

Liberians, and other people living in fractured societies, can draw a number of lessons from the writings of prominent experts offering advice about state reconstruction. Some of these lessons build on the wisdom and experience of those experts, other lessons grow out of the need to find answers for problems not addressed by the political specialists who view the world from a western and macro-level perspective.

The first lesson to be gleaned from a survey of western expertise about state reconstruction is that Liberians can rely only on themselves to restore their society and nation. Tragically, while the international community will protect the existence of virtually any nation, it will exert very little effort to ensure that unjust or ineffective regimes improve.⁴ The history of Zaire/Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, and Liberia suggest that Europe and the United States have little stomach for a sustained commitment to basic stability and security, let alone democracy or good government.

Only when a beleaguered state is in the business of harboring terrorism (Afghanistan), occupies a pivotal geopolitical position (Iraq), or poses a threat to a close strategic ally (Palestine to Israel) can the international community be mobilized for more than a brief interlude. While stressed countries can expect some modicum of assistance from the west, especially if their misery makes the TV news, such assistance will never be equal to the need. As Goodson noted, even in the face of a great disaster, the need always is greater than the pledged aid from the donor community, the pledged aid is always greater than the actual appropriations, and the appropriations are never fully or efficiently spent.⁵ The implication of these realities for Liberia is that Liberians cannot depend on the international community either to put an end to a predatory regime or to force such a regime to improve. While the international system will not allow Liberia to die, it will do little to ensure its convalescence.

The second lesson is that Liberians will need to advance beyond conventional prescriptions for rebuilding failed states. Although useful, generic measures offering electoral, constitutional, legal, and military advice, ignore the key issue of political culture. This disregard comes in spite of the fact that most experts accept, in principle at least, the notion that the attitudes, opinions, and values of local people matter. Of course, all writers note the importance of support for a regime and its public policy from politicians and bureaucrats if any government is to endure and function effectively. However, most assume that such support will be an automatic by-product of increased security, a good constitution, a more equitable judicial system, and free and fair elections. Only a few acknowledge that the challenge is far more complex and that it is related to political culture. One scholar who takes the challenge of political culture more seriously is Stephen Krasner. Discussing ways of combating corruption and inefficiency, Krasner, says that merely formulating and imposing regulations and laws will not guarantee better performance from government officials. Somehow, he says, people carrying out those rules must want to do so. In other words, their goal must be to use their expertise to implement rather than circumvent the state's laws, budgets, or procedures.⁶ Similarly, in a well-reasoned essay, Francis Fukuyama notes the key to good governance is finding a way to ensure that the personal incentives of individual government agents align with the larger principles of public government.⁷ Unfortunately, neither Krasner nor Fukuyama go on to make suggestions about how to fix the problem of voluntary compliance, a problem intimately linked to political culture.⁸

The third lesson is that remedies for improving Liberian political culture need to target ordinary citizens as well as the political elite. While Krasner and Fukuyama are writing about mid- to high-level politicians and bureaucrats, their concern should also be directed to ordinary citizens. If government is to function effectively and efficiently, people at all levels of society must see a correspondence between the rules of that government and their own personal interests. Propaganda, punitive measures, and formal policies may foster compliance, but at best they lead to minimal levels of obedience, not energetic support or implementation. For people to follow laws, budgets,

and official bureaucratic procedures, they must actually *desire* to do so. Fukuyama is right when he says a state never has enough coercive power or regulatory presence to make sure that functionaries and politicians do what is expected. If that is true for officials, how much more is it the case for ordinary citizens.

The fourth lesson for Liberia is that although failed or dysfunctional states fall far short of good governance and even recovering states face enormous obstacles when seeking needed citizen support for the regime, we should not succumb too quickly to despair. Joel Migdal reminds us that even very strong democratic states such as the United States and Israel were, and continue to be, strongly marked by serious shortcomings. Migdal's point is that even profound injustices such as slavery, ethnic polarization, social marginalization, and highly unequal access to state resources have not been enough to undermine the essential strength and success of those two states. Although condemning injustice in America and Israel, Migdal argues that it sometimes had a stabilizing influence. While sharp social polarizations may have been immoral, they enabled the elite to maintain control and provide direction.⁹ Migdal's essay should serve as a reminder that perfection is neither attainable nor indispensable. Without justifying problems such as corruption, inefficiency, or ethnic tension, when contemplating the future of a country such as Liberia, we should not be paralyzed by the proposition that the political and social systems must function flawlessly before the lives of the people can improve.

Rebuilding Liberian Political Culture

Political Culture and the Common Good

Good governance happens when people, both ordinary citizens and those in the political elite, follow, for the most part at least, the laws, regulations, budgets, performance expectations, and goals the state has established to promote the common good rather than benefit privileged groups or individuals at the expense of the whole. The sad reality in Liberia is that these principles have not been observed. For leaders to pursue the common good means, as Liberians say, "they must have the people at heart." For citizens to pursue the common good, they must have confidence that their fundamental rights will not be eroded by the state and they must want to behave in ways that support the well being of all people, not just members of their own family, religious group, or region. Such support is a prerequisite for security, order, and compliance. While citizen involvement in decision-making (democracy) may not be a necessary ingredient in a society characterized by good governance and order, protection of basic human liberties (liberalism) is essential for order to endure. Unfortunately, some aspects of Liberian political culture have been both undemocratic and illiberal. The chaos of civil war and its aftermath is evidence of that fact. Paradoxically, the last two decades of turmoil in Liberia may be the result of a misguided effort to impose order.

For generations, by overemphasizing the value of stability and order, Liberian political values have downplayed the importance of tolerance, accountability, and innovation.¹⁰

Although there are many elements foundational to a healthy political culture, some of the most important for Liberia are the following: 1) the right of all citizens to share a common culture and heritage, 2) the right of all inhabitants to participate fully in politics, 3) the right for accountability and transparency when dealing with public decisions and resources, and 4) the right to an educational system that encourages human development and appropriate research rather than obedience and deference. These four rights contribute to a political culture that promotes the common good. Although most Liberians would claim to support the items in this list, the real challenge is for the nation and its people to move beyond sentiment and rhetoric so that these rights become realities.

The remainder of this essay will explore the rights noted above and offer suggestions about measures that might be taken to achieve the rights associated with a healthy political culture that provides for the common good. Any reordering of Liberian political life must be voluntary and authentic. Only voluntary actions and attitudes are democratic and only voluntary behavior is self-sustaining. Furthermore, any changes to Liberian political culture must build on the best aspects of Liberia's own social values. That means that although they will need to deal with shortcomings in their own political culture, Liberians should use, not abandon, that culture. When changes are warranted, it is Liberians themselves who must invent their own future. Therefore, I want to be very clear that my suggestions about the future are meant to start a discussion; I do not regard them as anything more. My assumption is that some of my ideas will be criticized as unworkable or misguided. My hope is that such criticism will emerge because someone has formulated a better suggestion or has identified more pressing needs in the area of rights. My conviction is that until Liberians identify the weaknesses in their political culture and develop culturally appropriate solutions, the country will continue to accept tyranny and mismanagement.¹¹

The following sections of the paper will address four fundamental problems areas within Liberian political culture. Each problem is the antithesis of one of the four rights noted previously. The paper will then offer two sets of suggestions for confronting each of the problems. The first set of solutions will deal with structures such as laws, rules and regulations, constitutional arrangements, and organizations. Structural changes offer incentives or penalties calculated to persuade or compel people to behave in a different way. The second set of solutions—the set in which I am most interested—will deal with socialization. Thus, symbols, rituals, educational strategies, scholarly efforts, and social mores will receive detailed attention. Less coercive than structures, socialization is designed to invite and inspire people to change their conduct.

Problem One: Division and Polarization

The Problem Described

Unfortunately, Liberians do not see themselves as one people. Virtually any conversation—scholarly or popular—about Liberian society, politics, religion, or economics begins with a discussion of division. If asked, “Who are the Liberians?” almost everyone will point out that Liberia is a country of 16 ethnic groups and two distinct cultures (settler and indigenous). Although Joel Migdal notes that even intensely polarized societies can achieve high levels of success,¹² it is clear that Liberia has suffered and continues to suffer because of its many divisions. Tragically, politicians, ethnic entrepreneurs, and warlords encouraged and exploited perceptions of separation. However, the political culture of division is not a recent phenomenon nor is it the sole creation of political opportunists. In fact, well-intentioned teachers, preachers, researchers, and social reformers also have magnified the nation’s differences. Throughout Liberian history, far too much scholarly and popular attention has dwelt on distinctions whether settler and indigene, Congo and Kwi, Bassa and Kpelle, Mandingo and Krahn, city and country, or educated and non-educated. To the extent that this has been true, Liberia’s divisions are the result of artificial intellectual constructs. But, whether real or imagined, division can lead to unfortunate political consequences. Divided communities tolerate, even encourage, injustice and inequality. In divided communities the elite devote their energies to control while the underdogs struggle to undermine the status quo. Division can hinder productive civic discourse and stand in the way of human rights for all. Highly polarized societies suffer from political paralysis or from acts of violence, revenge, and retribution.

Throughout the years, Liberians leaders—political, social, and religious elite—have used the specter of disorder to justify their control over society. Warning the nation of the danger of divisions, they presented themselves as the best defense against chaos. From the earliest times, they employed a combination of structural techniques (legal restrictions and harsh punishment) and socialization measures (intimidation and excessive decorum) to deal with the peril of division.¹³ Although useful for the elite, those measures have been counterproductive for the people. Relying on Krahn or Loma soldiers to impose control over rural dwellers multiplied rather than mitigated ethnic tensions. Using public resources to dispense favors to clients led to resentment, inefficiency, and budgetary collapse. Centralizing power in Monrovia increased rather than reduced the lines of separation between the settler elite and the indigenous peoples. Concealing real tensions under layers of ritual, false politeness, and sycophancy has exaggerated rather than cured Liberia’s social, economic, and political divisions.

Structural Solutions to the Problem of Divisions

During and after the civil war, political discussions in Liberia have focused on the structural measures needed to overcome division. The 2004 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Accra included provisions for revamping the government in order to make it more representative and accountable. The CPA calls on Liberian leaders to move away from the patterns of the past that dealt with the problem of division by exercising abusive control. In both traditional and "modern" Liberian society, such control has relied on brute force, economic advantage, secrecy, religion, magic, gender distinctions, kin ties, seniority, and class hierarchy. The current discussion—much of it based on the Accra settlement—about restoring social wholeness, has explored more democratic and transparent ways to help Liberians cope with their many differences. These measures are exclusively structural. Limiting the power of the presidency, strengthening the judiciary and the legislature, transferring authority from Monrovia to the counties, protecting the press, guaranteeing more rights for women, challenging nepotism, providing for fiscal transparency, introducing affirmative action, and establishing a truth and reconciliation process are some of the key structural reforms designed to include, benefit, and protect all Liberians. A successful conclusion to this discussion about good governance, democracy, transparency, and reconciliation is absolutely vital to Liberia's future. Although structural reforms are vitally important, ultimately success will depend on changes in the way people think about politics. Such changes will depend on socialization as much as on structures.

Socialization Solutions to the Problem of Division

As indicated earlier, the main focus of this essay will be on political culture. When considering the problem of division, it is important to recognize that the difficulty is largely an artificial creation. Therefore, it should be susceptible to a cultural or intellectual solution. Although conventional wisdom holds that Liberia is a country of divisions, in truth Liberian society has numerous identifiable internal similarities and connections. As I argue at length elsewhere, Liberians have many commonalities in the marital, social, religious, economic, educational, and political domains. For example, although every history of Liberia stresses the notion that the settlers were distinct from the indigenes in that the former rejected slavery, ate imported food, lived in western style houses, married only other settlers, cherished freedom, and rejected African religious values, the truth is that they relied on pawns and bonded labor, relished local foods such as *dumbo*, often constructed African style dwellings, contracted formal and informal traditional marriages, developed a hierarchical political patronage system, and accepted African concepts of magic.¹⁴ Simply acknowledging these linkages would be an important step toward dealing with the unfortunate consequences of division. While it is a natural human tendency for people to parse their dissimilarities, Liberians should give more attention to the myriad material objects, events, values, family ties, and experiences that connect them.

How should these linkages be recognized? History books could note the many trade and cultural linkages among Liberia's ethnic groups and among settlers, "recaptives,"¹⁵ and indigenous peoples. Sermons and theological dialogues could acknowledge (even celebrate) the interplay of the religious perspectives of all groups inhabiting Liberia. Political science monographs could explore the congruence between the political strategies of traditional chiefs and modern political actors operating at the local, regional, or national levels. Sociology and anthropology lectures could give attention to the porous and malleable nature of ethnic, racial, and cultural boundaries. Formal academic economic analyses and more practical market or labor surveys by business groups could investigate the linkages between production in the so-called informal sector and the macro-economic realities at the corporate level, between the rural and urban economies, and between indigenous and "book" knowledge about farming and trade. Research or therapeutic work related to the trauma of the last 15 years could confront the fact that deeply held social and political values shared by all Liberians contributed to the tragedy and offer concrete strategies for its solution.¹⁶

If academics and religious leaders would investigate and promote Liberia's shared heritage and culture, they would be following the successful example of Tanzania, a country that has enjoyed remarkable harmony since independence. In the early years of independence, the history department at the University of Dar es Salaam worked to produce high quality studies that demonstrated the historical interconnectedness of the nation's people. Furthermore, the president/teacher Julius Nyerere encouraged the use of Swahili as a language of inclusiveness. In Liberia, politicians and other public figures could take the lead in using public symbols to socialize citizens toward overcoming divisions. In doing so, they might follow the example of Nelson Mandela, who reached out to embrace even former enemies and did much to unify a sharply divided nation. He accomplished this not only through the politics of state, but also through countless seemingly mundane actions. For example, when president, he hosted an annual picnic for everyone—both inmates and guards—formerly connected to Robben Island. In another instance, by sporting the sweater of the Springbok rugby team (a team that had served as a powerful symbol for Afrikaner pride and dominance), he went a long way to winning the grudging approval of the Afrikaner community. By his deeds and words, Mandela set a contagious tone of unity and reconciliation that had positive implications for all races and social groups in South Africa. Because Mandela was so consistent over time, even his detractors became convinced of his good intentions and they came to trust that he would stand by his promises. Mandela's actions took great courage and determination, but they are not superhuman or impossible. Liberia needs editors, politicians, business leaders, pastors and imams, and teachers who follow the Nyerere and Mandela examples.

Problem Two: Exclusion from Full Participation in Politics

The Problem Defined

Liberia's political history has been one of highly restricted access to politics. In part this has been because winners in the political process interpreted their mandate as a warrant to monopolize power indefinitely. In part this has been because ethnic background, race, class, or social status excluded some people from offering their opinions, from voting, or from holding office. Much of Liberia's political history has been a record of exclusion, an exclusion based on class, gender, age, ethnicity, level of educational, religion, kinship, or wealth. One argument of this paper is that until Liberians find ways to change that record, the country's problems will not be resolved.

In preparation for the October 2005 elections, Liberian political leaders in Liberia and the United States held grass-roots level discussions designed to give people a voice. While that was an important step toward inclusiveness, a number of problems plagued those gathering. First, the meetings sometimes were designed to demonstrate the erudition and statues of big people rather than to actually gather input from the rank and file. For example, in March of 2005, the National Elections Commission (NEC) held a two-day national consultation in Tubmanburg. Delegates came from Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, and Gbarpolu counties. Supposedly, the purpose of the meeting was to educate local leaders about the October presidential balloting, to gain their support for elections, and to gather their input and concerns. Although the event was intended to reach out to illiterate local leaders, the program featured a panel with formal papers similar to those one might expect at an academic conference. While the list of topics listed in the printed program and the actual papers themselves may have impressed international donors, educated Liberians, and perhaps even the uneducated participants accustomed to standing in awe of westernized intellectuals, the topics and formal papers did little to elicit a genuine conversation. An article in *All Africa* noted that "Presentations of papers on complex topics will not only be boring for the participants, but will also subtract from their expectations, and reduce them to mere spectators." The *All Africa* article proposed a very sensible alternative by calling on the NEC to abandon the strategy of using "high-profile academic presentations" and replacing it with "sincere, honest, purposeful, and homegrown round-table discussions with the delegates doing most of the talking while the panel moderates." Such an approach, the article argued, would "achieve maximum results with little input."¹⁷

Second, the political elite organizing the national discussion about Liberia's future transformed the talks into a complex political competition which excluded ordinary Liberians. In the United States, the early 2005 wrangle involving groups headed by Dr. James Tarpeh, Ms. Mydea Reeves-Karpeh, and Rev. Robert Karloh was yet another example of political infighting during a time when Liberia was in deep crisis. While it is possible that all parties to the conflict believed they were defending essential philosophical or ethical principles, it is also possible that some degree of personal or parti-

san interest was involved. Without discussing the specifics of the case or speculating about who was at fault, it was evident that conflicts among Liberian leaders thwarted the Liberian National Conference in the United States. Regardless of which faction emerged as victorious, it is clear that time was being wasted. Even more evident is the fact that ordinary Liberians were marginalized by the conflict.

Structural Solutions to the Problem of Exclusion

Because historically Liberia has suffered from the abuse of power by the president, social classes, or ethnic groups, an important task is to find ways to control the winners in politics so that they do not dominate the process to the exclusion of the rest of the population. Without endorsing any specific suggestion, it is obvious that this problem needs to be addressed structurally, through legal, constitutional, and procedural means. First, something must be done to control the near monopoly on revenues by Monrovia, and by extension the executive branch. Because so much of Liberia's income flows through Monrovia (fees for shipping licenses, mining and timber revenues, payments for rubber concessions, import tariffs, and beer taxes), the executive branch maintains a stranglehold on the government's disposable income. When this fact is coupled by a lack of transparency in budgeting (both income and expenditures), the problem is compounded. Second, something must be done to limit the executive branch's ability to thwart the legal process. Like the American president Andrew Jackson, who blatantly ignored a ruling by the Supreme Court and openly boasted that the Court had no troops to enforce its will, Liberian chief executives have been able to bully, manipulate, and evade judges and the law. Third, Monrovia must not be allowed to exert so much control over county government where, in addition to appointing county executives, Monrovia dominates the fiscal and regulatory apparatus. Fourth, the president must not have such complete control over his or her own political party. Unfortunately, this is not just a problem for presidents and parties in power. As can be seen in the on-going political in-fighting, opposition political parties expressing displeasure with the excessive power of a chief executive do not curb authoritarianism within their own ranks. That fact does not bode well for the future should one of those parties actually assume power.

Constitutional experts have offered many possible suggestions about ways to restrain the power of any one individual or group. Arend Lijphart, who has done a great deal of work on arrangements to curb the power of winners, argues it is especially important that deeply divided societies find ways to limit the political playing field.¹⁸ By taking some items off the table, society prevents winners from using their gains in a way that completely disadvantages others. For example, mandating that the president and speaker of the house each come from different regions, ethnic groups, or religious constituencies restricts the power of any one group. Requiring a coalition government, establishing a mutual veto, using proportionality in elections, and agreeing to high levels of regional autonomy are some of the other strategies Lijphart sug-

gests. The current Liberian discussion about decentralization, electing county administrators, limiting the president's term in office, reducing the tenure of senators from nine to six years, strengthening the legislature, and establishing a more robust and independent judiciary are all in line with Lijphart's thinking. Clearly, in Liberia as elsewhere in Africa, a main concern must be to limit the scope and power of the presidency.

Stephen Krasner takes another approach to limiting the control of individuals or interest groups. Although his suggestions will be discussed more fully under the topic of accountability, he argues that certain functions of the state—for example collecting taxes at the port or licensing foreign concessions for resource extraction—should be contracted out to a reputable international agency in a way that would prevent revenues and regulations from being used for narrow personal or partisan purposes. In Krasner's view, sharing sovereignty is the best way to limit the power of a small group to divert funding, circumvent standard procedures, or offer insider terms on government contracts.¹⁹

Because there are many legal, constitutional, and political strategies for combating the abuse of power, the preceding discussion of limiting executive or group power should be taken as suggestive rather than prescriptive. What people need to recognize, however, is that even the most ingenious structural arrangements will fail if they are not supported by the country's political culture. Therefore, until Liberian expectations about leadership are examined and reformed, the best laws in the world will not prevent tyranny and mismanagement. With tragic consequences, Liberian political culture has long privileged authority over true democracy.²⁰ Historically, in Liberia authority has been embodied in the person and party of the president. However, fathers, pastors, school principals, university administrators, members of parliament, and cabinet members have all enjoyed the privileges of rank, power, and wealth. Because of the pervasiveness of the clientage system, little people at the bottom support or tolerate the arrangement because they expect to garner the crumbs of patronage from their champion. The powerful undertow of popular political culture, a political culture that confers great power and expects partisan rewards, means that merely changing the constitution or electing an honest politician will not be enough to change the system. The leaders and political system must be altered, but the values, expectations, and demands of ordinary people must be transformed as well. Systems can be modified structurally, but values will be changed only through socialization.

Socialization Solutions to the Problem of Exclusion

A first step in the process of socialization for more inclusion would be to take steps demonstrating that respect is earned not demanded or required. These measures should be taken at every levels of society, from the statehouse to the domestic domain of the family. One sensible, but cost-free, strategy would be to reorder symbols. While it is proper to expect that schools and government offices display the president's picture, it

is not acceptable to demand that every store or office follow suite. Nor is it healthy for the president's image to be on the nation's currency or to insist that the lead story in every news broadcast be about the president. While it is proper to expect that public officials should have adequate transportation, purchasing expensive vehicles as symbols of status is an unacceptable use of the people's resources. The ubiquitous display of the president's picture and the expectation that public servants travel in mobile thrones send a message that privilege and primacy are rights to be expected simply because one has managed to gain office. Given the fragile nature of Liberia's political and economic systems, the chief executive and his or her associates must project an image of service and competence rather than of entitlement and grandeur. Because the president serves as a model whose behavior is imitated by other public officials and even ordinary citizens, his or her actions and attitudes—good or bad—will be replicated countless times in many parts of the country.

In looking at Liberia's problems, it is easy to blame people at the top, but it also must be acknowledged that little people expect their patrons to display wealth and power in a lavish way. Unfortunately, ordinary citizens often believe that extravagance and disregard for laws and conventions on the part of big people is proof that such individuals have the resources and power to protect their more humble clients. Thus, abusive power and ill-gotten gains are tolerated so long as they are held by one's own patron. In order to change this attitude, people need to make adjustments at all levels of society. Although less powerful and exalted, teachers, pastors, and parents serve as models for how leadership should be exercised. Too often, the model they see is that of an authority figure who demands and commands, not one who protects and includes. While it is proper to expect that a pastor or parent should provide leadership and guidance, it is not acceptable for them to insist on unqualified loyalty. Nor is it healthy for them to become angry merely because their decisions are questioned.

While healthy political debate can be divisive, partisan, and polarizing, much of the discussion over the last 15 to 25 years in Liberia has not been productive. Anyone who has read the newspaper, witnessed a legislative debate, or sat in on a court case knows that political and legal arguments are often intended to demonstrate or protect rank and status rather than actually solve public problems. Sharp arguments among the elite often are symbolic exchanges meant to preserve privilege and control. A parallel example from the academic realm illustrates this point. Lengthy portions of a faculty meeting may be devoted to elaborate discussions of parliamentary procedure or points of English grammar. The goal of such exchanges is not to solve problems of import. Rather the intent is to demonstrate erudition and establish position. The goal of such discussion may also be to prevent serious change. Although the consequences of pointless debates may be insignificant in the academic arena, they can be profoundly damaging in the political domain. If that pattern is to end, political leaders must commit themselves to dealing with real public issues instead of using the public forum as a platform for personal aggrandizement.

Authority, although essential, must be tamed or it will become tyrannical, disorderly, and bestial. "Liberians might ponder the fact that they may have confused deference (an outward expression) with respect (a more foundational quality) and that deference without respect is hollow. Liberian leaders also need to understand that respect is earned, not demanded or purchased."²¹ Earned respect is compatible with a democratic political process in which leaders are honored and rewarded for their actual accomplishments, not merely for the fact that they have come into a position of leadership, whether by election, appointment, subterfuge, or force. Legitimate accomplishments are those done with the consent and advice of all the people and that benefit all the people. Thus, they will stand up to public scrutiny and they will not require artificial accolades.

An example from my own city of Spokane, Washington suggests that such a transformation is possible. During the 1990s, the city council was deeply polarized as people on and off of the council accused each other of incompetence, of engaging in behind the scenes manipulations, of building unholy alliances, and of grandstanding. The situation became so bad that council members began relating to each other through lawsuits rather than through parliamentary procedures. Not only did the state of affairs become so acrimonious that it drew the attention and scorn of the media throughout the Pacific Northwest, it also paralyzed local government. While much of the problem could be attributed to a sharp downturn in the local economy and to honest political and ideological differences, the problem was also cultural. The city council and political operatives involved in Spokane affairs had become immersed in a pattern of distrust, finger pointing, and non-cooperation. Like children or dysfunctional married couples unable to stop the cycle of blame, they could not work for the common good. The situation changed when several newly elected leaders—men and women from different parties—made a pledge to ensure that council meetings and other dealings were conducted in a civil manner. Patiently, but persistently, those individuals imposed that pledge on the council. Differences about issues did not disappear, but opposite sides were able to work out their disagreements in a constructive manner. Furthermore, the cloud of low self-esteem that plagued city government and the city itself began to lift, replaced by trust, self-confidence, and optimism. The transformation took place in part because of civic embarrassment and because a few committed individuals insisted on a different political climate. Liberia has such individuals.

Liberian politicians need to bring ordinary Liberians to the table. Of course it may not be practical to invite uneducated villagers, Monrovia market women, busy entrepreneurs, or elementary school students to sit in Cabinet sessions, political party caucuses, or budget deliberations, but political leaders participating in meetings at every level need to find ways to consider the common good rather than personal agendas. Although the following suggestion may seem trivial, I wonder what would happen if every important meeting reserved an empty chair at the table or podium dedicated to the ordinary citizen. As the political elite conduct their discussions, they would be

reminded to ask how their talks and decisions took that ordinary citizen into account. Although it is not possible or even desirable to extinguish personal ambition for political dealings, Liberian leaders must find ways to constantly remind themselves of how their dealings affect farmers, business people, teachers, students, children, health care providers, housewives, and young people looking for employment. An empty chair dedicated to such people might help big people to consider their needs and also remind big people that ordinary people often have no voice or presence.²²

At the national level, widely held Liberian attitudes about the acceptability of exclusion have barred two important groups—Mandingos and Lebanese—from full political participation. Longtime residents of Liberia, both peoples have suffered from political marginalization. Although Tubman, Tolbert, and Doe reached out to the Mandingo community, their place in Liberian society has long been somewhat precarious. The strong public emphasis on the Christian character of Liberia and the insistence that Mandingo's are transient traders reinforces the image of Mandingos as second-class citizens. The situation is even more uncertain for the Lebanese community that must accept the status of resident alien. Since the late 1800s, Lebanese merchant families have played an important role in the economic life of Liberia. However, the Liberian constitution does not permit them to own land or become citizens.

Paradoxically, although both are politically and socially marginalized, Mandingos and Lebanese are commonly regarded as people of wealth and high status. Thus, there is a wide discrepancy between their obvious power in the economic realm and their weak voice in politics. Historically, groups with substantial economic resources seek to influence the political process so that it is favorable to their economic activity, whether farming, mining, manufacturing, commerce, or finance. If social or legal structures prevent them from participating openly, they will find ways to participate surreptitiously. Using furtive and extralegal methods, they may bribe bureaucrats and politicians in order to shield their enterprises. For their part, government officials may make threats or throw up bureaucratic obstacles in an effort to collect rents from wealthy, but politically weak, communities.

To protect themselves in Liberia, Lebanese businesses hire Liberian lawyers, place Liberian politicians on their corporate boards, or use Liberians as fronts for their operations. While this unholy alliance may benefit both the Liberian elite and their Lebanese clients/hostages, the situation is unhealthy for the country as a whole. This arrangement encourages financial corruption, disregard for the law, investment for short-term gains, racial hostility, and distrust. The arrangement also provides an incentive for politicians and regulators to implement and enforce rules that obstruct business (and therefore make it possible to collect bribes) rather than develop a climate that is supportive of productive economic activity.

Although I have rarely met a Liberian who agrees with me on this point, I think it is time to consider some form of open political representation, if not actual citizenship, for the Lebanese community.²³ Such a move would harness their considerable

skill, wealth, and determination for the good of the Liberian nation. I also believe that giving the Lebanese full political rights would make it more likely that they would discipline their own members who take advantage of Liberia's weak legal and political systems to pursue wealth in illegal and anti-social ways. The histories of Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa indicate that Asian, European, and Middle Eastern peoples can be integrated as productive and patriotic citizens. The histories of those countries also demonstrate that exclusion leads to economic decline or stagnation and to an increase in unlawful political and economic activity. While Liberians often say that the Lebanese and Mandingos need to be kept out of politics because they would simply add political dominance to their existing economic supremacy, in a truly democratic state such fears are unfounded. Neither group, particularly the Lebanese community, has the numerical strength to gain positions of political leadership without strong support from other elements in Liberian society.

Changing the status of Mandingo's and Lebanese is more dependent on a shift in political attitudes rather than on any structural change. Of course, for the Lebanese community, only a constitutional amendment would allow full political participation. But for both Mandingos and Lebanese, the end of exclusion will require a profound transformation of Liberian perspectives about ethnicity and race. One place to start this transformation would be to give more attention in the academic curriculum to the contributions of the Mandingos and Lebanese. Their role as entrepreneurs would be a fitting topic for textbooks and lessons from the elementary to the university level. Treating both groups with respect would also teach students to appreciate ethnic groups and religions in general. A second strategy to socialize Liberians to be more accepting of all peoples would be to include Lebanese in government posts. Although they cannot currently serve as cabinet ministers, legislators, governors, or supreme court justices, they could be appointed as advisors and counselors. A third strategy would be to support and expand the efforts of the Interfaith Council. This group, which has only moral authority, is widely credited with limiting the violence of the civil war. Their efforts prove that persuasion and socialization can have a powerful effect on people's behavior.

Problem Three: The Lack of Accountability and Transparency

The Problem Defined

Liberians have low expectations about integrity on the part of public officials. Although no one believed Doe or Taylor would be honest, there also has been deep disappointment in officials associated with the interim governments headed by Sawyer and Bryant. Recent accusations about corruption have implicated members of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, the executive branch, and the Liberian embassy in Washington. At a press conference, the Liberian Ambassador to the U.S. seemed to downplay the importance of corruption by suggesting that it was something

to be expected and tolerated. Although the records of Halliburton, Enron, World Com, Boeing, and the U.N. Oil for Food Program are proof that financial malfeasance is not limited to Africa, all would agree that Liberia must find effective tools to deal with the problem.

Corruption thrives in Liberia because of a number of factors. Poverty, low government salaries, complex legal and bureaucratic procedures, and weak accounting mechanisms all can be blamed. Furthermore, the chaos of civil war and the nature of reconstruction after a disaster contribute to corruption. Transparency International's 2005 report notes that corruption flourishes in a context of confusion and change. Corruption is an even greater problem when money flows in for larger projects such as infrastructure rebuilding.²⁴

Structural Solutions to the Problem of Accountability and Transparency

Although it may seem counterintuitive, one way to reduce corruption might be to include patronage as part of the public budget. For example, the Liberian president could be given 10% of the national government's budget to dispense as patronage. The money could be spent in any way the president wished, the only stipulation being that the expenditures would be accounted for publicly. The president would also be allowed to transfer his patronage rights to others, for example to government ministers, regional party leaders, or local chiefs. Again, the only restriction would be that those individuals would need to give a public accounting of how they used the money. This strategy would 1) recognize the fact that patronage is a normal part of Liberian culture, 2) provide an incentive for using patronage for the greatest common good, and 3) actually reduce the level of extra-budgetary patronage from current levels.²⁵

Also, in the area of structural reform, a reduction and simplification of government regulations would reduce corruption. Although rules are ostensibly in place to protect the people against predatory or dangerous business practices, too often rules serve only as excuses for government personnel to extract money from business. Instead of waiting hours, days or weeks for official documents held up because of legal or bureaucratic complexities, business people pay off officials who essentially act as rent collectors. The result is a loss of profits and an increase in inefficiency that harms every Liberian. An anti-business climate is not unique to Liberia; many American counties and cities have been accused of excessive regulation. In my own city of Spokane, Washington, in response to such criticism, the mayor streamlined the agencies, insisted that all government offices simplify their procedures, and called on all public officials to treat the people asking for services as valued customers. The mayor did not reduce taxes nor did he soften environmental or zoning laws. He simply made the process more understandable and more efficient. The change in the political culture made Spokane a more business friendly city without undermining protections needed by the citizens.

Over the years, Liberians have struggled unsuccessfully to control corruption. Legal mechanisms, separate monitoring agencies (for example Liberia's Cash Management Committee), scrutiny by the press, and the election of well-intentioned leaders have all failed. Evidence that Liberian officials sold iron ore to China at under-market prices and revelations in 2005 that the Ministry of Health accredited a non-existent medical school point to the problems inherent in complex transactions. Stephen Krasner has gone so far as to suggest that governments such as Liberia's should simply contract out certain services to external agencies that could be expected to manage affairs with more integrity and efficiency. Should Krasner's idea of "shared sovereignty" be adopted in Liberia, an outside body might oversee and collect the revenues from the ports; shipping registrations, and rubber, mineral, timber, and fishing concessions. Similar bodies might supervise road, rail, and airport construction; administer rebuilding the water, sewer, and electric system; and offer accounting services to the national government. According to Krasner, such an arrangement would bring expertise and integrity into process of public administration.²⁶ Although seemingly novel, Krasner's ideas are similar to what has been tried in the past.²⁷ His is another example of a structural solution. He pins his hopes on adherence to rules; the only difference is that he believes outside contractors could be expected to follow the rules more faithfully than people within the country.

To some extent, Krasner may be correct. Outside contractors would be less subject to pressures from family and friends expecting patronage. While Liberians should consider Krasner's ideas, they must accept the fact that rules and structural arrangements alone will not solve the problem.²⁸ The multiplicity and complexity of government decisions, regulations, and transactions make it impossible for them to be monitored adequately, let alone controlled, completely. Although not writing specifically about the problem of corruption, Francis Fukuyama offers a theoretical explanation about why it is so difficult to police the behavior of public servants. Like teaching or medicine, public administration is highly individualized and involves a complex set of transactions. Both teachers and doctors must make countless decisions as they diagnose, identify probable outcomes, decide on strategies of action, and measure the results. Given the unique character of every encounter, it is important that service providers (in this case teachers and doctors) have a great deal of autonomy when making decisions about how best to accomplish their goals. Furthermore, they must be afforded much latitude when measuring and explaining results. Of course, some aspects of teaching and medicine are standardized, for example taking attendance in class or giving mass polio inoculations, but many elements are highly personalized and idiosyncratic. Thus, the work of a doctor or teacher cannot easily be monitored or regulated. The same is true for public administration. The sheer number of transactions and the fact that personal judgments often come into play means that it is impossible to end corrupt behavior by regulations and systems alone. For example, there probably were carefully crafted legal documents justifying every aspect of the sale of iron ore to

China. Most likely those documents would stand up in court. What did not exit, at least not in the public domain, were the secret records about kickback agreements and financial transactions that presumably resulted in the transfer of Chinese funds into foreign accounts of Liberian officials. The case of the fictitious St. Luke School of Medicine is another example of how difficult it is to stop corruption. Although initially an ethical dean at the University of Liberia was able to block accreditation, a dishonest official in the Department of Health circumvented the dean's efforts. Because of the necessary complexity of government, the multitude of channels, authorities, and rules makes it possible for a persistent wrong-doer eventually to find a way to profit from corruption.

Socialization Solutions to the Problem of Accountability and Transparency

Although rules, penalties, and structures will always be essential elements in the never-ending struggle against corruption, it is clear that anti-corruption efforts must also be directed at the attitudinal level, the domain of political culture. Attitudes and expectations are just as important as accountants and external experts. One place to start would be the Liberian family. Liberians tend to view the family and kin group as distributors of wealth rather than as engines of economic production. The Kpelle proverb, "A rich man is like a pond, all the birds come there to drink," expresses the way many people think about family and wealth. Consequently, friends and relatives become a burden on the prosperous rather than a source of production and wealth creation. For people working in any public capacity, the result is incessant pressure to divert funds, provide jobs, offer insider knowledge, and make special concessions that undermine government authority. Businesspeople in the private sector face similar challenges.

Liberians need to find culturally appropriate ways to change this pattern. Although it would be impractical and immoral to abandon family in an effort to end corruption and parasitism, Liberians must find a way to make the family a tool for wealth creation. As has been demonstrated in Asia, close kin ties and deep loyalty to family have long been used to generate savings, provide loyal and low-cost labor, build a reservoir of commercial knowledge, and assemble a network of trustworthy business partners. Historically, in Liberia's Lebanese community, the family has been an engine of wealth creation and a conduit for investment. Perhaps Liberians can learn from the Asian and Lebanese examples.

In order to combat dishonesty in public life, Liberians need to develop a culture of shame regarding corruption. In spite of the outrage in the media and among people committed to reform in Liberia, the fact is that most Liberians at every level tolerate corruption. In part this may be because they are too disheartened and disillusioned to express indignation; in part this may be because corruption is regarded as normal and inevitable; in part this may be because they hesitate to accuse or humiliate friends or

family members; in part this may be because they hope to benefit from insider advantage. Because Liberia is such a face-to-face society, it is tempting to treat everyone with politeness when in their presence. But if people who engage in corruption were excluded from social events, snubbed by the business community, and chastised by their churches or mosques, Liberia might develop a culture that curtailed rather than tolerated corruption. In the past, the Liberian political elite used organizations such as the Free Masons to socialize and discipline its members. Although the focus of the Masonic lodge was on gaining and holding power, in theory such an organization could reorient its emphasis to encourage public morality. In rural Liberia, Sande, Poro, and other structures controlled by elders regulated behavior. Although it may be unrealistic to expect these institutions to regain their former power, their rituals, educational programs, and moral values should inform current efforts to restore integrity in public life.

Another way to encourage transparency would be for some agency—the media, an ecumenical religious group, the Chamber of Commerce, or the universities—to publish simple-to-understand visual records of government revenues and expenditures. Such documents would need to be clear to average Liberians. Until ordinary citizens have a basic understanding of the amounts and sources of revenue and also of the amounts and categories of money spent, there will never be sufficient public pressure to encourage reform. While some may claim that illiterate people cannot comprehend the intricacies of complex government budgets, government finances are not unlike individual household budgets, except that the amounts are larger. During the 2004 American presidential campaign, Ben Cohen of the Ben and Jerry's ice cream company used a very effective animated graphic that explained the US budget using stacks of cookies to represent various categories such as military, social service, and educational expenditures. Because of that graph, people with no previous exposure to public finance instantly understood the macro-budgetary picture. Perhaps the rotating sign on Broad Street could be rehabilitated for a similar use. Billboards in Gbarnga, Buchanan, Kakata, Cape Mount, and Harper could carry the message as well.

A final suggestion/recommendation for dealing with corruption would be to establish anti-corruption support groups among Liberians. In Kenya, a nation infamous for corruption, a number of churches have organized anti-corruption gatherings for businesspeople. During the lunch hour or in the evening, professionals meet to discuss the pressures pushing them to engage in corruption (offering bribes, bending rules, giving jobs to kin) and offer suggestions about how to resist the practice. The people who gather are motivated by their religious convictions, by the belief that corruption is ruining their country, and by the knowledge that corruption is an impediment to profitability. They benefit from the meetings by gaining moral support from their colleagues and by learning ways to stand firm against the practices of corruption. As people directly involved in the economic and political system of Kenya, they are expert about the pitfalls and about strategies for avoiding corruption. Significantly, their

efforts have had some success. For example, they discovered that businesses that gained a reputation for never giving bribes—even small gifts to police, customs officers, and licensing agents—soon were subject to far fewer demands for illegal payments.

Problem Four: An educational system that encourages obedience and deference rather than individual initiative, economic development, and appropriate research

The Problem Defined

In *Popular Political Culture, Civil Society, and State Crisis in Liberia*, I argue that Liberia's educational system gives too much attention to teaching people about statues, privilege, respect, deference, and obedience rather than focusing on genuine learning and inquiry. Furthermore, too many students regard a diploma as a ticket to life-long entitlement rather than as a certificate of competency. From its inception, Liberian education has been designed to celebrate, support, and solidify social hierarchy as much or more than to stimulate curiosity and practical learning.²⁹ The previously noted problems—unhealthy social divisions, the exclusion of certain groups from full political participation, and an economic and kin system that emphasizes patronage linkages rather than individual effort and investment for productivity—are reinforced by an educational system that socializes for obedience and relies on rote memorization rather than teaches practical skills or habits of inquiry.

Structural Solutions to Problems in the Educational System

Adequate and appropriate textbooks, better classrooms (especially in the rural areas), regular pay for teachers, improved supervision and training for teachers, and money for universal primary education are some of the structural challenges Liberians must deal with as they seek to improve the educational system.³⁰ Because both the people and politicians favor improvement in all of these areas, they will be implemented when the budget allows. But, the structural problems are not only related to finances. Although the lack of books is a serious matter, the problem of appropriate content and focus is a more difficult challenge. Even if there was sufficient money to purchase and distribute textbooks, the books' contents need to be revised. How might that be accomplished?

One suggestion would be to mobilize the Liberian diaspora to develop new textbooks for elementary and secondary schools. As just one example, I will consider the topic of Liberian history books. Although there are competent social scientists living in Liberia, few have the time or the access to scholarly material needed to prepare a good history of Liberia that takes into account newer directions in research or the events of the last two or three decades. It should, however, be possible to organize a group of Liberianists living in the United States and commission them to write a good

basic history of Liberia. Such a history would include themes and topics not commonly treated in existing materials. While Liberians living in the diaspora may want to undertake such a project out of a desire to assist their country of origin, they may also want to create such a text for the benefit of their own children. Liberians living in America frequently worry that their children will lose touch with their Liberian roots. Thus, they would not only assist in writing educational materials that would recount the story of Liberia, they would purchase such materials for their own children. While I have dwelt on the topic of history, one could imagine textbooks on Liberian culture, oral and written literature, geography, and religion. These books would not ignore Liberia's flaws, but neither would they denigrate her many accomplishments.

Socialization Solutions to Problems in the Educational System

Rather than offering a menu of socialization options in the realm of education, I will deal only a strategy for reorienting the curriculum in two crucial areas. The first would be to revise the curriculum so that it takes the unity of Liberia's people into account; the second would be to introduce materials that encourage economic development. Hopefully, these suggestions would be relevant for dealing with other problems.

The previous discussion of writing a history curriculum dealt with the structural mechanics of such a process. The following paragraphs will address the content of books about Liberia's past. A new history of Liberia should include themes and topics not commonly treated in existing materials. A rewritten history of Liberia should emphasize all the people rather than just selected leaders, mainly of settlers or individuals of settler descent. Thus, the story would begin with a description of the Kwa, Mel, and Mande peoples who hunted, fished, farmed, and traded in the area that later became Liberia. Only afterwards would the story of the story of settlers from America and other regions be introduced. Without overlooking the distinctive characteristics of the various indigenous communities, the section on early history would point out the similarities and connections among these people working to make a living in a very challenging ecological setting. This section would also describe the trade that was oriented first toward the great savanna empires and subsequently toward the coast. The variety of political structures ranging from chiefdoms to secret societies would be discussed. Here, both the positive and negative aspects of traditional political systems would receive attention. This section would also note the malleable nature of ethnic boundaries which allowed people to move across tribal lines, not just in terms of trade, marriage, and pawnship, but also as people actually switched or constructed ethnic identities. This section on Liberia before 1820 would include representative myths and legends explaining the origins and political ideology of Liberia's indigenous peoples. In addition, the history of this early period would point out that virtually all of the people living in Liberia in the early 1800s were immigrants from other places.

Without going into as much detail about the following sections of a history book, I would note only that it might discuss similarities and connections as well as differences and lines of separation. Although the emigrants from America reflected their New World experience, they had also retained many African values and social patterns. Furthermore, when they settled in Liberia, they developed countless links to the local people. While some of these exchanges were violent, many more were cooperative as settlers and indigenes came together in the workplace, markets, farms, marriages (formal and informal), churches, schools, and in traditional supernatural practices. Furthermore, the many recaptives who arrived in 1846 and after deserve serious attention. Not only did these people—many from Nigeria and Central Africa—introduce African values into the settler community, they served as a bridge between the settlers and the indigenous peoples.

Any history of Liberia must deal with the issue of borders, debts, concessionary companies, and presidents, but these topics should not be allowed to monopolize a textbook. The long history of Kru men working outside Liberia, the efforts of Liberian entrepreneurs to engage in commerce and grow export crops, the endeavors of indigenous communities to cope with the intrusions of Monrovia, the argument of people such as Blyden that all Liberians should join together, the impact of rubber production on interior villages, and the perspectives of chiefs and traditional religious leaders about “modernization” are all worthy of inclusion in a new history textbook. In addition, such a textbook should be filled with first-person accounts about life in Liberia. A good textbook should give adequate attention to voices too often not heard. The experiences of women, children, and the elderly deserve attention. Textbook writers should describe how those people were affected by the great events and movements in Liberian economic, social, political, and religious history. Itinerant imams, Mandingo traders, and indigenous Christian preachers and teachers should be given voice. That voice should be authentic and not just expressed from the perspective of the western trained intellectuals.

Finally, any good textbook must deal with the events and ideas of the last 25 years. The Doe revolution, the failure of the Doe regime, the civil war, and reconstruction are all topics that must be addressed. Again, the voices of the participants, both winners and losers, deserve to be heard. The perspective of families who lost loved ones in the 1980 coup, the dreams of “country people” when Doe took power, the strategies of students and journalists who worked for transparency and good governance, the expectations of child soldiers, the hopes of the women who called for peace, the desperation of the refugees, the intentions of the emigrants to America, the poetry of people like Patricia Wesley, and the plight of people who remained in Liberia should all be a part of any good history used by students. Such a history should also look at the ecological consequences of war and unfettered mining, logging, and hunting.

Although incomplete, the list of topics and themes noted above is too ambitious for a single textbook. However, they could be covered over the course of a child's

educational career. Furthermore, some of the topics could be dealt with by having students themselves conduct oral interview or even describe their own experiences. Allowing the students to participate in the process of reconstructing history would send a number of useful messages. First, it would tell them that history is about people like themselves, not just about distant people living in the Executive Mansion. Second, it suggests that education is about active participation and discovery, not just about rote memorization and accepting answers from authority figures. Third, it would help students realize that there are many different perspectives about the past, not just one official position that must not be challenged. And fourth, it would help students recognize that well-intentioned people made mistakes and than much maligned leaders may have tried to do some good. Hopefully, such a history would begin to heal some of the cultural, social, religious, and regional divisions that have been used to injure Liberia.

Liberian educational materials should encourage young people to contribute to the economic well being of society. Although this will take many paths, one strategy to confront the challenge of economic progress might be to introduce practical business education into all levels of the curriculum. Because business touches so many areas of life, virtually any school subject from primary school though university could include topics involving business. Reading, math, spelling, social studies, science, religion and ethnics, and even art could all contain some business/economic content. At the elementary level, material about farmers, market women, taxi drivers and owners, shop keepers, furniture makers, mechanics, bankers, money lenders, food wholesalers, retailers of used clothing, and tailors could be incorporated into stories for reading lessons, math classes, the science curriculum, and history. The material could be based on real-life examples that would motivate and instruct students. At the secondary and university levels, the instructional methods and teaching material could become more complex and more hands on. Field trips and internships could acquaint students with real challenges and opportunities. Actual research on market demographics, consumer preferences, sources of business financing, suppliers, transport costs, money lending, accounting practices, business clustering, attitudes about business people, and government's impact on small business could be carried out by students in high school and university.

Incorporating business into the curriculum could lead to many benefits. First, school-work would become more tangible and hands-on. Because many people are concrete rather than abstract learners, real learning would be enhanced. Second, field trips, internships, and research could help students develop a respect and admiration for individuals that students might ordinarily look down on as people with less education or status. Third, more focus on business would help students learn about how challenging it is to operate even a seemingly simple business. Should such students eventually become members of the political elite, they would be more attentive to the needs of the business community. Fourth, an emphasis on the practical details of business

would help students to develop a respect for vocations that do not center around an office, a suit and tie, a title, or a government salary. This respect might even translate into students deciding to seek work in the production sector rather than the service sector of the economy. Fifth, the study of past business failures or abuses by businesses would alert students to the treacheries of the global market, the dangers of environmental pillaging, and to the fact that profits do not come easily. Sixth, through classes in ethics and religion, students could be introduced to case studies about real life choices and dilemmas faced by people in business. Thus, after graduation, if they enter into business or into an area of public service where they must deal with businesspeople, they will be better equipped to make ethical decisions instead of taking the first steps toward supporting corruption. Also, such classes may help students navigate the narrow path that separates generosity and kindness from being victimized by friends and kin hoping to benefit from a businessperson's prosperity. Seventh, more education and research about business, especially at the small business level, could provide useful data for national and county leaders struggling to improve the economy. Instead of reading theoretical studies about obstacles to business around the world, Liberian policy makers would be better served by surveys conducted by high school and university students in which they collected the opinions of local taxi drivers or market vendors about what are their greatest challenges. Their difficulties may be lack of capital, unreliable suppliers, an unresponsive government bureaucracy, family pressures, inadequate infrastructure, theft, or lack of accounting skills. Until government officials understand the obstacles faced by business people, they will not be able to formulate effective policies to combat the problems. Eighth, students would see the importance of small business. Currently, when thinking about economic development, too many young people pin their hopes on an external, almost magical solution. They regard an MNC, an NGO, or foreign aid as the answer to Liberia's economic problems. Not enough attention is given to the place of individual entrepreneurs and small businesses in growing the economy, providing employment, supplying the people's basic needs and as targets for savings and investment. For Liberia to prosper, the country's educational system must intentionally socialize people to think about economics in a new way.

Conclusions

As Liberians look to the future they face a number of great challenges. First, the nation is in desperate need of security. Unless the people can live in a country marked by law and order, not guns, child soldiers, bandits and warlords, the society will not move forward. Second, the nation also needs a functional and responsive political and economic system. Although that system need not be patterned after western democracy or American-style capitalism, it must protect basic human rights and it must operate for the benefit of the people. As important as these two needs are, Liberia faces a third, and equally important, challenge. Liberians must work to build a healthy

political culture because political culture is the foundation of all political belief and behavior. My paper has identified a number of areas that I believe need improvement.

The paper also offers a series of concrete ideas about how to address the problems in Liberian political culture. Some of these proposals are merely mentioned in passing, others are described in more detail. However, all of the suggestions are intended for illustrative purposes only. My hope is that Liberians themselves will develop concrete, practical, and cost effective strategies for rectifying some of the dysfunctional components of their political culture. An outsider such as myself cannot do that. All across Liberia and in America, Liberians are identifying and discussing problems related to security, good governance, and economic development. It is just as important that when Liberians gather in person or electronically that they talk about the issue of political culture. What are the strengths and weaknesses of that culture? What are practical ways to redeem and preserve the good in that culture and also to mitigate that which is harmful? Such a discussion should include people from all regions of Liberia, from all religious groups, from all income levels, and from both genders.

As Liberia struggles to restore stability and hold elections, the focus has been on power—military and political. News reports from Liberia describe failures and successes in controlling bandits and former rebels, in revising the constitution, and in preparing for elections. Thus, the attention has been on threats to power, on the proper exercise of power, and on who will come into power. While managing and gaining power are essential topics for citizens, politicians, and social scientists, there is another important and fundamental issue that must be considered. That is the matter of political culture and rights. Liberians need to give just as much attention to those topics as to laws, political parties, and elections. It is essential that Liberia develop a political culture that addresses and protects rights as much as it pursues power. In the end, all Liberians have a right to a political system that deals with division in a healthy way, that includes all people with a permanent stake in the country, that promotes accountability, and that fosters education that seeks the common good. A healthy political culture is foundational to that system.

Endnotes

- 1 Andrew Reynolds, "Building Democracy After Conflict: Constitutional Medicine," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 54-68.
- 2 Larry Diamond, "Building Democracy After Conflict: Lessons From Iraq," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 9-23.
- 3 Larry Goodson, "Building Democracy After Conflict: Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 24-38.
- 4 For an excellent discussion of this topic see Lisa Anderson, "Antiquated Before They Can Ossify; States That Fail Before They Form," *Journal of International Affairs* 58 (Fall 2004): 1-16.
- 5 Goodson, 29.
- 6 Stephen D. Krasner, "State Building After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005): 69-83.

- 7 Francis Fukuyama, "Why There Is No Science of Public Administration," *Journal of International Affairs* 58 (Fall 2004): 189-201. Page 191. Commenting further, Fukuyama says that corruption is best defined as following principles or interests that diverge from those of the larger organization within which one works.
- 8 Krasner's idea of shared sovereignty, while it may work, side steps the issue of voluntary compliance by outsourcing areas of government most likely to be subverted by local political culture.
- 9 Joel S. Migdal, "State Building and the Non-Nation State," *Journal of International Affairs* 58 (Fall 2004): 17-46.
- 10 John C. Yoder, *Popular Political Culture, Civil Society, and State Crisis in Liberia*, (Edwin Mellen Press, 2003).
- 11 In many respects my argument parallels that of Cyril Broderick who writes about the need for self-sufficiency in agriculture. As Broderick notes, to achieve true security, Liberians must develop the capacity to solve their own problems. See Cyril E. Broderick, "Food, Agriculture, and Peace for Liberia," *All Africa*, March 8, 2005.
- 12 Migdal.
- 13 A central argument of my book *Popular Political Culture, Civil Society, and State Crisis in Liberia* is that Liberians overemphasized order in an effort to combat the dangers of division. Although physical and social coercion controlled the problem temporarily, the solution was short-term and the side-effects were lethal.
- 14 Yoder. See chapters 2 and 3.
- 15 Recaptives, often called "Congoes," were the men and women captured while on the Middle Passage. Rather than be repatriated to their lands of origin or allowed to live in the United States, many were settled in Liberia. In 1846, 756 people were delivered to Liberia and in 1860 4,701 more came. Significantly, only about 13,000 immigrants from America came to Liberia before 1865. Curiously, the recaptives are virtually unacknowledged in histories about Liberia. One might speculate that this omission is the result of a tendency to suppress evidence of Africanization within the settler community. Because the recaptives were "integrated" into settler society, one must assume they were instrumental in linking the settlers to African culture.
- 16 Ibid, chapters 1 and 4-7.
- 17 "Review Rural Consultation Strategy," *All Africa*, March 11, 2005.
- 18 Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (Yale University Press, 1977).
- 19 Krasner, op. cit.
- 20 The titles of some of the best known books on Liberia acknowledge that fact. Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy, The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (New York University Press, 1999), J. Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Quest for Democracy* (Indiana University Press, 1987), Amos Sawyer, *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia* (Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992).
- 21 Yoder, p. 350.
- 22 Before this suggestion is dismissed as trivial, readers should recall that an important aspect of the Jewish Seder meal is an empty chair and a glass of wine for the prophet Elijah, who serves as a reminder of the restoration of the messianic kingdom.
- 23 A measure short of full citizenship would be to allow the Lebanese community to be represented in the National Legislative Assembly or be eligible to serve on the Supreme Court.
- 24 Transparency International, *Annual Report 2005*. According to Transparency International's president Peter Eigen, "Corruption is nowhere more deeply rooted than it is in the building and public works sectors."
- 25 J. Mills Jones estimates that in 1984-5 nearly 25% of the total government expenditures could not be accounted for in the national budget. "Development Planning, Politics and the Bureaucracy: The Liberian Experience," *Liberian Studies Journal* 11, no. 1 (1986), p. 5 and 14. While I

suggested a 10% for the president, smaller numbers could be used for other political figures. There could be a sunset provision that would be met by reducing the total number by a percentage point each year.

- 26 Krasner, op. cit.
- 27 From a purely operational perspective, this strategy seems to have worked well with LAMCO and with the U.S. office handling Liberian shipping registrations. However, this type of arrangement failed in the early 20th century when American and European interests forced Liberia to accept outside management of the budget and armed forces. In those latter cases, outside governments and corporations had a clear conflict of interest that prevented them from working for the good of Liberia.
- 28 William Powers's recent book, *The People of Blue Clay*, acknowledges that even an organization such as Catholic Relief Services could not control corruption within its ranks.
- 29 Yoder, chapter 7, pp. 305-54.
- 30 In her keynote address to the 37th annual meeting of the Liberian Studies Association in Kalamazoo, Michigan in April 2005, Minister of Education Dr. Evelyn Kandakai noted these and additional structural problems.

Peacekeeping in Liberia: ECOMOG and the Struggle for Order

Charles W. Hartwig*

Introduction

Very significant changes in the role international organizations play in dispute settlement have taken place during the past fifteen or so years, most notably at the United Nations. Among the many far-reaching developments during the 1990s were the successes of several United Nations efforts to implement and expand the peacekeeping concept pioneered by the UN in the mid-1950's. (This is distinct from the older [and ongoing] UN "**observer**" mission practice, which dates back to 1948.) These successes led to the creation of even more UN "peacekeeping" missions, such as in Angola, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia, to cite a few, with several breaking new ground by taking on elements of peace-making. Two cases of *preventive* peace operations have even been deployed—in the Central African Republic and FYR Macedonia. Some of these ventures were hardly "successful" however, such as the missions in Rwanda and Somalia. In addition, the practice has developed wherein "UN Peacekeeping" has evolved into two major categories or types, both of which use the term "peacekeeping": missions which are (a) truly internationally-supported, based on the concept of neutral outside forces intervening—such as in Namibia and Cambodia, and (b) missions *authorized* by the UN, but in reality led and often created by a major power—such as the 1990 Gulf War campaign against Iraq and UN "peacekeeping" operations in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Haiti.¹ While these innovations in international organizations were taking place, another new development occurred in West Africa in 1990, where a regional, economic-oriented organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created a multinational peacekeeping force of its own in an effort to resolve a civil war in Liberia, one of ECOWAS's founding members. Three years later, with the ECOWAS peacekeeping force known by the acronym ECOMOG bogged down in controversy and conflict, the United Nations created a new type of observer force (UNOMIL) to collaborate with the original West African force, which itself was modified by the addition of

* Dr. Hartwig is an American Liberianist. He served as a Fulbright professor at Cuttington University College from 1985 to 1986. He is a Professor of Political Science at Arkansas State University.

African troops from outside the West African area (thanks to UN and US financial support). UNOMIL was a new type of UN force because it was the first to be specifically designed to cooperate with a regional organization's peacekeeping or peacemaking force. UNOMIL pulled out of Liberia in September of 1997, following the election that brought Charles Taylor to power, and ECOMOG itself pulled out of Liberia in November of 1999. [After Liberia's civil wars resumed during Taylor's troubled tenure as Liberia's President, a new ECOWAS peacekeeping military force landed in Monrovia in August, 2003, known as the ECOWAS Mission to Liberia, or ECOMIL. ECOMIL did not last long, however, since it was transformed by UN Security Council action the next month into a formal UN peacekeeping operation of up to 15,000 troops, which got the new acronym of UNMIL. The formal transformation of the West African peacekeepers into UN troops took place on October 1, 2003, with the now-familiar painting of helmets blue.] This chapter is *not* an overview of all past and current international peacekeeping in Liberia, but rather is a brief effort to ask whether the early, or first-generation ECOWAS action and subsequent evolution was a new and promising development in the theory and practice of international peacekeeping,² a one-time fluke, and/or a major blunder which could possibly doom ECOWAS.

Peacekeeping

The original "Type A" United Nations peacekeeping model developed in the 1956 Suez crisis calls for the insertion of lightly-armed neutral troops between two opposing sides in a conflict, to act as a buffer while—it is hoped—negotiations and a settlement of the conflict are reached via diplomacy and other means.³ Although the UN itself has had mixed success in attempting this method of preventive diplomacy, it has done better than the past occasional efforts by regional international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Organization of African Unity (OAU), both of which had specific sections of their constitutions or charters which provided for possible multilateral military intervention by the organization. The OAU especially virtually collapsed over disputes which seemed to have the potential for being assisted by a peacekeeping force, e.g., ones involving Chad, Western Sahara, and Zaire, since in practice these conflicts created severe divisions among OAU member states, and played a role in the evolution of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2002.

The UN's forty-plus years of peacekeeping experience has by now engendered numerous practitioner and academic analyses,⁴ although most writings have been single case studies, with very little theory-building attempted until fairly recently. Laura Neack has pointed out that as of 1995, there had been a grand total of ONE published *comparative* study of peacekeeping, based on six cases of peacekeeping (four UN and two multinational) in the Middle East, and that came out in 1988!⁵ Paul Diehl, the author of that sole study, attempted to generate a tentative predictor model of success for peacekeeping forces by establishing several "conditions for success" in peacekeep-

ing operations.⁶ His findings suggested that *the* most important condition in predicting success is a willingness by third party states and sub-national groups to stop fighting and accept the peacekeeping force.⁷ Other significant conditions include the need for the peacekeeping force to geographically keep the hostile forces apart, and for the peacekeepers to be perceived as neutral by all concerned.⁸ While still relevant, Diehl found overrated the importance of the roles of the superpowers and the question of whether or not the force has a clear mandate.⁹ While Diehl might have been a somewhat lonely early pioneer in trying to develop practical guidelines for future decision-makers in potential peace-creating situations, the explosion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War created an urgent need for such guidelines, and the UN itself finally came up with a comprehensive study in 2000, informally known as the Brahimi Report, named after the of the panel that made the study, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi.¹⁰

Since the Brahimi Report was ten years in the future when things started to fall apart in Liberia in 1990, with Diehl's model in mind then, the ECOWAS decision in August of 1990 to create a peacekeeping force in Liberia will now be examined to see if it met his conditions for success. The action of the UN Security Council on September 22, 1993 to create a supporting UN Observer Mission (UNOMIL) will then be reviewed, again in the context of Diehl's model.¹¹ The following is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation or explanation of ECOMOG, but rather an outline of the major facts and developments of this unique experiment in international conflict resolution.¹²

Liberia

Liberia is a country about the size of Ohio, with an estimated 2.5 million citizens. Founded in the 1820's by ex-slaves and freedmen from the United States, it has maintained a special relationship with the United States over the years.¹³ In 1980 the ruling class of "Americo-Liberians," descended from the original colonists who had completely dominated the political and economic life of the country since independence in 1847, were overthrown in a bloody coup by a handful of noncommissioned officers in the army, led by a Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. Initially hailed by much of the population as a man of the people, Doe gradually turned into a clone of the President he had killed, complete with corrupt officials from a favored group; fancy clothes, cars, and other symbols of power [proudly including an honorary doctorate in international relations from the University of Seoul]; plus an intolerance of even mild criticism.¹⁴ After surviving a several challenges, including a serious counter-coup attempt in 1985, Doe installed himself as President of the "Second Republic" in 1986, and watched with suspicious isolation from his fortified Executive Mansion as the country lurched from one economic crisis to another. Even the Reagan Administration, which had initially turned Liberia into the largest recipient of US foreign (mostly military) aid in Africa after Doe briefly flirted with the USSR and Libya, eventually cut off most

assistance in the late 1980's after Doe's government repeatedly reneged on promised reforms and debt payments.

In December of 1989, a small band of rebels led by a former Doe minister named Charles Taylor entered Liberia's Nimba County (in the north-central part of the country), from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire. President Doe sent in two battalions of army troops, who apparently assumed that most of the Mano and Gio people in the Nimba region of the country were supporting the rebels and responded to the challenge in a very brutal, scorched-earth fashion, turning thousands of surviving Liberians into enemies, and thousands more into refugees. Taylor's forces, supposedly aided by Libya via Burkina Faso,¹⁵ gradually gained strength and forced Doe's army back to the capital of Monrovia.¹⁶ By late July, 1990, President Doe's forces continued to hold only central Monrovia and the Executive Mansion, while a small fleet of mostly US warships—which among other things carried several thousand US Marines—hovered offshore. As Taylor's forces prepared for the final assault on Doe, a breakaway rebel force led by former Taylor aide Prince Johnson slipped into central Monrovia, wresting control of the devastated area from government troops. One of the worst of many atrocities took place the next day, July 30th, when troops in government uniforms massacred at least 600 persons, mostly Mano and Gio women, children, and old persons in Monrovia's largest Lutheran church, which had been serving as a Red Cross refugee center.

At this point in the civil war, with three competing fighting forces located in the shattered capital city, it seemed as if the international community was finally about to take decisive action to halt the killings. Several members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, pressed for a formal Security Council debate on the Liberian crisis in New York, and began working on possible courses of action. Then on August 2nd, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the UN and much of the rest of the world promptly forgot about Liberia. Back in Monrovia, Prince Johnson finally got the US Marines to come ashore three days later by kidnapping several foreigners, including some Americans, and threatening to shoot them. The Americans were quickly released after the Marines landed, but the Marines confined their presence to the US Embassy grounds and a few other US installations, such as the large Voice of America station outside the city. A military stalemate among the three Liberian forces developed, while at the same time it became clear that neither the United States nor the United Nations was going to take decisive military action. It now became evident that if any definitive solution to the Liberian civil war was going to take place, it was going to be an African one. In this context, then, the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided on a new course of action, and a peacekeeping force with troops from five countries (the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone), called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, or "ECOMOG," landed in Monrovia in late August of 1990.

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, was formally created in 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos, signed by fifteen states in West Africa. (A 16th member, Cape Verde, joined in 1977.) Inspired in part by the pan-African dreams of the 1950's and 1960's and several earlier efforts at economic coordination, ECOWAS owed much to the efforts of its giant member, Nigeria.¹⁷ Intended to promote trade, cooperation and self-reliance in West Africa, ECOWAS to date has not been very successful in its primary mission of economic cooperation, due in large part to competing intergovernmental organizations—especially among its Francophone members—state failures to meet financial obligations, and unilateral actions such as Nigeria's infamous overnight expulsion of 1-2 million alien workers in 1983, mostly from other ECOWAS countries—roughly 50% of them from Ghana.¹⁸ [Nigeria defended its action, which created "...the largest forced migration of people since the 19th century"¹⁹ by claiming that it was taken during the financial crisis which followed the end of the oil boom era, was technically not illegal, even under ECOWAS rules, and was simply an economic necessity.²⁰]

An ECOWAS move virtually ignored in the West was the creation of a defense pact in 1981, at the ECOWAS annual summit conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Nigeria pushed hard for the pact, and Radio Nigeria commented on June 8, 1981, after the pact had been signed, that "the significance of a defense protocol cannot be over-emphasized, as ECOWAS is the first major grouping of African states to take a concrete step towards the creation of a defense organization."²¹ Glossed over at the time was the fact that three of the sixteen member-states of ECOWAS, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, had strongly objected to the proposal from the start, and refused to sign the defense pact.²² The defense pact, formally known as the "Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense," identified three categories of hostile military actions which could call for an ECOWAS response: (a) aggression from a non-member state; (b) conflict between member states, which specifically (Article 17) called for the deployment of a peacekeeping force upon a decision of the Authority; and (c) internal conflict in a member state, if that conflict is actively maintained and sustained from the outside.²³

The 1990 Liberian civil war had concerned many of the ECOWAS states, although for sometimes different reasons. Burkina Faso was an early and consistent supporter and supplier of Charles Taylor's forces, which also got some help from Côte d'Ivoire. Once the conflict became severe, and large-scale refugee problems were created, several ECOWAS countries, Ghana and Nigeria especially, became very concerned about the fate of their citizens trapped in Liberia.²⁴ The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (comprised of the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and Togo) became actively involved in mid-1990 in attempting to help with the refugee crisis, both in Liberia and in neighboring countries—especially Guinea and Sierra Leone—after most Liberians became refugees or displaced persons, either inside their country or over the border.

The Mediation Committee, chaired by Gambia, then became actively involved in various cease-fire proposals, all of which failed. On August 7th, the committee, meeting in Gambia after another failed peace conference, with UN and world attention suddenly focused on Kuwait, decided to propose an ECOWAS peacekeeping force to go to Liberia to stop the killing. Also proposed was the creation of an "Interim Government" of Liberia, to help restore order and lead to general elections. This proposal was accepted by ECOWAS as a whole, and the 3000-man (later tripled in size) ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force arrived via sea in Monrovia on August 24, 1990. The force included troops from the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, commanded by a Ghanaian general.²⁵ An "all-Liberia" meeting was convened by ECOWAS in Banjul, Gambia, in late August, and Dr. Amos Sawyer, a Liberian political scientist and former dean at the University of Liberia, was selected by the "representative Liberians present" as the Interim President of Liberia.²⁶

The ECOMOG force, literally from the day it arrived in Monrovia, was caught up in fighting. Although welcomed by the forces of President Doe and Prince Johnson, Charles Taylor's units, operating under the name National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), resisted the ECOWAS force from the start, fearing Nigeria's hand behind ECOMOG. (President Doe had developed a good relationship with Nigeria's President Babangida.) After ECOMOG had secured a base in the port area of Monrovia, President Doe suddenly decided to pay the ECOMOG headquarters a visit on September 9th, catching the peacekeeping force unprepared, according to Ghana's Foreign Secretary.²⁷ A group of fighters under Prince Johnson's personal command then arrived, and a gunfight between them and Doe's bodyguards left dozens dead, and Doe captured. Despite futile ECOMOG verbal protests, the President was taken away, grilled, tortured, and finally killed.

After bringing in a new Nigerian field commander, ECOMOG became actively involved in military action designed to secure Monrovia, which often meant fighting alongside Johnson's forces. (Calling themselves the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the late president's troops, mostly from Doe's Krahn ethnic group, still remained a viable force in the Executive Mansion area, and murdered dozens of civilians from ECOMOG countries in revenge for their leader's death.) After extensive fighting, which included attacks on NPFL positions by Nigerian jets based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, ECOMOG gained full control of the capital city in late October, 1990, and was able to bring in Interim President Sawyer. (Charles Taylor had also declared himself Interim President of what he began calling "Greater Liberia," with his capital being the interior town of Gbarnga, some 130 miles from Monrovia.) To complicate things further, breakaway elements of the AFL, the late president's army, formed in their stronghold near and across the border with Sierra Leone another movement in 1991, the "United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy," or ULIMO.²⁸ In an effort to enlarge its area of control, ULIMO launched sporadic attacks deeper into Sierra Leone, the rela-

tive success of which eventually led to a military coup in that country at the end of April 1992.

Diplomatic efforts by ECOWAS and other interested parties finally resulted in a real cease fire agreement being reached in Bamako, Mali, in November, 1990. Then an all-Liberia peace conference, involving all of the contending forces and interest groups, was convened in mid-March, 1991 in Monrovia. Like many other settlement attempts, this effort was only partially successful, but at least it led to the calling of a "final" peace conference. After many false starts and problems, and intense diplomatic efforts by key ECOWAS states such as Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, a peace settlement was finally inked in the Ivoirian capital of Yamoussoukro in October of 1991, calling for the disarmament of the various military factions by the ECOMOG force, with national elections to be held in 1992. Implementation of this agreement proved impossible, leading to more meetings and "agreements," such as an April 1992 mini-summit of West African leaders in Geneva, convened by Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny, attended by both Liberian "presidents"—Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer.²⁹ The relative peace which had lasted since the cease-fire of November, 1990 came to an abrupt end in August of 1992, when ULIMO successfully attacked NPFL positions from bases in Sierra Leone. Taylor's NPFL then launched a large-scale attack on Monrovia itself, codenamed "Operation Octopus."³⁰ After heavy fighting, the attack was repulsed, and ECOMOG decided to take the fight to Taylor's forces by launching an offensive operation of its own. In the heat of the battle for Monrovia, ECOMOG out of necessity enlisted both the AFL and ULIMO to help counter the NPFL.³¹ Despite ECOMOG reinforcements, the use of Nigerian jets for bombing and strafing, and the *de facto* alliance with the AFL and ULIMO forces, the counter-offensive did not gain back much territory from the NPFL, and the human rights abuses which took place during the offensive did much to sully regional and international support for ECOMOG. (Many of the apparent abuses were carried out by the "allied" forces, especially the AFL, although ECOMOG forces were accused by an Africa Watch investigative team of numerous abuses as well, including the bombing of hospitals.³²) In November of 1992 the UN Security Council finally put Liberia back on its action agenda by imposing an arms embargo and by sending a special UN Representative to Liberia to report first-hand on conditions.

Internal splits surfaced within the ECOMOG forces in 1993, especially between Nigeria and the Francophone states,³³ and despite verbal support from the Organization of African States, the UN, and the United States, pressures mounted on ECOMOG and its supporting states to change course. The result was the return of ECOMOG to its original intended objective of peacekeeping, and the abandonment of the effort to punish the NPFL by force of arms.

UNOMIL

Finally another peace conference was called in Cotonou, Benin, and on July 25, 1993 the "Cotonou Agreement" was signed between the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)³⁴, which described the 1991 Yamoussoukro IV Accord as "the best framework for peace in Liberia." Next the United Nations Security Council unanimously established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) on September 22, 1993 (by SC Resolution 866), intended to monitor the cease-fire agreement established by the Cotonou agreement, observe the elections scheduled for February/March 1994, and to coordinate humanitarian aid.³⁵ The unarmed UN mission (whose original mandate was to expire in April of 1994, but was extended at six months intervals for years) was specifically directed to coordinate its activities with ECOMOG, which was however urged to enlarge its component units to include troops from non-ECOWAS African countries. The UN Secretary General reported in September of 1993 that the unprecedented cooperation between a regional mission and the UN was "a special opportunity" which might set a precedent for future peace-keeping operations.³⁶ A Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement was established to support the UN's activities in Liberia, with the USA contributing some \$20 million to the fund as of December 1993, with another \$11 million promised to support the deployment and maintenance of troops from Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as a part of ECOMOG.³⁷ These troops did arrive in early 1994, and were sent primarily upcountry. Bolstered by the infusion of attention, fresh African troops, the UN observer force, and funds, the peace process seemed to quickly accelerate, and a power-sharing coalition government was sworn in on March 7, 1994 in Monrovia, headed by Sawyer ally David Kpormakpor.³⁸ (ECOWAS and UN diplomacy finally had some success, as Benin President Nicéphore Soglo and former Zimbabwe President Canaan Banana managed to get some last-minute disputes between the IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO resolved in time for the new government to be installed.)³⁹

Liberia's problems were far from over, since the reconstituted ECOMOG force's efforts to effectively disarm the many groups with weapons, especially in the interior of the country, again did not succeed. The armed groups continued to fight with and among themselves, with several new groups and warlords emerging. Dogged ECOWAS diplomacy led to a power-sharing "peace accord" being signed in Ghana in September of 1994 by the leaders of the three largest factions, the NPFL, ULIMO, and the AFL, but the exclusion of other factions created considerable opposition back in Liberia, including the seizure three days later of the Executive Mansion in Monrovia by an ex-AFL officer. The Mansion was reclaimed by ECOMOG forces, but sporadic fighting and successive rounds of peace talks and negotiations dragged on for another eleven months. Finally, with the patience of the UN, aid organizations, and ECOMOG about to snap, an ECOWAS-brokered gathering of warlords in Nigeria produced the Abuja

Agreement of August 19, 1995, signed by all of the major factions. A real cease-fire ensued, followed by an interim Council of State (comprised of the main warlords and chaired by traditional leader Wilton Sankawulo) being installed on September 1st, 1995.⁴⁰

Although there were some serious breakdowns in that peace plan, there is reason to believe that this conference in 1995, called to discuss “post-civil war” Liberia, was not just another exercise in futility. The UN mission UNOMIL by then included specialists on elections, and national elections were slated for August 20, 1996, although they had to be postponed for a year by another ECOWAS meeting on Abuja in August of 1996, which also established a timetable for implementing the agreement and ways of verifying and possibly enforcing compliance with disarmament provisions on “faction leaders” (e.g., warlords).⁴¹ These elections actually did take place as (re)scheduled in 1997, resulting in the election of Charles Taylor as President. The peace conference technique thus finally worked. On the other hand, the arms sales embargo voted by the UN Security Council in November of 1992⁴² did not make much difference, especially to Charles Taylor’s forces, since Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” survived the armed assaults of ECOMOG and various warlords, and a 1992 ECOWAS-imposed trade embargo.⁴³ The key to this economic viability was control of the natural resources of the interior (mainly diamonds, iron, rubber, timber, and gold), and the willingness of international economic concerns to sign contracts with his government⁴⁴—called the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly—or any other group able to establish *de facto* control of an area.⁴⁵

Evaluation

The original ECOMOG force in Liberia violated nearly all of Diehl’s main guidelines for successful international peacekeeping. They landed against the wishes of one of the main parties to the dispute, and soon found themselves fighting on one side in a civil war. (They did take action against all of the warring groups at different times, however, as the force attempted to fulfill its directive of bringing peace to Liberia.) ECOMOG was initially unable to establish a geographic buffer zone, and was clearly not seen as neutral by Charles Taylor’s NPFL. ECOMOG did meet some of Diehl’s less important conditions, in that the United States, along with the Organization of African Unity, supported the ECOWAS efforts, and the force did have a rather clear mandate with respect to their objectives.

Internal splits within ECOWAS seem to have been initially made worse by the ECOMOG operation. Burkina Faso continued an active role supporting Taylor’s forces, Côte d’Ivoire also had serious reservations about ECOMOG, and Guinea initially pulled its troops out of ECOMOG after a few months, as did Senegal eventually. (After some time, Guinea sent combat forces back to serve in ECOMOG in the mid-1990s, along with Ghana, although the bulk of the forces remained Nigerian.⁴⁶ East African troops were pulled out in frustration, after several years of thankless duty in

Liberia.) Togo decided at the last minute not to contribute troops to the initial ECOMOG force, but started to emerge in 1991 as a mediator between the Francophone and English-speaking ECOWAS countries. The future viability of ECOWAS itself remains unclear, although the Liberian conflict is but one of its problems.

Given the ongoing nature of the Liberian crisis, a definitive evaluation of the initial ECOMOG operation lies in the future. The unique situation created by the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the dramatic United Nations military response during a moment of decision in West Africa was crucial to the ECOWAS decision to create a peacekeeping force in August of 1990. The urgency and frustration of ECOWAS at that time clearly led to the key decision to create ECOMOG, despite the situation's failure to meet the Diehl conditions for success. It should be recalled, *however*, that ECOWAS decided to not only create a military peacekeeping force, *but also* to create an interim "Government" for Liberia. The ECOWAS leaders hoped that the academics-dominated Government would be accepted as truly neutral once it was installed by ECOMOG in Monrovia, but that expectation proved to be flawed.

Unlike the initial ECOWAS decision to create ECOMOG in 1990, the United Nations' action in creating UNOMIL after three years of struggles by ECOMOG came at a time when it **seemed** that the key aspects of Diehl's predictor model of peacekeeping success had finally come about—the willingness of factions to stop fighting and accept a mediating peacekeeping force. While UNOMIL was technically not a "peacekeeping" force, the fact that it was directed to work closely with ECOMOG, plus the stress placed on making ECOMOG more truly neutral by the addition of non-West African troops all suggests that perhaps the UN Security Council was in fact utilizing Diehl's model—or something similar. Diehl's central thesis would thus far appear to be partially validated by the Liberian case study. Unfortunately, the primary assumption in September 1993 of nearly everyone involved that the Liberian warlords would actually stop fighting each other proved premature. Even now, if new national elections actually take place as scheduled in late 2005, questions still remain as to whether they would be perceived as legitimate by all the key actors.

Despite all of its problems, the ECOMOG/UNOMIL experiment in conflict resolution would appear to be a modest success. (Adebajo [see Endnote #2] also agrees that ECOWAS was partially successful in Liberia.) ECOMOG clearly saved many lives, and indeed may well have been responsible for allowing even the dream of a peaceful and democratic future for Liberia to survive throughout the horrors of civil war. As former national coalition leader Kpormakpor said in his inaugural address, "It is time to extend a deep gratitude to those countries who, despite limited resources, spent a long time trying to bring peace to Liberia in a display of African solidarity." He went on to add, however, that "never again must we let this happen to our country. It is up to you, Liberians."⁴⁷

Endnotes

1. Laura Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1995), pp. 182-183. [This chapter is a revision of Charles W. Hartwig, "ECOMOG to UNOMIL: Peacekeeping in Liberia," in *Africa in the New World Order*, ed. by Michael O. Anda. Little Rock, AR: DCI Publishing, 1996, pp. 111-123.]
2. Then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose thought that the ECOWAS initiative offered "...an appropriate and cost-effective alternative to calls for massive UN intervention." Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, June 9, 1993. Reproduced in *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (1993), p. 353. [For several years after 1991 the *Liberian Studies Journal* included an unindexed "Document" section of each issue which reproduced important statements, agreements, treaties, etc. relating to the Liberian civil war, some of which are otherwise difficult to obtain. The issue cited above includes 76 pages of such documents.] Other evaluations of the ECOMOG experience include Comfort Ero, "ECOMOG: A Model for Africa?" in *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium*, Monograph 46. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, February 2000. <www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html>. Perhaps the most thorough evaluation of the initial ECOMOG experience in Liberia is found in Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
3. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 2nd ed., New York: United Nations, 1990.
4. Such as Ibid.; Henry Wiseman (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1983; Indar J. Rikhye and Kjiell Skjeisbaek (eds.), *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects - The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990; and Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 451-464.
5. Neack, op. cit., p. 184.
6. Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 485-507.
7. Ibid., pp. 502-503.
8. Ibid., p. 503.
9. Ibid., p. 504.
10. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Also available at <www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations>.
11. Diehl, op.cit., p. 503.
12. It might be argued that the UN experiences in Georgia and Tajikistan during 1994 and 1995 are similar to the UN-ECOMOG cooperation in Liberia, in that official UN Observer Missions coordinated their efforts with non-UN multinational military forces, but this author feels that since the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forces were totally dominated by Russian troops, the parallel is not valid. For an overview of the UNOMIG (Georgia) and UNMOT (Tajikistan) experiences, see John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (eds.), *A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations*, UN Association of the USA, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995, pp. 69-77. This annual publication is an excellent source of information about UN and regional organizations' peace operations, with updates published just before the annual convening of the UN General Assembly each September. See UNA/USA Publications, at <www.unausa.org>. Also helpful for concise and authoritative information is the 2004 update of the UN's *Basic Facts* book: United Nations, *Basic Facts About the United Nations*. UN Department of Public Information, No. E.04.I.7 New York: United Nations, 2004.
13. J. Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Quest for* , Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, Part I.
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16. "Liberian Agony Continues," *Africa News*, (September 17, 1990), pp. 1-3.
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28. "Liberia—Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights," *Africa Watch*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (June 1993), p. 24.
29. Reed Kramer, "Disarmament Pledge Raises Liberia Peace Hopes," *Africa News*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (May 11-24, 1992), pp. 1+.
30. "Liberia...", *Africa Watch*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-26.
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34. "Coronou Peace Agreement on Ending Civil War in Liberia, July 25, 1993," *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (1993), pp. 329-341.
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37. "Peace-Keeping Troops," *Focus on Liberia* (a Newsletter for Friends of Liberia), Vol. 6, No. 3 (December 1993), p. 5.
38. Mark Fritz, "Power is Taken in Liberia," *Jonesboro Sun* [AP], (March 8, 1994), p. 11A.
39. *Ibid.*
40. "Liberian Factions End Conflict," *UN Chronicle*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 19.
40. UN Security Council Press Release SC/6295/Rev.1 3717th Meeting (PM) 27 November 1996, p. 3.
41. Frank J. Prial, "UN Bans Arms Sales to Liberia and Dispatches a Special Envoy," *New York Times* (November 20, 1992), p. A6. (Via NEXIS (R) CD-ROM full-text service.)
42. *Ibid.*
43. Kenneth B. Noble, "In Liberia's Illusory Peace, Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design," *New York Times* (April 14, 1992), p. A3.
44. William Reno has suggested that Taylor's use of foreign firms to support his "shadow state" is a new direction in patrimonial rule which has parallels in the relationships that West African coastal chiefs had with European traders in the middle of the 19th century. See Reno, *op. cit.*
45. Harry Mouzalas, "International Help Sought for Liberian Peacekeepers," Reuters Byline, Accra, Ghana (March 14, 1996), archived at FOL E-Mail News Network, <grayjk@VTVM1.CC.VT.EDU>, 15 March 1996.
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Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia. Amos Sawyer. Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, 201 pp. + Appendices, References, Index.

In this masterful work, Amos Sawyer, former Interim President of the Republic of Liberia, applies the tools of institutional analysis to the past, present, and future of his country. This model, which “helps us understand how institutions structure incentives and influences choices” (p. 4), derives from the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom and is a variant of the “rational choice” theories common in Political Science. Such theories have failed in the past when they assume a universal human rationality or single set of “correct” choices that can be made by actors in any given situation. The “institutional analysis and development framework” employed by Sawyer, however, tries to include as variables the local cultural and ecological conditions of a specific place and time; thus we learn how the particular geographical features of the Liberian littoral helped shape the concentration of power in the executive branch during the drafting of the first constitution. While a focus on institutions can sometimes lend a rather static and over-determined quality to the analysis of conflict, in Sawyer’s hands it provides a refreshing and welcome corrective to recent trends in the literature which attribute the decades of violence in the Guinea Coast region to the religious and cultural values of its people.

After outlining the general tenets of his model, Sawyer proceeds to analyze the series of choices and missed opportunities for alternative outcomes that led to the Liberian tragedy. He describes how Liberia came to be an “overcentralized” state and how the broader global context of the Cold War led to particular decisions on the part of Liberia’s leaders and those in other countries. In his discussion of the personalities involved in the unraveling of the state, he provides a particularly compelling argument about how Charles Taylor was able to fashion himself as “all things to all people;” at the same time an “African revolutionary” to the Libyans and a “reasonable alternative” to the Americans. Sawyer’s account of how Taylor was able to manipulate his association with the progressive leaders and ideologies of the 1970’s in order to gain moral authority and a “cover” for his purely self-serving activities answers a number of important questions and demonstrates how institutional analysis can accommodate the behavior of individuals without falling into either the “great man” or “bad man” theory of history.

The heart of the book is really Chapters 4 through 7, in which Sawyer dissects what has gone wrong in Liberia’s past and lays out an original and creative plan to completely restructure the government. Noting that calls for redistributing many of the powers vested in the executive have gone unanswered in the past, Sawyer argues that the problems which led to years of suffering and death cannot be addressed short of

"Shared Sovereignty and Polycentric Governance." This means that the national government would no longer control the appointment of leaders and administrators at the county, township, and clan levels and that ordinary people in their communities would participate in decision-making about the provision of services (including sanitation, education, and healthcare) and the disposition of resources (including mineral and timber rights) in their local areas. The role of the central government would be limited to the protection of civil and minority rights, the setting of national standards in health, education, and so forth, the development of foreign policy, and the coordination of defense and trade across international borders. Even some of these functions, Sawyer suggests, might be better handled at the regional level within the Mano River Union or some other transnational entity. Removing the monocentric power over access to jobs, privilege, and the profits from natural resources currently vested in the president, Sawyer argues, would free national development and the general welfare from dependence on "good" or "bad" individuals seeking power at the expense of all.

Sawyer points to the "self-organizing" genius of ordinary Liberians during the years of war and upheaval as evidence that such decentralized or polycentric structures could work, if only the political will can be found to truly restructure the constitution and indeed, the entire administrative machinery of the country. With successful elections and a new administration about to take power, it is a hopeful moment and all Liberians and friends of Liberia can but sincerely wish that the new government will read and closely consider Sawyers' book. Although many of his proposals sound strikingly unorthodox, at their base, they are grounded in the central (and too often ignored) idea of 18th century democracy; that all functioning adults, regardless of wealth, income, or education, have a right to speak, to contest injustice, and to participate in decisions that will affect them and their children. There is nothing "foreign" about these ideas in indigenous West African cultures; indeed, there are numerous institutions, both in the past and working well today, which serve to guard precisely these rights in village communities. Allowing these institutions to flourish within a system of polycentric governance is the goal Sawyer sets for Liberia's emerging process of structural reform.

In the past year, I was called for jury duty in the small, rural county in upstate New York where I live and work. It soon became clear that I was one of only a few of my fellow jurors to have finished high school (let alone hold a BA or PhD). The case was a complex one of medical malpractice, in which a woman had died and her husband was seeking monetary damages which had to be determined by the jury. After sitting through a week of medical and legal testimony, I was designated as the alternate and could not deliberate with my fellow jurors, but in talking with them after the trial and listening to how they carefully weighed the evidence and used their own life experience to reach both the verdict and the monetary judgment, I am more convinced than ever that Sawyer's proposed plan for Liberia could work. Both the jury system and Sawyer's proposals are based on a radical trust in the good sense of ordinary folks. If the

in-coming government can only share that radical trust enough to truly share power, then Liberia could be remade as the beacon to the world it has always styled itself to be.

Colgate University

Mary H. Moran*

- * Dr. Mary H. Moran is a leading American Liberianist and an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Colgate University in upstate New York. She is the author of *Civilized Women: Gender and Prestige in Southeastern Liberia* (Cornell University Press, 1990), *Liberia: The Violence of Democracy* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), and numerous articles about Liberia.

The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia. Claude A. Clegg III. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xii + 330 pp. Maps, figures, tables, notes, bibliography and index. \$55.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Claude A. Clegg has written an important book that explores both the American background and the African experiences of nineteenth-century emigrants from the United States to the colony, and later the independent nation, of Liberia. Concentrating on the 2,030 black emigrants who left the state of North Carolina between 1825 and 1893, Clegg interweaves detailed statistical data with rich anecdotal material to offer an extremely well-rounded and thoughtful portrait of one key subset of the Liberian colonization movement.

Clegg begins by examining the colonial and early national efforts by North Carolina Quakers to ameliorate the conditions of slavery, and then gradually to dismantle the institution entirely. Shaped by the dominant racist ideology, most Quakers came to see the removal of the African American population west of the Alleghenies, elsewhere in the Americas, and finally to Africa as the only reasonable way to rid the nation of both slavery and racial discord. While many, like Levi Coffin, opposed transatlantic colonization, after 1816 pro-colonizationist Quakers cooperated with the newly formed American Colonization Society (ACS) and turned their attention more specifically to Liberia. Most African Americans, of course, remained suspicious of such plans. Drawing upon diverse sources such as county histories, emigration rolls, ACS and Quaker records, newspapers, census data, and personal papers, Clegg pieces together a convincing analysis of the issues facing the "first wave" of enslaved and quasi-free black North Carolinians who contemplated the prospect of emigration during the 1820s.

As his story turns to the Liberian coast, Clegg effectively uses secondary sources and migrant and ACS commentaries to depict the complex geographic, economic, and cultural landscape of the region, with due recognition of "the cultural fluidity of coastal peoples" (79) like the Kru who had long maintained contact with Europeans and who operated as middlemen in Atlantic commerce. However, his primary analysis remains focused on the experiences and perceptions of the American migrants. In an aptly titled chapter, "Inventing Liberia," Clegg delineates the "laager mind-set" of the emigrants, which was deeply "[r]ooted in existing Western ideas about civilization and race" (110). Constructing a dichotomous outlook which posed themselves as "Liberians" and the various West African ethnic groups (Dei, Gola, Kru, and others) as "natives," black American immigrants saw indigenous cultures as backward and depraved. The Americans thereby established in their own minds their own superiority and justified the subjugation of the "native" population. The book's discussion of the process of identity construction among American migrants is one of its most intriguing and

important contributions. The migrants' cultural imperialism and dismissive treatment of both the indigenous populations and of the "recaptives" who were brought into Liberia after being liberated from transatlantic slave ships set the stage for a future of "mutual suspicion and endless conflict" (112).

Back in the United States, by the 1830s, the ACS had largely displaced Quakers as the driving force behind colonization. Migration trends fluctuated over time, with marked declines during the 1840s and 1860s, and after 1890. Clegg ties these patterns both to events in the United States like the Nat Turner rebellion and the Civil War, and to conditions in and reports from Liberia. He also offers a valuable statistically-based demographic portrait of the migrants, both before and after their journey, with considerable attention to the immensely deleterious effects of malaria and other tropical diseases in West Africa. Death in the tropics was one of the major "prices of liberty" paid by nineteenth century American migrants. Clegg also delineates the various "prices" paid by African ethnic groups, recaptives, and even Euroamericans over the course of the nineteenth century. "Indeed," he argues, "Liberian colonization was expensive to many on both sides of the Atlantic, and no single person or group—neither Quaker, free black, slave, African, nor colonizationist—seemed to enjoy freedom without paying a price for it, or causing others to do so" (270).

The Price of Liberty is a significant contribution to the history of Liberia, African American emigration movements, and the nineteenth century Atlantic World. For all its value, the book does have limitations. Perhaps most fundamentally, while Clegg provides a convincing analysis of his North Carolina sample, it is not clear how representative this sample is of the Liberian colonization movement as a whole. His groups comprise 2,030 of over 14,000 migrants from the period of study, and a greater number actually came from Virginia than North Carolina. Also, while Clegg succeeds admirably in his analysis of the American migrants, Liberian specialists may wish he had attempted a more nuanced and thorough examination of indigenous ethnic groups. But this is to criticize the author for not writing a different book. The book he did write is well-researched and effectively argued, and sets a standard for future studies of African American emigration movements.

Western Michigan University

Mitch Kachun*

* Dr. Kachun is an Associate Professor of History at Western Michigan University.

W. Sankawulo, *Sundown at Dawn: A Liberian Odyssey* (Houston, Texas: Dusty Spark Publishing, 2004), 204 pp.

The most prominent Liberian writer today is Wilton Sankawulo. He has a mastery of Liberian idiom and standard English. Sankawulo has published a biography of the late President William R. Tolbert, Jr and other works of non-fiction. He has also published two collections of folktales. Although he has published fiction in an assortment of anthologies, journals, and periodicals, his first novel, *The Rain and the Night*, was published in London by Macmillan Education Ltd in 1979.

Sundown at Dawn is Wilton Sankawulo's second novel to date. The subject of his second novel is a radical departure from that of his first novel, *The Rain and the night*, which dramatizes events of an inter-ethnic war between the Kpelle and the Gola of Liberia during the nineteenth century. Although doom and gloom are initially foreshadowed in the novel, the narrative ends optimistically on a note of hearty *bonhomie* when the Kpelle and the Gola express a sincere desire for peace and amity. What the two novels share in common, therefore, is that both protagonists or major characters, Chief Kortuma in *The Rain and the Night*, and Dougba Senfenui Jr in *Sundown at Dawn* are members of the Kpelle ethnic group. Here end the similarities and the differences begins.

Sankawulo's second novel is pervaded by a deep sense of degradation, decadence, tragedy, loss, hatred, cruelty, melancholy, and a blatant miscarriage of justice. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about *Sundown at Dawn* is its genesis. Ostensibly inspired by a miscarriage of justice that lands Dougba Senfenui Jr in a prison cell at Camp Belle Yallah, a prison for hardened criminals, the novel is a serious indictment against man's inhumanity to man in general and against erstwhile Liberian officials in particular. The novel will initially depress readers or students of humanity. A book has that effect when it records a series of untoward events leading to the arrest and eventual, unjust lifeimprisonment of the major character, Dougba Senfenui, and two minor characters, Pastor Isaac Gbada and a county superintendent without trial or a writ of *habeas corpus*. It seems that those who tread the corridors of power treat educated and progressive Liberian citizens like little children. They simply must submit to the whims and caprices of their rule or face the might of their corrupt leadership. However, even though the heart sinks at the tragic lives of the characters, the spirit also soars because Sankawulo sheds so much light on the miscarriage of justice, a subject long left in the dark in Liberia.

Sankawulo establishes suspense in the first chapter of *Sundown at Dawn* when the narrator figure, Dougba Senfenui Jr, chaperones the reader round the action in which he himself is involved. In artistic prose that is carefully wrought, Dougba Senfenui Sr hopes for a better future for his son by narrating a story about Ngalakemeni, the only

child of a decrepit, old couple, who is saved from the drudgery of subsistence farming by acquiring a good education and becoming a District Commissioner. But to preserve the novel from didacticism and sentimentality, Sankawulo makes the reader perceive the action from the vantage point of Dougba Senfenui Jr. He, in turn, makes the reader aware that the theme that permeates the whole book is the miscarriage of justice resulting from jealousy, corruption, greed, hatred and the petty-mindedness of officials who make a mockery of democracy and a travesty of justice.

The first chapter, "Ngalakemeni," contains an illustrative or framework story. In this illustrative story, Sankawulo attempts to make both interlocutors, Dougba and his father, to listen to each other. Besides setting the tone, the illustrative story also provides the *leitmotif* of *Sundown at Dawn*. But this illustrative story has other purposes. Firstly, it is a mandate from father to son. In other words, Dougba's father's mandate is a spur towards his acquiring a good education that will enable him to take a step from perdition to salvation. This is true because a good education will liberate Dougba Senfenui Jr from the tweezers-grip of subsistence farming. Secondly, in this illustrative story, the author shows the reverence of traditional Liberian society towards parenthood while at the same time exposing its cruelty. Finally, Sankawulo uses the illustrative or framework story to capture the worldview of Dougba Senfenui Sr. Here, for example, is the dialogue between father and son on the first page of *Sundown at Dawn* to emphasize the significance of the, illustrative story:

I watched him with entreaty and groaned. Spying my pouting lips by the glare of the center room fire, he said:

"I'll tell you a story just to put you to sleep."

"Not about Mr. Spider, I hope," I said, laying my arm on his thigh for support. I was tired hearing about Spider and his greed.

"No!" he said, so loudly that I thought he was addressing the lightning that tore the sky and brightened the porch for a moment. "My story is about Ngalakemeni who was born in his parents' old age. Not wishing to leave him a helpless, lonely orphan when they died, they sent him to school to become a *kwii*."

"Where did he go to school?" I hung my head in contemplation.

"Ducor, kwii people's biggest town." Father scratched his beard stubble softly. "After finishing school, Ngalakemeni got whatever he wanted: money, women, wine, and servants-not to speak of cattle, rice, oil, meat, and fish. All he had to do was ask and he was given. He deserved the privilege, though, for he gave up the comfort and security of home and chose to suffer."

"Must have become a king, then."

"You could say that. The president made him Deecce for Salala District. Became the mainstay of support for his family. Ngalakemeni fought his battle alone because his parents were too old to help him. His relatives said they would be dead or too old when he finished school. What would they get out

of him for their troubles? But the lonely battle made him wise, brave, and determined. As they say, 'The child with too many hands to hold never learns to walk.' " After a pause, Father ended the story on a firm note: "I want you to be like Ngalakemeni."

The fictional Kpelle society which Sankawulo depicts in *Sundown at Dawn* is highly organized and stratified. There is Chief Zina of Haindi. There are the elders; there are young men who work in age groups and are *bona fide* members of the Poro Society; and then there are young girls who are graduates of the Sande Bush School. Finally, there are Dougba Senfenui Jr (alias Joseph Dennis) and members of his extended family.

Be that as it may, before Dougba starts school, he is given the necessary preparation. His father teaches him the English alphabet and the rudiments of arithmetic. Next, he goes through the ritual of circumcision. Kote, who performs the circumcision, relatives, and friends bestow their blessing upon Dougba and wish him success. Eventually, his father accompanies him to Kpolopele, a school run by a gracious missionary called Ma Miller. Ma Miller informs Dougba's father that Dougba has to complete the Primer before he qualifies to attend Kpolopele. Meanwhile, Teacher Thomas fills Dougba in on the nitty-gritty of the rules and regulations of Kpolopele Mission. A conscientious individual, Dougba is the only student who completes the fifth grade at Kpolopele.

The narrative eventually moves to Belefanai and Zorzor Missions, where Dougba continues his schooling, and ends it at Lutheran Training Institute (LTI) in Salayea. It is at LTI that he becomes a very good student and earns his diploma. At both Belefanai and Zorzor Missions, Dougba participates in a work-study program to defray the cost of his education. At Zorzor Mission, he meets John Flomo who tells him that his confidence in the national government is misplaced. Government officials are only interested in building mansions and keeping mistresses. It is the missionaries who really educate Liberian youths and develop the country. However, before Dougba goes to Zorzor Missions, Caesar Dennis wants him to continue his education in Monrovia. He goes to Monrovia, but he is ill-treated by the Dennises. He runs away from their home and returns to Haindi, where he informs his parents about his ordeal.

Before Dougba matriculates to LTI, he takes a year off to become a rubber-tapper in Firestone. Pastor Gbada gives him a letter of recommendation, used clothes, shoes and \$60 to enable him to continue his education at LTI. Before he goes to LTI, he visits the Dennis family in Monrovia. He learns that Caesar Dennis is continuing his education in the United States. In Monrovia, Dougba also visits his friend, Jacob, who beats his girlfriend and ends up in prison. Dougba also spends a brief period in jail for an alleged vagrancy. Eventually, he enters LTI. Once more, he defrays the cost of his education by taking part in a work-study program. At LTI, he becomes a good student. Just before his graduation, he receives a letter from a white teacher called "Daddy", who informs him that his father is seriously ill. Dougba visits his father, who outlines

the history of the Kpelle as a great ethnic group. He returns to LTI and graduates. Following his graduation, he returns to Haindi when he learns of the death of his father, Dougba Senfenui Sr. In Haindi, Dougba, his girlfriend, Sianeh and members of his family, perform a ritual dance around Dougba's father's grave. He places his diploma on the grave as a symbol to denote that his father's mandate has been carried out. It is at this moment that he changes his name from Joseph Dennis to Dougba Senfenui Jr.

To set his life on an even ethical keel, Dougba marries Sianeh. Pastor Gbada performs the wedding ceremony. Meanwhile, "Daddy", the white teacher, congratulates Dougba, recognizes his literary talent, and informs him that he has recommended him for a scholarship to go to the United States for further study. However, Dougba informs "Daddy" of his intention to head Zamei Mission in order to gain experience before he goes to the States for further study.

Dougba becomes an exemplary teacher and Head of Zamei Mission. But a jealous friend, Benda Folokula (nicknamed "the General"), betrays him when he informs the Council that Dougba wears charms, worships ancestral spirits and is immoral because he has sired a child out of wedlock. Benda also accuses him of murdering Emmanuel Dennis in Monrovia, a crime punishable by hanging. Consequently, Dougba gets the sack. Pastor Isaac Gbada approves his dismissal. When Dougba learns of Benda Folokula's betrayal, he vows revenge because he is annoyed, and indeed astonished and stunned that a friend should behave in such a manner. He visits the hospital where he thinks Benda is a patient. He is delighted to meet his wife, Sianeh, in the hospital. But he learns that Benda was DOA (dead on arrival) at the hospital from a plane crash.

Eventually, Dougba and Sianeh return to Haindi and decide to build their own school. They plant coffee and cassava. The money the couple generates from these cash crops enables them to build the Dougba Senfenui Academy. Before they establish the Academy, Chief Zinz proffers a word of advice. He advises Dougba to build the Academy elsewhere rather than in Haindi. Nevertheless, Dougba stands his ground and establishes the Academy at Haindi. The Academy becomes a remarkable success. As a result, Dougba decides to establish schools throughout Fuama Chiefdom.

However, Dougba's good intentions and efforts encounter hostility from Senator Loryii, an illiterate official and a polygamist. Senator Loryii sends water zoe, Kollie, who confesses that

"... Senator Loryii had hired him to send me crazy or infect me with an incurably paralyzing disease. I told the boys to set him free. I didn't want to take responsibility for the death of someone who was halfway in the grave. I organized two shifts of vigilantes, the toughest boys I found, to guard the mission day and night. But the Senator employed another strategy that almost succeeded in destroying the mission." (p. 185)

Despite a peace offering from Dougba and the assurance that he does not have any political ambition, Senator Loryii hires "The Devil" (i. e. the Poro) to destroy the mission and the coffee farm. "The Devil" nearly succeeds in destroying the mission. Because of this act, members of a delegation advise Dougba to give up the mission and keep a low profile for his own security. But Dougba tells the delegation that he will confer with officials of the Ministry of Education before he makes a decision.

Meanwhile, Jeremiah Foday, a fellow-alumnus of LTI, visits Dougba and informs him that he has finally succeeded in placing his school on the list for a government subsidy. Foday also informs him that the President of Liberia is unhappy about his "misdeeds" or "insolence". Therefore, Foday urges him to write an article that will educate and inform Liberians. When the article is published, Dougba's admirers regard him as a farsighted young man. But his detractors consider the article as an attempt to sow seeds of discord in order to topple a constituted government. Moreover, Senator Loryii regards Dougba as a staunch rival. But the article succeeds in having Senator Loryii's name dropped from the list of senatorial candidates because he is illiterate.

However, before Senator Loryii leaves the senate ignobly, he succeeds in destroying Dougba Senfenui as a great Liberian educator. Senator Loryii tells the President of Liberia that Dougba has established the Academy on the pretext of educating the youths of Liberia when, in essence, his intention is to overthrow the government. The president tells him to take care of the matter because Dougba is a member of his constituency. In compliance with the president's request, Senator Loryii dispatches four soldiers to arrest Dougba Senfenui and detain him at Camp Belle Yallah for life-imprisonment. In his fifth year at Camp Belle Yallah, Dougba discovers that Pastor Isaac Gbada is also flown to the same prison for preaching the truth from his pulpit in Monrovia. Coincidentally, Dougba, Pastor Gbada and a county superintendent share a prison hut in Camp Belle Yallah.

The novel under review is a masterpiece of literary fiction. The only adverse criticism that the present reviewer has to offer lies in the author's omission of the word, "Chapter", in each heading in *Sundown at Dawn*. This would make easier reading in that it would guide the reader for the purpose of making references. It would also require the author to have a table of contents because that is the convention. But this is such a minor fault as to be negligible. Furthermore, the author's approach could be construed as a matter of style.

Sankawulo's depiction of man's inhumanity to man and the miscarriage of justice that lie outside the knowledge of this fictional society and the law is commendable, and commendable too is his portrait of the total absence of any redeeming value in the lives of criminals such as Benda Folokula, Senator Loryii and his lackeys, the police, the soldiers, some inhabitants of Haindi, and the prison guards. He presents Dougba's mother as a kindly, even-tempered lady, who is irked by her son's occasional misdeeds. He portrays Dougba Senfenui Sr as a caring and loving husband and father who,

nevertheless, rules the roost at home. His portrayal of Dougba Senfenui Jr, Pastor Isaac Gbada, the county superintendent, Jeremiah Foday, Teachers Moana and Lorkula, and the prison guards illustrate the author's amazing ability to create memorable characters. He achieves this principally by revealing their thoughts, actions, and the idiolects he constructs for their speech. For example, when a prison warder overhears the detainees' discussion about the nation's state of affairs, he gives a brief lecture. His lecture reveals that the detainees' discussion and the crimes they are allegedly guilty of are a collusion between them and the government. The reader sympathizes with, and for, the detainees because there is an attendant prophetic doom in the tone of each detainee's voice. Moreover, the reader experiences vicariously the degradation, cruelty, humiliation, and the debilitating ennui and tedium that mark the detainees' each day because they wear chains that circumscribe their movements. It is indeed amazing that living in the midst of his conflict Dougba Senfenui finds the physical and emotional convenience to write a memoir which spans a period ranging from his childhood through adolescence to adulthood. Sankawulo's insight into character and social relationships has much to commend it.

Sundown at Dawn shows originality and great creative ability. As in his first novel, Sankawulo uses symbolic imagery in his second novel. For instance, the title of the novel is another brilliant example of his use of symbolic imagery. The reader is made aware that the sun is the source of life in our planet, earth. But it also portends doom and gloom for some characters in the novel, who sing their swan song when the sun rises at dawn. Then too, the sun emits magnificent yellow rays of light against the horizon as well as on the Deyn river, which is also a source of livelihood for the inhabitants of Haindi-and indeed of the entire Fuama Chiefdom. But it also prefigures death because on its riverbed lurk water zoes who seize and kill anyone who, in their opinions, violates the laws and mores of the chiefdom.

Sankawulo uses the internal or first-person point of view in *Sundown at Dawn*. In other words, Dougba Senfenui, the major character, tells the story. Because the story is told from this vantage point, it has an element of truth or immediacy in that it involves the reader. The reader vicariously experiences the emotional turbulence that inundates Dougba Senfenui. Dougba is constantly seen as wincing with pain and frustration when his vision to contribute his quota to national growth and development by educating and moulding the minds of the youths of Liberia is a dream fit for nothing but Utopia because it is thwarted by the likes of Senator Loryii and his lackeys.

Indeed, Wilton Sankawulo is a story-teller of genius with a tragic view of human behaviour. As a modern writer, he cultivates the short, snappy dialogue of the day. Although his characters occasionally speak Liberian Pidgin English, his style isn't the demotic idiom of a loafer or urchin. It is very accessible. In short, he combines a simplicity of style with an entertaining narrative. Sankawulo uses a whole galaxy of devices in *Sundown at Dawn*: the framework story, figures of speech, proverbs, symbolism, humour and wit to give unity and depth of meaning to his narrative. These

structural qualities will make the novel to endure as a supreme work of art. Each word, each phrase, indeed, each sentence is assigned its place with pointilliste precision. Even though the novel is set in Liberia, the message it conveys transcends its cultural milieu and nationality. In this regard, the message is a universal metaphor for the human condition. A masterpiece of a classic, *Sundown at Dawn* is, indeed, a prize-winning novel. The novel will be at home with secondary schools, colleges and universities as well as with the general reading public.

Leicestershire, England

Robert H. Brown*

- * Dr. Brown is a leading Liberian Liberianist. He taught English at the University of Liberia before his departure to England in the 1980s. He teaches English at a college in Leicestershire, England.

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LIBERIA: The Restoration of Our Nation

Statement delivered by
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
at The All Liberian National Conference
Columbia, Maryland
April 14th, 2005

Madam Chairperson, Officers and members of the Liberian National Conference, Mr. President, Officers and Members of ULAA and other Liberian Organizations, Distinguished Presenters and Participants, Fellow Liberians, Ladies and Gentlemen;

I thank you for the opportunity to exchange views today on the awesome task of the rebuilding of our nation and I thank you all for the recent coming together of all those who are contributing, in these fora, the ideas and the concepts that will help to shape the national agenda for the New Liberia. The same spirit of unity is the driving force at home as we strive together to respect our differences while moving forward collectively in the interest of our country.

Today, I will depart from the usual practice of recalling the litany of problems, cataloguing the many failures of our national existence. I will also refrain from the attempt to provide the conceptual and intellectual framework for the reform agenda for our country since this will be fully covered by the Presenters over the next couple of days and has been amply presented by our colleagues during the related conference held in Washington DC about 10 days ago. Moreover, representatives of the Governance Reform Commission will be joining you to share the Commission's views on the reform agenda.

And so, I will try to reach out to each and every one of you, heart to heart, soul to soul, in speaking to the need for the restoration of hope; to the challenges of renewal of our country. I will look into the eyes of each of you and ask, as I have asked myself, have I done the most for our country? Have I tried hard enough to make a difference in responding to the needs of our country? Have I been a positive force for change in our country? Have I accentuated the positive; given each the benefit of the doubt; looked for the truth and the substantive in our dialogue with each other?

With these heartfelt questions in mind, I will focus my remarks on five themes – Reclaiming our History; Bridging our Social Divide; Fixing our Economy; Reorienting our Political System and Restoring Small Values.

Reclaiming Our History

I am not a historian and I have not read enough of our history but I know that something is missing when our nation's evolution, as conveyed in the textbooks and taught in the schools, start with the emancipation of slaves in the United States and the event of the American Colonization Society. I know that more needs to be known about the ancient kingdoms of Mali and Benin and Songhai, from whence many of our people came into the territory which we now call home. I know that we need to appreciate among with the great historical men and women such as Elijah Johnson, and Joseph Jenkins Roberts and Jehudi Ashmun, the likes of Sao Bosoa, and Chief Botswain and Chief Suakoko.

Much of our nation's history, which included all the great personalities and events of both settlers and indigenous population, has been researched, analyzed and reported by many scholars, Liberians and others, and a whole lot of it has been captured in dissertations, thesis and studies carried out over the years in professional journals such as the *Liberian Studies Journal* and the *African Studies Journal*. It is a history worth cataloguing in its richness and it is our challenge to organize this effort of revision and dissemination so that our current generation has a better perspective and a better appreciation of our common heritage.

Bridging our Social Divide

One of the reasons that our country has experienced continuing conflict is that we have permitted our differences, both ethnic and political, to divide us. I believe that we do not have to be the same, in ethnicity or religion or culture, to co-exist. I believe that we can have differences of opinion without resorting to violence. I believe that there is strength in diversity; that we can preserve our originality while subscribing to the same national agenda of equity and equal opportunity.

Our challenge is to bridge the long standing social divide that has been used as political fodder, by revising our constitution and our statutes and our policies and our practices to ensure that every Liberian, by whatever name, tribe or religion has a recognized role to play in national development; that every Liberian has the right to enjoy the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by our constitution; that every Liberian has the right to opportunities that may be available so long as he or she is prepared to use this opportunity in the national interest; that every Liberian has the right to the assurance of equal justice and protection under our laws.

Our challenge is to bridge the social divide by a strong program of national reconciliation which respects and accepts the fullness of our history; which ensures that our government is one of inclusion; which promotes programs that reflect the diversity of the nation.

Like many others, my family is a living example of the good and the bad of this social divide. My father, the son of the Gola Chief Jahmale and Jenneh, one of his many wives, was born in Julejuah, Bomi County. As a result of my grandfather's friend-

ship and loyalty to President Hilary Richard Wright Johnson and on the advice of the President, my father was brought to Monrovia, his name changed to Johnson and he was given to the settler family, McCritty. He served in the usual manner and suffered the usual humiliation of a country boy under the ward system but he was able to get an education and become an apprentice, which enabled him to become a successful lawyer. He eventually became the first native representative in the National Legislature and was included in several Liberian delegations to meetings abroad.

My mother had a similar experience. She was born in Greenville, Sinoe County, to a marketeer and farmer, Juah Sarwee and a German trader who was forced to leave the country when Liberia declared war on Germany during the first World War. My Grandmother was unable to take care of my mother so she sent her to Monrovia to live with a family where she suffered unimaginable indignities and humiliation until she was taken by the childless Cecelia Dunbar who adopted her and treated her like her very own. My mother enjoyed the best of available education and the full life of a settler family.

I don't know how my mother and father met for in those days, children who "had to be seen and not heard" did not ask such questions of their parents. But I do remember the good days we had with our foster Grandmother Cecelia and all of her settler friends. However, I am glad that neither my father nor my mother forgot their roots and so we spent a lot of time with my two illiterate grandmothers, Jenneh and Juah. We also spent all of vacation time in Julejuah my father's ancestral village where I learned most of all that there was to know about village life including the long walks from village to village, swimming and pulling canoe in the Kpo River, fishing with twine made from the palm tree, bird hunting etc. etc.

Today, I go back to Julejuah to start, once again, the effort started by me, my siblings and our children to bring some small measure of development to our village, to restore what was destroyed by the conflict. I roam the village and talk to the many cousins, old and young, many of whom have suffered in those difficult days past because of their relationship with me. I reflect with pain how that village has remained unchanged; in fact, changed only for the worse in terms of development.

My challenge is to work to bring change to the many Julejuahs of our country, to all of the villages that have been bypassed by the development process, to address those root causes of conflict and division such as poverty and exclusion.

In this regard, we have all suffered; we and our families and our villages have all been through a desperate situation for the past 15 years. Yet, the record and the experience show clearly that we are a strong and resilient people, able to survive, able to rise from the ashes and start anew; able to forge a new beginning, forgiving if not forgetting those terrible things of the past.

Our challenge as a nation is to transform adversity into opportunity, to renew the promise upon which our nation was founded-the promise of freedom, equality, unity and self-reliance.

Fixing Our Economy

We are a wealthy people. Our nation is blessed with an endowment rich in natural and in human resources the likes of which are in this room. Yet, our economy has collapsed due to economic criminalization by a small array of predatory individuals in successive governments. The task of reconstructing our devastated economy is awesome, for which there will be no quick fix. Yet, we have the potential to promote a healthy economy in which Liberians and international entrepreneurs can prosper. We can create the investment climate that gives confidence to Liberian and foreign investors and we can promote those activities that add value in the exploitation of our natural resources. Although the benefits from exploration in the past have been minimal, our mineral resources are still vast and can provide the basis for growth. We can recognize and give support to our small farmers and our marketers who, through their own effort over the years, have provided the buoyancy and self-sufficiency in economic activity, even during the difficult years of conflict. Given the start from a small base and commitment to economic expansion, the 20% growth estimated for 2006 rather than 2005 is not beyond our ability to achieve.

Nevertheless, the environment for private sector driven growth and development cannot be achieved without the political will and policies of a government committed to these goals.

Our challenge, therefore, is to insist upon a government, which promotes a lean and efficient public sector; which will ensure that government intervention is limited only to those activities which it must undertake to defend the integrity of the nation and the welfare of the people. We must call for the right mix of economic policies to ensure an environment that attracts private capital and investment.

While an economic policy that stresses market orientation is appropriate for today's globalizing world, there is scope to ensure that the policies relating thereto give adequate support and protection for those activities that are vital for sustainable and balanced development.

Our challenge also is to restore discipline to the budgetary system through a balanced budget derived from a fiscal system of aggressive revenue collection and expenditure control. We will need to address the serious external debt which our country faces by working with multilateral and bilateral partners to adopt measures that qualify us for debt relief and ensure that the revitalization, diversification and expansion of the export sector strengthen our reserve position to keep the Liberian dollar stable while maintaining the concurrent use of the US dollar.

Corruption, which has permeated every aspect of our national life, is today the greatest threat to economic reconstruction. It is for this reason that it is proper to support the UN position of continued sanctions against the exploitation of our diamond and forest resources. It is also for this reason that the Governance Reform Commission has raised the issue regarding the right of a short-term transition government,

which lacks a mandate from the people, to grant long-term contractual rights to business entities to exploit the resources of the country.

Our challenge is to bring to an irrevocable end to this cancer of corruption, which has constrained our effort to start the process of economic recovery. In this regard, in the New Liberia, public servants will need to serve within the context of a meritocracy with a code of conduct, which includes full penalties for violation of the public trust. We are convinced that the majority of our people are sick and tired of dishonesty in public service. We must therefore ensure that there is efficiency in resource allocation and use and insist on financial management with full transparency and accountability in public sector operations.

The first priority of an economic recovery program is the creation of jobs. It is simply unacceptable that unemployment countrywide is at a record 80%; that those with jobs, particularly in public service, earn less than a living wage and cannot even get that on time. It is not beyond our nation's ability in human and financial resource to restore the dignity of our people by supporting labor intensive civil works programs aimed perhaps at the rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure. A few of our external partners notable USAID and UNDP already have ongoing programs on which we can build and expand.

No nation can develop nor expect to promote the private sector under a system lacking in basic economic infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads, communication etc. Although it will take time and substantial resources are required, it is not beyond our means to restore power to our capital city or to use the best practices of other countries to design rural power systems that use our ample water resources. It is not beyond our capacity to include in our investment strategy for foreign investment the rehabilitation of the rail systems built by the old mining companies to facilitate the transportation of goods and services. It is certainly within our means to revitalize and modernize our major ports whose operations can be made feasible and self financing.

Other priority sectors on which successful economic recovery and sustainable development depend are agriculture and education.

Our country is an agricultural nation, providing through the export of primary agricultural commodities the foreign exchange which is needed to finance our imports and to service our external debt. The largely subsistence farming communities in our rural areas provides the basic sustenance for the nation.

Our challenge is to revitalize the labor intensive rubber industry using the long term plan formulated by the Liberia Rubber Planters Association and, over the medium term, to promote a revitalization and diversification of other agricultural export potential.

We will need to review our long standing land tenure system to ensure ownership and the protection against displacement of our rural communities and enhance, through credit and technology, the levels of production and productivity of our small farmers thereby moving them from subsistence to surplus.

Experience points to recent indiscriminate exploitation of our forests for export without consideration for their replenishment. There is a need for sound management of this resource to ensure its preservation for future generations and to maintain the role our nation plays as one of the few remaining rich biodiversity centers of the globe.

The years of civil strife have deprived our youth and our children of the opportunity to develop the basic skills that will enable them to contribute to the country's prosperity and to compete in a globalizing world. We must insist in the New Liberia that every child is given the opportunity to go to school through a compulsory primary education system, which is our current unmet national goal. A revitalization of our education system will require more than this. We will need to ensure that there are quality secondary schools in all of our counties and that regional vocational and technical institutions are rehabilitated to provide skills training for our high school leavers and for the thousands of youths who have voluntarily given up arms with the hope that they can return to productive endeavors.

A high level of education is also important for a modern society making it necessary that we enhance the quality and expand the availability of college level education to a greater number of our citizens by decentralizing the University of Liberia system into colleges with specific disciplines in selected counties.

There is also the need to recruit and maintain a cadre of good teachers by launching a program of benefits, retirement, training and proper compensation thus ensuring that our graduates are competitive with others in Africa and the world.

Reorienting our Political System

Our Republican system of government, patterned after that of the United States with a strong Chief Executive and a bicameral legislature, has not served us well for it has produced in the past fifty years an imperial presidency which has undermined the independence and development of institutions that provide the checks and balances in the society. It has also led to the patronage system which has deepened dependency and sapped the dignity of our people. We ought not to be timid in trying to examine other political systems and best practices so as to ensure proper and full representation of and accountability to the people. In a national reform agenda which has decentralization and the devolution of power at its core, we might consider the establishment of regional assemblies thereby bringing decision making closer to the people whose lives and destinies would be affected by such decisions.

A political system which guarantees participation by the people would require that those who represent and who exercise authority over the people should be elected by them and should be given the authority to lead, at the local level, the processes of development including the determination of priorities and the budget and disbursement processes which provide the resources for the achievement of development goals.

Restoring Small Values

Many historical practices have helped to instill the values of patriotism and a sense of national identity and unity. Children in years past looked forward to July 27 and what it represented in terms of the new outfit that one would get for the occasion on the Executive Mansion grounds which brought them together for goodies and for play. Children knew what it meant for families to be their brother's keepers, for every child was the child of us all and we did not hesitate to discipline them when they acted with indiscipline away from home. How well we remember those character strengthening practices of family prayers and required church and Sunday school attendance. The "Santa Clause" of past days, which featured skillful dancing and oratory through the speaker who told of the story of the journey of the Santa Clause and his men, was replaced in latter days by "Old Man Beggar" thereby changing the value of earning through skill and intellect to one of dependency through begging. Today, we hardly see the beating of Judas on Good Friday thereby denying our young ones the implications of a rejection of behavior which represent treachery and hypocrisy.

There are more substantive little details that we might consider restoring to bring about a greater sense of national unity. It would enhance our feeling of nationalism and give us a good feeling if our national anthem were sung at the opening of every public event. It would go down well if our Head of State or President removed the disconnect from the people by doing away with the large convoys and armed guards that accompany travel. It would strengthen our stake in the nations' agenda if there were opportunities for exchange of views through town hall meetings or some other medium between the political leadership and the people.

Madam Chairperson, Fellow Liberians, as our country faces yet another crossroad, we can and we must turn the current adversity into an opportunity for national renewal. I believe that the current, albeit fragile, peace can be maintained and stability restored to allow the fulfillment of our national vision. I am convinced that Liberians can achieve their full potential in an environment that protects their fundamental rights and guarantees equal opportunity for all.

Those of you in this room and throughout this country who represent our country's greatest asset will have a key role to play if we are to rise to the challenge of this opportunity for change and renewal. We need you at home to join in the effort to rebuild our country. And even if you cannot join us now, we need your skills and your counsel and your ideas if we are to get it right; if we are to adopt the right policies and identify the right measures to set our country on course.

Let us resolve that it is our collective charge and commitment to bring hope to our people, to convince them that change is on the way, that their dignity can be restored, that they can now rely on the promise of a better future for all.

I thank you and God bless us all.

Unity Party's Vision For A Better Liberia

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

Members of the Diplomatic Corps here present, our friends in the international community, my fellow citizens;

I wish first of all to thank the Almighty God for continuing to sustain us during this campaign period and the prior process of conventions that took us throughout the length and breadth of our country. I thank all of the Liberian people for the warm and enthusiastic welcome which we continue to receive as we move around to meet and share with them our vision for the renewal of our nation.

Fellow Liberians, in April 1980 our nation had the first real opportunity for change, an opportunity for a fundamental altering of the framework of economic, political and social systems that had been shaped over many years of settler domination.

Unfortunately, it did not happen; and we witnessed a mere shifting of the monopolization of power and privilege from one group to another.

That is our inherited legacy, our historical legacy. We cannot change it nor can we turn back the clock. But we can, together, in the spirit of unity and reconciliation put it behind us.

In our economic legacy there is no doubt that improvements were registered during the early years of our national life. This process was started with the activities of Firestone which commenced its operations in 1926, and was funded by the iron ore mining companies, notably – Liberia Mining Company and LAMCO whose activities were the source of the extraordinary growth of the Liberian economy during the 1950-1960 decade.

However, the tendency toward fiscal indiscipline, supported by external borrowings depending upon foreign trade and a failure to develop the subsistence economy resulted in vulnerability to the external shocks of falling primary commodity prices and increases in the costs of imports. Consequently a pattern of “boom/bust” conditioned by commodity prices, continued over several decades.

Efforts by the Tolbert Government to start the process of development proved to be too little too late in a climate of political agitation and radicalization. The economic mismanagement and economic criminalization which followed in successive regimes created the conditions which sent the economy into a free fall from which it has yet to recover.

That is our economic legacy.

Today, our economic situation is even more desperate. Our natural resource endowment has deteriorated, with the exhaustion of major iron ore deposits. Rubber

plantations throughout the country have aged and been subjected to careless and illicit exploitation. Forest resources are depleted due to unchecked exploitation. The production of traditional agricultural products, including exportable cash crops has plummeted due to the exploits of war and the resulting displacement of the rural population. Unemployment stands at 85%. The national debt has skyrocketed, reportedly now over \$3.8 billion, and our international credit worthiness has been lost for well over a decade. Our already limited economic infrastructure has been largely destroyed and social infrastructure set back for several decades.

Moreover, and perhaps of more concern, a culture of dishonesty has spread at an alarming rate, undermining the little commitment that is left to the notion of public service.

Yet, our nation still possesses the requisite foundation for growth and development. A large portion of our mineral resources remain unexplored and unexploited, and there is still time to introduce control and conservation measures to forestry operations. The scope for promoting the production of both traditional and nontraditional exports remains quite broad. The subsistence economy begs for support and transformation through new technologies, technical assistance and access to credit.

Under conditions of sound economic policies and efficient allocation of domestic resources our seemingly intractable debt problem can be addressed through the several mechanisms that exist for debt relief. Our international credibility can also be restored through honest and competent financial management. Moreover, Liberia can boast of an overall human resource capability that equals or surpasses most other countries in the continent. This can be found in the collective talents and skills of Liberian professionals at home and abroad.

What is the framework embodied in the Unity Party platform that will enable us to employ these advantages in an effort to achieve development objectives?

First, our economic vision – GROWTH FOR DEVELOPMENT – the formulation of economic goals consistent with national endowment and regional and global dynamics.

While in the short term, growth may soar to over 20% due to the low starting base; a long term goal is to achieve a level of growth of not less than 7% annually so that poverty is addressed.

The Unity Party will seek to achieve these objectives by stimulation of economic growth through structural changes that include:

One: Land Reform, as discussed in a statement released to the nation in November 1999.

We will revisit the system of land tenure throughout the country so as to ensure that this fundamental resource is used in a manner that fosters the achievement of sustainable development goals. The traditional land tenure system of ownership, tribal reserves, excessive urban and concession holdings, has contributed to our underdevelopment. More recent practices of illegal land grabbing and squatting have added to

the problems. We must face this issue squarely and equitably if we are to stimulate investment in agricultural activities and urban development.

Two: A revisit of the costs and benefits of concession activities.

Traditionally, concessions have operated as enclaves, with little linkages to the rest of the economy other than through the limited purchasing power and tax obligations of employees. Satellite industries and outsourcing of business activities have been limited. The hosting of employees in a controlled environment prevented development of autonomous economic activities in surrounding communities.

A review of all long term contracts and concessions will enable us to ensure a mutuality of interest for concessionaires and the nation, granting assurance that those which met this basic requirement will be respected.

Three: The prioritizing of agriculture.

Unity Party will support subsistence agriculture through the introduction of research which provides new technologies. CARI, the Central Agriculture and Research Institute, will be strengthened and expanded with the support of multi lateral partners. We will strive to mobilize private equity for strengthening the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment and for reopening the Agriculture and Cooperative Bank so as to make credit available to farmers. We will embark upon a program to attract foreign investment in large-scale production of crops such as coffee, cocoa, citrus and aimed at a diversification into non traditional exports such as horticulture, vegetables, cassava, pineapple and other tropical products. We will work with the Rubber Planters Association in implementing their long term plan for a resuscitation of the rubber industry. In the short term we will seek availability of rice, our main staple, by liberalizing the market, through the removal of monopolies and margins that represent illegal kickbacks. In the long term the real solution lies in a stimulation of domestic production for self sufficiency.

Four: The fourth element of our framework for economic recovery deals with restructuring and reform of the public service. The number of government agencies is simply too large and the administrative capacity too limited to produce the level of efficiency required to achieve development goals.

The Unity Party will rationalize the public sector with the number of separate government agencies reduced. We will also introduce a merit system and place emphasis on professionalism and performance.

In the area of resource management, we will ensure priorities, accountability and transparency. The budgetary process is a vital element in this regard. In the exercise of fiscal policy, public expenditures will conform to budgetary allocations which in turn will reflect development priorities that focus on stimulation of agricultural production, particularly exports which will generate foreign exchange to support growth.

The low level of tax compliance needs attention. This is a long-standing problem in Liberia's financial performance. As a result of practices of tax evasion and tax avoidance, the tax base remains much too narrow. It is disturbing to note that extra legal

taxation and the collection of illegal fees have become the norm as opposed to the collection of legitimate taxes and fees. Unity Party will put a halt to this practice.

In similar vein Unity party will have zero tolerance for corruption requiring all public officials to serve under a code of conduct which is clear in the provision that those who violate the public trust will bear the penalties prescribed by law. This policy is without prejudice to the merit system which will include proper compensation, selection, promotion and retirement.

Liberians know that it is because of the high level of corruption, the lack of basic services, a budget process out of control, the lack of accountability and transparency that has invoked the reaction of our partners which resulted in the Government Economic Management Plan proposal. Let me be clear again on our position regarding GEMAP. We certainly had concerns about the original proposal which sought to bring foreign judges into the Liberian courts. This is because of the constitutional and statutory implications of that proposal. Our partners have now changed and restricted GEMAP to a program which essentially will enhance revenue collection, address corruption and promote institutional capacity building. We are therefore pleased that this has been finalized with the signing of GEMAP and we can now move toward a renewal of good relations with our development partners. We can also now start the process of meeting the requirement for the removal of IMF sanctions and the negotiation of a Staff Monitored Program that will enable us to seek access to the several mechanisms for relief of the staggering US \$3.8 million external debt which our country faces.

As regards monetary policy, it is likely that in the short term we will have to maintain a dual currency thereby allowing time for a careful review of the options which include dollarization, full local currency and, in the longer term, integration into the regional currency arrangement that is being introduced.

Our fifth legacy agenda is Education. We will start with the promotion of free universal primary education.

As in other sectors, innovative approaches and tough measures will be required. Over the years, our educational system has produced a lot of graduates but relatively few trained people. This is because of the low quality of teaching staff and the lack of textbooks and school equipment. As a result, the majority of those graduating from our and universities hardly possess a high school equivalent education and are woefully ill equipped to compete in an environment of their peers worldwide. The Unity Party will seek to advocate 20% of our budgetary resources for the expansion of quality high schools in each county in the rehabilitation of the several vocational schools to cater to our war affected youth. The University of Liberia will be decentralized into colleges in several counties. A literacy program, important to our process of renewal, will be structured to include skills training, thereby enhancing the contribution of our illiterate population to the nation's development goals.

Health is our sixth area of focus.

A positive impact on the health of our people could be made by prioritizing the availability of clean water. Unity Party will seek to provide a well or borehole in every major village by the year 2008. We believe this is an achievable goal and that external assistance can be attracted to support this endeavor.

The seventh element of a recovery framework relates to economic infrastructure – energy, roads, telecommunications, sea, and airports.

This is a clear area for private sector participation, making possible Liberia's access to the several equity and loan funds which are available to support private sector investment in these areas. Of course, to succeed in this regard, the Government will have to ensure that bona fide individuals and corporations, are given the right to invest and manage these assets under regulations that ensure that the national interest is protected, citizens receive quality service and good corporate governance procedures are employed.

Electricity and roads will receive particular attention. Unity Party is convinced that power can be restored to our Capitol city within six months while the hydro facilities at Mt. Coffee are being rehabilitated with the support of our Chinese partners. There is also scope for the development of small hydro potential throughout the country. The repair of roads initiated through labor intensive methods using well established U.N. programs will create jobs for our citizens even as a major road construction program is being formulated and implemented.

It is clear that no program of economic recovery will succeed unless there is an environment of security. This is not a matter to be taken lightly since the safety of life, limb and property is an important consideration in the decision of individuals to live and invest in our country. Each citizen, each visitor, each international organization representative, each diplomatic mission official takes note, records and relays the activities and practices regarding the safety and protection of rights in the country. A secured environment is thus a major ingredient in confidence building and confidence is a major ingredient in investment decisions.

Unity Party will ensure that all Liberians are confident in their safety by enhancing the ongoing processes to restructure and professionalize our security services including the armed forces. We will request the support of our partners for the continuation of an international peacekeeping force for a few years to allow for a consolidation of the processes of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

A program of national renewal must cross borders to include regional cooperation and integration. Consistent with practices in other regions of the world we must broaden our market and seek economies of scale through regional effort. The Mano River Union and ECOWAS represent the first stages of the building blocks that will lead us toward realization of this goal.

Gender empowerment is my final word on economic recovery.

In Liberia, as in the rest of Africa, women produce some 60 to 80 percent of the region's food but account for 10 percent of the income and 1 percent of the assets.

Unity Party with a woman leader will ensure that the role of women is enhanced in every aspect of our national endeavor, paying particular attention to the education of girls and the improvement of market conditions for our sisters in the informal sector.

A special word to our business community. We take the view that the economy of any nation is energized by a vibrant business community and as such, we consider the relationship between government and business to be one of partnership. This imposes deep and extensive responsibilities on both parties; on the one hand the formulation of fair regulations and laws and on the other hand respect of same by the business community in a unified effort to create the appropriate environment that will safeguard long-term investments. In this regard we know that much has been said about what our policy is likely to be regarding Liberianization.

We want to be very clear on this issue. Our government will be strong in its pursuit of encouraging Liberian entrepreneurs to participate in the economic development in a substantive manner. This does not mean that we will be lax in our protection of foreign owned interests in preference to Liberian businesses. This is because we do not feel Liberian participation and foreign interests are mutually exclusive. We believe in the healthy co-existence of both realizing that extra efforts have to be made in the identification and allocation of resources (financial and others) pertinent to the full inclusion and participation of Liberians in the money economy.

My reflections on the economic agenda concluded let me turn briefly to the other two aspects relevant for nation building. In fact it has been suggested that over the years, it has been the politics and society, not the economics of Liberia, that have remained arcane and problematic. It has also been suggested that social and economic reform are the most important preconditions for development of the country.

With this in mind, I will now touch upon the legacy, status quo and framework for social reform.

The long standing divide between the settler and indigenous population has its genesis in the nature of the country's settlement and in the lack of a common cause or unifying force such as that which pertained in the colonized countries of the continent. The concept of a national identity has thus not been an inherent part of our national psyche. Additionally, the two sides of the social divide maintained, for much too long separate distinct group identities – in speech, dress, lifestyle, and culture. President Tubman in his Unification Policy introduced a break from that undesirable proclivity. However, in reality the ideal of equality represented in his official policy remained lacking in structure and substance. Thus, although the ward system and intermarriages heightened the process of assimilation, despite the lack of adequate policy action, it was not until the coup d'état of 1980 that the divide between the settler and indigenous groups was permanently punctured.

That is the legacy.

Although studies indicate that today the divide is more along income rather than ethnic lines, yet we must recognize that vestiges of this divided social order still remain and could once again be used for political purposes

The Unity Party will confront this issue with policies and actions that ensure full unity and equal opportunity for all Liberians. A rewrite of our history to give due recognition to the role, lifestyle and contribution to nation building of the indigenous population would be a good place to start.

Additionally a revisit of those dividing symbols such as those mentioned in my statement at the 1972 CWA commencement and those subsequently detailed more eloquently by Unity Party founding member Edward Binyan Kesseley, may be required. For example, let us not be timid in seeking changes in the national motto, the flag, the wording of citations of merit, and the constitution.

And now the politics.

Our political status quo has been shaped by this legacy and by the events following the 1980 coup d'état.

That is the legacy, which one might say, is strikingly familiar to the status quo.

Change must be introduced into our political system, political institutions and political processes if we are to achieve our national development goals. Analysis and empirical evidence have shown beyond a doubt that development fosters best in an environment of freedom, civil rights protection and the exercise of choice without penalty or repression.

A new political agenda would call for a rebalancing of power between the Presidency and the people, since indeed all power is inherent in the people as our constitution dictates. An imperial Presidency which has in its hands, the power of life or death, wealth or poverty, success or failure is an obstruction to progress.

A reorder of the political system to achieve development objective would also require more decentralization and more decision making regarding development priorities and resource use at the local levels, through leaders that are elected and serve at the will of the people on the basis of their responsiveness to their needs.

The other two branches of our political system – the Legislature and the Judiciary – pose no real problem in so far as structure is concerned. It is their lack of independence from the Executive that contributes to the problem. Unity Party will ensure that its independence, which provides the check and balance in our national platform, is fully respected.

The civil society at large, including the media, also has a role to play in ensuring that our economic, social and political systems provide the basis for growth and development. The basic freedoms of choice, association, religion that are enshrined in our constitution can only become a living instrument if everyone is prepared to preserve, respect and challenge any attempt at an undermining of these freedoms. Thus, by commission or omission, action or inaction, it is each and every one of us who have the responsibility to determine what our society should be.

Fellow Liberians, many of us in this room and many within the 'country or outside in the diaspora, have come a long way in the more than twenty years' struggle for democracy and the freedom of choice. While others accepted and benefited from the status quo, we demonstrated courage. We stood tall in challenging successive regimes characterized by patronage, repression and exploitation. We were beaten, jailed, tortured, disadvantaged and ostracized for exercising the courage of our conviction. And so today, because of our determination and consistency; because of our courage and character; our country stands on the verge of becoming one of those embarking upon an irreversible path toward freedom and democracy. And so today, we welcome to this environment of peace and tranquility, of commitment and competition, the many who stood on the sidelines waiting to claim the right of participation and contest earned by the blood, sweat and tears of their more courageous compatriots.

To Unity Partisans all over the country: let us be different and let us make a difference. Let us rise above the negatives by speaking of and promoting our vision, our guiding principles and our pledge to the nation. Let us emphasize our capacity, our competence and our commitment to respond to the needs of our people. Let us be robust in thought and bold in action.

To Fellow Liberians, let us all commit today to the strengthening of the process of peace and reconciliation; by supporting our effort at inclusion; by rejecting any influence which seeks to condone through collective guilt; by tempering justice with mercy in a judicial system guided by the rule of law.

Let us combine effort and talent in contributing to the processes and the programs that move our people from patronage to progress, from dependency to self sufficiency, from despair to hope.

Let us commit to building the constituency for change, for the implementation of a robust reform agenda which has at its core the devolution of power and authority from the center in Monrovia to the periphery in the counties, thus ensuring that our counties and administrative subdivisions have the responsibility and the authority and the means to set and achieve their own priorities with the participation of the people whose lives are affected thereby.

Fellow Liberians, Unity Party makes a commitment to serve people, to establish a Government of inclusion that represents the diversity of our nation, to ensure that all the tenets of good governance are part of all that we do; to address corruption, to rehabilitate and reintegrate our war affected youth, refugees and displaced people into their communities, to work within our means and with the private sector; to rehabilitate our social and economic infrastructure, particularly electricity, the road network and school systems; to improve the condition of our markets in which our women in the informal sector must work; to assist our small rural businesses to enhance subsistence production of our staple foods; to remove the margins and the kickbacks on major commodities, such as rice and petroleum, so that the prices are affordable by our people; to put our people to work, thereby restoring their dignity.

Fellow Liberians, Unity Party commits to our youth to give them back a future of hope, by providing them with the opportunity of an education, of skills, of jobs, of the chance to participate in the decision that affect their lives.

We also have a word to our colleagues and opponents in other political parties, — a respect for their right to participate in a democratic process, free of violence, intimidation, mudslinging and false accusations, confirming and abiding by the Code of Conduct prescribed by the National Elections Commission.

To our leaders and citizens in the Mano River and ECOWAS Countries — a big thank you for the sacrifices, for the investment, for the resources you have given to bring peace to our country. We pledge never to use our country for the destabilization of any other country; we pledge to work for regional cooperation and integration; we pledge to make Liberia safe and prosperous so that your investment and effort have not been in vain.

To our international partners - we pledge a system of good governance, sound economic policy and performance and a restoration of credit worthiness so that your confidence is restored in our ability and commitment to manage our Nation's resources for the good of the Liberian people. We commit to those resources that will accelerate our efforts to achieve the millennium development goals and access to resources such as the Millennium Challenge Account and the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

And so, once again, Liberia stands at the crossroads, facing the choice of looking backwards, clinging to those symbols of a lost and dubious glory or walking boldly into the future, embracing the new requirements of a new and fast globalizing world.

This is not a choice to be made by the Government alone. This is not a responsibility to be assumed by the Government alone. This is not a right to be exercised by the Government alone. The Government in concert with its institutions and its people; the Government in partnership with non governmental organizations and the private sector that is all the bodies and institutions represented in this room, must embark upon a new path to save our nation.

We owe this to the fore parents who welcomed their brothers and sisters from a place of bondage. We owe it to the fore parents who returned to the land of their nativity and founded and defended the birth of a new nation. We owe it to our mothers and our fathers who labored and sacrificed to provide us with the capacity to make a choice that is right. We owe it to ourselves to leave behind a legacy of which we can be proud and we owe it to our children to ensure that they have a place to call home and to which they can return. We owe it to generations unborn to enable them to inherit their fair share of the benefits of their land. Unity Party commits to the fulfillment of its legacy. Unity Party will do it and will deliver to the Liberian people.

Thank you and God bless you all!

Autobiographical Notes

G. Flamma Sherman

I first thought of writing a book about my experiences, and family background after 28th August 1928. My father died on this date and my uncle Blaye, who had succeeded him as head of one of the traditional Ruling Houses of River Cess, had come to Monrovia in this capacity to instruct me as to the customs, practices, and requirements in our House and personally deliver to me relics and kingly souvenirs of the warrior King George Flamma, then spelled Flammie.¹

My intention was to begin with some of the informal learning processes and experiences to which children within a traditional African family, particularly of a Ruling House, are exposed.

Several decades have elapsed since the 1920's. Events of farreaching significance and worldwide consequences have taken place; also, I have ended four decades of public life.

My father was Joseph Sherman. His father was King George Flamma of River Cess² of the Ruling House of the Sardios.³

I don't believe it was by mere coincidence that the General R. A. Sherman and the Bombo, George Flamma, met and became friends, for, George Flamma was himself a General and Warrior King of River Cess, of world renown as evidenced by gifts and symbols of recognition sent to him by heads of Boards of Directors of foreign companies that were established and operated along the Cestos Coast, under his protection and within areas regarded as his kingdom.

Before his assassination by his younger brother, Kpowuh Kpehjou, he had extended the kingdom and his rule from Zodaë to Draw Creek, a tributary of the River Cestos. called the Flammie Creek by early Geographers,⁴ and areas around where European traders had factories.

I began service to my country at the Monrovia Customs while I was a teenager and an elementary (primary) school student, serving an apprenticeship of nine years.

¹ Spelled Flammie by the early European explorers and German traders who first established their factories at the mouth of the Cestos River under his protection, including Jacob West and Company.

² Born in 1799; King in 1819 at the age of 23; assassinated in 1859.

³ The people that throw and catch or fight with the spear - spearmen. They constitute one of the three Ruling Houses of River Cess.

⁴ See Sir Harry Johnston, *Liberia*

Excluding this apprenticeship, the period of my service to my country falls into four periods during which I served partly at home and partly abroad.

The first period dates from February, 1939, shortly after I completed Liberia College (now the University of Liberia), until March, 1952. During the whole of this period, I served in the field of Education, beginning under Dr. G. W. Gibson as Secretary of Public Instruction⁵ in the Administration of President Edwin J. Barclay. My first assignment was as a teacher at the Hartzell Academy (later known as the Bassa High School). I became Principal of the institution in 1942 and served until March, 1944, when I was appointed Supervisor of Schools for Grand Bassa County and Marshall Territory (an area which with Gibi Territory is now called Margibi County). I served in this position until 1952. The Administration was that of President William V. S. Tubman and the Secretary of Public Instruction was Dr. J. W. Pearson.

The second period dates from March, 1952, until January, 1956⁶ when I served as Superintendent for Grand Bassa County under President Tubman, a position which brought me to the center of local politics and placed me in touch with the center of national politics. I thoroughly enjoyed and took advantage of this opportunity until, not unlike most individuals in politics where the "die-hard" profess "politics is not righteousness", my own hour of disillusionment and disenchantment came.

The third dates from July 20, 1956, until December, 1969, and covered the years during which I was assigned to serve at different posts in the foreign service of my country. I began as Liberian Consul General in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and served from 1956 to 1960. I was then posted as Liberian Ambassador to Accra, Ghana, where I served until December, 1969. Part of this time, from 1963 to 1969, I was Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. This was a most interesting period in post World War II Africa. From July, 1960 to June, 1961 of this period, I served concurrently as Special Representative of the President of Liberia to the Congo (now known as Zaire), in which capacity I was named to and served as a member of the United Nations Conciliation Commission to the Congo. I was then based in Leopoldville (presently called Kinshasha). This was a most intriguing and challenging assignment, at the end of which I returned to Accra. The other concurrent assignment I held was as Ambassador to the Republic of Togo from 1967 to December, 1969.

In January, 1970, I began my fourth and final period of service in the Liberian Government. I was appointed Secretary of Education by President Tubman and was holding this position at the time of Tubman's death in July, 1971. I continued in this position under William R. Tolbert, Jr. who acceded to the Presidency on the death of Tubman.⁷ In January, 1972, President Tolbert effected a change in the position title of the Cabinet members from "Secretary" to "Minister". I was appointed Minister of

⁵ This title has since 1972 been changed to Minister of Education.

⁶ There followed a period of six months, January to July, 1956, when I served as Assistant Secretary of Public Works and Utilities with Honorable Thomas Buchanan as Secretary.

⁷ Tolbert was Vice President at the time of Tubman's death and had been since 1952.

Education, the first person to hold this title. I held this position until my resignation in April, 1973.

Shortly after my resignation, I was invited by the Maryland Logging Corporation, which was having problems with Government, to serve the Corporation in a consultative capacity. I was named Vice President of the Corporation and began an entirely different phase in my life, a position I held until I decided to retire in December, 1987. During this period, I was able to get the Corporation to transform its operations so that there was full compliance with its Agreement with Government, improvement in infrastructure in River Gbeh, center of the Corporation's operations, and in benefits to the workers and the people of the area.

Released at my 77th birthday celebration
Middletown, New Jersey
September 1, 1990

A Tribute To Harry Fumba Moniba

by D. Elwood Dunn

I thank the family of **my late classmate and friend** for the opportunity to say a few words over his mortal remains

I met **Harry Fumba Moniba** at Cuttington College and Divinity School in the early 1960s. We were graduates together in the class of 1964. By today's enrollment numbers it was a small class of about 25 students. It included, but was not limited to, the following: Etmonia David-Tarpeh (current head of World Vision in Liberia), Shirley Davis-Stewart (an educator), Eva Johns (also an educator), Gladys Kiawon-Johnson (Lawyer and former Judge), Juliette Phelps-Maxwell (Physician), and the late Stephen Marka Yekeson (educator, with service as President both of our alma mater and the University of Liberia).

Cuttington was then the only private liberal arts college in Africa, and it attracted students from across the continent with its reputation of academic excellence. Moniba, an education major, and a cum laude graduate, was part of a small, contingent of students from the Episcopal Order of Holy Cross St. Augustine High School in Bolahun (Lofa County). A Holy Cross report of the era, which I discovered at the Archives of the Episcopal Church in Austin, Texas headlined "Bolahun Students Sweep Awards at Cuttington Graduation". This was a tribute to the quality of education that the Order provided, as well as the caliber of the students themselves.

Into the boundless world we took off - those of us academic regulars and our academic stars confreres. We took off to prepare ourselves for service to church and state, as our charge from Cuttington put it in those days. Following stints of service in the education sector, Harry pursued a terminal degree in African history and international relations at Michigan State University, earning the PhD in 1975.

We met briefly upon his return home shortly thereafter. He was soon to return to the United States, to Washington DC to join the Liberian Embassy as First Secretary and Consul. This was not his first choice. He was not happy, but decided to bide his time, or, as we say in Liberia, wait for God's time.

Harry's time arrived first, when a vacancy occurred at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Hon. Trohoh Kpagahai, then Assistant Minister for European Affairs was appointed Minister of Postal Affairs by President William R. Tolbert, Jr. Harry was

appointed in 1979 Assistant Minister for European Affairs in succession to Mr. Kpagahai. Perhaps less than a year later he was named by the People's Redemption Council government as Liberia's Ambassador to Britain. The crowing jewel of his rise in government came with his choice as the **27th Vice President of Liberia**, a position in which he served 1986 through 1990.

Perhaps a historical note is in order here. Harry was one of a small number of Liberians of indigenous background to serve in the office of Vice President of Liberia. Before him only two others had served as Vice President - Henry Too Wesley of Maryland County who served in the second administration of President C.D.B. King (1924-1928), and Bennie Dee Warner of Margibi County who served the last administration of President William R. Tolbert, Jr (1977-1980).

The convoluted circumstances of the civil war, which began in earnest in 1990, denied Harry the opportunity to succeed the deposed President Samuel K. Doe. He was in quest of the presidency when he left us.

Lest we forget! The deceased was a student of world politics, though he did not opt for a purely academic career. As I said earlier, his doctorate degree was in international politics. The thought processes he cultivated, and the knowledge and insights he acquired at the summit of academic training no doubt came in handy throughout his public service career. He set forth in a booklet what he himself labeled. "personal observations" on Liberian politics in the 1990s and beyond.

Always of a quiet, smiling and friendly disposition., Harry was quintessentially a gentleman, a natural diplomat, and caring politician who sought to remain connected to the people. We - he and I - enjoyed infrequent associations particularly during the years of civil war in our country. As I drove from work one evening perhaps five weeks or so ago, I picked up a message from Harry. I returned the call immediately. He wanted my mailing address. I received shortly thereafter an item in the mail from him. I had not replied when the news of his tragic death reached me.

My wife, Matilda (and our children) extend heartfelt sympathy to **Harry's widow, Minita, and all of his children - Harry, Jr., Paul, Alicia, Gladys, and Clarence, as well as the entire immediate and extended Moniba family.**

May the soul of **HARRY FUMBA MONIBA**, and the souls of all the faithful departed rest in peace!

SOCIAL CONCERNS DEPARTMENT

Society of African Missions
Box 4468 Washington DC 20017
Phone (202) 529-4200

April 5, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

I am a Catholic priest who, for the past twenty five years has been working in Liberia and with Liberian students in the United States: I am a member of the S.M.A. Fathers, a missionary society which has been working continuously in Africa for well over one hundred years and which at the present time has 600 priests workin in eleven African countries.

In January of this year I visited Liberia for a period of about four weeks. I was disturbed by the deterioration of human rights and the lack, of political freedom. What makes this more disturbing is that Liberians see the massive financial aid the United States gives to Liberia as indication that the U.S. both backs the Government of Dr. Samuel K. Doe and wants it to remain in power despite its record of depriving its own citizens of basic human rights. I am enclosing a copy of a report I wrote on Liberia as well as other documents pertaining to human rights violations in Liberia.

At \$45 per capita, Liberia receives the largest amount of aid of any African country south of the Sahara. I am perticularly concerned with the more than \$40 million of MAP to Liberia during the past four years. While much of this money was used for military housing it was also used to equip a 6000 man army. Soldiers from this army invaded the University of Liberia campus and beat, raped, shot and killed Liberian students who were peacefully protesting the arrest of Dr. Amos Sawyer. In addition Dr. Doe still holds students and other citizens in jail without being charged or tried.

Recently CIC Dr. S.K. Doe broke ground for a \$20 million Ministry of Defense Headquarters Building. This was to administer a 6000 man army in a country of two million. If Liberia can afford that why does it seek MAP?

This year your Administration Is asking for over \$88 million for Liberia of which \$13 million is for MAP. In view of the Ministry of Defense building and especially because of the violation of human rights I am asking you to do all you can to reduce

MAP funds for Liberia. I suggest a reduction of \$5 million. Withholding funds would serve as a warning to Dr. Doe that he must not violate basic human rights and that he is expected to fulfill his promise to return the country to civilian rule through open and fair elections.

What particularly disturbs me is the militarization of our foreign policy. As it pertains to Liberia I find it difficult to understand our position. Liberia has been free since 1847. It has not been at war with its neighbors. It has neither attacked them nor been attacked by them.

The only function of a 6000 man well trained and equipped army is for internal purposes. At the present time it is being used to suppress and harass its own citizens. It might seem dramatic to say that an army equipped with American uniforms, boots, helmets, weapons and riding in American jeeps invaded the University of Liberia to respond to a non-violent protest by Liberian students. The students injured and killed with bullets paid for by American taxpayers. It might sound melodramatic but unfortunately it is true.

When I mention these facts to American friends and relatives of very political spectrum in both parties they are horrified. None of them want their tax dollars used to equip a Liberian army which has no external threat and can be used only to repress Liberian citizens.

Liberia may be small. The violations of human rights there might seem insignificant. But people are being repressed and lives are being lost.

I ask you to take effective action to see that a clear and unequivocal message is sent to the Government of Liberia that the United States will not continue to give substantial economic aid to that country until its human rights record improves.

Thanking you for your assistance in this matter, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Rev. Thomas Hayden, S.M.A.

Report on Liberia

Human Rights Issues

Rev. Thomas Hayden, SMA, Ph.D.

I. Introduction

From January 17 - February 4, 1985, I visited Liberia. With the exception of three days in Cape Palmas and three days in Bong and Nimba Counties, I spent my time in Monrovia. Prior to leaving for Liberia, I decided I would spend some time investigating human rights issues as well as continuing work on the West Point project.

Since 1959 I have been following development issues in Liberia.* Frequent visits to Liberia combined with continued contact with hundreds of Liberians in the United States, whom I have known from the time I taught in Liberia or met during my visits there, have given me an opportunity to frequently assess social, economic, and political changes in Liberia. During my recent visit, I had the opportunity of talking with the people of West Point, New Kru Town, market women, students, professional people and government officials at every level, including cabinet members. In visits to various counties, I met with students, teachers, farmers and fishermen. This provided me with varied viewpoints while I was gathering data for this report.

During previous visits my contacts were almost exclusively with Liberians: remaining independent of the U.S. Embassy and community allowed me to make my own assessments depending only on contacts with Liberians. Also it was important for me not to become identified with U.S. policy or officials in Liberia. However, this year I wanted to assess the impact of U.S. policy in Liberia so for the first time since 1963, I made a call on U.S. Embassy officials to express my concern with certain aspects of U.S. - Liberia relations.

Two areas particularly concerned me: first, the invasion of the University of Liberia on August 22nd and actions which have since taken place there; second, the deterioration of personal and political freedom within Liberia.

* For ten years (1959-1969), I lived in Cape Palmas, Liberia, and taught at Our Lady of Fatima College and High School as well as being involved in the development and implementation of credit unions and cooperatives. Since 1969, I have visited Liberia almost every year for a period ranging from four weeks to three months. During some of those visits, I conducted extensive research on the Kru Coast. This provided the data for my doctoral thesis on Social Change Among the Sikleo Kru. In 1976, I received my Ph.D. from Howard University. Since that time I have written on social, political, and economic questions concerning Liberia.

II. SMA and Catholic Church Concern for Human Rights in Liberia

Liberia, as an original signer of the United Nations Charter, is committed to respect the basic human rights of all Liberian citizens.

Because of increased violations of human rights in many countries, the Catholic Church has given increased importance to its obligation to speak out against the violations of these rights.

After the rice riots in 1979, the Catholic Church issued a statement condemning the use of force to disperse demonstrators. The Church in 1980 asked that the PRC have the soldiers return to the barracks and the country return to civilian rule. It asked for amnesty for all political prisoners. Since 1980, it has issued severe statements on human rights including the November 1984 Pastoral Letter.

There are many American Catholic missionaries working in Liberia. It would not be proper for us to comment on particular political decisions which should be made by Liberian citizens and their leaders. We try to maintain a neutral position with regards to strictly political issues in Liberia. However, political and economic decisions have ethical and moral implications. The Church should and must comment on these implications.

The U.S. has increased dramatically its economic aid to Liberia since 1980. Prior to 1980, U.S. aid to Liberia ranged from 12 - 18 million per year. In the past two years it has exceeded 80 million each year. The aid is given on the assumption that it will provide for the basic economic needs which will enable the military to hand over the government to civilians in 1986. As Americans, we can demand that our government use our tax dollars only for the purpose of development and helping Liberians on the road to civilian rule. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act requires that countries which receive U.S. economic aid respect the human rights of its citizens. As U.S. citizens we can demand that our Government make respect for human rights a condition of U.S. economic aid to any country.

This report is principally concerned with a challenge to the U.S. Government on the level and conditions of its economic support to Liberia during the past four years.

III. Liberian Troops Invade the University of Liberia - August 22, 1985

On Wednesday, August 22, at 3:50 p.m., CIC S.K. Doe gave the following order: "Mr. Minister of Defense, Mr. Army Chief of Staff, I want the students at the University campus to disperse without delay NOW! And you will move or be removed." Roughly 1,000 students were assembled at the University of Liberia campus gate, calling for the release of Dr. Amos Sawyer and others who were detained the previous Sunday. Accounts of the incidents which followed are attached to his report. Most of them are from the **Daily Observer**. My own observations are as follows:

1. The Government of Liberia has admitted that students and others were injured by bullets, beatings and rapes. The Government has not confirmed any

deaths. The Liberian Government has not conducted an investigation of the August 22nd incident nor will it allow any group to conduct an investigation.

2. There were deaths on the campus. There are highly credible accounts of confirmed deaths at the John F. Kennedy and Maternity Center Hospitals. Persons have testified that they saw student bodies at the JFK morgue.

3. A student whom I have known for over ten years and who I have every reason to trust gave the following account:

Student: "I was on the University campus that day. I saw soldiers coming and students running. There were two other students with me. One was a Kpelle boy and the other was from Barclayville. A soldier grabbed me and slapped me. I begged him and he let me go. All three of us were running. I heard guns fired. I heard the Kpelle and Barclayville boys cry out when they were shot. I saw them fall to the ground and they were not moving. I ran down the hill to Jallatown. A Vai woman told me and another student to come into her house. She hid us for two hours. I could hear people screaming and guns being fired. After two hours she gave each of us one dollar for taxi fare to go home."

Q: "Did the two students you saw shot die?"

Student: "I cannot say for sure but they were not moving. I have asked their families and neither one of them said they saw their sons after the shootings."

Q: "What do you think happened?"

Student: "My brother is a soldier at Camp Sheflin and he saw an army truck come there soon in the morning and bury many bodies in a mass grave. He saw this with his own two eyes."

4. Responsible and reliable persons have confirmed that the soldiers removed the dead and some wounded from the Maternity Center on the evening of August 22nd and carried them to Camp Sheflin.

5. From the above and other testimony, I have reached the following conclusions:

a. The students at the University were holding a vocal but peaceful demonstration concerning the arrest of Dr. Amos Sawyer and others. After 77 days in prison, Dr. Sawyer was released without ever being formally charged with any crime. He was being questioned on an alleged plot to overthrow the government. Among other things, Dr. Sawyer was accused of planning to blow up LEC (the hydro plant), plotting to destroy bridges and even setting fire to the city of Monrovia to cause civil disturbances. All this would end with a coup. With the

exception of a very few persons closely connected to CIC Doe, no one believed that Dr. Sawyer would be involved with such a plan. LU students did not believe this and were peacefully demonstrating for his release.

b. Hundreds of students were beaten. Women were raped. Students were shot at and wounded. Some students were killed by bullets. Faculty members, including Dr. James Tarpeh and T. Nelson Williams, were stripped naked and beaten. A peaceful student protest cannot possibly justify such brutal action.

c. The entire University administration was dismissed as well as many faculty members. This directly violates the laws dealing with the governance of the University of Liberia. A struggling University has been severely damaged by such arbitrary action.

d. At the present time, students at the University are discouraged. They are frightened and subdued. When an issue of *React* appeared one day on campus, a rumor spread that the Army would return: students, faculty and staff abandoned the campus in mid-afternoon. If the invasion's purpose was to frighten, subdue and intimidate the students and faculty, it succeeded.

IV. Liberian Political Parties Seek Free Elections

After I arrived, Archbishop Francis mentioned that some friends who were concerned about human rights wanted to see me. They expressed concern over the lack of political freedom in the country and the deterioration of personal freedoms. Among the issues they talked about were the issuance of Decree 88A, PRC Decree No. 2, the closing of the **observer**, the harassment of political parties trying to register, the jailing of students without charge, and the killings, beatings, stripping, wounding, raping and humiliating of the students, faculty and staff of the University of Liberia.

In this meeting, those present said that they thought that the United States was the only country which could have any major influence on CIC Doe. They were concerned that the United States was not exerting enough influence on Dr. Doe. They asked that I try to inform the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Congress of what is really going on in Liberia and that I urge the U.S. to place some further conditions on the U.S. financial assistance which Liberia receives. The most recent figure was \$91.4 million.

At the beginning and end of the meeting, I stated very clearly that I was not interested in commenting on the various political parties or philosophies in Liberia. I also said that I did not think it was proper for me to talk about Liberian politics but that it was important to discuss human rights considerations. I stated that people have a right to life and certain basic freedoms, such as the freedoms of speech, press and association. In the Liberian setting, I added that I thought the people had a right to

choose their leaders through free elections. It was within this context that various groups of Liberians and I focused on human rights issues.

These people asked that I request the U.S. Government to attempt to ensure that the free elections actually do take place as CIC Doe promised. They feel that if the U.S. makes free elections a condition for continued economic support, CIC will take note. Furthermore, they feel that Congress will be able to require these conditions. When Dr. Sawyer was in prison for 77 days, effective lobbying in Congress finally convinced the Liberian Government to release him. They would like to see the same pressure applied to the elections.

V. Meetings with U.S. Officials in Liberia

Shortly after I arrived, I went to the U.S. Embassy to meet with Mr. John Hall, the economic attache. I expressed concern over the level of U.S. support to Liberia. I had two definite issues to discuss: (1) the level of U.S. rice imports, and (2) U.S. economic support of the Liberian army.

On the rice issue, I said I was concerned with the \$15 million worth of U.S. rice imported each year under Public Law 480. For this issue, Mr. Hall referred me to Mrs. Palma at USAID. She explained that the U.S. had suspended shipments of U.S. rice to Liberia as of October 1984. The reason for this was twofold: first, the U.S. Government thought that too much rice was being imported to Liberia and consequently the demand for local surplus rice was less; second, the Liberian government had not fulfilled its obligations under the signed PL 480 rice contract. The new contract which was supposed to be signed in January 1985 has not even come up for discussion. Mrs. Palma felt that the U.S. probably would not renegotiate the rice contract unless market forces in Liberia demanded it.

Mr. Hall explained that most of the approximately \$16.5 million in military assistance was given for military housing (\$15 million) with the remainder reserved for training. Less than \$500 thousand was for equipment.

I also told him that I had been talking with many Liberians—from the poor people of West Point, to students, to Liberian political candidates and friends with high positions in business and government. From my conversations with them, I said that the Liberian impression of the U.S. role in Liberia was that CIC Doe was in power because the U.S. Government wanted him there. Moreover, the Liberian people believe he will remain in power after October precisely because the U.S. government wants him to remain. Mr. Hall said that he thought that my words represented the perceptions of the Liberian people but that they were not true. He said the American government is neutral: they want a peaceful transition to civilian rule. He said that those who want Doe out are convinced that the U.S. wants to keep him in. But Doe, on the other hand, is convinced that the U.S. is trying to get him out. Doe interprets the meeting of the American ambassador with people such as Byron Tarr, Amos Saw-

yer and others as part of a scenario to prevent him from becoming the civilian Head of State.

When I mentioned my concern over the August 22nd incident on the University of Liberia campus, Mr. Hall suggested that I see Ambassador Swing. I agreed to meet with him the following week to discuss the rice issue, U.S. support for the Liberian army, the University of Liberia, and freedom for Liberians to participate in open elections.

In addition to John Hall, I met with Mr. Greg Fergin (the political officer), Mrs. Fergin (an economic officer), Mr. Costello (the controller at USAID), and Mr. Doug Kline (the PVO coordinator at USAID).

VI. Meeting with U.S. Ambassador William Swing

While in Liberia, I met with Ambassador William Swing twice. During those meetings I made the following points:

a. The U.S. has made a heavy financial commitment to the Government of Liberia on one premise: that with financial stability, CIC Doe will fulfill his commitment to bring the country to civilian rule. I doubted that CIC Doe would do this. As reasons I cited the following:

i. He dissolved the PRC and created the INA (Interim National Assembly). He was "elected" as its president.

ii. He decreed Rule 88A which gives him sweeping powers to thwart all political criticism.

iii. He jailed Amos Sawyer for plotting to overthrow the Liberian Government. For 77 days he kept Sawyer in jail. Eventually the charges were dropped.

iv. Because the students protested the arrest of Dr. Sawyer, he himself ordered troops to invade the campus. They injured, raped and killed students.

v. He dismissed the whole University administration and faculty and closed the University.

vi. He has arrested students and jailed them without charge. They are still in jail.

vii. He verbally attacked the Christian Churches before the diplomatic corps for their criticism of Decree 88A and other decisions.

viii. SECOM (Special Election Commission) has made it very difficult for parties other than his own to register.

b. The U.S. Government is giving too much aid to the Liberian Army. Liberia has been at peace with its neighbors for well over a century. The only need for a well-trained and equipped army is to harass the Liberian people. That is exactly what Doe is doing.

c. On August 22nd, Liberian soldiers - wearing American uniforms, riding in American jeeps, and carrying American rifles and other weapons - invaded the University of Liberia campus. They shot, wounded, and killed Liberian citizens with American bullets. I said that I did not think the American taxpayers wanted their money used for those purposes.

d. The economic aid given by the U.S. Government has allowed CIC Doe to use Liberian funds for private jets, expensive trips abroad, and for personal goals.

e. The U.S. Government has spent \$45 million on housing for 6,000 soldiers. They have spent nothing for civilian housing for the 30,000 people of West Point.

f. The U.S. Government did nothing about the invasion at the University of Liberia. In effect, CIC Doe got off "scot free". There were a few days of unpleasant publicity but the international community - including the U.S. - did not impose any political or financial sanctions in response to these events.

VII. Ambassador Swing's Response

Ambassador Swing responded by saying that the U.S. cannot interfere with the political process in Liberia but that it has made known its concerns to the Liberian Government. He said that the State Department decided to make their concerns known at an official rather than at a public level through the newspapers.

- He said that U.S. support for the Liberian Army was for training and discipline. In fact, the Liberian Army is much more disciplined now than it was at the time of the coup. - The United States worked quietly but effectively for the release of Amos Sawyer.

- The American Ambassador keeps lines of communication open for all Liberians. He has talked with the leaders of all political parties and does not favor one over the other.

- CIC Doe and the Liberian government realize that the U.S. expects them to keep the commitment they made to return the country to civilian rule.

- He said that when he arrived in Liberia in 1980, he asked the U. S. Government to provide money for civilian housing. Unfortunately, that request was turned down.

VIII. Meetings with Archbishop Francis and Bishop Dalieh

In meeting with Archbishop Francis and Bishop Dalieh the following points emerged:

- a. They are seriously concerned with the deterioration of human rights in Liberia.

- b. They expressed their concerns in the 1984 Advent pastoral. While this is considered a forceful statement, the original version was much stronger and more specific.
- c. They hope the U.S. can influence CIC Doe to return the country to civilian rule through honest and open elections.

IX. Report on State Department Visit - March 5, 1985

Mr. Edward Perkins, head of the West Africa region, and Mr. Aubrey Verdun, desk officer for Liberia, met with SMA Social Concerns staff, Fr. Thomas Hayden and Mr. Richard Massaro, on March 5, 1985 at 10:30 A.M. in Mr. Perkins' office at the State Department. One of the purposes of the meeting was to discuss violations of human rights in Liberia.

Fr. Hayden presented accounts he heard in Liberia of the events of August 22, 1985. Students protesting the arrest of Dr. Amos Sawyer were injured, raped and killed by soldiers. The protests were not a riot, as the government of Liberia had claimed. One student whom Fr. Hayden has known for ten years was beaten himself and saw two other students shot while they all were fleeing from the soldiers. He could not say that the students were definitely killed but he saw them lying motionless on the ground. The same person told Fr. Hayden that his brother saw soldiers burying people in a mass grave the next day. In addition, one woman who was trying to locate her student son told Fr. Hickey that she bribed her way into the morgue and looked at three bodies of students before she became too overcome to continue. She was not able to look at any of the other bodies that were there. These accounts seem to confirm the killing of students and contradict official accounts that there were injuries only.

Fr. Hayden protested that the response of the U.S. to this amount of rights abuse and violence was inadequate. Mr. Swing joined five or so other ambassadors and asked the government of Liberia for more information on the events but they did not make a formal public protest.

Fr. Hayden presented the case to Mr. Perkins and Mr. Verdun that the U.S. is responsible for the violence by virtue of its increased military support to a country that has no history of external threats or conflicts. The soldiers who invaded the campus were completely equipped and supplied by the U.S., from clothing to weapons and ammunition, and were being trained here and in Liberia with the help of U.S. military personnel. In short, the U.S. has given C.I.C. Doe the ability to be violent and repressive.

The campus events are not the only rights violations. Dr. Amos Sawyer is under house arrest and is banned from all public activity. *The Observer* has been shut down again and there is no freedom of speech in the country. So far, only one party has met all the criteria of certification for the elections in October and it seems that C.I.C. Doe will run unopposed, giving Liberians no access to the right to choose their leadership. The perception among Liberians is that none of this would be possible unless the U.S.

condoned the policies and activities of the government that continues to receive U.S. support, funds, and weapons.

In a lengthy discussion, Mr. Perkins answered that the U.S. did respond to the events of August 22. He himself flew to Monrovia and met with C.I.C. Doe to express official U.S. displeasure at the violence. The U.S. chose not to publicize the trip in the media. Mr. Perkins raised the possibility that his visit may have been a factor in curtailing any further repressive measures. Furthermore, neither the embassy nor the State Department have any hard evidence or confirmed reports of actual deaths during the incident. What is certain is that students were beaten, raped and shot but no one has yet identified a single person who was definitely killed that day. In response to Fr. Hayden's argument that U.S. intelligence at least should be, able to gather such evidence, Mr. Perkins said that it is not the place or the right of the U.S. to conduct an inquiry into a domestic incident in Liberia.

As for the other rights issues, both Mr. Verdun and Mr. Perkins presented the perspective that Liberia is showing progress in the move toward democratization. Although only one party is fully certified, five of the thirteen others have completed the preliminary phases and the only thing that remains is for them to meet the challenge raised to the validity of all the signatures on their petitions. Liberia did go through a process of drafting a constitution and the people were given the opportunity to vote on it. C.I.C. Doe has not declared a oneparty state. Elections are scheduled. In terms of evidence of political freedom, and in comparison with other nations in the region, Liberia is quite democratic and open.

In response to the issue of military aid, both contended that the amount is not at all excessive. Much of the money has been and is being used to provide adequate housing for the soldiers. No sophisticated or large scale armaments and equipment is being provided. U.S. funds and training are being used to bring discipline, order, and appropriate efficiency to what had been a "rag-tag" army. In their view, the aid is needed and appropriate. The U.S. does not condone violence and repression and prefers that the normal course of political events in Liberia be allowed to proceed. The U.S. cannot do anything that is in fact or in perception a direct intervention in internal affairs and an ouster of the present Head of State.

X. Meeting with Steve Weissman, Staff Consultant, Subcommittee on Africa - March 14, 1985

I expressed concern over the U.S. Government's policy of continuing substantial financial assistance to the Government of Liberia in the light of serious human rights violations.

Mr. Weissman was aware of the issues involved. He referred me to the testimony of Dr. Patrick Seyon before the Subcommittee on Africa. Mr. Weissman asked what I would recommend. I said that I thought that the only way to impress CIC Samuel Doe that the U.S. Government was interested in human rights and free elections in

Liberia was to make a substantial budget cut. I suggested that \$5,000,000.00 be cut from the military assistance portion of the budget. Mr. Weissman thought that this would be a little difficult but that they could cut a lesser amount in the light of budget constraints. He suggested that it might be easier when the bill went before the Appropriations Committee in a couple of months. I asked him with whom I might discuss this matter. He suggested:

- Mr. Bevin Dufty (Chief Legal Assistant to Rep. Julian Dixon of Los Angeles)
- Mr. Mike Marek (Legal Assistant to Rep. David Obey of Wisconsin)
- Rep. William Gray of Philadelphia.

XI. Telephone Conversation with Salih Abdul-Rahim, Subcommittee on Africa - March 15, 1985

The proposed FY 1986 Budget is as follows:

Economic Support Funds	ESF	\$48.0 million
PL 480 - Title I	PL 480	11.0 million
Development Assistance	DA	15.0 million
Military Assistance Program	MAP	13.0 million
Int'l Military Educational Training	IMET	1.3 million
Peace Corps	PC	3.1 million
TOTAL		\$91.4 million

Salih said that the Committee staff was concerned about the Sudan and Liberia. That is why they heard testimony on these two countries. However, the Chairman of the Subcommittee did not want to focus sharply on any one particular country; thus, the bill will go to the full committee, i.e., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, without any specific recommendation to make substantial cuts on the proposed Reagan, Administration budget. I mentioned that I might be able to get word to Rep. Dante Fascell, Chairman of the full committee. Salih said that If someone on the full committee would offer a restrictive amendment on Liberia, the Subcommittee on Africa would most probably back it. He also said that Rep. Bill Gray of Philadelphia should be contacted. Another possibility is to work through the Appropriations Committee. In addition, he noted that the current appropriation recommendations from the Subcommittee of Africa contain some restrictive language which says that the appropriations are based on the expectation that there will be free and fair elections in Liberia.

XII. Status of the FY 1986 Budget Recommendation for Liberia.

On March 19th, the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee met to make their recommendations on various assis-

tance programs for Africa. The Subcommittee voted to recommend to the full committee that \$91.4 million be given to Liberia for the U.S. Federal fiscal year, which runs from October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1986. As part of the recommendation the Subcommittee stated:

"In recognition of the United States' special relationship with Liberia and of our wide variety of interests in that country, security assistance to Liberia is based on the expectation of a successful completion of free and fair elections on a multi-party basis in October 1985, as proposed by the Government of Liberia, and a return to full civilian, constitutional rule as a consequence of such elections...

The Subcommittee believes that U.S. interests in a stable, friendly regime will be best served by a legitimate civilian rule in Liberia. In this regard, the Subcommittee would expect the Administration to link security assistance allocations to Liberia to a successful completion of free and fair elections, on a multi-party basis, in October 1985, as proposed by the Government of Liberia, and a return to full civilian, constitutional rule as a consequence of such elections.

In making its recommendations, the Subcommittee recognizes the friendship and mutual interests which cement the ties between out: two countries and also that Liberia's eventual return to electoral politics is at a pivotal point. The Subcommittee also recognizes the importance of ESF funding to the ongoing stability of the government and its daily operations.

However, the Subcommittee takes note of the serious political dissension and conflict that has occurred in Liberia during the past: year, in particular the Liberian army's brutal invasion of the University of Liberia's campus on August. 22, 1.985, and the subsequent wounding and alleged killing of students. It further notes the continuing abridgement of rights to free speech and assembly as well as harassment of political opposition figures and their adherents. The irregular nature of the electoral commission's procedures and activities are also matters of concern."

This Subcommittee recommendation is the first of a series of steps which must be taken before a final decision is made. After the recommendation goes to the full Committee, it must pass through the Appropriations Committee and then be presented to the full House of Representatives for a vote on the House floor. A similar process of Subcommittee review and recommendation, full Committee action and final vote by the Members must also take place in the Senate. At: this time, it is not certain what the final outcome will be, especially in light of pressure to reduce the total budget and control the growth of the Federal deficit.

TRIBUTE

to
 Florence Ricks-Bing
 Grace United Methodist Church
 Tacoma Park, MD.
 Saturday, 29 September 2001

by Prof. Raymond J. Smyke

I am deeply honoured to be invited by the family to give this Tribute to our departed sister Florence Ricks-Bing. On 8 August, less than two months ago, I telephoned her nursing home in Connecticut and to my surprise the staff insisted that I stay on the line as they searched for her, the implication being that Flossy and I would speak, whereas a year ago they simply told me she could not speak

The same day I reported by Email to Elwood Dunn: "while it was difficult for her to speak clearly, we surely exchanged words and there was certain recognition of who was calling. Perhaps she spoke half a dozen understandable words. I followed this up with a note to her."

What brought us together in 1970 was teachers and education. I worked for the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) where I was responsible for the African Programme. Secretary of Public Instruction Nathaniel Massaquoi (the first African on the Executive Board of UNESCO) invited me to Liberia in 1960 to meet with leaders of the National Teachers Association (NTA), a founding member of WCOTP. In this way I entered the genteel world of Dr. Ora Horton, the President, Dr. Doris Banks-Henries, Timothy Summerville and others. Between 1960 and 1980 I made sixteen visits to Liberia in addition to seeing NTA delegates at the annual world meetings of the Confederation.

In October 1970, WCOTP and NTA conducted a week-long "Conference on the Role of Women in African Teacher Organisations" with participants from all English-speaking African countries; resource persons from Canada, France, UK, USA; general secretaries from West Africa, and Liberian delegates from all the counties. All of these persons lived and worked together staying at Elisabeth Tubman Hall. Doris Banks-Henries was chair, Timothy Summerville NTA president was unwell and later died. Sharing their strength, hope and experience throughout the week was a significant learning experience for all.

A powerhouse from Since—Florence Risks Bing—was a participant. We had not known each other before the event, but at the end of the conference she told me: “Raymond, God caused the scales to fall from my eyes.” A year later Florence was elected NTA president. Bear in mind the changing of the guard at this time with President Tolbert as head of state.

Thus began Flossy’s great years. She was in her prime as a national leader, having the ear of the head of state, supported by a loving husband and family, with close and loyal friends. My role was advisor, friend, confidant, hand holder, showing that the World body was supportive of the energised NTA.

I came to know Flossy during our work and travel together to the hinterland and at the Delegate Assemblies of WCOTP held in different parts of the world. Her faith in God was absolute and unwavering, a wonder to behold. She was fond of saying “God made promises and I’m keeping Him to His word.” Extremely kind and sensitive to the needs of others, she suffered fools not at all.

Yet, one would never know the personal burden she carried every moment with her handicapped son Al, particularly as he grew and matured. Junior’s aborted dream of becoming an airline pilot after an accident in Florida caused sadness, but gratitude at recovery. In the early 1960s Flossy and John experienced financial setbacks.

THROUGH IT ALL that hymn and her belief sustained her. She built the NTA into its strongest and most articulate national position. There were rumblings in the late 1970s from youthful teachers, but they were paid no mind. One could not envisage the changes these foretold.

Let me share a few recollections of Flossy in action. She had great stamina. Load travel between Since and Monrovia on NTA business was an overnight trip. From time to time we would fly Air Liberia or even hitch a ride on a charter that a logging company used. She was always in motion—even when still.

In Greenville at the opening of a school year I was invited to watch the student body being dewormed. Lined up by height on the playing field, everyone knew the drill. Flossy started the process giving it an official aura. A bucket of “medicine” with an immense spoon was carried along and as each student was approached they would open up, grimace and swallow. There were no nay sayers. After the first row was completed the task was taken up by other teachers. I asked her if it was ministry policy, she smiled and said “oh no, it’s my idea.”

On another occasion I was invited to be in the NTA delegation visiting teachers in many, if not most of the counties. It was well planned. John Bing arranged that we stay in the guest houses of his fellow county superintendents. A vehicle was laid on, the group included Aunt Georgia Miller, Sister Ethelda James, Flossy and myself. The ladies determined that the driver was a layabout, with evil habits like smoking and an occasional drink. I felt sorry for him with three back seat drivers.

This ten day safari significantly added to my liberal education. Rural teachers gathered at each county seat to meet us for a day long programme. In the evening we four

had prayer service, singing and food, followed by Ethelda James' real life adventures. Early the next day we would press on to the next venue. By the time we reached Voinjama I was exhausted but the ladies were just getting into it, lamenting the need to head South.

I came away with a new appreciation for rural Liberia and the people who live and work there, but also for the "Matilda Newport" spirit of Liberian women, including my travelling companions.

Flossy's world crashed in 1980 as it did for so many. The horror of the events on the beach, the murder of her husband John Bing in their own home, her house arrest in the same home, for a time being held incommunicado. She got word to me that one could direct dial her at home: "these boys are too dumb to know how to stop it."

In less than a year her personal situation eased but the concern for Al grew; he was devastated by the loss of his father. On medical-compassion grounds both were allowed to travel and to seek treatment in Tampa. I believe Junior was there at the time. Flossy was in a survival mode. My wife and I organised some financial support, others helped. By 1983 she was anxious to return home. I arranged passage with the International Organisation for Migration which involved some slight contact with the American and Liberian governments. Wisdom prompted her to refuse this help as she wanted nothing to do with her government.

In August 1983 she wrote: "When the hospital discharged Al on 1 April he was a complete invalid. There were no follow up visits from doctor or nurses, no medications, no therapy, all because I could not pay for extra treatment. I attended him daily using mother's wit: hot water massage, rubbing with Aspercream, BenGay, anything that I could get. Through It All he is now almost back to normal. Thank God."

In the event Al did not want to return home so she reluctantly considered leaving him to be cared for by Health and Rehabilitation Service in Tampa. Nevertheless, in December she wrote from Monrovia very happy to be back with kith and kin, living in a two bedroom flat on 9th Street in Sinkor. Again, "Through it All the Lord is a wonderful provider and problem solver."

Several dozen pieces of correspondence from the time she returned until the mid-1990s recount life in Monrovia. Al convey the faith and belief of a survivor despite the deteriorating environment and loss of friends like Georgia Miller, Ethelda James, and relatives Laura Ricks Dillon, Edmund Dillon and others. A rocket destroyed her house, severely wounding Al who then disappeared for almost a year when the hospital he was recovering in was raided. Attempts to provide financial help via Sierra Leone failed, yet in 1995 she was the Deaconess in her church, preaching, helping others, praying for sanity to return to her beloved country. After this I lost track of Flossy until Elwood gave me the nursing home address.

What does one say in summing up a life like Flossy's? Why are some people chosen to suffer so much more than others? Why are nations thrown into turmoil by a few? I do not have any answers, although knowing Flossy as I have, I am absolutely con-


vinced—no doubt at all—that at this very moment she is interrogating God with the same questions and if His answer is not satisfactory, she will keep after Him. No one deserves a response more than Flossy, His most faithful child.

I could even imagine easy going John Bing telling her: “Honey, leave the poor fellow alone, He’s got other things on His mind. We’re home now!”


May Mother Africa Rest Lightly on Her Soul

**National Elections Commission
Republic of Liberia
Our Vote Our Future**


Presidential Run-Off
The Final Vote
November 8, 2005




Queued up for the final vote




More security deployed



Security is present




Not enough for the queue positions




A short voting queue




Early morning queue




UNMIL security addressing an issue




Voters well composed and ready to vote



Next please




Police officer advice voters to be orderly and calm



"I am not leaving you behind, my child"


"I wonder... your decision is my future... vote right, I beg"




The handicap goes to vote happily




Assisting the elderly to vote right




Voting officers await voters



He votes Liberia



She votes Liberia




He's voting Liberia




And she came out to vote Liberia also




Going to be inked, an observer looks on




One is deciding; the other has



The left index finger marked after voting




"I have finally voted right for you, children of Liberia"



A disabled lady displays her voter card after voting Liberia




Presidential Candidate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf votes for Liberia




Presidential Candidate George Manneh Weah votes for Liberia




NEC Chairman & Special Representative of the
Secretary General at a press conference
November 8, 2005 - 7 pm




Parties observers carefully watch for the counting




The ballots are openly displayed to the observers




Polling officers count under the watchful eyes of party observers




All eyes are on the counting process



Carefully counting delicate presidential ballots



Counted bit by bit; one ballot at a time



A party observer tallies and keeps her records at a polling place

Liberian Election Candidates

PRESID ELECTION

BARNES, Milton Nathaniel
V.P. : HARRIS, Parleh D.

Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)

BRUMSKINE, Charles Walker
V.P. : WARD, Amelia Angeline

Liberty Party (LP)

CONNEH, Sekou Damate
V.P. : SALI, Edward Y

Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)

DIVINE SR., Samuel Raymond
V.P. : MAMU SR., Jacob Gbanalagaye

Independent

FARHAT, David M. Free
V.P. : GBOLLIE, S. Ciapha

Democratic Party (FDP)

JALLAH, Armah Zolu
V.P. : SAMMY, SR., Isaac G.

National Party of Liberia (NPL)

JOHNSON-SIRLEAF, Ellen
V.P. : BOAKAI, Joseph Nyuma

Unity Party (UP)

KIADII, George Momodu
V.P. : MCGILL, Washington Shadrack

National Vision Party of Liberia
(NATVIPOL)

KIEH, JR., George Klay
V.P. : TOKPA, Alaric Kormu

New Deal Movement (NDM)

KORTO, Joseph D. Z.
V.P. : BARCLAY, James K.

Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)

KPOTO, Robert Momo
V.P. : SINGBE, Sylvester Bondo

Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)

KROMAH, Alhaji G. V.
V.P. : RUSSEL, Emmanuel M.

All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)

MASSAQUOI, Roland Chris Yarkpah
V.P. : PAYGAI, Q. Somah

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

MORLU, John Sembe V.P. : DEMEN, J. Omaxline	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
REEVES, Bishop Alfred Garpee V.P. : SHERIF, Alhaji Martin Mohammed Njavola	National Reformation Party (NRP)
SHERMAN, Harry Varney Gboto-Nambi V.P. : FANIA, John Kollehlon	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
TIPOTEH, Togba-Nah V.P. : DAHN, Marcus	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
TOR-THOMPSON, Margaret J. Freedom V.P. : MARSH SR, J. Rudolph	Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
TUBMAN, Winston A. V.P. : SULUNTEH, Jeremiah C.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
TUBMAN, William Vacanarat Shadrach V.P. : WILLIAMS, Garlo Isaac	Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
WEAH, George Manneh V.P. : JOHNSON, J. Rudolph	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
WOAH-TEE, Joseph Mamadee V.P. : BROH. I, Samuel Washington	Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)

SENATE ELECTIONS BOMI

ANDERSON, Alfred Boimah	National Patriotic Party (NPP656)
BALLOH, Musah	All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
BENSON, Rebecca T.	Liberty Party (LP)
BROWN, Samuel Njalbae	Liberty Party (LP)
DEVINE, Richard Blamah	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
JOHNSON, Sando Dazoe	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
KO-JUAH, Amos Boima	Unity Party (UP)
LANSANAH, Lahai Gbabyte	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
MASSALEY, Mohammed Aliu	Unity Party (UP)
SANDO, G. Aaron	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
SARNOR, Faliku G.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
VINCENT, Erik Bauman	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

VINCENT, Lincoln
WASHINGTON, Hajah Sheri

Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

SENATE ELECTIONS BONG

CORNORMIA, SR., Joseph N.

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

DAVIES, Olive Quita

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

DOLO, Othello F.

Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)

HOWARD-TAYLOR, Jewel Ceaineh

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

JACKSON, Ranney Banama

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

, Mustapha A.

Unity Party (UP)

KERKULA, SR., Martin Fahnlon

Liberty Party (LP)

KERMUE, Melee I. L.

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

LAKE, Delores Zoe

Unity Party (UP)

RICHARDS, Paul Mhulbah

Liberty Party (LP)

SAMUELS, Fata S. National

Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

SEESEE, Lasana Abraham

Independent

SIAKOR, Franklin Obed

Independent

SIRLEAF, Lassana M.

Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)

TOKPAH, Molley O. K.

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

WOKPEH, Lysander B.

Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)

SENATE ELECTIONS GBARPOLU

DUKUKY, Jestina V.

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

KOLLIE, George Blama

Liberty Party (LP)

KONNEH, SR., Siafa Varney Gaindeh

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

MANNAH, SR., Isaac Freeman

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

MENDS-COLE, Edward Sumo

Liberty Party (LP)

NAATEHN, SR., Daniel Flomo

Unity Party (UP)

SEH, William M.

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

TARNUE, SR., Harris Fomba

National Democratic Party of Liberia
(NDP L)

TAWEH, Joseph Jarleakai

Unity Party (UP)

TORMETIE, Samuel Sumo

National Reformation Party (NRP)

WESSO, A. Kanie

Independent

SENATE ELECTIONS GRAND BASSA

DAVIS, William Bill Patrick

Unity Party (UP)

FINDLEY, Gbehzohngar Milton

Independent

INNIS, SR., Nathaniel K.	Liberty Party (LP)
JOHNSON, Charles Jefferson	Independent
LATHROBE, Joseph O. National	Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
MARSHALL, Julia Saturday	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
NATT, Ellen Janjay National	Patriotic Party (NPP)
ONUMAH, Nathan Alphonsus	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
REEVES, Hilary Yhrakehmenn	Liberty Party (LP)
REEVES, Lee Pennalton	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
ROBINSON, SR., Wesley Bonne	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
VAH, Andrew Dehkp0	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
WHITFIELD, JR., John F.	Independent
WOLO, Matthew Alan	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)

SENATE ELECTIONS GRAND CAPE MOUNT

BONDOKAI, III, J. Siafa	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
DAVID, Mambu George	Unity Party (UP)
FAHNBULLEH, Ma-John T.	Liberty Party (LP)
FREEMAN, Arthur Bamoley	Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
GBANA, Edison T. Vaanii	Liberty Party (LP)
GRAY, M. Kdaia	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
KAMARA, Jeneh M.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
MASSALAY, Abel Momolu	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
MOMO, James Kormah	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
PAASEWE, Varney	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
SHERMAN, Rudolph Emmett	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

SENATE ELECTIONS GRAND GEDEH

BOONS, Seward K.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
DENNIS, Annie Suah	Liberty Party (LP)
DWUYE, SR., Philip Bayor	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
GAYE, Alphonso G.	Unity Party (UP)
KANNAH, Amos Querty	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
NYENABO, Isaac Wehyee	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
SANDY, William Cheyety	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
SAYDEE, Augustine N.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
SLANGER, Edward N.	Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
WALLACE, John N.	Unity Party (UP)

SENATE ELECTIONS GRAND KRU

BARTEKWA, Numene T.H.

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

BARTU, Amos Yonkon

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

BEDELL, SR., W. Frey Augustus

Independent

DOE, J. Sawoloday

Liberty Party (LP)

JARGBA, Thompson N.

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

JOHNSON, Tiahkwee Weah

Unity Party (UP)

KAYDOR, SR., Victor E. Dweh

New Deal Movement (NDM)

KYNE, Samuel E. K.

Liberty Party (LP)

NELSON, Blamoh

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

NIMELY, Thomas Nah

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

SHERMAN, Beatrice Nimene

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

SIEH, SR., D. Nyandeh

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

SNEH, Rosalind Segbe Tonne

Unity Party (UP)

WEAH, Zaw-Dioh

Independent

WOTORSON, Cletus Segbe

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)**SENATE ELECTIONS LOFA**

FARKOLLIE, Joseph Hinnah

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

GBEGBE, Frederick Sayon

United Democratic Alliance (UDA)

GBOLLIE, Fayah Joe Sahr

Unity Party (UP)

JOE, Saa Philip

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

JOHNSON, Lavela Kobo

Unity Party (UP)

, Alfred S.

National Reformation Party (NRP)

, Massaquoi Morlu

Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)

KANDAKAI, Lwopu Gawee

Liberty Party (LP)

KANNEH, Fomba All

Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)

KARBAR, Josephus M.

Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)

KOKOLO, Flomo Yanquiwolo

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

KPARKILLEN, Stanely Sumo

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

KUPEE, Sumo G.

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

NGAIMA, SR., Samuel Kpehe

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

SORSOR, SR., Kollie Massayan

Liberty Party (LP)

TALI, Phillip Saa

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)**SENATE ELECTIONS MARGIBI**

BENNIE, Charles D.

Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)

BOWIER, Joseph Jensen

Unity Party (UP)

DAVIS, Bestus Peter

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

DENNIS, William E.

Unity Party (UP)

FAHN, Sampson Bedell

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

GARNEO, Abraham B.Y. Jusu
 GARWON, A. Sylvester
 JAH, Clarice Alpha
 KAINE, Roland Cooper
 KROMAH, Mohamed Taqii
 LEITAL, Joe Roberts

MULBAH, SR., Michael S.

NEBLETT, James Adof
 PENNEH, John M.
 TOWNSEND, Clarence Benjamin
 WYMON, Benjamin Kolo-V.

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 National Reformation Party (NRP)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 National Reformation Party (NRP)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
 Liberty Party (LP)

SENATE ELECTIONS MARYLAND

BALLOUT, JR., John Akel
 BEDELL, Anthony S. Wloflo
 BREWER, JR., Robert Alexandeer
 CLARK, Wilfred Ernest

CLARK-WAH, Theodosia Minikon
 COX, SR., James Lamark
 FOLEE, Eric Deiojue Kitue
 GOE, Mason Chumue
 HUTCHINS, Alexander Mcknight
 JEFFY, Paul R.
 MUSU-SCOTT, Gloria Maya
 NEUFVILLE, E. Danny
 RAGLAND, Willie Dalleh

TOOMEY, J. Kla National

Unity Party (UP)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Patriotic Party (NPP)

SENATE ELECTIONS MONTSERRADO

BILITY, Losene F.
 BRENT, Hannah G.
 CAESAR, Ruth Gibson
 FRANCIS, Josephine M. George
 FREEMAN, Joyce Musu
 JACKITAY, Chemon Feson
 JALLAH, Ola Walker
 KAMARA, Kadie Sannor
 KROMAH, Amara M.
 KUMEH, Charles Max
 PAYNE, SR., Jessie S.

Independent
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Independent
 Independent
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)

RICHARDSON, Nathaniel Reginald
(COTOL)

SEAKOR, Daniel Success

TARPEH, Wilson Kargeor

TAYLOR, Bob D.

TRAVERS, Rudolph

UREY, Clemenceau Blayon

WOHEEL, SR., Roland Kollie

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia

Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

Unity Party (UP)

Unity Party (UP)

SENATE ELECTIONS NIMBA

BARTUAH, Benedict Zuah

DOGOLEA, Mary Siaway

DOKIE, Josephus Saye

DOLO, Saye-Taayor Adolphus

JOHNSON, Prince Yormie

KOAH, Evans Vaye

KROMAH, Ansumana Fassu

KRUAH, SR., Cooper W.

LUO, Harrison Dologbean

MANTEIN, Nyah

MYERS, Prince B.

NOAH, Mac Sonkarley

SENNEH, Peter S. T.

WUOR, Emma Kou

YUAN, SR., Harry Targehn

United Democratic Alliance (UDA)

Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)

Liberty Party (LP)

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

Independent

Independent

United Democratic Alliance (UDA)

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

Unity Party (UP)

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

Liberty Party (LP)

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

Unity Party (UP)

SENATE ELECTIONS RIVER CESS

BANNEY, Jay Jonathan

BARYOEGAR, James G.

BEN, Jasper Morris

DOLE, Roberto Gbegba

GLAYBO, Uriah

JOHNSON, Francis B.S.

MONWEH, SR., Davidson Tompo

MOORE, George Dee

PAYE, Francis Saturday

PEARSON, Moses Jududoos

SAWMADAL, Arthur D.K.

SOBEOR, Dorr Henry

Unity Party (UP)

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

Unity Party (UP)

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

Liberty Party (LP)

Liberty Party (LP)

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

New Deal Movement (NDM)

New Deal Movement (NDM)

SENATE ELECTIONS RIVER GEE

CHEA, Christian Snorteh
 CHEAPOO, SR., Chea
 CHERUE, Frederick Doe

Liberty Party (LP)
 United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)

DALMEIDA, Clara A.
 DAVIS, SR., G. Saygbegee
 JLAH, SR., Benjamin Belju-Wleh
 JOHNSON, Isaac Nyenekartoe

Liberty Party (LP)
 Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

JOHNSON, Samuel C. F.
 MORLEE, Nathan Victor
 SAYTUE, SR., A. Nyenpan
 SLOBERT, SR., Anthony W.C.
 VINTON, Regina Saytue
 WESSEH, Conmany B.
 WILLIAMS, Nathaniel J.

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)

SENATE ELECTIONS SINOE

BARTEE, Nathaniel Sniweah

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)

CLARKE, Charles Amstard
 DOE, Julius Blamo
 GIBSON, Myrtle Francelle
 NAGBE, Joseph Nyenetue
 NYENPAN, Mobutu Vlah
 SARPLOH, Stephen Sloh
 SLEWEON, SR., Harrison Nimleh
 TURPLUE, Emma G.

Unity Party (UP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BOMI D1

BOIMAH, Sando Samuel
 BROWN, Jeru S.
 GRAY, Quaye Boimah
 GRAY, SR., Sylvester Kojuah
 TYLER, Jenekai Alex

National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 National Reformation Party (NRP)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Liberty Party (LP)

YORYOR, Miatta Richardson
 ZINNAH, Alfred Blamah-Seh

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BOMI D2

DAVIS, JR., Ballah K.M.
 GBELLAY, SR., John I.
 GOLANYON, Daniel Amadu

New Deal Movement (NDM)
 Unity Party (UP)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)

JABATEH, M. Khalifa
 KARNEH, A.J. Armah
 KEMOKAI, Joseph Bamgongo
 MANUBAH, Musu Foley
 SAMOLAH, Adama Boimah
 SHERIFF, Daouda V.
 SIRYON, Haja Fata
 WILES, David Momolu

ZENNEH, George M.

National Reformation Party (NRP)
 All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
 Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
 Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BOMI D3

COOPER, Tarnue H.
 DAVIS, Ernest Gray

HOLMES, JR., Joseph Boakai
 KARNLEY, Gbillely Dougba
 KOLLIE, John Zoebohn
 SIRLEAF, Sando Gaiyah
 TARWEH, Seth Momo
 TIPAYSON, Oretha Maviayer

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 New Deal Movement (NDM)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
 Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
 Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

BARCLAY, Corpu G.
 CIAPHA, Wayfa Florence
 GBOLOR, Joseph Fonuham

JOHNSON, George Kponwonwoe
 KAINÉ, Moses Boye
 LOMAX, Emmanuel A.
 POPE, Etta N.
 TEHMEH, Momo B.H.

BONG D1

Unity Party (UP)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Independent

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

ABI-RACHED, Adib Kolleh N.
 BAYSAH, Sarah Famata
 BAYSAH, Woiwor Johnson
 BRIGGS, Molley Reformed
 CORNEH, Adam Bill
 GBAH, George G.
 JOSS, Jerome Billy
 KPATEH, James S.

BONG D2

Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
 United Liberia Party (RULP)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

ROGERS, Joseph Lee	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)	
SALLAY, JR., George Lamie	Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BONG D3

BONDO, G. Samuel K.S.	Liberty Party (LP)
CLINTON, Joseph Orendor	Unity Party (UP)
COOPER, Viola Nyamah	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
DENNIS, Oretha Tinapu	Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
RENNIE, Charles S.	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
TUCKER, Larwuson M.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BONG D4

DOLO, Comfort Nowai	Liberty Party (LP)
FAIJUE, Mustu Leemu	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
FREEMAN, Samuel Bonne-Kollie	Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
KOLLIE, Charles Morris	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
KPANGBAI, Omolu Joe	Unity Party (UP)
KWEEKEH, Kwalee Kokota	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
MCJOE, John Gbaweah	National Reformation Party (NRP)
MULBAH, George Sylvester	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
SIRLEAF, Bangalle Yousufu	Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
WARBEY, Esther Coaline	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
YALLAH, Henry Wailee	New Deal Movement (NDM)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BONG D5

BLACKIE, John Alvin	National Reformation Party (NRP)
GONKPALAH, Moses Fineboy	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
GUEH, Dekpah Jacob	Liberty Party (LP)
GWEH, Jackson Saye	Unity Party (UP)
MULBAH, Tokpah J.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
ZACKPAH, Adolphus Besman Gbogar	Independent

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BONG D6

FLOMO, James C.R.	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
FLOMO, SR., Mogana Szorkpor	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
JUAH, Edwin Tokpa	New Deal Movement (NDM)
LIBERTY, Estelle K.	Unity Party (UP)
MATOR, Susannah Lorpu	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
SULONTEH, Dallamah Joseph	Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GBARPOLU D1

GOBA, JR., Samuel V. G.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
LAMIN, Gertrude Tene	Unity Party (UP)
MATHEWS, SR., Joseph Momo	New Deal Movement (NDM)
MORLEY, David Nelson	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
OKAI, J. Varney	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
QUIAH, Gbondojeve S.	National Reformation Party (NRP)
VOMOWOOD, Hiliary Alpha	Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENT.

DAVID, SR., Norris Gbartoe
DORLEY, Bartu Marie
FALLAH, Yassah Gbissi-K

MCCAY, Joseph Botoe
SANYON, Filiman Sekou
SARNOR, Armah
SARNOR, Momo Gornah

GBARPOLU D2

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GBARPOLU D3

FREEMAN, Joseph Z.	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
GBELEEE, Korlue	Liberty Party (LP)
GORMOR, SR., John Gwalar	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
KOMAH, Roland Flomo	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
TARNIAH, SR., Gibson L. M.	Independent
YARSIAH, SR., Dickson Temo	Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND BASSA D1

GRAY, SR., Solomon Saynbarn	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
GREENE, Al William	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
HILL, Trokon	Independent
PAGE, SR., Samuel Dornaworlo	Liberty Party (LP)
PASSAWE, Agathon Buelue	Unity Party (UP)
SMITH, Jackie Clipton	Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
SPILLER, Austine Wreemongar	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
ZEHYOUE, Jerry Fineboy	National Reformation Party (NRP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND BASSA D2

CEE, John Siahn	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
GGOBOR, Henry A. Vinjae	Unity Party (UP)
GRIGGS, Dawn Julius	National Reformation Party (NRP)

HODGES, Vinicius Sona
 KARWOR, Zanzan Gbotoe
 KING, Daniel Bmg
 TOTO, Aaron W.

Liberty Party (LP)
 Free Democratic Party (FDP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND BASSA D3

DUOBAL, Murphy G. Harris
 JACKSON, Eric B. Free
 KARYEA, Amos N.
 MENDSCOLE, James T.
 MOORE, Della G. Stewart
 PARKER, Marie Dogboma
 SUNDAYGAR, Edward Bueh
 WRAGBOE, Hitler P.
 ZANGAR, Augustus Bob
 ZANGAR, SR., Obediah Youado

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Democratic Party (FDP)
 National Reformation Party (NRP)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 New Deal Movement (NDM)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND BASSA D4

BARCHUE, Borbor Baryogar
 BARWON, Elizabeth Mayuepleh

JIMMY, Arthur B.
 MOORE, Christian E.
 NASSER, Etta Summarmah Kpui
 REEVES, Samuel Gier
 SMITH, Gabriel B.
 TOGBA, K.M. Bailey
 VERDIER, SR., Buster Gargar
 WILLIAMS, John S. C.

Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 New Deal Movement (NDM)
 Unity Party (UP)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Independent
 Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND CAPE MOUNT D1

BENSON, James Amsu

FAHNBULLEH, Edwin Semaila
 FREEMAN, D. Caesar B.
 GETAWEH, Hamidu Majeed
 KAWAH, Arthur Adama
 KPAKA, SR., Ansumana
 PAASEWE, Charles Boima
 ROQUES, Safiyatu Alice-Massaquoi
 SAMAI, Kromah Tito
 YATES, Lawrence M. Songa

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
 Unity Party (UP)
 National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 National Reformation Party (NRP)
 Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Independent
 Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

BLAKE, Jeremiah Dennis
DARBLO, SR., Matthew V.Z.

FAHNBULLEH, Bai Borbor
KANNEH, Satta Sheriff
MADAVE, James Momodu
METZGER, Frederick Kelkeh
QUAYE, SR., Philip Momoh
SELLU, I, Abraham Dassama Johnson
SHERIFF, JR., Momo Francis

GRAND CAPE MOUNT D2

Liberty Party (LP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Independent
Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Unity Party (UP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
National Reformation Party (NRP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND CAPE MOUNT D3

FAHNBULLEH, Ennish Lamie
KIAHON, Clarence C.
KIAZOLU, Mohammed Abdurahman
MOHAMMED, J. Dinne
SMITH, Oliver Siafa
SONII, Baindu
SONII, Mambu Mahamudu
WARE, SR., Mohammed Abraham

ZOLUDUA, SR., Edwin Boakai

Unity Party (UP)
Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Liberty Party (LP)
Independent
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND GEDEH D1

GBIEOR, Rufus Wonblayon
GLEN, Jomael Nyonplu
KARYEE, William Surveyea

PARJEBO, Brown Chayee
WHYEE, Kai-Matthew

New Deal Movement (NDM)
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Unity Party (UP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND GEDEH D2

PENNUE, Zoe Emmanuel
SAYDEE, Goldy William
TAILEY, James Chollos

TARLEY, Samuel Drowuneneh
TARLEY, William Buster
TURAY, Abou M.
TWEH, Dailah Martha
ZARKPA, Benyea Cecelia

Independent
Liberty Party (LP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND GEDEH D3

BOWAH, Patrick G.	All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
FARLEY, Kai G.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
NUAH, Mahalia Dorothy	Liberty Party (LP)
TARYON, SR., J. Karyowl	New Deal Movement (NDM)
WAYLEE, Morais Tarwoe	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
WAYLEE, Tarwoe Ib	Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND KRU D1

BOYE, Vincent B.	Liberty Party (LP)
BROHDONYEN, SR., Proftehneseo P.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
KIPI, Abraham Kipi	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
KOFA, SR., Stephen Gbeh	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
SARKOR, Isaiah Moboe	Unity Party (UP)
SLOPADOE, Gbenimah Balu	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
TOE, William Buwolo	National Patriotic Party (NPP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GRAND KRU D2

BLAMO, SR., John Neh	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
BLAMOH, George Wesseh	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
BROWNE, James G.	Liberty Party (LP)
HARRIS, Ralph N.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
JLATEH, SR., Sasa Sawlo	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
NIMLEY, Dargbe	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
WEAH, Patrice Pokar	Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LOFA D1

DOVEE, SR., John Borley	Unity Party (UP)
FARYOMBO, Nicholas Fallah Mangorlor	Free Democratic Party (FDP)
KPARKAR, Eugene Fallah	Liberty Party (LP)
KPOTO-WAYAS, Katherine Mamie	Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
MCCARTHY, Gabriel Fayia	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
MOLIWULO, SR., Samuel Forkpa	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
NYUMALIN, SR., F. Sakila	Independent
TENGBEH, George Tamba	National Patriotic Party (NPP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LOFA D2

ARMAH, Alphonso Boakai	Liberty Party (LP)
KAMARA, Gemiel A.	National Reformation Party (NRP)

, Vaforay Alhaji Musa
KOLLIE, Stephen Ndorbor
KPADEH, SR., Francis Yougheson
MORLUE, Jackson Ngafua

NGOMBU, Prince Sao
SESAY, Jeremiah Duwana

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

BALLOH, Mary D.
DUWOR, Frederick A.
FOFANA, Alhaji Sekou

JALLABAH, Malian Kanneh
KARGBO, Catherine Sonnie Akoi
KOLLIEBLEE, Ballahwala K.
SHERIFF, Boakai Mohammed
VARNEY, Kula

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LOFA D4

FARWENEL, SR., C. Cor-Pulu Fred
GARMI, Jacob Mulbah
GODSON, James K.
HOWARD, Beyan D.
KOLLIE, Moses Yarkpauo

KPUKUYOU, William Kulubah

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARGIBI D1

CEMBIANOR, Nyumah Tamba
COOPER, Joseph Saah
FOFANA, Sansee Karpheh
LORYEE, Henry B.
NUQUAY, Emmanuel James
SHERIFF, Tejan Cheik
SONII, Dao Ansu

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

BUWAY, John Z.
DENNIS, Joseph S.
GWESA, C. Lawuo

JALLAH, Kollie Sorsor

All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Unity Party (UP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

LOFA D3

National Reformation Party (NRP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
Unity Party (UP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

New Deal Movement (NDM)
Unity Party (UP)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
Liberty Party (LP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Unity Party (UP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Independent
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

MARGIBI D2

Free Democratic Party (FDP)
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

LACKIE, Ansu Washington
NEBLETT, Nanuh Prince
SNOH, Mc-Hilary Malawi

Unity Party (UP)
Liberty Party (LP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARGIBI D3

COLLINS, Ida Bouyonor-Swen
EVERETT, Dorothy Ben
GBOLLIE, Saah Richarid
HOWISON, Doppa Dormou

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Unity Party (UP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
New Deal Movement (NDM)
Liberty Party (LP)

MULBAH, Henry Zayzay
PARKER, Chippaye Martha
PARKER, Lahai B.
ROBERTS, William G.
TUNNIE, Moses Flomo

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARGIBI D4

CHIDERYOU, Flasher Garjuan
HOWARD, Louise Korpo
KAIHEYAH, Joseph Ngobeh
MCCAULEY, Edward
MCGEE, JR., George Gahway

Independent
Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
Independent
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
Unity Party (UP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Liberty Party (LP)

MORRIS, Robert Franz
THOMAS, Arthomilts Sieh
WEH, Mellish P. G.
WRIGHT, George S.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARYLAND D1

462 DENNIS, Sophia Diode
391 SAYDEE, David Gwiah
657 SMITH, Solomon Saide Nyemah
62 WAH, G. Glomah
758 WALLACE, Adolphus G.
191 WILSON, Ben J.

Liberty Party (LP)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Unity Party (UP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARYLAND D2

BROWN, Wilmont Yeabay
CARR, SR., Abraham Tye
CHAMBERS, Bhofal
JOHNSON, Nathaniel Namuh
WILSON, Nathaniel C.
WILSON, Samuel S. T.

Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Liberty Party (LP)
Unity Party (UP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRES

ANDERSON, SR., William Phillip
 BINEY, James Pobee National
 HODGE, H. Suku-Toe
 MERRIAM, J.D. Hodo
 NAH, Eliza Monline
 THOMPSON, Alfred Thowone

MAR**D3**

Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
 Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Unity Party (UP)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D1

BEER, Emmanuel Manjoe
 BLAY, Washington N.

ENNOS, Alomiza M.
 JAWARA, Abraham
 JOE, Beatrice N.
 KOFA, Amos Teah
 KROMAH, Madusu Matorma
 LLOYD, J. Henry
 MAMBU, Prince V.
 SARYON, Lasana Kennedy
 SIEH, A. Blamoh

National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
 New Deal Movement (NDM)
 All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
 Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

BANNERMAN, Elizabeth Alexandra
 DAVIES, Cleopatra Manu
 FOYAH, SR., Johnny Saley
 JACKSON, Lawrence Wah

JAMES, Macokoni All Liberian
 KORTIE, David Ernest
 NEUFVILLE, Rufus Dio
 SEVILLE, Ephraim Baysamah
 TIADY, Alphonso P.

MONTSERRADO D2

National Patriotic Party (NPP)
 Free Democratic Party (FDP)
 Liberty Party (LP)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Coalition Party (ALCOP)
 Unity Party (UP)
 Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
 Independent
 New Deal Movement (NDM)

HOUSE OF REPRESENT

ANDERSON, Richmond S.
 CATAKAW, B. Miller

COOPER, Sam Y.
 DIGGS, Michael Ishmael
 JARBOI, Tarnue
 JOHNS, Kainde Deree
 , Fatu

MONTSERRADO D3

National Party of Liberia (NPL)
 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
 (COTOL)
 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
 Independent
 Unity Party (UP)
 New Deal Movement (NDM)
 Liberty Party (LP)

KAMARA, Mohammed V.	Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
KESSELY, Michael K.	Independent
KINGSLEY, Jallah Momolu	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
MURRAY, Kettehkumuehn Earl	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
THOMPSON, Una Kumba	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D4

AL-SHERIF, Omar Vamba	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
COKER, Beegar Isaac	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
DENNIS, JR., Barclay Bonoquo	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
GOODRIDGE, SR., Eric Jonathan Rickie	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
HOLMES, Kaifa Musa Reformed	United Liberia Party (RULP)
JOHNSON, Richelieu Lewis	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
KAILONDO, SR., George Bobby	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
LANSANAH, Jenekai Dabla	National Reformation Party (NRP)
SAYLEE, Alexander V. S.	Liberty Party (LP)
WOLOKOLIE, Dusty Lawrence	Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D5

BYEPU, JR., Benjamin Luwushleh	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
CLINTON, Lewis Johnsom Freedom	Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
FREE, Rebecca Bendu	National Reformation Party (NRP)
LAWRENCE, Augustus Alexander	Liberty Party (LP)
MCINTOSH, Marie Elowene	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
SHERIF, Mary Z.	Unity Party (UP)
SNOWE, JR., Edwin Melvin	Independent
WEAH, SR., Steven G.	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D6

DEDDAY, D. Christopher	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
DONZO, Abraham Kalulu	Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
DORBOR, Kuku Younger	Liberty Party (LP)
JALLAH, Emmanuel K.	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
MABANDE, Varney J.	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
NORMAN-SIEBU, Keturah B.	Unity Party (UP)
TWEHWAY, Teah William (Bill)	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
ZAWIEA, Dickson D.	Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D7

BARCO, Allison	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
DENNIS, John B. N.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
DONZO, Abu Fouboi	All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)

FALLAH, Thomas Pangar
FLOMO, Isaac Levi

GBARDYOU, Solomon Cephus
MORRIS, D. Mcallen Freedom
MULBAH, Joseph Godfray
SAYSAY, Sekou Mohammed
SHERIFF, Mohammed S.

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Liberty Party (LP)
Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D8

AUGUSTINE, Tawah Yafrondo
FAYIAA, Kpengba Francis
FAYIAH, Samuel Sahr
FISHER, Benetta Jema
KOOMEY, Dave
NYENKA, J. Gabriel Seedee
SAYSAY, Stephen Saah
SIEH, George Lawo
SNOH-BARCON, Nyenekon Beauty
TUCKER, Doris Dunbar

Free Democratic Party (FDP)
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Liberty Party (LP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
New Deal Movement (NDM)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Unity Party (UP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D9

CHATTAH, Dennis E.
COOPER, Cecelia Kailake
JAYE, Andrew B. W.
 , Nerissa Finda
KOLLIE, SR., John Henry
KUMEH, Gabriel Tugbe
MASSALAY, Mohammed Manding Jallah
MOMOLU, Joseph Sando
SHERIF, L. Kutubu
SHERMAN, SR., Baryonic William
TANDANPOLIE, SR., Moses Saah
WISSEH, Francis Forkey

Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
Unity Party (UP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
Liberty Party (LP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSERRADO D10

CORNEH, Abraham Vamuyah
DENNIS, Moivee C.
JALEIBA, JR., M. Boakai

KIMBA, Stephen Foday

National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Unity Party (UP)

SIRLEAF, Fomba Kalifa
TEAH, Regina Sokan

All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTERRADO D11

BARCLAY, Elmond Tattus
DARAMAY, Musa S.
JOHNSON, Amex Ballah
KAIFA, JR., Stephen
KIAWU, Ma-Zoe Bendu
MATHIES, Larine Euginea
PELENAH, Jenkins Dah-Nunmah

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
Unity Party (UP)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)

SACKOR, Bokotoe Nate
SAMUELS, Philip D.
WILSON, Clarence Napoleon

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTERRADO D12

BARCLAY, SR., Ebenezer Chea
CRUSOE, J. Levi
FORH, Edward S.
KARLAY, Al Bigboy
PETERS, S. Weaka

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
Liberty Party (LP)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Independent
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

SWEN, David Kirlee
TAYLOR, Benjamin Saah
TUMU, James T. T.

Independent
Unity Party (UP)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTERRADO D13

BAI, Etmonia Musu
BAYSAH, Karziel Coruboi
CASSELL, SR., Shadrick B.
COOPER, I, Stephen
DOLEA, John G.
LAMIN, Edward Musa

Liberty Party (LP)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Unity Party (UP)
Faithful Independent
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

LYNCH, Victoria
NYEI, Sekou I.
PARKER, SR., Julius Sylvester
PUNNI, Lucinda A. Eastman
TAH, Christopher Moham
WADE, Wilfred Alvin Freedom

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Independent
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MONTSEERRADO D14

ELIAS, Famatta Gompue	Liberty Party (LP)
FAHN, Seyer Josen	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
GEORGE, SR., Lawrence Ashton-Sackie	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
GOBA, Edward Kpingbah	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
HOLDER, Richard I. A.	Independent
JAIH, Henry E.	Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
KETTER, Musu Cuch	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
SIAFFAH, William Borbor	Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
YARKPAZUA, Emmanuel D.	Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D1

DOUSAYE, Alexander Saye	National Reformation Party (NRP)
KABA, Mamadee K.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
KARWAY, Francis Luogon	Unity Party (UP)
SUAH, Thomas Quewon	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
TOKPA, Joseph Larkpor	New Deal Movement (NDM)
TOKPAH, I, Prince O. S.	Liberty Party (LP)
TORLON, Joseph Dolo	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
WEANQUOI, George Flumo	Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D2

BUDY, Joe D. Teeconbla	Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
FARNGALO, Martin M.	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
LEAMAN, SR., Johnson T. B.	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
LYON, Henry G.	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
WOLEH, Samuel G. Z.	Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D3

BAYE, E. Frederick	Progressive Democratic Party (PRODEM)
DOE, Daniel Zlankerwon	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
DUNAH, Worlea-Saywah	New Deal Movement (NDM)
GONWOE, Lucretia Bendu	Liberty Party (LP)
MENWON, SR., Johnson P.	United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
MIAMEN, Giamen E. F.	Free Democratic Party (FDP)
SAIWEAH, Peter Obarto	Unity Party (UP)
TURAY, Sidikie Abraham	Independent
WANTEE, Targen Mohamed	National Patriotic Party (NPP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D4

KIDAU, Nohn Rebecca	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
MAWEAHN, Francis N.	Liberty Party (LP)
MIANAH, SR., Saye Sylvestain	Unity Party (UP)
SOKPAH, Wuo Garbie	New Deal Movement (NDM)
ZUAGELE, Zawolo Z.	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D5

FLINDOR, Jackson Saye	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
JABATEH, Madenyen Nough	Unity Party (UP)
JACOBS, David Logbae	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
JOHNSON, David Madean	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
MEHNPAINE, S. Reginald Zunleh	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
YOUNQUOI, Larry Payetozay	Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D6

KEHN, Presley Mehn	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
KOLLAH, Wehyi Stephen	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
MANEH, David Saye	Unity Party (UP)
MARTOR, J. Lynon	Liberty Party (LP)
QUEEGLAY, David Wonle	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
TUAZAMA, SR., Paul Duo	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)
VAH, Johnny Saye National	Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
VOKER, Yohn Z.	National Vision Party of Liberia (NATVIPO L)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NIMBA D7

GAYE, Edwin Power	Independent
GRUPEE, Melvis Mentee	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
ROGERS, James Mentor	Liberty Party (LP)
SAYWAHN, Stanely Bueh	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
WILES, Michael M.	National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
ZARLEE, David N.	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
ZAYEE, SR., Moses B.	Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RIVER CESS D1

BARTEE, Charles Zarkpah	New Deal Movement (NDM)
CEPHAS, Sampson A.	Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
GLASSCO, Idamay Dehconwulu	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
KABA, Morris Abrahima	Liberty Party (LP)
KNOWL DEN, William Trokon	National Patriotic Party (NPP)

MITCHELL, Ronald Alexander
WILLIAMS, Elizabeth Pennoh

Independent
Unity Party (UP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RIVER CESS D2

GIAH, Adonis Petep
HARVEY, JR., John F.
MASSEH, Jerry Bowier
PETERS, Andrew
SANGO, John Wee

Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Liberty Party (LP)
Unity Party (UP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
National Reformation Party (NRP)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RIVER GEE D1

BARDYL, Charles K.
DARBEH, Hixenbaugh Kear

DAVIES, Wilfred G. N.
GIBSON, Edmund B.
KLIGBEH, Emmanuel Karkutu

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Liberty Party (LP)
National Patriotic Party (NPP)
Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RIVER GEE D2

CHEA, Johnson Toe
FORPOH, JR., George Tee

SEAH, Elijah Flahn
SWEN, Curtis Chenekan
TEH, SR., Daniel Butty

Unity Party (UP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)
Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RIVER GEE D3

BROOKS, Joseph T.
DOEBO, Alfred P. T.
QUAYE, William C.
TARLESSON, Josephus N.
TIPAYSON, J. Tarty

TOE, Albert S.

Free Democratic Party (FDP)
New Deal Movement (NDM)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)
Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SINOE D1

BARH, Nelson Wah
BUSH, E. Ciah Jarwleh
CARLOR, Samuel J.
JARWLEH, Joe Cheyettee

United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)
Unity Party (UP)
National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

JELLY, SR., A. Kai

National Vision Party of Liberia
(NATVIPOL)

PANTOE, Papa Doe

Liberty Party (LP)

QUIOH, Thomas Romeo

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

TEAH, B. Darlington

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SINOE D2

DAVIES, James Timothy

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

GREENE, Fannie Louise

Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)

JABBAH, John T. A.

Free Democratic Party (FDP)

JARTEH, Priscillia G. Kargeor

National Reformation Party (NRP)

MANEE, Manee Wion

Unity Party (UP)

MONBOE, Alfred Gebeah

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

NAGBE, Nah T. Freedom

Alliance Party of Liberia (FAPL)

PANYONNOH, I, K-Hastings

Liberia Equal Rights Party (LERP)

QUIAH, Victor Soloe

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

ROBERTS, George M. W.

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

SARKOR, Othello Wiah

New Deal Movement (NDM)

TARPEH, Amos W.

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

TUOPAY, Virginia Blyee

Liberty Party (LP)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SINOE D3

DOE-WLEH, SR., Saywon

Liberty Party (LP)

DWEH, Joseph D.

Labor Party of Liberia (LPL)

KANMOH, Jefferson Seykonmuh

Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD)

MCCAULEY, SR., J.W. Nyeswah

Unity Party (UP)

NYENPAN, D. Wisseh

Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)

SAYDEE, Annie S.

National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)

SEONGBAE, SR., Augustus Theo

Coalition for Transformation of Liberia
(COTOL)

SOKAN, Abraham P.

National Patriotic Party (NPP)

