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**Edward Wilmot Blyden
1832-1912**

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A refereed journal that emphasizes the social sciences, humanities, and the sciences, the *Liberian Studies Journal* is a semiannual publication devoted to studies of Africa's oldest republic. The annual subscription rate is \$40.00, \$15.00 for students and \$50.00 for institutions, and include membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. All manuscripts and related matters should be addressed to The Editor, *Liberian Studies Journal*; Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature; The University of South Carolina at Spartanburg; 800 University Way; Spartanburg, SC 29303. Subscriptions and other business matters should be directed to The Secretary-Treasurer, Liberian Studies Association, Albany State University; 504 College Drive; P. O. Box 31222; Albany, GA, USA, 31705-2791.

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From the Editor

This issue is the first in a long time that has an illustration other than the map of Liberia on its cover. We like to hear your reaction to this bold t, and some of the other layout changes we have made. The editorial decision to change the cover for this issue would not have been possible without **Boikai Twe's** thought provoking article, "Edward W. Blyden's Lessons in African Psychology." The Blyden article is followed by **Timothy Rainey's** article on relations between the U.S. Army and the Liberian Frontier Force between 1912 and 1927. **Margaret Deconte Brumskine** plunges a stake into the heart of male chauvinism with her article on possibilities for reform of marital rape exemption laws in Liberia. The ongoing debate regarding the role of ECOMOG/ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis is kept alive in this issue by **Emmanuel Kwesi Aning** as he gives us his analysis of the role of Ghana in the regional peace keeping effort.

The three book reviews by **Momo Rogers**, **George Klay Kieh**, and **Alfred Konuwa** respectively, provide good synopses of books about Liberia that treat with very con issues.

Our "Recent Publications and Thesis" section provides a list rich in titles dealing with current research and information of relevance to Liberia. Of particular interest is **George Padmore's** long awaited *Memoirs of a Liberian Ambassador* (1996).

We have included in our News and Notes section, the minutes of the 28th Liberian Studies held at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana March 21-23, 1996. Our thanks to **Diana Brown** and **Elaine Armour Wolo** for compiling the minutes. We have also included an announcement for the 29th Annual Meeting, which will be hosted by **Massala "Prince" Reffell** at Prairie View A&M University, Prairie View, Texas, April 2-5, 1997. See you there!

Our ts section carries the complete text of the Final Communique of the Abuja Agreement of August 17, 1996. Also in this section is **Blyden's** 1857 Independence Day Address to the Council and citizens of Monrovia.

This issue also contains the index to Volume XXI.

The Editor

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EDWARD W. BLYDEN'S LESSONS IN AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGY

Boikai S. Twe

Introduction

Statesmen and scholars have turned to Edward Wilmot Blyden for inspiration and lessons for more than a century. Virtually every person involved in West African Studies and African psychology has been influenced by Blyden. J.E. Casely-Hayford (1911) in his book *Ethiopia Unbound* called Blyden "a god descended upon earth to teach Ethiopians a new their way of life." Hollis Lynch (1970) in a biography of Blyden called him the "Pan Negro Patriot." St. Clair Drake (1970) in his work *The Redemption of Africa and Black Religion* called Blyden the "Intellectual Ethiopianist." George J. Benjamin (1979) in another work on Blyden called him a "Messiah of Black Revolution." In other works, he is called the "Black Spokesman," a "Black Heart Man," and the "Outstanding Black Intellectual of the 19th Century." I believe also that Blyden was the first modern African social scientist.

Blyden was born in 1832 in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, and spent a few months in Venezuela and North America during his youth. His passion for goodness, truth and liberty led him to emigrate, at the age of eighteen, to Liberia in 1851. He saw Liberia as the ideal place where African Americans could build a new and great civilization by using the knowledge they had acquired in the West and by preserving the best of the African way of life.

He completed high school in Liberia under the supervision of Rev. David A. Wilson, a graduate of Princeton College. In 1853 he became a lay preacher and the following year he became a teacher. Blyden acquired a

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higher education, on his own, by the systematic reading of books, magazines, newspapers, and through regular correspondence with scholars like Gladstone, Dean Stanley, Charles Dickens, and Charles Sumner. Some of his ideas were shaped by active hinterland explorations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, visits and study in Egypt and Syria and widespread traveling in Europe and America.

Promotion of education constituted the foundation of Blyden's works in African culture, psychology and science. However, he worked primarily as an African social scientist.

Blyden is regarded by Lynch (1970) and

Blyden is regarded . . . as the first person, in Africa, to scientifically refute the myth of white superiority and to invent ideas for the regeneration of African personality.

Benjamin (1979) as the first person, in Africa, to scientifically refute the myth of white superiority and to invent ideas for the regeneration of African personality. In 1857 at the age of 25, he published his first acclaimed work "A vindication of the Negro Race." In a speech that same year, he made an objective assessment of "Liberia as She is and the Present Duty of her Citizens" before the Common Council and the citizens of Monrovia. Blyden won favorable comments from international scholars with his article in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* (1869) titled "The Negro in Ancient History." The article was based on a long and careful study including a visit to Egypt. His research into biblical and classical sources gave him a philosophy of history that took the rise and fall of nations as a part of the order of nature. His observations of the order of nature led him to invent the "African Personality." The concept of African personality was a psychological form of Pan-Africanism because he saw a need to override various forms of religious, ethnic and political division. Lynch (1970) suggests that Blyden's

concept of African personality was invented to overcome African colonial shortcomings, dispel feelings of inferiority, and act as a spur for united action. Blyden's 1878 article in *Fraser's Magazine*, titled "Africa and Africans" was his initial attempt to redirect the study of African Psychology, which he felt was being distorted by what he termed racist scholars.

An evolution of ideas

From 1857 to 1908 when Blyden's major works were published, one can see the evolution of his ideas from an early conviction in the power of Christianity and Islam to "civilize" and "regenerate" Africans to his 1908 invention of an African-centered interpretation of African culture and personality. In these works, he used scientific observations to support his theory of Africa as the "spiritual conservatory of the world." For Blyden, African personality represented "the softer aspects of human nature." Blyden foresaw the danger of a general defeat of African culture and personality due to its "softness." He promoted his ideas of African redemption and social science while serving in a variety of jobs. Blyden became Professor of Classics at Liberia College in 1862, Secretary of State of Liberia in 1864, President of Liberia College in 1881, Ambassador to England in 1877, vice-president of the American Colonization Society in 1884, and was nominated in 1885 by the Republican Party of Liberia as their presidential candidate.

The discussion that follows will review some of the lessons drawn from Blyden's lectures and articles on psychology, education, culture and scientific achievements. This discussion will highlight his ideas on love of race and African ancestors; promoting African personality and African redemption; working for human equality and women rights; preparing youth for leadership; the importance of moral and spiritual consciousness; promoting African cultural nationalism and unity; and invention of self-knowledge and human civilization. From these lessons, the author will propose a self and community development plan. This plan will describe how Africans can repair their psyche through self knowledge and

self-determination, how they can use male-female complimentary forces to repair their families and communities and how they can use African spiritual consciousness to heal Africa and the world.

Love of Race and African Ancestors

Blyden's significance stems from his attempt to grapple with a fundamental psychological problem facing many African people and their descendants-- self-alienation due to enslavement and colonialism. His commitment to understanding the African personality and battle with white supremacy in the social sciences transformed him into the most outstanding African intellectual of the nineteenth century. Due to his passionate commitment to the study of African people and his revolutionary ideas, he was feared by some black and white who wanted to maintain the *status quo*. Even today, white supremacy and intellectual falsification worldwide have virtually obscured Blyden's contributions to human development (Bishton 1986).

For Blyden, the essence of black unity is love of race (self and ancestors). He believed that colonial education is responsible for mental enslavement and racial misidentification among Africans. George Benjamin (1979) indicated that Blyden was greatly inspired by the idea of a genuine African race development in Liberia. According to Benjamin, Blyden said, "Love of race will take possession of the cultured Negro. Love of race must be the central fire to heat all his energies . . . , " (quoted in Benjamin 1979, p.5). Blyden also advocated an intellectual self-defense, which is in the tradition of African struggle for freedom and self-rule. He felt that showing respect for African ancestors is a way of presenting the cultural values and human dignity of the black race. He felt that all fights between blacks and whites bring about a change for a better black situation. However, he believed that fights among blacks only make the black situation worse.

Blyden's idea on race also had a negative consequence because he

blamed the "failure" of Liberia on the many mulatto immigrants who he felt did not love the black race. He accused them of imitating whites' corrupt ways of living and developing "the cult of personal interest." His virtual hatred of mulattos forced him into several conflicts with both Liberians and African American mulatto elite (Drake 1970). His vision of black unity based on "bloodlines" was contradicted by the biological reality that many African and African Americans were of mixed ancestry and therefore did not choose to identify only with Africa. According to Drake (1970), Blyden himself was accused of being a "sell out" to the British by some Liberians and was criticized by some young African intellectuals for glorifying African traditions while he himself competed for prestige in western literary circles.

Blyden promoted his idea of "race love" and respect for African ancestors as a psychological defense against white supremacy. This strategy of self-affirmation and self-consciousness is still valuable for African people and their descendants given the current threats to African life. The need to promote self-consciousness and self-preservation among Africans is important due to their higher rates of poverty, civil war, disease, and death than any other people. However, there is also a need to be critical of the concept of race because of its tendencies to foster ethnocentrism and the myths of racial purity and authenticity. This is a problem we are still faced with today.

In sum, Blyden had a passionate commitment to the redemption of the African personality from self-alienation and colonialism. This commitment was epitomized by his idea of love of race-- self and ancestors-- which he believed could unite Africans in their fight for liberation. The magnitude of psychological enslavement during his lifetime led him to clash with the mulatto elite due to their mixed allegiance and political power in black communities. This conflict with the mulatto elite of Liberia and the US undermined his effort to forge black unity because he needed their support and cooperation to establish African unity.

MILESTONES IN THE LIFE OF EDWARD W. BLYDEN

- 1832 Born in the Danish Island of St. Thomas, West Indies.
- 1842 Visited Venezuela with his parents.
- 1851 Emigrated to Liberia at the age of eighteen
- 1855 Ordained as a Presbyterian Minister.
- 1853 Graduated from Alexander High School in Clay-Ashland, Liberia
- 1856 Served as the Principal of Alexander High School
- 1857 Published his first acclaimed work. "A Vindication of the Negro Race" and delivered Liberia's 10th Independence Day address before the Common Council and Citizens of Monrovia.
- 1862 Appointed Professor of Classics at Liberia College.
- 1864 Served as Secretary of State under President Daniel B. Warner.
- 1871 Fled to Sierra Leone during the political crisis of Pres. Edwin J. Roye
- 1877 Served as Liberia's Ambassador to England under President Anthony. W. Gardiner.
- 1881 Appointed President of Liberia College.
- 1884 Elected vice-president of the American Colonization Society.
- 1885 Elected presidential candidate of the Republican Party of Liberia.
- 1887 Published the first edition of *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race*.
- 1896 Appointed Agent for Native Affairs in Lagos, Nigeria by the British.
- 1901 Appointed Director of Mohammedan Education in Sierra Leone.
- 1905 Published *West Africa Before Europe*.
- 1908 Published his last major work *African Life and Customs*.
- 1912 Died on February 7 in Sierra Leone.

African Personality and Redemption

Blyden's notions of "African Personality" and "African Redemption" have become powerful inventions for mobilizing black nationalism on the continent and in the Diaspora. He believed that moral excellence was the best foundation of African redemption and cultural regeneration. However in his classic work *African Life and Customs* (1908), Blyden used social science findings to support his theory that the African personality was more cooperative, collective and spiritual than what he saw as the rampant individualism, materialism and competitiveness of the European personality. His biblical approach to African Redemption shifted to a more scientific platform for a black revolution late in his career. In his lecture "Africa's service to the World" delivered in America in 1880, he explained his initial notion of African Redemption by saying:

Africa is distinguished as having served and suffered. In this, her lot is not unlike that of God's ancient people, the Hebrews, who were known among the Egyptians as the servants of all . . . The lot of Africa resembles also His who made Himself of no reputation, but took upon Himself the form of a servant and having been made perfect through suffering, became the "Captain of our salvation." And if the principle laid down by Christ is that by which things are decided above, viz., that he who would become the chief must be the servant of all, then we see the position which Africa and the Africans must ultimately occupy . . . (Blyden 1888, p.139)

It is easy to see that Blyden in his early works depended more on biblical traditions to support his ideas. However, as he grew intellectually, he used more findings from social science. He had the conviction that a common psychology and spirituality could keep Africans united with all black people of the world in a monolithic entity. Because of the development of Blyden's ideas along with others, African psychology has been translated into useful programs of service to Africa, like Pan-Africanism, Garvey's UNIA, Rastafari African Historical Societies, African Independence Movement, African Heritage Version of the Bible, Nation of Islam, and the African-centered Movement.

In 1881, Blyden advocated African psychology when he suggested that college students should study their brothers in the hinterland who knew more about the natural laws of human development (Blyden 1888). This concept of endogenous human development has again been recently proposed by UNESCO (Huynh 1979); it focuses on the human aspects of development and takes into consideration the characteristics and inherent strengths of the people involved. This focus on the inherent strength of a people produces self-respect, confidence and efficiency in production. Blyden (1888) went on to suggest the need for educated Africans to learn about traditional African religions, literature and oral traditions. He felt that self-respect and original action would draw world attention to Africans.

According to Drake (1970), Blyden's ideas on African personality and redemption went out of vogue in the 20th century due to the secularization of ideologies and disreputation of biological determinism which supported Blyden's idea of distinctive African traits. Additionally, his belief in the spiritual and moral superiority of African people attracted criticism because of its racial emphasis and was seen by some to be promoting "black supremacy." However, these ideas continue to provide the rationale for independent and separatist African churches, professional associations and various expressions of black cultural nationalism like the Association of Black Psychologists. Black psychologists like Niam Akbar (1979), Joseph Baldwin (1981), and Wade Nobles (1985) have all articulated and used an "Africentric world view" which has its roots in Blyden's inventions of African personality and African redemption. It is the assumption of these African American scholars that an Africentric approach can provide a viable framework for theory, program development and research within black communities. Additionally, the advancement of the science of melanin by some Africentric scientists has supported Blyden's claim of African distinctive genetic and behavioral traits (Moore 1995).

In essence, Blyden believed that moral excellence and African

consciousness were the best means toward cultural regeneration. For him, African Redemption-servant-leadership was the best platform for a black revolution. He advocated the concept of endogenous development planning which takes into consideration the psychology of the people involved. He encouraged educated Africans to learn about traditional African religions, literature and oral traditions. His ideas went out of style in the first half of the 20th century because they were seen by many critics to be supporting black supremacy. However, the 1960's Black Power movement reintroduced Blyden's invention of cultural nationalism, and today his idea provides the moral and historical foundation for the African-centered world view.

Human Equality and Women's Rights

Blyden advocated that all human beings are equal and have the same right to enjoy life, freedom, and peace without domination. According to Benjamin (1979), Blyden felt it was his obligation to fight, even without arms, without compromise, until there was recognition of human rights and justice for all black people and all other people-- white, red or yellow-- suffering from hunger and deprived of human dignity. As a prominent democratic revolutionary leader, he is a noble example of the servant-leader who sought to serve others rather than to have power over them.

In his inaugural address as President of Liberia College in 1881, he advocated the rights of women to equal education. He said:

I trust that arrangements will be made by which girls of our county may be admitted to share in the advantages of this College. I cannot see why our sisters should not receive exactly the same general culture as we do. I think that the progress of the county will be more rapid and permanent when the girls receive the same general training as the boys; and our women, besides being able to appreciate the intellectual labors of their husband and brothers, will be able also to share in the pleasure of intellectual pursuit. (Blyden 1888, p. 102-103).

In *African Life and Customs* (1908), Blyden promoted his idea of

women's rights and contributions to African liberation when he quoted Mary Kingsley, a British scholar, as saying "I have had to stand up alone these two years and fight for Africa's freedom and institutions, while Africans equally well and better educated in English culture have been talking about religious matters, ect, to a pack of people who do not care for Christianity at all," (Quoted in Blyden 190, p.16). Blyden documented and discussed the contributions of women to African families under the system of polygamy in this classic work. He saw them as equal partners in "the work of continuing the human race." His advocacy for women's rights produced concrete benefit for Liberia. Women graduates of Liberia College (the University of Liberia), like Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown-Sherman served as President of the University of Liberia, Dr. Florence Chenoweth served as Minister of Agriculture, and Mrs. Angie Brooks-Randolph served as President of the United Nations General Assembly and as Supreme Court Justice of Liberia, just to name a few. Blyden would welcome the appointment of Ruth Perry to head Liberia's present transitional government.

As a prominent democratic revolutionary leader, he is a noble example of the leader as servant. He agreed that there is the need to use force against those who deliberately kill Africans and devastate their property. He felt

(Blyden) tended to be inconsistent about the righteousness of force because he defended the Muslim jihads in Africa on the grounds that they involved Africans and not outside conquerors.

that most human beings would act violently if their lives are at stake and if they have to safeguard their rights and dignity. However, he tended to be inconsistent about the righteousness of force because he defended the Muslim jihads or holy wars in Africa on the grounds that they involved

Africans and not outside conquerors (Blyden 1888). Though he was a total egalitarian, he did not criticize Islam for its use of war and domination of non-Moslems to spread its theology as he did Christianity. Additionally, he praised Islam's promotion of polygamy and patriarchy and did not adequately consider its negative implications for women's rights and self-rule in Africa. This entanglement of race, class and gender issues is still problematic and subjective for many scholars today. Angela Davis (1981), for example, exposed this in her historical study titled *Women, Race and Class*.

In other words, Blyden felt it was his obligation to fight without compromise for human equality and justice for all people suffering from hunger and deprived of human dignity. He advocated for women's right to equal education and partnership in continuing the human race. He was an egalitarian who contradicted himself by praising Islam for its promotion of polygamy and patriarchy while directing criticisms at Christianity for its unequal treatment of women and people of color.

Training Youth for Leadership

For Blyden, education and leadership training are the perquisites for societal development and transformation. He saw a liberal education as providing the best foundation of culture and scientific advancements for Africans. Because of his commitment and training as an educator, Blyden dedicated himself to Liberian youth in particular and the black world in general. He spent most of his professional career as a high school teacher, principal, college professor and President of Liberia College between 1854-1882. As the Agent of Native Affairs in Lagos in 1896, he agitated for a West African university. As director of Moslem education in Sierra Leone (1901 -1908), he prepared Muslims to cooperate in the emergence of "a great Black Nation" (Drake 1970). In his inaugural address as President of Liberia College, Blyden summarized his ideas on education by saying,

"The object of all education is to secure growth and efficiency, to make a man all that his natural gifts will allow him to become, to produce self-respect, a proper appreciation of our own powers and of the powers of other people; to beget a fitness for one's sphere of life and action and an ability to discharge the duties it imposes. " (Blyden 1888, p.85).

Blyden always stimulated the youth by demonstrating to them that any people who want independence must be willing to fight for it. His ideas have inspired students at the University of Liberia to take the leadership in opposing unfair Liberian government policies during the Tubman, Tolbert and Doe administrations. As a professor of moral philosophy, he sought to bring his students in contact with realities rather than mere words. He taught them that until they freed themselves from dependency on other people, they would never be free. He taught them that Africans must advance by methods of their own; the African must possess a power distinct from that of the European. He warned African youth about the indiscriminate use of foreign literature and how it can lead to transcribing the faults rather than the virtues of the works. According to John Henrik Clarke (1991), this advocacy of African self-determination made Blyden the defender of the history and culture of the African continent and its people.

Blyden felt that there is much to be learned from African ancestors, most especially, how they were able to train their minds without the help of western and Arabian literature. In *African Life and Customs* (1908), he spoke of the regular traditional process of education for both males and females which prepares them for the life and culture under which they are to live. Under the traditional system, training the mind to cooperate with nature is more important than accumulating information. This experiential type of education is more difficult because most insights are gained through failures. However, he believed that this slow process would produce the methods of growth that are best for Africans.

Furthermore, Blyden believed that the training of youth should take place in the hinterland of the continent, away from foreign influences on the

coast, as it is traditionally done in the Poro and Sande secret societies. He believed that an uninterrupted intercourse with the intelligent and cultural elements of the African hinterland, manual labor, and relationship with the soil could help students to gather "fresh inspiration and fresh and living ideas" (Blyden 1888, p.106). He advocated the study of Arabic because of the Moslem influence in Africa and the study of some of the principle indigenous languages to facilitate communication and research.

Blyden also believed in the "Classical" approach to learning. On this topic, he said:

The training and discipline, the patience and endurance to which each man must submit in order to succeed; the resolution which relaxes no effort, but fights the hardest when difficulties are to be surmounted - these are qualities which boys go to school to cultivate, and these they acquire . . . by a successful study of Classics (Greek and Latin literature) and Mathematics (Blyden 1888, p.101).

He felt that the Classics lay the foundation for the successful pursuit of scientific knowledge in that they are also free of disparaging ideas of the African which pervade modern European literature. On this point, Blyden presented a good argument but he failed to show how the "Classics" (i.e., Greek and Latin) and Mathematics could be usefully applied to African development and self-determination. If Blyden had introduced classical Egyptian and Ethiopian literature and applied science like engineering, agriculture, architecture, medicine, metallurgy, and navigation in the curriculum, African youths would have been better able to understand the foundations of Greek and Latin thoughts and develop more industrial skills. His idea of a liberal education is not skills-oriented enough to support nation building at the village level in Africa.

To materialize his vision for an educated elite, Blyden spent most of his professional career as an educator of African youth. He saw education as the means to achieving growth

and development, and a proper appreciation of our own creative powers and duties. He taught his students that they must free themselves from colonial dependency if they ever expected to be free and must advance by their own methods. He supported the traditional education process which prepared both males and females with African values and skills. He believed that the training of youth should take place in the hinterland to promote uninterrupted interactions with African intelligent and cultural elements. He promoted the study of classical Greek and Latin literature but did not include classical Egyptian and Ethiopian literature from which the Greeks and Romans borrowed many of their ideas.

He taught his students that they must free themselves from colonial dependency if they ever expected to be free and must advance by their own methods.

Moral and Spiritual Consciousness

Africans do not distinguish between what is secular and what is religious. Religion enters every aspect of life. Blyden observed that traditional African education and training have always been based on African religion. An attempt by western education to secularize school education for African youth and dissociate religion from teaching is unAfrican and dangerous, according to Blyden (1908). To encourage the interest of youth in religion, he wrote, "It is certain that Religion originated in Africa. It went from Ethiopia, that is to say, from Negroland eastward and northward to Egypt and down the Nile, extending to the heart of Asia. All representations of Buddha which we have seen are painted black." (Blyden 1908, p.62). He went on to explain that the African believes that the Creator can be

approached through every object which has been created, animate or inanimate. The African is focused on religion rather than on theology, spirituality rather than on doctrine. To explain his concept of religion, Blyden (1908) wrote:

What is Religion? Generally the answer is that which makes a man feel that he is not his own guide, judge, or ultimate authority; that he is bound to a higher and irresistible Power that created him and by whose fiat he will cease to live . . . He only knows it exists - I AM - and is sufficiently impressed by the reality of its existence, whether looking within at the working of his own mind or without at the operations of nature. He knows that a power not himself is working in and around him and not to offend this power and to gain its favor, he uses various means which appeal to his untutored imagination to effect this object. All races without the Bible and even with the Bible have their own method to approaching this Being (p.61).

Being a Christian minister, he used the symbols and lessons of the Bible to teach African consciousness. He spoke of the spirit of the great Master who is an example of self-sacrifice to the highest truth and the highest good which excludes no one (Blyden 1888).

Blyden's belief in the spiritual and moral superiority of African people is the most controversial of his ideas. He believed that more attention should be paid to developing African moral and spiritual traditions in order to promote and transform African culture and mind. He felt that God was a spirit and should be worshiped as a spirit. In one of his first published speeches, "Liberia as She is and the Present duty of her Citizens," he suggested that Africans are becoming less spiritually minded and more materialistic due to western dependency (Blyden 1857). They are thinking more about eating and drinking than of fasting and prayer.

On the interconnection between the African visible-invisible world, he wrote:

The intercommunion between the people of the earth and those in the spiritual sphere is a cardinal belief of the African and will never be uprooted . . . Death is simply a door through which we enter the life to come or the Hereafter. This being the basis of their faith they have, like the Japanese, no dread of death (Blyden 1908, p.69).

He went further to compare African spirituality with the Jewish religion when he wrote, "So you may change the theology of a people, but you cannot change their Religion. This is especially true of the Jew and African" (Blyden 1908, p. 73). According to Blyden, the religions of the African, Japanese and Jew are communalistic rather than individualistic.

Blyden's acceptance of the doctrine of Providential Design and other subdogma which promote the notion of predestination and his conviction that Islam met African needs better than Christianity draw many criticisms and led to some contradictions in his whole scheme of thought. For example Lynch (1970) pointed out that Blyden's acceptance of Providential Design give divine sanction to the slave trade, absolved those who had taken part in it, and nullified his argument that Christianity had stunted the "growth of " among New World Negroes. Additionally, he lauded the Muslims for their ban on alcoholic drinks, their devotion to learning and artisan crafts and trade, but overlooked their oppression of women and their use of wars to spread Arabian theology. Blyden was aware of being open to these types of criticisms, so he often used later articles to clarify his ideas on the equality of women in African religion and how in e interference of both Islam and Christianity were contributing to African dislocations, d and death (Blyden 1908). Blyden's ideas have contributed to the recent developments of the *African Heritage Study Bible*, Kawaida theory, the theology of the Nation of Islam, and the spread of Ethiopianism worldwide through the Rastafarian movement.

Thus, Blyden believed that religion originated in Africa and is a part of every aspect of African life. He defined religion as the collective method used by a people to approach the Supreme Being. He felt that Africans are focused more on spirituality than on theology or doctrines. He believed in the spiritual and moral superiority of African people but observed that they were becoming more materialistic due to western dependency. He said that African religions are more communalistic than individualistic. In his early

works, Blyden embraced some contradictory ideas about Christianity and Islam but in his later works, he clarified some of the contradictions and reaffirmed that both Islam and Christianity contributed to African d i s l o c a t i o n ,

degeneracy and death. His moral philosophy of African centeredness has become the basis of new biblical and Koranic interpretations and religious movements like Rastafari and the Nation of Islam.

Blyden believed that religion originated in Africa and is part of every aspect of African life. He defined religion as the collective method used by a people to approach the Supreme Being.

Cultural Nationalism and African Unity

According to George J. Benjamin (1979), Blyden is the true inventor of Pan Africanism because he was the first to assert "Africa for Africans." As an intellectual and revolutionary, he was dedicated to understanding and defending the black race. He felt that only the African can explain the African to the rest, of humankind because the scholar must love his or her subject of study. In African psychology, he argued that to understand Africans, you must love Africa and Africans (Blyden 1888). On the topic of African unity he wrote: "The cruel accident of slavery and the slave trade

drove all Africans together and no discrimination was made in the shambles between the Foulah and Timneh, the Mandingo and Mendi, the Ashantee and the Fanti the Eboe and the Congo - between the descendants of nobles and the offsprings of slaves . . . "(Blyden 1888, p. 315). He was very concerned about tribal discord which weakened African spirit of solidarity and means of defense against invaders. As a matter of self-defense, he believed that scattered Africans must live as a strong, united family whose members are irreducibly reliant on each other (Benjamin 1979).

St. Clair Drake (1970) has indicated that Blyden's greatest contribution was toward the invention of African cultural nationalism. This intellectual invention provided the rationale for the emigration movement to Africa, independent and

(Blyden) was convinced that Liberia and Sierra Leone should be merged to form a single state and become the foundation of a great "West African Community" that would evolve into a West African nation.

separatist African churches, and various expressions of black nationalism. He visualized the emergence of a great West African nation cutting across artificially imposed political boundaries. He was convinced that Liberia and Sierra Leone should be merged to form a single state and become the foundation of a great "West African Community" that would evolve into a West African nation. Because he was aware of the obstacles to West African political unity in his lifetime, in 1896 he promoted the idea for a West African university linking scholars in Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Liberia and Nigeria. This push for cultural nationalism was a way of circumventing European political domination of the region.

In African Life and Customs, Blyden further promoted his ideas of

cultural nationalism and African unity. He wrote, "We, and not I, is the law of African life" (Blyden 1908, p.30). He went further to explain this collective principle as the root of all ethical thought. He believed that the individual in order to achieve justice and a higher sense of morality has to identify with the whole. He wrote further, "The main business of a tribe-- all the families cooperating-- is to provide sufficient food, clothing, house-room, and all the conditions of a reasonably comfortable life for all -- even the slaves . . . " (Blyden 1908, p. 32). He observed that African states and tribes were accepting the legitimacy of the political and economic systems of the administrative colonial regime. Blyden condemned this submission to urban-centered and capital-intensive development as contradictory to the African personality and an insult to African martyrs.

Blyden's cultural nationalism grew as he became more disillusioned with African Americans and Liberians in helping him to fulfill the vision of a liberated and united Africa at political economic, and cultural levels. He began to seek alliances with the British and other friendly European powers to promote his ideas of African self-government at these various levels. Drake (1970) discussed Blyden's contradictory attempt to promote both African cultural nationalism and European imperialism at the same time. Drake wrote, "So convinced was Blyden that European imperialism was a necessary step in preparing Africans for the task of modern self government that he praised German colonial administration, and would not even criticize King Leopold for permitting atrocities in the Congo!" (1970, p.69). In spite of these contradictions, Blyden's ideas provide the foundations of worldwide Pan-Africanism, the Organization of African Unity, Economic Community of West Africa, religious-political movements like the Million Man March and the celebration of Kwanzaa in the African Diaspora.

All in all, Blyden is the true inventor of Pan-Africanism because he first suggested that Africans must live as a strong united family if they are to defend their self-interest. His greatest contribution was his invention of African cultural nationalism which led to Garvey's Back-To-Africa

movement and Independent African Churches. Blyden had a vision of a West African Community which would lead to a West African nation. He believed also that the individual has to identify with the collective in order to achieve justice and a higher sense of morality. To demonstrate this sense of collectivity, he sought alliances with friendly European powers to promote the idea of African self-rule. Once again, he embraced contradictions due to his promotion of both African nationalism and European imperialism as necessary steps toward African self-government. In spite of this, Blyden's ideas have contributed to regional unity in Africa and self-development programs in the African Diaspora.

Invention of Ideas and Human Civilization

As a thinker, Blyden believed the spirit was the supreme expression of human existence and its power could be seen in human inventions and civilization. He thought that all human beings must deal with spiritual feelings and must find out for themselves how the spirit shapes their ideas. According to him, the main mistake of Karl Marx and other materialist philosophers came from ignoring the spiritual factors involved in understanding the world in scientific, economic, social or political terms (Benjamin 1979). Although Blyden's thoughts were shaped by African spirituality, he evolved into a social scientist who sought scientific verification and objectivity like the materialists.

He recognized from this observations and study that modern 'on had been made of the blood, sweat, tears and ideas of the people of color. Instead of the inventions of civilization being resources for human unification and solidarity as the ancestors had hoped, they have become means of domination, sources of iniquities and destruction of human society. Blyden's intellectual and philosophical inventions were driven by a keen interest in seeing social and moral balance restored in human society. As an intellectual, he was influenced by a broad range of contemporary thinkers and writers who shared his similar like Arthur Schopenhauer, Pierre

Proudhon, H. Taine, Leon Tolstoi, Nietzsche, Anatole France, Emile Zola, V.J. Soloviev, Charles Mair, Francois X. Garneau. Alfred Garneau, Henri Bergson Sigmund Freud, Jean Jaures, and Herman Sudermann, just to name a few (Benjamin 1979).

As a revolutionary genius, Blyden was an inventor of ideas-- a constructivist of knowledge. In one of his first published speeches, he recognized that knowledge is power (Blyden 1857). He recognized also the power of metaphors and symbols and how they could reflect and structure complex thoughts. For example, he used the biblical verse, "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" to warn Liberians of retribution for their evil ways. He employed many biblical and psychological metaphors in his theories and rejected extreme mechanical and materialistic conceptions. He understood that metaphors could affect how one would choose to interact with others and solve problems. He used ideas like "Captain of our salvation," "African Redemption," "African Personality" to extend meaning and understanding in African psychology.

Blyden recognized that repetitive exposure could lead one to become attracted to an idea or image due to observational learning. He warned Africans that they are being held in bondage by repetitive exposure to western symbols and literature (Blyden 1988). He felt that the existing western civilization and its ideas could not equip Africans to run their own affairs and cope with their responsibilities. Therefore, he encouraged Africans to be inventive rather than culturally dependent on others; they should learn as much as possible about African literature and symbols in order to transform them into practical tools.

Blyden did not seek power or control over others but focused his efforts on service to African people and the world. He believed that a proper education would produce self- respect and creative power (Blyden 1988). For him, inventions of the mind were the greatest contributions to human civilization. In a speech, "Africa's Service to the World" delivered in 1880

in the United States, Blyden described Africa's contributions to human civilization and science as follows:

Africa has been called the cradle of civilization and so it is. The germs of all science and the two great religions now professed by the most enlightened races were fostered in Africa. Science, in its latest wonders, has nothing to show equal to some of the wonderful things even now to be seen in Africa. In Africa stands that marvelous architectural pile-- the great Pyramid-- which has been the admiration and despair of the world for a hundred generations. Scientific men of the present day, mathematicians, astronomers and diviners, regard it as a sort of key to the universe-- a symbol of the profoundest truth of science, of religion, and of all the past and future history of man (Blyden 1888, p. 134).

Blyden's strong love for Africa and its history, sometime overwhelmed his objectivity but it is clear from this description that he was aware of the historical facts of the human genesis more than a century before most scientists and historians. Blyden's deep understanding of the human mind and its inventions helped him to overcome the many obstacles he faced as a black man and intellectual in colonial Africa. The genius of Blyden is an illustration of the will and intent of the African psychic to create for itself in any time and any place. This legacy of intellectual inventions has been handed down to African-centered

(Blyden) felt that the existing western civilization and its ideas could not equip Africans to run their own affairs and cope with their responsibilities.

social scientists like Cheikh Anta Diop, Molefi Kete Asante, Maulana Karenga, and Niam Akbar, just to name a few. Like Blyden, the works of these intellectuals have reaffirmed the African genesis of human civilization and other major intellectual inventions.

Blyden believed that the African spirit is reflected in most human inventions and civilizations. He found historical evidence of African contributions to the development of science. His ideas and

(Blyden) was one of the few scholars in the 19th century who knew that Africa was the genesis of civilization, science, religion and the human race.

scientific inquiry were influenced by a broad range of contemporary thinkers and writers. He was an inventor of ideas and a constructivist of knowledge. His creative use of metaphors and cultural symbols enabled him to affect the thoughts and behaviors of several generations. He recognized the negative psychological impact of repetitive exposure to western symbols and literature. He was one of the few scholars in the 19th century who knew that Africa was the genesis of civilization, science, religion and the human race. His intellectual legacy is supporting the new generation of African-centered intellectuals who are challenging the falsification of African consciousness.

African Reparation Plan

This plan is an attempt to draw on the lessons of Blyden and other African intellectuals to promote internal healing of the African psychic and external reparation of African society. The necessity of this plan is based on the increasing self-alienation, inter-ethnic conflicts, dependency and deaths among Africans. Like Blyden and other African-centered scholars, I believe that growth in self-knowledge and self-determination is a key in global African reparation and redemption. Additionally, the reestablishment of African male-female equality and interdependence is seen as crucial for family and national reconstruction worldwide. Finally, this plan will argue for the revitalization of worldwide African spirituality as a part of restoring Africans to their tradition of moral excellence.

Repairing the African Psyche

Self-knowledge is the philosophical foundation on which psychology is based-- "know yourself in order to take better care of yourself." There are many aspects to the psyche but the three most known aspects are the mental, spiritual, and physical. These three aspects of the psyche can be developed through the processes of education, initiation or spiritual awakening, regular exercise, meditation, and healthy nutrition. I have found that many Africans find it difficult to achieve self-understanding and self-determination due to unconsciousness, but if individual Africans are not conscious of their higher and divine selves, Africa will not grow.

Self-knowledge involves learning from nature because the whole universe, including humans, is governed by certain natural laws which are sometimes referred to as the seven Hermetic principles of ancient Egypt (Chandler 1994). One of the seven principles is the principle of mentalism-- "the universe is mental." Everything is first conceived in the "Living Mind"; you are what you think. It is important to maintain an active and inventive self-knowledge like Blyden. It is important to help create African liberation and intellectual power. Creating study groups on African literature and history where personal criticisms and corrective action are encouraged is a good way to promote self-understanding and mental growth. Ideas from the study group could be tested in the community to assess their value and practical application in the community. Remember, most of Blyden's intellectual growth and inventions came from this kind of informal study and interactions with others.

Self-knowledge also involves understanding our connection to the spiritual sphere and the universe. Another one of the seven Hermetic principles of nature which ancient Africans discovered is the principle of correspondence-- "as above, so below; as below so above" (Chandler 1994, p.225). This principle explains the multidimensional reality in which we exist on all

Traditional African education of separate but complimentary training for males and females fostered the physical durability of Africans and a deep understanding of the contradictions and reconciliation of our humanity.

planes: mental, physical and spiritual. Our true nature of energy, power, and matter is reflected in our spiritual essence, as Blyden said. Our spirituality can be awakened by the practices of Maat-- truth, justice, harmony, balance, reciprocity, righteousness and order in daily life (T'Shaka 1995); rituals of mediation, libation, respect for ancestors, and special fasting and praying. A love of Africa and African must be the driving force behind our spiritual awakening and ethical relationships, as Blyden demonstrated in his life and work.

Finally, self-knowledge involves understanding our physical nature and its contradictions. Two of the seven Hermetic principles observed by ancient Africans can best explain our material nature and its contradictions. The principles are the principle of polarity-- "everything is dual; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree" and the principle of gender-- "gender is in everything; everything has its masculine and feminine principles" (Chandler 1994, p.226-227). These principles explain the common truth that there are two sides to everything and everything is

broken down or divided into opposites, yet these opposites are identical in nature, different only in their degree. The color black is the opposite of white but they are identical in nature but different only in degree. In each of us are elements of feminine and masculine energies. No creation is possible without these two natural principles. Our growth in physical well-being requires that we make right choices to change ourselves from weak to strong and a balance of our male-female energies. Traditional African education of separate but complimentary training for males and females fostered the physical durability of Africans and a deep understanding of the contradictions and reconciliation of our humanity. This system of initiation or rites of passage at the village level involves singing, drumming, dancing and martial arts to promote the development of strong fathers and mothers who are able to withstand all challenges and adjust to changing circumstances. African youth must be trained to develop physical discipline and prepared for motherhood and fatherhood through village initiation or rites of passage programs in addition to their school education.

Self-determination can be achieved with another of the seven Hermetic principles of nature which ancient Africans have identified as the principle of cause and effect-- "every cause has its effect; every effect has its cause" (Chandler 1994, p. 228). The masses of the earth are governed by the few, obedient to the wills and desires of others stronger than themselves. Once this principle is understood and practiced, one becomes a mover as opposed to the moved, a player of the game of life, as opposed to being a spectator. As Blyden demonstrated, Africans must be inventive and self-determined in order to be free and self-ruled. Maulana Karenga (1967) identified self-determination as the second principle of the Nguzo Saba - the seven principles of Kwanzaa. According to Karenga, self-determination is "to define ourselves, name ourselves, create for ourselves, and speak for ourselves instead of being defined, named, created for and spoken for by others." Practice of the Nguzo Saba, especially the principle of self-determination is the minimum value needed for the revitalization of African communities. This principle of self-determination can lead to

African-centered inventions, problem solving, and self definition.

Repairing African Families and Communities

Gender equality and male-female interdependence is another theme which emerges from the lessons of Blyden in African psychology. This idea of gender equality and interdependence is also emphasized in two recent works of Maulana Karenga (1980) and Oba T'Shaka (1995). When this principle is employed, we see the creation of life of all kinds, especially in the family and community. The violation of this principle is responsible for imbalance, disorder and destruction in the family and community. Male dominance, slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism have all contributed to inequalities and strain in male-female relationships and energies. The imposition of Arabian and Euroamerican style of patriarchy and theology on African communities worldwide has contributed to what Blyden called "dislocations, degeneracy and death." We have an obligation to struggle for gender equality and male-female interdependence without compromise and apologies.

Maulana Karenga (1980) in his *Kawaida Theory* maintains that there is a need to strengthen and expand the egalitarianism and collective focus of the black family. He argues that the extended family concept has much to offer and build on in restructuring of the black family because it is a social unit rather than a biological one, based on common values and vision rather than blood. The extended family is voluntary rather than accidental or imposed and provides a welcome context for the single parent who needs support. Karenga's theory builds on Blyden's idea that "we, and not I, is the law of African life" and the root of all ethical thought.

Oba T'Shaka (1995) has shown that central to the revitalization of African and African American dysfunctional families and communities is an understanding and internalization of the masculine-feminine equality and the Mother-Father principle. A return to masculine-feminine equality based on

the model of the Dogon of Mali will enable the family to unite feminine intuitive powers with masculine creative powers. This synthesis leads to the development of practical ideas and programs that can produce food, clothing and housing. Masculine-feminine synthesis is a lifelong effort to achieve balance between forces inside and outside each of us. This synthesis is being facilitated by manhood and womanhood training through African rites of passage or age-grade systems. Blyden has suggested that both men and women need to be equally prepared in continuing the human race and its civilization. We must provide loving and cooperative models through actions and words for our children to be better.

Oba T'Shaka (1995) suggests that leadership of the extended family and community should not lie in the hands of the male or those of the female but should arise from the union of male and female and should be decentralized.

When families or communities ignore the principle of male-female equality and impose the arbitrary rule of the male over the female or female over the male they are acting unjustly. Families and communities should develop and elect both male and female leaders or co-leaders using the "twinlineal model" which is based on ancient African equalitarian families and communities. Policy decisions within the extended family and community should be based on consensus. Once decisions are made, delegation of authority to implement the decisions should be based on who is best qualified to carry them out. Balanced families and communities should encourage the development of business and organizational skills among its members, in order to be

The return to masculine-feminine equality based on the model of the Dogon of Mali will enable the family to unite Masculine-feminine synthesis is a lifelong effort to achieve balance between forces inside and outside of each of us. . . .

conscious economic units. These cooperative economic units can finance and run small-scale businesses using appropriate technologies, consensus and mutual benefits for all its members. As major consumers, efforts should be made to produce and sell goods that African people buy on the village level. Ongoing cultural political and historical education is needed to build and maintain trust and self-confidence among African people at all levels of society.

Restoring African Spiritual Consciousness

According to Carl Jung (1933), one of the chief founders of modern psychiatry, modern man is in search of a soul. His classic work explored the modern spiritual problem that has arisen due to scientific and technological advancement and the deification of the material. Because Africa is part of this "modern" world, Blyden warned that Africans are increasingly losing touch with their past and collective soul. This has brought Africans to the brink of chaos and self-destruction like many others of the so-called modern world. Blyden's conceptualization of African psychology has the potential to restore the African collective soul and consciousness. He argues that African religions have a collective focus rather than the individual focus that one finds in modern religions like Christianity and Islam. African spirituality trains the mind and body to become harmonized with nature. African spirituality is a living religion that brings the psyche outside through rituals and symbols to reduce spiritual problems and uncertainty. It is not based on theologies and doctrines but is a public display of morality.

Africa's potentials for moral excellence and higher levels of spirituality have been publicly displayed in many ethnic groups like the Dogon of Mali, Ashanti of Ghana, Yoruba of Nigeria, Twa of Central Africa and among national leaders like Haile Selassie I, Marcus Garvey, Nelson Mandela, Kwame Nkrumah, Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu, Julius Nyerere, Queen Nzingha, and Queen Yaa Asantewa, just to name a few. Ethiopia and Liberia displayed moral excellence by taking apartheid South Africa to the

International Court of Justice for violating African human rights at a time when the whole world was silent in the face of this international immorality. This potential for moral excellence is possible for all Africans based on the fact that religion originated in Africa and is a part of every aspect of African life.

However, African moral traditions have become distorted by many anachronous thoughts, feelings and actions which have led to ethnic conflicts, death of millions of African women, men and children, and cannibalism. There is a need to experience genuine remorse and atonement for these violations of morality and regressions into barbarism. The Dogon of Mali describe the soul as the union between heaven and earth. The search for justice on earth is then the search to achieve union with the divine within. The purpose of human life on earth is to remember where we came from and to awaken within us harmony, balance, truth, justice, and righteousness (Maat).

African use of rhythm and vibration, two of the seven Hermetic principles, is crucial to the restoration of African spiritual consciousness. African musical inventions have become major means of spreading African spirituality and consciousness worldwide. The popular impact of African-American musical forms like Blues, Spirituals, Jazz, Soul, Raggaе, Hip-Hop on the consciousness of the world is already well established (Pasteur and Toldson 1982). However, more spirituality and African consciousness is needed in the music. For example, Raggaе seems to have the greatest spiritual impact on its audience because of its Jamaican-African roots, mastery of African rhythms, and messages of Ethiopianism and African redemption. Raggaе has had a great impact on the spirituality of black youths worldwide. It has encouraged them to love and respect all living things, promote human dignity and self-respect and strive for freedom (Saishinsky 1994). African popular musical inventions are now being called "World Music" (*West Africa*. July 3-9, 1995). This worldwide need for African music is a clear indication that Africa can provide the spiritual model

and consciousness for global solidarity.

Conclusion

Blyden is the most revolutionary thinker to come out of Africa. His ideas evolved over a long period of time to contribute to the study of African psychology and to programs of African reparation and regeneration. Some of his contributions to African psychology promote a love for Africa and Africans, moral excellence and African consciousness, African redemption and centeredness, human equality and women's rights, gaining and maintaining creative power through traditional and modern educational methods, African spiritual influences on world religions, Pan-Africanism, African cultural nationalism, and the African genesis of science, religion, history and civilization. African Studies must include Blyden in its canon as one of its major modern inventors.

Blyden's intellectual inventions contribute also to the African reparation project through several practical developments. The following are just a few examples: African-centered movement, Million Man March and Day of Atonement, University of Liberia, *African Heritage Study Bible*, Independent African Churches, Organization of African Unity, Economic Community of West Africa, and the rapid growth of independent black publishing companies and their books on the African World revolution. Blyden is no doubt the greatest thinker and writer that Liberia has produced, but his ideas remain unknown to several generations of Liberians and other Africans due to miseducation and lack of African-centered education. A revisitation of Blyden's ideas has offered some inspiration and practical strategies for the reconstruction of post-civil-war Liberia and the rebirth of African psychology. Blyden's ideas need more investigation and appreciation by the Afrocentric intelligentsia in order for the ideas to be more usefully applied and transformed in the African-centered movement. Blyden's name and ideas also need to be immortalized in African popular music and literature.

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Buffalo Soldiers in Africa: The U S. Army and the Liberian Frontier Force, 1912-1927-- An Overview

Timothy A. Rainey

Throughout its history, Liberia has maintained close ties with America, particularly, with the United States military. American servicemen were intricately involved with the establishment of the Liberian colony in 1821 by the American Colonization Society. Navy Lieutenant, later Captain, Robert F. Stockton, commanded the United States Brig *Nautilus*, which brought 33 black colonists to relieve the few surviving members of the initial 1820 voyage.¹ Stockton, together with Dr. Eli Ayres, a surgeon in the United States Navy, appointed by the Society as Agent in July 1821, took charge of the expedition and have been given credit for having been the first to negotiate land purchase with the native chiefs.² In addition, the United States Navy provided supplies and protection to the fledgling colony despite the fact that Liberia was founded by private American organizations which were not instruments of the U. S. Government.³

On numerous occasions throughout the remainder of the 19th century, the United States, through its military, continued to assist, provision, arm, and protect Liberia: As early as 1824, the American Government had made clear its position toward Liberia saying:

...as they (Liberian colonies) are themselves nearly powerless, they must rely, for protection of their rights, on the just sympathy and justice of other powers . . . It is to her that I should inform you that this Government regards it (Liberia) as occupying a peculiar position, and as possessing peculiar claims to the friendly consideration of this Government and all Christian Powers; that this Government will be at all times, prepared to interpose its Good Offices to prevent any encroachment by the Colony on the just rights of any nation, and it would be very unwilling to see it despoiled of its territory rightfully acquired, or improperly restrained in the

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exercise of its necessary rights and powers as an independent settlement⁴

In 1827, Agent Jehudi Ashmun with the assistance of the U. S. Navy led militia raids against Spanish and French slavers and their African allies operating in areas claimed by the settlement. The Colony called upon the United States for assistance again in 1843. A squadron of American warships under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry responded to break an embargo imposed on the Colony by the Grebo. Another Grebo rebellion in 1870 resulted in an American naval expeditionary force arriving to quell the uprising, recapture settlements, and force the expulsion of foreign traders.⁵

It is evident from the aforementioned examples that Liberia and the United States had established an informal military relationship prior to the 20th century. The purpose of this article is to focus on the first formal military relationships between the governments of Liberia and the United States of America, which began with the arrival of the first black American servicemen, former "Buffalo Soldiers," to Liberia.

Liberia became the first independent state in West Africa when it adopted a constitution and declared itself a sovereign state in 1847. With independence came the need for an army or defense force. Although the militia, a paramilitary unit consisting of settlers, indigenous Liberians

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and recaptured Africans, had been created in 1822, Liberia's first professional military organization, the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF), was not created until 1908 under British command.⁶ The Force's original mission was to uphold the country's claims to sovereignty along its interior border, where clashes between outlying groups on both sides of the frontier caused Great Britain and France to claim that Liberia was unable to preserve order and maintain security. In addition, the LFF was a national constabulary, mandated to maintain public order, open up the hinterland and assist in the collection of public taxes.⁷ In accordance with the Loan Agreement of 1912, the United States established formal military ties with Liberia. The Department of War was authorized to cooperate with the Liberian government by nominating and furnishing the military service records of suitable former black American Army officers to help reorganize and train the Liberian Frontier Force. Their arrival in May 1912 opened a unique chapter in American and Liberian military history as United States Army commissioned and noncommissioned officers of African descent commanded the Liberian Frontier Force from 1912-1927.

"Uncle Sam" Lends a Helping Hand

Six developments contributed to the U.S. decision to send several black American Army officers to help reorganize the LFF:

- territorial encroachment by Great Britain and France;
- the mutiny of Major Cadell;
- the report of the American Commission of 1909;
- Liberia's request for United States Army officers;
- the Loan Agreement of 1912;
- the recommendation of Captain (later Brigadier General) Benjamin O. Davis, Sr.

According to the Head of the American Legation to Liberia, " . . . The boundaries of the Republic, being based on vague barter-concessions from

the native tribes (with which the Republic was often at war) have never been well defined."⁸ Thus, European colonial powers, particularly Great Britain and France, were recurrently encroaching upon Liberia's territorial integrity, as evidenced by the annexing of Liberian territories to Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea.⁹ In the case of Great Britain, one of the most critical land questions was the Northwest Boundary Dispute between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Between 1863 and 1884, there were incessant border clashes and every attempt to peacefully resolve the boundary dispute failed. Finally, in 1885, Great Britain forcefully assigned the Mano River as the boundary and refused to recognize any rights Liberia claimed to any portion of the territory in dispute. Liberia, lacking the military might to reclaim the territory or the resources to make her presence known or felt in land that she claimed, acquiesced.

Territory that Liberia claimed along its northeast border was hotly contested by France in support of her colonies, Guinea and Ivory Coast. In 1892, France seized a large part of Maryland County between the Cavalla and San Pedro

Finally, in 1885, Great Britain forcefully assigned the Mano River as the boundary and refused to recognize any rights Liberia claimed to any portion of the territory in dispute.

Rivers. Treaties defining and redefining the boundaries between Liberia and the French colonies of Guinea and Ivory Coast were concluded in 1892, 1907, and finally in 1911.¹⁰

From 1880 to 1910, the United States almost constantly used its good offices with Great Britain and France in the settlement of boundary disputes with Liberia. It appeared, however, to American diplomats that the British and French were formulating plans for the partitioning of Liberia between themselves. There is little doubt that both Great Britain and France

would "welcome the disappearance of the Negro republic since they regarded it as a standing challenge to European control over other parts of African soil."¹¹ In 1909, the United States dispatched a commission to investigate this situation which threatened Liberia's sovereignty.

The second major development was the "Cadell Incident." Liberia's internal and external security depended on the colonial militia until 1908, when Great Britain demanded that the Liberian government establish a regular army. Liberia had failed to pay accumulated debts owed to the British government and private firms dating back to loans made in 1871 and 1906. In January 1908, the British Colonial Office in London delivered the following ultimatum to the Liberian government:

- (a) Appoint three British officials to the customs administration of the country, and their expenses must be paid from the national treasury;
- (b) Establish a frontier force under the exclusive command of European officers;¹²
- (c) Reform the Finance and Court Laws of Liberia.¹³

If Liberia failed to comply with these demands, immediate payment of the loans would be required. Liberia accepted the terms of the ultimatum and on 6 February 1908, an Act of

On 6 February 1908, an Act of Legislature was passed, creating the Liberian Frontier Force and placing it under European command.

Legislature was passed, creating the Liberian Frontier Force and placing it under European command.¹⁴ A former British Army Captain who had served in South Africa, R. Mackay Cadell, was given the rank of major and

appointed commander. Major Cadell took command and immediately recruited British officers to assume subordinate commands at all levels. The bulk of the Force was composed of a few Liberians and a large number of "natives" from the colonial militia in Sierra Leone.¹⁵ The LFF was outfitted with uniforms and munitions imported from Great Britain, as was its organization, training and tactics. Cadell had organized the Force on a sound basis but he also took over the duties of various municipal offices in Monrovia. Not only was this action extremely unpopular with the Liberian government, but the French Vice-Consul at Monrovia protested that Cadell's Frontier Force was merely a "British army of occupation." The Vice-Consul demanded equal French representation among the officers and enlisted ranks.¹⁶ Sustained pressure from France for participation resulted in the appointment of a French national as Chief Medical Officer for the Frontier Force. Having received numerous complaints from within his government and pressure from the French about Major Cadell, President Arthur Barclay asked him to resign. Cadell refused to comply, asserting that he was subject only to orders from the British Colonial Office in London. He also informed the President that the native troops of the LFF threatened to mutiny because they had not been paid in several months and there was little that he and his officers could do to prevent it. On 1 February 1909, native troops of the Frontier Force under the command of Major Cadell and his expatriate officers mutinied against the Liberian government. The mutiny was quashed by the militia under command of the President. Major Cadell, his British officers and the Sierra Leonean contingent of soldiers were accused of inciting mutiny, discharged from the Frontier Force and later deported from the country.¹⁷ Largely as a result of this incident, the Liberian government lost its trust in the European powers and sought the aid of the United States to reorganize the Frontier Force.

A third development was a United States commission to investigate Liberia's affairs. Arriving in May 1909, the Commission, under the chairmanship of Thomas J. R. Faulkner, a black American, spent about a month examining the general state of affairs in Liberia. It made the following

proposals:

(1) that the United States extend its aid to Liberia in the prompt settlement of boundary disputes;

(2) that the United States enable Liberia to refund its debt by assuming as a guarantee for the payment of obligations under such arrangement the control and collection of the Liberian customs;

(3) that the United States lend its assistance to the Liberian Government in the reform of its internal finances;

(4) that the United States lend its aid to Liberia in organizing and drilling an adequate constabulary or frontier force;¹⁸

(5) that the United States should establish and maintain a research station in Liberia;

(6) that the United States should reopen the question of establishing a naval coaling station in Liberia.¹⁹

Along with these proposals, the Commission concluded that Liberia was desperately in need of foreign assistance which only the United States could give effectively because the Liberians harbored a "spirit of great bitterness" toward Great Britain over the "Cadell Incident" and distrusted the French.²⁰

The fourth development was Liberia's request for United States Army officers to serve in the Frontier Force. As early as 1908, Liberia had appealed to the

On 1 February 1909, native troops of the Frontier Force under the command of Major Cadell . . . mutinied against the Liberian government.

United States for technical assistance and military protection against Great Britain and France. But the Department of State informed the Liberian Government that it had no right to call upon the United States for military assistance and preferred to give only technical and economic aid. By 1912, existing exigencies forced the Liberian Government to make another appeal to the United States. Liberian President Daniel E. Howard submitted a direct request to U.S. President William Howard Taft "that United States Army officers be designated."²² This request and the recommendations of the Faulkner Commission Report were incorporated in the Loan Agreement of 1912. The 1912 Loan Agreement between Liberia, the United States and an international receivership consisting of British, French and German banks was the fifth major development. Arranged through the good offices of the U. S. Government, the loan brought \$1,700,000 to Liberia's credit with the proviso that the four countries would appoint general receivers to control the finances of the country.²³ Article four of the Agreement stipulated that:

For the further security of the revenues, the Republic forthwith will establish, and will hereafter maintain, a Frontier Police Force sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace within the territories of the Republic, and will, from time to time, and as often as may be necessary, request the President of the United States of America to designate trained military officers to organize and drill such Frontier Police Force.²⁴

Although Liberia was obligated by the loan agreement to undertake the reorganization of the Frontier Force by enlisting the aid of the United States, conditions within the LFF had become so serious that the Liberian government welcomed American involvement.²⁵

The sixth major development which contributed to the U.S. decision to send Army officers to Liberia was the recommendation of Captain Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. Davis, one of only three black officers (Charles Young and John Green were the others) in the Regular Army from 1906-1916, had been assigned to the American Legation in Monrovia as

Military Attache upon the request of Ernest Lyon, the United States Minister to Liberia.²⁶ Arriving in April 1910, Cpt. Davis believed that as military attache he would be closely involved with the training of Liberian soldiers. However, his major task was to send home reports on the military forces of Liberia, including their organization, strength, staff, training, morale, mobilization system and important military events.²⁷ Davis' observation of the Liberian Frontier Force convinced him of the incompetence of the officers and general ineptness of the Force. An event in April 1911 made a vivid impression upon him. A mob of approximately 120 Frontier Force soldiers mutinied and threatened the civilian secretary of war with violence unless they were paid immediately. The group only dispersed when they became convinced that no money was available. Davis concluded that the government could not control its soldiers and strengthened his belief that the LFF was "worthless and should be reorganized."²⁸ His proposed solution for the reorganization of the military suggested that the Frontier Force should be run by five American soldiers, two officers (with Davis as lieutenant colonel/chief of staff and John Green as major/quartermaster) and three noncommissioned officers.²⁹ While his plan was not adopted by the Liberian government, they did take note of Davis' willingness to serve. Most of Captain Davis' recommendations were adopted by the United States and formed the basis of the Loan Agreement of 1912. Later asked by the Liberian government to accept an appointment in the Liberian Army, Davis refused, in fear that accepting the position would jeopardize his commission in the United States Army.³⁰ He departed Liberia in October 1911.

The Perfect Solution: Buffalo Soldiers to Africa

The United States Department of War was faced with a very difficult task in 1912--finding suitable Army officers to serve in the

It was (U.S.) Army policy to limit the assignment of black officers to black regiments.

Liberian Frontier Force. Both Ernest Lyon, the United States Minister to Liberia, and the Liberian government wanted and requested the service of black Americans to help train the army.³¹ Lyons believed that black American army officers would not only be good agents for the government to have in the Republic, but would also serve as an "inspiration" to the people (Liberians and black Americans).³² It was Army policy to limit the assignment of black officers to black regiments, detailed to black countries or detached duty to black training assignments to prevent them from commanding white soldiers. The senior officer of the three, Captain Charles Young, the third black graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, was on detached duty from the black 9th Cavalry, serving as a staff officer in Washington, D.C. Captain Benjamin Davis having just returned from Liberia as military attache, was slated to return to his black regiment, the 10th Cavalry. He had spent a six-year tour of detached duty from his regiment and his poor health conditions in tropical climates precluded his return to Africa. Lieutenant John E. Green was the military instructor at Wilberforce University, which ran the only college-level military program for black men. Their current assignments provided the perfect solution to the Army's problem of assigning them to white line units. In addition, Army Chief of Staff, General

Leonard Wood, informed the Secretary of War that these officers could not accept commissions in the Liberian Frontier Force because it would violate the United States Constitution. While they remained on active-duty in the United States Army, officers could only act as advisors to foreign armies without compensation.³³ The War Department concluded that they would nominate former black officers or senior noncommissioned officers for service in the Frontier Force. In order, however, to satisfy the requests of Minister Lyon and the Liberian government, Captain Charles Young was designated as military attache to the American Legation at Monrovia and head of the ex-Army officers selected to reorganize the Liberian Frontier Force.³⁴

After consultation with the Liberian government, the United States agreed to offer temporary contracts of one year (renewable) to former

American Army officers as follows:

One Major at two thousand dollars and two captains at sixteen hundred dollars per annum. Salaries to commence when officers leave homes to be paid by General Receiver. Actual traveling expenses and free quarters allowed.³⁵

The War Department relied heavily on the recommendations of its three black Regular Army officers to nominate former officers or noncommissioned officers to fill the

...the buffalo soldiers encountered racial hostility ... were generally treated as inferiors, and were given less than equal treatment by their own headquarters.

vacancies in Liberia. All had served in at least two of the Army's four black regiments: 9th United States Cavalry, 10th United States Cavalry, 24th United States Infantry, and 25th United States Infantry. These four black regiments, formed during the Civil War, survived military cutbacks and became permanent Army units. The 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments had served on the American frontier between 1870 and 1896. Respectfully nicknamed "buffalo soldiers" by the American Indians, after an animal the plains' tribes considered sacred, they were assigned to western pacification. Their duties included fighting Indians, bandits, desperadoes and marauders from across the Mexican border, controlling civil disorders, escorting settler wagon trains and mail, protecting surveying parties, putting up telegraph lines and building forts and roads. Throughout their service, the buffalo soldiers encountered racial hostility from the very people they protected, were generally treated as inferiors, and were given less than equal treatment by their own headquarters.³⁶ The records of the 9th and 10th Cavalry show that they were first-rate units. They had excellent discipline, high morale, superior physical fitness, a lower desertion rate than most white cavalry units, and thirteen Congressional Medal of Honor winners.³⁷ All four

regiments saw combat during the Spanish-American War and are credited with supporting the Rough Riders in the Battle of Las Guasimas and the charge up San Juan Hill.³⁸ Many black noncommissioned officers received field commissions during the war as many white officers were killed early in battle. With, however, the end of the war, the growth of "Jim Crow," and the "Brownsville Incident," all of the black Regular Army officers were forced to retire or leave the army, with the exception of several chaplains and the aforementioned.³⁹ It was from the ranks of these "buffalo soldiers" that the Department of War nominated black Americans to serve in the Liberian Frontier Force.

During the 15-year tenure of American command of the Frontier Force, fourteen former black American soldiers and one civilian served as commissioned officers in the LFF. They arrived in seven groups as follows:

1st Group (1912): Wilson C. Ballard - former 2nd Lieutenant 9th Ohio Infantry/1st Lieutenant, 48th Infantry. Ballard was commissioned a major in the LFF and was the first American to serve as its commanding officer from July 1912 - July 1915.

Arthur A. Brown - former 1st Lieutenant/Surgeon, 10th Cavalry. Brown was commissioned a captain in the LFF and served until 1915.

Richard H. Newton, Jr.-- former 1st Sergeant, 9th Cavalry 1st Lieutenant Phillipine Scouts. Newton was commissioned a captain in the LFF. He died of tuberculosis in Monrovia in July 1914.

2nd Group (1914): Joseph H. Martin-- Civilian.⁴⁰ Martin was commissioned a lieutenant in the LFF.

William H. York-- York was commissioned a lieutenant in the LFF. He was promoted to captain in July 1914 to fill the vacancy created by the death of Captain Newton. In August 1915, upon the resignation of Major Ballard, he was promoted to major and assumed command of the Force and served until relieved of command in January 1915.

3rd Group (1915): James R Gillespie-- retired Sergeant (30 years

service). Gillespie was commissioned a captain in the LFF. He resigned March 1917.

William Rountree-- former Sergeant, 9th Cavalry. Rountree was commissioned a lieutenant in the LFF.

4th Group (1917): John H. Anderson-- former 1st Lieutenant, 24th Infantry. Anderson was commissioned a major in the LFF and served as its commander May 1917-May 1922. Anderson served and commanded the Frontier Force longer than any other American.

5th Group (1919): Henry O. Atwood-- former officer, World War I. Atwood was commissioned a captain in the LFF.

William D. Nabors-- former officer, World War I. Nabors was commissioned a captain in the LFF. He served as acting commander of the Frontier Force May 1922-June 1923, upon the resignation of Major Anderson. Nabors was promoted to major one month before his return to the United States.

Allen C. Bean-- former officer, World War I. Bean was commissioned a captain in the LFF.

6th Group (1923): Moody Staten-- former First Sergeant, 25th Infantry/Captain, 92d Division (WWI). Staten was commissioned a major and served as the commander of the LFF July 1923-May 1927. He was the last American to command the Frontier Force before that responsibility was handed over to the Liberians.

7th Group (1926): Hanson Outley-- former Sergeant, 9th Cavalry. Outley was commissioned a captain in the LFF and served until December 1927. He was the last American to hold a commission in the Frontier Force.

Another black American, **Eldridge T. Hawkins**, provided unique service to the Liberian government. Originally serving as the clerk to the American Legation to Monrovia, he resigned in 1913 to accept a commission as a captain in the LFF. Major Young recommended him for service to both the Liberian and American governments stating that Hawkins "has enough military training."⁴¹ Hawkins resigned in protest in August 1915.

In addition to the aforementioned officers who actually held commissions in the Liberian Frontier Force, the following American "buffalo soldiers" also played a key role in the reorganization and training of the Frontier Force in their capacity as the Military Attache to the American Legation in Monrovia:

- (1) **Benjamin O. Davis, Sr.**— Captain, 10th Cavalry. Served 1910 -1911.
- (2) **Charles Young**-- Major, 9th Cavalry. Served 1912 - 1916.
- (3) **John E. Green**-- Major, 25th Infantry. Served 1916 - 1919.
- (4) **Charles Young** - Colonel, 9th Cavalry. Served 1919 - 1922. Died on duty in Nigeria while g an inspection tour of the region.

This Execrable Force

On 1 May 1912, Captain Young and the three initial appointees arrived in Monrovia. Wilson Ballard was commissioned as major and commanding officer of the Frontier Force. Arthur Brown and Richard Newton were commissioned as captains commanding the two companies. After their arrival, it took nearly two months for the Liberian government to issue commissions to the newly appointed officers. Fortunately, the time was well spent as Captain Young had laid out a course of study for them based on the experiences and recommendations of his predecessor, Captain Benjamin Davis.⁴² These officers were shocked by the state of the Frontier Force upon their arrival:

. . . the Frontier Force, which force, upon all sides, was confessedly and the soldiers of that part of it which were at the camp and about town, their officers having lost complete control of them, were on the verge of mutiny. I found that they were neither fed nor paid. This nonpayment dates, for some of them, three years back. The money for their pay had been "jobbed" by the Interior and their officers . . . The force lacks much yet in the shape of getting it supplied

from its regular staff departments conducted with system and according to business records. It must have guns and ammunition, regular pay, food and clothing . . . ⁴³

The Frontier Force was also used to recruit labor for the building of roads and other infrastructure essential to the development of the interior. In administering the interior, the Force served as customs officers and a police force, collecting duties, poll and property taxes, fines and supervising the execution of labor details by inhabitants of nearby villages. The villages were frequently intimidated by the Frontier Force to such an extent that many of the villagers were forced to flee to the coastal towns or the neighboring European colonies.⁴⁴ In a letter to the American Minister in Monrovia, American missionary, J.M. Perkins, stated:

The chief of any native town is required by law to furnish quarters, supply rice and palm oil, deliver wood and water to any Government party--official, soldier or messenger that comes along; also, he must have sufficient labor to move all the baggage and plunder to the next town. For failure to do so, he may be given a flogging or ousted . . . the native people's patience and good nature is worn to a ragged edge, and they have been called on for more than they can do.⁴⁵

Having served with outstanding leaders in the U.S. black regiments, the Americans were appalled by the lack of leadership within the LFF. Major Young, promoted in the Fall of 1912, reported that the Liberian Secretary of War knew nothing of his duties and was unable to tell the number of men, officers, guns, or even the whereabouts of the forces. The Secretary of War confessed that he was a preacher and only assumed the office because it had been forced upon him. The officer corps was in even worse shape according to Major Young:

There is a dearth of men from whom to make officers in the Republic. The old Liberian officers of the old force cannot be trusted in it again for service, either on the frontiers or elsewhere . . . Again the separation of the military officers from the purely simple functions of commissioners is a thing that must be brought about right early. Such a dual position is altogether damaging to the Republic, in that it places too much authority in the hands of the same man and brings about the oppression of the

tribesmen who are today the best asset to the Republic. These officer commissioners have stolen from the natives their women and children, killed their men, purloined their food, ivory, and other possessions; have in general brought about all the dissension's and wars waged on the frontiers, together with the defection of the natives.⁴⁶

Young drew up a plan for the complete reorganization of the Frontier Force and placed its implementation in the hands of Major Ballard and his company commanders.

While it was intended that these officers would serve as advisors and trainers in the reorganization of the army, circumstances required them "to participate in active military campaigns in the interest of peace and order on the coast and in the interior to prevent serious internal complications."⁴⁷ Thus, the American officers unwittingly became instruments of the Liberian government in its expansion and pacification of the hinterland.

The Kanre-Lahun district in the northeast had been a source of continuous trouble for the Liberian government. The area was hotly contested with the British, who forcefully occupied it in 1906.⁴⁸ This action was supported by the

Soldiers of the Frontier Force were accused of stealing or destroying private property, harrassing and endangering the lives of the citizens they were sent to protect.

chiefs of the Kanre-Lahun district who preferred British occupation to the abuses they suffered at the hands of the Frontier Force. In 1911, the governor of Sierra Leone accused District Commissioner Cooper and Colonel William Lomax's troops of heinous acts and vandalism against the chiefs and inhabitants of several villages in the district.⁴⁹ Lomax was the senior officer in the Liberian militia. Soldiers of the Frontier Force were

accused of stealing or destroying private property, harassing and endangering the lives of the citizens they were sent to protect. The situation reached explosive levels in June 1912, when the British accused Commissioner Cooper and Colonel Lomax of personally killing eight chiefs in the district.⁵⁰ The inhabitants of the village were on the verge of revolt which resulted in even harsher treatment from the soldiers under orders from their superiors. The British demanded the recall of Cooper and Lomax and the immediate removal of Liberian soldiers from the Kanre-Lahun district. In order to appease the wrath of the British, who he believed were planning to invade, and to maintain law and order in the Kanre-Lahun district, Liberian President Daniel E. Howard recalled both Commissioner Cooper and Colonel Lomax to Monrovia. Cooper and Lomax adamantly refused to relinquish their positions or return to the capital. After repeated demands, President Howard, through his Secretary of War, ordered Major Ballard to bring Cooper and Lomax to justice.⁵¹ Major Ballard dispatched Captain Arthur Brown and a detachment of Frontier Force soldiers to the Kanre-Lahun district to apprehend both men, which they did. This action was the first of many times that Liberian Frontier Force soldiers would be engaged in a military operation under command of American officers.

Lomax was indicted for the murder of two of the eight chiefs he was charged with killing. He was indicted for the murder of another chief. Tried separately, he was acquitted after a trial that lasted one day. Both Lomax and Cooper were Americo-Liberians with connections in Monrovia. Their trial was more a travesty of justice; important witnesses were not called upon and material evidence was deliberately suppressed. In fact, Colonel Lomax admitted during the trial that he had killed the chiefs because they were working in conjunction with one another to revolt against the Liberian government. In spite of this, Lomax' commission in the Frontier Force was never revoked.⁵²

During the first three years of their service (1912-15), the American officers were instrumental in quelling a series of revolts in the interior:

- Tappi**, August 1912 to January 1913, under Captain Brown;
- River Cess and Rock Cess**, October 1912 to April 1913, under Major Ballard;
- Bandi**, July to November 1913, under Captain Hawkins;
- Sissi**, November 1914 to February 1915, under Lieutenant Martin;
- Cape Palmas**, April to June 1915, under Captain Hawkins;
- Plamb and Secomb**, May 1915, under Major York.⁵³

During the suppression of the Kru revolt in 1912, Captain Brown and his detachment faced certain annihilation by over two thousand Africans if not relieved by Major Young and two hundred Frontier Force soldiers.⁵⁴ Although no American was ever killed in combat while in the Frontier Force, their lives were endangered in many operations.

Americans vs. Americo-Liberians

The "Cooper-Lomax Affair" brought to the surface the tension and animosity between the American officers in the Frontier Force and Liberian officials. The anti-American feelings displayed by many officials in the Liberian government combined with the "air of superiority" displayed by many of the American officers would plague this relationship throughout its tenure. From the beginning, the black American-Liberian relationship would be rocky. As early as 1911, Captain Davis' opinion of the Liberian army and militia, in which the Republic had great pride, as "worthless and should be reorganized," was an insult to the government. The situation did not improve when his reorganization plan called for the abolition of the office of the Secretary of War and suggestion that Americans command the army.⁵⁵ Many Liberians, who were already wary of foreign intervention in their

internal affairs after the "Cadell Incident" and territorial encroachments by European powers, found similar concerns in Davis' attitude towards them. These concerns were never openly expressed. Unfortunately, relations did not improve after Captain Davis' departure. With the arrival of Major Young and the first group of officers, tension began to rise. Young had been thoroughly briefed by his friend and predecessor about the frustrations of serving with the Liberians and that it was "a waste of time and energy" to merely advise the government.⁵⁶ Major Young's negative attitude toward Liberian government officials and officers in the Frontier Force and militia did nothing to improve the situation.⁵⁷ The Liberians were also not very satisfied with the performance of the Americans, particularly Captain Arthur Brown. In failing to renew his one-year contract, the Liberian government cited his temperament, lack of judgment and discretion, "failure to get along with Liberian officials and native tribes" and ill-suited for the work that had to be done.⁵⁸ There is little doubt that Captain Brown's involvement in the capture and arrest of Commissioner Cooper and Colonel Lomax, officials with powerful friends in the capital, greatly influenced this decision. Although still not openly expressed, it was evident that this animosity was growing according to the American Minister resident:

There seems to be a very general feeling among Liberian officials that the Liberian government has been over advised and over helped by our American military officers, because the Americans "have an ax to grind," as the Liberian thinks. This is not expressed, as far as I know, but one can feel it in the air.⁵⁹

The structure of the Liberian military was another source of continuous resentment and bitterness between the American officers and Liberian officers.

Senior Liberian officers considered it an insult that junior and less experienced foreign military officers wielded such authority in their country.

The military consisted of the Frontier Force, the permanent army, and the militia-- made up of all able bodied men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, who under law, were required to perform military duties. While the Frontier Force was commanded by American officers, the highest rank held being major, the two regiments of the militia were commanded by Liberian colonels. This dual command structure violated one of the major tenets of military command: unity of command. That is, all units are subject to the orders of a supreme military authority and there is a clear and distinct "chain of command" from that authority to the lowest ranking soldier in the military organization. This was not evident in Liberia. Soldiers of the Frontier Force and the militia were confused as to whose orders to follow. The American officers were faced with the same dilemma. Like the Liberian officers of the militia, the American officers also received their commissions and rank from the Liberian government. Under normal circumstances, they would be subject to the orders of all Liberian officers who outranked them. Because the Frontier Force was the permanent standing army, however, the American officers were subject only to the orders of the Liberian President and Secretary of War. American officers were not subject to the orders of senior militia officers, but neither were they subject to the orders of the Americans. Senior Liberian officers considered it an insult that junior and less experienced foreign military officers wielded such authority in their country. Military operations against the peoples of the hinterland often required the cooperation of these two forces. In several instances, arguments arose over which officer had authority. One such clash occurred in a government declared "martial law zone" in February 1917. The region was occupied and patrolled by soldiers of the Frontier Force under the command of American Captain William Rountree and militia troops under the command of Secretary of the Treasury, James F. Cooper, who also held the rank of colonel. Both men claimed command authority over the other. Cooper argued that not only his rank of colonel but his position as a cabinet official made him senior. Rountree countered that he was only subject to the orders of the commander of the Frontier Force, the Secretary of War or the President.⁶⁰ Both men had valid arguments and according to Liberian law,

they were both correct. This and similar situations, which occurred during American command of the Frontier Force, not only increased the hostility between the Americans and Liberians, but also had a detrimental effect on the morale and welfare of Frontier Force and militia soldiers.

Several actions by Liberian President Howard also contributed to this growing chasm. In November 1912, he requested Mayor Young to command a relief column to the interior to rescue Captain Brown and his detachment of Frontier soldiers who were cut off and surrounded by over 2000 "natives." Howard stated that he had no officers capable of commanding the force, much to the embarrassment of Liberian military officers.⁶¹ Then in March 1913, with the approval of the American and Liberian governments, President Howard increased the responsibilities and authority of Major Young by appointing him military adviser to the President. This action brought the tension Between Major Young and the Liberian Secretary of War, W. E. Dennis, to a head. Dennis resigned in protest over his belief that Major Young had usurped his authority.⁶² In October 1913, insisting that the training and reorganization of the army was behind schedule and the current number of American officers (3) was inadequate because duties kept them in the field, President Howard directed Major Young to request two additional officers to serve as lieutenants in the Frontier Force. In the Liberian request to the United States to send additional officers, it is stressed that these officers be "**trained and experienced.**"⁶³ Receiving the approval of both governments, two Americans, Joseph H. Martin and William H. York, are designated for duty in Liberia. It is surprising that, at this time, Major Young would recommend Joseph Martin, the only man without prior military experience for service as a commissioned officer in the Frontier Force. The concerns of many Liberian officials that the Americans believed "that an American officer with his superior training and well-disciplined men ought to be able to deal with any situation irrespective of the odds against him" appear justified.⁶⁴ Lieutenant Martin's service in the Frontier Force would ultimately be characterized as unsatisfactory by the Liberian government and his contract would not be

renewed.⁶⁵ In later years, the bitterness between the American officers and Liberian officials would result in verbal confrontations, brawls, arrests, and relief of duty. In 1916, a physical altercation broke out between American Captain James Gillespie and Liberian Captain William Boyle over an issue of loss money and financial irregularities. Both officers are reprimanded.⁶⁶ Major Moody Staten, the last American commander of the Frontier Force was accused of assaulting a Liberian sergeant in 1927. He was arrested and relieved of command. The hostility displayed between American officers and Liberian officials contributed significantly to the decision to terminate the commissioning of former American soldiers in the Liberian Frontier Force. Another issue exacerbating the animosity between the American officers and the Liberians was the issue of pay. Liberia's poor management of her financial resources and corruption in the government forced it to seek foreign loans in 1871, 1906 and 1912. As a result of the last two loans, Liberia was forced not only to establish the Frontier Force, but also to accept foreign leadership of the army. The travel, housing and salary of these officers were to be paid out of the Liberian government's coffers.⁶⁷ This put a strain on an already weak treasury and was the source of much consternation within the government. Complaints of arrears in pay were almost immediate:

The American officers have received, all told, since coming into the service last March, less than \$200 American gold each; and it must be borne in mind that living expenses are perhaps greater here than anywhere else in the world. Everything in the way of staple foodstuffs must be imported into the country: bread, butter, meat, sugar, coffee, tea, milk, sometimes even cabbage and potatoes. Add to this the fact that these officers have families in the United States, it can be felt how very discouraging are the circumstances under which they have had to work. They were, by terms of their contract, to be paid by the General Receiver, and what they have received has been through his kindness in making overtures to the Secretary of the Treasury.⁶⁸

The arrears in pay to the American officers was exacerbated by the outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914. As a result of the stoppage of British and German shipping to the West Coast of Africa, Liberia's customs

were reduced by almost fifty percent. Unable to pay the interest on her loans, the General Receiver, Reed Clark, an American, "decided that it could not legally use its funds to pay the men in the Frontier Force until interest charges had been met."⁶⁹ This included the American officers. In addition, the Receivership began cutting the salaries of government personnel and reducing the size of the Frontier Force. Government employees and Frontier Force soldiers deeply resented these cost-saving procedures at their expense. Throughout these drastic measures, the American officers noticed that most of the more important Liberian government officials continued to receive their full pay and allowances. Although the Americans continued to serve without receiving the compensation specified by their contracts, there was growing contempt for the corruption in the Liberian government and officials whom they believed were stealing from the treasury. Major Ballard resigned his commission in 1915, citing the financial burden that service in the Frontier Force had been on him and his family. The annual pay of \$2000 for a major, \$1600 for captains, and \$ 1200 for lieutenants was not sufficient inducement for most of the American officers, particularly those with families back in the United States, to renew their contracts.⁷⁰ At the conclusion of their service in the Frontier Force, several of the American officers attempted, through the good offices of the U. S. Secretary of State to receive arrears in pay and financial compensation for annual leave which they failed to take due to military exigencies. The annual cost to the Liberian government for the salaries of the American officers commissioned in the Frontier Force during the period 1912-1927, never exceeded \$6600.⁷¹

Black Yankee Rivalry

The intense rivalry between the American and Liberian officers of the Frontier Force impeded their ability to properly reorganize and train the army. Several reasons for this rivalry were evident. Those soldiers who had held commissions as officers believed that they were superior to those who served only as noncommissioned officers. Those who served in Regular U. S. Army units believed their training and experiences in these units was superior to

those who served in volunteer units. Those soldiers who had combat experience (i.e., Spanish-American War, WW I) believed their experience was superior to those who lacked combat experience. Those soldiers who had college education believed their intelligence was superior to the less educated. Those soldiers who had served long enough in the U.S. Army to retire believed that their long service and experience was superior to those who had not retired. With few exceptions, the American officers believed that their personal experiences in the U.S. Army entitled them to a higher rank in the Frontier Force. In addition, there was a \$400 annual increase in pay with each promotion. Unfortunately, however, instead of this rivalry spurring on healthy competition among the officers to the betterment of the Force, it exploded into confrontations and accusations. In August 1915, Captain Eldridge Hawkins tendered his resignation to the Liberian government in protest.⁷² Hawkins was the senior American captain in the Frontier Force and believed he deserved promotion to major upon the resignation of Major Wilson Ballard. President Howard and other officials in the Liberian government favored Captain York. Although York had barely spent a year as a captain, he was older, had considerable military experience and possessed great administrative skills. A disappointed Captain Hawkins returned to the United States.

The most serious rivalry was between Major William York and Captain James Gillespie. On 12 October 1916, Gillespie charged York with embezzlement. A month later he brought charges of cowardice against Major York for his actions against "natives" at Rock Cess in April 1913.⁷³ The Liberian government was obligated to investigate the allegations, the responsibility resting in the hands of the Secretary of War. Both officers were advised that, for the good of the Frontier Force and the honorable service of the American officers, they should settle the matter out of court. When they failed to do so, Captain Gillespie was asked to resign and Major York was relieved of command of the Frontier Force in January 1917.⁷⁴ As a result of the problems between Major York and Captain Gillespie, in May 1917, newly arrived, John H. Anderson, was commissioned as major and commanding

officer of the Frontier Force. Captain William Rountree, the senior serving American officer tendered his resignation in protest, however, the Liberian government assured him that they were satisfied with his service and persuaded him to withdraw it.⁷⁵ The rift between these officers was a blemish on the important service rendered by black American officers in the Liberian Frontier Force.

Quality Leaders or We'll Use Our Own

By the early 1920s, the Liberian government had grown weary of the friction between the American officers and Liberians, and among the Americans themselves. Many officials, particularly the Liberian military officers, complained that the command of the Republic's army should not be placed in the hands of former American Army sergeants. In conjunction with the U.S. Department of War, the Liberian government established minimum qualifications for service in the Frontier Force. The qualifications were:

- (1). black American;
- (2). age: 30-35;
- (3). good health, able to withstand the rigors of a tropical climate; doctor's screening required;
- (4). preferably married, although single men accepted;
- (5). capable of commanding troops with good knowledge of administrative work;
- (6). ability to adapt to unusual service under a foreign government;
- (7). no affiliations or sympathies either with "the radical-bolshevik elements of the colored population of the United States or with the so-called Marcus Garvey movement"⁷⁶

The United States Department of War sent a letter specifying these qualifications to all regimental commanders of black troops in the Army,

asking them to recommend and nominate soldiers who met the standards.⁷⁷ Because of the age requirement, the only men who met the requirements were active-duty officers. United States law would require them to resign from the Army, losing their rank, privileges and seniority, in order to accept a Liberian commission. There were no applicants. However, the War Department was flooded by nominations from regimental commanders of outstanding noncommissioned officers, both active and retired. The Liberian government reiterated its dissatisfaction with American noncommissioned officers and demanded black graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point.⁷⁸ Unknown to the Liberians, was the fact that there were no black West Point graduates in the mid-1920s. The last black graduate was Colonel Young, Class of 1889, who died in Nigeria in 1922 while assigned as the military attache to Liberia. The next black to graduate from West Point would be Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. in the Class of 1936. The United States notified the Liberian government that there were no qualified black officers, at the time, to serve in the Frontier Force. The War Department was prepared to nominate qualified white officers if the Liberians desired.⁷⁹ The Liberian government declined the use of white officers stating that it would lose prestige and respect with the "natives."⁸⁰ The United States requested and the Liberian government agreed, that the issue be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Firestone Agreement. The American government was anxious to distance itself from direct involvement, through former officers, with the Frontier Force. By now, allegations had reached the League of Nations that the Liberian government was involved in slave trading. Specifically, laborers were forcibly recruited by the Frontier Force for service on the Spanish-island colony of Fernando Po, where they were never paid, frequently mistreated and lived under inhumane conditions.⁸¹

The Firestone Agreement of 1926 brought to a close the Liberian Frontier Force under the command of black Americans. Taking effect in July 1927, the loan agreement required the Liberian government to

These "buffalo soldiers" fought bravely, shoulder to shoulder with their Liberian soldiers ..Yet, these black Americans never received any recognition from their own government....

maintain the Frontier Force and authorized the President of the United States to recommend for appointment four "qualified and experienced" senior officers (one colonel, two majors, one captain) of the Frontier Force.⁸² The Liberians were satisfied with the new loan agreement because the conditions of the authority of the American officers had been changed dramatically. American officers were not to exercise any direct command but were to establish "a relationship to the War Department analogous to that of the Financial Adviser in respect of the Treasury."⁸³ Informed of the contents of the loan agreement, the Liberian Secretary of War, notified Major Moody Staten, the American commander of the Frontier Force. Major Staten was directed to relinquish his command to Captain William Boyle, the senior Liberian officer in the Frontier Force. Staten relinquished command on 26 May 1927.⁸⁴ Thus, command of the Frontier Force reverted to Liberian nationals, concluding a fifteen-year tenure of black American command. The Firestone Agreement laid the groundwork for the formation of an American advisory group which was formed to assist in the operations and training of the Liberian Frontier Force.⁸⁵ This group, in one form or another, served in Liberia until the overthrow of the (Samuel Kanyon) Doe Regime in 1990.

Honorable Service

The service of black Americans in the Liberian Frontier Force has been overlooked by American military historians and is only a footnote in Liberian history. These former Army commissioned and noncommissioned officers formed the vanguard of American military service on the African continent. In Liberia, they faced a daunting task: to reorganize and train an army which lacked leadership, organization, training, supplies, and morale. Despite these obstacles and their small numbers, the American officers drew up a rehabilitation scheme that placed the Frontier Force on a path of steady improvement and professionalism. These "buffalo soldiers" fought bravely, shoulder to shoulder with their Liberian soldiers, mindful of their American heritage and command obligations. Their success in training and military operations in the hinterland led the American Minister to Liberia to comment:

When I am advised that Haiti, with about one-third of the territory of Liberia, with little more than half the population of Liberia, with better roads, better means of communication, and a higher average intelligence among its native population interiorward, has found it necessary to have 60 American officers to organize and discipline its military organization of 2000 men, I am constrained to believe that the wonder is not that the American officers here have not produced a better disciplined and more thoroughly organized Frontier Force, but that they have come in such measurable distance of the desired goal."⁸⁶

Their efforts and successes were also lauded by the President of Liberia.⁸⁷ Yet, these black Americans never received any recognition from their own government, who had nominated them for service. Nevertheless, command of the Liberian Frontier Force by these American officers of African descent demonstrated their leadership, valor and dedication to duty and laid the foundation for the establishment of close military relations between Liberia and the United States.

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⁶⁷See Loan Agreement of 1912, previously cited.

⁶⁸Major Young to Richard Bundy, 9 October 1912, RG 59, NA, M613, Roll 11.

⁶⁹Buell, *The Native Problem*, p. 807.

⁷⁰Letter, Bundy to Secretary of State, 8 June 1915, RG 59, NA, M613, Roll 11.

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service was \$5200.

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Marital Rape Exemption in the United States and Possibility for Reform in Liberia

Margaret Deconte Brumskine

Introduction

Universally, rape is regarded as a reprehensive crime. A crime of violence that not only damages the body but which also leaves great scars on the mind.¹ In Liberia, the Legislature has acted forcefully against such invasion of a woman's person,² and has given courts the means to punish the crime.³ However, under the marital rape exemption, the law affirms society's view that forced sexual intercourse is not a crime if the female is the wife, the live-in companion or, in some instances, the voluntary social companion of the perpetrator.

Under this law, which rationale is archaic and obsolete, a husband not only may demand that his wife consent to sexual intercourse, but should she refuse, he can threaten her with any weapon at his disposal; indeed, he can use physical force to secure his wishes.⁴

The situation has changed tremendously however, in the United States as proposals have been advanced and reforms enacted in many jurisdictions to eliminate this exemption.⁵ In 15 states, the marital rape exemption has been abolished totally either by the courts or through statutes (Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, D.C. and Wisconsin and North Carolina). In 23 other states, statutes provide for a marital exemption but with certain exceptions, most typically where the spouses are living apart pursuant to either a court order, a separation agreement or, in some places, even where they are living apart with no court order or separation agreement (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,

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Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah and

...the Liberian Statute, relying on the common law of England, does not consider marital rape a crime except where the parties are living apart.

Virginia). In 13 states, there is partial or limited marital rape exemption for some but not all degrees of forcible rape (Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming and Virgin Island). Finally, in Illinois, Mississippi and Puerto Rico, statutes provide a complete exemption to marital rape as long as there is a valid marriage.⁶

Women in the United States may also be able to use civil suits to fight marital rape under domestic violence statutes. These statutes make protection orders available independently of any other court action.⁷

Those states which do not have protection order laws are Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia and Washington. Where there are no specific legislation authorizing protection orders, victims of abuse may be able to get injunctions or peace bonds.⁸

This article will analyze rationales underlying the exemption, the statutes in State legislation, and the need to address the issue in Liberia. The article also makes some recommendations for statutory or judicial reform in Liberia.

Rationale Underlying the Exemption

The question of marital rape has not yet been brought before a Liberian court. But the Liberian Statute,⁹ relying on the common law of England, does not consider marital rape as a crime except where the parties are living apart. Thus, rape has been defined under section 14.70 of the Liberian Penal Code as follows:

1. **Offense.** A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife has committed rape if:

- (a). He compels her to submit by force, or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being;
- (b). Has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge intoxicants or other means with the purpose of preventing resistance; or
- (c). The female is less than sixteen years old, provided the actor is sixteen years of age or older.¹⁰

The exemption may be traced historically in the ancient concept of a wife as a chattel and the inviolability of the husband's supreme role in the marriage relationship.¹¹ At the time the rape laws came into being, women were viewed as their husbands' property,¹² and the exclusion was a means of legitimating and protecting the husband's sexual behavior.¹³ Probably somewhat related to this theory is the "unity of person principle"-- at common law the legal identity of the woman merged into that of her husband upon marriage.¹⁴ Since during marriage only one person remained, whom the courts automatically assumed would be the husband, there could be no sexual assault.

This exemption is also founded on the oft-quoted language of Judge Hale:

But the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up herself in his kind unto her husband which she cannot retract.¹⁵

Lord Hale's statement is the foundation upon which spousal immunity was judicially recognized in the United States in 1857.¹⁶ The statutory exemption in Liberia also had its origin in the common law of England and America.¹⁷

The theories discussed above have been noted in early case law and the rationales behind the marital rape exemption. If closely scrutinized, these theories prove to be outdated and illogical. However, United States courts for a very long time, blindly relied on these theories, "consent to rest on the statement alone,"¹⁸ rather than determine whether these theories were rationally based.

In practical terms, this consent operates to deny either spouse the right to refuse to engage in marital sexual intercourse, during the

At the time the rape laws came into being, women were viewed as their husbands' property.

tenure of the marriage. In legal terms, the consent given is implied by law, regardless of either party's expectation to the contrary.¹⁹ The most extensive criticism of this theory is that there has been no holding outside of the context of the rape laws which indicates that unlimited sexual intercourse is an implied element of marriage.²⁰ In fact, in domestic relations law, the contrary appears most evident. Excessive sexual demands have been the basis for divorce granted on grounds of cruelty or indignities to the person.²¹

On the other hand, courts have refused to grant divorces on the basis of denial of sex for a limited period.²²

Furthermore, in divorce law the legal concept of "condonation" necessarily implies that the wife has the right to refuse consent to intercourse with her husband in order to avoid condoning marital infidelities. It has been argued that if a wife refuses consent for the purpose of divorce laws, she ought to be capable of withholding consent for the purposes of the criminal law as well.²³ Finally, the civil law recognizes the right of a wife to refuse to have sexual relations with her husband when he has a venereal disease.²⁴

The legal fiction which deprived women of their equal status under the law has largely been abolished. In view of this fact, it is difficult to understand why the marital rape exemption has been retained.²⁵ Neither the basic concept of the rule nor the social values which it reflected exist any longer. For example, the adopting of the Married Women's Act in the United States gave married women separate legal identities²⁶ and abolished many of the common law restrictions on their rights. Married women can now make contracts, acquire, hold and convey property and sue and be sued with full capacity.²⁷

In the growing number of states where the inter-spousal immunity doctrine²⁸ has been discarded, husband and wife may sue one another for assault, negligence and other personal torts. The criminal law no longer recognizes the concept of spousal unity and as a result, conspiracy can be found to exist between husband and wife.²⁹ These examples from contract, tort and criminal law are illustrative of the comprehensive and sweeping changes which have occurred in the traditional views of the proper legal relations between husband and wife.

Proponents of the marital rape exemption, who believe that the exemption preserves the sanctity of marriage, argue, among other things, that an abolishment of the exemption would violate the marital right to

privacy and thwart efforts toward reconciliation.³⁰ One advocate of this position argues that "allowing access to the criminal justice system for every type of marital dispute will discourage resolution by the spouses and will make their ultimate reconciliation more difficult."³¹

What these persons have failed to take into consideration is that if a marriage has reached to a point where such a suit will be instituted, then there is really no marriage to save. The above quote, "allowing access to the criminal justice system for every type of marital dispute will discourage resolution . . ." shows how these persons really attach importance to the rape of a married woman as compared to unmarried women. In *Weishaupt v. Commonwealth*,³² the Supreme Court of Virginia responded to this argument by stating:

It is hard to imagine how charging a husband with the violent crime of rape can be more disruptive of a marriage than the violent act itself. Moreover, if the marriage has already deteriorated to the point there intercourse must be commanded at the price of violence we doubt that there is anything to reconcile.³³

It has been suggested that an argument in favor of the marital rape exemption based on the theory that it preserves marital harmony by encouraging reconciliation is just one more attempt to promote inequality between the sexes.³⁴ Thus, one commentator has noted that "while perhaps the concern with reconciliation was appropriate in the 18th century when divorce was nearly unthinkable, such an approach today is harmful to the individual, to women, and to the society purporting to be democratic and protective of freedom."³⁵

**Some states still do not recognize
marital rape as a crime.**

Case Law in the United States

There is not a great deal of case law currently addressing the subject of marital rape in the United States and one can only speculate as to the reasons. Reluctance of women to even attempt prosecution of their husbands certainly is one reason. Another reason could be attributed to the fact that there are still some states that do not recognize marital rape as a crime.³⁶ The result is that victims fail to perceive the incident as rape and thus the crime is grossly under-reported.³⁷ It has been suggested that because marital rape is seldom recognized as a criminal act, men and women are allowed to establish a value system which tolerates wife rape.³⁸ This serves to perpetuate the failure to report the crime and explains why there is not an abundance of case law regarding marital rape.

The first American case to address this issue where the husband and wife were living together at the time the rape occurred was *Frazier v. State*³⁹ in which the wife attempted to obtain a divorce from her husband but her petition was refused by the court. Therefore, she stayed in the same house with her husband, but slept in a separate bedroom. When the husband forced himself upon his wife, the wife brought charges. The court adopted the common law, declaring that "all the authorities held that a man could not rape this wife."⁴⁰

The implied consent theory was argued again in *State v. Parsons*.⁴¹ In that case, a divorce had been granted, and the husband's pleas that sexual intercourse had been accomplished by mutual consent was to no avail. The consent had been terminated by the divorce. The same situation applied in *Baugh v. State*.⁴²

The rape trial of John Rideout in 1978 was perhaps the first case to make public the issue of marital rape.

Even though the judge did not sign the judgment of divorce until six days after it had been granted (the husband had raped the wife the day it had been granted), the court found that all the issues had been adjudicated, and the marriage had ended.⁴³

The rape trial of John Rideout in 1978 was perhaps the first case to make public the issue of marital rape.⁴⁴ Prior to the case, no husband living with his wife at the time of the alleged offence had been persecuted. The case was brought under Oregon's newly revised statute, which abolished the exemption preventing prosecution of the husband for raping his wife. There was extensive press coverage of this case in the United States and most of the coverage was very sensational. Although John Rideout was acquitted, the issue had been raised and the public was made aware that husbands do not have unrestricted access to their wives' bodies.

The more recent cases in which a wife-rape victim has successfully pressed charges against her husband generally arise in the context where the couple is separated at the time of the offences.⁴⁵ It has been suggested that rape victims in general, in order to prove that they are deserving of the status of rape victims, must establish their legitimacy as victims.⁴⁶ It could be argued that the lack of reported cases where the husband and wife were living together at the time of the alleged rape is attributable to the fact that women in this factual pattern are unable to establish that they are legitimate victims of rape.

One of the
more recent cases

The Liberian courts have not dealt with the issue of marital rape exemption. There is a reported Liberian case where a woman accused her husband of committing sodomy upon her. He was acquitted ... (she wasn't)!

which did not arise in a situation when the couple was separated at the time of the alleged rape was *State v. Rider*.⁴⁷ Rather, in this case, Mr. and Mrs. Rider were living together as husband and wife, no dissolution of marriage action had been instituted, and no temporary restraining order or judicial decree of separation had been obtained at the time of the rape. In addition, it was apparent that this was the first time that Mr. Rider had sexually abused his wife. Although the factual pattern seemed contrary to the general trend established in previous cases, the court refused to recognize a common law "inter-spousal exception" to persecution under Florida's sexual battery statute.⁴⁸

The more recent cases that have confronted the issue of marital rape appear to be favoring the wife-victim, particularly where the parties were separated at the time of the alleged offense. Similarly, the Rider case seems to suggest that the courts are beginning to respond favorably to the wife who is raped by her husband even though they were living together as husband and wife.

Legal Basis for Reform in Liberia

The Liberian courts have not dealt with the issue of marital rape exemption. There is a reported Liberian case where a woman accused her husband of committing sodomy upon her. He was acquitted at a separate trial, but she was convicted on the charge arising from the same act. The state moved for dismissal, for the apparent reason that her conviction amounted to an absurdity.⁴⁹ The Supreme Court in its decision said, "when a husband has been acquitted at a separate trial of the one act of sodomy charge by the wife, she cannot thereafter, in all reasonableness be convicted at her trial on the same charge."

This seems to be a very unique case as it is the only one of its kind on the records of the Liberian Law Reported Opinions. Here, the plaintiff, defendant's wife, actually instituted this suit. The crime of sodomy under the

Liberian Penal Code carries no marital exemption; this gives one hope as to the possibility of the courts considering and deciding a marital rape exemption case if the same was prepared and presented to the Liberian courts properly.

Considering that under the sodomy statute, a husband may be charged with sodomy upon his wife,⁵⁰ the possibility for abolishing the spousal immunity under the rape statute seems possible. What is even more encouraging is that statute has a partial and not complete exemption when section 14.78 is taken into consideration. Section 14.78 (2) reads:

Spousal Relationship

In section 14.70 through 14.77, when the definition of an offense excludes contact with a spouse, the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to the persons living as man and wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship. The exclusion shall be inoperative with respect to spouses, or those who lived as man and wife though not legally married, living apart. Where the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse or conduct by a female, this shall not preclude conviction of a spouse or female as accomplice in an offense which he or she causes another person, not within the exclusion to perform.⁵¹

It has already been discussed in this article that the concepts advanced in support of this exemption are long outmoded and this is even more true in Liberia.⁵²

This concept was argued strongly under the common law but cannot be applicable under the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia as the same guarantees to all its citizens equality under the Law in Article 11 a, b, and c, which states:

All persons are born equally free and independent and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the right of enjoying and

defending life and liberty, of pursuing and maintaining the security of the person and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, subject to such qualification as provided for in this constitution.

All persons irrespective of ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin or political opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedom of the individual, subject to such qualification as provided for in this constitution.

All persons are equal before the law and are therefore entitled to the equal protection of the law.⁵³

Given the above constitutional provision, the Liberian Penal Code definition of rape containing the marital rape exemption could and should be declared unconstitutional in that it discriminates against women who are married because it does not protect them against rape from their husbands.

The argument that the woman has no separate entity from her husband and therefore has no right separate from her husband is not applicable in Liberia as the constitution provides to the contrary⁵⁴ and cases have also been decided to the contrary⁵⁵ in Liberia years ago.

The Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of Liberia and its provisions shall have the binding force and effect on all authorities and persons throughout the Republic.⁵⁶ The courts have also ruled on the supremacy of the constitution over legislative enactment⁵⁷ and have even gone further to state that any legislative enactment in conflict with the constitution is *void ab initio*.⁵⁸

This article has been written based on the Liberian Penal Code provision for the definition of rape. All crimes committed in areas governed by the Liberian Customary Laws are usually heard by the Tribal Court and may be appealed to the Commissioner of the Interior Department.⁵⁹ But even these customary laws, if inconsistent with the Liberian Constitution, the constitution prevails.⁶⁰

Conclusion

Rape of a woman by her husband is not a bizarre, unusual or isolated act. Rather, marital rape is a problem of serious magnitude and consequence. Professor Richard Gelles, a sociologist at Rhode Island University who has done extensive research on battered women, has estimated that over one-third of women who appear at battered women's shelters report having sexually assaulted by their husbands.⁶¹

Reform of this statute in Liberia would involve bringing about awareness of the problem by educating women with the help of the Liberian Women Organization, writing articles in newspapers, discussion of the issue on television and radio, and possibly, a proposed bill to the Liberian Legislature.

The question of inter-spousal rape has not come squarely before a Liberian court. There has been no discussion by judges and legal professors in the jurisdiction about the same.

There have been significant changes in women's rights and the status of women and marriage in Liberia. The Liberian Constitution provides that, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of person . . . except as a hearing judgment in accordance with due process of law . . .,"⁶² it further provides that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law."⁶³

Despite these changes in women's status in Liberia, the marital rape exemption exists and a married woman therefore has no means of protection from her husband for this heinous crime. The Penal Code of 1976 retains this archaic rape law that sanctions brutal conduct by the husband.

The Liberian courts as we have said, have not been called upon as yet to decide on this issue. The most logical decision, if and when they are

called upon, would be to decide in favor of the wife in keeping with the constitution.

The methods by which this exemption can be repealed are either through legislative or judicial action. Women will have to take active part in this process as any changes will have to be instigated by women. Education is very important to such reform. A reform of the statute can also affect traditional Liberian women. As women who are governed by the Liberian Code of Laws share the information contained in the code with the women who are governed by customary laws and seek their help and support to change the rape statute, a change in the status of all Liberian women is inevitable. This could also lead to some association whereby the Liberian women from both the civil and customary practice can forge some procedure to continue to eradicate provisions which are discriminatory to women.

Considering that the marital rape exemption contained in the Liberian Penal Code has its origin from the Common Law of England and the United States, the arguments presented in the various articles to eradicate this exemption in most states of the United States can also be used in Liberia.

The rationale for these arguments will be just as baseless in Liberia as they have been in the United States. As we have already established by Liberian cases dated as far back as 1889, 1894, 1896, 1922 and 1945, married women had separate legal identities from their husbands. These cases established that a married woman could convey property which she is possessed of otherwise than through her husband.⁶⁴

If the issue of spousal immunity for criminal prosecution of a defendant/spouse as argued in the cases in the United States came before the Liberian courts, they should rule there is no exemption for crimes committed upon the spouse. This researcher is certain that with enough participation, awareness and research, this marital rape exemption can be

removed from the Liberian Penal Code.

Endnotes

¹"Spousal Exemption to rape," 65 *Marquette Law Review* 121 (1982).
See also S. Brownmiller, "Against our Will" (1975).

²"An Act Adopting a New Penal Law and Repealing sec.31.3 & 32.1 of the Criminal Procedure Law," sec. 14.70 (1976).

³*Id.* at sec. 14.78(2).

⁴Of course, in the United States, if the effect of the husband's force meets the elements of assault and battery, the wife can bring charges in that area. However, the harm punished by the crime of assault and battery does not reach the harm accomplished in rape.

⁵Harmon, John D. "Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape." 22 *Journal of Family Law* 423 (1984).

⁶Marital Rape Exemption: State by State Chart. National Center on Women and Family Law (1987).

⁷Arnold H. Rutkin. *Family Law and Practice*, vol. 1 sec. 6.02 (1989)

⁸*Id.*

⁹*Supra* note 2.

¹⁰*Id.*

¹¹"The Marital Exemption." 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 306, 309 (1977).

¹²Id. at 309.

¹³Id.

¹⁴"The Marital Exemption to Rape: Past, Present, Future," 2 DET C. L. Rev. 261, 263 (1978).

¹⁵M. Hale. *Pleas of the Crown* 628 (J. Dougherty ed., 1800).

¹⁶*Commonwealth v. Fogerty*, 74 Mars. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857). Spousal Immunity in Criminal cases where a defendant is immune from testimony from his spouse does not include crimes committed by the defendant against his spouse or children. Therefore, if in criminal law, there is no immunity for crimes committed by the defendant upon the spouse regardless of the marital contract, there seems no rationale why immunity should exist for a defendant/spouse simply because of marital status.

¹⁷The Common Law in the absence of a special statute, prevails in Liberia by force of the Act of 1869, adopting the common law of England and America . . . *Coleman v. Republic*, 1 L. L. R. 320 (1898).

¹⁸*State v. Smith*, 148 N.J. Super 219, 227, 372 A. 2d 386, 390 (1977), Affirmed, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A. 2d 331 (1979), certiorari granted, 82 N.J. 292, 412 A. 2d 798 (1980).

¹⁹Supra note 13.

²⁰"The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse." 18 *Journal of Family Law* 565 (1980).

²¹See *Obernosky v. Obernosky*, 215 Ark. 358, 220 S. W. 2d 610(1949); *Diehl v. Diehl*, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 149 A. 2d 133 (1959), *Cimijotti v. Cimijotti*, 255 Iowa 77, 121 N. W. 2d. 537 (1963).

²²See *Hinkle v. Hinkle*, 209 Ga. 554, 556, 74 S.E. 2d. 657, 658 (1953) (Denial of sex has to be for a continued period), *Dominik v. Dominik*, 7 N. J. 198, 81 A. 2d. 147 (1951) (Denial of sex for three weeks did not constitute cruelty).

²³"Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage Contract." 3 *Monash U. L. Rev.* 255, 269 (1979). In Australia the doctrine of marital rape exemption was also based on Judge Hale's famous quote which has been discussed herein.

²⁴*Id.* at 268.

²⁵*Supra*, note 19.

²⁶41 AM. JUR. 2d., Husband and Wife sec. 2 (1968).

²⁷*Id.* at sec. 17.

²⁸W. Prosser. *Handbook of the Law of Torts*.

²⁹W. La Fave & A. Scott. *Criminal Law* sec. 62, 490 (1972). See also, *United States v. Dege*, 364 U.S. 51 (1960); *People v. Pierce*, 61 Cal. 2d. 879, 395 P. 2d. 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1964). Regarding the abolition in Criminal Law of the common law presumption of a husband's coercion of his wife in commission of a crime

³⁰West, Robin. "Equality theory, marital rape, and the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 *Florida Law Review* 72 (1990)

³¹*Id.* at 34.

³²227 Va. 389, 325 S. E. 2d 847 (1984).

³³Id. at 405.

³⁴Barshis. "The Question of Marital Rape," 6 *Women's Studies Int'l.* F. 383 (1983).

³⁵Id. at 388.

³⁶Supra note 6.

³⁷D. Russell. *Rape in marriage.* p.18 (1982) Quoting (California State Senator Bob Wilson).

³⁸Id.

³⁹Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S. W. 754 (1905).

⁴⁰Id

⁴¹285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926).

⁴²402 S.W. 2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).

⁴³Id. at 769.

⁴⁴*State v. Rideout*, (or. Cir. Ct., Dec. 27, 1978).

⁴⁵*State v. Smith*, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A. 2d 38 (1981) (the couple had legally married but had lived separately for approximately one year); *State v. Morrison*, 85 N.J. 212, 426 A. 2d 47 (1981) (the parties had been living apart for six months and the wife had filed a complaint for divorce); *State v. Smith*, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (the parties were separated and the wife had filed for divorce); *Commonwealth v. Chretien*, 417 N.E. 2d 1203 (Mass.1981) (the wife had separated from her husband

and instituted divorce pr); *People v. Liberto*, 64 N.Y. 2d 152, 474 N.E. 2d 567, 485 N.Y.S. 2d 207 (1984) (the parties were separated and the wife had obtained temporary order of protection); *Weishaupt v. Commonwealth* 227 Va.389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984) (the parties had been living apart for 11 months).

⁴⁶S. Randall & V. Rosse. "Barriers to Becoming a Successful Rape Victim." in *Women and Crime in America* (L. Bowker ed. 1981) at 341.

⁴⁷449 S. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).

⁴⁸Id. at 907. The d argued that since the Florida statute is silent as to the law exemption, it therefore had not abrogated it.

⁴⁹*Oruma v. Republic*, 21 L.L.R. 14 (1972).

⁵⁰Supra at note 49

⁵¹Supra, note 2, section 14.78.

⁵²*Pritchard v. Parker*, 2 L.L.R. 426, 429 (1922). Formerly the existence of a wife was commonly merged in that of the husband, leaving her under several civil disabilities; but with the growth in England and sundry states of the United States of America of more liberal policies, statutes were enacted to give effect to these more liberal views. (This is a direct quote from a 1922 Liberian Case).

⁵³Lib. Const., Art. 11 a, b and c (1986).

⁵⁴Lib. Const., Art. 22a and 23a. "Every person shall have the right to own property alone as well as in association with others; provided that only Liberian citizens shall have the right to own real property within the

Republic . . .

The property which a person possesses at the time of marriage or which may afterwards be acquired as a result of one's own labors, shall not be held for or otherwise applied to the liquidation of the debts or other obligations of the spouse, whether contracted before or after marriage”

⁵⁵*Dylon v. Lambert*, 1 L.L.R. 178 (1889), *Williams v. Allen*, 1 L.L.R. 259 (1894), *Williams v. Young*, 1 L.L.R. 293 (1896), *Pritchard v. Parker*, 2 L.L.R. 426 (1922), *Curtis v. Brown*, 3 L.L.R. 320 (1932), *Dennis v. Reffell*, 9 L.L.R. 26 (1945).

Dylon v. Lambert. (Under the Constitution, a *femme couvert* may convey property she is possessed of otherwise than through her husband, and this fact admits the inference that she may also bargain and buy property independent of her husband;

William v. Allen (the private acts of a husband done in that capacity, are separate and distinct from his acts as co-administrator of his wife's estate, and where in the latter capacity he makes a sale and transfer of a part of the estate of his wife, he is estopped from setting aside his own act for any cause whatever;

Williams v. Young (Under the Constitution of Liberia a woman does not lose her title to property which she may have acquired, either before or after marriage, on account of her coverture with an alien;

Pritchard v. Parker. (the giving to married women by the Constitution of Liberia of the control of such property as they may possess otherwise than through their husbands, which property can not be chargeable for his debts nor alienated otherwise than by her free and voluntary consent, is evidence of the adaptation by the people of Liberia of more liberal views;

Curtis v. Brown. (A Liberian woman who owns property in Liberia does not

lose her right to property because of her marriage to an alien;

Dennis v. Reffell. (The constitution provides that a married woman may convey property of which she is possessed otherwise that through her husband.

⁵⁶Lib. Const., chap. 1, art. 2 (1986).

⁵⁷*Farrow v. Decoursey*, 1 L.L.R. 243 (1893), *Harmon v. Republic* 2 L.L.R. 480 (1924).

⁵⁸*Karmo et al v. Morris* 2 L.L.R. 317 (1919). In *Re Cassell*, 14 L.L.R. 391 (1961). In *Re Constitutionality of Sec. 27.14 of the Executive Law* 24 L.L.R. 37 (1975).

⁵⁹This reference was supplied by the author's father, Counselor Philip J. L. Brumskine as he remembers from a provision in the *Liberian Judiciary Law* as contained in the *Liberian Code of Laws of 1956*.

⁶⁰In *Re Constitutionality of section 27.14 of the Executive Law* 24 L.L.R. 37 (1975) (The Court ruled in this case that any legislative enactment in conflict with the Constitution is void *ab initio*.)

⁶¹Hensey, Jan. 1, 1979, at 2.

⁶²Liberian Constitution, chap. 3, sec.20 (1986). 63 *Supra* at note 52. 64 *Supra*, note 54.

⁶³*Supra* at note 52.

⁶⁴*Supra*, note 54.

Ghana, ECOWAS and The Liberian Crisis: An Analysis of Ghana's Role in Liberia

Emmanuel Kwesi Aning

Introduction

Liberia's continuing crisis and the lack of international concern have led some analysts to depict Liberia as a "forgotten country."¹ Six years after the outbreak of civil war and amid continued lack of interest from major world powers to help regional efforts at shouldering the burden of salvaging the war-torn country, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations has, in comparable terms, described Liberia and its suffering as the world's "forgotten emergency."²

This article is an attempt to clarify, analyze and interpret Ghana's involvement in the Liberian crisis from a Ghanaian perspective. My principal argument is that, despite Ghana's adoption of a defiant posture of isolationism in the early 1980s, the subsequent activism of Ghanaian foreign policy, at least on the regional level, is a reflection of internal and external dynamics, not least Jerry Rawlings' "leader-driven" style of leadership. Hence, in order to understand the specific motivations underlying the dynamics of Ghana's foreign policy modifications and adjustments, in particular, why and how Ghana's strategies and perceptions of its interest on the regional level have been altered, we have to appreciate a number of crucial facts about the political and economic milieu within which Ghana operated during this period.

Background to the Liberian Crisis

The recent crisis in Liberia began with an uprising by Charles Taylor's

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forces-- National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)-- on 24 December, 1989. By April 1990, the NPFL effectively had control of over 90% of Liberian territory with the exception of Monrovia and its environs. Against the backdrop of rising refugee flows, internal disturbances, gross human rights abuses and demands for democratization,³ at the thirteenth summit of the Economic

Community of West African States-- ECOWAS-- the Heads of States and Government meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 1990, established an ECOWAS Standing

This article is an attempt to clarify, analyze and interpret Ghana's involvement in the Liberian crisis from a Ghanaian perspective.

Mediation Committee-- ESMC. The committee was made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Their specific mandate was to "look into disputes and conflicts among ECOWAS member states which have a disruptive effect on normal life within member states and on the smooth functioning of the community."⁴ This mandate resulted from the conviction of ECOWAS member states that regional security and stability were essential elements for regional cooperation and integration. And, also, that the disruptive effects that recurrent situations of conflict and dispute have on the region, could deny ECOWAS from achieving its major objective of attaining a "harmonious and united West African society."⁵

Different and varying perspectives on the Liberian crisis have been presented, most especially by Nigerian⁶ and Liberian⁷ scholars. There has been a surprising lack of Ghanaian perspectives on the Liberian crisis, and Ghana's role in the establishment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group-- ECOMOG-- an idea, whose conception is credited to Ghana.⁸ The decision to establish ECOMOG was made at the first session of the Community Standing Mediation Committee held in Banjul, August 6-7,

1990. ECOMOG originated as the instrument of a policy which came about from the first genuinely collective political initiative of a sub-regional economic organization in Africa. This decision stemmed from the 1978 and 1981 political decisions by ECOWAS leaders to include security-related protocols in the original treaty.

Between 5-20 July 1990, the ESMC initiated peace negotiations among the major factions in the Liberian crises without any concrete results. Several major

The central thesis in Ghana's diplomatic position on the Liberian crisis was the need for collective action.

concomitant issues occurred between 2-8 August which changed ECOWAS' traditional immobilism with respect to member states' internal crises. The central thesis in Ghana's diplomatic position on the Liberian crisis was the need for collective action. To that end, Ghanaian diplomats based at Accra, were dispatched to other West African capitals to discuss the possibility of a collective regional security scheme.⁹ At the United Nations, the seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, Victor Gbeho, in cooperation with Nigeria's Ibrahim Gambari, succeeded in mobilizing the necessary international support to put the Liberian crisis on the Security Council agenda, despite the opposition of Council members for Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Zaire. Ghana argued that the new "hostages policy" initiated by some of the warring factions in Liberia as a means of arousing international concern for the Liberian situation was untenable. Nigeria, which was to play a central role in future negotiations, was approached with a view to applying the relevant sections under the ECOWAS 1978 and 1981 Protocols to initiating a collective regional security scheme.

Nigeria's response came in a major policy statement on 2 August 1990 in which Nigeria pledged her support to any ECOWAS initiative to restore

peace to Liberia. This position was in sharp contrast to Nigeria's earlier solo act of extending support to Liberia's Samuel Doe.¹⁰

Yoweri Museveni,

then chairman of the Organization of African Unity-- OAU-- declared OAU support for any ECOWAS initiative on Liberia.¹¹ In a post-Cold War era Liberia played no important role in US strategic interest, despite "the recognition of the special relationship,"¹² or in the words of Congressman Ted Weiss of New York, "the significant historical relationship"¹³ between the two countries. Against this backdrop, between 3-8 August United States marines landed on the shores of Monrovia and evacuated US nationals. Based on the above, ESMC's first session between 6-7 August recommended among other things a national conference of all political parties and interest groups, the establishment of a Special Emergency Fund for ECOWAS and ECOMOG "for the purposes of keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease-fire is respected." Immediately after the meeting, the US categorically refused to intervene in the Liberian crisis but gave its support to ECOWAS' initiatives. Finally, on 24 August 1990, ECOMOG forces landed on the shores of Monrovia to begin their historic peace-keeping activities.

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Attempts to Conceptualize Foreign Policy Change

Recent aspirations on foreign policy change rely massively on the significant transformations which have occurred in international politics during the last decade. Most of these theories have not been applied in a West African context. Simply put, how can we account for the foreign policy changes that occurred within Ghana's Provisional National Defense Council-- PNDC-- with respect to its policies and relation with Liberia?

These policies which, to a large extent, are being followed by its National Democratic Convention--NDC-- successor government. One of the lucid conceptualizations of the dynamics of foreign policy change, its precursors, and its limitations was provided by Charles F. Hermann and Kjeld Goldmann.¹⁴

According to Goldmann, foreign policy change may come about in three distinct manners: by adjustment to changes in the external milieu; by knowledge (i.e., the alteration of policies in the wake of pessimistic feedback); and through changes in the domestic balance of power, e.g., when a new group with distinctive notions comes to power.

Herman, on the other hand, is interested in the sort of rudimentary transformation which result when an existing regime decides to move in a different policy direction. In sharp contrast to Goldmann, Hermann differentiates four sources of change. These he characterized as leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shock. These can work singly or in complex formations to create sources of change. His central thesis is that, despite the sort of combination, they can do so only through an intervening decision process or in his words:

to effect a change in governmental foreign policy, agents must act on the governmental decision process (as the) *decision process* itself can obstruct or facilitate change.¹⁵

Walter Carlsnaes¹⁶ has criticized these frameworks for not leaving room for actors and their innovative thinking, i.e., for foreign policy changes which are not a reaction to negative or pessimistic feedback or alternating circumstances, but which are rather anticipatory and imaginative. In this article, we will argue that the changes effected by the (P)NDC governments with respect to its changing relations with Liberia, regional powers and other external factors were both anticipatory and imaginative in the light of what happened later. These theoretical assumptions will help us focus both on the domestic and on exogenous factors that determine foreign policy making and change in Ghana.

Ghana and Collective Security.

No analysis of Ghana's active involvement in the Liberian crisis can be adequately dealt with without putting the Provisional National Defense Council-- PNDC-- and its democratic offshoot, the National Democratic Convention--NDC-- government's foreign policies within a historical context. Such an analysis will show the extreme fluctuations in Ghanaian diplomacy, dependent on regime type as demonstrated by figure 1 below. From the activist African policies of Kwame (1957-1966, civil regime), Kofi Busia's Progress Party (PP, 1969-1972, civil regime) followed the co-operations initiatives begun by the post- National Liberation Council (1966-1969, moderate military dictatorship)-- NLC. The Busia gov adopted a low profile in African affairs and openly declared its pro-western position to the extent of supporting the then apartheid South Africa's "dialogue" policy. The Progress Party government similarly distanced itself from anti-imperialist African countries, the consequence of which was Ghana's diplomatic isolation. This partly resulted from the Progress Party's Aliens Compliance Act of 1969.¹⁷

As a result of the unpopularity of the "dialogue" and pro-western policies, the National Redemption Council (1972-1979, military dictatorship)--NRC-- this stance and sought to revive the militant Pan-African policies of the period. Hilla Limann followed a right of center or a more restricted pro-western foreign policy but this policy contributed to diminishing the sense of regional underling to Nigeria. Jerry Rawlings' military from June-October 1979 resulted in regional and international isolation as a result of the human rights abuses during his brief period in power. In the subsequent civilian interlude, Hilla Limann's democratic experiment (October 1979-December 1981, parliamentary democracy) was brought to an ignoble end. Thus, at the inception of the second coming of Jerry Rawlings, successive governments had experimented "with a diversity of foreign policy approaches . . . run[ning] the gamut of non-alignment, an avowedly pro-western orientation,

disengagement, external supplication and purposeful isolation."¹⁸ The result of such extreme and inconsistent foreign policy fluctuations, according to Naomi Chazan, resulted in the deterioration and waning of Ghana's "influence internationally and regionally . . . and its original centrality replaced by a marginality reflective of a process of severe and rapid external deflation."¹⁹

Table 1
Post-Colonial Regimes in Ghana

Head of State	Date	Type of Regime	Comments
Kwame Nkrumah	1957-1966	Radical pan-Africanist	Established the CPP which won independence for Ghana. Radical foreign policy measures.
Generals Kotoka and Ankrah	1966-1979	Conservative military rule; NRC	Constricted Ghana's international engagements. Prepared for civilian rule
Kofi Busia	1969-1972	Democratically elected	Reestablishment of bilateral links with Western and moderate African governments.
Kutu Acheampong	1972-1979	NRC Military dictatorship	International disengagement; revival of militant Nkrumahist pan-Africanist policies.
Fred Akuffo	7/78-6/79	Liberal military junta	Timetable for redemocratization
Jerry J. Rawlings	6/69-10/79	Military junta	Violent "house-cleaning" exercise to restore society and restore credibility of military.
Hilla Limann	1979-1981	Civilian regime	Center-right foreign policy. Rhetorical Nkrumahist pan-Africanism
Jerry Rawlings	1981-1992	Military dictatorship	Purposeful isolationism; gradual regional engagement
	1992-1996	Civilian administration	Active regional engagement in conflict resolution, multi-leadership of ECOWAS 1994-

With such a background, how was Jerry Rawlings' PNDC regime expected to manoeuvre within the region to win Ghana some diplomatic and political space within which to operate in order to carry out the regime's stated democratic revolution? Our later analysis of Jerry Rawlings' leader-driven style and involvement in Ghanaian politics will amply show the dilemmas of foreign policy design and implementation by Ghana during Jerry Rawlings' two periods in power-- from June 1979-October 1979 and December 1981-December 1992 and again from January 1993 until now.

Ghana and Regional Security

Ghana's interest in a collective security arrangement, either on a continental or at worst on a regional basis, has a long tradition in Africa. The idea of the need for the establishment of a pan-African force to deal with the continent's post-independence security issues predated the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ideas concerning the establishment of such a force were first expressed by the most radical pan-Africanist of the time, Kwame Nkrumah at the All-African Peoples Conference in 1958, and not, as argued by Tom Imobighe, during the Congo crisis of 1960.²⁰ During this summit meeting, the final communique recommended the establishment of an African legion to defend "the freedom of the African people."²¹

As can be seen with the present ECOMOG exercise, the presentation of the ideas for the establishment of an African High Command (AHC) split independent African

The idea ... of a pan-African force to deal with the continent's post-independent security issues predated the establishment of the OAU.

leaders along a conservative-radical states axis: a split which can today be equated with the Anglo-Franco phone divide. Leading the pack of

conservative states was Nigeria. Nigeria opposed the establishment of an AHC at the conference leading to the formation of the OAU. Ghana's forceful arguments for the establishment of a continental security framework were pushed aside and, as consolation for Nkrumah's strenuous efforts, the newly instituted OAU agreed to the establishment of a Defense Commission as one of the Five specialized commissions established by the OAU.

Suffice it to say, subsequent meetings of the Defense Commission and different proposals for the establishment of an AHC did not materialize. One influential policy discourse alteration though occurred during this period: Nigeria's acceptance of the need for an AHC from 1971. Several reasons account for this change.²² But, despite Nigeria's policy change and its forceful arguments for the establishment of an AHC, nothing new happened.

In attempting to influence the changing positions of different West African governments with respect to regional security, Nigeria pursued an activist foreign policy in the post-civil war period which led directly to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States--ECOWAS.²³ Successful negotiation leading to the formation of this 16-member economic integration organization should be seen in the context of a rare convergence of leaders' interests of most members of the West African Heads of States Club (WAHSC).²⁴ Thus it was the favorable merger of civil-military leader interests that led to ECOWAS' formation. These interests, though, were not projected onto the politico-military scene, and the immediate establishment of ECOWAS did nothing to demonstrate to civilian-military leaders of the region the need for systemic stability as a prerequisite for integration and development. A spate of coups d'état hit the region.

Spate of Coups d'Etat

Between 1975, when ECOWAS was established and the second security related protocol was approved in 1981, 10 military takeovers

occurred in the region.²⁵ The spate of coups d'état that had characterized the region added to the failure of the OAU's Defense commission to create any worthwhile security related structures. ECOWAS leaders' first political accomp was the inclusion of a Protocol on Non-Aggression which, at the time, was depicted as an unnecessary complication.²⁶ This protocol member-states to convey intra-regional disputes to the ECOWAS for peaceful resolution. The protocol did not, however, address regional response to either external or internal conflicts. This omission was thus amended through a subsequent protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense signed in 1981. The 1981 protocol provided a scope for tackling "internal armed conflicts within any member state engineered or supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community."²⁷

To fully appreciate the centrality of these additions, one has to look at the regionally distributed coup d'état indexes between 1975-1990. During this period, the ECOWAS

Between 1975-1980, the ECOWAS region had 31 successful military coups, 21 attempted coups and 54 plots.

region had a total of 31 su military takeovers, 21 attempted coups and 54 plots. Compared to all other African regions, this zone had seen 55% of all coups d'état, 33.3% of all attempted coups and 50% of all reported plots.²⁸ These figures stand in glaring contrast to Nwokedi's assertion that ECOWAS' interests in security-related issues have come about as a result of "foreign military interventions . . . in the 1970s."²⁹ During the period in question, only two recorded incidents of foreign military interventions are documented: Guinea in 1970 and Benin in 1977. Thus, by the time of the Liberian crisis, military coups d'état, the possibilities for the infiltration of radical ideas from new leaders and the question of regional security cooperation had become the major preoccupation of ECOWAS and

Ghanaian leaders. As argued by Weiss and Kessler " . . . the origins of regional conflicts are primarily domestic . . . , (and) de-ideologization has exposed the extent to which ideological overlays had only temporarily obscured the most important sources of instability . . . and the fragility of most governments."³⁰

Based on the politico-military situation in the region, the addition of security-related protocols represented a realistic and logical addendum to the original treaty, one which was based on an intricate and complex interplay of disparate factors, some of which have been mentioned above.

Ghana-ECOWAS Relations From 1981 Onwards

Ghana's relations with ECOWAS between June-October 1979 and again between 1981-1995 can at best be described as checkered, as a result of the processes through which Rawlings came to power first in 1979 and again in 1981. Even though, with ECOWAS, a sub-regional framework for maintaining system stability and equilibrium had gradually been established, the paradox is that the coup d'état had become endemic and had increasingly become the technique for changing heads of state and government. Such actions create crises situations in the WAHSC, and it is the collective negative reaction to Rawlings' initial takeovers that characterized his responses to ECOWAS in the first few years of the PNDC regime. Immediately after the takeover, the PNDC professed its dedication to the ideals, norms and principles of the international and regional organizations to which Ghana had membership. The new regime similarly emphasized its commitment to non-alignment. Despite these statements, the PNDC experienced diplomatic hostility and negative responses from Nigeria, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, and Burkina Faso. This hostility involved recall of ambassadors, harboring of Ghanaian political opponents, closure of borders and Nigeria's decision to stop the supply of oil and other petroleum products and to cancel special credit facilities.³¹ Such concerted negative regional reactions made the PNDC government adopt "a posture of defiant

isolationism"³² toward ECOWAS and other regional states at worse, or at best, indifference for the first couple of years.

The PNDC's active re-involvement in ECOWAS begun with the payment of Ghana's arrears of several million dollars to the sub-regional organization,³³ and Rawlings subsequently attending at his first ECOWAS summit in Lome, Togo in 1988.³⁴ Within the short time between paying Ghana's debts to the organization, mending relations with the WAHSC, and attending his first meeting of Heads of States and Government, Ghana was to join Togo, Nigeria, Gambia and Mali to form the SMC in May 1990. Ghana's decision to join the SMC can be seen as a continuance of her interests in regional security which began in the 1960s. With the PNDC's stated pro-peace tendencies, it was not surprising that the government also decided to play an activist role in regional efforts at collective security and finding solutions to the Liberian crisis.

Similarly, a new regional strategy was initiated when Nigeria's increasingly hegemonic style of regional leadership was virtually causing splits in the ECOWAS, SMC and ECOMOG operations as a result of her singlehanded decision to replace General Arnold Quainoo, coupled with its excessive troop and financial outlays.³⁵ This new structure shifted the decision-making process from the competing Anglophone-dominated SMC and Francophone-dominated Committee of Five-- Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo-- to the Committee of Nine.³⁶ Ghana's inclusion on these committees was due to regional recognition of her counterbalancing role in regional diplomacy since the inception of the ECOMOG scheme.³⁷ Thus, Ghana's novel involvement in both ECOWAS subcommittees gave her a pivotal coordinating capacity which, through a more subdued approach to regional politics, brought Charles Taylor's faction to the negotiating table.

Ghana-Liberia Relations

Ghana-Liberia relations between 1979-1992 were unstable as a result of the diverse responses that Jerry Rawlings' and Samuel Doe's violent entrance onto the West African political scene in June 1979, April 1980 and December 1981, respectively, elicited from both Liberian and Ghanaian leaders. Under the conservative Tolbert regime, Rawlings' first coup d'état in 1979 was greeted with consternation and diplomatic isolation. Samuel Doe's takeover of power in 1980 drew a more concerted and hostile regional and international response. Ghana supported both the OAU and ECOWAS criticism of the brutality of the Doe takeover and the punishment meted out to leading figures of the True Whig Party [TWP]. ECOWAS initiated its fledgling norms against violent coup d'états by barring Samuel Doe and his delegation from participating in the May 1980 ECOWAS Heads of State and Government Summit in Lome, Togo, and the Extraordinary Economic Summit of the OAU in Lagos, Nigeria a month earlier.³⁸ It can be argued that part of the initial hostility meted out to Doe's People's Redemption Council (PRC) stemmed from that fact that this second example (Rawlings being the first in 1979) could set a regional precedence for other junior or noncommissioned officers to overthrow their superiors. In the ECOWAS region, therefore, regional leaders sense of fear, underscored by the threat posed through such radical and violent overthrows, was reflected in the establishment by ECOWAS of a "watchdog committee on Liberia" comprising of the leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Togo, to review the Liberian situation and report to the following year's summit.

Thus, by the time of Rawlings' second coming in 1981, regional responses to violent military takeovers, at least to the smaller states of the region had turned decidedly hostile. This led to a much more strident regional response to Rawlings' PNDC government, not least from the Liberian government under Samuel Doe which, between the period June 1980 and January 1982, had altered its initial revolutionary rhetoric to reflect the conservative interests of the region's other leaders, and Liberia's economic and political benefactor, the USA. Immediately after the Rawlings takeover, Ghana reestablished diplomatic relations with Libya, an action

which led to the recall of the Liberian ambassador to Ghana in protest against this resumption of contacts.³⁹ Ghana-Liberia relations continued to deteriorate with constant Liberian accusations against Ghanaian meddling in its internal affairs. This eventually resulted in the chargé d'affaires in Monrovia being declared *persona non grata* in November 1983, leading to his eventual expulsion for engaging in "activities incompatible with [his] diplomatic status."⁴⁰ Subsequently, Ghana was accused of complicity in the failed Thomas Quiwonkpa attempt to overthrow the Samuel Doe regime in November 1985.⁴¹ This scenario was part of a US-led campaign to isolate Libya and its supporters in the region.⁴² Even though relations were eventually reestablished, the initial hostility of the Liberian political elite, backed by US support against Rawlings' emerging "revolution" or "Holy War"⁴³ continued. It is thus against this background that Ghana's initial support for Charles Taylor during his West African sojourn and initial search for support and financing should be seen. The result of Ghana-Liberia relations, added to Ghana's isolation during this period was to eventually influence the Rawlings government into (i) giving support to anti-Doe elements in Ghana, and (ii) actively supporting Charles Taylor in his initial sojourn for support and sanctuary which, as has been argued by Zaya Yeebo,⁴⁴ was to change when Charles Taylor's political interests became contrary to that of the Ghanaian regime.

Regional Politics and ECOMOG formation

Initial regional responses to the Liberian crisis should be seen-- irrespective of the Protocols of 1978 and 1981-- in the context of the age-old immobilism which has

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c West African leaders' response to regional crisis by constantly

referring to stipulations of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Several incidents were to change this untenable position when the crisis became manifest in early 1990. Two issues are of critical importance in appreciating the volte-face responses of regional leaders. One was the amazing rapidity with which the Cold War ended, taking all regional leaders by surprise. The subsequent contours of an emerging uni- or multipolar world order were indefinite, and the remaining superpower, USA, made it categorically clear that Washington saw the Liberian crisis as an African problem.⁴⁵ The second issue was the crucial question of the involvement of outside countries in the training, financing and channeling of funds and weapons to the Liberian insurgents. The situation was made worse by the multinational character of the invading force and Charles Taylor's threat to unleash his forces on the region after his victory. Most serious of all was Ghana's increasing apprehension of Libyan intentions through its Burkinabe connections. Earlier in the decade, Benin, Burkina Faso and the latter's attempts at strengthening their bilateral relationships in the military, political and economic fields ended in acrimonious accusations and mutual suspicion, especially against Libyan ventures at dominating its partners.⁴⁶

It is against the background of regional leaders' confusion with respect to devising an appropriate collective or individual state response to the new threat, and the realization of the fact that any further delay would amount to rebel success that the SMC was formed and the relevant sections of the two protocols invoked for the peace keeping process to begin.

Ghana, Liberia and ECOMOG.

Diverse reasons are currently in circulation seeking to interpret Ghana's re-emergence into active ECOWAS politics. These explanations differ at providing explanatory paradigms for the Rawlings regime's prominent role in ECOMOG. This section will detail the diverse justifications presented, both from official statements and comments by observers. Hopefully, this would help put the decision by the (P)NDC to

engage in ECOMOG in its proper context, and to determine whether this decision was based on altruism, pragmatism or whether it was a regime-preserving action.

The immediate post-1981 coup d'état PNDC foreign policy statements assured the international community of Ghana's intention not to join power blocs. The government sought friendship and cooperation with all countries, regardless of ideology.⁴⁷ Obed Asamoah, PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs, asserted that, irrespective of the initial misunderstanding in neighboring countries of what was going on in Ghana, and the possibility of a spillover, the government had already sent goodwill delegations to Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin and Nigeria.⁴⁸ Being a signatory of both the OAU and ECOWAS treaties prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of member states, initial PNDC official statements alluded, when the Liberian crisis began, to its cognizance of internationally accepted norms of behavior. Due to the nature of the Liberian crisis and the potential for spillover, the government promptly changed this stance, and made its position known. Ghana asserted that the Liberian crisis created a special situation, making it difficult to draw the line between purely internal matters and matters on the interests of other countries in the subregion.⁴⁹

The issues of a spillover of the massive outflow of refugees into neighboring countries, trapped West African nationals in Liberia—including an estimated 70,000—were given as a reason for Ghana engaging in ECOWAS' initiated . . . Rawlings' government became alarmed at the nature of the stories coming out of Liberia and the threats of rebel leaders to use West African citizens as pawns to control the involvement of regional states. So the PNDC warned Taylor that he would be personally held "responsible for the lives of Ghanaians reportedly taken hostage by the NPFL."⁵⁰ In consequence of the above, the government finally rationalized its involvement on the fact that "it (had) become the responsibility of . . . gov . . . s to extricate them (i.e., their nationals)." Added to this was the fact that the crisis had degenerated to "a point where there was no

government in Liberia."⁵¹ The level of refugee flows had imperilled sub-regional security⁵² to such an extent that General Emmanuel Erskine, the former leader of the UN Peace-keeping forces in Lebanon, noted that,

with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, it is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of that country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.⁵³

Also, due to the fact that Liberia had reached a point where it was utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community, the violence, slaughter and anarchy in Liberia had begun to imperil not only its own citizens but threatened regional stability through refugee flows, political instability and random warfare. Liberia at this point had degenerated into a "risky" or failed state.⁵⁴

These factors, according to the publicly stated official version, were the reasons that led the (P)NDC governments into the Liberian imbroglio. Thus, on the surface, it was the prevalent moral, humanitarian and strategic/security motivations that guided Ghana's resolve to intervene.

An Interpretive Analysis

This myth of altruism has been sharply criticized by Zaya Yeebo who perceives that the unholy alliance between Nigeria and Ghana was directed more by a "grand design . . . to dominate West African politics,"⁵⁵ than by any altruistic reasons to save trapped nationals, control refugee flows, help in democratizing Liberia,⁵⁶ and to help Liberians find political solutions to their problems.⁵⁷ Other perspectives support this style of analysis. In its May 1991 issue, *Africa Confidential* pointed out that:

(the) most telling argument to get regional heads to fall into line (with the ECOMOG project) was that of self-interest. What was happening in Liberia could set an unfortunate precedent for the

region's many military rulers since (Charles) Taylor was a civilian arming ordinary citizens to march on the capital and overthrow a military government.⁵⁸

Apart from citing the supposed hegemonic tendencies of Ghana and Nigeria, Yeebo then asserts that Rawlings' ulterior motive for active commitment to ECOWAS was first and foremost to "prevent anti-Doe forces in Liberia from exporting their example to other West African states."⁵⁹ The implied multinational character of Charles Taylor's invading force, and the possibility of a domino effect after a Taylor victory, Yeebo argues, were instrumental in the Ghanaian decision. The net effect of this grand design on Ghana's relations with other countries, according to Yeebo, had been to alienate and worsen relations with Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.

This last assertion needs clarification as it overlooks Ghana's complicated political, and in certain instances, economic, relationship with these three countries. As indicated earlier, after

Rawlings reestablished ... (diplomatic) relations with Libya in conjunction with the PNDC's policy of "nonalignment and positive neutrality."

Rawlings ascent to power in 1979 and his subsequent noncompliance with regional pleas to halt the execution of political leaders, Nigeria's reaction was an abrupt cancellation of supplying petroleum products to Ghana due to "technical problems," and the persistent supposition that Nigeria intended to invade Ghana. Despite Ghana's dire economic straits, Nigeria demanded immediate payment of outstanding bills.⁶⁰ Thus, the hostility of regional powers to Rawlings in the aftermath of the 1979 and 1981 takeovers, provided scope for Libya to come to Ghana's rescue; not, as Naomi Chazan asserts, a conscious decision on the part of Rawlings "to separate Ghana from its African neighbors and traditional partners in the hope of *managing*

on the handouts of its prominent ally, Libya."⁶¹ While the Limann administration had canceled diplomatic relations with Libya on the spurious grounds of official anxiety concerning "Libya'[s] international terrorist campaign[s],"⁶² Rawlings reestablished and "normalize(d)" relations in conjunction with the PNDC's policy of "nonalignment and positive neutrality." These steps had been taken in cognizance of "national needs."⁶³ By 1986, however, after Gaddafi's state visit to Ghana, relations between these two countries begun to worsen as the Libyans became disgruntled with the pace of Ghana's "Holy war," and its increasing contacts with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Ghanaians, on the other hand, were increasingly critical of Libyan control tactics to the extent that the first meeting of Foreign Ministers to strengthen bilateral relations dealing with military, political and economic issues ended in acrimonious accusations and mutual suspicion.⁶⁴ At the start of the 1990s, relations between these countries were at an all-time low.

With respect to Burkina Faso, the death of Thomas Sankara in October 1987 ended the revolutionary relations between the two countries as the new leader, Blaise Compoare, initiated a more conservative style of government supported by Côte d'Ivoire. Sankara's pan-Africanist views, which corresponded to Rawlings' initial ideas, were disliked by some neighboring states: primarily Niger, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Mali who were skeptical of his ideological position. The post-Sankarist Burkinabe regime periodically accused Rawlings' regime of harboring dissidents.⁶⁵ Côte D'Ivoire, on the other hand, has always maintained a conservative approach to international relations. Its leader, the late Felix Houphouët-Boigny, a doyen of the WAHSC, which had designed norms for this increasingly entrenched group of leaders, was increasingly skeptical of Rawlings' style of radicalism.⁶⁶ Thus, in the Ivorian capital, relations with the Rawlings regime were characterized more by reserve than enthusiasm. Rawlings' decision, therefore, to join ECOMOG, far from worsening the already poor relations among these countries, in fact, strengthened Rawlings' military position, at least in Ghana by obtaining critical Nigerian support, and

helping to pave the way for Ghana's ce on the regional diplomatic scene.

Can the (P)NDC's decision to support ECOMOG be seen as a consistent foreign policy gesture? Based on the available evidence, can one characterize the policy formulation and implementation of actions undertaken by the Rawlings regime as consistent with stated government positions on ECOWAS? To fully answer these questions, it will be necessary to look at the regional role of the Rawlings regime since 1981.

According to the sparse material available, during Taylor's sojourn on the West Coast for refuge, he was accepted by Rawlings as a protégé until

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arrested and detained in 1987 while recruiting and planning his invasion of Liberia with dissidents in Ghana.⁶⁷ Facts remain murky as to the real cause for this change in Rawlings' attitude towards Taylor. One school of thought has argued that both the Doe and US governments wanted Taylor extradited: The former to stand trial for his alleged embezzlement⁶⁸ of Liberian gov funds when he headed the influential General Services Agency (GSA), the gov procurement arm, and the latter because of Taylor's escaped from a US jail. Not to create a diplomatic hiatus between Ghana and the US, especially at a time when Ghana-US relations were gradually being no following the 1985 incident in which Ghanaian intelligence agents were arrested in the US and leading subsequently to spy-swapping by the two countries,⁶⁹ Rawlings chose the easiest way out. He imprisoned and eventual repatriated of the Burkinabes. Convincing as this argument may sound, hindsight has created the avenue for other interpretations. It can reasonably be asserted that Taylor's brilliance, charm

and ideas might have had an all-too attentive Ghanaian youth audience⁷⁰ or what Stephen Ellis asserts to be Taylors "dabbling in revolutionary [Ghanaian] politics."⁷¹ Putting this in the context of the internal political climate in Ghana in 1987, it can be deduced that Taylor had, at that point in time, become a political liability.⁷² Prince Eric Acquaaah, a defected Ghanaian security supervisor, claims that Rawlings' change of position was based on the fact that "there were a number of Ghanaian dissidents fighting alongside Taylor in Liberia. Rawlings was worried that if Taylor triumphed, Liberia would be used to launch armed attacks against Ghana"⁷³ At the time of the invasion of Liberia, Taylor had under his control a thousand Burkinabe fighters and others from The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone and Togo.⁷⁴

ECOMOG Diplomacy, Deployment and Costs.

Initial West African leader response to the crisis in Liberia was to pursue individual state policies with respect to either supporting the Doe regime or protecting their respective citizens until they could be safely transported out of Liberia. Due to the changed international situation, Ghana argued that a solo Nigerian attempt at propping the Doe regime would create an international crisis involving the whole subregion at a time when the US had given up on the Doe regime because of its human rights abuses and gross economic maladministration.

Much as Ghana's active role in ECOWAS/ECOMOG creates the wrong impression of a singular uncoordinated endeavor. It is the argument of this article that Rawlings' foreign policy actions were consistent with Ghana's long tradition of interest in collective security and international peace-keeping, but erratic with respect to the stated aims of initiating a socialist transformation of society. Despite this contradictory behavior, the Ghanaian foreign policy elite had earlier on in 1986 argued in favor of the need for an instituted framework to deal with the spiraling nature of intra-African conflicts and, implicitly, with the outrageous cost of individual state

effort at finding solutions to such conflicts. The failure of the OAU's Commission to take meaningful steps toward the establishment of a security or peacekeeping force also played a role in the changing Ghanaian attitudes to continental security. Ghana had, by 1986, concluded that there was a critical need for: "a viable system for our collective security in the event of external aggression and mounting peace-keeping expenditures in times of intra-African conflicts."⁷⁵

The success of Ghanaian diplomacy during this phase of regional political negotiations can be deduced from its ability to get Nigeria, the major sub-regional player, to agree to a collective military solution to the crisis. According to observers:

the military option was a *fait accompli* even before the Banjul meeting was given legitimacy by the high profile of technical expertise present in Banjul.⁷⁶

Several reasons may account for this initial success of Ghanaian diplomacy. There was a convergence of three mutually complimentary factors that aided this success: Of the original five-member states of the SMC, four countries-- Nigeria, Mali, Togo and Ghana-- were led by military officers, and it would not be far-fetched to argue that military *esprit de corps* may have played a crucial role in creating a better environment for understanding.⁷⁷ However, irrespective of which type of government was in power in the five- ECOMOG contributing states,

The failure of ECOMOG to protect Doe ... from Prince Johnson ... gave Nigeria the requisite chance to take over the operation that they were virtually paying for.

these participatory states had one thing in common-- "all are ruled with a strong arm by a military or civilian dictator and have little experience with democracy."⁷⁸ Added to this was the fact that all participatory states did not have to refer to parliamentary committees for approval of decisions. Apart from cautiously nurturing the military aspect of regional diplomacy, Ghanaian efforts in carefully convincing both the summit host and Chairman of ECOWAS, Dawda Jawara of Gambia, of the need for a collective military option bore fruit. With the acceptance of the idea of an SMC of which Ghana was a member, and its recommendations for an ECOWAS' Monitoring Group in Liberia to be established, Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian General, became ECOWAS' choice as leader of ECOMOG forces⁷⁹. A perceptive analysis of the pre-appointment jockeying saw Ghanaian diplomacy thus:

Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings breezed in with a core of army officers that includes Ghana's most senior officer, Lt-General Arnold Quainoo . . . The Ghanaian (Quainoo) is believed to have visited Gambia a week before the meeting to advise on the technical feasibility of a military option.⁸⁰

Ghanaian diplomatic successes in the run up to the ECOMOG scheme have been questioned by others as "inviting speculation."⁸¹ Ademola Adeleke⁸² does not seem to devote much centrality to the dexterity of Ghanaian diplomacy prior to and during the Banjul summit. He rather interprets the appointment of a Ghanaian General to head ECOMOG more as result of Nigerian paternalism. To him, Nigeria "*allowed* a Ghanaian . . . to assume command. This was a tactical move aimed at de-emphasizing Nigeria's hegemonic interests and demonstrating that ECOMOG was a collective operation."⁸³ Later though, he credits Ghanaian diplomacy with its major success in bridging the schism between Nigeria and the NPFL. Jinmi Adisa follows suit and argues that Rawlings' perception of Taylor was that of an exponent of the "conservative revolution for export,"⁸⁴ and since the death of Thomas Sankara in 1987 had felt increasingly encircled by the more conservative WAHSC leaders, there was a pressing need to nib Taylor's "conservatism" on neutral territory in the bud. In evaluating

Ghana's position on Liberia and its involvement in ECOMOG, Adisa then concludes, surprisingly, that Ghana had demonstrated no "pronounced bellicosity" toward Charles Taylor. On the contrary, "Rawlings' attitude has been *circumspect* but steadfast(ly) aligning itself [sic] with the *modest* objective of the ECOWAS enterprise."⁸⁵ Adisa's arguments open up new aspects of regional political issues, which exemplifies some the problems that have bedeviled ECOMOG. To what extent can ECOMOG's mandate in Liberia be characterized as modest? In leading their country into Liberia what does one expect of Ghanaian troops and political leadership under a peace-keeping process apart from circumspection? .

In conceiving the need for organizing ECOMOG and securing its leadership, Ghanaian diplomacy had created a paradox for itself.⁸⁶ With Nigeria providing almost 70% of the total troop force and capital outlays, discords were bound to arise over leadership and command and control procedures among others. It thus came as no surprise that the failure of ECOMOG to protect Samuel Doe, and his capture and eventual torture to death from ECOMOG headquarters by Prince Johnson's forces, gave Nigeria the requisite chance to take over the operations that they were paying for. Nigeria's unilateral decision in replacing Quainoo with a Nigerian military officer, Joshua Dogonyaro, in the aftermath of the debacle that led to the murder of Doe, made the Ghanaian deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, complain bitterly that the decision ought to have been made collectively.⁸⁷

Squabbles between Ghana and Nigeria over the way and manner in which peacekeeping and enforcement procedures were to be

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implemented begun to surface in mid-1992. The *London Guardian* reported in mid-June 1992 that Ghana wanted to overtake the political initiative by calling for a new round of peace talks on Liberia. According to Mark Hubbard: "A greater Ghanaian role in the negotiation process would be (a) recognition of the appalling diplomatic failure of ECOWAS, under whose authority (ECOMOG) went to Liberia."⁸⁸

Not only did Nigeria's take over of the military operation affect the effectiveness of ECOMOG actions, but senior Ghanaian military experts felt that Nigerian attitudes towards the peacekeeping duties of ECOMOG had been inappropriate from the start.⁸⁹ Instead of dialogue, Nigeria was all too willing to resort to peace enforcement measures.⁹⁰ Ghanaian troops were consistently being seen as "ECOMOG heroes from Ghana" because of their presumed demonstrable professionalism.⁹¹ Ghanaian air force planes strafed NPFL strongholds, which invariably caused civilian casualties.⁹² Nigerian forces were increasingly seen as an active faction in the struggle.

Differences as to how best to perform the job at hand continued to be so visible that Ghana's Information Minister, Kofi Totobi Quakyi, had to warn of possible Ghanaian withdrawal:

(The ECOMOG operations) cannot be a perpetual exercise. That is why Ghana is very anxious to find areas of compromise . . . Compromise lies in the hands of Charles Taylor . . . There's a Nigerian passion to annihilate Taylor. Taylor is aware that the Ghanaian way of doing things is more accommodating, and (Ghana) is looking more at the way of achieving the end, of having an election.⁹³

Ghana's policy of constructive accommodation, or in Ademola Adeleke's term, "realistic approach" or "diplomacy of realism"⁹⁴ in dealing with the disparate factions, not least with Charles Taylor, eventually influenced and convinced powerful elements in the Nigerian administration to initiate a cautious policy of "limited sympathy" for the idea of granting Charles Taylor greater leeway in the Liberian peace process.⁹⁵ Ghana's position on this issue was that the only realistic way of achieving the

common regional objective of peace in Liberia was the inclusion of factional leaders in the peace processes.⁹⁶ The crowning moment of Ghana's ECOWAS leadership stint was the acceptance of Akosombo I and II to include the warlords in any negotiated process. Though this was to initially create problems, it succeeded in bringing Charles Taylor, the most virulent critic of Nigeria's role in ECOMOG to Lagos, Nigeria, for a meeting with Nigerian strongman, Sani Abacha. The communiqué released after Taylor's first major visit to Nigeria in June 1995, stated that the visit had "cleared away any notion that Nigeria had any private agenda in the sub-region's collective efforts to bring about peace, except treating all sides on an equal footing" and paved the way for the celebrated Abuja Accord.⁹⁷ These discussions thus initiated a new policy of adaptation with Nigerian leaders.

This strategy has indirectly sharpened the level of controversy between most Ghana and Nigeria as to who should lead the peace process in Liberia. John Inegbedion posits that the only manner in which Ghana may seriously challenge Nigeria for the leadership of the Liberia operations is if the IMF succeeds in selling Ghana as a structural adjustment success while Nigeria remains a basket case. Without considering any of the critical public statements made by Ghana, Inegbedion then asserts, rather unconvincingly, that Ghana is on the same side with Nigeria. Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, is seen as a serious contender for regional leadership it "has the *political status* and *policy objectives* that have continued to rival those of Nigeria."⁹⁸

Rawlings' involvement in the ECOMOG scheme, it has been argued, created splits within his government with the conservative minority group arguing for Ghana to withdraw from ECOMOG as the Liberian crisis was capable of derailing the country's otherwise impressive economic gains under the (P)NDC governments. There is an element of controversy concerning the financial outlays provided by the Ghanaian government on the cost to the Ghanaian state of its Liberian adventure in terms of finance, men and equipment. Based on estimates presented by the *Financial Times*

with respect to the total cost of the ECOMOG scheme and the number of Ghanaian troops involved, one begins to have an idea of the total cost incurred by the Ghanaian government.

The initial financial outlays estimated by ECOWAS for the operation amounted to US\$50 million. With the serious economic situation that Ghana had been under since the early 1970s, added to the stringent Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) being implemented by the government, Ghana's involvement in any such scheme, irrespective of its financial outlays, would create serious financial strains. To appreciate the relative significance of Ghana's ECOMOG contributions, Nigeria provides the clearest analytical case through which Ghanaian financial outlays can be calculated.⁹⁹ Sources generally agree that ECOMOG soldiers received around US\$ 5.00 as their salary with feeding costs making up another US\$ 7.50.¹⁰⁰ Ghana provided a modest naval task force comprising one merchant vessel, *MV Tano River*, and two Ghanaian gun boats, namely *GNS Yogaga* and *GNS Achimota*, to the ECOMOG force, while also providing transport and fighter planes. According to the Military Balance report for 1991-1992 and reports in *West Africa* magazine, Ghana provided 1,500 men to the force apart from the almost 200 supporting staff.¹⁰¹

William Keeling of the *Financial Times* stated that Nigeria had expended between US\$ 250-500 million to finance ECOMOG in Liberia from its Gulf war windfall. It is within this context of Ghana's lack of oil resources that the contribution in terms of men and material have, in relative terms, been more difficult to sustain. If, as has been argued, Ghana, after Nigeria, took a substantial part of the remaining 20-30% recurrent expenditure left for subsidizing ECOMOG, and based on the figures above, our calculations concerning Ghana's contribution to ECOMOG would then be in the modest vicinity of US\$ 8 million annually. In the first officially published speculative figure on the cost of the ECOMOG involvement to the Ghanaian government, former Minister of Finance, Kwesi Botchway¹⁰² said that Ghana had disbursed financial resources in excess of \$10 million on its

contribution to ECOMOG since 1990, mainly on salary and logistics. Ben Ephson¹⁰³, on the other hand, has argued that Ghana's total disbursements on its ECOMOG involvement in Liberia until late 1995 amounted to US\$ 15 millions.

Official government reports on ECOMOG performance and threats of withdrawing Ghanaian troops, is the only reliable indicator of the extent to which this involvement is a drain on the economy of Ghana. Added to this is the SAP programme initiated by the government in 1983, under which an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was launched to reverse the serious deterioration in the economy. The programme, which in 1991 was in its eighth year, included a package of economic deregulation which led to constant depreciation of the cedi, inversely kindling inflation and regressing the slight gains that had been made. It is in this context of depreciating incomes and diminishing economic performance that government financial outlays to the ECOMOG operation should be seen.

In Rawlings' acceptance and inauguration speech as ECOWAS C in August 1994, he pledged continued Ghanaian support for the ECOWAS operation. But he hinted baldly at the heavy burden that Ghana's involvement was causing the state. He argued that ECOWAS "economies can simply no longer bear the cost of sustaining troops in these ECOMOG contingents, and political support for the continued presence of these troops in Liberia . . . is understandably waning."¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

Finally, and simply put, how do we use concepts to explain all? Our analysis has shown the strong relationship between external influences, the dynamics of the internal political situation in Ghana and not least the attempt by a small state to gain regional influence by flexible policies. Ghana's perception of its national interests in the late 1980s differed sharply from the immediate post-PNDC era. Exogenous influences, not least the role of the

regional hegemon, Nigeria, in perceiving Ghana as an enemy contributed to Ghana's eventual re-entrance into ECOWAS politics. This article has attempted to position Rawlings' foreign policy in the Nkrumahist context to which his governments have so often alluded. In pursuing this perspective, we have traced the difficulties of the initial post-revolution era as a result of resistance from the WASHC, and subsequently the government's gradual change of policy to reflect the norms of the region. While acceptance as a fully-fledged member of the club did not lead to any active Ghanaian ventures under the ECOWAS framework, it has illuminated the government's interest in defining a viable collective security system for dealing with intra-African conflicts.

Despite the inconsistencies in Ghanaian official policy formulation and implementation with respect to Doe's government and Charles Taylor in particular, the exigencies of the domestic political situation led the government to initiate a major diplomatic offensive. This offensive led to the formation of ECOMOG and consistent official support for its activities. This period reflects one of the major foreign policy successes of note in the Rawlings era.

Despite being in the process of implementing an austere ERP under an IMF and World Bank designed SAP, and the consequent economic upheavals in which the country finds itself, the government has been consistent in its support for Ghanaian troops, amounting to several million dollars.

The major lessons that this article has demonstrated are the almost gridlock in which new states find themselves in their efforts to implement independent foreign policy measures based on their designation of their national interests. Ghana's rather inconsistent policy measures between 1981 and 1995 amply show the dilemmas of endeavor at autonomous design and implementation of foreign policy measures. Complications in autonomous action were faced both from regional powers and from the much wider

international scene. This complication has similarly been reflected in the responses of individual ECOWAS states to the ECOMOG operation.

Despite such inconsistencies, however, the lessons of the ECOMOG exploit has amply demonstrated the shedding of the immobilism that characterized both the individual and collective foreign policy of ECOWAS member states. Even though Ghana's worsening internal and economic conditions have forced her to wish to disengage from the crisis, two crucial factors may be central to her decision to stay: One is her long credentials with pan-Africanism and also her dependence on Nigeria for oil. The second factor is threats from Nigeria to suspend oil supplies in the event of Ghana's withdrawal.¹⁰⁵

Small states play small roles in international relations and this dictum has once more been exemplified by Ghana's balancing act since 1982 and the decision-making process in ECOWAS. Despite Nigeria's "managerial role"¹⁰⁶ and assertiveness in ECOWAS, Ghana's constructive diplomacy has managed to win it some measure of manoeuvrability.

What this study has managed to show also is that:

- ECOWAS underwent a radical change from being solely an economic integrative group to encompass political and security related issues, while Ghana underwent a series of internal and external crises which compelled her to change her policy of splendid isolation to one of active regional involvement. These occurrences went unnoticed until the outbreak of the Liberian crisis.
- Ghana's ECOMOG involvement has demonstrated a small state's political will to respond to regional problems, irrespective of her own economic crisis and international mar...tion.

Though a definite solution to the Liberian crisis is elusive, Ghana's

involvement in attempts at managing regional security has pointed to major issues that may be important in the rise of small states in future regional cooperation.

Endnotes

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²*Ibid.* "Liberia: Pushing Against the Odds," 4-10 December, 1995. p. 1878

³*Ibid.*, 28 May-3 June, 1990.

⁴see ECOWAS Decision A/Dec.9/5/90 Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Gani J. Yoroms, "ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective." *A Journal of Opinion*, Vol. XX1/1-2, 1993. see also Nwokedi, E "Regional Integration and Regional Security: ECOMOG, Nigeria and the Liberian Crisis," *Travaux et Documents*, no. 35, 1992.

⁷Tarr, B. S. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective." *A Journal of Opinion*, vol.XX1/1-2 1993. p.76ff.

⁸Baffour Ankomah. "With Taylor Inside Liberia." *New African (NA)*, October 1992.p.14. See also Adisa, Jinmi (1992). "The Politics of Regional Military Cooperation: The Case of ECOMOG" in Margaret Vogt, ed., *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt At Regional Peace Keeping*. Lagos: Gambumo Publishing Co. Ltd. p. 210. Decision A/Dec.1/8/90. p.4.

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¹⁰Clapham, Christopher. (1994). "Liberia." in Shaw, Timothy M & Julius Emeka Okolo, eds., *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*. London: St. Martin's Press. p. 81. See also *Africa Confidential*, 32, 10 (May 1991).

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¹³US House of _____ es. Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 101 st Congress, 2nd Session. Hearing on U. S. Policy and the Crisis in Liberia. 19 June 1990.

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¹⁸Chazan, Naomi. (1984). "Ghana." in Shaw, Timothy M & Olajide Aluku, eds., *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy--Comparative Analysis*, Aldershot:Gower Publishing Company Ltd. p.94.

¹⁹ibid. pp. 94-95

²⁰Imobighe, I. "An African High Command: The Search for A Feasible Strategy of Continental Defense." *African Affairs*, 79, 315, 1980. p.241.

²¹Aluko, op cit., p. 50.

²²Nigeria had experienced a demoralizing civil war in which it became patently clear that its conservative foreign policy had failed to win it support. Added to this was the fact that Nigeria, at this point, was under a military regime.

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²⁴Sesay, A. (1985). "The OAU and Regime Recognition: Politics of Discord and Collaboration in Africa." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, no.3.pp.26-28. Ojo, Olatunde, B.J. & Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 1991. "Interstate Conflicts in West Africa: The Reference Group Theory Perspective. " *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, October, p.304.

²⁵McGowan, P & Thomas H. Johnson. (1984). "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol 22, no.4, p.638. Welch, C.E. (1990). "The Military Factor in West Africa: Leadership and Regional Development." in Okolo, J.E & Stephen Wright, eds. *West African Regional Cooperation*. Boulder: Westview Press.

²⁶John Ravenhill. "The future of Regionalism in Africa." in Onwuka & Sesay, eds, *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York, 1985.

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²⁸McGowan, P. & T. H. Johnson. op cit., p.635.

²⁹Nwokedi. op cit.

³⁰Weiss, T.G. & A.M. Kessler, eds., *Third World Security in the post-Cold War Era*. London: Lynne Rienner. p.13.

³¹Agyeman-Duah & Ojo. op cit., p 299ff

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³³J.E. Okolo & S. Wright, eds. *West African Regional Cooperation and Development*. Boulder: Westview Press.

³⁴*West Africa*. "Togo/Ghana-- Love Thy Neighbour." 8 August 1988, p.1435.

³⁵State Department (Confidential Priority) cable to US Embassy in Cotonou, Benin. *Africa Confidential*, vol. 33, no. 11, 1990. *West Africa*, 12-18 November 1990, p. 2836.

³⁶Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. (1994). "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia." *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn, p. 276.

³⁷*The Guardian* (London) 8 June 1992.

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³⁹*WestAfrica*, 25 January 1982, p. 225.

⁴⁰*African Research Bulletin*, November 1-30 1983, p. 7053. See also, Akpan, Steven. (1986). "Liberia:How the November Coup failed." *WestAfrica*, 17 February 1986, p. 336 for a discussion of some of the regional states accused of complicity in the coup attempt.

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⁴³*West Africa*, 11 January, 1982.p.68.

⁴⁴Zaya Yeebo (1991). *Ghana: The Struggle for Power - Rawlings, Saviour or Demagogue?* London: New Beacon Books. Especially, pp.273-274.

⁴⁵*West Africa*. "ECOWAS and Liberia." 20-26 August 1990. p. 2309. *The Economist*. 21 November 1992.

⁴⁶*African Research Bulletin*, January 1988, p. 7494

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸*West Africa*, 5 July, 1982.

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⁵⁰Ibid. 17-23 September, 1990. p.2478

⁵¹Ibid. "Diplomacy is Necessary." 4-10 March, 1991. p.304.

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⁵⁷Ofori-Obot, W. (1994). "Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia." *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 264.

⁵⁸*Africa Confidential*, vol.32, no.10, May 1991. Lansana Conte, the Guinean leader, is on record as stating, "Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians shouldn't be encouraged to overthrow military regimes." Baffour Ankamah. "The Shame of ECOWAS," *New African*, October, 1992, p. 16.

⁵⁹Yeebo. Ibid, p.273. *WA* 23-29 August, 1993, p.1486.

⁶⁰Agyeman-Duah, B. "Ghana, 1982-1986: The Politics of the PNDC," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 4, 1987. While Agyeman-Duah describes Nigeria's use of oil diplomacy against Ghana during this period as "punitive," the Foreign Secretary, Obed Asamoah stated that, "the arrears (Ghana) owed them were so considerable that efforts should be made to clear the arrears... There might have been some political motivation (from Nigeria) as well particularly since there had been some excitement in Ghana over a possible invasion," *West Africa*, 5 July, 1992. p. 1754.

⁶¹Chazan, op cit., p. 107. emphasis mine.

⁶²*African Research Bulletin* [Political series] 1 -31 January, 1992, p. 6314.

⁶³*West Africa*, 25 January, 1982. see also Hansen, E. "The Military and Revolution in Ghana," *Journal of African Marxists*, No. 1, August 1982. p. 67. For an economist's interpretation of Rawlings' foreign policy change, see Agyeman-Duah, B & C.K. Daddieh "Ghana." in T.M. Shaw & J.E. Okolo, eds. *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS* (London: St Martin's Press). p. 123. They state that "by 1983 the dynamo in the professed change of course in foreign policy began to fizzle out as the PNDC began to revert to **traditional positions**. The revolutionary rhetoric was back-pedalled and despised imperialist agents, notably the World

B , were courted to rescue the country's economy." p.33 & 38 (emphasis mine. For a totally different interpretation see Emmanuel Hansen.

⁶⁴*African Research Bulletin*, January 1988, p. 7494.

⁶⁵For further expositions on this theme, see Martin, G. "Ideology and Praxis in Thomas Sankara's Populist Revolution of 4 August 1983 in Burkina Faso." *Journal of Opinion*, vol.XV, 1987, p. 86 Skinner, P "Sankara and the Burkinabe Revolution:Charisma and Power, Local and External Dimensions," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26, 3 (1988) p. 446.

⁶⁶Agyeman-Duah, B. "Military Coups, Regime Change, and Interstate Conflicts in West Africa." *Armed Forces & Society*, 25:4 1990

⁶⁷*The Guardian* (London) 29 May 1993. Ebow Godwin. "Did Rawlings Back Taylor," *New African*, April 1991.p. 26.

⁶⁸British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Report, 22 June 1990 stated that Agence France Presse (AFP) had reported that "the Liberian government had dropped charges that rebel leader Charles Taylor had ed one million dollars of government money when he was in charge of the procurement of government supplies." Taylor was no longer considered an "outlaw," p. 56 quoted in Weller, M. ed., *Regional Peace Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁶⁹*Africa Report*, 30, 5, 1985.

⁷⁰Chazan, op cit., p.97 discusses the role of Ghanaian youth in national politics.

⁷¹Ellis, Stephen 1995. " Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." *African Affairs*, no. p. 181.

⁷²For a discussion of the centrality of youth in West African politics, see Richards, P. (1995). "Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?" in Oliver Furley, ed., *Conflict in Africa*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, pp. 134-170.

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⁷⁴*West Africa* 22-28 March 1993., *ibid* 23-29 August 1993. "Did Rawlings Back Taylor?" *New African*, April 1991. 74. *West Africa* 4-10 November 1992.

⁷⁵*African Research Bulletin, (ARD)* vol. 23, no.5 1986.

⁷⁶*WestAfrica*. "Liberia: Intervention Time." 13-19 August, 1990., p. 2280.

⁷⁷*Africa Confidential (AC)*, vol 32, no. 10, May 1991.

⁷⁸Henry, Niel 1990. "African Dictators embark on Democratic Mission." *The Washington Post*, August 10. (microfilm).

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⁸⁰*Ibid*.

⁸¹Adisa, Op cit, p. 211.

⁸²Adeleke, A. (1995). "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33, 4, p. 586.

⁸³*Ibid*, p. 578

⁸⁴Adisa, p. 211. Agyeman-Duah & Daddieh, op cit., p.38 for a similar view.

⁸⁵Adisa, Ibid., p.211

⁸⁶*West Africa* 23-29 August, 1993. 87Ofuatey-Kodjoe, op cit., p.290.

⁸⁸*The Guardian* (London), 8 June 1992.

⁸⁹Cleaver & May, op cit., p.493.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹*New African*, October 1992.p. 26

⁹²I am grateful to one of the anonymous readers for making me aware of this point. Ankomah, Baffour 1993 "UN Turns Blind Eye to ECOMOG's Atrocities." *New African*, May, pp. 14-16.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Adeleke, Ademola. op cit., pp.583 and 586.

⁹⁵*West Africa*, 12-18 June, 1995.

⁹⁶Ibid. 12-18 September 1994, p.2116.

⁹⁷Ibid. 18-24 September 1995, and *The Economist*, 9 September 1995.

⁹⁸Inegbedion, J.E. "Ecomog in Comparative Perspective." in Shaw & Okolo, op cit., p.238.

⁹⁹I A. "The Price of Peace-keeping." *African Guardian*, October 1990.

¹⁰⁰see *Africa Watch*, (1993). "Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace-- The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights." June. Washington, D.C. p. 30.

¹⁰¹IISS. *The Military Balance 1991-1992*, (London: IISS, 1991). Segun Aderiye. "ECOMOG Landing" in M.A. Voigt, (ed) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping*. Lagos, Nigeria: Gambuno Press, 1992.

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¹⁰³Ephson, B. "Ghana: Today and Tomorrow-- A Report on the Economic and Political Problems to be solved by Ghana." *Udvikling (Development)*, nr. 1-2, Feb-March 1996. p.33.

¹⁰⁴*West Africa*, 22-28 August, 1994, p.1458-1459. *ibid.* 15-21 August, 1994.p. 1418

¹⁰⁵Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi. (1994). "Managing Regional Security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Liberia," *CDR Working Paper 94.2* p.17.

¹⁰⁶Ayoob, M. "The Security Problem of the Third World." *World Politics*, 43, 1991, p.82. Sayigh Y. "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries." *Adelphi Papers*, London: Brassey's, p.60ff.

Joe M. Bee and Aaron Von Williamson, *The Liberian Civil War 1990-1994*, Chicago Illinois: JB Publishers, 1995. 110 pages.

This book is one of the growing number of chronologies written so far of events, starting on April 14, 1979, that led to the present civil crisis in Liberia. As the authors noted, it is their attempt

to give a just and accurate account of the breakdown of law and order, the violation of human rights, the loss of life, the of property and the total collapse of government in Liberia from 1990 to 1994 (p. 1).

The authors may have achieved this goal. But they did not do so well on their second goal, which is their attempt to give an "account of the roles played by individuals, institutions, nations and armed groups during this civil crisis as well as relevant events prior to its onset" (p. 1). On this count, the authors have failed to give the needed analytical and documentary support.

The book is divided into five chapters, each with several subheadings. The first three chapters can be grouped together and characterized as d the "symptoms" of the crisis. In Chapter One, the authors give the "scope" of their assignment, followed by a very brief introduction to the present crisis, and then move on to set the historical background necessary to und the crisis, with subheadings such as Population and Ethnic Makeup, and Liberian Political Culture. Chapter Two, "Backdrop to the War," gives more historical explanations for the crisis by looking cursorily at these subheadings: the Settler-Native Schism, and Ethnic and Political Conflicts. Chapter Three, ' ate Causes of the War,' outlines important events within the reign of the PRC/Doe regime, including the Military Takeover of April 12, 1980, the 1983 Nimba Raid, the Army's Attack on the University of Liberia on August 22, 1984, the 1985 General Election, the November 12, 1985 Quiwonkpa Invasion, and the subsequent Prosecution of Mano and Gio Citizens.

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The major theme of the book, the Liberian Civil War itself, is dealt with in details in Chapter Four, with some interesting subheadings such as The War Escalates, Terror Grips Monrovia, Conciliatory Overtures, NPFL

Closes In On Monrovia, Government Changes Position, The Divided City, A Cry for Intervention, No to ECOMOG and Imported Government, ECOWAS Initiatives, Emergence of Other Warring Factions, Operation Octopus, the Liberian National Transitional Government. Chapter Five, "Which Way, Liberia?" contains the authors' suggestions on how to "initiate a program of Reconciliation, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Democratic Pluralism." Here, the authors make recommendations that they hope will lead to a solution of the present crisis and a building of a more peaceful postwar Liberia.

As noted earlier, the authors achieved, to a large extent, the goal to chronicle events leading to the crisis that began with the December 24, 1989 invasion by

Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) through Nimba County. However, the secondary goal of analyzing why the crises occurred in the first place is at best shallow in many areas, and this reviewer believes

The authors achieved, to a large extent, the goal to chronicle events leading to the crisis that began with the December 24, 1989 invasion by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)....

The (second) goal of analyzing why the crisis occurred in the first place is at best shallow in many areas....

for two reasons: First, the events are too current for any well-meaning historical analysis. Second, a lack of sufficient documentary evidence leads to more subjective rather than objective analysis. Although the authors gave endnotes as references, this second deficiency is amplified by a lack of a bibliography page to substantiate historical data presented in the book.

For example, in looking at pre-1980 events, many historical statements were made out of context about the period of the True Whig Party's rule simply because they were based mostly on generalizations, in which, like past Liberian histories, one group of people were

While the excesses of over 100 years of the True Whig Party's rule should not be overlooked, in the same sense, it would be absurd to disregard the negative role some native Liberians have played in thwarting the efforts of nation building.

made to be seen as villains. In this book, a case for reverse historical discrimination could also be made, as one sees no in-depth analysis of actions taken by the native Liberians that could be construed as detrimental to the national polity. Where such negatives are mentioned, they are justified as being n reactions to settler Liberians' oppression. This reviewer believes that such oversimplifications, which can become perfect tools for demagogues and propagandists, could have led this generation of Liberians to discount the enormous sacrifices made by generations past (both native and settlers) to foster a Liberian nationality. Who knows if the senseless and wanton destruction of the present civil war has not been a result of this blind xenophobia toward and against the settlers and their descendants?

While the excesses of over 100 years of the True Whig Party's rule should not be overlooked, in the same sense, it would be absurd to disregard

the negative role some native Liberians have played in thwarting the efforts of nation-building, especially the repression perpetrated under the rule of the PRC and Samuel K. Doe, however short their reign. After all, as the cliché goes, "Two wrongs do not a right make." Therefore, it would do our posterity good if we who aspire to write about the historical events of our country with the aim supposedly of educating future generations about the pitfalls of the past that we undertake this task in a most objective and balanced manner.

Conclusion

Besides the weakness in the sociopolitical analysis, I highly recommend the book as a chronological reader of events leading to the present civil conflict, much in the tradition of its predecessors: Bill Frank's *Enoanyi's Behold Uncle Sam's Stepchild: Notes on the Fall of Liberia, Africa's Oldest Republic* (1991), G. Henry Andrews' *Cry, Liberia Cry* (1993), and James Youboty's *Liberian Civil War: A Graphic Account* (1993).

The authors should be highly commended for adding a book to the scarce fountain of knowledge about events in Liberia. They should also be highly commended for undertaking such a worthwhile task. All Liberians and friends of Liberia should make it their business to find these books and to read them. Therefore, while this review may sound a bit critical of the authors' efforts, it is not meant to discourage others who may want to venture into the often formidable field of writing, whether it be fiction or nonfiction. For all such works add, cumulatively, to our overall knowledge as a people and a nation.

Momo K. Rogers, Sr.
Kpazolu Media Enterprises

McDaniel, Antonio. *Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: The Morality of Colonizing Liberia in the Nineteenth Century.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 191 pages.

Antonio McDaniel's book is a significant contribution to a current trend in historical research, where narratives of the past have been subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis. These studies have presented a rich body of literature especially in economics and demography. Economic historians have used this methodology to thoroughly analyze the content of political, religious or social history under the guise of what is now known as "the new economic history" or cliometrics. Cliometrics derive from *clio*, a muse of history, and *metrics*, a standard of measurement. This methodology, while intended to adduce scientific and unbiased treatises of history, has been vigorously criticized by those who believe that the concentration of measurements and empiricism has subjugated the character and content of explanations of the past. Two proponents of cliometric studies, Robert Fogel and Alfred North, received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1993 for their work to integrate this methodology in an analysis of American economic history.

McDaniel, a sociologist and demographer currently at the Population Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania, uses this approach to study the mortality cost of colonizing Liberia in the 1800s. The book's title is gleaned from the Negro spiritual, "Swing Low, Sweet Chariot," which exemplified the yearning of enslaved Africans in America to return home in a chariot that swings from the skies.

The author specifically evaluates the role of the disease and mortality factors that differentiate the composition and survival of migrating populations (page 3). He uses three themes as focal points in this study:

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- (a). the liberation of an enslaved African population in America;
- (b). the epidemiological encounter faced by repatriated former slaves in an African environment and;
- (c). A rigorous analysis of the application of epidemiological framework to study the morality of migrants

Written in seven chapters, the book provides a general review of population dispersion across Africa in Chapter 1.

Here, McDaniel

establishes the relationship among migration, the level of communication and disease environments. He shows, for example, how communication between ancient African kingdoms and Europeans and Arab slave traders, on the one hand, and African colonialism by Europeans on the other hand, affected the complexity of African disease environments. Such communication and contacts undermined the equilibrium that existed in Africa's diseased environments. "The foreigners brought their diseases with them and took some African diseases home," (page 15). An example that incorporates this thinking relates to the near annihilation of the Native American population by European settlers who brought with them diseases to which the population had no immunity.

The foreigners brought their diseases with them and took some African diseases home (page 15).

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the repatriation of ex-slaves to Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively.

Chapters 4 and 5 relay the mortality of the Liberian immigrant population using standard statistical processes to estimate life tables for Liberian immigrants between 1820 and 1843. For example, McDaniel

calculates that within the age interval of 25-29, the general probability of an immigrant dying was .28; the death rate among this age interval was .06. However, conditioned on survival of the calendar year of arrival, this probability and death rate decreases to .21 and .05, respectively. His calculation of the Liberian immigrant life table corresponds to general patterns of similar models; explanations for deviations in the shape of these curves are provided in a detailed appendix. His calculations in these chapters were used to debunk a hypothesis (ive debilitation) that "immigrants suffered greater health problems the longer they resided in Liberia." On the contrary, life table observations suggested that the repatriated slaves acquired immunities to the disease environments of their new settlement.

Chapter 6 is a comparison of Liberian immigrant mortality to that of African Americans in the United States, Trinidad and Jamaica, the British military and those aboard ships. Again, using life tables, McDaniel finds that the mortality rates in Liberia between 1820 and 1843 were substantially higher than those of the enslaved population of Trinidad between 1813 and 1816 and the Jamaican slaves between 1817 and 1820, in spite of the high mortality rates that were

recorded for slaves in Jamaica and Trinidad when compared to American southern plantations. This high mortality cost of immigration to Liberia also rejected a widely

held theory about the immunological superiority of Africans in tropical environments. With respect to the comparisons between Liberian immigrants and Africans serving in the British military in Sierra Leone between 1817 and 1836, Liberian immigrants were twice more likely to die of fevers than the native born (Sierra Leoneans). Ecological and cultural differences between the immigrants and his new host environment are given as the

The book is easy to understand and represents another addition to the social science literature on Liberia.

reasons. "The greater the difference in ecological conditions, the greater the exposure to new diseases . . . and because they are not aware of the social practices that may help them to avoid and/or treat certain illness," (p 133).

The seventh chapter is a two-page epilogue that reveals the relationship between migration of a population and variables that affect health and mortality. The epilogue presents characteristics that are reminiscent of cliometric studies: an analysis of a question that is seemingly obvious to the casual observer. However, McDaniel's attempt, like other quantitative analysts of social events, is to take the obvious to another level of abstraction and respond to the question, "to what extent did this phenomenon impact the structure and performance of the society?" Such an analysis cannot be undertaken without a deference to rigorous empirical analysis. The author has responded to this challenge, using standard statistical methods of analysis. He is careful to maintain a balance between narrative and empiricism, leaving most of the technical details to an appendix. This makes it possible for anyone with an elementary exposure to demography or statistics to follow the relevance of the author's arguments.

In a few instances, though, the criticism against cliometric methods is evident. For example, in his comparison of mortality rates between Liberia and the Caribbean nations of Jamaica and Trinidad, the author presents the results of a calculation of the differences in mortality rates but does not delve into the details or hypotheses that explain this result, even given his selection of very different periods of comparison.

The book is easy to understand and represents another addition to the social science literature on Liberia. It is a good supplement to a Black Studies, African Studies, history or demographic methodology course.

Alfred B. Konuwa
California State University-- Chico
and Butte College.

Forsythe, David P. *Human Rights and Peace: International and National*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. 206 pages, bibliography and index. Price: \$13.95.

The central focus of the book is the linkage between the respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace. This concern permeates the six chapters of the book. In the first three chapters, Professor Forsythe addresses the theoretical issues regarding the human rights-war/peace linkage, and seeks to develop a broad theoretical framework for analyzing the problematique. Chapters 4-6 are case studies on civil conflicts in Sri Lanka, Liberia and Romania. The final chapter is a summary of the major issues and offers reflections on the human rights-peace problematique.

Professor Forsythe attributes the causes of the civil conflicts in Sri Lanka, Liberia and Romania to a synergy of ethnicity (particularly the Sri Lankan and Liberian cases) and elite pathologies. Specifically, in the Liberian case, he argues that the civil war which started in 1989 was precipitated by the excesses of settler or Americo-Liberian hegemony (1821-1980). And Krahn hegemony (1980-1990). In other words, he posits that throughout Liberia's history there have been two hegemonic ethnic groups, and these groups have monopolized the levers of political and economic power to the exclusion of the other ethnic groups. Also, within this tapestry of ethnic hegemony, the elites, especially the presidents of Liberia-- mainly Tubman, Tolbert and Doe-- who hailed from the dominant ethnic groups, engaged in corruption and the mismanagement of societal resources, and violated the human rights of the Liberian people. Interestingly, the author attributes settler hegemony in Liberia to a confluence of factors:

- 1). ethnic divisions among the indigenous groups;
- 2). the high rate of illiteracy;

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- 3). State repression; and
- 4). external support from the United States and some European powers.

Correspondingly, he maintains that the historical-ideological source of legitimacy was the central precept that the settler class

comprised the legitimate rulers of Liberia; and this historical-ideological source of legitimacy was shared by the settler and the indigenes (p. 16).

The book's major strength (includes) its efforts to provide a theoretical context.

Overall, the book addresses a very important problematique that is central to the process of democratization and peace, both within and among states. The book's major strengths are: 1).

Its efforts to provide a theoretical context; and 2) The excellent employment of the historical evolution of the three cases as the crucible for examining the taproots of their respective civil conflicts.

One major weakness, particularly for the Liberian case, is that the author treats ethnic groups as monoliths, undifferentiated by class and other cleavages.

On the other hand, the major weaknesses particularly for the Liberian case are the following:

- 1). The author treats ethnic groups as monoliths, undifferentiated by class and other cleavages;

- 2). he fails to address the central role of Liberia's peripheral capitalist mode of production and its class system in nurturing the seeds of the civil war
- 3). he does not fully assess the state of human rights during Liberia's civil war.

The book represents a good effort to address a salient issue. Certainly, it is a pioneering effort that should stimulate interest and further research. This is very critical, given the prevalence of civil conflicts in the international system. Clearly, the efforts to resolve these conflicts must include the development of a human rights architecture both at the global and domestic levels because the protection of fundamental human rights-- political and economic-- is epicentral to the maintenance of global and civil peace and prosperity.

George Klay Kieh, Jr.
Morehouse College.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS AND THESES

Chinchen, Delbert Clifford. "The Patron-Client Relationship Concept: A Case Study From the African Bible Colleges in Liberia and Malawi." Ed.D. diss. Biola University, School of Intercultural Studies, 1994, 277 pages. *DAI-A* 55/11, p. 3550, May 1995.

Dahn, Marcus S.G. "Developing A Conceptual and Operational Model of the United States' Community/technical College System for Liberia's Educational Structure." Ph.D. diss. Ohio University., 1994, 290 pages. *DAI-A* 56/03, p. 836, Sept. 1995.

Kilroy, David Peter. "Extending The American Sphere to West Africa: Dollar Diplomacy in Liberia, 1908-1926. (Africa). Ph.D. diss. University of Iowa, 1995. 463 pages. *DAI-A* 56/06, p. 2383, Dec. 1995.

Marshall, Rachel Johnson. "An Exploration of Literacy, Learning and Instruction in Seventh-Grades in Selected Schools in Liberia Under Conditions of Strife." Ed.D. diss. Indiana University, 1994. 150 pages. *DAI-A* 56/04, p. 1276, Oct. 1995.

Padmore, George Arthur. *The Memoirs of A Liberian Ambassador*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996.

Wonkeryor, Edward Lama. "The Effects of United States' Political Communication and the Liberian Experience (1960-1990): An Afrocentric Analysis." Ph. D. diss. Temple University, 1995. 190 pages. *DAI-A* 56/04, p. 1171, Oct 1995.

Wreh, James Christopher Monday, I. "Economic Analysis and Policy Implications of the Rice Market With Two Substitutes (Cassava and Potato) in Liberia (Pricing Policy)." Ph.D. diss. Utah State University, 1993. 103 pages. *DAI-A* 54/08, p. 3140, Feb. 1994.

**Minutes, 28th Annual Liberian Studies Association Meeting
March 20-23, 1996; Southern University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana**

The Business Meeting of the 28th Annual Conference of the Liberian Studies Association, hosted by the Center for International Development Programs of Southern University and A&M College, was convened at the Hilton Hotel on March 23, 1996 at 11:45 a.m. by Arnold Odio, Secretary-Treasurer of the Association. Those present included: Dr. Arnold Odio, Dr. William Allen, Dr. Boikai Twe, Dr. Walter Wiles, Dr. Alpha Bah, Dr. David Hartsfield, Dr. D. Elwood Dunn, Dr. James Dennis, Dr. Joseph Holloway, Ms. Doris Railey, Mrs. Elaine Wolo, Mr. Timothy A. Rainey, Dr. Mario Bick, Dr. Ciatta Diana Coleman, Dr. Yekutieli Gershoni and Mrs. Ruth Gershoni, Dr. Albert and Mrs. (Ngawa) White, Mr. T. Max Davis, II, Mr. Jeff Bates, Mr. Kenneth Best, Prof. Massala Reffell, Dr. Augustine Konneh, Dr. Momo Rogers, Dr. Adetokunbo Borishade, Mr. Vito Weeks, Cllr. Margaret Deconte Brumskine, Dr. Alton B. Johnson and Dr. Roland C. Massaquoi.

Dr. Odio read the minutes of the 27th Annual Liberian Studies Conference held in Dayton, Ohio, in April 1995 at Sinclair Community College, and hosted by Dr. Boikai Twe. Dr. Alpha Bah moved that the minutes be adopted as read. The motion was seconded by Dr. D. Elwood Dunn. Dr. Odio noted the current composition of the Executive Board: Dr. Walter Wiles, President; Dr. Arnold Odio, Secretary-Treasurer; Dr. William Allen, Editor of the *Liberian Studies Journal*; Ms. Doris Railey, member-at-large, and Dr. Peter Severeid, whose position ends this year. Dr. Odio said that there was a need to have an election to fill Dr. Severeid's seat.

Dr. Odio then turned the meeting over to Dr. Twe for the discussion of old business:

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Book Committee

Dr. **Two** asked for a report from the Chair of the Book Committee, Prof. **David Hartsfield**. Prof. **Hartsfield** noted that one shipment of books had already been sent from Dayton, Ohio, and one locker space is still available for another planned shipment. He said storage and transportation are the biggest costs in this project. The Book Committee feels that the current priority should be the list of priority books provided by the University of Liberia. Dr. **Two** explained that he had gone to Liberia and obtained the list from the Chief Librarian at the UL for the replacement of books destroyed during the war. Prof. **Hartsfield** handed out a list of these books, urging everyone to contribute any they can, but Dr. **Alpha Bah** cautioned that most of the books were in the reference section at the UL library, and are out of print. UL is also interested in receiving any liberal arts books, general textbooks on Liberia, and scholarly journals. Back issues of newspapers should not be sent. Prof. **Hartsfield** said that the regional selection of Book Committee members is intended to broaden the search for appropriate books. Dr. **Allen** urged the need to oversee the books collected. He said that members should be informed about those titles that have already been obtained to avoid duplication of efforts. He further suggested that if the committee is willing to contact publishers and get prices for books wanted, LSA members might contribute money to the committee to purchase some of these books. Dr. **Dunn** suggested, and Dr. **Bah** moved, that this effort should be broadened to include Cuttington University College's list of book priorities as well. The motion was seconded by Dr. **Allen** and passed. Dr. **Two** thanked the Book Committee for its efforts.

Membership Committee

Dr. **Two** asked Ms. **Doris Railey**, Chair of the Membership Committee, for a report. Ms. **Railey** reminded members that the Association had delegated her committee to investigate whether or not to

increase membership dues, and to select a logo for the Association. After reviewing the current dues for various categories of members, the committee recommended increasing the annual membership dues as follows:

Category	Current Rate	Proposed Increase
Individual Professional	30.00	40.00
Institution /Organization	45.00	50.00
Student	15.00	20.00

In the discussion that followed, Dr. **Mario Bick** questioned the idea of increasing the institutional subscription rate. He said he feared that small colleges may stop their subscriptions, thus reducing both subscriptions and circulation of the *Liberian Studies Journal*. Dr. **Bah** agreed, arguing that most of the members in the LSA whose students would benefit from the availability of the *Journal* are teaching at smaller schools. Dr. **Odio** responded that he favored the increase in institutional rates, since there are very few institutional subscribers, of which the great majority are major research universities. Moreover, he said this *Journal*, like others, may soon go on-line. Dr. **Konneh** suggested a compromise: to raise institutional membership but give a break to small institutions. Dr. **Ciatta Coleman** supported increasing the rates. After more discussion, and Ms. **Railey** urging the need to generate more income, since the cost of producing the *Journal* has increased by an additional \$400-500 per issue, Dr. **Bick** moved that membership rates be changed to:

Individual: \$40; Institutional \$50; Student \$15.

The motion was seconded by Ms. **Railey**. It passed by a vote of 14-2. The new rates will go into effect as of 1997. Pending rate changes will be published in the next issue of the *LSJ*. Ms. **Railey** then presented various potential logos for the letterhead of the Association. One was the image of a book superimposed upon the map of Liberia; another was a single open book, and a third option was a stack of books. Dr. **Dunn** supported the use

of books, saying that they symbolize the Liberian Studies Association's commitment to learning and scholarship. Mr. **Kenneth Best** added that books are a symbol of knowledge, and of the Liberian Studies Association's commitment to preserving and restoring knowledge and learning to war-torn Liberia. This was supported by Dr. **Adetokunbo Borishade**. Dr. **Bah** proposed that the appropriate symbol would be a palaver hut, which would emphasize the traditional African production of knowledge, but Dr. **Konneh** responded that the palava hut symbolizes the settling of disputes, rather than the commitment to scholarship. Ms. **Railey** then moved that the logo of the book superimposed upon the map of Liberia, with the addition of the inscription "Founded in 1968" be adopted as the LSA's official logo. The motion was carried by a vote of 16 to two. Dr. **Twe** thanked the Chair of the Membership Committee for her report.

Brochure

Ms. **Railey** circulated the draft of a membership brochure designed to explain LSA's activities and to provide information for current and perspective members.

Budget

Dr. **Twe** asked Dr. **Odio** for a report on the budget. Dr. **Odio** presented the budget. He noted that 1995 income-- \$8774 from membership dues, *Journal* sales and conference registration for the Dayton conference--exceeded expenditures-- \$7,522-- for costs of publishing the *Journal*, \$1,473 for Office supplies and storage. Added to the previous balance of \$2,019, the current balance as of February 1996 was \$3,492. But printing costs for the LSJ Volume XXI:1 must still be deducted from this figure.

Dr. **Odio** then provided further details on expenditures. He noted first that the LSA still has not acquired tax exempt status, due to the fact that Dr. **Peter Severeid** who was in charge of this issue is in Japan, and the lawyer

working on it is doing *pro bono* work. Expenditures include 91 comp issues of the *LSJ* given out at the discretion of the editor to potential new individual members, institutions, and major research centers. Storage charges are for back issues of the *LSJ*, some of which are stored in a U-Haul facility in Illinois. Editorial costs show an increase with the shift of the editorship away from the University of the South, which provided free help and office supplies. Individual issues of the *Journal* may also vary in printing costs, which are determined by the number of pages.

Dr. **Tw**e then asked for discussion of the budget. Dr. **Odio** further clarified that there are several volumes of the *LSJ* in storage in Bloomington, Eastern Illinois, where they have been since Dr. **Thomas Hendrix** (RIP) took over as Secretary-Treasurer from Dr. **Svend Holsoe**. These take up roughly the space of a single car garage. The most recent issues, beginning with Volume XIX, are stored in Dr. **Odio's** office in Albany, Georgia. It was proposed that some of these back issues should be sent to Liberia, but Dr. **Dunn** cautioned that it is crucial to keep some of them in the U.S., since both people and institutions are often interested in obtaining back issues. It is important to get them out of paid storage, but Dr. **Odio** said this has proven to be a difficult task because he just has not found the time to travel to the storage facility in Illinois. Dr. **Odio** noted, however, that yearly storage cost for the *Journal* is relatively small (\$335.00 in 1995) which constitutes only 4% of the total budget expenditures. Dr. **Bah** observed that getting them out of storage is advisable, since right now it is difficult to get back issues of the *Journal* because they are stored so far away from the S -T . Dr. **Tw**e offered to look into the matter of storage. He also charged the next president of the Liberian Studies Association, Dr. **Walter Wiles**, with this task. Dr. **Allen** suggested that the Association should express its thanks to Dr. **Severeid** for his assistance and efforts to obtain tax exemption and for his contribution of \$200 for legal fees to **Erwin C. Surrency, Esq.**, for his *pro bono* work. The members approved this suggestion.

The Liberian Studies Journal

Dr. **Two** then asked for a report on the *Liberian Studies Journal* from the Editor, Dr. **William Allen**. Dr. **Allen** extended thanks for his long and skillful editorship to Dr. **Dunn**, the editorial workers who helped him, and to the University of the South for their support.

Dr. **Allen** reported that despite the inevitable complications of a change in editorship and venue, the new editors had produced their first issue of the *LSJ* only 60 days late. He said that following a mandate handed down at the Dayton meeting, he had recommended to the Editorial Advisory Board, and they had approved, the addition of five new members to the Board-- Dr. **Alpha Bah**, Dr. **D. Elwood Dunn**, Dr. **Romeo Phillips**, Dr. **Momo Rogers**, and Dr. **Yekutieli Gershoni**.

Dr. **Allen** explained that he was now teaching at the University of South Carolina in Spartanburg, and that at the time of his interview, he had informed the University of South Carolina officials that his editorship would bring the *Journal* to the South Carolina campus. The next issue is planned for June-July, 1996

Dr. **Allen** urged that papers presented at the meetings be submitted as soon as possible to the *Journal* for consideration for publication, since this is the main source of articles for the *Journal*.

At this point in the meeting, Dr. **Diana Brown** left, and Professor. **Elaine Armour Wolo** of Tulane University was asked to help take the minutes.

New Business

Dr. **Two** announced that it was time to move to new business:

1. Election of president, Liberian Studies Association
2. Election of a new board member to replace **Peter Severeid**.

Dr. Alpha Bah nominated **Dr. Walter Wiles** to be the next president of LSA. **Dr. Momo K. Rogers** seconded the nomination. **Dr. Wiles** was elected by acclamation. In an LSA tradition, **Dr. Twe** initiated **Dr. Wiles** by placing a hand on **Dr. Wiles'** head, tapping him three times, and stating that it was a pleasure to turn over the leadership to **Dr. Wiles** who had worked so hard to assist in the planning of an effective 1996 conference.

In remarks to the group, **Dr. Wiles** thanked the Association for his election and stated that his major effort would be toward strengthening the organization. He said that every member should strive to make a difference; that the Board of Directors should meet once before the annual meeting to plan strategies for success. Further, he challenged each member to be a financial member, follow up items in the minutes and work to keep the professional organization apolitical. Finally, he challenged each member to encourage at least two other persons to join the LSA; and, encourage other professionals outside the humanities/social sciences to contribute to conferences and to the *LSA Journal*.

Dr. Odio announced an election to elect one person to the Board. Nominations were: Counselor **M. Deconte Brumskine** and **Dr. Ciatta Coleman**. **Dr. Coleman** received seven votes; Counselor **Brumskine**, nine votes. **Clr. Brumskine** was declared the winner by a simple majority.

Site for 29th LSA Conference

Dr. Odio led a discussion of the site for the 29th annual meeting. Suggested sites were: , Michigan; Atlanta, GA; Prairie View, TX. The consensus was that the Board of Directors follows up the suggestions and make the determination. **Dr. Bah** offered the College of Charleston where he teaches, if all other sites are unavailable.

Since the site for the next meeting was not determined, the question of the election of a vice president was tabled. Dr. **Bah** suggested, and the group accepted, by consensus, that the Board of Directors names the vice president once the site is selected. In keeping with this agreement, Dr. **Allen** stated a resolution, which was also accepted by consensus. Dr. **Odio** reminded the group that the sitting president is responsible for finding the next site-- that Dr. **Wiles** is to assure a site for the next meeting.

There was a suggestion that the LSA set up a committee to develop a communique to present to visiting officials of the Government of Liberia based on the deliberations at the 28th annual meeting. A committee comprising Dr. **William Allen**, Mr. **Kenneth Best** and Dr. **Momo K. Rogers** was set up. Instead of presenting a communique, the committee requested clarification of the task. Upon reading Article I, Section 2, of the LSA Bylaws, it became clear that LSA had to maintain the non-political stance of the organization, meaning that the LSA could not present any statement of a political nature. Hence, no communique was drafted.

Dr. **Wiles** asked if the editors had solicited and received submissions from the natural sciences and agriculture. Drs. **Dunn**, former Editor, *LSJ*, and **Allen**, current Editor, assured the group that all areas of knowledge can contribute to the *Journal*. Dr. **Allen** said that subsequent editions of the *Journal* will include a statement inviting all persons to submit articles.

Dr. **Wiles** requested a motion to adjourn. He expressed thanks and appreciation to Dr. **Gloria Braxton** and the Center for International Development Programs at Southern University for their help in putting the conference together. Dr. **Twe** requested special permission to extend thanks and appreciation to Southern University, the City of Baton Rouge, the people of Baton Rouge, and the Head of Government, State of Louisiana, for the gracious way the LSA was received in the city and state. Dr. **Twe** reiterated that special thanks should be given to Dr. **Gloria Braxton** and Dr. **Walter Wiles** for their work in organizing the 1996 conference.

By co following a suggestion by Dr. **Momo Rogers**, the group suggested that Dr. **Twe's** last act as outgoing president should be writing thank-you notes from the Board of Directors of the Liberian Studies Association to all organizations and entities mentioned above. Dr. **Twe** accepted the responsibility and promised to respond accordingly.

Dr. **Wiles** requested a motion to close the meeting. Dr. **Twe** moved for adjournment with Dr. **Odio** seconding. The meeting adjourned.

Diana Brown

Elaine Armour Wolo

Respectfully Submitted,

Arnold Odio, Secretary-Treasurer, LSA

29th Annual Liberian Studies Association Conference

Prairie View A&M University
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Looking forward to seeing you in Prairie View.

**Liberia As She Is and the Present Duty of Her Citizens
The Annual Address Before the Common Council and Citizens of
Monrovia, Liberia-- July 27, 1857**

Being the Celebration of the National Independence

By Edward W. Blyden

Friends and Fellow Citizens:

It has been, I believe, customary on occasions like the present for speakers to make the prosperity of the country, its independence, its liberties, themes of discourse. This, in its time and place, is of course proper. And such themes might perhaps, accord even with the present occasion, where we not in the midst of times unlike any preceding times --as many of the oldest testify-- in points of scarcity and distress. But in view of existing state of things, when hunger like an armed man is invading the homes of many in our land, you will pardon me for departing from the usual style of addresses, and allow me to make the theme of my discourse, "LIBERIA AS SHE IS: AND THE PRESENT DUTY OF HER CITIZENS."

While this day reminds us of independence declared, it should also remind us of responsibilities assumed. It should be a day not of senseless mirth and irrational reveling, but such joy and gratulation as consist with sober thoughtfulness and serious reflections. And anything that leads the people to think, to read, to examine, to act for themselves is in place. It is important in an infant country like ours that the people should think: for wherever there is thinking there is hope of improvement.

Liberia occupies a two-fold relation of the deepest interest: First, to

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the aboriginal inhabitants around her; and, Secondly, to the descendants of Africa in American thralldom. Each of these relations involves corresponding responsibilities and duties. By the first, we are placed under the obligation to do all we can by *effort* and by *example* to rescue the heathen around us from their moral debasement. No matter what may have been the immediate causes, which induced our fathers to leave the Western world, brave those perils of the oceans, encounter the dangers of a noxious climate and a savage foe: every Christian and truly philosophic mind cannot but look through the extended chain of causation to the contemplation of the Great First Cause, who sees the end from the beginning, and whose counsels and plans were known unto Himself from the foundation of the world. It was He who brought us to these shores and planted us here, and not without design. And in view of the various unfavorable circumstances, which, for centuries, have surrounded this continent, it may not be an erroneous interpretation of the designs of Providence to say, that He brought us hither that we might be instrumental in recovering from the degradation of heathenism the thousands of our brethren that roam this spiritual desert. And for the omission of no other duty, do I conceive that we shall be held more fearfully accountable, both as a nation and as individuals than for neglect in this respect.

By the second relation, it is incumbent upon us to exert ourselves to the utmost to hasten the disenthralment and elevation of our exiled brethren. We are doubtless the forerunners of the powerful exodus-- we are the pioneers of a large empire. Only a very small portion of the thousand and hundreds of thousands who have been carried into captivity have returned. A large majority are yet in slavery; yet in oppression; yet burdened by those influences which crush the souls of men; and it is imposed upon us by the relation we sustain to them to achieve in Liberia a true independence and a name: and to strive to exert an influence among the nations of the earth, by which they, in their unpleasant exile, may be wholesomely affected. It was the opinion of an ancient philosopher that if he had a fulcrum for his lever he could move the world. The imaginings of the philosopher are realized in

Liberia. Here, for the African race is the fulcrum of Archimedes. Here we have an opportunity that we have no where else, of compelling the world to an audience. Standing upon the soil of freedom, in the land of our forefathers, and employing the powerful lever furnished by the combination of Religion, Literature, Sciences and the Arts, we have a fulcrum and a lever wherewith we can move the whole world in behalf of our race.

The question may now arise: Are we availing ourselves of the means within our reach, for the faithful and efficient discharge of the duties involved in our peculiar relations? Are we doing any thing to sustain ly [sic] our responsibilities? If we are, what are we doing? We hold a trust of great and solemn significance. We hold it on the borders of a moral and physical wilderness. We hold it in the sight of millions of our benighted and suffering kindred, whom our example and our destiny must affect for good or for evil. Now, in all seriousness, what are we doing toward the discharge of the duties of this solemn trust: What are we, Liberians doing? The answer is obvious. Very little. And from present indications we shall do less, unless there be a radical change in the whole system of Liberian life and manners.

The present signs of Liberia's future are by no means encouraging. For several months past, the thinking portion of the community has been enquiring and enquiring into the causes of the present ominous state of things, and very recently public meetings have been held, at which discussions bearing upon the same subject have been engaged in. Various minds of course take various views of the matter, and attribute the state of things to various causes. Some refer it to improvidence and financial in Executive and Legislative officers; others, to freedom of trade granted to foreigners on the coast by our laws and treaty stipulations; which subjects our merchants or traders to an unequal and injurious competition with foreign capitalists? And others, to the indifferences of our people to the cultivation of the soil, and their unmanly dependence upon foreigners.

So far as I can ascertain, it does not appear that our people have been, for the last few years, less engaged in agricultural operations than heretofore; off the contrary, I think that the interest in agriculture has increased, and the number of farmers has also been augmented. And even if the present scarcity in our borders should appear to have resulted from the indolence and indifference of our people that would not account for the general famine among the natives, for miles around us. It seems that not only have the sources of supplies within our own midst failed, but sources beyond us for hundreds of miles; so that, humanly speaking, our present distress was inevitable. Hence, in all seriousness and soberness, we should look more carefully-- a little more deeply than the surface of things-- for the causes-- they are not merely physical, not merely financial, commercial or agricultural-- they are moral causes.

And it becomes us as a Christian community, devoutly to recognize the hands of the Supreme Ruler, in our present distress. In the prosecution of His designs, the Divine Being employs second causes; but let us not in the discussion of second causes, lose sight of the Great First Cause; of Him who has all carefully guarded and protected us; but who now, for our misdoings, has specially visited us. Let us harken unto the rod, and profit thereby,

But what are the misdoings which may be regarded as those of which Providence in the present dispensation designs to remind us: This is not an easy question. It belongs to that class of questions which may be viewed through so many different media or under so many aspects, that any particular answer may not be free from objections. It is a settled principle in nature as in morals that "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." In nature, a uniform experience has rendered this a self-evident truth. But in morals, in consequences of the various results which we see attend the actions or conduct of men, we cannot lay down any general rule by which to determine, at all times, the ultimate results, so far at least as this world is concerned, of any particular course of conduct. The man of immoral habitudes is often the man of prosperity, of affluence, of outward happiness;

while the upright and virtuous is so often the subject of grievous temporal calamities. So when any, distress by fire, tempest, or any other of that class of evils befalls an individual, we cannot, without danger of presumption, point to any particular sin for which such calamity is a visitation. Yet there is oftentimes so obvious a connection between the sin and the punishment that a moment's reflection is sufficient for the discovery of the relation. As for instance, when the slave trader, the rumseller, the gambler, is reduced to poverty; when the habitual d or the licentious man falls a victim to the most fearful diseases, often we instinctively recognize the sin which induced the calamity; and in the case of nations, there are retributive evils which are easily traced to their cause.

What then, we recur to the question, are the moral causes of the present evils in Liberia: Before answering this important question, I would invite the serious deliberate attention of the portion of this audience, hoping that such will give the facts which may be stated, and the arguments adduced, an impartial consideration-- and attach to them the importance they shall be found to deserve, after candid examination.

The first of the causes that I shall mention is the fact that as a people *we have been in too much haste to be rich*. Relinquishing the pursuit of those attributes that would fit us for the faithful discharge of our peculiar duties as men, as Liberians, as an infant nation-- we have used every possible measure to our importance; and in our precipitate efforts at wealth we have not been careful as to what means we have employed. The desire to be rich, or to *appear* rich, pervades all classes. The love of money-- the root of all evil, has grown upon us to such a degree that all other avenues of distinction seem but trifling in comparison to those which lead to the acquisition of money.

To be rich seems with many the "chief end of man." Hence no talents, no endowment of the mind-- no skill or knowledge, no amount of education is appreciated only so far as it will pay. *Cui bono?* is the question with

reference to every pursuit. And it cannot be disguised that had we been left to ourselves; had not foreign genius and learning and piety been sent among us to elevate our standard of education, shape our civilization, and stimulate our piety, we should have fallen into barbarism. And even now that foreign influence is among us, the disposition of turning every thing to pecuniary benefit is seen even among those lads in our schools who are kept hard at their Latin, Greek and Algebra. There is ever and anon [sic] a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the discouragingly slow method of amassing a fortune. This fact has operated greatly in retarding the literary progress of our youth. Alas: the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on the edge.

As a consequence of this absorbing desire for riches, I cannot say how often we have departed from strict uprightness in our transactions: but I do affirm that I regard the present state of things, as a retributive visitation of Providence for our delinquencies in this matter. This to my mind is an obvious moral cause of the pecuniary stringency of the times-- of this general monetary embarrassment-- affecting not only the husbandman, the merchant, the artisan, but threatening the whole nation with fatal pecuniary catastrophe.

Another cause of this adversity may be seen in the unjustifiable extravagances in which we indulge; in that luxury of expenditure for houses, for dress, for furniture, for food, constantly made the subject of reprehensive remark by thinking foreigners. We are in a fearful error with regard to our country, if we suppose we are truly prosperous. Our prosperity is not real; it is false; it is fictitious. The prosperity of a nation is real when the springs of that prosperity are contained within itself, in the hands of its citizens; when it depends for its existence upon its own resources; when it is independent. But this is not the case in Liberia. We are as a nation upheld by foreigners. We are entirely dependent upon foreigners for schools, for churches, for preachers, for teachers. Most of the talent of the country is in the employ and at the control of foreigners. Those thus employed must ever

hold their talents and their efforts subservient, not to what they conceive to be the interest of their country, but to the desires and directions of their foreign employers. And their employers, the missionary boards, losing sight of the fact that they are operating, not on purely heathen ground, but in a Sovereign State; and that they are employing men who owe allegiance and service to that state, require them to hold themselves free from all civil relations: or thing however, of which the prudence and feasibility are doubted by some.¹ But this is not the place to discuss this point. What we wish to bring before our minds today is the humiliating fact that nearly off the talent of Liberia-- talent not in ordinary men-- but in our principal men-- is supported by foreign means, and controlled by foreign influence. And yet, in the fact of these humbling realities, we boast of our civilization-- of our prosperity-- of our independence, and indulge in unjustifiable extravagance. Where is our prosperity? -- Where is our independence? Where?

But there are some who are not in foreign employ-- some who, as I have learned, would never yield allegiance to foreigners, because they could live with such allegiance. But these are not free from censure; for, uniting those who are in immediate dependency upon foreigners, they have introduced from Europe and America, countries centuries in advance of us, a style of living and habits of expenditure ill-suited to our present conditions. Intelligent and reflecting foreigners, no matter how they smile over our luxuries, and flatter our vanity, in our presence, in their private intercourse with each other, either pity our folly or ridicule our pretensions.

Our style of living in respect to our houses, furniture, dress, eating and drinking is entirely inconsistent with the circumstances of the country. The money lavished upon houses, which add nothing of health and comfort, upon dress which does not increase the dignity or beauty of personal appearance; the large sums laid out in expensive furniture, most of which is really superfluous; the great amount consumed in the luxuries of the table, would go a great way in keeping our streets clear of weeds, in felling the dense forest around us, in reclaiming the wilderness, in cultivating the soil, in

civilizing our degraded brethren.

Throughout our whole country there has been no conformity in living to our circumstances-- to our means. We are most of us living beyond our income. And what is the basis of all this prosperity? The answer has been more that anticipated. It is the annual appropriation of benevolent Societies in America. That is all. And has our style of living had no injurious effect upon the morals of the community: Loot at the numbers who, irrespective of character, in order to advance to, or maintain this style of living, flock to the fostering arms and sheltering wings of these Societies. Thus, dishonesty stalks abroad under the semblance of piety; and impiety assumes the appearance of religion for the sake of gain. And not only so; but this extravagant manner of living; these fine houses, and costly furniture are made in the minds of many the standard of respectability. And what is the effect on the minds of youth: They see men of high standing-- men whom it is natural for the young to imitate-- indulging in such and not only indulging in them, but striving after them; hence they, in their simplicity and inexperience, regard them as essentials to respectability. They see their fathers proffering them to the distinction conferred by learning and talents-- by virtuous deportment; and they strive more after those than after anything else. Every thing is made subordinate to the acquisition of fine houses, of fine furniture etc. And the general effect is, that as a people we attach more importance to *display* than to *reality*. There is very little of the substantial about us. And allow me to remark, that this disposition to make a fine show is characteristic of but a low degree of civilization, --it is a mark of the absence of true refinement.

For these things, fellow citizens, do I conceive, are we visited by a righteous Providence; for these things are we chastised. During the scarcity which prevailed in this community, a little prior to the recent arrivals of American vessels, every thinking mind must have remarked how, by a severe discipline, the Judge of all the earth was teaching us 1st our utter and humiliating dependency upon foreigners, 2nd, that we can live on far less of

the luxuries of life than we do, and that, therefore, most of our expenditures are needless.

What, then, is our duty in view of these lessons of Providence, and in view of the evils they are designed to correct? **First.** It is our duty to learn that there are other objects of infinitely greater importance than wealth in our rising country. It was not the design of Providence in bringing us to these shores that we should spend our energies, and prostitute our talents to the attainment of selfish ends. No; No; a higher destiny is ours; our duty and privilege is the laying of the foundation of future empire in Africa. It becomes us then to be a more solid and substantial people. The materials we are gathering for the

superstructure should

be chosen more with regard to than

beauty. We should pay

more attention to the reality than display.

The attainment of

wealth should be

subordinate to the

cultivation of those

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Secondly. It is our duty to view the lessons of Providence to curtail our superfluous expenditures. There should be retrenchment of our expenditures for splendid edifices; less costly being more accordant with our circumstances; retrenchment of our expenditures for the luxuries of the

table. Let our surplus means be more rationally and beneficially expended; let it be vested in the improvement of our country, in the placing of our prosperity upon a sager and more permanent foundation-- in rendering over selves independent, and above all, in advancing the cause of Christianity among our benighted brethren.²

Thirdly. We are taught by the present dispensation of Proficiency that it is our duty to *labor*. We dwell in a country rich in resources, which with little exertion can be called forth in sufficient variety and abundance to render us comfortable and independent. But there is a fatal lack of productive industry among us. In our eagerness to be rich we have availed ourselves of the means which we supposed would more speedily secure to us that and, without reference to the general influence of such means upon our country. The commerce of the country has always been in such articles as our citizens have had no part in producing; hence we acquire wealth from this source without helping to create it. Our skill and ingenuity are not called forth. We purchase the palm oil and camwood and ivory from the natives, giving them in exchange articles of foreign production. We receive the product of their industry, and give them in return the product not of our own industry but of the industry of foreigners. Now, in such trafficking as this where in is the country actually benefitted? Remember, fellow citizens, that no merchant, no matter how affluent, or how varied the channels of his trade, can be regarded as a benefactor of his country, unless he has, by his own industry, or by encouraging the industry of others, *created* his wealth; unless he has developed the productive powers of his country. For then he has placed the prosperity of his country upon an enduring basis. But this cannot be affirmed for us. The prosperity arising from our commerce, is almost as evanescent as that based on the missionary appropriations. Foreigners on the one hand, and the natives on the other, are our supporters.

Such, fellow citizens, is Liberia. Not Liberia as libeled and maligned and traduced by her foes, but Liberia as she presents herself to the minds of the thinking portion among her citizens. And knowing the hardships and

adversity which our fathers endured, the self-denial they exercised in order to secure to their children and those who should come after them from the land of bondage, freedom and independence, we cannot believe that they could rejoice were they cognizant of the true condition of Liberia. Ye spirits of the illustrious dead, ye fathers of Liberia, ye who suffered and bled and died in order to transmit to us liberty and independence, can you repose in deep tranquility when you behold your beloved Liberia? Oh, I fancy that if, clothing themselves once more in tenements of clay, they could visit us, their exhortation to us would be, "Be men, Be heroes."

Shall we, then, content ourselves with such a state of things and still claim to be independent? No: the nobler impulses of our nature, answer No: our sense of consistency

A State of dependency is entirely incongruous with a state of liberty. Liberty and Independence are one and inseparable.

answers, No. No; we must either abandon our state of utter dependency upon foreigners, by creating the means of supplying our own wants, or relinquish our profession of liberty as a nation. A state of dependency is entirely incongruous with a state of liberty. "Liberty and Independence are one and inseparable." This is an important fact for our consideration; and one that should urge us to the laying of good and sure foundations on which to claim in reality and truth, "Liberty and Independence."

No nation has ever permanently prospered, under circumstances similar to ours. Indeed, I hardly think that any independent nation has ever existed in precisely our circumstances. We occupy a nondescript position. And that we should continue in such circumstances is inexcusable. Lift up your eyes and look at the extensive tracts of land of unexampled fertility, which the hand of a beneficent Creator has placed within our reach. Let us betake ourselves to the development of its resources. The soil, the rich and fertile

soil, belongs to us, and invites us to its cultivation. Nothing should be allowed to interfere between us and the soil. In bestowing so much attention upon commerce, we have mistaken the true policy. Nature has granted to Africa no facilities for an extensive commerce. Where are her commodious harbors? Where, her broad and sheltered bays: Where her deep, bold and sweeping rivers: Where her ample lakes: Alas! Where? Nature intends that Africa shall be an agricultural country. She does not intend that the African coast shall be whitened with the natives of the nations; but that, far and wide in this expansive territory, the corn, the coffee, the cotton, the sugar cane, and the innumerable and valuable articles of tropical production shall sing in joyous harvests. Let us then unfetter our hands for toil. Let pride be banished from our midst. Providence points out and leads us in that direction; let us follow. The whole physical creation groans around us to be delivered from the effects of the curse. Labor is no disgrace. It is only slavery that has given us the false idea of labor. Labor is sacred. It is the only power by which greatness and independence are achieved.

“Let us then be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate--
Still achieving-- still pursuing,
Learn to labor and to wait.”

Fourthly. We are taught by the present visitation of Providence that it is our duty to sever some, if not all, of those ties of dependency upon foreigners, which, like the deadly Upas of the east, are shedding their baneful influence upon the energies of our people. This must be done, at some time, if ever we become a truly great and prosperous people. We are struggling on this coast, for a position for our race among other races, properly earned; but we shall never so earn that position at this rate. Liberia is no place for ease and indulgence-- no place for base inactivity and repose. No. It is a theatre of active exertion; it is the scene of a struggle; a race, down-trodden and oppressed, struggles for a name and a place among the nations of the earth. In this struggle, to be unfaithful is criminal; to slumber is dangerous; to cease to act is to die. The time has certainly arrived for the organization

of a just national sentiment in Liberia, -- for the correction of the errors of our people, -- when we should generally be inspired with a determination to perpetuate by our own industry and enterprise our free institutions.

On the subject of severing our ties of dependence upon foreigners, there are, of course, various and conflicting opinions. One class of thinkers on this subject urges our infancy, our weakness, our inferiority; while another class asks, and with propriety too, will Liberia be anything else but an infant so long as she is dandled upon the knee? The former wishes us to have resources in the country before we bring this emergency upon ourselves-- the latter, trusting in our own power, in our innate ability-- and our circumstantial opportunities to create resources-- thinks that the presence of this emergency would call our resources. Of course on this subject, there should be caution-- there should not be precipitateness. Evil of long standing cannot be suddenly uprooted without danger. But it is our duty to eradicate them gradually, and prepare ourselves for the matter in question: and the first step in this preparation is the one already recommended-- Retrenchment-- Self denial. And let us bear in mind, that the question that should determine our course of action in this matter is not whether the American people should, as a matter of propriety and duty, assist us as Africans, as the descendants of those whose labor, and sweat and blood have contributed to the upbuilding of their country; but whether it is compatible with our positions as an independent nation-- or conducive to our growth, manhood and proper development as a rising country, to *lean so much* upon their supporting arm. The American nation owes us as African a debt, which they can never discharge; and country but less the desire of some to manifest that indebtedness and to make all the compensation in their power; but we owe it to our selves as a nation, to achieve for ourselves an independence of their donations. This is our duty-- our solemn duty, if we desire to transmit to our children-- unimpaired and uncorrupted, this our only home. But if it is our aim to incur the censure, if not the execration of posterity, by leaving them weakness, helplessness, inefficiency--- decay; let us persist in our course of luxury. "Let us eat, drink, and be merry."

Fifthly. Another lesson which, I conceive it is our duty to learn in view of the times, is the importance of *union*. There is not a sufficient oneness of feeling among us as a people. I think we should be a very different people, if we could see more together; if our aims were single; if we did not suffer ourselves to be so much influenced by matters of mere selfish interest; if our energies were concentrated to one point; namely, the achievement of a true independence for our country-- and a position for our race. But instead of this, we stand apart from each other. Everyone distrusts his neighbor. We live and have lived for years, in the same community, in the same city-- and yet are ignorant of each other. We do not know each other. Every man wraps himself up in his won exclusiveness and thinks his own plans as good, if not better than his neighbor's. Some who by superior advantages, have acquired some information think it a great stoop of condescension to be sociable with others of less erudition. They assume such an air of importance as reproach the humble approaches of any humble seeker after knowledge. They stand off in cold and stiff repulsiveness, and when they condescend to converse with those whom they regard as educationally inferior, it is with such an air as to make the humble individual feel that he is in the presence of his superior; from whom it would be the most presumption to express a difference of opinion.

"I am Sir Oracle,
And when I ope my lips let no dogs bark."

Our social intercourse with each other is extremely restrained. How seldom do we visit each other for the purpose of interchanging thoughts on subjects of importance-- We are all engaged-- about our own business, all busily employed, at what?

This ought not so to be. The high should condescend to the lowly-- the learned to the unlearned. We should oftener meet with each other on terms of unembarrassing equality, and freely or fully interchange opinions. By this our contractedness of views, our extreme individuality will be corrected. We shall become more and more prepared and disposed to receive truths or

principles on their merits and not by prejudice. We shall understand each other better, and be more disposed to make proper allowances for each others' errors and failings; hence there will arise a more general feeling of charitableness toward each other; and, indeed the whole state of society will assume a more pleasant and agreeable aspect and as a nation we shall advance in one unbroken phalanx to national greatness.

Sixthly. We are instructed, by the times, as to the importance of information among us.

"Knowledge is power;" when

"Knowledge is power;" when generously diffused, it is the safeguard of a nation's liberties.

generously diffused it is the safeguard of a nation's liberties. Of this important element of national prosperity we are sadly deficient. There is a deplorable lack of information among us. We need agriculturists, we need merchants, we need artisans, we need laborers of information. And what is more lamentable, we need legislators, we need lawyers, we need ministers of information. We have a superable abundance of dignitaries, we have a multitude of title gentlemen-- have "squires" and "honors" enough and to spare; while title of "honorable" tires on the ear. But how many are titles whose information as to matters in general transcends the range of their individual observation? How many, who are acquainted with the general principles of political science: These are suggestions, questions, fellow citizens, and they are not very pleasant. But, let us not "Lay the flattering unction to our souls," that we are a wise people. We are in need of information in all the departments of society. And it is this deficiency that operates so injuriously upon our industry. It is this that retards our progress. Ignorance is the partner of vice. It is not my belief that the people of Liberia are indolent. They do a great deal, but to no purpose. Because of ignorance, we are inefficient in our efforts. We know not how to do; and therefore our industry is unproductive. Our duty then is plain. We must learn. And one of

the surest means of learning is by devoting ourselves, not to books only, but to the service of physical nature. This is to impart to us that experience which must fit us for permanent freedom and independence.

Lastly. Another lesson we should gather from the present state of things, and the most important of all, refers to the need of earnest piety among us. In point of religion we are in a sad condition. Here again our disposition to rest in externals shows itself. We are fond of flaming professions, with little knowledge and less practice of the principles of religious truth; or in the language of Scripture, we have "a name to live while we are dead." The prosperity of vital piety in a land is after all the surest index of its true condition. "Righteousness exalteth a nation."

Tell us not that Liberia is prosperous, -- tell us not that her fields are loaded with grains, her ports are crowded with ships, all the branches of industry are in a thriving condition, and therefore she is advancing, if her churches are cold, dull, lifeless; if the members are trifling, worldly, unchristian. Let the people awake to their duty in this matter. Let them be men of earnestness and devotedness in religion--men who wrestle with the Almighty in prayer; whose object is to glorify Him; and, so far as their influence extends, to lead the heathen around to a knowledge of their Maker-- and to an appropriation of their Redeemer. Then, and till then, may we cherish the hope that Liberia's prosperity will be permanent and enduring. Then, let what will, oppose, our course will be onward and upward. The delightful sunshine of heaven's favor will rest upon us. Happiness and contentment and peace, will exist throughout our borders; for "Happy is that people whose God is the Lord."

In conclusion, our mission on this coast, as I have already said, is important; not for ease or indulgence-- not for physical or mental gratification. We have not come, as some seem to think, for the purpose of retaliating for social or political wrongs inflicted upon us in the land of bondage by our oppressors. It is more magnanimous, more Christian, to

forgive an injury than to revenge it.

Revenge, we ever find,
The weakest frailty of a feeble mind.

We have come to observe the great interest of the Church of Christ and of a needy and downtrodden race. The incentives that urge us to the accomplishment of this great work are numerous and powerful. Our brethren in bonds, in affliction, in sufferings, are beckoning to us, beseeching us not to fail; but to show ourselves as men. For us to fail would be to rivet more firmly and indefinitely their chains and bonds; for us to fail would be to close, perhaps forever, the door of hope for them. If we are true to our position and the duties it involves-- the influence we have already exerted in their behalf, will continue to increase, and increase, until it shall have operated to the rescuing them from their thralldom.

The millions in this land, enveloped in thick moral gloom, sunken in ignorance and vice, are calling to us. They call upon us for deliverance. From the depths of their impervious darkness they are eagerly stretching forth their hands to receive Christianity and civilization.

Shall we slight the urgent appeals of our ? They are bone of our bones and flesh of our flesh. Shall we turn a deaf ear to their entreaties: Can we? O no, we cannot. Brethren in bonds, brethren in chains; and ye brethren in the still more awful chain of sin and superstition, we come to your assistance. Your calls shall be obeyed. Your voices animate us, and they steal solemnly as and earnestly upon our ears. We come to the rescue. And we promise you, that God helping, there shall not be effort lacking on our part; there shall not be the absence of self-denial, of diligence, of labor, of enterprise, of earnest devoted piety, to rescue you from your physical bondage-- to snatch you from the servitude of sin and Satan-- to secure your temporal and spiritual emancipation.

In this delightful, though arduous task, fellow citizens, we are not with

encouragement. Interest in Africa and the African race is becoming general in every Christian land; efforts in their behalf are multiplying in every direction: facilities for the spread of the Gospel, and the introduction of civilization in this beclouded land are increasing. And in our contemplations, visions of future glory rise enchantingly before us. We carry onward our thoughts, and we behold the approaches of the season, the delightful season, long delayed indeed, but now arrived, when man shall own, universally, a brother in man; when "every fetter which cruelty hath forged, or avarice hath riveted shall fall," when the oppressed with spoils of infinite value and importance, shall return from their bondage. We carry our thought still further, and we see a mighty christian influence being exerted over the length and breadth of this continent: we see Africa rising on the wings of a Christian civilization, the last perhaps of time's empires and the noblest; and her sable sons hastening from every quarter to the shines of Jehovah--bearing offerings to the King of kings.

¹The indiscreet connection of missionaries with the political agitations of the country, has undoubtedly been unfortunate; both in its influence upon themselves and upon their work. We hold that "ambassadors for Christ" should maintain a high, unworldly, and consistent demeanor-- should be free from party politics-- and unmoved by sectional strifes and disputes. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in Liberia there will be, for a while longer, a necessity for the services of such men in the State. If the different Educational and Missionary Boards, operating in this Republic, should see fit to prohibit their colored missionaries from the halls of Legislation, from the Judiciary, etc., the interest of Liberia will be very injuriously affected; for it would be creating the necessity either for permanently placing the most important affairs of the Government, in the hands of a few; or of entrusting them to the hands of those entirely unqualified for such responsibilities. Those who advocate the unconditional restriction of colored missionaries in Liberia from civil positions of trust, take a one-sided view of the subject.

²We regard as one of the chief failing of Liberians, and one of the most serious hindrance to their improvement, that they are too willing to be taken care of. They have no self-supporting schools; very little has been done to support the gospel among themselves; and there is a disposition to look to the missionary societies to do everything of the kind for them; and the sooner they are taught to depend upon themselves, the better-- Wilson's *West Africa*, Page 410.

"I am told that all the schools in Liberia are supported by donations from America. This is not creditable to the people. They ought, from self respect, to do all they can to sustain their own schools and churches. If they do not stand alone, they cannot be said to stand at all."-- Bowen's *Central Africa*, Page 33.

Economic Community of West African States**Fourth Meeting of Heads of States and Government
of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia
Abuja, Nigeria, 17 August, 1996****Final Communiqué**

Heads of State and Government of the Committee of Nine on Liberia held their fourth meeting at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in Abuja on 17 August, 1996, under the chairmanship of His Excellency, General Sani Abacha, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and current Chairman of ECOWAS Authority. Heads of State and Government reviewed the situation in Liberia and considered ways to put the Liberian peace process back on course, in conformity with the Abuja Accord.

The following Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives were present:

His Excellency Matthieu Kerekou
President of the Republic of Benin
Head of Government

His Excellency Blaise Compaore
President of Burkina Faso
Head of Government

His Excellency Jerry John Rawlings
President of the Republic of Ghana

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His Excellency General Sani Abacha
Head of State, Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria

His Excellency Captain Edward Singhatay
Vice-President and Minister of Defense of The Gambia
Representing the President of the Republic of The Gambia

Mr. Barry Moussa Barque
Minister of State
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Togolese
Republic. Representing the President of the Togolese Republic

Mr. Amara Essy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Cote d'Ivoire
Representing the President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

His Excellency Lamine Camara
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea
Representing the President of the Republic of Guinea

Mr. Massokhna Kane
Minister of African Economic Integration
of the Republic of Senegal
Representing the President of the Republic of Senegal

The following guests were also present:

His Excellency Professor Wilton Sankawulo
President of the Council of State of the Liberian
Transitional Government

His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare
President and Head of State of the Republic of Mali

His Excellency Ibrahim Mainassara Bare
President of the Republic of Niger

His Excellency Alahaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

The following were invited observers:

- OAU Eminent Person in Liberia
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Liberia

The following persons also attended the meeting in capacity:

- Mr. Edouard Benjamin, ECOWAS Executive Secretary
- Major-General Victor Malu, ECOMOG Field Commander

The fourth meeting of Heads of State and Government Committee of Nine was preceded by a meeting of the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of ECOWAS Member States and a meeting of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Nine on Liberia

Heads of State and Government reviewed the situation in Liberia as presented in the report of the thirteen Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of ECOWAS Member States report of the eighth meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Nine on Liberia. They considered ways to put the Liberian peace process back on course and focused attention on the following issues:

- a. Assessment of the implementing of the Accra Mechanism;
- b. Extension of the Abuja Peace Agreement of 19 August 1995 and review of its schedule of implementation;
- c. Measures to ensure compliance with the Peace Accord by Liberian parties;
- d. Performance of the Council of State;
- e. Status of Monrovia;
- f. Elections in Liberia;
- g. Strengthening of ECOMOG;
- h. Restructuring the Armed Forces, Police and other security agents;
- i. Return of Arms seized from ECOMOG and property looted from the UN and other agencies;
- j. Humanitarian assistance to Liberia.

Assessment of the Implementation of the Accra Mechanism

Heads of State and Government noted the nonobservance of several important obligations inherent in the mechanism put in place by the seventh meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Nine with the aim of relaunching the peace process.

Extension of the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995 and Review of its Implementation Schedule

Heads of State and Government ed that the Abuja Agreement which was designed to usher in peace and lead to the organization of free and democratic elections on 20 August 1996 remained the most appropriate legal framework for finding a settlement to the Liberian crisis. They therefore decided that it should be retained in its entirety. However, given that very little progress had been made in its application, it had not been possible to adhere to its implementation schedule.

Consequently, Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Abuja Agreement remained the best and last framework for finding durable peace in Liberia and should thus be retained in its entirety. It was therefore approved that the validity of the Abuja Agreement be extended for another nine months from 21 August 1996 to 15 June 1997, the following program of implementation shall be undertaken before the holding of free, fair and democratic elections on or about 31 May 1997.

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| August 20-31, 1996 | Ceasefire, Disengagement of Fractions from checkpoints and present combat positions |
| Sept. 1, -30 Nov., 1996 | Delivery of logistic supplies by the international/donor community to ECOMOG |
| Aug. 20/'96-Jan. 31/'97 | Verification of ceasefire and disengagement by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and LTNG |
| October 3-10, 1996 | Assessment meeting in Liberia by C 's Special Envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, Representatives of donor community and LTNG |

Oct. 12, '96-Jan. 31, '97	Recce Mission by ECOMOG and UNOMIL of arms collection centers
November 4-Nov. 8, 1996	Committee of 9 meeting (Ministerial) in Monrovia
Nov. 7 1996-Jan. 31, 1997	Deployment of ECOMOG to Agreed Safe Havens by Committee of Nine
Nov. 22, 1996-Jan. 31, '97	Disarmament, Demobilization and Repatriation
Jan. 6-13, 1997	Verification visit to Liberia by Chairman's Special Envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, Representatives of donor community and LNTG
Jan. 20-April 15, '97	Preparation for Elections
March 10-15, 1997	Committee of Nine meeting, Monrovia
April 17-24, 1997	Assessment visit to Liberia by Chairman's Special Envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, Representatives of donor community and LNTG
May 30, 1997	Election Day

The new schedule of implementation of the Abuja Agreement also provides for the dissolution of all fractions by 31 January, 1997, resignation by 28 February 1997 of the members of the Council of State and public office holders who wish to run for election. The new government is expected

to be sworn in on 15 June 1997.

Heads of State and Government adopted a mechanism designed to ensure strict compliance with the peace plan by all Liberian parties.

Measures to Ensure Compliance With the Peace Plan

Heads of State and Government deplored the lack of sincerity and commitment shown by the Liberian fractions to the peace process. They therefore adopted a decision envisaging measures that might be invoked against any persons found guilty of acts capable of obstructing the peace plan concluded by the signatories to the Abuja Agreement. Such measures which would be invoked against any defaulting party would include:

1. travel and restrictions;
2. freezing of business activities and assets in Member States;
3. exclusion from participation in the electoral process;
4. on the use of the airspace and waters of Member States;
5. expulsion of members of the families of the Liberian leaders and their associates from the territories of Member States;
6. request for the UN Security Council to impose visa restrictions;
7. restrictions on imports from Liberia;
8. invoke the OAU 1996 Summit Resolution which calls for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to try all human rights offences against Liberians.

Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the need for Member States to observe the arms embargo declared against the warring factions and therefore adopted a Decision designed to ensure strict compliance

therewith. They urged Member States, particularly countries bordering Liberia to adopt all measures to stop the flow of arms from their territories into that country and noted with appreciation the measures taken by the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire in this connection. They recognized the rights of ECOMOG to carry out a search on anyone including members of the Liberia National Transitional Government and any other government official on the territory of Liberia.

ECOMOG was directed to ensure that only airports under its control were operational. Heads of State and Government decided to set up a committee to monitor implementation of the Peace Plan. This committee may prescribe sanctions to be taken by Member States against persons who obstruct implementation of the peace plan. Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their resolve not to recognize any government which comes to power by force of arms.

Performance of the Council of State

Heads of State and Government were concerned about the performance of the Council of State and felt that a change in the leadership of the Council would improve upon its effectiveness and cohesives.

Heads of State and Government, therefore, agreed to the appointment, by the signatories to the Abuja Agreement, of Mrs. Ruth Perry, a former Senator of the Republic of Liberia, as the new Chairman of the Council of State. The Heads of State expressed their appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Professor Wilton Sankawulo for his services rendered under rather difficult circumstances.

They also stressed that, if in future, any Council member found wanting would be replaced.

Heads of State and Government adopted a code of conduct for

observance by members of the Council of State and other public office holders in implementing the Abuja Agreement and these would be used as a yardstick for assessing their performance, individually and collectively.

Status of Monrovia

Heads of State and Government expressed satisfaction at the measures taken by ECOMOG to restore relative calm to Monrovia. They however expressed concern at the recent incidents of harassment, abduction and on of civilian members of rival faction or other ethnic groups. They strongly condemned the growing tendency to partition the city of Monrovia along factional lines and mandated ECOMOG to intensify its efforts to restore Monrovia and environs to its original safe haven status.

Elections in Liberia

Heads of State and Government noted that, because of the failure of successive peace plans, it had been impossible to organize free, fair and democratic elections. They that the process should be set in motion for the holding of elections in Liberia on or about 30 May 1997. To this end, they recommended that modalities for the organization of elections be formulated, taking into account the electoral laws of Liberia.

They appealed to the United Nations, donors and nongovernmental organizations for support and ensuring that the elections are successfully organized.

Strengthening of ECOMOG

Heads of State and Government took note of the information that successful implementation of the peace plan would require deployment of 18,000 troops to Liberia. They commended the efforts of those Member States of ECOWAS which had promised to contribute troops once adequate

logistic support was provided.

Heads of State and Government expressed gratitude to the Government of the United States which had embarked on its second assistance package involving provision of logistics and communication equipment.

Restructuring the Armed Forces, Police and Other Security Forces

Heads of State and Government expressed grave concern over the fact that security agencies have deep affiliations with the factions and condemned the control wielded over the Police by fighters and non-qualified personnel.

They endorsed the proposal to restructure the armed forces, the police and other security forces to reflect geographical and ethnic balance. They noted the offer by the British Government to sponsor the "Train the Trainers" program. ECOWAS should look into the possibility of obtaining the required assistance from countries within the region.

Return of Arms Seized from ECOMOG and Property Looted From the UN and Other Agencies

Heads of State and Governments strongly condemned the seizure of ECOMOG arms and ammunitions by fighters belonging to the armed factions. They also condemned the looting of vehicles and other assets from the United Nations and nongovernmental agencies. Heads of State and Government directed the Liberian faction leaders to return the arms and ammunition seized from ECOMOG and to release to the UN and other organizations the vehicles and other property looted from them. They called on the authorities of countries bordering Liberia to assist in identifying, confiscating and returning such property on their territory to their rightful

owners.

Humanitarian Assistance to Liberia

Heads of State and Government firmly condemned the crimes, atrocities and other acts by the Liberian fighters which violate the rules of armed warfare. They issued a fresh warning to the factions to desist from such acts which are offensive to the international community. Heads of State and Government directed the faction leaders and their fighters to undertake to abide by the terms of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1994 and the annexed Protocols as well as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. They called on the faction leaders to guarantee the safety of relief personnel in Liberia, to enable them to resume their operations.

Heads of State and Government expressed gratitude to the OAU and to the United Nations, for their constant support in the quest for peace in Liberia.

At the end of their deliberations, Heads of State and Government expressed their sincere gratitude and deep appreciation to His Excellency General Sani Abacha and to the Government and people of Nigeria for the warm, brotherly hospitality extended to them during their stay in Abuja.

DONE AT ABUJA, THIS 17TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1996

**HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMISSION
OF NINE**

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