


LIBERIAN STUDIES JO AL



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LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

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A refereed journal that emphasizes the social sciences, humanities, and the natural sciences, the *Liberian Studies Journal* is a semiannual publication devoted to studies of Africa's oldest republic. The annual subscription rate is \$40.00; \$15.00 for students and \$50.00 for institutions, and include membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. All manuscripts and related matters should be addressed to The Editor, *Liberian Studies Journal*; Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature; **The University of South Carolina Spartanburg**; 800 University Way; Spartanburg, SC 29303. Subscriptions and other business matters should be directed to Dr. Dianne Oyler, Secretary-Treasurer Liberian Studies Association; **Minot State University**; Division of Social Science; 500 University Ave. W; Minot, ND 58707.

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From the Editor

This, my final "From the Editor," is a bittersweet exercise because of all the usual sentiments one experiences when moving on— people to thank for helping out during my editorship, motivating words for the incoming editor and his staff, and finally, missing the tremendous stress this job has had on my life during the past three years. Serving as your editor for the past three years has been good. It has been good for me both personally and professionally, it has been good for the University of South Carolina Spartanburg, and I believe it has been good for the Liberian Studies Association. I am sure not all our readership agreed with our style of editorship during my tenure, but I hope you would chalk up all my shortcomings, real and perceived, to the fact that I am a hapless victim of the "frailties of the human condition." The sentiments stop here.

Seriously though, I would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to the Administration of the **University of South Carolina Spartanburg** for housing the *journal* here. The Chancellor, Dr. **John C. Stockwell** has been most supportive, along with Dr. **Jane Stephens**, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Dr. **Rita Marinho**, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, and Dr. **Donald Knight**, Chairman of the Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature, all here at USCS.

Dr. **Augustine Konneh**, the book review editor; Dr. **Similih Cordon**, the associate editor; and all the members of the **LSJ's Editorial Advisory Board** were most supportive when called upon to help with the work of producing the *Journal*. Thanks. It would be space consuming to mention everyone by name, but certainly, Dr. **Dianne Oyler** our Secretary-Treasurer from **Minot State University**, and her predecessor, Dr. **Arnold Odio**, who both wrote the checks, deserve mention. Also, a somewhat invisible group of persons who are crucial to the quality of the *Journal*, those of you who refereed articles, deserves a *merci beaucoup*.

As Dr. **Amos J. Beyan** of **West Virginia University** takes over the editorship of this journal, I wish him and his staff my very best. I do hereby solemnly and publicly pledge that I will lend him the same degree of support I received from Dr. **D. Elwood Dunn**, my predecessor and guru of sorts. I believe Dr. **Beyan** will be good for the *LSJ*, and the *LSJ* good for him.

This issue kicks off with **Carl Patrick Burrowes'** "Textual Sources of the 1847 Liberian Constitution," which, in my estimation, is a brilliant piece of scholarship and a significant contribution to Liberian Studies. **Cyril Broderick's** "Liberian Agriculture: History and Status Toward the Twenty-first Century"

discusses some changes that have occurred in Liberian agriculture in the most recent past and indicates how agricultural investment can provide the base for reconstruction and development. **Boikai Twe's** article, "A Review of African Psychology in West Africa," attempts to review some empirical aspects of African life as a part of the next century's quest to reestablish internal order and truth (Maat) through self-understanding. "The Virtual University: The Technology of Long Distance Education," by **Dianne Oyler** is a how-to type article which, among other things, provides information that could help policy makers take the educational experience in Liberia into the Cyberage. **C. E. Zamba Liberty's** article is one that would generate a lot of discussion among Liberians and Liberianologists for some time to come. However, **Dr. Liberty** will not be taking part in that debate. As most of you know, he died October 22, 1997, at his home in Glendale, Wisconsin. The title, and I hope you are ready for this, is enough to start the ball rolling—"BUTUO: A Lilliputian Testament to a Struggle— The NPFL Journey to State-Power: How Charles Taylor Upset the Bowl of Rice and Took Home the Whole Hog. . . ." A crucial editorial note is important here. This is the only article printed during my editorship that was not refereed as the editorial policy of the *LSJ* requires. The reason, the author was not around to respond to his anonymous referees, so, given the stature of **Dr. Liberty** when it comes to scholarly issues related to the Liberian State, I made an editorial judgment to publish what his son, **C. E. Zamba Liberty, II**, refers to in a foreword to the article as "the last product of (his) father's mind before he departed this earth." Now, you make your own judgment.

In the book review section, **Emmanuel Kwesi Aning** takes a crack at **Abiodun Aloa's** *The Burden of Collective Goodwill-- The International Involvement in the Liberian Civil War*. **Walter T. Wiles**, in his maiden contribution to the *LSJ*, is critical but fair in his review of **Syrulwa L. Somah's** *Historical Settlement of Liberia and Its Environmental Impact*. The minutes of the Atlanta meeting and the LSA's financial statement can be found in the "News and Notes" section. We end this issue with "The (revised) Articles of Association of The Liberian Studies Association" printed in the "Document" section.

Thanks for letting me serve you as your editor for what are three of the most memorable years of my professional life.



The Editor.

TEXTUAL SOURCES OF THE 1847 LIBERIAN CONSTITUTION

Carl Patrick Burrowes

The original Constitution of Liberia, which was adopted in 1847, would remain in force until the military coup d'état 1980, when it was scraped. Despite its longevity and other significant features, that Constitution has received very little scholarly attention. Its origin has remained shrouded in mystery, partly because of a scarcity of sources. The original source materials from the 1847 Constitutional Convention, including the official minutes and two private diaries, were never published, and the originals have not been found.¹

This paper argues that the Constitution reflected a fusion of black nationalism, Protestant Christianity and republicanism, which formed constituent elements of a Liberian ideology that came to be crystallized between 1822, when Liberia was established as a colony of free African Americans, to 1847, when the repatriates declared their independence from the American Colonization Society.² An ideology is conceived of as "a structure of meaning expressed through a historically specific system of communication."³ The interpenetrating of the religious and political ideas of Liberians was facilitated by the absence of a firm division between the secular and sacred in African-American cosmology, which one scholar characterized as one of "the most important links between African culture and African-American Christianity."⁴ The Liberian Constitution presents one of the earlier intellectual integrations of those three previously disparate traditions.

This paper is an outgrowth of two earliest articles on the 1847 Constitution by this author. The first consisted of biographical sketches of delegates to the Convention. The second traced three major aspects of

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the repatriates' cosmology as reflected in their Declaration of Independence and Constitution.⁵ In the process of researching the first article, a list was compiled of books available to or highly regarded by the delegates. These were read in an attempt to absorb the flavor of their times and better understand the tenor of their thinking. On that list was Poore's two-volume compilation of U. S. federal and state constitutions, which was requested from a friend in the U. S. in 1847 by Samuel Benedict, Liberia's first chief justice and the former president of the Constitutional Convention.⁶ By reading Poore in conjunction with the 1847 Constitution, I was able to identify the U. S. state constitutions on which the Liberian document was modeled, thus, partially clearing up the mystery concerning the latter's origin (See Appendix).

Given a paucity of sources and lack of serious investigation, the 1847 Constitution has been the object of various speculations. The most popular and enduring of these is the notion that the Constitution was written by Samuel Greenleaf, an ACS supporter and Harvard University professor of constitutional law.⁷ By the early 1970s, this myth had become so widely accepted that the Liberian government, in appreciation of Greenleaf's alleged authorship, named a state university building in his honor.

This thesis, first advanced in 1847 by a critic of the Convention, became codified in modern scholarship through the legislative history of Liberia prepared by Huberich, himself a Harvard law professor. The major flaw in Huberich's otherwise masterful tome is his careless and uncritical use of sources regarding the origins of the Constitution. One example is his cryptic and unattributed claim that the official dairy of the proceedings was accidentally destroyed.⁸ Given the significance of that subject, one would have expected him to name his source and describe more fully the circumstance of the dairy's destruction, but he does nei-

ther. Even more detrimental is his uncritical reliance on Dr. J. W. Lugenbeel, an observer of the Constitutional Convention who held a low opinion of blacks in general and of several Convention delegates in particular.⁹

Huberich's interpretation has been challenged by Brown who shows Greenleaf's thinking on several controversies to be in sharp contrast to certain provisions of the Liberian Constitution. For example, Brown points to a discrepancy between Greenleaf's stated opposition to women's economic rights and the Liberian document's guarantee of such rights (Article V, Sections 12 and 13; see Appendix for this and all other references to the Constitution). Brown also suggested local authorship of those constitutional provisions which limited Liberian citizenship and property ownership to people of African descent (Article V, Sec. 12 and 13) — restrictions which both Greenleaf and the ACS had opposed.

While myth-shattering and meticulous, Brown's work suffered from minor deficiencies. For example, he ascribed to delegate Hilary Teage authorship of the clause on liberty of press (Article I, Sec. 15), a medley of language taken, as shown below, from the constitutions of Connecticut (1818), Massachusetts (1780) and Maine (1820). Such claims resulted largely from a failure to locate key documents on which the delegates drew. Unfortunately, by overestimating the Liberians' contribution, he risks unintentionally supplanting one myth with another.

Socioeconomic and Historical Setting

When independence was declared, Liberia was an extremely fragile polity. One year before, the government reported expenses of \$7,536 and income of \$8,525, for a surplus of \$989. Imports averaged \$78,915 annually while exports, mainly of camwood, palm oil and ivory, brought in \$61,845.¹⁰ By 1847, there were about 3,300 people living in

the various colonial settlements, including 500 indigenes who, having adopted settler ways, were eligible to vote. This population was distributed unevenly between three counties: Montserrado (2,000), Bassa (1,000) and Sinoe (300). One year after independence, there were said to be 23 churches with 1,500 communicants, a third of whom were indigenes. Liberia's 16 schools counted 200 non-repatriates among their 560 students.¹¹

One immediate cause of Liberia's independence was British threats, in the form of both territorial encroachment by the government and refusals by its subjects to pay tariffs to the colony. While this factor was often cited by the settler leadership in the years prior to independence, there were equally important internal dynamics. Among these was the tension between the largely autocratic ACS government and the repatriates, especially the freed blacks, many of whom had come to Africa seeking liberty.¹²

When in 1838 the ACS decided to revise its plan of government to accommodate the colony's expansion in population and territory, the repatriates submitted a draft constitution of their own for the Society's consideration. Written by elected delegates, that "Monrovia Draft" constitution sought to limit citizenship to people of color and to invest final political authority in the colonists rather than the ACS. It also called for the non-involvement of the governor in the judiciary. However, by the time this draft arrived in the United States, the ACS had already issued its 1839 revised plan of government. Under this plan, the governor continued as chief justice, but he now had to share legislative powers with elected representatives of the settlers.¹³ Nonetheless, the writing of the "Monrovia Draft" would provide the Liberian leadership with experience and advanced thinking on the issues they would confront during the 1847

Convention, just as key sections of the document itself would be incorporated into the Liberian Constitution.

Evidence of the Convention's Originality

The available evidence on the Liberian Constitution and its possible sources supports Brown's main argument concerning the overlooked input of the Liberian delegates but calls for a moderation of some of his minor claims. By all indications, Greenleaf did have some input, no matter how indirect, into the Convention. In January 1846, the ACS directors solicited suggestions from some "legal gentlemen" for a suitable Liberian constitution, and Greenleaf reportedly responded. His proposal, which has not been found, was sent that June by the Reverend Tracy, head of the Pennsylvania Colonization Society, to Governor Joseph Jenkins Roberts. It is improbable that Greenleaf, given the press of his other activities, would have written an original constitution for Liberia between January and June. More likely, he simply sent a copy of the 1820 Constitution of Maine, having served in that state's legislature in 1820 and as its Supreme Court reporter from 1820 to 1832.¹⁴

This interpretation draws support from the reference by Lugenbeel, who was present at the convention, to "The Constitution which was sent out, as a *model*, by Professor Greenleaf"¹⁵ (emphasis added). Greenleaf's intention notwithstanding, the repatriate leadership had 12 months in which to alter his document to their liking. They also had had eight years since the "Montserrado Draft" to further consider the kind of government and rules they desired to live under. In the end, about 48 percent of the Liberia document was taken from Maine's. Another 18 percent can be traced to other U. S. constitutions, especially from the New England states. This finding, presented in the Appendix, draws confirmation from Cmd. Bell of the U. S. brig Boxer who, following a visit

to Monrovia two months after independence was announced, noted the similarities between the *states'* constitutions and Liberia's.¹⁶

In all, the Convention produced about 7,497 words (11.25 inches of text at 68 words per inch). This included a 1,955 word Declaration of Independence which was entirely of local origin. Another 34 percent (1,894 words) of the Constitution has not been traced to any existing documents and was probably of local origin. Given the absence of the official minutes and other firsthand reports, it is not possible to identify with finality which sections of the Constitution arose in response to specific local problems. Nonetheless, certain striking correspondences suggest themselves.

When a referendum on independence was called, voting was disrupted in Bassa County where all of the 49 collected ballots were opposed. Three concerns fueled Bassa's opposition. First, there was anxiety that independence would bring enormous taxes. Second, many feared domination by Montserrado which had both more colonists and wealth. But the thorniest issue of all was the disposition of ACS-owned land in the new republic. As suspicions deepened and emotions flared, Bassa's secession from the commonwealth seemed eminent.¹⁷

In what seems to have been concessions to the Bassa delegates, then in opposition, the Liberian Constitution omitted references to treason and the legislative contempt powers mentioned in many contemporaneous U. S. constitutions. Another section promised, in most categorical terms, that "No subsidy, charge, impost or duties ought to be established, fixed laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the legislature" (Article 1, Sec. 16). Entrenched in the Constitution also was the continuity of existing municipalities and their officers (Article 5, Sec. 3), a possible palliative to fears of Montserrado's domination.

Similarly, the recognition of women's economic rights (Article V, Sec. 12 and 13), which went against the grain of Anglo-Saxon tradition and the stated opinion of Greenleaf, can be explained in light of the local demographic picture. Although an almost equal number of men and women immigrated between 1820 and 1843, men had a much higher mortality rate. Between ages 26 and 45, the central death rate (death per thousand per year) was 89 for males and 72 for females. From age 46 to 98, the rates rose to 201 for males compared to 153 for females.¹⁸

But the Liberian Constitution was original in other ways. Sections taken from Maine's Constitution were improved upon, the Liberian version invariably being shorter, crisper and easier to understand. For example, what in Maine's read as "All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority, and instituted for their benefit; they have, therefore, an unalienable right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it" became in the Liberian version (Article 1, Sec. 2), "All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are instituted by their authority and for their benefit and they have the right to alter and reform the same when their safety and happiness require it."

This rewriting strongly suggests the hand of Teage, the Convention's secretary, who was editor of the *Liberia Herald* from 1835 to 1849 (For a sample of Teage's literary flair, see the Declaration of Independence with its repetitive cadence, a section of which is quoted below). In a 1849 article, he would specifically urge local courts to employ simple English, understandable to average Liberians, in place of traditional Latin phrases like *habeas corpus*.¹⁹

But more importantly, as regards originality, sections of the Liberian Constitution borrowed from elsewhere had been appropriated and combined in keeping with an emergent worldview. This cosmology was

rooted in the three intellectual traditions of black nationalism, Old Testament Christianity and republicanism. The Convention's secretary, Hilary Teage, in promoting independence among the colonists, had called for "a nation of colored people on the soil of Africa, adorned and dignified with the attributes of a civilized and Christian community."²⁰ These three themes were repeated by Benedict who wrote, in presenting the Convention's final documents to the citizenry:

It is our earnest desire that the affairs of this government may be so conducted as to merit the approbation of all Christendom, and restore to Africa her long lost glory, and that Liberia under the guidance of Heaven may continue a happy asylum for our long oppressed race.²¹

The black "nationalism" of the Liberian document was in reaction to the privileging of whites in U. S society which found expression in existing statutes and constitutions.²² This is especially obvious in those provisions which limited citizenship and property ownership to "people of color," restrictions which both Greenleaf and the ACS had opposed.²³ It also barred trafficking in slavery by citizens, a provision not found in any of the U. S constitutions from which the delegates borrowed. In terms both poignant and detailed, the Declaration of Independence described the racism which had both shaped their worldview and driven them to Africa:

We were every where shut out from all civil office.

We were excluded from all participation in the government.

We were taxed without out consent.

We were compelled to contribute to the resources of a country, which gave us no protection.

We were made a separate and distinct class, and against us every avenue to improvement was effectively closed.

Strangers from all lands of a color different from ours, were preferred before us.

Time and again Liberians would refer to “restoring Africa to her long-lost glory.”²⁴ To describe their mission, supporters of African colonization appropriated the Old Testament phrase “Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands unto God.” In a poem celebrating independence, Teage would write: “Shout the loud jubilee, Afric once more is free.”²⁵

In addition to being more black conscious, Liberia’s Constitution was more specifically Christian than Maine’s. Unlike Maine’s which talked of religious freedom in general terms, Liberia’s specified that no *Christian* sect would dominate or enjoy exclusive privileges (implying that non-Christian religions were not to enjoy the equality before the law specifically extended to Christian denominations) (Article 1, Sec. 3). The Declaration of Independence pridefully noted:

Our churches for the worship of our Creator, every where to be seen, bear testimony to our piety, and to our acknowledgment of His Providence.

The native African bowing down with us before the altar of the living God, declare that from us, feeble as we are, the light of Christianity has gone forth, while upon that curse of curses, the slave trade, a deadly blight has fallen as far as our influence extends.

Therefore in the name of humanity, and virtue and religion — in the name of the Great God, our common Creator, and our common Judge, we appeal to the nations of Christendom, and earnestly and respectfully ask of them, that they will ... extend to us, that comity which marks the friendly intercourse of civilized and independent communities.²⁶

But “Christianity” as used here and in the Constitution often meant a set of practices: observation of the Sabbath, church attendance, abstinence from liquor, abandonment of superstitions and conversion of non-practitioners. Highlighted was the Old Testament God, deliverer of entire peoples. The Declaration of Independence is replete with references to “the Great Arbiter of human events,” “the God of nature,” “a beneficent Creator,” “the God of our fathers,” “His Providence,” “the living God” and “our common Judge.” This was a social Christianity from which Christ was effaced along with the New Testament message of personal salvation. This alternative theology, which promised deliverance to blacks — cast as the Israelites of the Old Testament — was reflected in countless black spirituals, many of which doubled as codes for those engaged in smuggling runaway slaves northward.²⁷

Also at the core of Liberia political thinking was a belief in small privately-owned property as a source both of wealth and virtue.²⁸ This conviction was the result of a double articulation: readings in civic humanism²⁹ and immersion in republicanism in America, the latter apparently providing the greater influence.

In coming to Africa the repatriates, especially free blacks, were motivated in part by the desire to own private property. As Samuel Benedict, judge and president of the Constitutional Convention, boasted in explaining to African-Americans the liberties enjoyed in Liberia: “We are proprietors of the soil we live on, and possess the rights of freeholders.”³⁰ In this context, property held practical and symbolic value. It became a measure of the worth which they had been denied in the United States, as well as a measure of good citizenship.

Compared to Maine’s document, Liberia’s was more restrictive of the government *vis a vis* the people. It affirmed the right of the people to return their officials to private life to keep them from becoming op-

pressive (Article 1, Sec. 19), gave the president a two-year term (Article 3, Sec. 1), and allowed suits against the republic “in such matters, and, in such cases as the legislature may, by law direct” (Article 1, Sec. 17). Liberia’s Constitution was much more emphatic than Maine’s regarding freedom of the press (Article 1, Sec. 15), an issue which was of particular concern to Teage, the editor of the *Liberia Herald*. Unlike the U. S federal constitution, Liberia’s did not create a standing army.

But this limited government came at a price: The Liberian Constitution also limited political franchise more than most U. S constitutions of the day. While Maine allowed 21 year olds to hold office, Liberians had to wait until they were age 23. Furthermore, both voting right and office-holding was restricted to property holders (Article 1, Sec. 11, and Article 3, Sec. 7). In contrast, there was no property qualification under the laws of the commonwealth government of Liberia.³¹ Regarding property, the 1847 Constitution listed its acquisition, possession and protection of property as “natural, inherent and inalienable rights.” One clause barred the purchase of aboriginal lands by individual citizens, an apparent attempt to forestall land alienation on the one hand and unbridled accumulation on the other. Another clause, linking industry to virtue, required the president to promote the “wholesome” industries of agriculture and husbandry among indigenous groups, as soon as funds became available (Article 1, Sec. 1; Article 5, Sec. 14 and 15).

In brief, the Liberian document resonated throughout with *classical* civic humanism, the development of which was particularly influenced by French philosopher Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu. Unlike the framers of America’s constitution, classical civic humanists like Montesquieu believed that true democracy was possible only in small republics. The writings of Montesquieu was particularly popular with literate blacks during this period, given his polemic against slavery — one of

the earliest by a noted European philosopher. No wonder then that Benedict, who was familiar with Montesquieu's writing³², predicted in 1841 that Liberia's independence would bring "a purer form of government than any now to be found, even in the United States."³³

Conclusion

The 1847 Liberian Constitution and Declaration of Independence carried a decidedly American flavor. This flowed, not from the documents having been written by U. S jurist Simon Greenleaf, as has been popularly believed. Rather, it resulted from a worldview with American antecedents. This vision was a medley of republicanism, black consciousness and an African-American theology rooted primarily in the Old Testament.

At the core of the Constitution laid a unique standard of citizenship (involvement in the political life of the community), a by-product of the intellectual heritage and practical political experience of early Liberians. By this standard, anyone without African ancestry and Christianity, Western culture or property would have been unfit for public office. While these criteria for citizenship may seem elitist by today's standard, they were quite radical at the time. Instead of a social order that fixed one's place at birth, this one theoretically would allow talent (property-ownership) and virtue (Christianity and public service) to rise.

Even in the absence of important primary materials, it is possible to conclude that the documents were assembled locally. They were original in two ways. First, all of the Declaration and a third of the Constitution addressed local concerns in language reminiscent of local leaders. Furthermore, even the borrowed sections of the Constitution were appropriated and combined in keeping with a specific Liberian cosmology.

These findings support the view, first advanced by Brown, that the Liberian national documents were fashioned locally. Given the key source documents identified in this paper, it should be possible to identify the contribution of specific Convention delegates, by comparing the available writings of those delegates with the Liberian Constitution on the one hand and the source documents identified here on the other. By this slow process, it might be possible to further unravel the mystery that shrouds the origin of this important document.

APPENDIX

LIBERIAN CONSTITUTION³⁴

Article I:

Declaration of Rights

The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government, is to secure the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it, with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquillity, their natural rights, and the blessings of life; and whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people have a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity and happiness.

Therefore, the people of the Commonwealth of Liberia, in Africa, acknowledging with devout gratitude, the goodness of God, in granting to us the blessings of the Christian religion, and political, religious, and civil liberty, do, in order to secure these blessings for ourselves and our posterity, and to establish justice, insure domestic peace, and promote the general welfare, hereby solemnly associate, and constitute ourselves a free, sovereign and Independent state, by the name of the Republic of Liberia, and do ordain and establish this Constitution for the government of the same.

Section 1: All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights;

TEXTUAL SOURCES³⁵

Mass. (1780), first paragraph of preamble, p. 956: The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence of the body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquillity, their natural rights and the blessings of life; and whenever these great objects are not obtained the people have a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity, and happiness.

Maine (1820), preamble, p. 788, but rephrased: We, the people of Maine, in order to establish justice, insure tranquillity, provide for our natural defence, promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity so favorable to the design, and imploring His aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine, and do ordain and establish the following constitution for the government of the same.

Maine (1820), Art. I, Sec. 1, p. 788: All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural,

among which, are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Sec. 2 All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are instituted by their authority and for their benefit and they have the right to alter and reform the same when their safety and happiness require it.

Sec. 3 All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship God, according to the dictates of their own consciences, without obstruction or molestation from others: all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, and not obstructing others in their religious worship, are entitled to the protection of law, in the free exercise of their own religion; and no sect of Christians shall have exclusive privileges or preference, over any other sect; but all shall be alike tolerated: and no religious test whatever shall be required as a qualification for civil office, or the exercise of any civil right.

inherent, and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 2, p. 788. All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority, and instituted for their benefit; they have, therefore, an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 3, pp. 788-9: All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, [and no one shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, nor for his religious professions or sentiments, provided he does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship;] and all persons demeaning themselves peaceably [as good members of the State, shall be equally under] the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law, nor shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust under this State; [and all religious societies in the State, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall at all times have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for their support and maintenance.] Also see Conn.

Sec. 4: There shall be no slavery within this republic. Nor shall any citizen of this republic, or any person resident therein, deal in slaves, either within or without this republic, directly or indirectly.

Sec. 5: The people have a right at all times, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good; to instruct their representatives, and to petition the government, or any public functionaries for the redress of grievances.

Sec. 6: Every person injured shall have remedy therefore, by due course of law; justice shall be done without sole denial or delay; and in all cases, not arising under marital law, or upon impeachment, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, and to be heard in person or by council, or both.

Sec. 7: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime, except in cases of impeachment, cases arising in the army and navy, and petty offenses, unless upon presentment by a grand jury; and every person criminally charged, shall have a right to be seasonally furnished with a copy of the charge, to be con-

(1818), Art. 1, Sec. 4, p. 259: No preference shall be given by law to any Christian sect or mode of worship.

Original. Similar provisions were contained in the ACS Constitution of 1820 as well as Art. 3 of the Montserado Draft³⁶.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 15, p. 790: The people have a right, at all times, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, to give instructions to their representatives, and to request of either department of the government, by petition or remonstrance, redress of their wrongs and grievances.

Maine (1820), Art. 2, Sec. 19 and 20, p. 790: Every person, for an injury done him in his person, reputation, property, or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.

In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practised; the party claiming the right may be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his election.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 7 and 8, p. 789: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in such cases of offences as are usually cognizable by a justice of the peace, or in cases arising in the army or

fronted with the witnesses against him, -- to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have a speedy, public and impartial trial by a jury of the vicinity. He shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself and no person shall for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.

Sec. 8 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property or privilege, but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.

navy, or in the militia when in actual service, in time of war or public danger. The legislature shall provide by law a suitable and impartial mode of selecting juries; and their usual number and unanimity, in indictments and convictions, shall be held indispensable.

No person for the same offence shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.

Also see **NY (1821)**, Art. VII, Sec. 7, p. 1347: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of the militia, when in actual service, and the land and naval forces in time of war, or which this State may keep, with the consent of Congress, in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny, under the regulation of the legislature,) unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and in every trial on impeachment or indictment, the party accused shall be allowed counsel as in civil actions. No person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 5, p. 789: The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor without prob-

Sec. 9: No place shall be searched, nor person seized, on a criminal charge or suspicion, unless upon warrant lawfully issued, upon probable cause supported by oath, or solemn affirmation, specially designating the place or person, and the object of the search.

Sec. 10: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor excessive punishment indicted. Nor shall the legislature take any law impairing the obligation of contracts; nor any law rendering any act punishable, in any manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.

Sec. 11: All elections shall be by ballot and every male citizen of twenty-one years of age, possessing real estate, shall have the right of suffrage.

Sec. 12: The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense. And as in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained, without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.

Sec. 13: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

able cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 5, p. 789: See above.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 9 and 10, p. 789: Sanguinary laws shall not be passed; all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offence; excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.

All persons, before conviction, shall be bailable except for capital offences, where proof is evident or the presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

Original: Based on (but more restrictive than) the Montserrado Draft constitution which granted suffrage to all, without regard to property or sex³⁷.

Mass. (1780), Part 1, Art. 17, p. 959: The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 21, p. 790: Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation, nor unless the public exigencies

Sec. 14: The powers of this government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the powers belonging to either of the others. This section is not to be construed to include Justices of the Peace.

Sec. 15: The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this republic.

The printing press shall be free to every person, who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the rights thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print, on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.

require it.

Maine (1820), Art. III, Sec. 1 and 2, p. 790: The powers of this government shall be divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial.

No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

Mass. (1780), Part 1, Art. 16, p. 959: The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth.

Also see **Maine (1820)**, Art. Sec. 4, p. 789: Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of this liberty. No laws shall be passed regulating or restraining the freedom of the press; and, in prosecutions for any publication respecting the official conduct of men in public capacity, or the qualifications of those who are candidates for the suffrages of the people, or where the matters published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury, after having received the direction of the court, shall have a right to determine, at their discretion, the law and the fact.

Also see **Conn. (1818)**, Art. 1, Sec. 5, 6 and 7, p. 259: Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

In all prosecutions or indictments for libels the truth may be given in evidence, and the jury shall have the right

Sec. 16: No subsidy charge, impost, or duties ought to be established, taxed, laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the legislature.

Sec. 17: Suits may be brought against the republic in such manner and in such cases as the legislature may, by law direct.

Sec. 18 No person can, in any case, be subjected to the law martial, or to any penalties or pains by virtue of that law, (except those employed in the army or navy, and except the militia in actual service,) but by the authority of the legislature.

Sec. 19 In order to prevent those who are vested with authority, from becoming oppressors, the people have a right at such periods, and in such manner, as they shall establish by their frame of government; -- to cause their public officers to return to private life, and to fill up vacant places, by certain and regular elections and appointments.

Sec. 20: That all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless, for capital offenses, when the proof is evident, or presumption great: and the privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall

to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court.

No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.

In all prosecutions or indictments for libels the truth may be given in evidence, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court.

Mass. (1780), Part 1, Art. 23, p. 959: No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties, ought to be established, fixed, laid, or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the legislature.

Original

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 14, p. 789: No person shall be subject to corporal punishment under military law, except such as are employed in the army or navy, or in the militia when in actual service, in time of war or public danger.

Mass. (1780), Part I, Art. 8, p. 958: In order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the people have a right at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life; and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and appointments.

Maine (1820), Art. 1, Sec. 10, p. 789: All persons, before conviction shall be bailable except for capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption great; and the privilege of the

be enjoyed in this republic, in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions and for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months.

ARTICLE II: Legislative Powers

Sec. 1: The Legislative power shall be vested in a legislature of Liberia, and shall consist of two separate branches. A House of Representatives and a Senate, to be styled the legislature of Liberia; each of which shall have a negative on the other, and the enacting style of their acts and laws, shall be, "*It is enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Republic of Liberia, in Legislature assembled.*"

Sec. 2: The representatives shall be elected by, and for the inhabitants of the several counties of Liberia, and shall be apportioned among the several counties of Liberia as follows:

-- The County of Montserrado shall have four representatives, the County of Grand Bassa shall have three, and the County of Sinoe shall have one; and all counties that shall hereafter be admitted in the Republic shall have one representative; and for every ten thousand inhabitants one Representative shall be added. No person shall be a representative who has not resided in the county two whole years immediately previous to his election and who shall not then elected be an inhabitant of the county, and does not own real estate of not less value than one hundred and fifty dollars, in the county in which he resides, and who shall not have attained the age of twenty-three years. The representatives shall be

writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-1, Sec. 1, p. 791: The legislative powers shall be vested in two distinct branches, a house of representatives and a senate, each to have a negative on the other, and both to be styled the legislature of Maine; and the style of their acts and laws shall be, "*Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives in legislature assembled.*"

Largely original. Incorporates part of **Maine (1820)**, Art. IV-1, Sec. 2 and 4, p. 791, but tailored to local conditions.

elected biennially, and shall serve two years from the time of their election.

Sec. 3 When a vacancy occurs in the representation of any county by death, resignation, or otherwise, it shall be filled by a new election.

Sec. 4: The House of Representatives shall elect their own Speaker and other officers; they shall also have the sole power of impeachment.

Sec. 5: The senate shall consist of two members from Montserrado County, two from Bassa County, two from Sinoe County, and two from each county which may be hereafter incorporated into this republic. No person shall be a senator, who shall not have resided three whole years immediately previous to his election in the Republic of Liberia, and who shall not when elected, be an inhabitant of the county which he represents, and who does not own real estate of not less value than two hundred dollars in the county which he represents, and who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years. The senator for each county who shall have the highest number of votes shall retain his seat four years, and the one who shall have the next highest number of votes, two years; and all who are afterwards elected to fill their seats, shall remain in office four years.

Sec. 6: The Senate shall try all impeachments; the senators being first sworn or solemnly affirmed to try the same impartially, and according to law; and no person shall be convicted but by the concurrence of two thirds of the senators present judgment in such cases shall not extend beyond

Maine (1820), Art. IV-1, Sec. 6, p. 792: Whenever the seat of a member shall be vacated, by death, resignation, or otherwise, the vacancy may be filled by a new election.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-1, Sec. 7 and 8, p. 792: The house of representatives shall choose their speaker, clerk, and other officers.

The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Largely original

Maine (1820), Art. IV-2, Sec. 7, p. 793: The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, and, when sitting for that purpose, shall be on oath or affirmation, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members pre-

removal from office, and disqualification to hold an office in the republic, but the party may be tried at law for the same offense.

When either the president or vice president is to be tried, the Chief justice shall preside.

Sec. 7: It shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as conveniently may be, after the adoption of this constitution, and once at least in every ten years afterwards, to cause a true census to be taken of each town, and county of the Republic of Liberia, and a representative shall be allowed every town, having a population of ten thousand inhabitants, and for every additional ten thousand in the counties after the first census, one representative shall be added to that county, until the number of representatives shall amount to thirty; afterwards one representative shall be added for every thirty thousand.

Sec. 8: Each branch of the legislature shall be judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members. The majority of each shall be necessary to transact business, but a less number may adjourn from day to day and compel the attendance of absent members. Each house may adopt its own rules of proceedings, enforce order, and with the concurrence of two thirds, may expel a member.

Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under this State; but the party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-2, Sec. 2, p. 792, but adopted to local needs: The legislature which shall be first convened under this constitution shall, on or before the fifteenth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, and the legislature at every subsequent period of ten years, cause the State to be divided into districts for the choice of Senators. The district shall conform, as near as may be, to county lines, and be apportioned according to the number of inhabitants. The number of senators shall not exceed twenty at the first apportionment, and shall, at each apportionment, be increased until they shall amount to thirty-one, according to the increase in the house of representatives.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-3, Sec. 3 and 4, p. 793: Each house shall be the judge of the elections and qualifications of its own members, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each house shall provide.

Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for

Sec. 9. Neither house shall adjourn for more than two days without the consent of the other; and both houses shall always sit in the same town.

Sec. 10. Every bill or resolution which shall have passed both branches of the Legislature, shall before it becomes a law, be laid before the President for his approval, if he approves, he shall sign it, if not, he shall return it to the Legislature with his objections--if the legislature shall afterwards pass the bill or resolve of two thirds in each branch, it shall become a law.

If the president shall neglect to return such bill or resolution to the legislature with his objections for five days after the same shall have been so laid before him--the Legislature remaining in session during that time, such neglect shall be equivalent to his signature.

the same cause.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-3, Sec. 12, p. 794: Neither house shall, during the session, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days, nor to any other place than that in which the houses shall be sitting.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-3, Sec. 2, p. 793: Every bill or resolution, having the force of law, to which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, which shall have passed both houses, shall be presented to the governor, and, if he approve, he shall sign it; if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the house in which it shall have originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its journals and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass it, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall be reconsidered, and, if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall have the same effect as if it had been signed by the governor; but, in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be taken by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill or resolution shall be entered on the journals of both houses, respectively. If the bill or resolution shall be returned by the governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, it shall have the same force and effect as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall have such force and effect, unless returned within three days after their next meeting.

Sec. 11: The senators and representatives shall receive from the republic a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law; and shall be privileged from arrest except for treason, felony or breach of the peace, while attending at, going to, or returning from the session of the Legislature.

Maine (1820), Art. IV-3, Sec. 7 and 8, p. 794: The senators and representatives shall receive such compensation as shall be established by law, but no law increasing their compensation shall take effect during the existence of the legislature which enacted it. The expenses of the members of the house of representatives, in travelling to the legislature and returning therefrom, once in each session, and no more, shall be paid by the State, out of the public treasury, to every member who shall seasonably attend, in the judgment of the house, and does not depart therefrom without leave.

The senators and representatives shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at, going to, and returning from each session of the legislature, and no member shall be liable for anything spoken in debate in either house in any court or place elsewhere.

ARTICLE III: Executive Power

Section 1: The Supreme Executive Power shall be vested in a president, who shall be elected by the people, and shall hold his office for the term of two years. He shall be commander-in-chief of the army, and navy. He shall in the recess of the legislature, have power to call out the militia or any portion thereof, into actual service in defense of the Republic. He shall have power to make treaties, provided the Senate concur therein, by a vote of two thirds of the senators present. He shall nominate, and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint and Secretaries of State, of

Maine (1820), Art. V, Part 1, Sec. 2, p. 794: The governor shall be elected by the qualified voters, and shall hold his office one year, from the first Wednesday of January in each year. Also see **U.S. (1787)**, Art. 2, Sec. 1, Paragraph 1, and Sec. 2, pp. 17-18: The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term... The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

War, of the Navy, and of the Treasury, Attorney General, Commission all ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls, all Judges of Courts, Sheriffs, Coroners, Marshalls, Justices of the Peace, Clerks of Courts, Registers, Notaries Public, and all other officers of State civil and military, whose appointment may not be otherwise provided for by the Constitution, or by standing laws. And in the recess of the senate, he may fill any vacancies in those offices, until the next session of the senate. He shall receive all ambassadors and other public ministers. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed -- he shall inform the legislature from time to time, of the condition of the Republic, and recommend any public measures for their adoption, which he may think expedient. He may after conviction, remit any public forfeitures and penalties, and grant reprieves and pardons for public offenses, except in cases of impeachment.

He may require information and advice from any public officer, touching matters pertaining to his office. He may on extraordinary occasions, convene the legislature, and may adjourn the two houses whenever they cannot agree as to the time of adjournment.

[This section seems to be a compromise between the U.S. which gave the president four years per term and Maine which gave the governor a one-year term.]

Sec. 2 There shall be a Vice President who shall be elected in the same manner, and for the same term as that of the President, and whose qualifications shall be the same: He shall be President of the Senate, and give the casting vote when the house is equally divided on any subject. And in case of the removal of the President from

of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into actual service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardon for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the president alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Department.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Largely original with some language from **Conn. (1818)**, Art. IV, Sec. 13 and 14, p. 262: The lieutenant-governor shall, by virtue of his office, be president of the senate, and have when in committee of the whole a right to debate, and, when the senate is equally divided, to give the casting vote.

office, or his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office; the same shall devolve on the Vice President; and the Legislature may by law provide for the cases of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President, and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

Sec. 3 The Secretary of State shall keep the records of the State, and all the records and papers of the legislative body, and all other public records and documents, not belonging to any other department, and shall lay the same when required, before the President or Legislature. He shall attend upon them when required and perform such other duties as may be enjoined by law.

Sec. 4 The Secretary of the Treasury or other persons who may by law, be charged with the custody of the public monies, shall before he receive such monies, give bonds to the State with sufficient sureties, to the acceptance of the

In case of the death, resignation, refusal to serve, or removal from office of the governor, or of his impeachment, or absence from the State, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise the powers and authority appertaining to the office of governor, until another be chosen at the next periodical election for governor, and be duly qualified; or until the governor impeached or absent shall be acquitted or return.

Also **U.S. (1787)**, Art. II, Sec. 1, p. 17; see article immediately above. Liberia's Constitution more specifically delineated the process of transition in the event the president and/or vice president is incapacitated.

Maine (1820), Art. V, Part 3, Sec. 1-4, p. 796: The secretary of state shall be chosen annually at the first session of the legislature, by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in convention.

The records of the State shall be kept in the office of the secretary, who may appoint his deputies, as they shall respectively require.

He shall carefully keep and preserve the records of all the official acts and proceedings of the governor and council, senate and house of representatives, and, when required, lay the same before either branch of the legislature, and perform such other duties as are enjoined by this constitution, or shall be required by law.

Maine (1820), Art. V, Part 4, Sec. 1-4, p. 796: The treasurer shall be chosen annually at the first session of the legislature, by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in convention, but shall not be eligible more than five years suc-

Legislature, for the faithful discharge of his trust. He shall exhibit a true account of such monies when required by the President or Legislature, and no monies shall be drawn from the Treasury, but by warrant from the President, in consequence of appropriation made by law.

Sec. 5: All Ambassadors and other public Ministers, and Consuls, the Secretary of State, of War, of the Treasury and of the Navy, the Attorney General, and Post Master General, shall hold their offices during the pleasure of the President. All justices of peace, sheriffs, coroners, marshalls, clerks of courts, registers, and notaries public, shall hold their offices for the term of two years from the date of their respective commissions; but may be removed from office within that time by the President, at his pleasure: and all other officers whose term of office may not be otherwise limited by law, shall hold their offices during the pleasure of the President.

Sec. 6: Every civil officer may be removed from office by impeachment, for official misconduct. Every such officer may also be removed by the President, upon the address of both branches of the

cessively.

The treasurer shall, before entering on the duties of his office, give bond to the State, with sureties, to the satisfaction of the legislature, for the faithful discharge of his trust.

The treasurer shall not, during his continuance in office, engage in any business of trade or commerce, or as a broker, nor as an agent or factor for any merchant or trader.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury but by warrant from the governor and council, and in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published at the commencement of the annual session of the legislature.

Largely original in language but modeled after U.S. (1787), Art. II, Sec. 1, p. 17, cited two articles above. This section delineates the structure of the government in considerably more detail than most state constitutions of the day.

Maine (1820), Art. IX, Sec. 5, p. 798: Every person holding any civil office under this State may be removed, by impeachment, for misdemeanors in office; and every person holding any

Legislature, stating their particular reason for his removal.

Sec. 7: No person shall be eligible to the office of President, who has not been a citizen of this Republic for at least five years; and who shall not have attained the age of thirty five years; and who is not possessed of unencumbered real estate, of the value of six hundred dollars.

Sec. 8: The President shall at stated times receive for his services, a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. And before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation.

I do solemnly swear, (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the Republic of Liberia, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution, and enforce the laws of the Republic of Liberia.

office may be removed by the governor, with the advice of the council, on the address of both branches of the legislature. But, before such address shall pass either house, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the house in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that he may be admitted to a hearing in his defence.

U.S. (1787), Art. II, Sec. 1, Paragraph 4, p. 17: No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

[Liberia's Constitution adds property holding clause.]

Original but draws on **U.S. (1787), Art. II, Sec. 1, Paragraph 6, p. 17:** The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: -- "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

ARTICLE IV: Judicial Department

Section 1: The Judicial power of this Republic shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such subordinate courts as the Legislature may from time to time establish. The Judges of the Supreme Court and all other Judges of Courts, shall hold their office during good behavior; but may be removed by the President on the address of two thirds of both houses for that purpose, or by impeachment and conviction thereon. The Judges shall have salaries established by law, which may be increased, but not diminished during their continuance in office. They shall not receive any other perquisites or emoluments whatever from parties or others, on account of any duty required of them.

U.S. (1787), Art. III, Sec. 1, p. 18: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Also see **Conn. (1818), Art. V, Sec. 1-3, p. 263:** The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of errors, a superior court, and such inferior courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish; the powers and jurisdiction of which courts shall be defined by law.

There shall be appointed in each county a sufficient number of justices of the peace, with such jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases as the general assembly may prescribe.

The judges of the supreme court of errors, of the superior and inferior courts, and all justices of the peace, shall be appointed by the general assembly, in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. The judges of the supreme court, and of the superior court, shall hold their offices during good behaviour; but may be removed by impeachment, and the governor shall also remove them on the address of two-thirds of the members of each house of the general assembly; all other judges

Sec. 2 The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls, and those to which a County shall be a party. In all other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Legislature shall from time to time make.

and justices of the peace shall be appointed annually. No judge or justice of the peace shall be capable of holding his office after he shall arrive at the age of seventy years.

U.S. (1787), Art. III, Sec. 2, Paragraphs 1-2, p. 18: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; -- to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; -- to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -- to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party; -- to Controversies between two or more states; -- between a State and Citizens of another State; -- between Citizens of different States; -- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States; and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

ARTICLE V: Misc. Provisions

Section 1: All laws now in force in the Commonwealth of Liberia and not repugnant to this constitution, shall be in

Maine (1820), Art. X, Sec. 3, p. 800: All laws now in force in this State, and not repugnant to this constitution,

force as the laws of the Republic of Liberia, until they shall be repealed by the Legislature.

Sec. 2 All judges, magistrates, and other officers now concerned in the administration of justice, in the commonwealth of Liberia, and all other existing civil and military officers therein, shall continue hold and discharge the duties of their respective offices, in the name and authority of the Republic, until others shall be appointed and commissioned in their stead, pursuant to this Constitution.

Sec. 3 All towns and municipal corporations within the Republic, constituted under the laws of the Commonwealth of Liberia, shall retain their existing organizations and privileges, and the respective officers thereof shall remain in office, and act under the authority of this Republic, in the same manner and with the like powers as they now possess under the laws of said Commonwealth.

Sec. 4 The first election of President, Vice President, Senators and Representatives, shall be held on the first Tuesday in October in the Year of our Lord, Eighteen Hundred and Forty Seven, in the same manner as election of members of the Council are held in the Commonwealth of Liberia and the votes shall be certified and returned to the Colonial Secretary, and the result of the election shall be ascertained; posted and notified by him, as is now by law provided, in case of such members of Council.

shall remain and be in force until altered or repealed by the legislature or shall expire by their own limitation.

Maine (1820), Art. X, Sec. 5, p. 800: All officers provided for in the sixth section of an act of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, passed on the 19th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nineteen, entitled "An act relating to the separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts proper, and forming the same into a separate and independent State," shall continue in office, as therein provided; and the following provisions of said act shall be a part of this constitution; subject, however, to be modified or annulled, as therein is prescribed, and not otherwise.

Original

Original

Sec. 5: All other elections of President, Vice President, Senators and Representatives, shall be held in the respective towns on the first Tuesday in May in every two years to be held and regulated in such manner as the Legislature may by law prescribe. The returns of votes shall be made to the Secretary of State, who shall open the same, and forthwith issue notices of the election to the persons apparently so elected, Senators and Representatives, and all such returns shall be by him laid before the Legislature at its next ensuing session, together with a list of the names of the persons who appear by such returns, to have been duly elected Senators and Representatives; and the persons appearing by said returns to be duly elected, shall proceed to organize themselves accordingly as the Senate and House of Representatives. The votes for President shall be sorted, counted and declared by the House of Representatives. And if no person shall appear to have a majority of such votes the Senators and Representatives present, shall in convention by joint ballot, elect from among the persons having the three highest number of votes, a person to act as President for the ensuing term.

Sec. 6: The Legislature shall assemble once at least in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in January unless a different day shall be appointed by law.

Sec. 7: Every Legislator and other officer appointed under this constitution shall before he enters upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe a solemn oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this Republic, and faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of such

Original.

Original.

Maine (1820), Art. IX, Sec. 1, pp. 797-8: Every person elected or appointed to either of the places or offices provided in this constitution, and every person elected, appointed, or commissioned to any judicial, executive, military, or other office under this State,

office. The presiding officer of the Senate shall administer such oath or affirmation to the President, in convention of both houses, and the President shall administer the same to the Vice President, to the Senators, and to the Representatives in like manner. When the President is unable to attend, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may administer the oath or affirmation to him at any place, and also to the Vice President, Senators and Representatives, in Convention. Other officers may take such oath or affirmation before the President, Chief Justice, or any other person who may be designated by law.

Sec. 8 All elections of public officers shall be made by a majority of the votes, except in cases otherwise regulated by the Constitution or by law.

Sec. 9 Offices created by this Constitution which the present circumstances of the Republic do not require that they shall be filled, shall not be filled until the Legislature shall deem it necessary.

Sec. 10 The property of which a woman may be possessed at the time of her marriage, and also that of which she may afterwards become possessed, otherwise than by her husband, shall not be held responsible for his debts; whether contracted before or after marriage.

Nor shall the property thus intended to be secured to the woman be alienated otherwise than by her free and voluntary consent, and such alienation may be made by her either by sale devise or otherwise.

Sec. 11: In all cases in which estates are insolvent, the widow shall be entitled to one third of the real estate during her natural life, and to one third of the per-

shall, before he enter on the discharge of the duties of his place or office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I, _____, do swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and of this State, so long as I shall continue a citizen thereof: So, help me God." "I, _____, do swear that I will faithfully discharge, to the best of my abilities, the duties incumbent on me as _____, according to the constitution and the laws of the State: So help me God." Provided, that an affirmation in the above forms may be substituted, when the persons shall be conscientiously scrupulous of taking and subscribing an oath.

Original.

Original.

Original. Goes directly against Anglo-Saxon tradition of jurisprudence and Greenleaf's argument in his article, "On the Legal Rights of Women"³⁸.

Original. Same as Sec. 10 above.

sonal estate, which she shall hold in her own right subject to alienation by her, by, devise or otherwise.

Sec. 12 No person shall be entitled to hold real estate in this Republic, unless he be a citizen of the same. Nevertheless this article shall not be construed to apply to Colonization, Missionary, Educational, or other benevolent Institutions, so long as the property or estate is applied to its legitimate purposes.

Sec. 13 The great object of forming these Colonies, being to provide a home for the dispersed and oppressed children of Africa, and to regenerate and enlighten this benighted continent, none but persons of color shall be admitted to citizenship in this Republic.

Sec. 14 The purchase of any land by any citizen or citizens from the aborigines of this country for his or their own use, or for the benefit of others, or estate or estates in fee simple, shall be considered null and void to all intents and purpose.

Sec. 15 The improvement of the native tribes and their advancement in the arts of agriculture and husbandry, being a cherished object of this government, it shall be the duty of the President to appoint in each county some discreet person whose duty it shall be to make regular and periodical tours through the country for the purpose of calling the attention of the natives to these wholesome branches of industry, and of instructing them in the same, and the Legislature shall, as soon as it can conveniently be done, make provisions for these purposes by the appropriation of money.

Sec. 16 The existing regulations of the American Colonization Society, in the Commonwealth, relative to emigrants,

Original. Delicately balances the interests of the ACS against the Republic's on the one hand, and the concerns of Bassa against the other counties on the other. Apparently based on the 1838 **Montserrado Draft** constitution³⁹.

Original. For local antecedent, see the **Montserrado Draft** constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3⁴⁰.

Original.

Original.

Original. Goes against Greenleaf's recommendations to the Convention.

shall remain the same in the Republic, until regulated by compact between the Society and the Republic; nevertheless, the Legislature shall make no law prohibiting migration. And it shall be among the first duties of the Legislature, to take measures to arrange the future relations between the American Colonization Society and this Republic.

Sec. 17: This constitution may be altered whenever two thirds of both branches of the Legislature shall deem it necessary. In which case the alterations or amendments, shall first be considered and approved by the Legislature, by the concurrence of two thirds of the members of each branch, and afterwards by them submitted to the people, and

v .

[Underlined portion substituted for the simple majority found in Maine's constitution.]

Maine (1820), Art. X, Sec. 4, p. 800: The legislature, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, may propose amendments to this constitution; and when any amendment shall be so agreed upon, a resolution shall be passed and sent to the select men of the several towns and the assessors of the several plantations, empowering and directing them to notify the inhabitants of their respective towns and plantations, in the manner prescribed by law, at their next annual meetings in the month of September, to give in their votes on the question whether such amendment shall be made; and if it shall appear that a majority of the inhabitants voting on the question are in favor of such amendment, it shall become a part of this constitution.

Endnotes

1. C.H. Huberich, *The Political and Legislative History of Liberia*, 2 Vols, New York, 1947, pp. 821-2.
2. The standard work on the American Colonization Society is P. J. Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
3. Joyce Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 125; also Thomas L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 1," in *The Antislavery Debate*, ed. Thomas Bender (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 107-160.
4. Donald G. Mathews, *Religion in the Old South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 190.
5. C.P. Burrowes, 'Black Christian Republicans: Delegates to the 1847 Liberian Constitutional Convention.' *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1989) and C.P. Burrowes, "Black Christian Republicanism: The Cosmology of the 1847 Liberian Constitution." Paper presented to the First Annual Liberia Symposium, Virginia State University, Petersburg, October 1989, cited hereafter as "Burrowes, 1989b."
6. B. Poore, *The Federal and State Constitutions of the United States*, Washington, DC, 1878.
7. For example, A.P. Blaustein and M. G. Kitay, 'Liberia' In A.P. Blaustein and G.H. Flanz (eds.). *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1975 -, (looseleaf), p. 3.
8. Huberich, pp. 821-2.

9. R.T. Brown, 'Simon Greenleaf and the Liberian Constitution of 1847,' *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1980-81), p. 53.
10. Republic of Liberia, *The Independent Republic of Liberia: Its Constitution and Declaration of Independence ... Issued Chiefly for Use by the Free People of Color*, Philadelphia, 1848, cited hereafter as *Liberia*, p. 16; and Huberich, pp. 803-4, quoting Governor Robert's 1846 report to the Colonial Council.
11. *Liberia*, p. 16; also Huberich, pp. 638, 649-50, 819. These figures, which do not include the neighboring colony of Maryland in Africa, may have been somewhat inflated since they were given by Samuel Benedict, constitution convention president, in a publication intended to win friends for Liberia among people of color in the United States.
12. Samuel Benedict in *Liberia*, p. 10; Hilary Teage in American Colonization Society, *Annual Report*, Jan. 19, 1847, p. 21, cited hereafter as *ACS Annual Report*. In fact, 'The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here' would become Liberia's motto, engraved into the national seal.
13. Huberich, pp. 638-9, 641, 646, 677, n.1.
14. Brown, p. 52; A. Johnson and D. Malone (eds.). *Dictionary of American Biography*, Vol. IV, New York, 1960, pp. 583-4
15. Huberich, p. 823.
16. *Maryland Colonization Journal*, November, 1847, p. 77, cited hereafter as *MCJ*.
17. Huberich, pp. 670-72, and *African Repository*, January, 1848, pp. 28-9, cited hereafter as *AR*.

18. T.A. Shick, 'A Quantitative Analysis of Liberian Colonization from 1820 to 1843 with Special Reference to Mortality.' *Journal of African History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1971), pp. 46, 51.
19. *AR*, August 1849, pp. 236-7. At the risk of overstating the point, this concern for stripping away ornamentation extended beyond the Constitution: Liberia's national seal lacks the awe-inspiring, superstition-laden symbols common to emblems of that period. In place of the all-seeing eye and other referents to the ancients, Liberia's carries a ship, a plow and a dove with a letter in its beak, all reflecting a faith in the rising age of commerce, global interdependence and modernity.
20. *ACS Annual Report*, Jan. 19, 1847, pp. 21-4. Teage went on to claim that the planting of an independent black nation was 'The grand object which at first brought us to Africa.' This might have been one motivation of Teage's parents and other freed blacks, but it probably did not apply to all repatriates, especially those ex-slaves who were manumitted on the condition that they emigrate to Liberia.
21. Huberich, p. 839.
22. A.L. Higginbotham, *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period*, New York, 1978.
23. Article V, Sec. 12 and 13; for the positions of Greenleaf and the ACS on these issues, see Brown, p. 54.
24. Huberich, pp. 816, 839.
25. C.A. Cassell, *Liberia: History of the First African Republic*, New York, 1970, p. 142; for another Teage poem, see E. Holden, *Blyden of Liberia*, New York, 1966, p. 142.
26. Huberich, pp. 831-2.

27. On African-American theology, see E. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*, New York: Vintage, 1976, pp. 232-55; S. Stuckey, *Slave Culture in America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 93-97; L.W. Levine, *Black Culture and Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought From Slavery to Freedom*, Oxford, 1978, pp. 43-53.
28. Burrowes, 1989b.
29. For an insightful discussion of civic humanism, see J.P. Greene, *The Intellectual Heritage of the Constitutional Era*, Philadelphia, 1986, p. 36. Greene holds that, according to civic humanists, "virtue was attainable only by men of independent property, preferably in land, whose independent holdings would permit them to cultivate the intensely autonomous behaviour that alone could preserve the polity in a stable and uncorrupted state. ... a virtuous polity was presided over by proud independent citizens who gloried in their capacity to defend the state with a citizen militia... To prevent the degeneration of a virtuous government into a corrupt one, civic humanist writers stressed the utility of institutional devices such as rotation in office and frequent elections."
30. Liberia, p. 10.
31. Huberich, p. 865.
32. A. Alexander, *A History of Colonization on the Western Coast of Africa*, Philadelphia, 1847, p. 537-8.
33. AR, Nov. 1, 1841, pp. 323-25.
34. Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives at their First Session, held in Monrovia, January and February 1847. Taken from Huberich.

35. Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to Poore, *The Federal and State Constitutions*.
36. Huberich, p. 640, and Dunn/Holsoe, p. 46.
37. For possible source, see Teage's articles in the *African Repository* for arguments similar to that made in this section, especially *AR*, July 1851, pp. 199-200; *AR*, September 1851, p. 269; *AR*, November 1853, p. 349.
38. Brown, p. 60, n. 25.
39. Huberich, p. 640.
40. Huberich, p. 640.

Liberian Agriculture: History and Status Toward the Twenty-first Century

Cyril E. Broderick, Sr.

Abstract

The progress of agriculture in Liberia was halted by the recent civil war. Recent war activities caused serious problems and a retrogression in Liberian agriculture. There has been a loss of physical equipment, including pumps, tractors and other machinery, and especially human resources. The objective of this article is, consequently, to assess Liberia's agricultural opportunities historically, then determine the status of agriculture by the end of 1996. The methodology of this work involved a survey and review of reports on policies and projects in Liberia for their successes. Literature and reports are scarce, but there were many references to policies and projects. Furthermore, their impacts were generally noted and cross-referenced in many facets of Liberian life. This assessment found that there is historical opportunity for food and tree crop production in Liberia. Production of other crops, both animals and plants, is crucial to food security, growth and development. The indication is that rice and cassava will continue to be major food crops. It is noted that vegetables, cattle, poultry and swine should not be neglected. With large import food bills and low per capita income, impoverishment and poor nutrition result, and widespread poverty was maintained. With governmental and institutional support for agriculture, there can be greater production that will assist in the provision for education, industry, trade, and economic growth and development of Liberia.

Introduction

The area of the Grain Coast that now is Liberia has a history of copious production and marketing of some very important agricultural

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commodities and products (Johnson, 1906; Maugham, 1920; Brown, 1941; Marinelli, 1964; Smith, 1987). In recent years, however, Liberian agriculture has lost a large number of the inputs, and the system has become quite underproductive. Trained agricultural personnel was lost in the mass exodus of the Liberian population beginning with the military coup d'état of April 12, 1980, followed by the civil war that ran from December, 1989 through 1996. Food production and commodity processing for added value and manufacturing declined drastically over the same period, and agricultural productivity suffered. Agricultural machinery, an important input to cultivation, harvesting and pre-processing of produce, virtually disappeared, and the level of intrinsic agricultural inputs dwindled. Clones, improved varieties, and bred cultivars of rubber, rice, coffee, cocoa, oil palm, cassava and other important crop species have been abandoned and lost. Improved breeds of cattle, swine, and poultry were also killed and consumed and progeny lost during the period of the 1980s and '90s. In the same scenario, however, there has been migration, emigration, and some human population growth, especially in large towns and cities, and a resultant increase in import of food through food aid. Other essential agricultural products have been secured through expenditure of scarce moneys, and there has been a complete cessation of research and development in the agricultural sector.

The year 1996 represented the first year with sustained non-belligerence over several months. With the end of such active belligerence, there is hope that certain basic infrastructure will remain in the Liberian agricultural system. The opportunity consequently exists for directed growth and development to secure a modern, productive, and sustainable agricultural system in Liberia. What has to be done to stimulate agricultural growth and development includes the following: Policy determination; investment in agricultural machinery, pre-processing and processing facilities, the building of food storage facilities, and the re-establishment of basic, applied and adaptive research. The technology these inputs provide is a strong investment in Liberian agriculture and the Liberian people.

Also, economic, marketing, and sociological factors that support agriculture must be developed. A strategic approach to agriculture must be conceived to ensure that agriculture will establish a wide economic base for improved human nutrition, education, and an up-graded standard of living. Agriculture is a primary industry, but it touches every other industry. The stimulus from agriculture shall be defining to every facet of growth in the Liberian economy.

This article is written to characterize changes that have occurred in Liberian agriculture in the most recent past. It indicates how agricultural investment can provide the base for reconstruction and development....

This article is written to characterize changes that have occurred in Liberian agriculture in the most recent past. It indicates how agricultural investment can provide the base to the reconstruction and development of this war-ravaged country. It emphasizes that much of the ingredients for agricultural development must be locally based, but it is also essential to court foreign investment (capital) in Liberian agriculture. The primary outlook is through the production of agricultural crop plants, but plants feed animals and feed availability determine animal production. People make the /agricultural process work, and factors, including roads and transportation, and the supply of money are factors that will also be mentioned. A complementary paper will follow to discuss strategies for the reconstruction of agriculture in Liberia.

Methodology

Most reports about Liberia are about the political life of the so-called "Negro Republic." Little focus has been made on what productively

maintained the Nation. This analysis consequently relies largely on historical accounts of Liberia, focusing on observations and reports about agricultural activity. Among the citations featured here are *Liberia*, first published in 1906 under the authorship of Harry Johnston, *The Republic of Liberia* by R. C. F. Maugham and published by the Negro Universities Press in New York in 1920, and *The Economic History of Liberia*, written by George W. Brown and published in 1941 by the Associated Publishers of Washington, D.C. Other important accounts come from Nathaniel R. Richardson's *Liberia's Past and present*, as published by The Diplomatic Press and Publishing Company of London in 1959. Saha (1990) published a study on economic and social development in Liberia titled *A History of Agriculture in Liberia, 1822 – 1970: Transference of American Values*. The book is a reflection on literature and casual observations about Liberia. It discusses stereotypes, and the author is sometimes ambiguous about his facts. Although it states 1822 to 1970 in the title, it discussed the decade of 1970 to 1980 as an afterthought in its Chapter 8. This reference is not substantially agricultural in presentation, but it provides some thoughts about agricultural development that may be relevant in the discussion of Liberian agriculture.

Among other significant publications are *Behold the Promised Land* by Tom W. Shick, as copyrighted in 1977 by the Johns Hopkins University Press, and *Proceedings of the Liberian Agricultural Policy Seminar (1985)* in Yekepa, Nimba County, Liberia, as published by the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture in Monrovia, Liberia. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations maintains an enormous electronic database publication of statistics of its member countries. The FAO's selection on Liberia is tremendous and impressive, and descriptions about how data were collected even during the war years reflect a unique commitment of the Organization in fulfilling the diverse roles of the United Nations.

Data were generally cross-referenced among texts and other print and electronic reports for reliability, but especially with the new electronic

data system, care must be exerted and data must be scrutinized. The FAO data on chickens and ducks may be the reflection of an underestimation, and the entries of population data for Liberia changed from 2.575, 2.661, 2.751, 2.845, 2.941, and 3.039 million people for 1990 to 1995, respectively, in the March 31, 1997 database to 2.575, 2.500, 2.364, 2.215, 2.119, and 2.123 million people for the same period 1990 to 1995. This emphasizes the need for close scrutiny of data, especially electronic data, whose accuracy may depend on the date of entry. Generally, however, the significance of the availability of such data cannot be underestimated.

Results

Historical Agriculture: We found that historical agricultural productivity has been centered on a variety of crops at different times. Rice (*Oryza sativa*) has been the most important, for it has been the staple of the Liberian population for centuries. Part of the rice heritage is the historical name of geographic Liberia -- the Grain Coast -- although some regard the name with reference to the grains of paradise or Malegueta pepper than to grains of rice. *Manihot esculenta* (cassava) is a second food crop of historical importance. Cultivation and consumption of these two crops are very widespread, and they have served as staples in times of scarcity and plenty.

Several other crops have been important to Liberian agriculture. Coffee (*Coffea* spp.), cocoa (*Theobroma cocoa*), and oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) have served well in enhancing agricultural production and economic diversity of Liberian agriculture. These crops have earned millions of dollars over the years, and these crops will have to continue to contribute to Liberia's economy.

The Nineteenth Century: The establishment of the political entity of Liberia in the forested tropics of West Africa challenged the inhabitants with the need for self-sufficiency. Agricultural productivity was essential to that goal, and the need was the first basis of cooperation and collaboration

between the original inhabitants and the settler population of Liberia. Rice, cassava, wild rubber, palm kernels, cocoa, and coffee were among the first agricultural commodities produced.

Since then, other agricultural products have served as exchange commodities in traditional and international commerce. Liberia exported dyes, woods, grains internationally, and sugar to the United States during the U. S. Civil War when sugar import to U. S. North from the U. S. South was interdicted. The role of agricultural products in commerce has not gone away. Local commerce is important, but international commerce has increased to the extent that the role to be played by agriculture in Liberia is clearly emphasized.

The Twentieth Century: The Twentieth century ushered in new developments in agriculture. The British had introduced Hevea rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*), and a Hevea rubber plantation was established at Mount Barclay near Monrovia between 1906 and 1910. The success of Hevea trees stimulated the adoption of Hevea as a crop in a multitude of farms. Trade improved, and production of palm kernels, cocoa, coffee and other crops increased dramatically. Liberia's agricultural base became stronger.

Investments in agriculture were quickly recognized as a potential major source for the development of Liberia. The critical need for agriculture was indicated by Marinelli (1964), who wrote:

Although Liberia is the oldest Negro Republic in Africa, its economy is still young and growing. The road of independence has been uphill, lonely and difficult. During Liberia's early decades of independence, the British and French were antagonistic toward what they considered a threat to their colonial ambitions as well as a refutation of the assumption that the Black African was incapable of self-government. Across the Atlantic, Liberia's unofficial mother country, the United States, was still in the isolationist period of its history; its gestures of friendship were few and cautious. Nor did Liberia have easy-term foreign-aid programs to provide quick

remedies for financial crises. Pleas for aid fell upon the ears of unsympathetic bankers. For the first eighty years or more, each of Liberia's several loans was used to repay the last. The battle was for survival, leaving little room for development.

World Wars I and II: The great wars were a period during which Liberia became internationally recognizable, and Liberia became a lowly but important player in world affairs. This became possible because poor and rich people everywhere have similar needs. People however naturally seek to dominate others, and as others resist domination, a lot of mistrust ensues.

The importance of Liberia during World War I was its strategic alliance to England, France and Spain who were the trading giants of the day. When Germany forcibly sought a dominant role in world affairs, there was resistance by the Allied Powers. Liberia had good trading relations with the Germans, but because Liberia's size and circumstance emphasized civility as the recognized route to the solution of world problems, Liberia did not support the route taken by Germany in seeking a grander station in world affairs. For Liberia's stance, Monrovia was bombarded by German U-boats during the First World War.

The location of Liberia on the bulge of West Africa, directly across from the bulge of the Amazon in Brazil made Liberia a strategic prize for the Allies in World War II.

(In World War II), rubber for the war effort was in short supply, and the rubber trees of Liberian became even more strategically important to the Allies.

Planes had been built, and the shorter distance was a flyable route for planes from the United States to Brazil to Liberia, then to Senegal and other areas proximal to the Sahara, where Rommel, the German Desert Fox, caused havoc among the

war machinery of the Allies. An alternate route away from the European beachhead was essential to the Southern Europe and Africa arenas of the war. Liberia's role was lowly but critical.

A second and maybe more important role Liberia played in the war was through agriculture. By the middle of the war, the Japanese had captured the bulk of Southeast Asia. The "British" rubber plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia were in Japanese hands, and so were the "French" plantations in Indochina. Rubber for the war effort was in short supply, and the rubber trees of Liberia became even more strategically important to the Allies. American investment in a latex processing plant at the Firestone Plantations Company in Harbel and a Free Port of Monrovia were a result of the recognition of the need for rubber and the strategic importance of Liberia to the war effort of the Allies. The war ended in 1944 and 1945, and the Allies were the victors.

The Tubman Era: Demand for rubber and other products during World War II helped to establish primary industries in the towns and cities of Liberia. As Monrovia and other urban populations grew, so did the demand for agricultural products. Agricultural production increased, and investment into rubber production also increased. The level of mechanization rose with the spread of Hevea production in Liberian agriculture, and rubber and other tree crops became even more prominent in Liberian agriculture. William V. S. Tubman was President of Liberia from 1944 to 1971. He and his government encouraged agricultural production. This was partly supported by activity of the mining industry. Some revenues from iron ore export were directed to support agricultural development. Table I is a listing of major contributions to agriculture effected during the Tubman presidency. The larger rubber producers formed the Liberia Rubber Planters Association, an organization that assisted the use of improved management practices on Liberian rubber farms.

Tolbert and the 1970s: President Tolbert served as Vice-President

to President Tubman for many years. His experiences as a private citizen and in government made him appreciate the importance of agriculture. His rise to the presidency afforded him the opportunity to make requisite investments in concepts and ideas he had nursed over the years. He and President Tubman had significant investments in rural estates and rubber farms. Agricultural Development Projects had been initiated in the late 1960s, and they became an important facet of his national development policy. Non-coastal counties were to receive the bulk of the investment in the area development projects, and the Bong, Nimba, Lofa, and Grand Gedeh Agricultural Projects were off the ground. Investments were into the production and processing of rice, palm kernels, coffee, cocoa, and other agricultural commodities, and their production increased dramatically. The Liberian Palm Products Corporation (LPPC) and the Liberian Coffee and Cocoa Corporation (LCCC) were established.

Another very important initiative of the Tolbert government was the establishment, with the assistance of the Government of Israel, of the Agricultural Mechanization Company of Liberia (AGRIMECO). This company provided initial and immediate assistance in land clearing, bridge construction, and other heavy-machinery jobs, but other than their ability to repair and maintain the machinery in question, much of the agricultural work was a trial and error adventure.

There were other miscellaneous investments in agriculture, some public and others private. They included the formation of the Partnership for Progress (PFP) initiative that worked for the development of alternatives in agriculture in Nimba County, especially for the mining town, Yekepa, that was being threatened with loss of income due to the imminent closure of the iron ore mining operations in the Nimba mountains.

Other forces were operating in the economic, political and international arena that played out in agriculture by the end of the 1970s. Rice production in Liberia was increasing rapidly, but rice produced was

meeting stiff competition from the PL-480 Rice, rice purchased from the United States in a budgetary support arrangement. With government intervention by price fixing, the cost of rice became too high for most of the inhabitants of Monrovia, who were largely employed, directly or indirectly, by the Government in Monrovia. The culmination of these forces was "the Rice Riots" of April 14, 1979. People were killed in the uprising, and repercussions, some national and others international, were bound to emerge.

The growth in the production of local Liberian rice was in direct competition to the purchased imported rice, and conflict about whether rice price should be set by government regulations or by "market" forces were evident in politics in 1978 and 1979. The political fallout of the events surrounding the "Rice Riots" calamity day of April 14, 1979, was a trigger to the politics that followed. Agricultural questions had shown up as political crossroads. Some of the major installations in agriculture in Liberia during the Tolbert era are listed in Table II.

The Doe Era

A bloody military coup d'état hit Liberia on the morning of April 12, 1980. President William R. Tolbert and many members of his government were assassinated. The coup d'état ushered in a new government of non-commissioned officers and other military personnel and their collaborators. These new leaders had little formal schooling, and the quality of advice they received varied immensely, but the focus of investments was arms. Investments in farming came largely from the private sector, but many investors grew wary of inflationary forces and military interference in the economy. Resultantly, many finally disinvested in local agriculture and diverted their capital to other investments. Also, there was little foresight and focus on the direction of the country. Agricultural programming and development were resultantly left idle, and agricultural productivity began to decline.

Military investment increased heavily, but that was in contrast to the productive enterprise of agriculture and manufacturing. With the decline in agricultural productivity, imports increased, prices increased, and more discontent surfaced. Moreover, there was a devaluation of the Liberian dollar, beginning a major inflationary cycle.

In addition, there was rumbling in the alliance of the military who took over in 1980, and the infighting left many of them dead. The leader of the People's Redemption Council (PRC) Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, remained in control of the military leadership, and he tightened his grip on power and increased the number of his ethnic Khran tribesmen in the armed forces. By 1986, most of the official opposition to Sergeant Doe were dead, in exile, or jailed. Doe had installed himself as a civilian president after a 1985 election that was widely accepted as seriously flawed, but from which Sergeant Doe was declared winner by the Chairman of the Election Commission.

The entrenchment of a military government in power further robbed investment from agriculture, and agriculture declined further. Additionally, when Thomas Quiwonkpa, one of Doe's exiled cronies, returned to Liberia and failed in his attempt to overthrow President Doe, retribution to him and his tribesmen was swift and complete. The effect was that it seriously reduced the production of agricultural commodities in Nimba County, the north-central Liberian territory that was one of the more productive agricultural regions of the country, and Quiwonkpa's home county. This decline had additional rippling effects, and prices of food, goods, and services rose. Disgruntlement became more widespread when workers were paid wages that did not compensate them for their work due to inflation, and salary payments were very irregular and often delayed for several months at a time. Some investment was maintained in agriculture as a means of buffering the inflationary effects of money supply. Investment in agriculture, however, declined, and such investment eventually bottomed off with the

announcement of an invasion into Liberia through Nimba on December 24, 1989.

The Liberian Civil War years -- 1989 to 1996

During the Liberian Civil War of December 1989 to 1996, tens of thousands of people were displaced from one week to the next. Many of the young left, leaving behind most of the old, sick, and infirm. Populations shifted from one locality to the next to escape military clashes, but fighting continued around the country. The result was that agricultural production suffered immensely. Because of the method and cultural requirements for rice farming, planting cassava was an easier venture, than planting rice. In addition to this, seed stocks of rice for planting had to be consumed to prevent starvation in cases where there was no food. Rice production suffered, and cassava became the alternate staple food crop.

US Public Law (PL) 480 supply of rice directly through the Liberian government undermined rice production and trade in Liberia, partly contributing to the trauma of the 1979 Rice Riots in Monrovia.

In the devastation of agriculture, progress of the war went from Nimba County to Bong, Grand Bassa and Rivercess Counties, to Margibi, Montserrado, Cape Mount, Lofa and Bomi Counties, and to Sinoe, Maryland, Grand Kru and Grand Gedeh Counties, involving every region of the country in the waste of war. The effects were enormous, and the destruction to agriculture was fairly complete. See Table III.

Agricultural Production in Modern Liberia

The term modern Liberia reflects the period since the establishment of larger towns and cities around Liberia with public electric power supply. Areas that became even more important trading centers included cities and towns from the Atlantic coast to the heights of Zorzor, Voinjama, Saniquellie and Yekepa, and from the Cavalla River in the east to the Mano River in the west. From large towns like Bopolu, Gbarnga, Tchien, and Totota, agricultural products made their way to port towns and cities, including Robertsport, Monrovia, Marshall, Buchanan, Rivercess, Greenville, Sasstown, the Kru Coast, and Harper. Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) that trace the growth in agricultural production are presented in Table III. These data form the basis of the following analyses.

Food Crop Production

Food crops have been one of the primary purposes for agriculture in Liberia. Food for the family was a primary concern for the agrarian population of the earliest days. There was trade in food items, and food supplies from the States came with every ship. The supply, however, was only a complement to local production, and there was good trade between new settlements and the Chieftainships. When large villages or settlements were formed, residents maintained a farm in some proximity to the village. When larger towns and cities were formed later, the garden plot was small, and the dependency for food from the rural masses became the norm. Farmers, mainly traditional farmers, made good income from rice farms.

In the case of villages and towns in Harbel and areas associated with the Firestone Plantations Company, rice was imported and issued to workers as a part of their wages to reduce the need for Hevea plantation workers to take leave from their plantation jobs to make rice farms. It worked, but it increased Liberia's dependence on rice imports. As other large companies, including the Bong Mining Company (BMC) and the Liberian American Swedish Company (LAMCO), were established, the resolve to complement

wages with rice imports was maintained, and importation of rice into Liberia grew, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, a new craving for imported rice was established.

Also through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), food aid of rice, KLIM milk, and oils, in the '50s, '60s, and early '70s, the demand for imports reached new highs. There were imports of rice through the US Public Law (PL) 480 program to Liberia. This supply of rice directly through the Liberian Government undermined rice production and trade in Liberia, partly contributing to the trauma of the 1979 Rice Riots in Monrovia.

Rice is a major food crop for Liberia, and it is considered Liberia's staple, but there are other food crops. They include the cassava (*Manihot esculenta*), the yam (*Dioscorea alata*), sweet potatoes (*Iopomea batatas*), eddoes (*Xanthosoma malfafa*, also *Colocasia esculenta*), peanuts (*Arachis hypogea*), cowpeas and country peas (*Vigna sinensis*, *unquiculata* and other *Vigna* species), and numerous species of other legumes, fruits, spices, and vegetable crops. Common names of a few of the fruit crops are bananas, the mango plum, the golden plum, guavas, oranges, avocado, sour sop, bread fruits, palm fruits (palm nuts), the cola nut, and plantains, among others. Purseglove (1968) provide excellent coverage of the biology and production of these and other major tropical crops, that are very intrinsic to the life and welfare of people in the tropics, Liberia being no exception. The importance of these crops is indicated by the modern production history of rice, cassava, and sugar cane between 1961 and 1996. These data are presented in Figure 1. Sugar cane production increased with the establishment of LIBSUCO, The Liberia Sugar Corporation, but the company was short lived. Sugar cane production was maintained, however, because the cane is an important local snack as well as the raw material to the manufacture of important local alcoholic beverages. Cane juice is an important trading commodity when cash from other income-generating activities is scarce.

The response in production of rice to urbanization and inputs of machinery, pesticides, and fertilizers and other requisites to production, and its drastic decline during the Liberian Civil War of 1989 to 1996 are evident. For cassava, its steady production is evident, but with the decline in rice production during the Civil War, efforts went into the less cultivation demanding and less precariously productive cassava plant.

The oil palm plant is important in the production of palm oil, an important complementary food. Other traditional staples in the diets of Liberians have also been surveyed, and production statistics for these crops given in Figure 2. Statistics for other important crops such as peanuts, pulses, and fruits are not given, but they too are important to the nutrition of the Liberian people.

Cash Crops

Certain crop plants were consumed locally in small quantities, but were grown more specifically for trading purposes. These crops included cotton, coffee, cocoa, palm kernels, palm kernel oil, some palm oil, some coconut fruits and coconut oils, piassava, and sugar cane, among others. The species and diversity of crop plants that grow well in Liberia are enormous. In addition to the traditionally strong crops, other exotic crops, from mangosteen through the passion fruit, and the Brazil nut are produced in Liberia.

For the purposes of this report, we shall focus on the production of a few of these important crops to indicate their historic importance to Liberian agriculture. Figure 3 is a report on Hevea rubber production and palm oil production. Figure 4 compares the production of coffee, cocoa, and palm kernels. These are cash crops that relate significantly to farmers' cash income and national foreign exchange earnings. The Liberian Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC) and companies that existed prior to its establishment promoted the production and marketing of these crops.

Animal Production

Domesticated animal production in Liberia includes production of chickens (*Gallus domesticus*), swine (*Sus scrofa*), goats (*Capra* spp.), sheep (*Ovis aries*) and cattle (*Bos taurus*), but meat comes from a diversity of animals. Forested lands and low bush habitats are rich with a diversity of animals that provide meat for the table. Such animals include the deer, wild hog, and a variety of other animals (Strong, 1930). Many wild animals are harvested by hunters who do good business in rural areas, supplying meat to villages and towns in markets, and selling meat portions on highways throughout the country. Domesticated animals represent the wealth in terms of assets of families and communities. Such domestic animals are used in purchases, barter exchanges, and even in the payment of dowries in marriage. The interaction of traditional and newer trends in agriculture is in several surveys that were conducted at the College of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Liberia (McCourtie, 1968).

The poultry industry is old. Once individual families raised birds for the family and sold the extra, but some families were more productive. In recent history, commercial poultry houses have been established everywhere. The Sangai Farm in Bong County, owned by the Stephen Tolbert family, was recognized as a leading poultry producer. The family company, the Mesurado Group, Inc., supplied poultry food and medicines for many years through the 1960s and 1970s, but hundreds of commercial facilities existed, producing and supplying birds in quantities from as little as 100 and 200 birds to 10,000 birds and more. The rapidly growing towns and cities, including Yekepa, Monrovia, Harbel, depended on the supply of poultry meat for their inhabitants.

Swine production was equally widespread and commercial, and fresh and pork were widely available. Despite religious taboo about the consumption of pork by various religious sects, pork was readily available and widely consumed. Additionally, there was a significant importation of certain pork products, including the popular "pig foot." Raising pigs for meat was an adapted practice for families, schools, and businesses. Some swine research was done at research centers around the

country.

Cattle production was also very widespread, and several breeds were available. Ticks and the sleeping sickness disease, trypanosomiasis, were two factors that contributed to the precarious health of cattle and the resultant low production rate. The distribution of breeds and the size of herds, however, varied tremendously. The local N'Dama breed thrives in Liberia. It has a reputation of being resistant to trypanosomiasis, but its maturity size market weight is smaller than many other breeds. The Central Agricultural Research Institute, CAES/CARI, was able to introduce new and exotic breeds, including the Jersey, Zebu, and the Brahma, in selecting, breeding, and developing new lines that were adaptable for milk and meat production.

There were lots of successes, but the war was most devastating to these efforts, for soldiers and rebels in the civil war indiscriminately killed cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, and poultry. There is a story about the complaints by residents of a small town in western Liberia after a take-over by a rebel faction.

"The little boys come into our towns and kill all our chickens, goats, sheep, pigs and cattle," they complained. The commandant, who had invited them to the command post, listened intently to their queries, then answered, "I am glad you came by to express your dissatisfaction," he stated. "Ma'am," he addressed the leader, "We train those young people to kill people. When they kill only the animals, we are thankful. We will monitor their activities," he continued, "but we are happy that you are okay."

The population of cattle in Liberia is indicated in Figure 5. This figure is reflective of the slaughter of other farm animal population during the civil war after 1989.

Inputs to Liberian Agriculture

A focus on the level of inputs into Liberian agriculture is made in Figures 6 and 7. Tracking the number of tractors and the purchase of fertilizers, pesticides, poultry feed and medicines, and similar imports is important. It is clear that agricultural inputs were high in the early 1960s, buying with the financial resources obtained from iron ore mining. Between mid-1970 and 1980, new investments in coffee, cocoa and oil palm production were evident with the establishment of LCCC and LPPC. Rubber prices had been low to variable, and its production was stable. Investments in rubber also leveled off. Investment in agriculture hit a new low in 1980, but it picked up in 1981. Subsequently, however, there was a continuous decline in agricultural inputs. The relationship between inputs of agricultural requisites, including fertilizers and lime, and rice production is given in Figure 6. Figure 7 is plot that indicates the relationship between agricultural production and purchase of imported goods: Total production of coffee and cocoa correlate strongly with the importation of milk and other milk products into Liberia. Such strong correlation between agricultural production and purchases from the international market emphasizes the significant role of agriculture in national earnings, growth and development.

Despite emigration, starvation, deaths, and other trauma to Liberia's people, a large population remains in Liberia. Figure 8 is the growth curve of Liberia's population (FAO, 1997), and a derived comparison with per capita rice production.

Discussion

The agricultural history of Liberia is rich in its scope. It is a cornucopia of plants cultivated, demands satisfied, and contributions to Liberian markets and other world markets. Food crops are salient to the welfare of Liberians, and production levels are critical because of their limited access to and affordability of imported foodstuffs. Production of rice and other food crops was maintained at a subsistence level for many years in the early history of Liberia. During the 1950s and 1960s, the growth of

cities exerted new demands on Liberian agriculture. Self-sufficiency in rice declined to near 60 percent. In the 1970s, rice self-sufficiency rose to greater than 70 percent and close to the 80-percent level. Improved rice varieties such as Suacoco 8 and LAC 23 were high yielding and resistant to most diseases. In the '80s, rice production declined and reached critical low levels during the war. Cassava was in high demand, and the "Matadi" and the "Bassa Girl" cultivars were consumer favorites.

Indications are that peace and minimal inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, and the newer production technologies can readily reverse the current low level of agricultural production.

Rubber is the major cash crop produced in Liberia. Despite indications of certain cyclical changes in the Liberian climate, as indicated by Harbel data (Broderick, 1995), Liberia remains a haven for the production of Hevea rubber. Hevea rubber production occupies a very important place in Liberian agriculture, and Broderick (1995) also gave indications that Hevea plantation management is critical to sustainable rubber production. The critical periods for tree survival are the rainy season for disease infestation, and the dry season for water stress and fire damage. With appropriate management, however, rubber will remain an important agricultural commodity. Dr. Kenneth McIndoe initiated a legacy of research in rubber, bringing forth productive Harbel clones, including Harbel 10, Har 43, and Har 112, among others. Dr. McIndoe also bred oil palm cultivars, leaving many to refer to improved *Elaeis* clones as McIndoe palms. Dr. McIndoe's legacy is however strongest in his work with Hevea rubber.

Major companies investing in Hevea rubber production in Liberia include the Firestone Plantations Rubber Company in Harbel, Liberia (Taylor, 1956), the Liberia Rubber Company (LRC), a UniRoyal Company, in Grand Bassa, Liberia, Salala Rubber Corporation in Salala, Bong County, Liberia, many smaller expatriate companies. Also, a group of Liberian rubber farmers with mid to small farms formed the Liberia Rubber Planters'

Association.

Food is an important investment for the people of Liberia whose per capita income is in the world's lower tier. Without an internal sustainable production system, the people would be vulnerable to monetary supply, inflation, strife, war, and other caprices, both natural and artificial. Additional to production systems, a system for storage of food supplies cannot be overestimated for Liberia. Silos for the storage of rice and other grains, as well as food processing and manufacturing facilities, are a must. For reliable food supply and trade, all-weather roads and rails must be integrated. Rails should not only be for the export of ores, but also to transport agricultural commodities and products locally and internationally.

The Liberian government and private investors, both internal and foreign, must invest in various commodities and products of Liberia. Commodities refer to the raw materials that go into making finished goods; the different qualities of finished goods are referred to as products (Janick et. al., 1969; Samuelson, 1976; Cramer and Jensen, 1985). Cotton is the commodity that goes into making textile products, and coffee beans form the commodity that goes into making coffee beverage products. The economic necessity of agriculture is a given axiom, and every effort should be exerted to assure that the Liberian people benefit. In the midst of the Civil War, there were reports of vibrant unrecorded trade in Hevea rubber, cola, rice, and other agricultural commodities and products through non-traditional trading routes. Logs and timbers, gold and diamond were some of the non-agricultural products that were sold and traded during the 1989 to 1996 period. Monies earned helped in the import of sugar, milk, butter, margarine, and cheese, wheat flour, tomato, and the dozens of food products not manufactured in Liberia.

Agriculture must continue to also play roles in the provision of quality human nutrition, develop resources to support education of the masses, and provide resources for an improved standard of living for the Liberian people.

Kellogg (1975) wrote that cooperation between countries and between urban and rural people within countries is the closest thing to a "key" to agricultural development.

The recognition of the role of tree crops, including forest products, is strategic, and in planning for the future, we must build on the old technologies found in natural rubber production, as well as the efficiencies of coffee, cocoa, and oil palm production. It is also necessary to access and implement the new technologies, from fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds to techniques of genetic engineering and biotechnology.

A future of plenty is attainable, and there is room for tremendous growth and development. Liberia has lost much in the Civil War, from roads, buildings and machinery to schools, hospitals, and trained personnel. Rebuilding is difficult, but agriculture is the foundation to Liberia's growth and development. With Liberia's rich history, the momentum for growth, based on a productive agricultural system and an enlightened populace, can make for prosperity as Liberia moves into the Twenty-first Century.

Table I: Major contributions were made to agriculture during the Tubman Presidency. They included investments in education in agriculture, agricultural extension education, and marketing out-reach to farmers to acquaint them with promising varieties, cultivars, clones, fertilizer practices and equipment, among other kinds of investments in agriculture.

Education	Cuttington College, about ten years, up to 1960; thereafter, College of Agriculture and Natural Resources established with UN (FAO and UNDP) and Liberian Government funds at the University of Liberia. Human resources were attracted and developed.
Extension	Provided Extension for plant and animal production through the Department of Agriculture Offices in Counties and Territories around the Country.
Rubber Production	Liberia Rubber Planters' Association established to support production through the provision of fertilizers, loans for tapping cups, knives and stimulants, and in processing and marketing rubber products.
Marketing Cash Crops	Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation was effective in forming routes for the sale and export of coffee, cocoa, and oil palm products in the international market, especially to Europe.
Improving Palm Kernel Processing	Built an Oil Palm Kernel Processing Plant in the National Free Port of Monrovia. Adaptive Research Support Conceptualized and began the establishment of County Area
Development Projects (ADPs).	These projects provided improved planting materials and helped in the marketing of farm produce.
Mesurado Group of Companies	Poultry production facilities for egg and broiler production and fishing fleets were established by non-governmental entities.
Agricultural Research	Central Agricultural Experimental Station (CAES)

Table II: The approach of the use of public corporations to promote agricultural development was an approach of the Tolbert Administration. With this focus, many facilities were established to enhance the production of quality agricultural commodities and agricultural products.

Corporation Established	Scope of Activities
Liberia Palm Products Corporation (LPPC)	Oil palm and Coconut Advisory and Support for all phases of the production process.
Liberia Coffee and Cocoa Corp (LCCC)	Coffee and Cocoa Advisory and Support for all phases of the production process
The Agricultural Mechanization Company	To design, modify, and make machinery available for agricultural activities, including land-clearing, planting, and harvesting
Area Development Projects (ADPs)	Expanded activity, especially extension role and adaptive research activities.
Agricultural Research	Expanded research activities at the University, and expanded the research activities at CAES, renamed the Central Agricultural Research Institute)
Liberia Sugar Corporation (LIBSUCO)	Corporation to produce sugar. It was established in Maryland County and promoted the cultivation of sugar cane. At different times during the life of the Corporation, bilateral support came from the Chinese governments in Taiwan or Peking.
Rice Research	Established the West Africa Research and Development Association (WARDA) with objectives to improve rice varieties and develop improved practices through research.

Table III. A time-series survey of the production of a selection of four major plant food crops (paddy rice, cassava, vegetables and palm oil), one representative food import, sugar, cattle production; three major plant cash crops, Hevea rubber, coffee, and cocoa; three factors intrinsic to agricultural production in Liberia, namely tractor import, agricultural requisite imports, and pesticide imports; and Liberia's population. Source: The FAOSTAT database at <http://www.fao.com>. Reported by permission of the Food and Agriculture of the United Nations, (FAO) Ref. No. A53/1997.

YEAR UNIT*	Pa Rice Th MT	Cassav Th MT	Vegeta Th MT	Palm O Th MT	Sug Im Th MT	Cattle Th Hds	Hevea Th MT	Coffee Th MT	Cocoa Th MT	Tractor MS Im	AgReq MS Im	Pestici MS Im	Popula Million
61	115	250	48.0	7	1.8	19	41.2	3.4	0.7	0.99	1.20	0.18	1.068
62	120	250	48.3	8	2.5	20	45.4	3.8	0.8	1.21	1.41	0.17	1.098
63	125	255	48.5	10	2.9	21	41.3	3.7	1.0	2.60	2.89	0.22	1.129
64	130	252	48.7	10	2.3	22	43.3	3.5	1.5	0.93	0.76	0.44	1.161
65	135	255	49.0	13	4.0	23	52.7	3.2	0.7	0.54	0.69	0.25	1.195
66	141	255	49.2	13	4.2	24	55.3	8.9	1.5	0.11	1.04	0.47	1.230
67	142	260	50.3	14	4.3	25	62.6	4.3	1.4	0.86	0.99	0.25	1.267
68	152	260	51.2	14	3.9	26	64.7	4.7	2.3	0.19	0.95	0.27	1.305
69	163	265	51.8	14	4.1	27	65.6	4.3	1.9	0.25	1.35	0.51	1.345
70	190	265	52.6	14	6.5	28	83.4	5.0	1.6	0.74	1.84	0.42	1.385
71	200	267	53.6	15	6.9	30	84.6	5.5	2.6	0.36	1.36	0.45	1.427
72	210	267	54.6	16	6.2	31	83.3	5.6	3.2	0.55	2.53	0.42	1.470
73	225	250	55.7	17	7.9	32	86.0	6.9	2.4	0.45	2.35	0.41	1.515
74	248	255	56.7	19	5.8	33	88.5	3.4	3.3	3.12	10.26	0.71	1.561
75	229	252	58.0	23	3.5	34	82.3	4.2	3.2	2.65	8.79	0.64	1.609
76	245	275	59.5	24	7.0	35	84.5	4.2	2.5	2.63	7.38	0.84	1.659
77	256	285	60.5	25	7.4	36	77.8	10.1	2.0	3.24	8.42	0.93	1.710
78	244	295	61.2	25	7.2	37	78.0	8.7	4.0	2.02	10.11	1.33	1.763
79	249	300	62.7	26	7.1	38	78.9	8.2	3.4	1.09	10.02	1.52	1.819
80	243	300	64.2	27	5.7	39	81.4	12.7	3.7	0.18	6.09	1.45	1.676
81	269	300	64.3	25	3.9	40	82.3	8.4	6.7	1.96	8.59	1.63	1.934
82	284	300	67.0	30	4.5	41	75.0	11.8	4.6	0.73	4.23	1.02	1.991
83	290	270	71.2	30	8.9	42	81.0	7.5	5.7	0.49	3.65	1.50	2.051
84	298	218	72.5	34	8.2	42	93.5	11.5	6.2	0.59	10.75	1.95	2.120
85	289	282	75.0	34	6.2	42	97.1	9.0	5.0	0.65	7.37	2.00	2.199
86	282	306	76.0	35	9.5	42	100.7	9.0	4.0	0.70	8.20	2.10	2.297
87	298	372	77.0	35	10.4	42	106.8	4.2	3.1	0.60	8.01	2.15	2.409
88	298	447	77.0	35	13.0	42	108.4	3.6	3.0	0.63	8.11	1.80	2.512
89	294	446	77.0	35	9.8	40	106.0	4.8	6.0	0.65	7.84	1.90	2.574
90	250	350	71.0	30	5.0	38	40.0	1.6	2.0	0.55	5.90	1.70	2.575
91	130	350	71.0	25	4.3	37	19.0	1.3	2.0	0.58	6.33	1.50	2.500
92	110	390	71.0	25	4.3	36	32.0	3.0	0.5	0.50	5.50	1.60	2.364
93	65	425	71.0	30	7.1	36	45.0	3.0	0.3	0.60	5.57	1.60	2.215
94	50	450	76.0	38	7.0	36	31.0	3.0	0.4	0.60	5.60	1.60	2.119
95	56	450	76.0	38	7.5	36	31.0	3.0	0.4				2.123
96	55	450	76.0	38		36	31.0	3.0	0.4				2.245

* Th MT = Thousands of metric tons; Th Hds = Thousands of Heads; SM Im = Millions of dollars of import; and Millions of people.




Figure 1: The comparative production of rice and cassava, the major staple foods, and sugar cane, a crop that is widely used as a snack. It is also used to produce a local grain alcohol.




Figure 2: Other important food crops, including sweet potatoes, yams, groundnuts (peanuts), pulses, and vegetables, are complementary crops in the feeding of Liberia.




Figure 3: The production of Hevea rubber and palm oil. Hevea rubber is a very important cash crop, and palm oil is a food crop and a cash crop. Note that in the 90s, palm oil production reached the level of Hevea rubber production.




Figure 4: Production of coffee, cocoa, and palm kernels. These are crops that are produced and exported for cash. Foreign exchange earned is used in the import of many goods and services, from paper and books to automobiles, trucks and airplanes.




Table 5. Population of cattle since 1961, with a recognized decline in numbers since 1990. Similar, but more accentuated declines are indicated for poultry and swine, among other animals.




Figure 6: Agriculture responds to inputs. The correlation of 60 percent indicates the strong respond from rice. The correlation for coffee and cocoa combined is 42 percent, and rubber is 45 percent.




Figure 7: Income from coffee, cocoa, oil palm, and rubber are used in the purchase of essentials such as milk. The strong correlation (82%) between coffee and cocoa production and milk supply is testimony to the importance of such agricultural goods.




Figure 8. A per capita rice production of between 100 and 150 kg is a critical minimum for rice security in Liberia. The drop in Liberia's population after 1990 is evident. After 1990, per capita rice production dropped to under 50 kg per annum.

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A Review of African Psychology in West Africa

Boikai S. Twe

Introduction

After decades of investigation and reflections in the field of psychology, several psychologists like Wade Nobles (1986), Na'im Akbar (1994) and this author have come to realize that the notion of human psychology, as a study of the human soul or mind, is an ancient African invention.¹ In studying ancient African wisdom, one cannot easily make distinctions between psychology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, art, religion and politics because all of these disciplines were approached in a holistic and complimentary way to gain self-knowledge and spiritual transformation. Cheikh Anta Diop's theory² on the cultural unity of Black Africa and Edward Wilmot Blyden's theory³ on the moral excellence of African personality have followed this holistic and complimentary tradition while providing the theoretical framework for this discussion on African psychology.

Though, ancient African psychology is relatively unknown due to conquest, neglect and distortions, this article will attempt to review some empirical aspects of African life as a part of the next century's quest to reestablish internal order and truth (Maat) through self understanding. The ancient African objective of psychology was to know the soul and as Na'im Akbar (1994) suggests "to gain awareness of the full dimensionality of the soul" (p.8). In my view, it is the study and transformation of one's human potentials, spiritual consciousness and higher powers. I have shown in previous works like "A Perspective on the Psychological Disorders of Liberia" and "How to Improve African-American Education" that the optimal African psyche is African centered rather than Euroamerican centered. This is to say that African human potentials and soul have been and are best understood when they are studied and viewed through African

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traditions and creativity.

The discussion that follows will review some of the traditional African manifestations of self-study and collective practices among West Africans before Euroamerican enslavement and colonization. It will also review some of the psychological problems of

This article attempts to review some empirical aspects of African life as a part of the next century's quest to reestablish internal order and truth (Maat) through self-understanding

self-alienation, learned helplessness and self-destruction experienced by West Africans after the introduction of colonial and neocolonial domination. It will conclude by identifying some positive signs of the rebirth of African psychology. This discussion is a limited contribution to a complex project of promoting African self-study and collective responsibility in the 21st century. Two West African states, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and their religion, history, social organization, health, economic organization, political organization and creative production are discussed to illustrate the development of West African psychology. This cautious undertaking is with the awareness that African psychology is more complex than could be presented in this brief discussion. The 'mystical' aspects of African psychology found in astrology, alchemy and numerology will be avoided in this introductory discussion.

Traditional West African Psychology

Historically, Edward Wilmot Blyden (1888) suggests that three streams of influence helped to shape traditional West Africans, one from Egypt through Nubia and Hausa, another from Abyssinia through Yoruba and Ashanti, and the third from the Barbar States across the desert through

Timbuktu. He argues that West Africans have never been cut off commercially or culturally from Europe or Asia. West Africans in the precolonial period easily traveled to Egypt, Arabia and Jerusalem. Even today, these routes are still being used. West Africans helped to establish most of the major traditions of the human race, including psychology, in Egypt, India, Greece and Rome and were themselves influenced by these traditions through travel and trade.

Discussing the impact of wars on West Africans, Adu Boahen (1986) suggests that the Mane invasion from Mali around 1540 helped to reshape the West African mind on the Liberia/Sierra Leone frontier, in what is today the Cape Mount area. These Mande-speaking people settled among the Gola and Kissi and set up a major Mane Kingdom in the Cape Mount area which resulted in the establishment of smaller kingdoms among the Temne and Baga of Sierra Leone. This region developed a homogenous social organization in spite of its linguistic diversity of Kwa, Mel and Mende-speaking people. According to Blyden (1888), the Cape Mount area was called the "Paradise of New Guinea." It is no wonder that this "paradise" has been a frontier of West African unity and wars to this day. These historical accounts suggest that West Africans have always contributed to the major human traditions of self-understanding and collective security while promoting these values in their major traditional learning and cultural centers at Jenne and Timbuktu in precolonial times.

Religiously, the secret societies of West Africa played a major role in the government, economic and self-understanding of the people of Sierra Leone and Liberia. For example, the Poro and Sande secret societies promoted the spiritual and material links of the Mel and Mande-speaking people of Cape Mount and other areas of what is now Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (Sawyer, 1992). The Poro and Sande societies emerged out of the will and intent of West African males and females to better understand themselves and to maintain harmony and balance among themselves and their environment. To maintain Maat⁴ the feminine principle of truth,

harmony, justice, balance and right order, West Africans developed various symbols, rites and rituals to give meaning and complementarity to the visible-invisible, material-spiritual cognitive-emotive and male-female forces.

Arthur F. Kulah (1994) argues that in spite of the diversities in the beliefs and practices among traditional African religions, "they are united in their belief in God, ancestral spirits and other divinities, in life after death, and in their belief that human and all other creations are the extension of God" (p.69). He goes on to suggest that both males and females practice complimentary equality as religious leaders--village elders and priest physicians. Highlighting the traditional African principle of male-female equality, Cheikh Anta Diop (1989) argues that Africans attachment to the land through agriculture predisposed them to develop a mother-centered world view and religion as compared to a father-centered world view and religion found among more nomadic Europeans and Asians. Oba T'Shaka's (1995) recent study of Diop's matriarchy theory confirms the centrality of women and complimentary male-female equality in African traditional religious and family systems. This suggests that the traditional African mind maintains a masculine-feminine synthesis which is promoted by Maat, the mother principle of truth, justice and harmony. The will and intent of the African psychic to choose Maat gave birth to human civilizations in Africa.

As Egypt and Mesopotamia began to experience major confusion after Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman dominance, West African traditional religions began to be impacted by increased conversions and foreign domination. The African system of mother centeredness, moral excellence and male-female equality began to degenerate into male domination, war, environmental insensitivity and oppositional thinking. This same pattern of psycho-social dysfunctions occurred at the sources of the major world religions in Ethiopia and Egypt as they became increasingly hierarchical and patriarchal in response to hostile foreign forces and a gradual loss of self-knowledge.

The spread of Islam profoundly altered and realigned the character, feelings and conditions of many West Africans through its promotion of Arab culture, male domination, war, trade and literature. For example, Boahen (1986)

suggests that the Mane invaders from Mali of the 1500s lost their Islamic religion as they became absorbed by the far more numerous

West African family organization was “twinlineal,” which meant that men and women lived in relative equality....

non-Muslims in the Cape Mount area. However, by the 18th century Islam began to make headway into this same region due to the proselytizing and trading of the “Mandingos” (d’Azevedo, 1994). There is evidence that some West Africans like the Dogon of Mali and the Yoruba of Nigeria practiced patriarchy before the introduction of Islam, but even for them, mother-centeredness, complimentary and male-female religious authority was the norm (T’Shaka, 1995). However, overtime Islam obtained power, structures and military force to impose Arab and male religious dominance on West Africans in the empires of Mali and Songhai.

In the precolonial era, the underlying social structure of the village, town, district, state or tribe was patterned after the family organization. The family was considered to be the basic human unit of existence and not the individual. West African family organization was “twinlineal,” that meant that men and women lived in relative equality, with men and women jointly making decisions about every area of life (T’Shaka, 1995). West African family organization gave structure and legitimacy to all other social arrangements based on collectivity. Secret and age-grade societies like the Poro and Sande promoted male and female education, public religious ceremonies, and popular entertainment of dance and music. These male and female societies helped to unite separate ethnic communities behind common customs and practices of combining complimentary male-female forces.

Even the first Muslim Mandingos and Fulas to settle and trade in what is now Sierra Leone and Liberia were absorbed into these equalitarian social systems and practices (Boahen 1986).

Carl Burrowes (1993) suggests that by 1660 "polygyny was clearly established as the desirable form of marriage" along the coast of what is now Liberia even though this was an option mainly for men of "wealth and influence" (p.236). This seems to mark the period of the decline of West African male-female equality and the gradual impact of the Islamic influence along the West African coast. He suggests further that large households of about 13 to 15 persons per apartment were the norm along the coast of what is now Liberia. Women and children were well protected and sheltered.

To maintain a healthy community, West Africans practiced a form of socialized medicine which was available to everyone. According to Charles Finch (1983), traditional medicine had a magical-spiritual conception of diseases. Traditional male and female practitioners were intimately acquainted with the psychic, social and cultural nuances of their community. Priest-physicians and village elders used hundreds of animal, plant and mineral products in the treatment of illness. For example, among the Mano of Liberia, all children's diseases, obstetrics, and "everyday" complaints were handled by women, particularly the elderly women, while surgery, bonesetting and other major therapeutic problems were handled mostly by men. African invention and use of soap created a level of hygiene quite remarkable for the period.

Politically, the interior communities were more interconnected and influenced by Islam than coastal communities. Diop's (1987) study of precolonial political organization in West Africa suggests that there were two major types, monarchic and tribal. He argues that in the major empires of Ghana and Mali, West Africans lived under a matrilineal monarchic political organization and were detribalized in certain cities. He cites examples of West African states like Ashanti, Mossi and Cayor as

constitutional matrilineal monarchies which were typical of the political organization of non-Islamic West Africans. According to Diop, many of these matrilineal constitutional states remained in existence until 1870.

According to Blyden (1888), it was in the 9th century AD that Islam subdued North Africa and established its center at Timbuktu. It began to convert the most energetic and

... West Africans in the precolonial era were engaged in self-study, self-extension and the transformation of their psychic through collectivism and Matt (truth and justice)....

enterprising tribes of West Africa and began to build and occupy the largest cities in the heart of the continent. Most of these communities and kingdoms retained their indigenous substructures under an Arab superstructure. This capacity of the African soul to develop and respond to historical forces without losing essence reflects its unlimited capacity for transformation.

To a large extent, the economic and social systems of West Africans were derived from studying nature. The study of recurrent natural patterns and signs led to the development of African male-female joint control of economic activities and land use. Every member of a community had a home, sufficient food, clothing and other necessities of life. There was always enough to spare. The secret and age-grade societies of males and females exercised equal control over local trade and market prices (Boahen, 1986). In most cases, this male-female control over the economy was intended to encourage the widest distribution of wealth and to prevent it from being concentrated among a small number of individuals.

On economics and trade, Burrowes (1993) suggests that horticulture was the major economic activity of West Africa during the 1600s. Trading

of salt and kola nuts between the coast and interior was vigorous. He suggests further that there was an extensive long distance trade of gold and rice which went to Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. There were local standards of measure and currencies which European traders also adopted. Additionally, Diop (1987) suggests that there were modern-type commercial activities being conducted in the interior by detribalized merchant classes in the empires of Ghana and Songhai. The currency used consisted of salt, cowries or gold in either dust or pieces. He suggests that local minted gold coins were used as well. The production and trade of soap, iron, fabric and glass reached a semi-industrial stage. In fact, some of these products were superior to those produced in Europe at the time, according to Burrowes.

To summarize some of the empirical aspects of traditional African psychology, West Africans in the precolonial era were engaged in self-study, self-extension and the transformation of their psychic through collectivism and Maat (truth and justice); they established large women-centered states and kingdoms which provided unity and social stability to most of West Africa, including the Cape Mount area. Traditional secret and age-grade societies were mostly responsible for promoting self-understanding, self-mastery, male-female equality and joint control over every aspect of life. The use of symbolism in traditional Africa reflected both the will and intent of the African psychic to choose universal truth, harmony, justice and the natural transformation of itself. Traditional African psychology helped West Africans to achieve self-understanding, transformation and moral excellence through the mother-centered principle of male-female equality and collectivity.

Colonial West African Psychology

Columbus' voyage to America provided a new frontier which led to the transatlantic enslavement of Africans to build the "New World." West African psychology was deeply affected by the more than 300 years of wars and enslavement. Many West African men and states participated and

profited from the enslavement activities. The greatest disorders were felt in the maritime districts along the West African coast. Enslavement activities led to the displacement and death of 15-125 million Africans, according to some estimates (Boahen, 1986; Mazrui, 1994). The enslavement raids and wars created an atmosphere of general insecurity, impeded interregional trade and cultural activities while eliminating the indigenous industries which West Africans had created.

West African relations with Europe and America were radically changed by the industrial revolution between 1800-1830. Many Euroamerican industrialists, and humanitarians began to realize that Africans could be more profitably employed in Africa to produce raw materials and commodities needed by manufacturers. Additionally, manufactured goods could be sold to Africans at home. According to Adu Boahen (1986), this realization led to the abolition of slavery in England between 1807-1833 and the push for colonization. West African psychology was impacted by the colonization movement organized by Granville Sharp which landed more than 350 freed Africans from England to Sierra Leone in May 1787. In 1792, 1,131 Africans from Nova Scotia joined the new settlement, Freetown. After the English Parliament abolished the slave traffic in 1807, Sierra Leone was designated as the place for landing and sheltering Africans recaptured by the British Navy from slave ships. In March 1820, 88 African-American settlers from the United States arrived in Freetown. By 1822, some of these settlers were relocated to Dugbor, renamed Cape Mesurado, and settled on Dozoa Island, renamed Providence Island in what is now Liberia. On the annual rate of settlement, Blyden (1888) estimates that there was an average of two immigrations a year, averaging 250 new settlers coming to Liberia during the middle of the 19th century. Like Sierra Leone, Liberia was also designated by the United States as a place for landing and sheltering Africans recaptured by the US Navy from slave ships.

One can easily see that the abolition of the enslavement process began to involve Europeans and Americans more deeply into the affairs of West

Africans. To protect the activities of Western traders and missionaries, Europeans began to annex parts of West Africa. The need for control over trade and territorial rights led Liberians to declare their "so-called" independence from the American Colonization Society in 1847. For all of the above reasons, the development of the African psychic in West Africa was arrested by Euroamerican colonial, economic and political forces. These external forces dominated every corner of West Africa, after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 when European states laid down 'rules' for the partition and occupation of Africa.

The activities of Arab and Euroamerican missionaries contributed to the arrested development of African traditional mother-centered consciousness and the establishment of an unnatural and unjust colonial mentality. By 1795, the Wesleyan Missionary Society had already sent out a group of preachers to Sierra Leone; they went also to the Gambia in 1821, Ghana in 1834 and Yorubaland in 1840. After Liberia's independence, more than ten missions from the United States were operating in Liberia (Boahen, 1986). The educational and religious training of the people of Sierra Leone and Liberia, during the 19th century, rested wholly upon these missionaries. These Euroamerican and Arab religious missions had a stifling effect on the psychic of West Africans because they promoted continuous foreign dependency, patriarchal authority and the will for power over others, especially women. Further, these foreign missionaries' manipulations of religious symbols and myths led to the dysfunctional response of Africans deifying white and Arab males and dehumanizing themselves, especially African women. This led to a loss of morality, truthfulness, justice, harmony, intuition and the male-female equality found in traditional Africa's past.

In discussing colonial social organization, Adu Boahen (1986) suggests that colonialism introduced a new social class arrangement in West Africa based on locality, ethnicity and gender, especially after the European scramble and partition of Africa. This new social arrangement introduced greater urban-male privileges over the land and its resources and uneven

social development of the greater society. In each of these major social divisions were privileged and underprivileged subclasses. For example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone there were greater authority and privileges for the settlers and not for the indigenes, for the "mulatto" and not the "Negro" settlers, for the literate and not the illiterate indigenes, for the urban and not for the rural dwellers and for the male and not the female citizens. Discussing the disharmony introduced by colonialism, Blyden (1908) wrote "So much apprehension is felt for the future of Liberia as a State in Africa composed of African colonists. The settlers brought up under the individualistic ideas of the West could not understand that there is an African social and economic system most carefully and elaborately organized" (p.33). Strafes and cleavages introduced by colonialism increased individualism, disharmony, injustice, inequality and self-alienation among West Africans.

The psychic traumas of enslavement and colonization repressed the African soul and implanted the authority symbol of the colonial master to maintain order in the mind of the conquered African. This led Africans to subconsciously identify with whites as "the bringer of civilization and salvation." Africans subjectively adopted the attitudes of whites and developed a sacrificial dedication toward them. On the other hand, their aggression and frustration were released on other Africans, especially women and children. In this colonial context, traditional African priest-physicians often kept their best knowledge of medicine secret and restricted to a few individuals. Without the benefit of medical textbooks, tremendous amounts of medical knowledge were lost during enslavement and colonization. In spite of this, Charles Finch (1983) reminds us that West African surgeons attained levels of skills comparable or superior to Western surgeons up to the 20th century.

Colonial control of the African mind was also promoted by missionary educational activities which included the establishment of schools as well as training colleges. The Church Missionary Society in 1827

established Fourah Bay College and more than 21 elementary schools in Sierra Leone by 1841 (Boahen 1986). The Bible and Christianity were major foundations of laws and civil life in the colonies of both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Christian and Muslim Africans were rarely trained to trust their own intuition or to think that they had political interests which foreigners needed to respect. African children had to read books and stories about African "savages" and white "heroes" written by white men. These mission activities created alienation from African stories and self-study and arrested the development of traditional African psychology.

Colonial rule destroyed the indigenous systems of government; it established professional armies and caused uneven economic development among most West Africans. The traditional political organizations were changed to support patriarchal colonial rule. As an example, women's authority in traditional West African politics can be seen in the life and work of Chief Suacoco, a female leader after whom the Coco Clan in Bong County is named. She persuaded her people to cooperate with the Liberian government in its expansion of the First Republic. President Daniel E. Howard commissioned her chief in recognition of her services to the government (Guannu, 1985). This demonstrates the level of political power that some West African women had in traditional political organizations.

Blyden (1888) suggests that the enslavement of West Africans spread confusion and disorder throughout the maritime regions of West Africa and legitimate trade had to be suspended for some time. The reintroduction of legitimate trade to West Africa's maritime regions in the 18th century came to be regulated by English language and laws. The British colonization efforts were motivated by their increasing need for agricultural products like coffee, sugar, palm oil, camwood, rubber and cocoa. This need for cash crops reduced West African women's power over agricultural decision making and the use of land. It led to different values being placed on male and female work, leading to greater inequalities between African women and men (T'Shaka 1995). On the positive side, the colonists introduced new

crops, set up plantations and experimental farms to encourage "legitimate" trade as a substitute for the "slave trade." However, colonialism led to highly centralized male-dominated administrative structures, artificial African states and national boundaries and the impoverishment of West Africans and the enrichment of Europeans and Americans; i.e., the importation of Euroamerican manufactured products killed the preexisting African industries and forced Africans into an unjust system of contract labor.

To summarize some of the empirical aspects of colonial West African psychology, it is apparent that the enslavement process introduced social disorders and psychic traumas into the West African soul.

Slavery's destruction of the West African psychology was temporarily relieved by the industrial revolution ... Europeans and Americans realized that they could now benefit from legitimate trade with West Africans.

Africans increased these psychic traumas by their own participation in the enslavement and colonization of other Africans. Slavery's destruction of West African psychology was temporarily relieved by the industrial revolution because Europeans and Americans realized that they could now benefit from legitimate trade with West Africans. This just desire to promote legitimate trade and abolish slavery led to the unjust colonization movements in England and America which began to settle and shelter freed Africans in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The West African psychic became the target of Euroamerican missionaries, patriarchy and manufactured products. The African soul was repressed by the traumas of enslavement and colonization and the authority symbol of the white man was implanted in the African mind to promote servitude. The collective impact of these forces reshaped the West African mind into a colonial mentality to serve the needs of the West until the 1960s. Displaced aggression was released on other Africans

instead of the adopted white male “heroes” and “saviors.” Europeanization of the West African consciousness led to a loss of African medical skills, male-female equality, indigenous wisdom and moral excellence. This has led to the arrested development of African psychology in West Africa today.

Neocolonial West African Psychology

In modern times, West Africans have shown some signs of traditional collectivism and equality when they fought for the decolonization of Africa in the 1950s and when they helped to establish the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1976. Based on African cooperation and equality, these organizations have advised, politically supported and financially assisted African freedom fighters in the struggle against colonialism and racism. This African consciousness of unity and justice led to the fall of colonial rule in West Africa by 1965 and the beginning of the Black Psychology Movement in the US in 1968. The need to transform the evils and injustices of enslavement and colonialism prompted some African students and their Euroamerican friends to launch the African Studies Movement, Human Rights Movement and the Pan-Africanist Movement worldwide. West Africans under the leadership of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana began to increase their African self-consciousness.

In spite of these positive signs from the 1960s and 1970s, West Africans have been confronted with neocolonialism, a new form of domination. According to Kwame Nkrumah (1968), this is where political power has been held by undemocratic and in many cases military rulers and economic power has remained under the control of international finance capital. Neocolonialism promotes male-female inequalities, dysfunctional families, civil conflicts, imbalance in the use of natural resources and self-destruction in West African states like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. In this context of crisis, the West African mind has to develop its higher powers through self-study and spiritual transformation to overcome

psychological colonization.

On the religious front, Bishop Arthur F. Kulah (1994) of Liberia has called for the dewesternization of the African Christian Church and the integration of traditional African religions in theological education of Africans. This is a recognition that traditional African religions can better speak to the mother-centered African soul than Christianity in its present form. In fact, the majority of West Africans continue to practice some aspects of traditional African religions. Unfortunately, some West Africans are promoting certain aspects of religious colonization as they continue to use needed resources and labor to support and build hundreds of new churches and mosques every year which imitate Euroamerican and Arabian cultural symbolism. For example, the biggest church in the world, the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro was built with West African resources to showcase the religious images of white males.

This continued "blindness" to African mother-centered psychology and male-female complimentary equality is contributing to West Africans disconnection with their creative consciousness and higher powers. Some West Africans are heading churches which were overwhelmingly European before the 1960s. There have been some attempts to integrate some aspects of African culture and the interest of women into some of these churches. However, they continue to spread their brand of Euroamerican culture among West Africans. Fortunately, African Independent Churches are the fastest growing Christian churches in West Africa today. Their Africanized religious practices emphasize prayer, bible reading, faith-healing, sacrifices, music and dance. This synthesis of Western and traditional African religions is addressing the psychological and the spiritual crisis of many West Africans. The rapid growth of these churches seems to be due to disillusion with West African neocolonial states.

The relations between Christians and Muslims have been generally good in many West African states, including Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Muslims have generally accepted the political leadership of the Christian elite in these states but this is changing due to the accelerated growth of Islam, with present estimate of about 40% of West Africans being Muslim as compared to about 30% being Christian (Boahen 1986). Nigerians constitute the largest Islamic community in West Africa. It is through Islam that many West Africans have acquired an international understanding of the world or past history. However, there has been a proliferation of sects and brotherhoods among Muslims which has led to clashes and deaths, especially in Nigeria. In December 1980 in Kano City, there was a clash between a new fundamentalist sect (Umarua) with orthodox Muslims which led to a massacre of several thousand. More deaths followed in 1982 and 1984 involving the same fundamentalist sect. Islam and Christianity are being used by some as instruments of power and divisiveness in West Africa but their increasing synthesis with traditional African religions could transform them to support a psychology of African Redemption⁵ as Blyden (1888) and George G. H. James (1976) had proposed.

At present, there is a lack of statistics on West Africans who adhere to traditional religions. The number seems to be declining. However, traditional West African religions continue to influence both West African Christians and Muslims, especially among the new sects. Many of these converts continue to practice a number of traditional religious customs, associated with secret associations. It seems clear that African traditional mother-centered principle and its ability to synthesize some of the positive elements of Christianity and Islam is the key to reviving West African soul and mind.

Today, African social consciousness continues to be impacted by the disruptive effects of the enslavement and colonization processes. The colonial influences on ethnicity, individualism, greed, inequality and materialism have contributed to civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. An estimated 150 thousand West Africans have died in the Liberian civil conflict and most Liberians and Sierra Leoneans are displaced or

refugees. Massive international relief and medical assistance by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been unable to address the health and educational needs of these West Africans. West Africans have been unable to develop adequate public health services since the days of their colonial rulers. In spite of this, West Africans have doubled their numbers of doctors, nurses, pharmacists, hospitals and dispensaries since independence (Boahen, 1986). With the cooperation of international agencies like the World Health Organization and US Agency for International Development, West Africans have been able to control epidemics and communicable diseases. According to both West African and US sources, foreign-based NGOs are quickly replacing African neocolonial states as the primary institutions of social development in Africa today.⁶ Traditional African medicine today does not reflect the best that traditional doctors knew and only fragments of knowledge and skills have survived. Rural areas with the majority of West Africans have the fewest hospitals and have to rely on NGOs and the remains of traditional African medicine.

West African governments have spent little on improving health services, especially in the area of preventive measures such as better nutrition, family planning, clean drinking water, good housing and improved sanitation which directly impact the status of women. As a result, malaria remains the most widespread public health problem facing West African women and children and shanty towns and malnutrition continue to stifle their health and life expectancy.

Education among West Africans has been expanding at all levels--primary, secondary and higher. In fact, Nigerians now have universal primary education. There has been some progress in Africanizing western education by displacing missionary control over primary and secondary education. However, among French-speaking West Africans in Ivory Coast and Senegal, Africanization of secondary education has been a low priority (Boahen, 1986). Additionally, a lack of schools and teachers of technical subjects is a serious problem for West African industrial development. In

Liberia before the civil war, there was one technical college compared to five Bible colleges, among the 16 diploma-granting colleges (Mason et al, 1993). Few West African graduates have suitable training in agriculture or rural development. West African women, who are the foundation of West African family and society, have the highest illiteracy rate of about 80-90% and represent the greatest number of civil war victims (Twe, 1994). All of this represents the failure of the neocolonial African mentality to promote self-development and male-female equal empowerment.

Looking at the political aspect of West African psychology, Mwizenge Tembo (1990) suggests that one of the shortcomings of West African political development before and after independence is that it was and is based on African males protest and struggle for power rather than the democratic restructuring of African political life. For example, President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia extended suffrage to women not to promote democracy but to create an independent power base of support which helped him to crush the opposition, extend his presidency for life and undermined Liberian multiparty democracy (Sawyer, 1992).

West Africans have not relied on their own political traditions and creativity but have accepted artificial nation states, Euro-American style constitutions and multiparty systems a ruling party opposed by one or more opposing parties. The independence revolution has not produced many self-conscious West African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Amilcar Cabral who were willing to experiment with Pan-Africanism to promote complimentary male-female equality and African consciousness. After an initial period with multiparty systems, West Africans began to develop one-party rule under Republican constitutions. They also experimented with socialism and political unions between two or three West African states, e.g., Ghana-Guinea Union, The Mali Federation, Senegambian Confederation and the Mano River Union. The failures of these political experiments led to half of West Africans living under military rule by 1970. By the end of the 1970s, there was a trend toward giving

civilian rule and multiparty democracy another chance. However, the Liberian military coup of 1980 started a new wave of military rule for West Africans. In fact, by 1984, there had been more than 30 successful coups in twelve of the 16 ECOWAS states, including Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Colonial authoritarian political culture continues to shape West African self consciousness. In the case of Sierra Leone, its multi-party system was split along ethnic lines. From independence to the military coup of 1967, Sierra Leoneans were plagued by ethnic rivalries with the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) led by Sir Milton Margai and his brother Albert Margai and the opposition All People's Congress (APC) led by Siaka Stevens. The SLPP gained most of its support in the south among the Mende Chiefs, while APC got its support from the Temne, other ethnic groups, professionals, workers and students who were disillusioned by the economic chaos and open corruption of the ruling party. After Milton Margai died in 1964, his brother Albert, with autocratic tendencies, came to power. He refused to concede defeat in the 1967 elections and the army had to step in to prevent ethnic civil war. This failure to allow democracy to take roots in neocolonial West Africa has been repeated in nearly all West African states. Military rulers like their civilian predecessors have governed by favoring one ethnic group and the use of force against others. This style of government precipitated the civil wars of Nigeria (1967-70), Liberia (1989-95), and Sierra Leone (1991- Present). These are some examples of how neocolonial-centralized governments and military rule have contributed to the current civil conflicts and self-destruction among West Africans.

West Africans have become economically dependent on Western technology of which they have little knowledge and no control. Since independence, major aspects of West African economic development in transportation, communication, agriculture and industry depend on Euroamerican technology and expertise. In fact, the major economic development plans of West Africans have followed capitalist or socialist policies in trade, agriculture and industry with very little success and

escalating national debts. In the areas of transportation and communication, new railway lines like those in Liberia and Guinea and tarred roads in Nigeria and Ivory Coast have made nationwide transportation and communication possible. In many cases, air travel has replaced sea travel for

In order to understand the African mind one must take a holistic and natural approach.

long distances. Most West African states run national airlines for external and internal services. Additionally, there have been some improvements of national telecommunication networks through microwave, telephone, telex and data transmission. Neocolonial West African states have had some relative success in the area of transportation and communication. These technological gains are contributing to West African economic and cultural integration and could lead to greater political unity.

In agriculture, the emphasis on cash crop production has led to the neglect of food production, the devaluation of women working and a dependency on imported food. Most West Africans are less self-sufficient in producing food than they were during the colonial period when African men and women both worked the land. Scarce foreign exchange is being spent on food and luxury imports to sustain the Western lifestyle of urban West Africans. Only Ivory Coast and Senegal have made significant progress in food production. On the other hand, both Ghana and Guinea used inappropriate socialist economic policies which did not increase food production. In fact, these policies led to large-scale emigration and food shortage, especially in Guinea. Guinea-Bissau's experimentation with agriculture socialism proved to be more successful. There were major efforts to diversify food production, use state collective farms and regional agricultural teams to demonstrate to small farmers the value of new crops, crop rotation, fertilizers and collective work. Additionally, a village

electrification program has made village life more attractive and slowed rural to urban migration. If this success could be duplicated in other West African states, this could slow down the massive rural to urban migration and reduce the health and psychological risks of living in shanty towns and displacement centers.

In the area of industry, only Nigerians and Ivorians have succeeded in attracting significant investments in manufacturing. In any case, production has been extremely low. This is due to a dependence on imported raw materials and expatriate technical manpower. West African industry is overly dependent on international capital and technology. This dependency has produced West African managers who are poorly trained, inexperienced and easily corruptible. In the area of mining, Liberia and Guinea have attracted considerable foreign investment but have no long-lasting development to show for the extensive mineral exports. Nigerians have been more successful in developing and benefiting from their oil and natural gas supplies. However, the limited concentration of wealth and economic activities have contributed to the massive migration of West Africans from the countryside to large towns and cities. Many of the migrants have found no work and the women and children have become squatters in shanty towns. This has led to increasing alienation, poverty, and crime among West Africans in cities like Monrovia, Freetown and Lagos. Many West Africans have lost understanding of their own abilities and creativity and have become bad imitators of the West. This is leading to individuals whose life styles reject their natural African dispositions, to others who displace their hostility and aggression toward other Africans while choosing self-destructive ways to alleviate their immediate wants, and ultimately to others who become afflicted with physiological, neurological and biochemical malfunctions due to these unhealthy living conditions (Twe, 1994).

Some positive concrete steps like the Mano River Union and ECOWAS have been taken by West Africans to start regional economic cooperation in order to achieve the goal of political unity. In 1973, President

Tolbert and President Stevens established the Mano River Union to work for the joint economic development of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. By 1975, the Mano River bridge in the Cape Mount area provided a concrete link between the two states. This bridge is a part of the planned trans-African highway from

This brief review has looked at three phases of the transformative power and complexity of the African psyche in traditional, colonial and neocolonial West Africa.

Dakar to Mombasa. The Mano River Union provided the needed incentive toward unity that the Treaty of Lome (1976) set up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Paradoxically, 1980 saw both the expansion of the Mano River Union when Guinea joined and the decline of the union when the Liberian coup disrupted Sierra Leonean-Liberian relations. At the present, it is the tragedy of the Liberian civil war which has concretely demonstrated the necessity of collective security and justice among West Africans if they are to promote human life and reestablish a mother-centered African psychology.

In order to understand the African mind one must take a holistic and natural approach. There is an apparent connection and order between the African mind and global events and cosmic cycles. This brief review has looked at three phases of the transformative power and complexity of the African psyche in traditional, colonial and neocolonial West Africa. If West Africans will engage in more self-study and synthesize the traditional colonial and neocolonial phases of their psychic, Maat (truth, order and justice) could be reintroduced with the hidden higher powers of the African mind and soul. I have chosen to review the African psyche from its birth in African traditions and history, arrested development under colonialism, death under neocolonialism and its current rebirth in the Global African

Reparation and Repatriation Movement⁷ -- Pan-Africanism as a metaphor for the natural African life cycle of birth, death and rebirth.

Conclusion

The colonial experience introduced Euroamerican lifestyles as well as increased self alienation, ethnicity, prejudices and inequalities among West Africans. This complex web of colonial forces and unjust choices by West Africans led to the disruption of traditional order, justice and truth (Maat). Ultimately, this led to fragmentation of the African mind and soul. The feminine principle of Maat (justice, order and truth) was overthrown by the masculine principle of power and materialism from the North and West. Patriarchy and manufactured products came to dominate African consciousness and ethics. The independence revolution succeeded in psychologically reviving the West African soul but failed to liberate it from the colonial mentality which was established after more than 200 years. This has led many West Africans to reject their natural African dispositions, to show hostility and aggression toward other Africans while embracing Euroamerican lifestyles and to choose self-destructive ways to achieve their immediate wants even when these ways are destructive to themselves and their communities. The neocolonial mentality has led to civil conflicts in many West African states, including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

The rebirth of the African psyche has been assisted by many African leaders like Edward W. Blyden, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Cheikh Diop, Haile Sellassie I, and Nelson Mandela, just to name a few. They have redefined and identified African fatherhood with morality, cooperation and internal discipline. It is this reestablishment of morality and cooperation which have contributed to the end of the Liberian civil war. ECOWAS has become a positive sign of cooperation, collective security and discipline among West Africans and all of Africa. However, this rebirth of African consciousness through ECOWAS will only take roots if Africans rediscover their mother-centered traditions and reempower their women. West African

women and children must become the focus of family, tribal, community, state, regional and continental policies, if we are going to reintroduce Maat (truth, justice and right order) into African life.

On a practical level, African women must be consulted as equals on all levels of decision-making and planning in order to mobilize a just combination of indigenous colonial, spiritual-material and female-male forces for development. The rebirth of the African psychic will only be achieved through practical steps by African men to seek forgiveness from African women and children for past involvement in slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism. This internal reparation can be promoted by institutionalizing African fatherhood training based on cultural history, collectivity, morality and internal discipline rather than foreign myths, individualism, competition, greed, domination and warfare. There must be a total rededication to the sacredness of African motherhood and fatherhood if African psychology will once again become a light to a world blinded by male domination, power and materialism.

Endnotes

¹See Wade Nobles (1986) "Ancient Egyptian Thought and the Renaissance of African (Black) Psychology" in *Kemet and the African Worldview* edited by Maulana Karenga and Jacob Curruthers and Na'im Akbar (1994) *Light from Ancient Africa*. Both show African/Egyptian thought and wisdom as the real origins of psychology-- study of the soul and mind.

²See Cheikh Anta Diop (1955, 1959) *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality* and *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* for historical and scientific evidence of the Black African origin of Kemet (Ancient Egypt) and Matriarchy or mother-centered culture of Black Africa.

³See Edward Wilmot Blyden (1888, 1908) *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* and *African Life and Customs* for historical and empirical

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evidence of the morality of African personality which has been hidden by the distortions and racism of Euroamerican scholarship on Africa.

⁴In Kemetic (Ancient Egyptian) philosophy and wisdom, Maat was the goddess portrayed wearing an ostrich feather. In the *Book of Coming Forth by Day*, Maat is said to have existed before creation and represented cosmic and earthly harmony-- truth, justice, balance and right order. The Ancient African World was a world of symbolism and for one to understand the ancient African mind requires a recognition of symbols such as Maat as a metaphoric device used to transmit precise and intuitive knowledge.

⁵The ideology of African Redemption as proposed by Edward W. Blyden (1888) and George G.H. James (1976) involves Africans "retaking their fame" which was lost through the ravages of slavery and racism. Specifically, this ideology requires Africans to retake their fame as the founders of Kemet (Ancient Egypt) and core contributors to the teachings of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

⁶ See *Newsweek*, August 1, 1994, two articles titled "The New Colonialism" and "NGOs: A Re-Sorting of Power," discuss the collapse of African neocolonial states and the growing power of Euroamerican NGOs in African development. Additionally, the *New Democrat*, May 30-June 1, 1995, a weekly in Monrovia published "Foreign NGOs: Uses and Abuses-- An African Perspective." This report reaffirmed the growing power of NGOs and the fall of African neocolonial states.

⁷See Ali Mazrui (1994) "Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists" published in *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 3 for a discussion of how the Organization of African Unity has appointed a group of Eminent Persons, headed by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, to devise strategies and modalities for a worldwide campaign to obtain reparations for colonialism and enslavement. This is a recognition of a "Global Africa"-- Pan Africanism which includes the Continent, the Diaspora of enslavement and

the Diaspora of colonialism. On the African grassroots level, Neil Savishinsky's (1994) study "Rastafari in the Promised Land: The Spread of a Jamaican Socioreligious Movement among the Youth of West Africa" published in *African Studies Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, discusses a Jamaican African consciousness and repatriation movement among young people of color the world over. This is another indication of the rebirth of African psychology among the youth.

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The Virtual University: The Technology of Distance Education

Dianne White Oyler

The newest experiment in African education formally opened its "doors" in the fall of 1997. The World Bank-sponsored pilot project, the African Virtual University (AVU), began teaching Internet classes at twelve public and private universities in Africa. Courses are taught by American and European professors targeting the areas of science and engineering, fields providing education that may fuel economic growth.¹ The benefits to the African student clientele include access to courses in fields under-represented in African universities (improving performance on admissions exams to American and European university graduate programs), to the Digital Library where both African professors and students can read the most current literature in their field, and to electronic publishing opportunities enabling African scholars to reach an international audience.

Countries participating in this project receive World Bank funding for the technology required to participate in the virtual university and for university staff/faculty virtual training workshops. For the first year of the pilot project, countries also receive free transponder capacity made available by INTELSAT. The ones selected for participation in this first wave of courses were the English-speaking countries of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Ghana. Those countries who came on-line in October 1997 were the French-speaking countries of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Cape Verde; Portuguese-speaking countries will be added in the second quarter of 1998.²

The construction and implementation of this African on-ramp to the world's information super-highway leads to a consideration of how Liberia can become a beneficiary of these latest events. In the aftermath of civil war, Liberia is operating at a reduced capacity in terms of the Internet gateway

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because it now lacks adequate and reliable communications technology. Entry into the arena of the Virtual University would benefit the University of Liberia while delivering cutting-edge technology to the entire population; later as communications infrastructure is extended to the interior, Cuttington University College may also benefit. The purpose of this study is to highlight the possibilities related to accessible, existing, funded projects and initiate dialogue among those interested in advancing education in Liberia. One hopes that the ideas presented herein will be the first step in the process of moving Liberia into the technological arena. Current international initiatives are specifically targeting higher education; however, once the technology is in place, its extension to secondary and primary educational institutions as well as the general public would be relatively easy. Part I of this article defines the concept of the virtual university and discusses the technology necessary for implementation of technological alternatives at various levels of participation from the least to the most expensive while also exploring the questions of a technology-based program's adaptability to Liberia's current situation. Part II examines the sources of funding for establishing an infrastructure and for participation in the current initiative offered by the World Bank. Benefits derived will initially affect the University of Liberia as well as the educational, economic, and social sectors of urban Monrovia; later benefits could affect the interior. Additionally, a methodology which shows how this can be accomplished is offered.

Part I

The Format

The Virtual University model evolved from the intersection of changing conceptualizations of the educational format and the technological advances of the last twenty-five years. The move toward Distance Education, often referred to as "alternative schooling," that accommodates learners separated in time and space from their instructors began with correspondence courses through which students interacted with instructors by written communication. As a beneficiary of the proliferation of technology, today's Distance Education provides instruction electronically

through telephone lines, or by microwave towers,³ or else by satellite dishes⁴ to a broad range of learners separated in time and space from their instructors and the peers with whom, nevertheless, they interact through these media.

One of the advantages to the virtual university model includes the ability to foster educational decentralization where fewer teachers reach a larger audience, and students successfully

In the aftermath of the civil war, Liberia is operating at a reduced capacity in terms of the Internet gateway because it now lacks adequate and reliable communications technology.

work independently in their own homes or in small group settings, while at the same time they interact with larger groups through chat lines or interactive video. Many universities in the United States, for example, are in the process of adding "On-Line" classes to the curriculum by securing funding for software and faculty development programs, including virtual training workshops.⁵

As technology quickens its pace, affordable electronic communications systems which include the telephone, facsimile machine, electronic mail by computer, and the newly advertised Internet cable channel, are testaments to the feasibility, capability, and necessity of using this technology for educational needs; older technology becomes more affordable as computer communications technology continually re-invents itself in the market. The current, cutting-edge, communications technology, the personal communication system (communication delivery without phone lines), is projected soon to be in the hands of millions of ordinary customers, as Motorola, Magellan, and Teledesic launch a plethora of information-relaying satellites to service the two billion or more people in the world who

are currently out of touch because they have no access to telephone lines. With a hand-held cellular phone (\$750-999) or solar powered telephone booths (\$1,000-2,500), people can contact individuals (at a current rate of \$3 per minute) on the Internet;⁶ therein lies the option for education in Liberia.

Affordable Technology

Beyond the print medium of postal pathways, the key to the cheapest “electronic” classroom based on existing infrastructure is the radio. Instruction by radio is not new to Africa. Many programs have been presented to educate the populace on matters of health, education, and agriculture.⁷ After an assessment of the current state of local radio stations, Liberian professors could broadcast courses in their fields of expertise that are prepared with the absence of printed texts in mind for transmission by local radio. Although knowledge would be immediately accessible to the listening public, problems for instruction might arise in constructing methods for student feedback and assessment, since postal delivery is unreliable in the present Liberian context. The most serious drawback to this method is that it is a passive educational process. While students may absorb information, they would not be reinforced through discovery and discussion techniques.

Existing technology available in Liberia includes short-wave radios.⁸ Short wave radios receive information by voice or by Morse code, and when a node controller is added, those same signals can be channeled into a computer with appropriate software by which courses can be easily transmitted. This system is called packet radio.⁹ The drawbacks to this process, however, are the lack of availability of hardware for the short wave radio and also access to computers. In this type of system other more basic concerns would focus on access to electricity and the structure of current delivery systems whether US, European, or generator; however, there are computers that can operate on a 12-volt system,¹⁰ and educationally, a

computer-based learning system is better for the student because it provides a little degree of interaction, albeit data flows only in one direction at one time.

In addition, pre-recorded audio and/or video tapes could be another option used to update instructional presentations or to create reinforcement.

A pre-recorded system, however, would not only have to rely upon instructors abroad preparing courses on pre-recorded tapes, either audio or video.

One hopes that the ideas presented herein will be the first step in the process of moving Liberia into the technological arena.

The equipment involved for recovery of taped information would include audio and video tape players and televisions. Problems associated with this method of information transfer center around the origination of the available equipment—VHS from the United States or PAL from Europe. Drawbacks might include the time lag created in shipping the parcel and its security in navigating the Liberian Postal System. While audio and video tapes are passive, cassettes indeed can be prepared in such a way as to include participatory exercises. Students would then listen to the taped portion, pausing occasionally for discussion and for questions, with the on-site faculty reinforcing the curriculum with updated information provided by electronic media.

Telephone lines would be the most practical in terms of accessibility and cost effectiveness because telephone service would bring the most information to the largest number of people in terms of access to the Internet. At the same time, this form of technology would allow for increased opportunities for two-way communication in real time, thus making it interactive. Items of telephone equipment necessary for

implementation of this model that already exist in Liberia are hand sets, speaker phones, and microphones, to which can be added an audio bridge which connects multiple phone lines and controls static noise. With this technology, electronic meetings between two or more locations would allow for conversations to take place in real time, a true interactive situation. At the present time, however, telephone service in Liberia is extremely unreliable.

Presently used by the fields of education and business, the audiographic system relies on telephone lines for voice transmission as the primary form of communication and supplements it with pictorial and electronic data transmitted over a second phone line connected to one of the following electronic options: facsimile machine (FAX), electronic blackboard, still video, or a personal computer. The FAX transmits printed data or printed images and can send and receive instructional materials and assignments. It allows for delayed interaction transmitting one direction at a time but also permits student reinforcement and student assessment. For the electronic blackboard, the instructor writes information on a pressure-sensitive board which is transmitted by phone line; then the signal is displayed in black and white on a television monitor. The students can respond, however, if they have the same equipment. Moreover, video images are frozen and framed into single images that can also be sent over a separate line. Computer technology, on the other hand, presents more possibilities for educational reinforcement because of more immediate interaction. The instructor can prepare materials in advance, store them, and then retrieve them for transmission by using the computer screen much like an overhead projector. The costs to universities for the implementation of an audiographic system would include upgrading current generator facilities and purchasing the hardware--such as facsimile machines, electronic blackboards, televisions, and computers--the prices for which are declining while their availability is increasing. Educational opportunities using telephone technology would require the securing of dependable phone lines and other technological components working in concert for transmitting


signals generated in the United States or Europe such as satellites, cable, and microwave systems, thus facilitating audio communication.¹¹

The development of a computer network using fiber optic telephone lines for a local area network and international access to the Internet would require reliable phone lines and an international Internet provider.¹² This technology would offer the capacity for computer conferencing on chat lines, electronic mail, listserves (such as LSA-L@uga.cc.uga.edu), on-line libraries, and information discovery on the worldwide web. Moreover, students and professors with e-mail accounts in Liberia would have the capacity to communicate with colleagues and other international experts in their fields, and also to download research information to that account for printing. These types of activities could be done at a reduced cost by selecting "delay transmission" until the hour designated by the university as purchased from an Internet provider. A local area network would provide multiple classroom access to data processed through a central location within the university as well as become the nucleus for technology-sharing and information-sharing with Liberian public and private schools.

The search for the most appropriate form of technology for the optimal learning environment, however, leads us to the interactive video network (IVN). Although the most expensive system, it provides the most important resource for education--interaction. The engaged learner draws more from the experience than does the passive one.¹³ Many forms of technology identified herein offer some interactive aspects, but interactive video features immediate reinforcement with the capacity for spontaneity.

The heart of the interactive video network is the multimedia workstation composed of microcomputer and video disc technology serviced by telephone lines or satellite transmissions. The equipment for the workstation is a computer network infused with the new video disc technology. The video disc can store 54,000 still images or thirty minutes of full-motion video or any combination of the two. According to the


computer industry, multimedia integrates video, audiographics, and data within a single workstation which can be linked to others within the same facility or in multiple locations through telephone lines. This system requires specialized hardware and software but promotes student interaction--two-way audio--with the instructor and fellow students through discussion and with the data.¹⁴

INTERACTIVE VIDEO CLASSROOM¹

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. Instructor's Monitors | 10. Drawer (Remote Control Storage) |
| 2. Instructor's Camera | 11. Auxiliary Equipment Drawer |
| 3. Visual Presenter | 12. Slide Transfer Unit |
| 4. Instructor's Console | 13. Slide Transfer Unit Remote Control |
| 5. Low Profile Microphone(s) | 14. VHS Player/Recorder |
| 6. Students' Monitors | 15. Lavalier Microphone |
| 7. Students' Camera | 16. Video Switcher (see page 13) |
| 8. Audio Speaker | 17. Rack Mounted Equipment (see page 10) |
| 9. Monitor and Camera Cabinet | |

¹Joseph R. Tykwinski and Russell C. Poulin, A Practical Guide to Teleconferencing and Distance Education: North Dakota Interactive Video Network, Bismarck, ND: North Dakota University System, 1991, p. 8.

INTERACTIVE VIDEO CLASSROOM INSTRUCTOR AND TECHNICIANS CONSOLE¹



The instructor sits here if a technician is to assist with the presentation. The visual presenter unit can be moved to suit the needs of the instructor.

¹Joseph R. Tykwinski and Russell C. Poulin, A Practical Guide to Teleconferencing and Distance Education: North Dakota Interactive Video Network, Bismarck, ND:North Dakota University System, 1991, p. 9.

The use of the satellite and the newest compressed video technology provides advantages in terms of transmission speed, delivery, and interaction for the communication of educational programming. The satellite receives the video and audio signals from an uplink antenna and transmits it either immediately or on delay to a downlink receiver which captures the signal and reconstructs it into its original form. Compressed video reduces the cost of transmitting full-motion video (the equivalent of 600 telephone calls) by digitizing the signal so that it will fit into the space of the less-expensive voice transmission.¹⁵

The cost of the interactive video network with either telephone or satellite delivery at this time would be cost prohibitive. Equipment for its complex technical infrastructure would include an uplink and downlink dish antenna, a receiver that selects the designated audio or video signals, televisions, and VCRs. Satellite technology is available for personal communication systems in Liberia. This type of technology would provide the closest approximation to interaction and discovery for Liberian university students. Depending upon its completeness, the system could offer courses through one-way video and two-way audio or two-way video and two-way audio (see Appendix for a "wish list" Virtual University of Liberia).

Part II

Sources of Funding

In developed and developing countries, the choice of the distance education model is based on its potential to educate the population at a minimum of expense. Although the technology that delivers distance education appears to be cost prohibitive, it is reputed to reduce costs and serve a greater number of students with the same funds.¹⁶ Capital outlay is allocated toward the following categories: delivery in terms of transmission costs such as telephone or satellite, the cost of materials production from computer-assisted learning programs to videos, and administrative costs that

ensure that the system works.¹⁷

The technology of Distance Education becomes cost effective when adopting a policy of shared-costs/shared-use¹⁸ with other sectors of the community such as the private sector, business and industry and the public sector, health (hospitals)¹⁹ and government. Many school systems in the United States have been successful in achieving their technological needs by arranging private-sector partnerships with telecommunications providers and suppliers.²⁰ For Liberia, the same approach could also be most successful.

In Liberia, however, the technological capability to approach the information superhighway on-ramp is virtually non-existent--a limited remaining communications infrastructure.²¹ Liberia's first step is to secure a telecommunications infrastructure. Half of the seventy nations signing the World Trade Organization agreement to open up their telecommunications markets were developing nations whose approach to communications had previously been government monopoly.²² By signing the agreement, telecommunications corporations began actively competing with one another to provide services in these countries. The Liberian government could receive significant concessions and make considerable gains in the arena of fibre optic telephone lines enabling it to build the foundation for Internet access and to compete for the funding for other types of "connectivity" infrastructure necessary to put universities, the government, and the population of Liberia "on-line." Organizations like the World Bank are no longer giving aid for infrastructural improvements unless the government's Post Office/Telegraph/Telephone (PTT) is being privatized and telecommunications monopolies deregulated. The World Bank expects the private sector to do the rest.²³

In 1997 AT&T's Africa ONE project, an example of the private sector at work, began laying underwater optical fibre cable around Africa's coastline to all African nations that were interested so that they may be

connected with each other and the rest of the world by 1999.²⁴ Another organization looking for participants in joint ownership of telecommunications connects is RASCOM, a Pan-African cooperative for large-scale purchase of satellite capacity. RASCOM purchased a large portion of INTELSAT #804 launched in March 1997 to connect the phone lines of their forty-two member nations. While there are some drawbacks for some African member nations, one of the satellite antennas is trained on the east coast of the United States.²⁵ Another telecommunications supplier is Pan African Telecommunication Union (PATU), which manages PanAfTel and which provides a system of cable and microwave transmitters for its subscriber nations.²⁶ Currently, Network Computer Systems is negotiating to provide Internet connections for Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Cameroon.²⁷ Also competing in the telecommunications market are MCI, Sprint Global One, and Intelsat.²⁸

While several institutions are prepared to render assistance in the virtual university market place, WorldTel, a division of International Telecommunications Union (ITU), is the only one primarily concerned with working for the establishment of "connectivity" through telecommunications infrastructure.²⁹

The re-creation of Liberia's telecommunications system would guarantee benefits and revenues to a long-distance carrier as transnational corporations return to the Liberian economy. Other corporations will come and infuse money into the economy if they can communicate more directly with the parent company or home office by e-mail and conduct business through the worldwide web. In Ghana³⁰, for example, the Association of African Universities (AAU) purchases time from one of the South African Internet providers³¹ with funding from the University of Ghana and the British Council; in return, these entities have free e-mail access by only paying the telephone charges between their computers and the local AAU server.³² The Ivory Coast has privatized its communications system financing CI-TELCOM through soft loans to be paid back through

telephone charges.³³

Once telecommunications readiness has been achieved, the university can develop its costly infrastructure through partnerships with many of the international corporations representing business and industry. In the realm of hardware such as televisions, VCRs, and computers, corporations renewing entry into the Liberian market such as Sony or Motorola and IBM or Apple could negotiate to donate a specified number of items in return through the University of Liberia's Internet access hold monthly teleconferences or video conferences with the home office. Other corporations could be asked to donate funds for uplink/downlink satellite hardware; thus allowing Liberia to become a partner in the RASCOM initiative. Again, the corporations would benefit by receiving equal value through teleconference or video conference appointments. It is a certainty that these corporations are going to make a profit in Liberia, and these profits will most assuredly be taken out of the country with little or no re-investment in the Liberia. Consequently, based on corporate past performances, Liberia should require donations to the infrastructure of the country in the name of humanitarian aid to education (perhaps through a corporate tax write off) to achieve parity in profits/benefits. Another source of funding for providing hardware, software, and audio-visuals can come from foreign aid and from individuals or groups writing grants to fund specific projects.

The Liberian Ministry of Education could apply for assistance to over one hundred established projects that have been aiding other African states since 1995. Examples of available funding are as follows:

- \$15 million Leland Initiative (USAID) aiming to provide about \$.5 million per country to assist with developing Internet connectivity in 20 African countries in return for agreements to liberalize the market to third party Internet service providers. Assistance is in the form of equipment, expertise, training, and free circuits for the first year;

- ITUs program for Africa resulting from the \$11 million SFR profits from Telecom95, as well as various rural, community telecentre, health, and satellite projects emanating from the Buenos Aires Action Plan being conducted in co-operation with UNESCO, IRDC, WHO, and others;
- The commerce-oriented TradePoint initiatives of UNCTAD which has made Africa the priority region for 1996-1998. UNCTAD has a grant from the European Union for ECU 30 million for the regional development of local trade efficiency networks in Africa;
- The Multi-doner InfoDev (World Bank) fund which has approved \$500,000 South African Telematics for African Development and the \$1 million African Virtual University Project;
- UNESCO's IIP program (funded by the Italian and Dutch governments), RINAF (Research and Information New for Africa) is currently funding work in ten African countries;
- UNECA/PADIS in conjunction with the IDRC initiated Capacity Building for Electronic Communications in Africa (CABECA) project is working with twenty-one African nations;
- The World Health Organization (WHO) has assisted in a number of Telemedicine and health information policy projects in Africa, including support for HealthNet;
- USAID's Economic Sector Growth & Environment Office of the Africa Bureau has launched the AfricaLink project which will fund equipment, training, and some communications costs to connect about one hundred African institution to local e-mail service providers; and
- The European Office for Outer Space Affairs is proposing the COPINE project to donate ground stations and transponder time to African research institutions.³⁴

From among the donors on this sample list, the World Bank's

Information for Development Program sponsors the Internet and the African Virtual University, while the Leland Initiative, a component of the USAID Africa Global Information Infrastructure Gateway Project for sustainable development in Africa, targets

Liberia's capacity to actively participate in this new global economy depends upon the intellectual capacity and skills of its labor force in the fields of science, technology, and business.

upgrading existing programs to enable Internet access.³⁵ African countries are scrutinized to assess their readiness for the program and recommendations are made for strategies to bring them up to specifications.

Under the Leland Initiative, a partner community is evaluated to assess its Internet readiness on the following criteria: telecommunications policy, telecommunications technology, specifically Internet infrastructure and Internet service provider industry; and Internet end user applications. The data helps the assessment team to determine how institutions will benefit "from the introduction of the Internet and the type and level of assistance needed at the institutional level to introduce or broaden Internet access and use."³⁶ The Leland Initiative appears to require the university to upgrade its existing equipment including phone lines. The United States, however, gave \$1.2 million to Ethiopia for the construction of their virtual university facility.³⁷ The World Bank, on the other hand, recognizes the problems caused by a lack of infrastructure and provides financing through itself and INFODEV. Once the program is running the financing of the program includes cost recovery through tuition and franchising.³⁸

Questions for Liberia

There are always questions of the funding projects' applicability to the Liberian context and the resulting obligation(s) to foreign agencies after its receipt. The short-term goal of the World Bank's program, however, appears to be the building of capacity in African universities through training and effective partnerships and also to Africanize program offerings.³⁹ African and non-African academicians will compete for production and customization of courses and dissemination of indigenous research. A long term goal is to provide the market with a large number of well-trained African scientists, technicians, engineers, businessmen/entrepreneurs, managers, and employees⁴⁰ needed for Liberia's participation in the new "global economy."

This new world economy has evolved from the events of the last twenty-five years in terms of the technology revolution, the end of the Cold War, and the democratization of ideas. It reduces economic isolation and places increased emphasis on knowledge and information as a critical factor of production. Hence, knowledge and information have been elevated to the status of a major resource and join the other key capital inputs--human, financial, and natural resources--as necessary to a country's development strategy.⁴¹ Liberia's capacity to actively participate in this new global economy depends upon the intellectual capacity and skills of its labor force in the fields of science, technology, and business. By taking advantage of the educational and technological benefits of the current international programs being touted by the African virtual university model, Liberia may have the opportunity to accelerate development and catapult all segments of the nation into the twenty-first century. The University of Liberia, and subsequently, the rest of the education, economic, and social sectors of society would benefit from access to the latest, cutting-edge technology, the Internet, and the virtual university, in which are found quality professors, libraries, and laboratories with a minimum of capital investments and operating costs.⁴²

Once the telecommunications links have been established by fibre optic line or satellite link, the universities of Liberia and the Ministry of Education can select the linkages they feel are appropriate to the Liberian context. Additionally, Liberia has another advantage found in the wide array of human capital located within Liberia and without in the Liberian diaspora. Many Liberians are employed at universities and professional positions in the United States and elsewhere. These professors and other professionals do have access to similar forms of technology and offer an alternative to the advertised selection of courses available through the AVU. This would allow all Liberians and those scholars who are interested in Liberia to be involved in the reinvention of the educational system in Liberia. Since many US universities are offering training in the preparation of "on-line" courses, Liberian students would have access to technology savvy instructors who share similar interests in restructuring the economy of the nation.

Liberia is on the IDRC's short list of nations requiring significant levels of support.⁴³ International telecommunications corporations are prepared to provide partners with infrastructure and lending institutions have acknowledged Liberia's need for funding. The goals of the initiative are to provide Liberia with the well-trained professionals, technicians, and employees to repair its flagging economy while at the same time restoring and improving the standard of living to the general public. In addition, an interesting benefit of open and easy access to local and international communication can be the entrenchment of political democracy in Liberia. The initiative will strengthen educational system from the university to the primary schools. Liberia is in a unique position. By accepting international assistance, the government and the university can seize the leadership role in re-inventing Liberia through the virtual university model.

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¹"Virtual University," (May 19, 1997), H-AFRICA--Mel Page <AFRICA@ETSU-TN.EDU>, (May 20, 1997).

Virtual University of Liberia

Distance education is a response to a need for providing the most appropriate education to the largest number of students by the most cost effective methods. The means by which this can be achieved is collaboration in the realm of educational distribution across state, national, and international borders. The Maastricht Treaty is a prime example of such a collaboration for international education in Europe that distributes educational resources through new forms of telecommunications technology. A list of Open universities and their offerings can be found through the web site www.gmi.edu/official/acad/mech-eng/dist_ed.htm.

The university administration would have to decide on its role in the process either operating its own system utilizing Liberians abroad as instructors for its own open university or, for a fee, supporting student access to other degree granting institutions such the African Virtual University. An "Open Architecture Model" at the University of Liberia with the maximum use of the most expensive technology could be developed. First, the facility would be air conditioned through electricity generated locally or through on-site generators and have working phone lines. A satellite dish would sit on the roof with both uplink and downlink capabilities (it's cheaper to buy both at the same time). The floor immediately under the dish is reserved for the ground station equipment which would employ one full time-technician. Perhaps the level beneath the ground station would contain the interactive video network studio where one or two technicians operate audio visual course programming. One large classroom would contain a computer lab of thirty computers with internet access and a television monitor. The computer lab then would be available to teach all types of computer courses. Each regular classroom would contain a television monitor [Conversation with John Murphy, Assistant Technical Director for North Dakota IVN Network, on March 26, 1997].

For the students matriculating from the University of Liberia, courses would be received by satellite during non peak-hours, recorded on video tape to be banked and then replayed during the appointed time for the class. Technicians would be responsible for creating a bank of course tapes by downloading one and making a copy for use. At the start of each class, the technicians load the day's lecture into the VCRs which reside in the studio. Students would change classes, attending the courses for which they are registered. Only the studio classroom could be totally interactive, and courses could be rotated to share in it, but that would have to be worked out with the instructor who, separated from his/her students by time and space, would need to adjust the hour of his/her presentation. For those students matriculating from other degree-granting universities, their courses could be offered simultaneously in other classrooms or at different hours. All courses would have flexibility in terms of the time they were offered thus allowing for the academic day to accommodate work schedules.

²"The African Virtual University (AVU): Pilot Phase Operation (July 1, 1997-June 30, 1998," <www.avu.org/pilot/implementation.html>, (January

24, 1998).

³For a brief description of microwave technology see Karen and Will Kitchen, *Two-Way Interactive Television for Distance Learning: A Primer*, Alexandria, VA: ITTE Technology Leadership Network, 1988, pp. 19-20.

⁴For a brief description of satellite technology, *Ibid.* pp. 23 24.

⁵For example, the author of this paper has been selected to participate in the "Faculty Virtual Training Workshop" at Minot State University that will guide me in the construction of and provide the resources for an "On-Line" general education course in world civilizations for fall 1998. This workshop is funded as a part of a Title III grant received by the university.

⁶William J. Cook, "1997: A New Space Odyssey," *US News & World Report*, March 3, 1997:45-47.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 44; and Linda Lachance Wolcott with assistance from Vicki S. Napper and Robert E. Lindsay, "Audio Tools for Distance Education," in Barry Willis (ed.), *Distance Education Strategies and Tools* (pp. 135-161), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1994, p.136.

⁸Conversation with Jim Palmer, Liberian Desk Officer U.S. State Dept.

⁹This author is a licensed short-wave radio operator. Instructions for set up may be found in Stan Horzepa, *Practical Packet Radio*, Newington, CT: The American Radio League, 1995.

¹⁰Many computer companies provide this feature. For field research in Guinea where I had no electricity, I used a computer and printer with 12-volt adaptor, a battery bought in-country, and a camping-sized solar panel to charge the battery.

¹¹Wolcott, pp.137-141.

¹²Karen and Will Kitchen, pp. 20-22; Richard A. Markwood, "Computer Tools for Distance Education," in Barry Willis (ed.), *Distance Education Strategies and Tools* (pp. 199-121) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1994, pp. 200-207.

¹³Educational theory is discussed in the following sources: *Linking for Learning: A New Course for Education*, Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, pp. 5-8, 33-38; Robert Threlkeld and Karen Brzoska, "Research in Distance Education," in Barry Willis (ed.), *Distance Education Strategies and Tools* (pp. 41-66), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1994; and John R. Verduin, Jr. and Thomas A. Clark, *Distance Education: The Foundations of Effective Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1991. 165.

¹⁴E. Lynn Oliver, "Video Tools for Distance Education," in Barry Willis (ed.), *Distance Education Strategies and Tools* (pp. 165-194) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1994, p. 169.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 170-171.

¹⁶Threlkeld, and Brzoska, p. 58.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p.58-59.

¹⁸F. Barry Brown and Yvonne Brown, "Distance Education Around the World," in Barry Willis (ed.), *Distance Education Strategies and Tools* (pp. 3-35) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology Publications, 1994, p. 20.

¹⁹The World Health organization has been looking for reliable telecommunications channels to expand their Telemedicine program where

doctors can consult a specialist anywhere in the world for diagnosis and treatment. The problem has been the lack of telecom links. Michael Hegener, (March 21, 1996), "Telecommunications in Africa--via Internet in particular," <<http://thing.at/thing/texte/hegener1.html>> (January 24, 1998).

²⁰Currently many satellites have excess telecommunication capacity, and a precedence has been set in the United States where telecommunications carriers have donated access to educational partnerships. Brown and Brown, p. 20.

²¹Mike Jensen, (August 21, 1996), "Bridging the Gaps in Internet Development in Africa," <<http://demiurge.wn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm>>, (January 24, 1998).

²²William J. Cook, "1997: A New Space Odyssey," *US News & World Report*, March 3, 1997:

²³Hegener, <<http://thlng.at/texte/hegener1.html>>.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸"Eastern African Telecomms Ministers, Experts and Private Sector Reps to Discuss Internet development," (October 7, 1997), <<http://www.worldbank.org/aftdr/connect/eca.htm>>, (January 24, 1998).

²⁹Hegener, <<http://thing.at/thing/texte/hegener1.html>>.

³⁰Ghana was the first country in West Africa to have permanent Internet connections. *Ibid.*

³¹Currently South Africa is the only source of Internet providers on the continent. *Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Jensen, <<http://demiurge.wn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm>>.

³⁵<www.info.usaid.gov/regions/afr/leland/index.htm>, (January 24, 1998).

³⁶"Internet End User Application Issues" <www.info.usaid.gov/regions/afr/leland/enduser.htm>, (January 24, 1998).

³⁷Abebe Kebede Bahiru, (April 30, 1997), "The Final Word/Open College / A V U - - T i m e t o H u s h - u p , " <<http://unicorn.ncat.edu/~michael/edla/mail/mail2.html>>, (January 24, 1998).

³⁸"AVU" <www.avu.org/documents/concept.html#heading3>, (January 24, 1998).

³⁹"African Virtual University," <www.avu.org/pilot/program.html>.

⁴⁰<www.avu.org/documents/concept.html#heading3>.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³Other countries on this short list are Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, Sudan, Niger,

Rwanda, Somalia, Guinea, Burundi, Benin, Chad, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Congo, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea,
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B U T U O:
A LILLIPUTIAN TESTAMENT TO A STRUGGLE--
The NPFL Journey to State-Power: How Charles Taylor Upset the
Bowl of Rice and Took Home the Whole Hog . . .

C. E. Zamba Liberty

With a Foreword by C. E. Zamba Liberty, II

Foreword

"Butuo . . ." is the last product of my father's mind before he departed this life October 22, 1997, at age 53. Because publication is posthumous, I am offering this brief foreword.

Dr. Liberty's devotion to his wife and family was matched only by his love for the country of his nationality. Though he resided in a materialistically wealthier nation, his immense devotion to his fatherland never wavered. His habitual discussions with compatriots, proximal and distant, incessantly focused on the antecedent, the contemporary and the prospective Liberia.

My father's deteriorating health and subsequent illness did not hinder the *tete-a-tetes*. In fact, as he approached the end of his life, his engrossment with Liberia ascended. He kept abreast of the daily activities in Liberia via the radio, television, computer service and friends. As an individual who prided himself on assuming the role of the devil's advocate, to the irk of close friends and compatriots, the current political situation in Liberia, inclusive of the war and election warranted a written explanation. His explanation may befuddle the greater majority who demand that an historian remain unprejudiced--- an historian's proclivities whether politically correct or not should remain covert.

Most would accord that the obligation of an historian is to unearth facts, as an archeologist does, and expose them unpolluted, to the public. The question then manifests itself: why would an historian extend an

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apologia benefiting the Taylor administration? Is not his appointment in life to honestly present the unadulterated facts? The answer, complicated as it may be, lies in the fact that Dr. C.E. Zamba Liberty deemed it obligatory to advocate tolerance at the least and acclamation at the most to the individual who challenged the tyrannical Doe regime. He maintained that the Taylor camp has sustained antipathetic, better yet, virulent denunciations by variant political camps. Quite like one of the king's men aspiring to reconstruct Humpty Dumpty, my father, the Liberian citizen, intended to cultivate conscientious support for the distinctive person of the hour whom he perceived had been scornfully slighted by innumerable critics. The critics, he observed, had or could not have accomplished better given the circumstances. As is known, the ideal is in the beyond and not the now.

That said, the multitudinous imputations of questionable moral behavior and character associated with President Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor and/or his retinue may be valid. However, his apologies for said acts seemed to have fallen on obstinate ears. Generally speaking, we are disposed to loath others for their inadequacies while being inadequate ourselves in lauding them for their virtuous acts.

Divergent from many previous Liberian political steersmen, President Taylor publicly apologized for solecisms caused by improper individuals associated with his government. Sadly, others whose associates may have indulged in similar indiscretions in the past have offered no such apology.

My father thus thought it in the highest interest of the nation to embrace an individual who at least did the following: he represented Liberia's interest; he showed defiant courage when he confronted Liberia's liability: Samuel Kanyon Doe; finally, he acknowledged his *faux pas* as all men should.

The idea behind the paper is not to solely propound absolution for temporal barbaric acts but to elucidate the historical aspects of them. He maintains that Taylor's retinues were not the originators of boorishness nor embezzlement. If Dr. Liberty could have, he would have rectified such acts if plausible and would have provided mechanisms for preventive purposes.

He thought that some of the current critics of the present government

could have established a guiding presence, as preceptors, in the government if they had forsaken self-aggrandizement. These guiding forces could have harnessed the impetus for the better of the country. As American President John Fitzgerald Kennedy stated, "ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country." This Dr. Liberty did.

Introduction

Dear Martin:

A decade has elapsed since our last communication. So much water has gone under the bridge that I sometimes wonder if any is left upstream. If you are like a few acquaintances of mine, you probably wish you had never heard about Liberia, more or less spent so much time trying to make it intelligible to your associates and your countrymen.

As you already know, two individuals dominated information about Liberia over the past decade: Samuel Kanyon Doe and Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor. The first was your potato greens; the second, your *kay-tay-lay*. This bit of writing is about the second. It is an attempt to bring some balance to the portrait painted by the media about Liberia since the Civil War erupted. Some will read the account presented here and dismiss it. They should think again. Otherwise they could end up gyrating wildly around like live chicken whose heads had suddenly been excised from their bodies.

What has recently occurred in Liberia goes against the grain of what is taken to be standard knowledge about Liberia. I predict that more events in the future will further eviscerate the pleonastic image. It is imperative that Liberians come to grip with all facets of their multidimensional national existence. In less than a generation, seventeen and a half years to be more precise, Liberians have gone through two socio-political brutal revolutions. A bloody coup preceded the first; a flagitious civil strife birthed and engulfed the second. The first was cocooned in the *ancien regime*; the second issued out of the first. All intertwined so tenaciously that oftentimes

it is adamant to dissect them. Scatter them around haphazardly in a patchy narrative and you have the making of an ephemeral analysis.

So far, so good, Martin. Let us now proceed to look at the *other side of the coin*.

Glendale, Wisconsin
August 29, 1997

The Other Side of the Coin: Of July 19, 1997, and Why I Write

What happened in the July 19, 1997 Liberian special general elections was no illusionist's legerdemain, no witch doctor's sleight of hand, no voodoo practitioner's concoction, no *neegee* scuttling. It was a simple, outright, old-fashioned, good spanking, sharply administered by the National Patriotic Party to the rest of the field.

Critics of the results allude to several items which, they claim, influenced the outcome. Featured among these are:

- the NPP had a near monopoly on the broadcast media;
- the NPP had so terrorized Liberians that fear of a renewal of the Civil War induced many to vote for it;
- the NPP, whether wearing the NPFL or NPRAG mantle, had been around a while and people were used to it;
- the NPP had an insurmountable amount of available resources obtained through questionable means;
- the high illiteracy rate made many voters enamored with the pizzazz of the NPP; and
- ECOMOG soldiers at the polling sites interfered with the process by marking ballots for the NPP when unwary unlettered citizens turned to them for assistance.

My people, my friends, my colleagues, persuasive as it may seem, the NPP did not win because it had radio stations. Remember 1985 and the broadcasting monopoly of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)? Who thinks that the omnipresent Liberian Broadcasting System (LBS) swung popular support toward the NDPL in 1985? Or were the managements of ELBC and ELWA horribly inept or insidiously hostile to the government of the day whereas the NPFL/NPRAG/NPP team was cleverer, more competent, more sincere? . . . (ii) Efficacious as it might be, the NPP did not win because of what has been described as unadulterated terror. Is the importance of the other militias with their political parties now going to be marginalized or dismissed because of their poor showing in the elections? Again, remember 1985 when the NDPL held the advantage on terror and did not have to compete with other armed groups? Why did the intimidated people not flock to its banner? . . . (iii) Astutely as it reads, the NPP did not win because it was the most experienced political group around and the Liberian public had become attuned to the face of Charles Taylor. Who had been around longer than our dear Grand Old True Whig Party? Could it have won a fair and free multi party election in 1984, even if it were still the party of government? Again, remember 1985 and the NDPL, after five years in power had the Liberian public not grown accustomed to Samuel Doe's face? How many Liberians honestly think today or thought at that time that the NDPL really won in 1985? As many as or considerable more than the votes (7843/621,880 or 1.26/100%) the NDPL received in 1997? . . . (iv) And what about the line that the NPP was loaded with *jafing, caloot, cabbage leaves*, and bought the elections? Again, remember 1985, did the NDPL not have much more than an evenhanded share of *jafing, caloot, cabbage leaves*? Let those who still think that the NDPL fairly won in 1985 raise their hands? . . . (v) The NPP did not win because the vast majority of Liberians are ignorant uneducated boors who fell for its hype, glitter and glamour. What has become of the rallying cry of the '70s and '80s?: **Power to the People! The Masses are the People!**? Are the masses no longer **the People** because they currently are dancing to the beat of another drummer? Do they no longer discern what is in their own best

interest because what they now do fails to conform with what has been prescribed by those who inferentially know better? Should they be denied the vote because they have little or no formal Western education? What can we say then to the tactics of the denizens of the *ancien regime* whose manipulations resulted in a very restricted franchise, if voting by rote necessitated a franchise? Or is it really true that the Liberian people dared to think that the NPP is the political party that best serves them at this time?

This article seeks to elucidate to some extent how and why Taylor and the NPP won. It is not a research document, a definitive study of the 1997 Liberian special general elections, and does not purport to be.

Alas, now is the time for all good men to do justice to the National Patriotic Party for what it has achieved: the winning on a grand scale of the first, free, fair, multiethnic, multi-party judiciously supervised, internationally monitored, Liberian general elections in the twentieth century. Anyone who had seriously reviewed the Liberian scene of the '90s could have predicted that the NPP would win. The bone of contention would have been the width of the victory margin. The NPP would have won if not a single ECOMOG soldier had been near a polling place. The NPP would have won if the most impartial foreign observer had been at every booth. The NPP would have won because of a nexus of achievements: it was the largest political party, the best organized political party, the best financed political party, the political party that unapologetically acclaimed Liberian (not ethnic) nationalism, the political party that had the muscles of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia behind it, the political party that had the effective civil local government experience of the National People Reconstructive Assembly Government, and the political party with the savvy and charisma of Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor at the helm of it.

The NPP would have won because it could count accurately and

understood that the name of the game was numbers registered and voting not status of voters or voters' educational level or voters' debating skills or the international popularity and pliability of the individual candidate. The NPP realized that the elections would be decided by Liberians in Liberia not by Liberians in the US or anywhere else in the world and tailored their political strategy appropriately. It would have been better if one could attract and retain the affection and commitment of Liberians in the US; but if that was not to be, why go *gaga* about it or disperse limited resources in that direction to entice or convince those who had already made up their minds. The NPP partisans were true believers, resolutely convinced about the rightness of their cause and the validity of their final objective. The acrimonious counter-arguments about the persona of Taylor did not register on or persuade them to abandon ship as these had impacted some of their second tier leaders. The core NPP leadership knew precisely who its real Liberian friends and supporters were. It did not conjure allies out of thin air and seriously expect them to materialize on demand at voting centers. Anyone can summon friendly legions from the dusky depths . . . anyone can phantomly array them to assail the citadel or staunchly advance in support of the prince or princess . . . anyone can beckon for amicable battalions from the opaque bottom . . . but will they come; indeed, dear friend, will they come? The NPP never forgot the 1979 *causa belli*-- the price of rice-- which set in motion our current cycle of insurrections. It is true that man may not live by rice alone, but he does need some soup and rice in his stomach while he clamors for his rights. Remember, **"empty bag can't stand."**

The NPP combined two political elements that have functioned rather fortuitously in the modern Liberian state, either in the open or surreptitiously:

- (a) the populist, which in its 20th century derivation, configured from the various attempts (some narrow rooted; others, broad-based) at political reform in the post-Second World War era, especially the '70s, sought to open up the closed political order of the day; and
- (b) the traditionalist, which originated in the century-old, institutionalized,

party of government, the True Whig Party, with its "caucus" formula, loose structure, and emphasis on political gaiety at election time within the arrangement of a strict political order. The NPP was not saddled with the guilt complex emerging from the **reform movement** and all the politically correct encumbrances of the '70s. And it was prepared to adapt "old style" traditional political tactics disparaged by the "new politics" as archaic and coarsely "full belly politics."

This article seeks to elucidate to some extent how and why Taylor and the NPP won. It is not a research document, a definitive study of the 1997 Liberian special general elections, and does not purport to be. It is exclusively the reflections of an opinionated and wearied commentator and he alone bears responsibility for its contents. It is his view that Taylor and the NPP did not somehow accidentally drop out of the sky onto the Liberian world. They did not pop up out of nowhere, a bunch of mercenaries hellbent on razing Liberia to the ground, *a la* the Scandinavian troops in central Europe during the Thirty Years War. They were the product of special circumstances of the '80s which made armed revolt the necessary condition to rid the country of tyranny. The Doe thesis of authenticity which had hoodwinked the West for most of the regime's tenure had at last germinated its antithesis. Doe was out there, dangling from one of his infamous light poles. His regime was fast unraveling in a downward spiral. The question of its downfall was not whether but when and how messy would the landing be. The **key reformers** of the '70s, who in one form or another had been associated with his administration at its inception, had been imprisoned, coercively coopted, cowed into silence, or driven into exile. They did not pick up the gauntlet, perhaps could not pick it up. For all intent and purpose, the external sponsors had withdrawn their component of the **Mandate of Heaven**. The **Verdict of History** had been conclusively passed. What was still unresolved by mid-1989 was the **Expediter** who would consign the regime to the dustbin of history. Taylor became the **Expediter**.

This article contends that Taylor and the NPP must be considered in a Liberian context, first and foremost, then reexamined in a West African and African mode. It insists that Taylor's uniqueness arises from the fact that

Taylor has been exceedingly adept at taking ordinary things and blending them into phenomenal alloys. Some would pretend that you can discuss the triumph of the NPP without alluding to the centrality of Taylor. Hogwash! It is a fallacy to intimate that there would have been an NPFL success story without the person of Taylor. Political parties, military systems, coups and putsches, bloody uprisings--all antedated Taylor's bid for power and have been present in Liberia in one configuration or another, at one locale or the other, over the past century and a half of independence. What Taylor did was to gather strands from a variety of these associations, bind them into a cord and scattered excisions of that cord all across the national landscape. What had once been particularistic now became generalized; once singular, now ordinary. A civilian, Taylor created a militia that wrecked havoc on a presumably professional army by eroding its sense of invincibility and its mantle of intimidation. A stranger, he recruited and cultivated a steadfastly loyal local force wherever he went that defies rhyme or reason and borders on the ethereal. A beguilingly ordinary-looking individual, he exudes a charisma that far exceeds his physical appearance. An amateur politician, he exhibits the skills of a consummate political insider, efficiently wheeling and dealing with the knack of saying the *bon mot* at the right time. A non-historian dealing with a moderately perused subject, he behaves as if the annals of the Liberian state is his favorite subject and specialized vocation. He treats power with public indifference while privately nurturing it in exquisite crystals. He suggests **committee** but it is soon apparent that he is *primus infer pares* and very much *primus* at that.

Taylor and the NPFL went through two phases of war: the military-political and the political-military. Both were actively present in the fatal confrontation with Doe and in the deadly competition with the reformers/progressives. They interfaced: the political was always latent in the military and vice versa. They contrast sufficiently, however, to warrant interpreting them sequentially. In the war or first phase, the target was Doe and the military elite around him which had been in power for almost a decade. The struggle was clear-cut: the good guy versus the bad guy, the right cause versus the wrong cause. Taylor was momentarily the undisputed

champion of the wide though shallow anti-Doe coalition, broadly acceptable to the Liberian intelligentsia at home and in the US, and the once and future Hero of the Monrovia *hoi polloi*. Yet, throughout this phase, the amorphous anti-Doe coalition was fracturing over who should actually lead in the post-Doe era and had begun staking out individual moral and political grounds. Everything burst into the open when Doe was killed in the Monrovia suburb of Caldwell some eight months after the foray at Butuo.

Ought Liberia to be ruled by her own political traditions, however murky they are, or by those emanating from “higher laws” or controversial foreign experiences that have nothing to do with Liberian realities?

For the remaining seven years of bitter and savage conflict, the political dimension influenced and defined the military course. The skirmishes and battles would be bloodier, the casualties higher, the arguments more contentious and irreconcilable, the diplomatic involvement more intense and widespread. Yet, in von Clausewitz’s terms, the Liberian Civil War was clearly the continuity and the instrument of Liberian factional politics. It was motivated by the political goal of attaining state-power in Monrovia and not just by the elimination of military autocracy. If the armed struggle had been necessary to dispose of the military, then who had the moral authority to replace Doe: those who had endorsed and engaged in that struggle or those who had refrained from getting their hands dirty but later formed the reception committee at the Executive Mansion? Ought Liberia to be ruled by her own political traditions, however murky they are, or by those emanating from “higher laws” or controversial foreign experiences that have little or nothing to do with Liberian realities? Taylor and the “warrior-molded” NPFL or the assorted “political parties” coalescing around Dr. Amos C. Sawyer and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)? This issue formed the crux of the much longer second part of the

Liberian Civil War.

Sawyer and the IGNU leadership were preeminently the reformers/progressives who had been around for almost two decades in opposition to the government of the day, save for about an intermittent three-year period (1980-1983) when they chafed in tight harness running along with the Doe regime. For the last decade and a half of that twenty-year period, they had become accustomed to framing the contours of the general debate by which Liberians and non-Liberians explicated on how Liberia is (or **was**) governed, **who** should rule, and how Liberia **should** or **ought** to be governed. This positioned them, or so some thought, to call the shot as to who would or should become the next national leader. Some felt they thought they had a monopoly on civic virtues. They were insistent that whoever wanted state-power should do so via the ballot box and not the barrel of the gun and should rule by law not fiat. They also insisted that political authority in Liberia be in the hands of civilian rather than military or militia persons. They were ill at ease with the legacy of the Liberian state, especially its mono-ethnic political leadership and the authoritarian character of the republican state. They professed a love for and commitment to democratic order, an order in which merit not heritage would determine one's station in government and society. Their domestic and international fame came from taking on and exposing the contradictions of the True Whig Party-dominated Tolbert government and their persistent pressuring for human and economic rights, and humane and representative governance. They were somehow akin to the Polish Solidarity movement: brilliant and compelling when laying out the defects of the authoritarian government of the day: completely impotent when in command of that government.

But all Liberians did not wholeheartedly subscribe to the radical agenda. It is arguable if a majority of the Liberian intelligentsia were spiritually attuned to it. Careerists rejected the radical agenda because they could not envision the radicals in power: the radicals would not seize power; the *ancien regime* would not permit the kind of election that would elevate them to power. Ethnicists held that the radicals were too cerebral, insufficiently anti-regime; were confusing the prime issue of the day (all-out

anti-Congoism) and missing the boat with their concentration on the ideal Liberian society. Pragmatists considered the radical program to be unpolishedly utopian, downright mean-spirited and sneakily envy-driven. The reformers/progressives, in the eyes of folks like these, wanted what the *ancien regime* had (i.e., status, wealth, respectability), and, through their articulations, was simply indirectly appealing for popular support to elevate them there. A few felt and still feel that by their unrelenting agitation the radicals had made any and all political reform and compromise under Tolbert appear picayune, odious, dreamy, and ridiculous therefore logically positing open revolt against Tolbert as justifiable, inevitable, and acceptable. That the radicals could not ever have countenanced the wanton killings by the military does not exonerate them from providing the rationale for the deed, they argued. These folks saw the radicals as charming but dangerous con artists, of being "soul" bedfellows with Doe while publicly loathing him, of going along for the ride with the soldiers then bailing out when the going got exceedingly rough. They contended that these figures were the real intellectual "godfathers" of Doe; that Doe's bloody coup and its homicidal aftermath of public political executions were very much their indirect handiwork. It was as if their own hands had carried out the foul deeds and sated the state with a generation of infectious bloodletting.

Rightly or wrongly, this perception has bedeviled and cast a shadow over the radicals and their plans, from the events of April 12, 1980, up to those of July 19, 1997. IGNU was perceived by many Liberians as the radicals' government. Although himself looked upon initially as a part of the broad reformer/progressive spectrum (albeit the center-right wing), Taylor's rejection of and direct confrontation with IGNU placed him in the unique position of being in the middle, of being both anti-military and anti-radical, of being against Doe and against Sawyer. He would battle the inane cruelty of the military and the romantic asininity of the radicals, while not totally identifying himself with the bland status quoism of the *ancien regime*. On the other hand, circumscribed by the harsh conditions of political life in IGNU's Monrovia (they were physically confined by the NPFL to Metro-Monrovia) while hoisting and keeping aloft the banner of political liberalism or cramped

by the uncertainties and insecurities brought on by the unholy Doe affiliation, the radicals' quest for physical survival and political coexistence seemed to suggest opportunism, sycophancy, pusillanimity, and intellectual bankruptcy. Their human foibles and frailties have been magnified and occasionally distorted, leading to basically decent and honorable men like Sawyer being evaluated sceptically and diabolically. The radicals have come to be looked upon as the "secret authors" of the nation's political and economic woes and stench, of its enduring agony. Their professed idealism is perceived as not at all commensurate with their political and governmental actions when associated with state-power.

In the first year of the Doe regime, there was admittedly a tenuous alliance between Doe and leading radicals, who themselves were fragmented along factional and personality lines. Doe saw a substantial measure of legitimacy in their support. They glimpsed the possibility of controlling state-power through him. There swiftly followed however a falling-off period as first this one then that one and the other one of the radicals was pushed off the Doe wagon as it madly rushed toward nowhere. The military-radical coupling had cracked into sizeable chunks by the time of the military assault on the University of Liberia Capitol Hill Main Campus in 1984 and had totally dissolved by the general elections of 1985. Upon advice of his Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, John G. Rancy, Doe craftily reversed course and courted the remnants of the True Whig Party leadership as replacement for the reformers-progressives. Most of the latter opted for the newly opened safety valve and escaped into exile after varying periods of incarceration or threatened incarceration.

In 1990 with victory so close yet so far away, Taylor and his people held that the reformers/progressives were butting-in or cashing-in on what the NPFL had unilaterally achieved. According to this line, the radicals and their allies had cleverly induced the premier NPFL field General Prince Y. Johnson to come over to their side in his Independent NPFL personification, then had quickly discarded him after wringing him dry. To the NPFL, it was a classic Liberian case of Monkey (NPFL) work and Baboon (IGNU) draw. On the other hand, to IGNU adherents IGNU stood for all-out resistance to

the imposition of yet another authoritarian regime in Liberia under the guise of liberation. Having failed to conclusively neutralize either Tolbert (done by Doe) or Doe (done by Taylor, with Prince Y. Johnson as executor of the final act), NPFL devotees charged that these members of the intelligentsia now desired to give the impression that they alone had the correct recipe for politically and economically transforming Liberia. They argued that IGNU supporters

were excellent at undermining and belittling those in power, had made a career at doing that sort of thing; but once in power or associated with it, IGNU leaders had behaved much like

. . . IGNU leaders had behaved much like their predecessors. They had been as pompous, arrogant, corrupt, and supercilious, if not more so than those they had so diligently and effectively denigrated.

their predecessors. They had been as pompous, arrogant, corrupt, and supercilious, if not more so, than those they had so diligently and effectively denigrated. Furthermore, in spite of their superior educational training, in terms of academic degrees, during their tenure in Monrovia these individuals had proven to be quite unimaginative, quite lacking in improvisational skills, and terminally ineffectual at managing the affairs of state.

The Liberian special general elections of July 19, 1997, was, in a sense, a choice between the two seminal post-Doe political figures, although one of them was not on the ballot. To put it bluntly, it represented a straight out contest between the roughhewn aggregation aligned with Taylor, however discordant its linkages, against the urbane combination associated with Sawyer, despite the unabated personal hostilities obtaining inside that camp.

Without endeavoring to be an *aficionado*, I must confess to having a certain fascination with and grudging admiration for Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor . . . the odd-breaker, the long-distance runner, the high

risk-taker, the uncrushable rubber ball, the rampaging iconoclast, the man with little in his favor at the time of his bid for power (pedigree, wealth, ethnicity, military background) but with everything breaking his way (particularly stamina and good fortune or "luck," the potency of which Machiavelli ingeniously wrote), "Fascination" and "admiration" are not indicators of personal friendship because men of this predisposition are usually loners whose ultimate friend is power itself. The trauma of a civilian militia leader engaged in a daunting insurgency campaign precludes such indulgence. Personal friendship for these individuals is utilitarian, worthwhile only if it enhances and promotes their power. Mystique and survival dictate keeping a certain distance, minimizing personal attachment, holding the ultimate objective in focus. This may look harsh but it is both necessary and essential. When these leaders do subscribe and submit to the traditions of the polity they lead or aspire to lead, these men can be very resourceful at reuniting and reinvigorating a seemingly disintegrating or quiescent entity. I do not doubt for a moment that there is a strong dosage of Machiavelli in Taylor, perhaps more innate than acquired. Through his actions, we see much of **The Prince** in the man. But he emerges out of a particular Liberian statist tradition-- the chieftaincy and the republican--that he intuitively understands and manipulates. I suspect that he realizes that his mark in history as President of Liberia will be principally determined by how he modernizes that tradition and strives toward perfecting the polity.

There is nothing moderate about public reaction to Taylor. He tends to be either fervently loved or fanatically loathed. Rational men debate irrationally about him. And the incoherent sometimes make reasonable appraisals when assessing him. I do not think Taylor walks on water or changes water into wine. Nor do I think he can make the blind see or the mute speak. I know he issued out of the same simple yet complex world as did some two and a half million other Liberians and I. He ate the same food, talked the same talk, walked the same walk, played the same play, and sang the same songs. I am certain that his childhood, youth and early manhood were formed and defined in that prosaic environment; that his perception and knowledge of Liberia is, in the main, derived from the cross-fertilized rural

community that was postwar "Up-River," Montserrado County.

The "Up-River" area is like a regional melting pot where elements from all four national population streams (Mel or West Atlantic, Mande, Kwa, and New World) converge in varying strengths. It encompassed the potency and impediment accompanying that admixture. This was especially true of the Congo ethnicity whose varied levels of stratification in terms of pigmentation, origin, occupation, education, and religion were represented here. In the 19th century, the major threat to New World primacy in the area came from a Gola upsurge, seeking to interdict trade between Monrovia and the hinterland and to create a political federation. All efforts were made by the incipient Liberian state to nullify that drive and to reduce Gola military power to that of the quiescent Kpelle. This pax prevailed until the last decade of the 19th Century when Samouri Toure bid to recreate a Malinke empire engendered a ripple effect which forced the Lower Golas to prepare to battle segments of the Samourian sofas. Since the Second World War and the opening of the various mining and rubber plantation centers elsewhere, the area has become an economic backwater with little to offer financially. Interestingly, between the collapse of trade in the 1870s and the emergence of rubber in the 1930s, the "Up River" region was the economic backbone of the fledging Liberian republic. Its production of coffee and sugar cane made it the hard currency earner of those years. The social inter-ethnic mixing that occurred there was more widespread and intensive than in any other emigrant community. As the frontier zone of Congodom vis-a-vis the central and western interior regions where the bulk of the national population resided at that time, the "Up River" region had to develop a certain sensitivity, an admixture of arrogance and fear, toward those inhabitants which Monrovia did not necessarily have to have. This gave rise to an appreciation of Monrovia, as the singular outlet to the Euro-American world, and a feeling of Liberian nationality that oftentimes escaped simple definition.

The deep-seated patriotism embraced in toto by Taylor and the NPFL, which seemed alien to the Monrovia sophisticates, was nurtured and promoted here. Over the last century of the First Republic, it had posed a

not so subtle threat to Monrovia primacy, but in that contest had always come up second fiddle, even with the Tolbert presidency and the subsequent catastrophe. Its wavering attempt to back Roye against Roberts fizzled in 1870. In the great political debates of the last century pigmentation (dark-skinned versus light-skinned), economic (agrarian versus trade) and education (location of Liberia College) argument-- "Up River" advocates produced the verbal fireworks but Monrovia habitually prevailed, setting the standard for what should obtain. Yet the "Up River" political machine, the True Whig Party, would come to state-power after Roberts' death and hold on for the next century, even though all its Standard Bearers, save two, would hail from Monrovia, Grand Bassa, or Maryland. The other "Up River" president, William David Coleman, who like Tolbert ascended to the pinnacle from the vice presidency, was compelled to resign in 1900 by the Monrovia power elite over a territorial expansionist policy, in support of the Lower Golas, that was readapted four years later and greatly enlarged. "Up River" was also the pivotal community that sparked and pushed the 1930 protests culminating in the resignations of President King and Vice President Yancy after the League of Nations inquiry into the forced labor crisis.

It is thus neither far-fetched nor aberrant to imagine Taylor wrapped in the Lone Star flag and unashamedly leading a flag waving parade down Broad Street up to the J. J. Roberts Monument on Snapper Hill, all the while rapturously singing "All Hail, Liberia, Hail!" Taylor possesses a primal feeling for Liberia that the ordinary people share. It is not better than or superior to similar feelings shared by his opponents. But it is more visceral, more outspoken, more down to earth. NPFL commandoes believed that they embodied the state, that they were "Liberia," and that they were prepared to act upon it. In 1996 there was a "trusteeship" breeze that blew through Liberian communities in the US and some circles in Monrovia. Of course nothing came out of it, and, as the expression goes: no harm, no foul. But it was an option seriously bandied about by some prominent members of the Liberian intelligentsia. It is unthinkable that anyone in the NPFL would have dared whisper "trusteeship" or publicly countenance any measure that would

have infringed on Liberian sovereignty. Taylor did not mince words about the centrality of "Liberianess" in his scheme of things. To some it might sound bogus, quite insincere; to others, maybe sincere but a mite too pretentious; but to the NPFL members, it was law and gospel.

Speaking of Liberian national leaders, I personally remain committed to the view that J. J.

Roberts, despite his limited vision of statehood, was the preeminent Liberian political figure of the 19th Century and *ipso facto* of Liberia; and W. V. S. Tubman, in spite of his vaingloriousness,

The NPP realized that the elections would be decided by Liberians in Liberia not by Liberians in the US or anywhere else in the world and tailored their political strategy appropriately.

the outstanding 20th Century Liberian political personality. I do think that Taylor has far greater intestinal fortitude and a much more adventurous spirit than does the average Liberian. It is a personal spunk and audacity more akin to the universe of Roberts than to our own times, albeit a few might wager that Liberia today is very much like Roberts' times. Taylor seems at his best when under the greatest pressure; radiates absolute confidence, when the situation is most dismal.

I do not recollect having met him in person, though I may have tangentially done so between the April 1980 coup and my departure for the Federal Republic of Germany in February 1981. While in Germany, I did recall hearing about his arrest in the US in 1983 on embezzlement charges proffered by the Doe government. I did not then take the charges seriously nor do I now do so with *gravitas* because the fiscal probity of the regime left much to be desired, to say the least. Public monies was at the time floating every-which-way-for-you-tell-me-what expenditures. Even though the US was pouring it in, more gravy was leaking out of the porous pot than could have remained in it. And accountability as a concrete actuality was

indefinable. What the anti-Taylorites do not care to remember is this: Taylor exited the Liberian scene in 1983 and did not reenter until December 24, 1989. Assuming he was the sole architect and perpetrator of public fraud in the country, pray tell me whose mother's child between 1983 and 1990 did the wholesale and blatant looting of state revenues and resources that wrecked the Liberian economy and brought the country to its knees? And have these persons, if known, ever been called to give account? What international arrest warrants have been issued in the US, where they may probably have gone for refuge, to apprehend and incarcerate them? Are these untouchables truly untouchables because they have done deeds worthy of their being classified untouchables or is it just "one of those things?" Alas, there smacks of a mammoth cover-up here, methinks. Perhaps 'tis better that things remain thus and let the dead bury the dead. Therefore, at worst, I considered the graft charges political: i.e., a deal gone sour--the Boss (Doe) being *juke* by an underling (Taylor) supposedly in league with a detested opponent (Quiwonkpa) in ominous exile in the US.

In late 1988 or early 1989, rumors circulated to the effect that he had already beaten the rap in the United States by escaping from jail, a known fact, and had put together a force that would duplicate the Quiwonkpa plan, with notable modifications as to point of entry, external backing, composition, and leadership, an as yet not proven fact. A prominent Liberian intellectual confirmed the stories to me but thought the one about an invasion impractical. Any such venture, he reasoned, would have to be a destructive, go-for-broke operation. A militia like this would be no match for Doe's professionally trained soldiers and purported death squads, or his seemingly unlimited supply of weapons and ammunition which he had been stockpiling for almost a decade. These units were already engaged in selectively eliminating elements of Monrovia society and scaring the bejesus out of Monrovia people. What could a bunch of assorted, untrained or ill-trained rabble do against a potent force of this nature led by a reckless potentate? In the first major skirmish, the militia would scatter to the four corners of the earth leaving an unprotected citizenry at the tender mercy of Doe's vengeful horde. The Liberian situation obtaining then appeared tilted

against any and all insurrections. Doe had created a Fortress Monrovia and would annihilate everything that threatened it. Taylor might be able to play around in the bush but, sooner rather than later, he would be trapped and wiped out. Taylor seemed as doomed as Quiwonkpa before him.

On December 24, 1989, Taylor and his National Patriotic Force of Liberia (NPFL) crossed over at the town of Butuo into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire.

The rest is Liberian myth, legend and history.

Change's Constancy

July 19, 1997, has come and gone. The Republic of Liberia essentially remains as singular and substantial as the proverbial rock (Cape Mesurado) on which Monrovia is built. Yet, in the sesquicentennial year of her independence, Liberia is again grappling with the elemental issues of statehood and governance, again frantically attempting to coalesce and redefine without completely self-annihilating itself. Like nature's copiousness that overlies the physical environment, Liberia renews itself while clinging tightly to the terrain beneath. Continuity and change conjointly attend all its sociopolitical developments. And if the cursor hits the continuity button more often than not, the change quotient briskly stirs the mix. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Personnel variation masks institutional constancy. Certainly, something profound and spectacular has impacted the Liberian world. And although there remains a sameness, in that sameness lies some fundamental differences. Underneath, things have significantly been altered: the familiar old clothes just do not fit as smugly anymore.

In the traditional mode of installation, and at the same venue (the Centennial Pavilion site) where twenty presidential predecessors took the oath of office, on August 2, 1997, Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor of Montserrado County and Enoch Dogolea of Nimba County were duly inaugurated President and Vice President of the Republic of Liberia respectively.

The Mano, Lofa, St. Paul (Du), St. John, Cestos, Sinoe, and Cavalla,

still pour into the Atlantic. Wologisi, Bomi, Bong, Gibi, Nimba and Putu, still daily welcome the rising sun. Monrovia, Lower Buchanan, Robertsport, Tubmanburg, Greenville, Harper, Kakata, Gbarnga, Voinjama, Sanniquellie, Zwedru, Barclaysville, Rivercess, still continue to radiate their presence. All roads--from Kolahun, Webbo, Zorzor, Salala, Cocoyah, Dambalah, Gbedin, Tapata, Suehn, St. John River City, Ziggida, Juarzon, Timbo-- still lead to Monrovia. Rice is still the staple food *Dumboy and fufu* are still eaten in the coastal areas. *Gbasajama* (cassava leaf) is still identified as the special dish of the Vai; *togboigi*, of the Lorma. Women still wear *the lappa and buba*. Rubber trees still proliferate across the countryside, albeit in disarray or marginal tapping condition. Coffee trees are oftentimes indistinguishable from the new-growth forest. Low-grade iron ore still abounds in the numerous hilly regions. Diamond and gold are still rumored to be plentiful here, there and yonder. *Baryoko* and *Club Beer* still constitute the most popular alcoholic beverages. Soccer is still the favorite sport. "All Hail, Liberia, Hail!" is still the National Anthem; the "Lone Star Forever," still the National Song. The *Lone Star* is still the national flag. And regardless of how down and out he may be, the Liberian man still has cheek in his mouth and "beg pardon" on his tongue.

Why reiterate these mundane things? Because we have been led to believe-- by an incessant and seemingly appealing proposition advanced in the Monrovia and international media throughout the '90s-- that Taylor's attainment of state-power is a *non sequitur*. Such a proceeding, we were repeatedly informed, would denude Liberia of whatever little international respectability still retained after the Doe *interregnum*. It would perpetuate the militaristic adventurism began in 1980 by the noncommissioned officers of the army and give rise to a false understanding among the younger generation of Liberians as to the meaning and the method of pursuit of state-power. It could never be done legitimately--i.e., through the ballot box-- because Taylor's ruthlessness, mayhem and rampage had resulted in an immense unpopularity and deep-seated loathing which made him and his faction nauseous to the Liberian people and adverse to all things involving free choice. It would incite others, principally the Krahn, to immediately

retaliate with another generation of warfare thus perpetuating the turmoil sparked at Butuo. The luxuriant Liberian landscape would rapidly eviscerate as the master looter and his band of locusts stripped the country bare. A Taylor presidency would signal the death knell of the Liberian Republic as we knew it or envisioned it as becoming. And so on . . . and on . . . the Taylor detractors argued.

Thus was born the legend of Taylor as the Liberian *Shaka*. The operative concept here is *Shaka*, the evil wrecker of peaceful ministates, paramountcies and harmonious acephalous peoples who then were forcibly merged into the maniacal Zulu state. Not *Shaka*, the resolute unifier of miscellaneous mini-states, paramountcies, and conflicting peoples into a centralized Zulu polity. The *Liberian Shaka* legend was formulated in part to make Taylor not just *unacceptable* to the Liberian people, a political scare tactic that could be expected in the contest for national power, but more especially *unpalatable* to the broad spectrum of enlightened thought abroad which had been positively appealed to in support of the *reform movement* in Liberia. These external groups (mainly in academia and the circle of international donor agencies and foreign aid bureaucracies) had initially been influenced to commit to the Doe government by the early stamp of approval granted by the reformers/progressives. Then the Cold War perspective began zooming in, seriously distorting Liberian realities by irrationally ignoring the trend toward tyranny while postulating an inane anti-communism. In a while the unsavory features of the regime registered so regularly and conspicuously in the foreign media that gross human rights violations could no longer be facilely dismissed or brushed off as the norm of post-independent African political life. After Butuo, Taylor increasingly became demonized to justify continued support for Doe or creation of an ideal society that seemed incapable of ever seeing the light of day. After the fall of Doe, events and developments that clearly antedated Taylor's emergence on the national stage were morphed into his struggle in order to further discredit him. In response to these public relations developments, Taylor responded in kind by raising the *ante*: he resolutely joined the issue. He compelled Liberians, renowned for their avoidance of taking sides ('I

not in it, oh!") to make hard choices. He obliged them to confront the fact that when disaster strikes, the just and the unjust do suffer together atrociously. And once a person remained on Liberian soil, that individual could no longer dexterously evade the challenges at hand by insisting that the hailstones pass over his dwelling to wreck havoc on his neighbors.

II

Altered Perceptions

The politics of national confrontation and violence came into vogue with the Monrovia rice riots of 1979 and the resulting high, up to that time, fatality and wounded figures caused by the implementation of state policies in a civil crisis. The 1980 coup intensified this type of power struggle and the ensuing periods of (a) the Military Interregnum, 1980-1985, and (b) the Second Republic, 1985-1990, contributed much fuel to the fire. But the active virus that accelerated the alteration process was the Civil War. As evidenced by the massive damages to physical structures, infrastructures, human lives, and the human psyche across the country, the Civil War has most certainly devastated the land, torn to shreds the foundation upon which the *reform* politics had been erected. The belief of good and evil as political absolutes, irreconcilable and indivisible, received shattering blows when in the '80s some of the oppressed quickly developed into unforeseen ruthless oppressors. The Liberian Civil War has been the most brutal kind of warfare: the war of brother against brother, literally and figuratively.

After almost a decade of intense political agitation against a century and a quarter of mono-ethnic state-power hegemony, the vaunted stability of the Liberian state system crumbled in the 1980 coup. There was a sense of annoyance with this "stability" thing in a segment of the Liberian intelligentsia who found it to be an excuse for tolerating the intolerable, perpetuating the suffocating mono-ethnic hegemony. This group welcomed any change that would negate that stability as they interpreted it. Later, after the coupmakers had entrenched themselves, there would be an attempt to duplicate a new mono-ethnic consolidation. This time the pace would be accelerated with a greater emphasis on the overt use of state violence in a

strictly civil milieu. The Liberian state responded by volcanically imploding. The Civil War speeded up life. A lifetime was lived in a year; a year, in a day. The extraordinary became commonplace. Dying and death and destruction became the norm not living and life and construction. Flight and escape into exile explained travel not learning and synthesizing of things foreign. Fear and distrust replaced hope and confidence. Personal friendship, ethnic associations and family linkages have been radically disrupted, transformed, realigned. In the aftermath, the roll call of souls abbreviated, incapacitated, exiled, and permanently departed, hymns like a rueful, continuous dirge. The positive impact predicted by many in the wake of the events of April 1980 has turned out to be the reverse. Violence as the instrument for political change has not only affected those at the top, the decision-makers and their allies, it has reached all the way down to the bottom of the barrel, right down to the *hoi polloi* who had served as the audience in the amphitheater. How the Liberian state and society are perceived by Liberians and non-Liberians will never be the same again.

III

Then and Now

In a mature, peaceful and orderly manner, the Liberian people have spoken in an authoritative voice and a transparent language at these special general elections. Given the bellicose and abrasive tone of the five-week campaign period-- coupled with the popular prognostication of mini-Armageddon eruptions at the polling booths-- many observers came to expect a voting day filled with rancorous disputations and bloody confrontations among the competing partisans.

But July 19, 1997, the Election Day, seemed more reminiscent of what took place in South Africa in 1994 than other similar operations in West Africa. In their resounding message of approbation and affirmation, the Liberian electorate have confounded, befuddled, and nullified the "scientific" analyses of the Liberian experts and the foreign experts on Liberia as to the

mood and disposition of the Liberian electorate on this historic occasion and as to the politically correct interpretation of Liberian life, history, and political order. The

Liberian community has finally pushed itself up toward the zone of fresher and cleaner air after passing through suffocating layers of fallacious political constructs and

nightmarish experiences which have so tenaciously and ruinously fastened themselves on perceptions of the national polity. But where are the analysts who will probe and elucidate the new plateau?

In the aftermath of the Doe diasaster, how many Liberianologists are as eager to admit their horrendous error and bite the bullet as they were to enshrine him?

Butuo had finally come to Monrovia.

After some four centuries (in the wake of the Mani Invasions of the late 16th and early 17th century) the effort at state-building or state-reconstituting in the Liberian region once again originated from the interior and moved toward the coast. The legacy of the Mani era has persevered through colonialism (in Sierra Leone) and Liberian statehood. If the St. John (Mani) River constitutes a rough divide, then the peoples and territories west of it retained the expanded and enlarged chieftaincy system from that era, while the inhabitants and lands to the east kept the pre-Mani acephalous structures dormant present today. A key difference now is that the new march was affected by what the coastal littoral had wrought a century and a half ago, the republican system of the Liberian state, then expanded interiorward by superimposing in the early part of this century the chieftaincy system of western Liberia over the acephalous system of eastern Liberia so as to better harmonize the local political order and facilitate centralized civil control from Monrovia over the newly annexed Liberian hinterland.

Yes, neither Butuo nor Monrovia has ceased to be because of the encounter. And the learning experience provided by the exercise has revealed the futility of those who consistently denigrate, dismiss or minimize the statehood legacy of Liberia. The journey was extended; too much so-- many argue, although whose fault it was remains a matter of controversy. What had taken a midnight assault on the Executive Mansion in April 1980 to achieve, the acquisition of state-power, now took seven and a half eventful and climatic years. The element of surprise had long ceased to exist, if surprise-- beyond the Christmas Eve NPFL announcement-- was ever an element in the equation. The assassination method through which the Doe administration had attained state-power instinctively sensitized it to losing that power through the instrument of the military. As the government was quite aware that its demise could only be brought about through the use of armed force, it reinforced the implements of state-power-- the military, para military and security apparatus-- that presumably could and would checkmate that force whenever and wherever it surfaced. Even when the Doe regime was overthrown in 1990, the blocking mechanism in effect against the NPFL was sufficiently puissant to deny it the predominant role in state-power it had so assiduously fought for.

And thus the journey dragged on through repeated, persistent and tedious haggling involved in the improvisation of *ad hoc* political institutions, each time masquerading as an authentic expedient national solution. NPFL/NPRAG undertook to reconcile first with IGNU, then with the fragmented successors to IGNU [the alphabet soup of warring factions: AFL, ULIMO-- almost immediately transformed into ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J, LPC, CRC, LDF, and the Traditional (Chiefs) and Civilian Blocs, etc.] in a simultaneously continuous, routine, frivolous, and absurd process. The name of the game was "Frustrate Taylor and the NPP." And for quite a while, it worked. As one side raised the ante, the other would match and raise again. With dexterous maneuvering, Taylor could basically hold his bloc together. The same could not be said of his antagonists who organizationally split at each new round of negotiations.

But there would be no clean cut beheading the second time around.

There would be no post-midnight announcement of the new authorities. And the national audience that expected an expeditious decollation was in for a huge surprise. There would be no tumultuous post-event celebration to be supervised by a parade of firing squads and light poles on sandy beaches with jeering throng and a jubilant crowd. The politics of violence runs in a circle. Until that circle is rounded, the game is not complete. April 1980 did not end the politics of violence. 1984, 1985 did not end it. 1989, 1990, 1991, did not conclude the thing. Matters reached a new intensity on April 6, 1996, which July 19, 1997, will hopefully bring to a close. Instead of a select few being the target of the state's wrath, everyone was now a possible target of corporeal violence; everyone, a potential assassin.

The martyrdom of the few was incredulously supplanted by the martyrdom of the innumerable.

IV

Snail-Paced Victory

One is prone to speculate, however, what a swift victory would have meant for Taylor and the NPFL had they been able to unilaterally seize state-power in 1990. Intoxicated with the immense authority derived from such a victory might have caused Taylor to exude the brazen arrogance some define as his Achilles' heel, his major character flaw. I personally do not think Taylor and the NPFL were prepared or capable of governing effectively then. The ethnic and individual contradictions within the organizational hierarchy would have instantaneously ignited and exploded the fragile coalition. Governmental inexperience ran deeply across the board and Taylor's primary authority as *numero uno, par excellence*, had not yet solidified. The maniacal anti-Doe fury, which had initially fueled the rage and fighting spirit of the NPFL, had not yet sufficiently diminished to allow for a more levelheaded approach to the problem of governance.

Conversely, total power had come too suddenly and easily to Doe and his People Redemption Council (PRC). Once Tolbert was assassinated, everything seemed to have fallen effortlessly into place. For all intent and

purpose, on the morning of April 13, 1980 (after the coup on the night of the 12th), Doe and his group were in effective control of the state apparatus and the entire country. To say the least, he and his military leadership team were totally unprepared for governing, and nothing interjected thereafter could rectify that quandary.

In Taylor's case, it is most probable that a quick resolution of the struggle would have absolutely ruined him and his people as the more propitious circumstance had done Doe. But by delaying political reconciliation and repeatedly extending ECOMOG's tenure, his adversaries unwittingly gave Taylor the opportunity to learn and mature both as a military and political leader.

From its Gbarnga base, the National People Reconstructive Assembly Government (NPRAG) enabled the NPFL to create and operate for almost five years a distinct state within a state, a full-fledged parallel government apparatus more effective in its domestic authority than its counterpart in Monrovia. The NPFL/NPRAG/NPP had a chance to practice the art of responsible governance by trial and error, by routine instead of theory, and was relatively free from inquiring and hostile eyes. NPRAG helped NPFL/NPP master the art of co-optation without revealing the heavy-handedness behind the act. A few observers who visited Gbarnga during the NPRAG period often described the setting as being exciting, boisterous and surreal. They were fascinated with the efforts of NPRAG officials to diligently replicate the national bureaucracy in Monrovia and the aura of its protocol, all this going on in the sleepy provincial atmosphere of the place. It seemed so reminiscent of pre-World War I Monrovia when the country was on the verge of breaking out of its isolation and slowly entering contemporary realities. In spite of this, no one was ever deluded into thinking that what was occurring in Gbarnga was a joke or just play-acting, that the inhabitants of NPRAG-controlled lands did not really believe that Taylor was indeed President, Dogolea Vice President, cabinet ministers cabinet ministers, legislators legislators, and bureaucrats bureaucrats. There was the serious business of administering territories, in the same appraisal of the 19th century Liberian state. Behind the NPFL

raucousness lay a defined political methodology which conformed with Liberian realities.

No where in the annals of the Liberian state had a rural-based political force so overwhelmingly and directly impacted the urban milieu. Over the last five years, the NPFL deliberately saturated and dominated political life in the countryside in such a way as to make its competitors look irrelevant, anarchic, narrowly ethnic and obsessively violent. The NPFL's multiethnic character, a consequence of the protracted struggle and the inclusivist recruitment and impressment policy which had evolved from the extensive negative reaction to its earlier restricted ethnic following. More substantially, its penchant for establishing civil order and administration wherever its military success sank adequate roots were in direct contrast to the single-ethnic make up and exclusively military domination of ULIMO-K (Mandingo), ULIMO-J (Krahn) and LPC (Krahn).

For control and administrative purposes, NPFL/NPRAG set up a dual-command system in the lands under their domain. The civilian superintendent, mayor, district commissioner, etc., answered to the NPRAG authority; the militia, to the NPFL chain of command. As the militia handled security and enforced compliance with the orders issuing from Gbarnga, it perforce held the upper hand vis-a-vis the civilian. There was the expected strain between the two, especially over economic matters. Like their civilian counterparts, the militia officials indulged in economic activities like local transport, petty trade, and prospecting for gold and diamond. Resolution of these disputes sometimes had to go all the way to Gbarnga. This did not mean that the militia could run amuck and create havoc because of their firepower; albeit, sometimes it did. While sympathetic to them, Gbarnga did its best to make them compromise with and become amenable to the local civil authority.

With their compact and unique population base (the Mandingo, as non autochthonous, and Islamic; the minuscule Krahn, as inadmissible putative heirs to the Congo), the anti-NPFL militias were perforce preoccupied with military matters and their respective roles in the new dispensation. Their high command had little time, energy, resources, and

capability for the logical political extension of their military attainment. They had to find allies in sufficient numbers in other ethnic groups so as to give the appearance of a truly national coalition instead of selective atomized individual cooptation. This they were unable to do because of the structural character of their militias. Fighters from conquered groups rarely could ascend to the apex of this militia pyramid and decision-making process, if only for cosmetic purposes. They were expected to faithfully obey and implement the commands passed down to them but had no say in the operational design. In a political war of this magnitude, such behavior on the part of the conquering group was tantamount to subjugation, which in turn was bound to recoil against the dominant group when the day of reckoning arrived. Over time, in the territories they occupied, the ULIMO-K and LPC militias began to be perceived by their non-ethnic compatriots as "occupation forces," which undermined their efforts at political legitimacy via the political party.

V

Monrovia Trump

It is rather interesting to note that from the onset the twelve other parties virtually conceded, by their inaction if not by their articulation, the populous areas of the rural region to the NPP. They rationalized the concentration on Monrovia (and Montserrado County which encompasses the city) on the grounds that it contained over half of the electorate, and could by itself out-and-out win the elections. Metro-Monrovia, they argued, was a gigantic basin into which had drained the rivers of internal refugees fleeing the unbridled chaos of the Civil War in the interior. For security, comestible and economic reasons, the argument went, the rural (interior)-urban (Monrovia) migration had increased a thousandfold in six years, turning the hinterland into huge patches of uninhabited zones and small pockets of concentrated populations. Greater Monrovia is indisputably the most urbanized and modernized region of Liberia, the reasoning continued. It was therefore inferred that more voters would register and turn

up to vote here than elsewhere. Besides, the presumed sophistication of these voters and their hypothesized relative freedom from NPFL coercion would result in a landslide anti-NPP outpour. In 1992 Operation Octopus had targeted Monrovia and "only God knows how many souls Taylor and his NPFL sent forward to wait for Judgment Day." How can Monrovia ever forgive and forget that calamity? Ah, if everything white and grainy or beige and grainy was sweet, the sand on the beaches would provide all the world's sugar. If everything went by reason, there would not be so many married men in the world. And, sadly enough, unreasoning-- for the anti-NPP elements-- ruled on July 19.

In the actual tally, Monrovia/Montserrado cast 227,261, or 35.54%, out of the 621,880 votes tabulated nationwide. The Unity Party of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the largest opposition party, received 49,931 votes, or 22% of the Montserrado votes. Taylor's NPP received two and half times more votes. Instead of Montserrado counting for half or more of the total votes, as the anti-NPP coalition estimated or hoped, it ended up registering a little more than a third, with the opposition parties combined not getting more than 44% of that. If Monrovia/Montserrado was denied to the opposition, and done so decisively despite the latter's longer authoritative presence there, despite ECOMOG's extended and decisive habitation there, despite the international donor agencies and election-monitoring groups headquartered there, what chance had the adversaries of knocking off the NPFL/NPRAG/NPP juggernaut in its rural lair? This also indicated that the reform politics had been and is primarily urban politics with smatterings of ruralism as an inflated extension; that the outreach to the countryside was mainly linked to urban individuals' fragile threadlike networking that insignificantly and insufficiently tied in or committed the clan, chiefdom and secret societies hierarchies of the selected ethnic community.

Admittedly, the Civil War had made penetration of the countryside a hazardous personal endeavor. But the other political parties seemed more content to simply play the Monrovia and ethnic cards of their respective national candidates (president and vice president) as compensation for a weak or nonexistent rural strategy. They hoped, or so it seemed, that the

ethnic background of their candidate would mechanically translate into a headlong rush to him on election day of voters of the same or cognate ethnicity whether in Monrovia or the home county. This kind of thinking sent presidential hopefuls accelerating to Bong County in pursuit of a Kpelle running mate. Three of the four most popular anti-NPP parties---Unity, Alliance, and United People Party---took vice presidential candidates from Bong. Though the Kpelle are the single largest ethnicity in Liberia (15% - 20%), pray tell me what electoral impact were they supposed to have if they divided their votes in at least three ways (four, if the small Reformation Alliance Party is included)?

An entire electoral strategy had been based on such urban and ethnic fallacies! Wishful thinking had substituted for solid fact! Highly intelligent men were running after a gossamer garment! What a porous substructure on which to raise certitude of victory!

Unlike the NPP which swept the countryside, none of the political parties identified with the other militias so much as won forty percent in an affiliated county. In the sparsely populated Grand Gedeh County, homeland of the Krahn who dominated the AFL, the ULIMO-J and the LPC, the allied-party (NDPL, the governing party of the Doe regime) won only 3420 votes, or 35%, out of 9732 votes cast. In the much more populous Lofa County, home territory of the Mandingo who controlled the ULIMO-K, the cognate party (ALCOP, All Liberian Coalition Patty) received 8846 votes, or 17%, of the 51, 911 ballots deposited. The non-NPP militias had failed to efficiently convert to a political mode beyond their respective ethnic base, a strategy that unfortunately locked them in while it sustained them.

The NPFL deftly used its committed cadre in the countryside to penetrate and positively influenced public opinion among the masses in the urban setting, particularly Monrovia and Lower Buchanan. They continued their proselytizing when they returned to their homes after being demobilized. With a change of attire, the NPFL rank and file became the NPP rank and file. These combatants brought the same zeal and ardor displayed in battle to the political fields. The dozen other political parties had nothing in kind to match this dedicated bunch. By the time of the elections,

the mission had been largely accomplished.

VI

Six Butts, One Chair

The route to the Executive Mansion for the NPFL was rather zigzagged. And, like most everything else, it worked in Taylor's favor.

Taylor's public entrance in Monrovia in 1990 at the height of his confrontation with Doe, his withdrawal under duress from the city in the same year, and his public return as part of the second transitional

No matter how the Liberian intelligentsia may seek to disparage him, Tubman remains . . . the quintessential political figure in modern Liberian history.

government in 1995, helped foster the heroic myth linked to his name. With hindsight, it is evident that the longer the delay in reestablishing central political authority in Monrovia, the more the pendulum swung in the direction of Taylor.

The concept of the collective presidency, an agreed-upon recipe for political inclusivity and joint responsibility during a transitional (post-IGNU, post-NPRAG) mode, might have worked were it a one-shot and one-time thing. It turned into a collective embarrassing fiasco with its repetitive personifications (the snide analogy of "*six butts can't sit in one chair*" which contradicted the common sense Liberian authority principle of "*one butt, one chair*"). One of the occupants designated to be a *multiple-butt in one chair* called himself, "property of the state," whatever that translates into. The value of these "properties of state" was as consequential as the convertibility of the local currency and rendered fatuous what could have been an advantageous presence. With its seemingly interminable duration, the idea went completely against the grain of the national political

experience. It meant that no single individual or faction was accountable for what was transpiring in the country. No single individual or faction was responsible for the humungous problems at hand. This too worked in Taylor's behalf. He could always claim that collective responsibility could not be transferred to individual responsibility.

To many, procedures like these seemed to be intentionally taken to prolong the game; to wear down Taylor's resolve; to bring his momentum to a crawl, if not to a complete halt; which would be surely followed by the disintegration and dissolution of his faction. Paradoxically, these transactions only served to develop public sympathy for the underdog valiantly struggling against the world, bouncing back after each reversal. For each step forward, there was another backward: forward, backward, forward, backward. Then came the April 6, 1996 Incident, which brought the war to the center of Monrovia on a ruinous and horrifying scale unattained before. *Operation Octopus* of four years previously may have had more civilian casualties, but the sheer intensity of the physical destruction, the excessive looting, the firepower display, and the psychological warfare accompanying the April 6 battle was incomparable. The war had now infested all aspects of Monrovia life, completely upsetting everything, as everything had already been turned upside down in the interior. With the exception of the grounds around the US Embassy at Mamba Point and ECOMOG headquarters at the Free Port, everywhere else was a free fire zone. What had previously been visited upon the Monrovia suburbs was pounding on the city's nucleus. No prisoner was taken and no sanctuary respected. No home was spared and no unprotected vehicle left unmolested. Street fighting was brought to a fever pitch of savagery and bestiality. In the frenzy, military commanders often lost contact and/or control over their command. Increasingly, militiamen grew extremely insolent and anarchic with their freshly acquired power. The newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, television videos and ordinary photographs of Monrovia fleeing the looted, burning, and shell-shocked city in overcrowded and dilapidated boats, singing the National Song and being denied disembarkation privilege at West African ports, remain an image deeply etched in the national consciousness. By the end of the madness, Taylor himself had to ask the ECOMOG authority for assistance in

disarming some of his troops. No matter what the West African leaders and diplomats were publicly saying, the military brass of ECOMOG had shifted position on the ground and was now no longer the patron of the anti-Taylor militias and political blocs.

In this latest strife, ECOMOG was at best overtly neutral; at worst, broadly sympathetic to the NPFL/ULIMO-K ephemeral alliance. Only the overt threat of US intervention and the corresponding covert threat of sanction against the NPFL leadership, perhaps coupled with covert military assistance to the beleaguered anti-NPFL forces, prevented the total collapse of the AFL/LPC/ULIMO-J/LDF/CRC grouping concentrated at the Barclay Training Center. And what a blessing in disguise for Taylor and the NPFL that such a military solution was not obtained at that time!

In conjunction with the continuing *Operation Grasshopper*, the Monrovia conflagration broke the will to fight of all combatants, especially the anti-NPFL militias, and finally negated the safe haven concept of Monrovia. No longer could the primary conductors of war openly orchestrate violence in the countryside while claiming sanctuary in Monrovia. Every major player immediately understood that the sole face-saving way out of the Liberian morass was through the political process, via the ballot box. The movement henceforth became an accretion of forward-forward-forwardness . . . finally culminating in the purifying deluge of popular choice!

VII

Wind and Whirlwind

The breath and depth of the National Patriotic Party victory at the polls on July 19, 1997, far exceeded anything dreamed of by even the staunchest of NPP partisans, if they should care to publicly admit it. A definitive statement was issued here that cannot be easily dismissed, as a few naysayers would insinuate. As was very early deduced, Taylor seemed not to be the first, second, or even third choice of Washington, the most important Liberian patron historically, and especially so on a bilateral basis, since the Second World War. Taylor knew this. All his opponents knew this.

The ECOWAS knew this. The OAU knew this. The UN knew this. And worse of all, for the Taylorphiles, the average Liberian man knew this. The US, as government and culture, occupies a pivotal role in Liberian politics and culture. Historically, what Liberians *think* the United States prefers for Liberia politically is *conjecturally preferred by* the Liberian political class. Naturally, the Liberian national politician who aspires to the top job but is perceived as being on the wrong side of Washington has a rough, if not impossible, trail to traverse.

The anti-Taylor combinations played on this cognition. "Support Taylor and lose the US," they intimated. "True, the US had messed up supporting Doe to the bitter end, but that was not really the US. Just a few Americans who didn't know us. Anyway, the US will never accept Taylor. He has embarrassed them with the Doe business and the Khadafi thing. You all know, you can't make a Big Man look bad." Those acquainted with the survival instincts of the average Liberian man would contend that simple logic dictated Taylor be dumped at the polls so that the external *largesse* could flow more unhindered and urgently again as in the early and middle years of the Doe era. Yet, in spite of this, the opposition could not capitalize on the appeal and was individually and collectively trounced in every nook and cranny of the state.

From the mega-metropolis of Monrovia to the isolated and scattered hamlets and settlements of the countryside, seventy five percent (468,443) of those voting opted for the NPP and its charismatic Standard-bearer. Sixty-two percent went for the NPP in Greater Monrovia alone, the supposed heartland of the anti-Taylor groups. The NPP won every county, every county seat, every large town, every urban or semi-urban setting. In several populous rural counties (Nimba, Bong, Grand Bassa, Margibi), the NPP received at least ninety percent. Seventy nine percent (370,673) of the NPP total came from six counties: Bong, Grand Bassa, Lofa, Margibi, Montserrado, and Nimba. These counties comprised *the* classic Liberian "Y" with Grand Bassa as the right buttress and Bomi and Grand Cape Mount as the left. Prior to the ECOMOG-imposed disarmament scheme, the NPP *qua* NPFL outrightly dominated four of these counties: Bong, Grand Bassa, Margibi, and Nimba. It shared Lofa with ULIMO-K. It held sway in

Montserrado, in those areas outside the confines of Metro-Monrovia, and seriously vied with everyone else for Monrovia. In the left buttress of the "Y," ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K skirmished continuously until the warring factions were dissolved in November 1996 and ECOMOG took over the entire security of the country. But these militias' presence there was a thin veneer and, as viewed from the elections' results, greatly detested. The NPP would take 87%-- 11,748 out of 13, 511 votes-- of Bomi (Taylor's maternal and Johnson Sirleaf's paternal county); of Grand Cape Mount's (Boima Fahnbulleh's paternal county) 17, 384, the NPP got 12,862 or 74%.

In the Kwa-populated lands of eastern Liberia, with the exception of Grand Bassa and Rivercess, the NPP was expected to do least favorably. Sinoe and Grand Kru were the home counties of Togba Nah Tipoteh, Cletus Wortorson and George Toe Washington; Grand Gedeh, of George Boley and Chea Cheapoo; Rivercess, of G. Baccus Matthews' maternal lineage. Together with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who could claim maternal connection to the Southeast, the potential existed here for an exciting donnybrook. Only in Lofa, where Harry Moniba and Alhaji Kromah had residual roots, was a similar contest of critical importance looming. That nothing significant occurred in either region was another one of the elections' mysteries. Had political ethnicism, the public and direct appeal to one's ethnic origins for political sustenance and push, lost its sting so rapidly? Had the Doe fiasco made the attraction of *countryism* blase? Had the demise of *congodom* ironically indirectly contributed to a corresponding decline in the enticement of *countryism*? In the Southeast, a key factor may have been the ferocity of the LPC military forays and intermittent occupation which turned fellow Grebo and Kru Kwa-speakers against the Krahn and their Sapo allies. The NPP did exceedingly well in the Grebo areas of Maryland (94%, or 14,562 votes out of 15,506), Tubman's ancestral county, and eastern Grand Gedeh (the NPP would take 55.5% of Doe's home county). In the Kru areas of Sinoe and Grand Kru, the NPP margin declined drastically, especially in Sinoe. In Sinoe, the NPP got its lowest total of the elections (49.7% or 6393 votes out of 12,867).

It should not be assumed that the candidates overwhelmed by the Taylor *tsunami* were marshmallows, either, as the tabulation might suggest.

The political field included many famous *reform* or *reform associated* political figures from the late '70s and post-coup and Second Republic era. In addition to Johnson Sirleaf, there was Moniba (vice president during the Doe presidency), and Tipoteh, and Matthews, and Wortorson (the eternal bureaucratic infighter bar none), and Kromah, and Fahnbulleh, and Boley, and G. Toe Washington. These candidates had impressive running mates also: a Joseph Guannu (presidential affairs minister, IGNU) with Tipoteh; a Peter Naigow (vice president, IGNU) with Fahnbulleh; an Alaric Togba (veteran student leader and political science lecturer) with Wortorson; or a Peter Bernah (a finance and management expert) with Johnson Sirleaf. They also fielded diverse and reputable personalities for the legislature. Regrettably, there was no place of refuge from the puissant landslide for any of these stalwart individuals. In the National Legislature, the NPP took 21 out of 26 Senate seats and 49 of 64 in the House of Representative. And for those influential ones who now sought comfort from the whirlwind, having artfully sown the wind, they were collectively plucked from their untethered roots and hurled scatteringly aloft like rootless pollen adrift in the humid air.

What had befallen the reformers and the reform cause of the '70s, a group of individuals with a set of ideas that had swept away everything in the path? Were reformers/reform now cast out into the wilderness as had the *ancien regime* they had feasted upon prior to their ascendancy? Was the Liberian public holding them equally responsible for what had occurred in the '80s (with the Doe junta and the Doe Second Republic) and the '90s (with the Civil War, IGNU, NPRAG, the various militias, and transitional governments)? The humiliating lesson of July 19, 1997 would suggest this.

VIII

Subtle Messages

Did the Liberian voters not grasp the import of their deed? Were they all fickle ignoramuses caught up in the hype; found standing on their heads; suffering from a severe heatstroke? A herd of deer tragically caught in the NPP vehicles' headlights, and destined to be run over? Or was a subtle message being relayed by the tom-tom of their voting cards? I incline toward

the last.

Without appearing to be pedantic, Taylor went beyond his martial rhetoric and maneuver and quietly put into place a number of techniques for his election strategy which were to some extent first implemented by the *reform* politicians of the 1970s and others from two decades earlier. He

masterly employed

the populist

authoritarianism that

Matthew had earlier

perfected with his

PAL and PPP tactics.

He distillingly used

the collegiality, mass

appeal and moral allurements standardized by Tipoteh and Sawyer in their

MOJA/Susuku operations. He ingenuously added to these two elements

drawn from the traditional past. He adroitly revived the *bon vivant*,

bonhomie vivacity of the Tubmanic True Whig Patty era. And from the 1955

electoral campaign, he refined the organizational principles of the True Whig

Party which had been permitted to go into hibernation a half decade

thereafter. These "feel good" political capsules cultivated the masses for him

and his patty. People flocked to be part of something that was much bigger

than the prevailing circle of association.

**Some might read the account
presented here and dismiss it. They
should think again.**

No matter how the Liberian intelligentsia may seek to disparage him,

Tubman remains--even more so in death-- the quintessential political figure

in modern Liberian history. While history may treat his successor, Tolbert,

more objectively and dispassionately than Tolbert's contemporaries have, I

am of the opinion that Tolbert's managerial rather than his political skills will

be the nuggets to be mined. He knew that the country had to go forward in

order to survive but could not for the life of him energize it toward that goal.

He wrongly equated advanced academic training with political or

bureaucratic know-how in the Liberian context and erroneously instilled in

many M.A.s, Ph.D.s and Ed.D.s the notion that their degrees had

instantaneously placed them in the driver's seat and had somehow

automatically fitted them for all senior political and bureaucratic slots in

Liberia. They constituted the *new political class* and Liberians and foreigners alike had better understand and respect this. What an illusion! The *new political class* got cut down to size during the Doe years by the military and Krahn elites. And what Doe did not finish, the Civil War definitely did. Doe, on the other hand, will perhaps be favorably remembered for his early moderation and for not pursuing the extremist *scorched earth* policy some of his People Redemption Councilmen advocated. He will also be cited for his desperate attempt to learn and master in a short time frame the intricacies of the type of modern government that had evolved in Liberia.

Like Tubman, Taylor probably has appropriated public funds accruing to his cause and faction to be used at his personal discretion; or, as a friend of mine noted: "where do you expect him to currently get money from without the house caving in on him?" Like Vat, he then turned around and from the same funds provided *gratis*, meals, transportation, lodging, and entertainment for the destitute general public. Like Borbor Shad, money for Taylor was a means for acquiring, securing, and enjoying power not an end in itself.

What is often misconstrued here is that Liberians in general resent a leader taking the biggest slice of the pie. Significance is unfortunately not attached to the view that, contrariwise, the public expects that of a leader. Resentment comes about when a leader is perceived as abrogating for his exclusive use the gigantic slice, then turning around and telling the public to look elsewhere for whatever little pittance it anticipates. Like it or not, Taylor's gesture made the ordinary folks feel good about themselves, each other, and their country, no matter how desperate their plight is. Consider it pabulum, or what have you, but the people wanted some gaiety, however transient and peripheral, in these times of extreme hardship.

Taylor, analogous to Tubman but divergent from Edwin Barclay or Tolbert, behaves much like an autonomous paramount chieftain in pre-state Liberia. *L'état, c'est moi*, is an absolutist royalist idea intelligible to the vast majority of the Liberian people. *The Civil War* tragedy made many Liberians more appreciative of strong and forceful leadership embodied in that idea. And in Taylor, they seemed to have found their man. The bulk of the intelligentsia scorned him for it, although perchance were they similarly

invested they would have gladly justified, accepting same and joyously partaken of the perks. Taylor unapologetically preaches Liberian political and economic nationalism, *a la* Edwin Barclay. But he refuses to cater to or bow down before the emerging professional class (bureaucrats and technocrats) as Tolbert had so perniciously and tragically done. Taylor is not intimidated by the *arriviste bourgeoisie* or its language of change and progress as Tolbert was. He cunningly reverses the intimidation and appropriates the language. I do not think that Taylor simply sat down one day or one night and plotted his political strategy along these lines. Rather, they reflect the improvised handiwork of a man-on-the-go. A political man quite willing to change gears in the middle of a climb. Given his extrovert personality, a few came naturally to him. The charismatic person responds in a certain manner to certain challenges. He meets crises head-on and affects as if he willed them. Others, like his Liberian economic and political nationalism, may have been forced upon him by the prevailing circumstances at the time [i.e., after the ECOMOG intervention which openly sponsored and protected the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in Monrovia]. And others may have been his reaction to the perceived hostility of the Monrovia bureaucrats and technocrats who literally despised or were mortally terrified of him and what they felt he represented.

Taylor's activities summoned this sentiment: "*I will rise or fall with the hoi polloi and rural folks. You wordsmith and paper pushers can shove it.*"

It should therefore not be surprising that the refrain of some Monrovia *hoi polloi* on July 19 was:

*They say, You killed my Ma
 They say, You killed my Pa
 . . . But I will still vote for you!
 Ahem, put that in your pipe and smoke it, Mr. Know-All.
 You people think we stupid anyway.
 Anything you all say, we 'gree
 No time for too much halahala.
 You people will pack trunk and go.*

We stay here.

This thing here we say: We want Ghankay!

We want Ghankay!

You like it, Jacko! You no like it, Jacko Lantern!

IX

Comparative Stories

Much to the chagrin and feeling of betrayal of the dedicated anti-Taylorites, the Liberian electorate had finally found the opportunity to validate the audacious operation executed by Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor and his little band on December 24, 1989, when their National Patriotic Front of Liberia had its rendezvous with destiny. To speak of July 19, 1997, without remembering December 24, 1989, is to speak inanely. The political intelligentsia, many of whose eminent members duly went into exile fearing the wrath of a defiant Doe, could and did reenter the Liberian political fray on Liberian soil following his demise. Their return was possible because of the Butuo incursion.

It is only fair to admit, however, that at the time of Butuo, Taylor was less known and recognized as a Liberian *reform* leader than, for instance, a Sawyer, or a Matthew, or a Tipoteh, or a Fahnbulleh. If anything, he was looked upon as a Liberian playboy, a *fine timer* in the mode of a pre-1944 Tubman. As head of the national purchasing agency (General Services Agency), he had hardly seemed to be the strong-willed political and military figure he would resurface as at Butuo. Those familiar with him during that period speak of a status-conscious but politically anemic government bureaucrat, more concerned with the perks and rewards of office than the pursuit of national political power. If he was play acting, he wore his mask well; but not well enough to get the Doe security apparatus off his track. His loyalty to Doe was always suspect, not because of he himself. Rather, it was his connection to Quiwonkpa, a link too chummy for Doe and his security network. The government sinecure he held was precarious in an over-centralized, patronage-laden political society as was and is Liberia. If there is the slightest indication of mistrust between the

El Supremo and the procurement director, then out goes the director. There is little tolerance or leeway for he who supervises and distributes a mountain of spoils. Taylor quickly and dutifully joined what would later become an all-pervasive flight into exile abroad.

With reference to national stature at the inception of his revolt, Taylor is perhaps comparable to Laurence Kabila (Democratic Republic of the Congo); and Taylor's opponents, to the likes of Tshesekedi. For thirty years Kabila stalked Mobutu as a kind of minor irritant. Tshesekedi, on the other hand and in a nonviolent confrontation, took on Mobutu frontally in Kinshasa for some seventeen years. Through thick and thin, both Taylor and Kabila determinedly pursued their target. When opportunity came for Kabila, it did so via Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila did not play dilettante. He was an amenable symbol who seized the moment and rode it all the way to Kinshasa while Tshesekedi dramatically and inanely sought to *constitutionally* dethrone Mobutu in Kinshasa with futile strike and sterile demonstrations. Taylor's chance came by way of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. For whatever reason, the authorities in these countries felt that the Doe government had to be removed at all cost, as had the Rwandan and Ugandan *vis-a-vis* Mobutu. The length and scope of each man's struggle meant that in the terminal phase, more pronounced in Taylor's case because of its longer period, the initial spate of quasi-favorable reporting quickly degenerated into outright hostility.

Like Kabila in his confrontation with Mobutu, Taylor soon found himself, rather than the Doe administration, being put under the microscope, the target of searing, unsympathetic, international scrutiny. This shift in emphasis momentarily startled the principals and enlivened the story, especially when Taylor's paternal ancestry was repeatedly thrown into the mix as a note of precaution and incitement. It was preferable to highlight the paternal *Americo-Liberian* ancestry of Taylor (and not the *maternal* Gola) than to explain who fathered the Doe debacle, which supposedly had reversed *Americo-Liberian* hegemony and brought liberation to the indigenous people. If *Tutsi* was the shibboleth for Kabila, *Americo-Liberian* was for Taylor. Public debate automatically oscillated from the particulars that facilitated and empowered Taylor's revolt to what a Taylor

administration portended. The ploy was too clever by half and lamentably failed to arouse the Liberian electorate in the direction its authors desired. The horse had again been beaten to near oblivion, then again revived. This time the revival was short-lived. The horse had finally been beaten to death. What most princes of the realm had failed to as yet comprehend was this: after Doe, the orchestra's signature tune could no longer agitate the audience with the same passion. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on . . . As the old folks say:

You can be too clever for your own good, young man.

Monkey thought he was clever, ran up the tree.

Hid his head among the leaves.

Failed to cover-up his naked behind.

Fine-shot brought him down.

Taylor seemed to grasp that in the ongoing struggle a minute public examination of the Doe legacy would embarrass the latter's foreign sponsors and reveal part of the source of Taylor's strength but would serve no useful strategic purpose for him or his cause. After the fray, and if he prevailed as he always predicted he would, he still would have to contend with these powerful combinations if he (Taylor) stood any chance of success. Yet, one cannot help but wonder how many African heads-of-state had five hundred million dollars plus literally thrown at them by the US government alone (not including the EU, Japan, South Korea, China Taiwan, et.al.) in two-thirds of a decade, and had so little to show for it? How many professional careers were advanced by promoting Doe? The Cold War and the superpower rivalry it engendered have saddled many a Third World people with obscene leaders who could have been more easily removed. In the aftermath of the Doe disaster, how many Liberianologists are as eager to admit their horrendous error and bite the bullet as they were to enshrine him? Very few Liberian analysts care to acknowledge that Doe's record made the Taylor option viable and sufficient to many Liberians up to the bitter end on July 19, 1997.

X

Misjudging the Liberian Electorate

But no understanding of July 19, 1997, will ever be complete without a thorough probe of what transpired in Liberia between April 1980 and December 1989, however unpalatable it may be to some. Not just because of the violent and disruptive nature of the shift in the political authority line in 1980, but because that realignment signaled a dramatic demographic, generational, and especially ethnic, permutation. For the cupboard to come up so bare after so much of the heart had been put in it was emotionally traumatic, to say the least. One had been led to expect the worst of the decapitated outgoing administration, but that the incoming with all its built-in advantages should out-brutalize and out-corrupt the preceding was inconceivable and intolerable!

Taylor, a scion of the far suburbs of Monrovia, rode the squeaky rural cart; his rivals, the classic urban van. After a fancy entry, the van kept breaking down while the noisy cart, like the Easter Bunny in the TV ad, just went on, and on, and on. Those of Taylor's challengers who concurred with his rationale for revolting realized that Doe could only be removed from state-power by the exercise of the same raw force that had put him there in the first place. Each knew that there would be heavy resistance by Doe's ethnic retinue, and events proved so. They probably thought that minus an expeditious surgical strike that would eliminate the problem (Doe), the Liberian public would never tolerate an extended, indecisive, armed struggle. Their reluctance was not mere cowardice. Their resistance, on varying scales of intensity, to the pettiness, arbitrariness, or vindictiveness of Tolbert and Doe confirmed their guts. They were brave souls, honorable and decent men, who at the time of their standing up had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Most were not fair weathermen; most stood firm in the foulest of storms. But they did not or could not seize the day; muster the will to take Doe out that kind of way. They could not grab with both hands the fleeting circumstance, bind it into a tightly-woven cord, and ride out the cyclone. As time changes everything, it was changing them too.

It is rather ironic that just as these individuals had completely

misjudged Doe's resolve and staying powers until it was too late, had misconstrued America's compassion for America's interests and commitment, they now set out to wrongly evaluate Taylor's latent popularity among the Liberian masses. Yet, their analyses have become the standard looking-glass through which many international bodies view Taylor and *the Liberian Civil War*.

To better assuage the way to state-power in the special general elections, Taylor's opponents had demanded and obtained at the Abuja II negotiations two rounds to knock him out. This was very unique in the history of Liberian national elections; frankly speaking, it had never happened before. In the post-Abuja euphoria, the anti-NPP parties tried to maximize what many felt was their advantage. Seven major political parties (the political parties of IGNU), would promote the feasibility of an *alliance candidate* who would coalesce the anti-Taylor vote into a consolidated aggregation. Such a candidate would render irrelevant a second round as he/she would utterly destroy the NPP in the elections. That reasonable idea dissolved in the sizzling air of Monrovia before the campaign season even saw daylight. The fractiousness of the "political parties" quickly revealed their hollowness here. The thing started out in a disputatious manner when Cletus Wortorson beat out Ellen Johnson Sirleaf for the Standard-bearership of the Liberia Action Party (LAP). Then at the March 1997 convention to decide who would be the *alliance candidate*, Wortorson's "victory" over Tipoteh and Matthews was immediately disputed on several grounds:

- (i) that Wortorson had bribed the electors at the convention, who themselves had been unrepresentatively proportionately selected;
- (ii) Wortorson had been in the governing circle of the country *too long* (thirty five years), was perceived as a *careerist*;
- (iii) Wortorson's politics was interpreted by some as one-dimensional, anti-Taylor because Taylor *is* part Congo-- everything "bad" Taylor did could be forgiven if he were not part-Congo;

(iv) Wortorson was looked upon as a continuance of Doe, had attracted to his banner many of the older remnants of the NDPL hierarchy;

(v) Wortorson claim of "clean hands" because he was not a member or a leader of any warring faction was viewed critically; and

(vi) Wortorson appeal did not extend beyond his ethnic base and those members of the intelligentsia familiar with him over the years. The steadfast refusal of first Matthews then Tipoteh to accept Wortorson's "victory," Fahnbulleh's subsequent charge that the whole *alliance* scheme stank and was simply a device to stop Taylor, and the melodramatic entrance of Johnson Sirleaf into the fray killed any hope of an *alliance* candidate. All four critics of Wortorson joined the presidential sweepstakes.

The fall back position of the grand anti-NPP scheme would be a second round, if no presidential aspirant obtained a majority (50.1%). Here again opportunity was supposed to loudly knock again. If discord ("*the everybody for self, God for all*" mentality) characterized the anti-Taylor political coalition at the onset, then the run-off scheme would nullify that disharmony.

Were Taylor denied the majority in round one, as almost all the pundits and experts predicted, then the runner-up, regardless of the percentage obtained in the first round, would be in the driver's seat. That person would automatically unify the opposition who, despite their personal antipathy shared a greater dislike of Taylor, would deal Taylor his comeuppance. I bought into that argument too, and still do. I am firmly of the opinion that there was not the faintest possibility of Taylor surviving a second round, if the presidential/vice presidential elections had gone into a second round. He would have been gravely wounded; his opponents would have smelled blood; the reality, not the illusion, of victory would have immediately energized and galvanized them into action. Furthermore, the constellation of internal and external forces aligned against Taylor would have proved insurmountable.

If anyone, other than Taylor and his entourage (who were considered beyond the pale anyway), had suggested that the whole conception was ludicrous, and had predicted a Taylor landslide on July 19, that individual would have been laughed off the printed page and rumor mill. There had to be a run-off! The second round was the secret weapon, the high-tech laser gun, the sucker punch, which would undo the smart-alecky joker. Taylor would not be standing outdoors grinning like a *Chessy cat* when he discovered what was marshaled against him.

Small boy can run, he can't hide.

Every day for thiefman, one day for master.

Taylor will be cut down to size, come run-off time.

How unequivocal was the proof that a run-off would occur?

Why do you think so much domestic political energy and foreign influence was dispensed to obtain it, Mr. Wise Guy? Do you think the new radio station publicly brought in here four days "to balance the news stories" on the public waves before July 19 plus the distribution of 5000 radio handsets a "funfu" thing?

Furthermore, to speak frankly, the evidence had already been elicited by the "polls." And who were conducting these "polls" and among which strata of the Liberian population were the surveys being carried out? Was the survey limited to new members of the recently enfranchised political classes, the *arriviste* group so to speak? Did it include the broad span of fighters, the committed and the floating? How far into the countryside did it penetrate? Was a cross-section of the local communities questioned? Were those interviewed being candid about their feelings or were they simply saying what they thought the interviewer wanted to hear? Bear in mind that the science of polling is a novel introduction to these parts, a first time operation that needs to be thoroughly adjusted and refine-- *Young man, stop being so damn inquisitive, don't you have work to do?*

XI

Focus on the Prize

Perhaps the reluctance or inability of Taylor's competitors to initiate and engage in military action against Doe stemmed from their relentless denunciation of the brutality and venality of the regime which made pursuance of a similar course to eject him from state-power an immoral endeavor, reprehensible to their conscience and to the middle class

"...Let he who is without sin cast the first stone...."

constituents they had elected to particularly appeal to. Perhaps the *constitutional way* they publicly and privately espoused was unlike a water faucet that could be turned on and off in consonance with their inclinations. The Quiwonkpa *putsch* proved that in the Liberia of the '80s, a *humane* coup or a limited military engagement could not be implemented without calculating the "ruthlessness" factor. They did not concur with the idea that for things to get better in Liberia, they had to become exceedingly worse; that to cure the cancer in the Liberian body politic, radical surgery was required. For the life of them and their cause, they could not proceed upon it that way. They were confident that after Doe would come a powerful deluge. So one had to tread delicately, preparing contingencies for all emergencies. Everyone knew that such a flood would wipe out much, the sinner and the innocent, the wicked and the righteous, and would deeply perforate the national psyche. Fewer realized that the "it" could also be a cleansing power.

Much useful time and energy was spent repeatedly denigrating and belittling Taylor [e.g., *Where is Agnes?* (his second wife who was quite visible in Gbarnga during the NPRAG period but went into eclipse shortly after Taylor joined the Council of State) . . . *We like Taylor, but we want to know how come Agnes is not around?*" or *"Who killed or . . . or . . . or . . . ?"* and the name of a prominent Liberian who was killed behind the NPFL lines would be inserted in one of the spaces.]. This did not deter most

of the Liberian people in Liberia and in many of the refugee camps in West Africa from fondly remembering the NPFL *vis-a-vis* the other militias and objecting to the vilification of its leader. To make fun of his family pitfalls sounded petty and frivolous. Besides, how many of his rivals had clean hands concerning *woman palaver*? *Let he who is without sin cast the first stone*. In this respect, Taylor's positives clearly outweighed his negatives. Besides, Liberia was drenched with negatives. The Liberian people wanted to be rid of *Doe and his henchmen* (much as the then-named "Zairians" wanted to oust Mobutu and his cronies), no matter what the outside world did or had to say on the matter-- and only Taylor seemed steadily mindful of that and repeatedly apprised Liberians of this mission.

The notion that all of Taylor's political adversaries were spotless with reference to the employ of militias to attain state-power is nonsensical. Equally absurd is that Taylor always initiated or provoked the violence. It should always be kept in mind that Taylor was not in combat against the innocent. From Doe onward, each of his antagonist overtly or covertly used coercive measures against him in pursuit of their aims. The "Black Berets," ULIMO (both J and K), Liberia Peace Council, Nimba Redemption Council, CRC, Lofa Defense Force, all had linkages to the anti-Taylor Monrovia administration of the day. That Taylor was usually unconditionally victorious, or fought to a draw, or saw the opposing armies turn on each other (as the capture of Gbarnga developed into), does not diminish the fact that oftentimes he was as much attacked or induced into attacking as he unilaterally elected to attack. This belies the constant refrain in the international press that the Liberian civil war was a one-man (Taylor) affair in which all other competing players, especially the armed factions, were simply pounced upon by the Liberian *Shaka*.

Irrespective of the vicissitudes of their lives, the NPFL/NPRAG/NPP never deviated from the final objective: fairly and transparently attained state-power. True, Taylor and his people hungered for state-power. Yet that hunger was conditioned by the overweening desire to have the acquisition of that power be perceived internally and externally as legitimate. So whether by means of armed struggle (publicly announced and openly undertaken instead of through stealth or nighttime assassination) or by

means of the Australian ballot (whose conduct and enumeration were attested to by renowned African and international official poll-watchers and media observers), the NPFL/NPRAG/NPP strove relentlessly onward.

XII

Looting the Looters

Taylor's social revolution correlates with his politico-military revolution, as had transpired in the case of Doe. Doe's prototype

was plain and simple: the *country people* had taken over; the *congo people* were out. The *natives* had been empowered; the *Americo-Liberian*,

Those flocking to the NPFL banner ... were primarily the dispossessed, the disillusioned, the left-outs, and the have-nots, from every ethnic group and social category.

dethroned. However, in a

short while, further clarification of the model was necessary. Which *country people* were really in power? And how better off were the *country people* in general? Which *congo people* had been *booted out*? And was the *booting out* a premeditated plan or an *ad hoc* improvisation? Was *Americo-Liberianism* still alive and well even if the *congo* were not unilaterally directing the show? And who exactly was in charge? Doe and the military? Doe and his Krahn people? Doe, his military and his Krahn people? Doe and his Tuzon crowd? Doe and the new bureaucratic and technocratic elites, predominantly indigenous but with a middling representation of *Congoes*, lacked a social conscience and were perceived as guiding the *soldier-boys* in a relentless assault on the public treasury? Was *Krahn* a euphemism for *country*? Was *country empowerment* a pretext for misrule, mismanagement and impoverishment by the military and their civilian collaborators?

Since the miscarriage of the Doe experiment, it has become fashionable to dismiss it outright, to label it a naked personal dictatorship, to reject it as an ethnic oligarchy, to pretend that it did not mean much to the

structure of the national society. There has been minimal analysis devoted to explaining how this shift, if indeed there was ever a substantial shift, came about. Denial cannot obfuscate the profound impact of the 1980 coup. And if Liberia had frozen in place at that time the realities would have been very self-evident. For a while, it was the over exploitation of the *country/congo* paradigm that enabled the regime to paper over the more serious internal ethnic and class cleavages. As the regime grew increasingly dysfunctional, its ideologues retreated deeper and deeper into a mystical *countryism* which reflected more and more the specificities of the acephalous *Krahn* world out of which the president and his key advisors had issued. So too had the Tolbert regime in its dying days. One can recall a radio address of a Tolbert official after the 1979 Monrovia Rice Riot (with its writing on the wall. "*Mene, Mene . . .*") talking about hegemony and the like as if Liberia had gone back to the turn of the century. Doe could no more have individually enriched and ennobled all his enraptured multitudes in 1980 than could have Tolbert with his "precious jewels" (the young professionals and technocrats) in the 1970s. And many Liberians honestly believed that the resources were there and all Doe had to do was put his hand into the barrel and dish out the *dough*.

In spite of all that transpired in the preceding seventeen years, many Liberian political analysts, as late as July 1997, still adhered to the '70s' and '80s' cliché that in any national campaign, all you had to do, in order to win, was to mount the soapbox and scream: "*country/congo, congo/country, country/congo!* and boom, you were in the Executive Mansion!" Sadly, the mood of the electorate had been grossly misread and underestimated. The ideological patrons of this idea had come up insolvent.

What was left unexpressed in the 1997 national campaign was this: Liberians in general had become so inured to the exhausting usage of the *country/congo* dichotomy that it was no longer their number one preoccupation. They refused to provide the automatic Pavlovian response to any and all *anti-congo* diatribe which contained neither salt nor pepper, was exceptionally wishy-washy and downright opportunistic. It was the *national intelligentsia*, claiming to be the *inheritance class* from *Congodom*, who had skimmed the cream at the top of the economy under Doe, while

permitting minuscule amounts to trickle down to the masses. There was no denying that the living condition of those at the bottom was comparatively much harsher than life had been before the coup. Subsequently, there would be no indignant protest, no massive upsurge of popular support from the common people in 1989 or 1997 as had happened in 1980 when the Doe regime was tenuously challenged by rumors of impending external intervention.

Taylor's social revolution is perforce more intricate. He did not foreordain it any more than Doe did. It resulted from his act of insurrection; was a by-product of his military defiance of the prevailing authority. Doe's background was thoroughly indigenous, an item which struck a romantic and quixotic chord among the ethnicists at home, and liberal academicians and Cold Warriors abroad. His obsessive desire to be assimilated into the dominant culture pleased the remnants of the old order's inner circle. But his pre-coup contact and familiarity with the operations of the state core was marginal at best. He thus had a warped idea of how the modern Liberian state functioned. It was not his indigenouness that determined his fate. Rather, it was his lack of knowledge about Liberian statecraft that ultimately abetted his doom.

On the other hand, Taylor was of mixed emigrant-indigene origin, a fact which made him suspect in the eyes of the above-named groups. He was utterly contemptuous of the softness that apparently underlaid the controlling culture. When his revolt commenced, the constituent and majority component of his militia was as distant from his ancestral hearth as one could get in Liberia. Himself hailing from the coastal littoral, Taylor's original NPFL would be predominantly Nimbaian and his initial thrust into Liberia would be at a Nimba town (Butuo) which was as far away from Monrovia as the 1985 Mano River Bridge crossing of Quiwonkpa had been as close. Certainly the ethnic character of the NPFL at its beginning and Doe's reinforcement of troops along the lower confines of the Sierra Leonean border determined the point of entry. But the 1989 favorable decision of Cote d'Ivoire to host and assist the insurrectionists was as major a factor as had been the insufficient backing of Sierra Leone in 1985. While Cote d'Ivoire seemed willing to endure a protracted engagement, Sierra

Leone had wanted a one-shot undertaking with great latitude for the usual diplomatic denial.

Those flocking to the NPFL banner as the struggle continued were primarily the dispossessed, the disillusioned, the left-outs, and the have-nots, from every ethnic group and social category. For these folks, the Doe social revolution had been a mere cosmetic change. They had no pang of conscience when they sacked communities, hamlets and villages, whole towns, or entire cities. Many felt they were merely looting the looters, as these looters had looted previous looters. How had poor people like themselves a few years before come into such current excessive wealth? They must have *looted* it from others or the government during Doetime, or Tolberttime, or Tubmantime, or Barclaytime, or Kingtime. What was so immoral and reprehensible about *looting* them? It was not like going into the church and *looting*. *Leave people be, man. Steal from steal makes God laugh!* There was little tangible betterment in their lives. The new political class with its *Krahn* core had seized everything of value and was as unapproachable, if not more so, as its *Congo* predecessor. Why should the *looted* be cried for?

The class dichotomy, within constituent ethnic groups as distinct from the *classic country/congo* divide, was more visible among Taylor's ranks than Doe's. The militia feature of Taylor's forces also tended to permit an openness and *camaraderie* among the ranks of the fighters than would have been permissible in a standard army. If the Doe revolution attracted and fostered the sons of the chiefs and the college level students and college graduates, Taylor's appeal was to skilled and unskilled workers and their families (the celebrated rubber tapper of rural life and well-known *grona* boy of urban vigor) and to the elementary and high school graduates and school leavers. Doe's group rushed in to seize the national bureaucracy. They were verbose and contentious but lacked the spirit and wherewithal to be violent. Taylor's group could not take over the national bureaucracy because it was beyond their capability at the time. They were deadly in their actions and had no qualms about carrying out what they threatened. There was a special "nationalness" about them, even when their life experiences had been

restricted to their ethnic community. They and their cause was "Liberia," in a way that was not noticeable in 1980. They believed that they were the embodiment of the Liberian state and those IGNU officials in Monrovia were interlopers.

In their social origin and national outlook, the 1980 coup makers themselves were much the same as the average 1990 NPFL militiamen. But as the

... many Liberian political analysts ... still adhered to the '70s and '80s cliché that . . . all you had to do, in order to win, was to mount the soapbox and scream "country/congo, congo/country and boom, you were in the Executive Mansion!"

Doe regime settled in the *presidential chair*, it swiftly discarded its *hoi polloi* image and almost as expeditiously embraced that of the professional bourgeoisie. Propagating and intensifying the *classic country/congo* chasm became the ideological weapon of the *new class* which desperately sought to hide the increasing discrepancy between the *new money* and the *continuing* poor and tried to redirect the frustration and anger of the dispossessed from them to that historical configuration. During the last couple of years of Doe, there were attempts to blame Doe alone for the country's ills. This scapegoating of Doe was designed to confuse the burning issue of who had wrecked the state economy and maladministered the country. Doe's death removed him from being the *monocausal explanadum* of the Liberian imbroglio as Mobutu's continuous hanging onto the threads of power made him. However, so obsessed have many foreign pundits and analysts been with the *country/congo* issue, they have not bothered to delve deeply into the true nature of the Doe era and the post-Doe struggle.

Without minimizing ethnicity, it has been evident from the onset that the NPFL's bid for power was more than simple ethnicism, as far as Taylor was concerned. This misreading provoked nasty intra-NPFL countermeasures as the revolt progressed. The realities of the situation

obtaining in the NPFL could not countenance narrow ethnicism, even if some in leadership positions desired it. *In lieu* of his life's experiences and the objective of his struggle, Taylor could not tolerate it. His survival depended on that. Everything about his character suggests that Taylor could never be the errand boy of what remained of the *rump* of the *Congo establishment*. He owed it nothing; it could not legitimize him as it had tried to do Doe by beseeching Doe to join its religious (Christian) organizations, social clubs and fraternal associations. Taylor was already in these bodies by virtue of his socialization. One gets the impression that if there would be any legitimizing, Taylor probably felt that he, not the *rump*, was the legitimizing authority. Herein his struggle differed markedly from Doe's. And because it so differed, foreign observers have not known exactly how to interpret it. What good tidings of great joy was there in reporting that *bete noire* Charles Taylor had been victorious and vindicated? If J. Gus Liebenow's archetype for interpreting Liberian life and society is disputable, then how do foreign reporters and columnists briefly portray the country in news snippets? It should not be surprising then that large newspaper column spaces have been devoted to items of exoticism like General Butt Naked's conversion to evangelical Christianity and his mobile loudspeaker preaching instead of to serious reviews and commentaries on the elections after the NPP triumph became crystal-clear and incontrovertible.

The NPFL fighters were as prepared to deal ruthlessly with their own ethnic kinsmen for collaborating with the Doe regime in excess what was generally perceived as a decent grace period of adjustment as they were to battle against the soldiers and fighters of Doe. This intra-ethnic quality lent a ferocity to the fighting that went far beyond anything seen or rumored before. And it established their reputation. They ruthlessly imposed the writ of the NPFL, daring everyone to abjectly submit or fight. For if a militiaman showed no sympathy for a brother, an uncle, a father, a cousin, or a best friend who was or could have been or might have been a collaborator with the Doe regime, what do you think he would do to a complete stranger? In this kind of struggle, militiamen or militiaboy, cut off from the world of their familiarity, quickly bonded into a family unit with Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor serving as *pater familias*. To negate his will was to commit

collective patricide, a truly heinous offense. The cause could not exist, could not go forward without a father-figure, especially when that father-figure was also the creator. To knock him off was to commit collective suicide, an act worst than death or ostracism. Under the circumstances, no internal contestant, whether of the same ethnicity as a given company of fighters or a valiant semi-autonomous field commander, could prevail in a bid to unseat Taylor after he had attained that exalted status.

There had been no full-scale internecine warfare in Liberia following the Sasstown War of the 1930s. Almost three generations had passed without a widespread "washing of the spear," without the initiation into the art of combat or what might be interpreted as art of armed conflict. The Liberian militia, the quarterly assemblage of young men carrying empty rifles and marching up and down cities' streets and the hypothetical counterweight to the presidentially-controlled national army, had degenerated into a quarterly parade ground force in the 1960s. Tolbert permitted it to entirely wither away by the early 1970s. Patrilineal/matrilineal, clan and ethnic military units had lost capability, autonomy, and foe, with the imposition of state authority. There was no outlet for the warrior spirit. The state had created no institution to channel that vitality. This dormancy was briefly broken by the 1979 Rice Riot and the 1980 Coup. But both dramatic events were largely Monrovia affairs, although they had national implications. The Civil War tore asunder the veil of lethargy. In the *mfecane* that ensued, every "crowd of boys" age-grade that had been uninitiated in warfare now had the opportunity of "washing the spear," of indulging in what amounted to in previous times a seminal *rite of passage*. Every area, every ethnic group, every social and economic class in Liberia was affected. The pent-up emotions blew up like the volcano in Montserrat. Exploding with it was *Old Liberia*, the Liberia of the ethnicities and the *classic country/congo divide*. The comfortable was afflicted; but the afflicted was not comforted. The *reformers/progressives* and *rump* of the *ancien regime* failed to correctly interpret this actuality. Taylor did not. He intuitively understood the dynamics at work, converted it to his advantage and stuck to that pledge.

Taylor was more than the customary warlord, as the press has taken to designate him. He had transcended that role long before Abuja II in

September 1996. War was not at all an end in itself for him. He was not a "pure" military person *per se*, nor did he aspire to be one. He employed war as a stepping stone to state-power. He was not out to avenge an ethnic wrong, to defend an ethnic interest, or to empower an ethnic community, as several analysts used the *Congo* angle to explain his motive. He was out to seize state-power and to transform that power into a *national* endeavor with himself at the front. By his actions, rather than his articulations, he would undertake to deethnicize the political life of the state. The multi-ethnic character of his militia meant that he bent more in the mold of the Congo General J.J. Roberts or the Malinke Generalissimo Almamy Samouri Toure or the Lorma (Gbunde Clan) General Sao Boso than in that of the Gola General Fan Filla Yenge or the Kru General Juah Nimley, the last two heading basically mono-ethnic forces.

Taylor the man had been consumed by the myth; the myth had dissolved into the man. He was a twentieth century man leading a nineteenth century polyglot force fundamentally loyal to him in pursuit of the twentieth first century.

XIII

Adjusting to the Bouncing Ball

And so President Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor must be congratulated not merely for achieving a very brilliant tactical political victory on July 19, 1997-- which most certainly it was-- but especially for his pertinacity, courage, vision, dexterity, compassion, commitment. His perseverance is worthy of an Odysseus legend. He did not allow setbacks and misfortune to obscure his strategic vision. At the onset of his adventure, he publicly declared his quest for the national presidency and for making his movement the dominant political organization in the state.

He never once wavered about these; not when military necessities induced him to leave his headquarters in Harbel, then later, his transient capital in Lower Buchanan. He stood his ground even when his ostensibly impregnable stronghold in Gbarnga temporarily was overrun and his forces compelled to retreat to the borders of Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. "If

Gbarnga falls," he laughingly intoned on a BBC "Focus on Africa" broadcast from a tripartite meeting [with Kromah(ULIMO-K) and Bowen(AFL)] at Akossumbo, Ghana, "*I will raise it up again.*" "*Does he know what he is saying?*" I asked myself after listening to the news report. "*Has he gone mad? Does he not fathom the array of forces against him? Why is he bluffing?*"

Rumors swirled in the US that Taylor was under house arrest in Ghana; had been barred from returning to Liberia; and that all border crossings with the Cote d'Ivoire had been tightly sealed. I must admit at the time that I thought the man was washed up, finished, *kaput*, *nada*. His public bragging, I felt, was a sure signal that worse had indeed come to worse; was nothing more than a swan song; was a face-saving gesture designed to placate his hard-core followers. The sole thing not yet in place was his epitaph.

The Gbarnga episode was similar to an earlier one. In 1990 the NPFL sought to prevent ECOMOG from entrenching at the Free Port of Monrovia with a rocketry display. This was after Prince Yormie Johnson had already hived off with his Independent NPFL, captured and executed Doe, and aligned with IGNU and its army and quasi-militia, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the "Black Berets." These units now reinforced ECOMOG. Although entering the wilderness years of his struggle for state-power, with this signal of defiance, Taylor seized the high ground of Liberian sovereignty and political empowerment. He showed a preparedness to strike a suicidal blow in defense of that principle. Two years later in Operation Octopus, the NPFL more vigorously stung again with its special contingent of Small Boys Brigade, Taylor's fierce shock-troopers, seeking to again expel ECOMOG from Monrovia in a concerted offensive. The human casualty toll was devastating, the highest it would ever be for the capital. Superficially, it looked like a futile gesture, like bashing one's head against a stone wall. The NPFL did not take the City and after the battle its mantle of invincibility was severely punctured. Conversely, it awakened the wrath of ECOMOG, drawing out a full-scale counter-offensive which the NPFL retreatingly fought off in a guerrilla mode until at length it reassembled in Gbarnga. I was in harmony with the current popular wisdom

of the time and thought Taylor had fumbled the ball away, was egotistically "showing off" with the lives of the innocent.

How wrong I was then. How terribly wrong I was later. The man was smarter than I gave him credit for. He proved that Liberians were made of tougher mettle than many thought possible. The 1992 *Operation Octopus* was a full-scale dress rehearsal for the bloody skirmishes that followed, culminating in the April 6, 1996 Incident that brought open warfare to a climatic end.

With *Operation Grasshopper*, Taylor, in a Lazarus touch, launched the reconquest of lands formerly controlled by NPRAG. It was an on-and-off process, beginning with the retaking of Gbarnga and not concluding until September 1996. The *April 6, 1996 Incident* wrote the prologue to the final verse in that operation.

With his military actions, it seemed as if Taylor was subjectively summoning folks back to their manhood. It appeared as if he had solitarily reversed a process of erosion of Liberian virility that had verged on the condition of nothingness by the time of Doe's ascendancy during the paralyzing final days of the First Republic. The heirs of the Mani Era, the Condo, Gola, Grebo confederacies, the Robertian Republic; the children of Roberts, Sao Boso, Fan Filla Yenge, Dinkan Korva, Getumbe, Akoi Tellowoyan, Tapa, Toweh, Suakoko, Juah Nimley; and the innumerable and nameless heroes and heroines were unwittingly being rallied to the defense of their people's honor and integrity, on all sides of the titanic struggle.

Foreign intervention (i.e., the ECOMOG's *entree*) had been the *bete noire* of the First Republic (1847 - 1980). Unlike neighboring Sierra Leone where Guinean troops protected the APC-regimes of Presidents Stevens and Momoh for almost a quarter century and Cote d'Ivoire where French military units defended the RDA-governments of President Houphout-Boigny and his successor, no Liberian government had received such protection. From the inception of the Liberian state in the last century throughout the years of the First Republic, no Liberian government dared sanction the introduction into the country of an entirely autonomous unit of foreign troops or an unencumbered foreign warship or an unregulated foreign air force. The slightest hint and citizens took to the streets of the

capital in agitated demonstration. National sovereignty to the leaders of the First Republic meant precisely that: national sovereignty. The notion that you could import a foreign army, let it do your exhortation, then send it out without paying an exorbitant price was unintelligible to them. When the bill came due, something would have to give. Tolbert's invitation to 250 Guinean soldiers to protect his person and his government in the wake of the 1979 Monrovia Rice Riot and the quiet mutiny of the national troops had been considered sacrilegious by the Old Guards of the *ancien regime* and had been vehemently assailed by the reformers/progressives. That the rejected idea had now been boldly resuscitated, significantly expanded and wholeheartedly endorsed in 1990 by the same reformers/progressives who would subsequently man and direct IGNU was a bitter pill to swallow for some of those who personally thought them preferable to Taylor and the NPFL.

What had come to Monrovia was no token 250-man unit but a full-fledged army forty times that size. Never in the history of the Liberian state had a foreign military force of that magnitude entered the country. The Mani Invasion did not muster a force of that dimension. Nor did the originally British-commanded Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) created by the Arthur Barclay administration in 1908. The troops numbered less than a tenth of ECOMOG, although their responsibilities were much wider than those of the initial ECOMOG. The LFF was to be spread in pockets across the vast interior lands which had been autonomous until the process of the Partition led to their incorporation into Liberia. They were to facilitate the collection of the hut tax, impose an arbitrary peace by forbidding interethnic warfare, and ensure subordination to the central authority in Monrovia. They were to be a constabulary body as well as defenders of the state. When the LFF mutinied over salary arrears less than a year later in 1909 and its head, the British officer Major Cadell, demanded government submission to the mutineers' demands, the Mende-dominated LFF was quickly demobilized. Together with Major Cadell, the troops were placed on ships and returned to the Sierra Leone Colony. The LFF would continue under different nomenclatures, ending up as the AF', but henceforth would be an all-Liberian force with all-Liberian officers, and a few American military advisers.

Tolbert's Guinean adventure had this central fact: it was subservient to him and the requisite Liberian officials. Conversely, ECOMOG was not subordinate to any Liberian authority, not even IGNU which had provided legitimacy from the Liberian perspective.

Taylor the man had been consumed by the myth; the myth had dissolved into the man....

W h e n
ECOMOG reversed

course later and exposed the foundational fragility of IGNU, few shed a tear for IGNU, though some were perplexed as to how a supposedly superintelligent corp of Liberians could have let themselves be caught in such a dilemma. The 1990 appeal to ECOWAS of the Banjul Assembly of Liberian *reformers/progressives* and their allies plus the ensuing certification of ECOMOG's *carte blanche* military authority over the state insinuated that all the hullabaloo about Guinean troops and national sovereignty in 1979 was a cheap ruse, a stick to beat the Liberian Old Guard with. *Reformers/progressives* would resort to the same measure used by the *ancien regime* when confronted with a similar threat and the fragmented masses could not be, did not want to be, or would not be persuaded to fall into line. The same ECOMOG that had empowered IGNU now sacrificed it for what proved to be an attenuated Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG). The effort of a few *reformers/progressives* to discredit ECOMOG following the switch fell on deaf ears, fell like water on duck back. There was little sympathy for this act of self-castration, justified on the grounds that lives and property would be saved, order restored and anarchy reversed. Alas, what was good for the goose was equally good for the gander. At the end of the day, many lives had been lost, much property destroyed, disorder reigned and anarchy prevailed until the last six-months leading up to the elections. That ECOMOG helped make July 19 possible, practical and free of violence is indisputable. Debatable is its long term cost to the country's psyche. The dependency complex linked to ECOMOG's presence will take a while before it is completely erased.

From here on in, I duly doffed my hat to Taylor and his star. From here on in, I discerned his singular destiny.

XIV

Rising to the top

Taylor did not permit continuous petty insults and character assassination to blindfold him to practical measures when compromise and accommodation were warranted. Every now and then he dished out reprisals in kind here, there and yonder, but insignificant vindictiveness was not his forte. Despite his overall military and political strength in the country, which at the time was heatedly disputed by his foes (who too often appeared to count ECOMOG troops as a part of their alliance), he thrice agreed to a Council-of-State (LNTG I, II and III) arrangement that contained five then six members (1993 - 1997) in which his faction always had a single representative but not at all the chairmanship. Again and again dispute over who should take the chairmanship often threatened to wreck the negotiations. For the life of me, I just could not understand why the anti-NPFL groups did not saddle Taylor with the chairmanship of the LNTG and get him bogged down in the innumerable trivial activities the chairman had to carry out. The chairmanship would certainly have clothed him with an added attire of prestige but it also would have taken him away from the daily operational and planning activities of the NPFL and compelled him to behave *presidentially*. *To spite face*, they proceeded to *cut nose*. They probably thought that Taylor would have had an inordinate advantage and, come elections time, be automatically propelled into the presidency. The sole strategy of the anti-Taylor cabal, I think, was to deny him the opportunity of sitting in the Presidential chair under any circumstance prior to elections, which they honestly thought he would never win. It was a *penny wise, pound-foolish* strategy. Or then, perhaps they could have been right: once in the chair, the wily Taylor would have outfoxed everyone and remained sitting there through elections, in the same manner and style as Tubman, who had done in Barclay and his admittedly more sophisticated crowd. The outcome was that when Taylor agreed to join LNTG II, he was perforce

granted all the rights afforded a member of the Council-of-State and none of the responsibilities the chairman had to shoulder. Weak and ineffectual chairmen, the product of hurried or incomprehensible compromise, would ultimately prove to be a principal bane of the Council-of-State institution during its lifetime.

In a subsequent tripartite [NPFL, ULIMO-K, IGNU (IGNU posts were later divided among AFL, ULIMO-J, LPC, CRC, LDF)] division of the ministerial, legislative and parastatal portfolios, his faction was similarly depreciated, although, interestingly enough, the NPFL selected slots like Foreign Affairs not Finance or Planning, Justice (and the National Police) not Defense (and the purported National Army), Agriculture (in exchange for Labor, LNTG II) not Commerce or Transportation, Local Government not Presidential Affairs, Labor not Youth & Sport or Education, Information not Post or Health, Lands & Mines not Rural Development. All these ministries were ones that linked NPFL/NPRAG with the outside world (like Foreign Affairs), controlled or influenced internal and external propaganda (Information), complemented what NPFL/NPRAG was doing internally (like Agriculture, Local Government and Lands & Mines), or discretely introduced NPFL/NPRAG to national security matters (like Justice). NPFL/NPRAG had its own currency--the J. J. Roberts banknotes issued by Doe rather than the rival Liberty banknotes put into circulation by IGNU to replace and invalidate the "J. J.s," presumably taken from Monrovia bank vaults by the NPFL and INPFL during their Monrovia stay in 1990-1991. The Liberty only succeeded in worsening the inflation. NPFL/NPRAG therefore had no need of control over a Finance ministry that would at best supervised just fifty percent of the local currencies floating around. Here again the NPFL did not project a tunnel vision approach to things. It was not a "ministry for ministry's sake" scheme. It was part of a long-range effort at effective direction of national affairs. Few grasped its relevance at the time; and in the mad scramble for titles, few seemed to care as long as they got a seat at the cabinet table, a desk in the Interim Assembly, and could boast of being part of the newly coined *in-word*, "inclusion."

Taylor did not succumb to abject despair when betrayal, denial and desertion engulfed him. The capture of Gbarnga revealed internal discord on

a scale unimaginable before. It reached deep into Taylor's personal security, allegedly including the *de facto* chief of that unit. Four out of six ministers sent to represent NPFL/NPRAG in the newly established LNTG (i.e., LNTG I) at Monrovia defected and created the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC) which, on paper, possessed the potential of rivaling the NPFL, as the INPFL briefly had done, and immediately became part of the military coalition that attacked and fleetingly occupied Gbarnga. As notable elements of his force now and then, here and there, broke away from the nucleus, he further broadened the movement by incorporating others from different regions and lifestyles. He did not indulge in self-pity when massive boulders blocked the roadway again and again. He blasted through them; moved around them; went over them; dug under them. He refused to become paralyzed by them. No, he did not throw in the towel when hammered to the ground by the vagaries of daily existence. He dutifully got up, dusted himself off and continued on his rocky way.

XV

Of Personal Errors

Where he had erred--and as a man of flesh and blood in precarious times he erred often, and sometimes grievously so-- he profusely apologized and accepted full responsibility for all accidents and tragedies which occurred during his watch.

The high profile deaths within his organization and from among the personnel of the national elite that took place behind the NPFL lines unquestionably tarnished Taylor's reputation. Perhaps he may have been deeply implicated with the tragedies within the NPFL because these were matters of grave urgency, of sheer survival, of "doing unto others before they do unto you." And an armed uprising, it should be borne in mind, is not a garden party, a gentlemanly affair that only involves gracious bowing and polite handshaking. There is a hardy component of conspiracy at the heart of its operation. Life or death is often a manifestation of instantaneous action. On the other hand, concerning violent acts against eminent officials outside the ranks of the NPFL, it is possible that subordinates took matters into their own hands in order to settle old scores or to advertise and prove

their manhood or to capriciously strike in behalf of what they construed as the best interest of the leader and the movement whether by direct command, a wink and a nod, a misinterpreted hint, or a presumed wish, a terminal blow by one's fighters against an actual, potential, or presumed deadly threat under questionable circumstances during a civil war implies that the militia leader is ultimately accountable for whatever happened.

And so Taylor was viewed by dispassionate observers as morally responsible for these deaths, whether he authorized them or not.

If the NPFL impressment policy had resulted in an enormous intake of young people who had been insufficiently socialized as to the NPFL military operations, then Taylor must ultimately be held accountable for their actions and failings.

And so Taylor dutifully kowtowed before the Liberian people.

"They say, You killed my Ma/ They say, You killed my Pa/ But I will still vote for you."

And they did! In record numbers they did!

XVI

Arrival

With July 19, 1997, having come to an end, so too have all the romantic and idealized reconstructions of "Old Liberia," pre-state Liberia. It is no longer possible to sound the tocsin summoning the multitudes to hasten to the ancient banners. We have been there, done that; seen it, felt it . . . and regrettably, it has not been worth the effort. We now have to live with the fact that the sole option available is to go forward along the road initially explored by the First Republic. The experimentation of going back to the future may sound right and read well but has proved calamitous when implemented. Liberians must stop mortgaging the destiny of their people to ideologies totally irrelevant to local realities. If they persist, there will be more embarrassing and humiliating July 19s ahead. It is imperative that the book be closed on that chapter.

Like it or not, a new chapter has opened in the Liberian story and there can be no turning back, however pleasant or unpleasant the thought.

Positively construed, the First Republic (1847-1980) had as its central thesis the idea that the African man can establish a modern republican government and operate it, in spite of the many troughs, as a civil affair. This held for a century and a quarter. The Military Interregnum (1980-1985) and the Second Republic (1985-1990) proved that the continuous imbalance of political power in the civil order can engender a displacement of that ordering and its substitution with a perceptible different, if not necessarily better, arrangement. The end of the Civil War (December 1989-July 1997) has given rise to the Third Republic (1997-) which, it is hoped, will strongly adhere to the main proposition of the First; broaden the base of the First by incorporating the new political classes which developed out of the Military Interregnum, the Second Republic, and the Civil War; and institutionalize democratic choice in the entire electoral process of the state.

The delicate matter of personnel, of some kind of ethnic and professional balance in state patronage, has been at the gist of the disturbances that have rocked the Liberian state the past twenty years or so. The rancorous negotiations during Abuja II and III dealt primarily with which militia or civilian factions got what and which individual *bossman* went where, no matter that *the what* and *the where* did not add up to a pile of five-cent ground peas. Even the elections, when viewed from another perspective, were primarily about which personnel would get to ride the state sedans. The mad rush to Monrovia from abroad following the official announcement of the election results was an unadulterated scramble for *a place* when the spoils were distributed. The larger issues of where the Liberian state was headed and the nature of the kind of society it would strive to produce have been momentarily swept under the rug. Not since the '70s has there been that kind of debate. The fiascos of the '80s have had a lot to do with this disinterest. If the articulators of those visions were themselves now caught up in the "portfolio business," then why should the little people be castigated for struggling to get a piece of the pie? The escapist "blame game" of monocasualism which sought to unilaterally explain Liberian underdevelopment and had itself been vaporized under Doe is another reason why the larger debate has stagnated.

Now that the Liberian people have spoken, perhaps the larger issue

will again resurface. Hopefully not in the old venomous mode but through the performance of the state in key sectors like security, economy, education, health, roads and transport, and a better sense of nationality. The Civil War has gone a long way in making Liberians more conscious of their Liberianess. What was taken for granted back home became cherished memories in the rough refugee camps in other African states or the indeterminate status of life in the First World. The Liberian man of letters needs to better articulate the latent cohesiveness brought about by the shared experiences of the Liberian people. The divisive quality of the debate over the last quarter century has ill-served Liberia and Liberians. The negativity has saturated everything. It has masked the flaws of so many for so long that it has become a way of life. The healing of the Liberian people demands that the softwares of these purveyors of hate, irrespective of from whence they come, should no longer be bought.

The skills and attributes that served Taylor so well in the wilderness may or may not be adequate in the presidency. Should he fail in his presidency, it will matter little because he has already been projected by the "experts" to fail. "Failure" in this case for many Liberians is simply the inability to provide the material incentives for minimal adequate living. There can be no illusion about the hostility toward him. Few credit him with possessing the knowhow to master the colossal uphill task he has to overcome. The general expectation among this group is that he will succumb to the stress and be overwhelmed. Their greatest surprise will come when he does not go down in abject defeat. Should he marginally succeed at bringing order and tranquility to the state while setting it on the road to economic and social recovery, Taylor will have done more than well, irrespective of what his detractors may say. He will not be able to right every wrong or heal every wound. Nor should he pretend to. Having been in the offensive/defensive mode of Civil War leadership for such a long time, he may find it exacerbating to shift gears so easily and smoothly. But just as he intuitively sensed what was to be done to win the elections, he must now intuitively move on to set the proper agenda for civilian times.

President Taylor, in the Liberian public eye, may seem and act more like President Tubman than any other past president. He himself may think

that way. I am of the opinion, however, that the tasks Taylor confront better resemble those of President Roberts than Tubman. Taylor faces Robert's dilemma: creating a functional and coherent state system. The events of the last seven and a half years have physically and, more dramatically, mentally drained and devastated Liberia. It is the psychological desolation that worries me. No Liberian president has had to face this absolute bleakness before. Times were hard and the political road untraveled in Roberts' days, but the spirit of his people was upbeat. In past years of trouble before the coup, there was always a core of elders who remained intact after the storm swept through. They gathered the shattered pieces of society, forged them together anew, and thus reassembled the polity. There is no such council of elders with sufficient mutual, national experience to proffer that kind of advice now. National elders are mostly dead or have lost the capability or will to reenter the public arena. Tubman's overextended tenure meant that upon Tolbert's ascension to power, he did not have men of national expertise older than he (and beyond the realm of power) who could aggregately advise him as dictated by custom and tradition. Besides, it is arguable, were such a council of elders around today, whether its members' life experiences would be relevant in current circumstances. Tubman, Tolbert and Doe inherited a state system, no matter how flawed, that had something of value in it. The *juice* was still flowing through the body politic. Unfortunately, this is not the case today.

Like Roberts, Taylor will have to produce his *own juice* to invigorate an inert body. And herein lies the rub. Roberts intimately knew the circle from which he drew his appointees. He understood the parameters, beyond which neither he nor anyone else in the colony or commonwealth dared not go. *The juice* he was injecting into the state system was really not so much his as it was what had evolved over a quarter century of experimentation in self-rule during the colony and commonwealth periods. All political aspirants understood the rules of the game and knew that nothing could be gained otherwise. The pool from which Taylor can draw his nominees is perforce wider and deeper, more *au courant* with the international world. In terms of their competency and expertise, the quality of today bureaucrats is far superior to the earlier periods. Yet they seem to

lack something. They do not grasp the limitations of their power; or, better put, their "I" have consumed their "We." Each plays the game recklessly, employing stratagem partial to him and not necessarily to the state.

The *juice* Taylor infuses into the state system should be of an institutional not a personal nature. If Taylor's input is exclusively personal, Liberia could indeed perk up and stagger along; but as sure as night follows day, the state system will again begin withering away once he has left

It has been an arduous task getting a handle on this paper, trying to mold it into the pleasing clay water vessel the old lady potter in Zorzor magically created back in the late '40s when I was a child...

the scene as happened on Tubman's watch. Taylor ought to seek a symbiosis between the tradition of the paramount chieftancy and that of the republican presidency. Tubman sought such a goal but leaned too much in the chieftaincy direction. Why did he? Power lay on that side. The numbers were on that side. The popularity was on that side. When the chips were down, as in 1955, that side delivered. He strove to institutionalize the paramount chieftaincy ideals at the national level while concurrently over-personalizing the republican presidency. His synthesis was a monarchical presidency. Tolbert understandably went the counter route. A completely different personality than Tubman, he could not comfortably adhere to the kind of regal absolutism that Tubman had become enamored of. Desiring to imprint the Liberian presidency with his own stamp, Tolbert attempted an all-out, re-definition of the role. He would gradually depersonalize the monarchical presidency and simultaneously gradually phase out the paramount chieftaincy. He would reactivate the republican presidency as practiced by Edwin Barclay, who in that sense could assert lineal descent from Roberts. These actions of Tolbert were also necessitated by fiscal realities of the times. Even had he wanted to, Tolbert could not have, for instance, retained

a main luminary of the Tubman state structure: the elaborate, expensive and intrusive personalized welfare scheme (the Public Relations Officer---PRO).

The country was on an austerity program and the funding was not there. The clientele had also become multitudinous and cantankerous. At the start of his

...This paper may lack the aesthetic quality of that vessel of my youth, but it contains the ardor of the old lady.

administration, Tolbert correctly adjudged the PRO system as being out of synch with the mainstream bureaucracy and pursued a drastic elimination solution. This was a calculated risk which he ultimately lost. Yet the gamble was worth taking although the price was extremely high and fatally detrimental to his political image.

With reference to the essence of the state system, Roberts impacted Liberia much more than either Tubman or Tolbert. True, the multi-party feature of the Liberian state, one party amicably transferring power to another after being electorally defeated, did not survive Roberts (1876), but all the other political legacies of the republican state system (tripartite government, civilian primacy, free enterprise, private property, Christian predominance, etc.) bequeathed by Roberts are still around today, not just in memory but as goals to be strived for. Roberts engaged in numerous military skirmishes and was elevated to general in the colonial/commonwealth militia. But he did not put on the military hat while president nor undertook to govern in a military mode. It would have been unthinkable in his time for him to do that. Roberts would not have favored a standing army either. The Liberian public of that era did not want one; there was no revenue to pay for it, if one had been desired; and it also went against Roberts' ken as a democrat who honestly believed that his authority derived from the Liberian people. The standing army would only come about four decades after Roberts died and following state expansionism and external threats with the ultimatum that either Liberian authorities maintain internal order or else Liberia be reduced to a protectorate status.

The military has become too interfering a power in national politics since 1980. Lamentably it has not been a positive intrusion. How to reintegrate it into the state so that it does not go free lancing again is a prime issue. Since the virtual dissolution of the militia in the '70s there was nothing to remotely checkmate the military until the NPFL militia threw down the gauntlet. What is to prevent the military from acting up in the immediate or not too distant future? What is to prevent the soldier-boys, after listening to siren songs from disgruntled politicians, from donning the mantle of "defenders of the State" and marching into the Executive Mansion again, leaving another bloody trail in their wake? By strength of his personality, Taylor may ward off such an intervention. However, this in no wise institutionalized military non-intervention in political activities unless the very existence of the state is threatened. Should not the historic militia (the concept of "citizen" not "professional" soldier) be reactivated as a countermeasure?

XVII

Manpickin'

It has been an arduous task getting a handle on this paper, trying to mold it into the pleasing clay water vessel the old lady potter in Zorzor magically created back in the late '40s when I was a child. This paper may lack the aesthetic quality of that vessel of my youth but it contains the ardor of the old lady. I am no longer a child and pretty creations by workmen of magic are mighty scarce to come by in today Liberia. I have close relatives and colleagues who see Taylor as a Liberian Timberline, a Liberian dan Fodio, a Liberian Gelele, a perpetual malcontent, a chronic disturber of public tranquility. And I have close relatives and friends who think quite the contrary. This puts in a bind anyone who attempts a reasoned appraisal of the man. It is easy to belabor, belittle and berate Taylor. That is (was?) the consensual attitude of the bulk of the Liberian intelligentsia. But four hundred and fifty thousand plus Liberians cannot be all wrong, all stupid, all insincere, all bootlickers, all brown-nosers, all sycophants, in our uniquely Liberian way. They must have seen something in the man that the broad run of the Liberian intelligentsia has missed or will not admit to noticing. I hope

I have put a finger on part of it.

In the final analysis, every leader has to be true to his conscience and to his sense of history, if he abides by history. Time will ultimately judge Taylor and his ascendancy to Liberian national prominence. Time will also show that the subject (Taylor) of this piece will always be an abstruse problem of inquiry. He slips through the written pages like an electric eel through water-- a flash then he disappears. Suddenly he rears up like a triumphant bull elephant at the end of the text. Everything rational suggests that Taylor should have failed cataclysmically somewhere along the line. Listening to stereotypical knowledge about Liberia and Liberians, he belonged to the wrong ethnic group, was of the wrong pigmentation, had the wrong approach to politics and life, knew zilch about his country and countrymen, was educated but insufficiently learned, had powerful external combinations aligned against him, and misconstrued personal bravery for national glory. . . wrong man, wrong time, wrong politics!

Still he gallingly prevails and does so convincingly! It were as if he thumbs his nose at us and the world while he continuously walks contemptuously on and off the stage of our national life! He is indeed a Man-Pickin'!

XVIII

A Fight! A Faith!

Charles Dahkpanah Ghankay Taylor and the National Patriotic Party simply fought the good fight. They simply kept the faith. What a fight! What a faith! The Rejected Stone had become the Cornerstone. Out of Disparate Materials had the Foundation of Liberia's Third Republic been laid. Of measures like these are seeded the giants of our Liberian soil. And of this my Lilliputian testament of this facet of our Liberian experiences must be inscribed, must bear true witness to.

Editors' note: Clarence Ernest Zamba Liberty departed this life on October 22, 1997. He was 53. Conforming with the editorial policy of the *Liberian Studies Journal* and the credo of the Liberian Studies Association, publishers of the *Journal*, not to take a political position on any issue, the editors wish to reiterate that the views expressed in this article are purely those of The Late Dr. Liberty.

Abiodun Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill-- The International Involvement in the Liberian Civil War*. March 1998. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers. 226pp. £41.00

This is one of the few book-length analyses of the Liberian crisis, which attempts to locate what has occurred in Liberia within a larger conceptual framework. It examines the nexus between state collapse and the subsequent intervention in the ensuing crisis by international actors, most especially the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the organization empowered to express consensual sub-regional goals, if and when possible. The author's main purpose for embarking on this project is to "discuss the international involvement in the conflict, the forces that shaped it and the degree of success that attended the efforts" (p.4).

To adequately deal with the stated objectives of the book, eight chapters are presented which explore all facets of the crisis and subsequent international responses from different angles. In chapter one, the correlation between state failure and international intervention is juxtaposed with Liberia's collapse as a functional state.

Without explicitly asserting it, the author in chapter two presents a political economy analysis of the conflict. This examines how the recourse to violence and unwillingness to cease war often mirrors a reasonable analysis of costs and benefits on the part of diverse actors in civil wars. Such a rational choice approach to war, which more often than not is seen as 'irrational'¹ eventually affected international efforts toward a transition from war to peace. This fusion of economics and politics in several instances led to cases of rearrangement of political interests and reorganization of economic tactics. Such strategies more often than not represented a momentary change in style rather than a clear suspension from violence to consent and compliance. This approach by faction groups through a constantly changing mosaic of shifting coalitions and contenders explains the

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difficulties faced by both the United Nations and regional actors during the conflict to elicit compliance from combatants.

Due to the nature of the international involvement in the crisis-- the regional dimensions of conflict, and the fact that the UN was for the first time cooperating with an already established

The author's main purpose ... is to "discuss the international involvement in the (Liberian) conflict, the forces that shaped it and the degree of success that attended the efforts."

peacekeeping framework, there was bound to be a certain level of dysfunctional parallelism in terms of the institutional and operational styles of these two organizations. Part of the problem between the UN component in Liberia and the sub-regional force dealt with the allocation of roles (p. 130) and, most especially with reciprocal perception (p.134), and eventually a rivalry (p.139) which to some extent affected their operational ability of complimentarily disarming, demobilizing, monitoring and verifying disarmament components of peace accords.

The Burden of Collective Goodwill appropriately tackles the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Liberian conflict and traces the dilemmas of navigating among the multiple demands of faction groups, ECOMOG and the Liberian administration in Monrovia while having the interests of the civilian population as their main target. This resulted in a scenario where NGO responses were always neither neutral nor satisfactory to all actors on the Liberian scene. Alao deals with some of the controversies surrounding the role of providing aid during the Liberian conflict (which in a manner can be found present in most intrastate conflicts) and the behavior of some of NGOs active in the conflict theater. Generally, the conduct of and responses to NGOs in Liberia can be summed up broadly in three ways, that: (a) aid was used directly as an agency of war; (b) aid circuitously

blended into the dynamics of the conflict; and (c) aid intensified the root causes of war and insecurity (pp. 160-164).

According to the author, "the United States, with long standing historical links with Liberia and some western European countries also *stretched forth their hands of goodwill*"

(p. x, emphasis mine).

The citation above is most controversial in the light of some of the activities undertaken by the US during this war-- the role of two US Rangers providing

Alao's infectious optimism for Liberia, Liberians and the prospects for reconciliation and reconstruction should, however, be tampered with some caution.

intelligence support to Doe's army and alleged extension of intelligence facilities to some faction groups. Also, this is one critical issue that will generate serious debates and arguments over interpretation and perception among readers. One of the decisive questions which this book will raise with most readers is why the author places so much importance on the United States in this book, when in our view, the US shirked its responsibilities toward a state it had helped establish. The US's neglect of its obligations to Liberia anno 1990 and afterwards resembles its earlier feeble attempts to dissociate itself from the establishment of this colony. Given the US's role or lack of same in Liberia during the crisis, such a lengthy analysis devoted to its function almost defeats what in our view is one of Alao's major contributions to West African studies: namely "ECOWAS's launch [of] the most extensive regional response to a civil conflict in Africa" (p.x). The initiative, financial burdens and majority of lives lost were borne primarily by Nigeria and to a lesser extent its community partners. Thus in our view, Nigeria's role in this scheme, despite the criticism of some of its actions during efforts to resolve the crisis deserved that space given to the US. More important, an analysis of how to improve Nigeria's ability, in

conjunction with its sub-regional partners, to tackle future crises on the subregion would have done excellent credit to this impressive sub regional effort.

The final chapter makes an appropriate analysis of the connection between Charles Taylor's electoral victory and prospects for international

Despite the few shortcomings of the book (it) is a welcome contribution to the growing number of academic works on the Liberian crisis.

involvement in Liberia's post conflict reconstruction efforts, while looking at the victory in terms of its effects on sub-regional security (p.210). This analysis is crucial as it demonstrates the centrality of potential roles that Taylor's government can and should play in terms of the crises in Guinea, Senegal and Sierra Leone to which it actively contributed in the early 1990s. Taylor's 'convincing' electoral success, according to the author, "has considerably lightened [his] burdens as Liberia's new President" and is "sufficient to convince the international community" of his popularity among Liberians and their expectations of him to reconstruct the country (p.206). Alao's infectious optimism for Liberian, Liberians and the prospects for reconciliation and reconstruction should, however, be tempered with some caution. Two caveats should guide the statements above. First, the electoral results should be seen as evidence of the general fear for Taylor's refinement of the exemplary use of violence during the seven-year crisis and not so much as a vote of confidence in his ability to bring prosperity to the country. Secondly, in the post-adjustment, market-led reform era with its insistence on public accountability, there should be some form of accounting for the 'loot' acquired during 1990 - 1997. The signal effect of such a requirement will be to discourage the use of force as a legitimate tool for therealization of political aims. Such international conditionalities will also undermine the increasingly wrong impression that insurrections are politically acceptable, legitimate tools for addressing political and personal disagreements.

Despite the few shortcomings of the book, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill* is a welcome contribution to the growing number of academic works on the Liberian crisis. This book is a significant one in that it brings into focus the difficulties of cooperation among different actors during civil conflict, while simultaneously analyzing the prospects, if any, for sub-regional organizations to tackle conflicts within their ambit of authority. This is a timely and laudable effort and I hope that this work sparks further debates in this field.

Endnote

¹“Horror Story.” *TheEconomist*, 21 November 1992.

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Syrulwa L. Somah. *Historical Settlement of Liberia and Its Environmental Impact*. University Press of America, 1994. 172 pp.

The primary focus of Syrulwa L. Somah's book is the historical settlement of African-Americans in Liberia and the destabilizing effect this had on the environment. This study, in an attempt to answer the question: "Did the Historical Settlement of Liberia Have an Impact on the Environment?" has provided a wealth of information and literature on the historical settlement of Liberia. It has also provided a broad picture of the environmental problems Liberia is encountering and examined in-depth the incidences of the dreaded disease-- malaria, in the world and Liberia. Comparisons from countries around the world with similar problems and possible solutions have also been discussed and documented in this study. The author discusses the historical, geographical, political, socio-cultural and economic factors which have hindered national unity and attempts to list them as the major contributors to the continued presence of the mosquitos (*plasmodium falciparum* and *malariae*) which causes malaria and other environmental problems. Malaria is not indigenous to Africa, it occurs worldwide although higher incidences have been found in developing countries.

In chapter one, Somah presents a very comprehensive historical root of the settlement of Liberia and a detailed analysis of the cultural clash between the indigenous Liberians and the Americans of African descent.

The second chapter expounded on the specific environmental problems facing the country and their root causes. Environmental changes will occur with population change to any location, however, the author throughout the book stresses the problems created by settlers presence in Liberia and the need to remedy the situation by the Liberian indigenous people. However, the author does not present the reader with the fact that Liberia's geographic position in the tropics makes it climatically very

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conducive for the breeding of disease parasites including malaria.

Environmental health problems addressed and discussed by the author do not include prior eradication policies and programs, successful or not, which were

The primary focus of Syrulwa Somah's book is the historical settlement of African-Americans in Liberia and the destabilizing effect this had on the environment.

implemented in conjunction with the guidelines and views of the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO is the world's regulatory organization that designs policies and enforces eradication programs.

With regard to foreign capital impact, the author states that most pollution has been encouraged by international diplomacy, and that African governments like other countries have high degrees of confidence in ambassadors who are sent to represent developed nations. The author then discusses in great detail with references, how the US has diplomatically lured Ecuador as a toxic dumping site by offering \$12.5 million toward an 80-bed hospital if the country allows the construction of a liquid-waste-recycling plant. After this discussion the author states that Africa and other Third World nations are lured by diplomatic double talk/persuasion toward business decisions or into accepting contracts that put the health of a country at risk. He then states that many of Liberia's environmental health problems have been influenced by international diplomacy. Further, in the city of Paynesville, a navigation station was built to direct US Naval ships in that region of the world. He then states that documented studies show that low radiation emitted from such towers can cause cancer to those who live in its parameters.

This reviewer feels that the author should have referenced studies showing the potential for cancer, and should have kept the discussion more

focused on Liberia, than Ecuador so that the reader can understand the point the author is trying to make regarding the direct relationship between Liberia, pollution, and the influence of international foreign policy.

The author states that one aspect of Liberia's environmental economic complex and Africa's in general is the tendency for new governments to compete with their predecessors. Further, that this mentality usually leads to a new government rushing to accept any project or formulated plans that might pose a health hazard or compound the country's burdens in the name of national development. As an example, the author then described the Union Carbide accident in India, which in his opinion has led to an "Open Door Policy" in India. Similar to the Liberian "Open Door Policy," foreign investments were highly unregulated in India also.

The author states that Africans did not sell piles of lumber nor use lots of timber but used mud and rock of the earth to build homes. He furthermore blamed the European methods of commercialization of forest wood, and suggested that their practices have caused a severe impact on the environment and rapid destruction of tropical rain forest and biological species in Liberia. The reviewer believes that with an adequate forestry management plan in place the Liberian government can commercialize their forest wood. These days, many developing countries are in need of foreign currency and often are negotiating business deals with industrialized countries. These deals often concern the natural resources of these developing countries. The key, however, is to make sure that environmental impact assessment and monitoring mechanisms need to be in place to maintain quality control of the government.

Agricultural activities and production methods were also discussed in-line with their negative socio-cultural and environmental impacts. The author stated that "agriculture has not been a high priority because farming activities have always been associated with not setting good examples for the younger generations who believe that the only way to be civilized is to

drive big, foreign cars and sit in an air-conditioned office.” The environmental threat of pesticides used in production practices was also addressed.

The author indicated that Liberia, like other Third World countries, experiences serious health problems because of the improper use of pesticides, lack of regulations for their

...the author states that Africa and other Third World nations are lured by diplomatic double talk ... into accepting contracts that put the health of a country at risk.

use, medical surveillance and monitoring. Special reference is made to the Liberian farmers or workers in the rubber and sugarcane producing companies being exposed to pesticides and the steelers not putting in place regulations and medical tests to protect them. The author endorses the position of Dr. Hessayon on the use of pesticide in the Third World which is that it should be completely banded. He goes on to recommend the adoption of the model of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) in Liberia and demands that the western companies take responsibility for information dissemination. Very little is said about the principle issue of how to go about meeting the national need for a safe and nutritious diet while ensuring that food production systems are environmentally sensitive, economically viable and sustainable over the long term, and socially responsible.

The author lists four major impacts caused by mining in Liberia: deforestation and mass destruction of biological species; massive pollution of fresh water; destruction of aquatic biomass and occupational diseases and referenced it with notes from the Annual Report of the U.S. Department of Interior and not research which has been done in Liberia.

In the summary and conclusion chapter, the author summarizes that

the following issues: the historical settlement of Liberia; the lack of patriotism and national unity; external influences on the presence of a class system; and the lack of the proper government structure were the root causes of the environmental problems facing

This book has provided a significant amount of information but is very weak in linking the title, "Historical Settlement of Liberia...", to the information presented.

Liberia. He went on to recommend that environmental health and national health education be provided at all levels; and also the implementation of a mosquito surveillance and control program; the formation of a regulatory agency to protect the environment and enforce policies; and equal access to education for all Liberians since, according to the author, indigenous Liberians did not benefit from the Liberian educational system.

The book has provided a significant amount of information but is very weak in linking the title "Historical Settlement Of Liberia And Its Environmental Impact" to the information presented. It is quite evident from the presentation that the environmental problems of Liberia are rooted in the lack of knowledge and particularly the absence of national policies to address these problems. The author stresses the establishment of a regulatory agency but policies must be in place for the agency to implement. This book will be a good reference material for the agency developing and implementing the national environmental policies for Liberia with a little editing.

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**Liberian Studies Association Business Meeting
Saturday, March 25, 1998. Hosted by Morris Brown College,
Atlanta Georgia. Held at The Westin, Atlanta Airport Hotel.**

Presiding: Massala Reffell, President

Call to order: Massala Reffell

- Councilman Walter Young officially greeted the Liberian Studies Association on behalf of the City Council of Atlanta.

Current business

1. 1999 Conference

- California State University, Northridge offered to host the next annual meeting of the Liberian Studies Association in the spring of 1999. Northridge's bid was accepted unanimously by the Conference, and the Vice President-elect, Joseph Holloway, became the official to record the minutes of the current meeting.

2. Secretary-Treasurer Report

- The minutes of the 1997 meeting at PrairieView A & M University, Houston, Texas were accepted as published in the December issue of the *Liberian Studies Journal* (LSJ) and not read.
- Dianne Oyler presented a cash flow statement for the period since she took over the duties as Secretary-Treasurer in August 1998. \$2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) were transferred to her in August, revenues added to that brought the total income to \$7,741.26 from which the expenditures of \$5,691.52 were subtracted to bring about the current balance of \$2,149.74. [See full financial statement after these minutes].

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- The membership raised the issue of reporting the financial status of the organization. In the past, the procedure has been to provide a copy to the Executive Board to save on the cost of copying. The membership then received oral accounting. Elwood Dunn articulated that the current procedure was incorrect and that a copy of the statement should be made available to the membership before the business meeting. Emmanuel Dolo offered to make copies of the statement for future business meetings, and this was agreed. During the discussion, Dr. Oyler had copies of the Cash Flow Statement made and distributed to the membership.
- Ciyata Coleman clarified registration and membership fees, in that, in the future the two must be separate to make Conference bookkeeping easier.

3. Committee Reports

- Membership Report: Doris Railey resigned as the chairperson of the membership committee. Mary Diallo volunteered to take the position, and Doris agreed to remain on the committee.

4. Liberian Studies Association Meeting in Liberia in the year 2000

- Elwood Dunn suggested that before LSA moved forward with its proposal to have the Association meet in Liberia in the year 2000, a host institution needed to be identified to explore the possibility. He suggested that Cuttington University might be a possible site. Dunn expressed the need for someone to go to Liberia to see what situation exists there, and then report back to the committee. The committee would present that information to the membership at the next meeting. Dunn invited comments from the Board.
- Dr. Dunn read a letter from Dr. Mary Antoinette Brown Sherman

regarding the untimely death of Dr. Clarence E. Zamba Liberty. She requested that his Ph.D. dissertation, "Growth of the Liberian State," (1976) be considered for publication by the Association.

- Joseph Holloway volunteered the Boniface I. Obichere Research Institute to publish the dissertation, and Dr. Dunn agreed to get the necessary release forms from the Liberty family to publish his work.
- Alpha Bah, Joseph Holloway, and Elwood Dunn will comprise the Liberty Book Committee, with Dr. Bah as chair.

New Business

1. Incorporation

- Peter Severeid presented his proposed changes to the Liberian Studies Association Articles of Association, and they are as follows:

The Articles of Association of the Liberian Studies Association be amended as follows:

a. Article IV, Paragraph 4, to add after "any question" the following: **"unless provided otherwise in these articles."**

b. Article VI, Paragraph 1:

There shall be six officers of the Association, viz. a President, a Past President, a Vice President, a Secretary-Treasurer, a Parliamentarian, and the Editor of the Association journal, *Liberian Studies Journal*. All officers shall be elected at the annual business meeting. The President, Past President, and the Vice President shall be elected for terms of one year and shall serve until their successors are elected. They shall be eligible for reelection. The Secretary-Treasurer, the

NEWS AND NOTES

Parliamentarian, and the Editor shall be elected for three-year terms, and shall be eligible for reelection.

- c. Article IV, add the following:
The Past President shall be a non-voting member of the Board and shall advise the President and the Board.
- d. Article IV, add the following:
The Parliamentarian shall be responsible for ruling on questions of procedure at meetings and shall be the designated officer for service of process and shall serve as the agent of the Association for the purpose of the incorporation of the Association as a nonprofit association under the laws of any state of the United States of America.
- e. The paragraphs of the Articles be renumbered accordingly.

The full revised document can be found in the "Document section" of this issue of the *LSJ*.

2. Election of New Board Members

Emmanuel Dolo was elected as the at-large Board member to replace Margaret Deconte Brumskine whose term has expired.

Arnold Odio was elected to the newly created position of Parliamentarian-at-large.

3. Presentation of Candidates for the Editorship of the *Liberian Studies Journal*-- The Candidates:

- Amos Beyan, University of West Virginia, Morgantown, West

Virginia.

- George Kieh. Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA.
- Each candidate was given 15 minutes to present his case to the membership before the election. The election was by secret ballot with Amos Beyan, University of West Virginia winning 22 to 14.
- C. William Allen's final journal will be the 1998 June issue. The new editor will have eight months to prepare the his first issue.
- Arnold Odio thanked William Allen for a job well done as the Editor of the Liberian Studies Association's *Journal*.
- The new Editor, Amos Beyan, was installed.

Adjournment

The next Liberian Studies Association meeting will be at California State University, Northridge. Northridge will be the host institution and the Boniface I. Obichere Institute the host research center.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph Holloway, Vice President
Dianne Oyler, Secretary Treasurer

Appendix to Minutes

Cash Flow Statement, August 26, 1997 through March 28, 1998-- LSA
Conference, Atlanta Georgia.

Membership Information

•	Professional	89
•	Institutional	95
•	Students	6
•	Complimentary	26

Income:

	Amount	Percentage of Budget
Previous balance	\$2,000.00	26%
Cash Transfer to Minot		
Revenues:		
Subscriptions	4,349.65	56%
Direct Sales	1,368.55	18%
Houston Conf.	0	
Interest	23.06	
Total.....	<u>\$7741.26</u>	

Expenditure:

	#journals	\$cost	%budget
--Printing	350	2,883.76	51
[\$8.24 per journal]			
--Mailing	190	592.41	11
[\$3.16 per journal]			
--Secretarial		550.00	10
[journal expenses]			
Bank Charges		15.52	
Editor's expenses		0	
Sec.-Treas's expenses		0	
Office Supplies		177.43	3
Storage [journal]		754.10	13
Storage [negatives]		96.00	2
Moving cost to Minot		322.11	6
Postage [direct sales & flyers		300.19	4
Total		\$5691.52	

Income (7741.26)-Expenditure (5591.52) = Cash on hand (\$2149.74)

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
OF THE
LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

ARTICLE I

Name and Objective

1. We, the undersigned, desiring to form a non-profit association for the purpose of effecting cooperation among persons interested in furthering research concerning the Republic of Liberia, and adjacent areas, do thereby constitute ourselves a voluntary association under the name of **THE LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION**.
2. **THE LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION** is a scholarly organization created to provide a means for effective cooperation among persons interested in furthering research in all scholarly disciplines, including the sciences, social science, and humanities, on topics relevant to the Republic of Liberia, and adjacent areas; to publish and otherwise disseminate the results of such research; to cooperate with scholarly organizations, and cultural, scientific and educational institutions, nationally and internationally, having mutual interests in the exchange and presentation of information and ideas resulting from research in the subject field; to encourage interest in Liberian affairs; and to stimulate and facilitate academic contacts and educational exchanges between Liberia and the United States. The Association shall not take any official corporate position on or seek to influence any legislation or policies of the United States or the Republic of Liberia.

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DOCUMENT**ARTICLE II****Office and Duration**

1. The office of the Association shall be located at the institution or location at which the Secretary-Treasurer has official residence; or at such place as the Board may from time to time determine, or as the business of the Association may require.
2. The duration of the Association shall be perpetual.
3. The death, removal, or resignation of any member of the Association shall not result in the dissolution of the Association.

ARTICLE III**Membership and Dues**

1. Membership in the Association shall be open to all persons who wish to support its objectives. Application for membership shall be communicated to the Secretary-Treasurer in a manner provided for by the Board. All members in good standing may vote or hold office and participate in all the activities of the Association.
2. A member shall be enrolled upon receipt of the first payment of dues.
3. The schedule of dues shall be determined by the Board and submitted for approval by a majority vote of the members present at the annual business meeting of the Association.
4. Dues shall be payable on the first of January. Any member failing to pay dues within six months after they become payable may be suspended from membership. Formal resignation from membership

may be presented to the Secretary-Treasurer of the Association.

ARTICLE IV

Meetings of the Membership

1. Meeting of the Association shall be held at such time and place as the Board shall determine. There shall be an annual business meeting and its location shall be determined by the Board.
2. A full and true statement of the affairs of the Association shall be submitted at the annual business meeting by all responsible officers. A summary of the transactions or proceedings of the meeting shall be prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer and shall be published in the first issue of the *Liberian Studies Journal* to appear subsequent to meetings, or otherwise notified to the membership.
3. At meetings of the Association, each member shall be entitled to one vote. At any meeting of the Association, any vote shall be taken by secret ballot, if any member so requests. Voting eligibility shall be established upon personal recognizance as a member.
4. Those members present at a meeting shall constitute a quorum. The vote of the majority of the members present shall decide any question unless provided otherwise in these Articles.

ARTICLE V

Government

1. The government of the Association, the management of its affairs, and the regulation of its procedures, except, as expressly otherwise provided in the Articles of Association, shall be vested in a Board composed of the officers and two (2) members elected by the

Association. If a vacancy shall occur on the Board or in any of the offices it may be filled by the Board, and the person designated shall hold the position for the unexpired term of the person vacating it. All actions of the Board shall be by majority vote in person or by correspondence.

2. The Board of the on shall have the control and management of its affairs, policies, and business. The Board shall exercise all the powers of the on and undertake all lawful actions which are not reserved by the Articles of Association to the membership at large.
 - a. Members of the Association shall annually elect one member of the Board by a majority of the membership present. Each such shall hold office for two years or until his successor is elected and qualified. Members will be elected and officially installed at the annual business meeting.
 - b. Board members shall be eligible for re-election.
 - c. An up-to-date copy of the Articles of Association shall be available to any member upon request to the Secretary-Treasurer.

ARTICLE VI

Officers

1. There shall be six officers of the Association, viz. a President, a Past President, a Vice President, a Secretary-Treasurer, a Parliamentarian, and the Editor of the Association's journal, the *Liberian Studies Journal*. All officers shall be elected at the

annual business meeting. The President, Past President, and Vice President shall be elected for terms of one year and shall serve until their successors are elected. They shall be eligible for re-election. The Secretary-Treasurer, the Parliamentarian, and the Editor shall be elected for three-year terms, and shall be eligible for re-election.

2. The President shall be the chief executive officer of the Association, shall preside at all meetings of the members and of the Board, shall have overall responsibility for the management of the Association and shall see that all decisions of the Board are carried into effect. The President shall present an annual report to the membership.
3. The Past President shall be a non-voting member of the Board and shall advise the President and the Board.
4. The Vice President shall preside at meetings of the members and of the Board, if the President is prevented from carrying out this function. In the case of death, resignation, or disability of the President the latter to be determined by majority vote of the Board, the Vice President shall succeed to the Presidency to complete the unexpired term.
5. The Secretary Treasurer shall combine the functions and duties of Secretary and Treasurer of the Association. In case of the death, resignation, or incapacitation of the Secretary-Treasurer the Board shall appoint a qualified member to assume the full duties of the office for the duration of the unexpired term.
 - a. As Secretary, --or in the absence of the Secretary Treasurer, an alternate designated by the President--shall record the proceedings of the meetings of the Association and Board.

The Secretary-Treasurer shall receive and maintain the records, archives, and membership lists of the Association and carry on such correspondence as pertains to the Secretary's duties.

b. As Treasurer, the Secretary-Treasurer shall collect, receive, and have custody of all funds of the Association and as directed by the Board shall have authority to disburse such funds. The Secretary-Treasurer shall keep full and accurate accounts of receipts and disbursements in books belonging to the Association, and shall deposit all moneys and other valuable effects in the name and to the credit of the Association in such depositories as the Secretary-Treasurer may designate with the approval of the Board. The Secretary-Treasurer shall process applications for membership. The retiring Secretary-Treasurer shall within one month after the expiration of his or her term of office deliver to the newly-elected or appointed Secretary-Treasurer all money, vouchers, books, and papers of the Association in the Secretary-Treasurer's custody. Any or all of the members of the Board may be given signature authority to act for the Association by a majority vote of the Board.

6. The Parliamentarian shall be responsible for ruling on questions of procedure at meetings and shall be the designated officer for service of process and shall serve as the agent of the Association for the purpose of the incorporation of the Association as a non-profit association under the laws of any state of the United States of America.
7. The Editor shall be responsible for the publication of the *Liberian Studies Journal* which shall be the official organ of the Association. The Editor shall recommend editorial policies to the Board. There shall be an Editorial Advisory Board whose membership and length of service shall be determined by the

Board of the Association. The Editor shall consult with the Editorial Advisory Board on Editorial policy and with the Secretary-Treasurer on all matters concerning the business management, financing, and distribution of the *Liberian Studies Journal*.

ARTICLE VII

Records

1. All minute books, correspondence and other records of the Association shall be preserved by the Officers. Records that have ceased to be of use for the conduct of the affairs of the Association may, by the direction of the Board, be turned over for preservation to a depository designated by it, or discarded.

ARTICLE VIII

Committees

The President may appoint committees from time to time in consultation with the Board.

ARTICLE IX

Dissolution

In the event of the dissolution of the Association, its property, funds, and other assets shall be transferred to whatever organization or organizations operated exclusively for charitable, educational, and/or scientific purposes as the Board may determine, provided such organization or organizations qualify as tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code of the United States or Liberia.

DOCUMENT

ARTICLE X

Amendments

Amendments to these Articles of Association may be made by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Association present at the Annual business meeting.

ARTICLE XI

Publications

1. Subject to the availability of funds, the Association shall publish the *Liberian Studies Journal* and such other publications as the Board, in consultation with the Editor and the Editorial Advisory Board, may determine. Members in good standing shall receive the *Journal*. Subscription rates for non-members and institutions shall be determined by the Board.

ARTICLE XII

Rules

1. *Roberts Rules of Order* (most current version) shall govern the proceedings of the Association except as otherwise provided in these Articles of Association and special rules which may be adopted from time to time.

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the duly adopted Articles of Association of said Association as amended at the Annual Business Meeting of the Association at Atlanta, Georgia, USA, March 28, 1998.

Dianne Oyler, Secretary-Treasurer
March 28, 1998

Emmanuel Kwesi Aning is completing a doctoral dissertation on ECOWAS and sub-regional security with emphasis on Liberia. He is attached to the Institute of Political Science, Copenhagen Univ., Denmark and concurrently at the Centre for Development Research, in Copenhagen.

Carl Patrick Burrowes is the Carter G. Woodson Distinguished Professor of Journalism at the W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications, Marshall University, where he is also affiliated with the John Deaver Drinko Center for the Study of American Political Institutions and Civic Culture, Huntington, West Virginia.

Cyril E. Broderick, Sr. is Associate Professor in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources at Delaware State University in Dover.

Joseph E. Holloway is professor of Pan African Studies at California State University Northridge, and Director of the Boniface I. Obichere Research Institute.

Clarence Ernest Zamba Liberty (December 2, 1943-October 22, 1997) is considered by many as a serious scholar of the history of the Liberian state.

Clarence E. Zamba Liberty II is CEO and Chairman of Dynastic Empires, Inc., in Milwaukee. He has a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley.

Dianne White Oyler teaches in the Division of Social Science at Minot State University. Her area of concentration is cultural and intellectual history in West Africa. She is currently secretary-treasurer of the Liberian Studies Association.

Boikai S. Twe is coordinator of the African American Studies Program at Sinclair Community College and Professor of Psychology and African American Studies at Sinclair.

Walter T. Wiles is project coordinator for the Kellogg-funded Southern Food System Education Consortium [SOFSEC] at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

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