


LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL



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The Role of Special Education and Rehabilitation
in Post-War Resettlement and Reconstruction: The Case of Liberia

"I have a bias against war, a bias for peace"
(Ralph J. Bunche)

*"We must learn to live together as brothers and sisters
or we will perish together as fools"*
(Martin Luther King Jr.)

Sakui W. G. Malakpa

By definition, war is a state of hostility, conflict and antagonism. In light of the ever-increasing production of technologically advanced weapons and ammunitions, matched by equally advanced techniques in warfare, war has increased its lethal capability as a quick and widespread ugly agent of death, destruction, displacement, and dismemberment. With such characteristics, modern warfare, which degrades the human race to its lowest level, has no winners but only losers. Hence, post-war reconstruction efforts need to consider a wide variety of approaches and services.

War is not an uncommon phenomenon to the human race. For example, limited to the definition of war as an armed conflict involving one or more governments and in which a thousand or more people die per year, Sevard (1987) finds that there were 471 wars around the world between 1700 and 1987. Africa had its share of these wars alongside varied violent conflicts and military coup d'états. For instance, between 1960-1987, no less than sixteen African countries had been involved in some violence or political conflict (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989). In fact, by 1984, twenty-four of Africa's fifty countries were under military rule (Zwi & Ugalde, 1989). To date, civil wars and political violence persist in several African countries, including Liberia, Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Rwanda.

Wars and political insurrections produce horrid consequences. Beyond the destruction of infrastructure, systems, organizations, institutions and private property, wars cause deaths, disabilities and myriad varied forms of human suffering. For example, the 471 wars between 1700 and 1987 led to 101 million deaths, including 2.2 million war related deaths in developing countries in 1987 alone (Sevard, 1987). In Mozambique, more than half a million children and infants under five died between 1980-1986 because of the ongoing war engineered by South Africa in an attempt to destabilize the region (Zwi & Ugalde, 1989).

Millions of lives are also lost as a consequence of military coup d'états and other forms of violence. For instance, from 1960–1986, there were at least 144 successful military coups around the world, many of them in Africa (Sevard, 1987; Sidel, 1987). In addition to coups, lives have been lost and disabilities sustained through other forms of violence in Africa. These include religious riots (e.g. in Nigeria and the Sudan), violent student demonstrations (as in Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso), labor unrest (in South Africa), and tribal conflicts (in Congo Brazzaville, Mauritania and Burundi) (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989).

Wars and other forms of violence cause disabilities which vary widely; that is, some disabilities are a direct result of injuries sustained in actual fighting while others are due to circumstances surrounding the war. Still, other disabilities result from long term effects of the war. This is exemplified by the finding that, because of the ongoing war in the region, Mozambique and Angola have, between them, one of the highest rates of disability conditions in any population (Hanlon, 1986; Zwi & Ugalde, 1989). Likewise, in Beirut (Farhood & Day (1986), South Africa (Yach, (1988), Nigeria, especially during the Biafran war (Nzimiro, 1985; Aall, 1970) other parts of Africa (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989) and among Vietnam veterans (Burgess-Watson & Hornsby, 1992), many disabling conditions have been linked to direct involvement in wars.

War related disabilities are also attributed to the link between psychiatric/psychological/physical conditions and stress (Burgess-Watson & Hornsby, 1992). This is exemplified by post-traumatic stress disorders found among former war combatants (Helzer, Robins & McEvoy, 1987) as well as among victims of war (Farhood & Day, 1986). The latter category includes victims of repression, brutalization, and torture as well as those who witness, or participate in, brutal activities (Zwi & Ugalde, 1989). As found in Beirut (Farhood & Day, 1986) and in Latin America (Bendfeldt-Zachrisson, 1988), such conditions require long term counseling, rehabilitation and therapy.

Other disabilities are sustained from, or exacerbated by, wartime activities. During such times, as in Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Liberia, hospitals and clinics are destroyed and health workers are either killed, injured or forced to flee the country (Ajavon-Cox, 1991; Liberian Coalition, 1991; Green, Asrat, Mauras, & Morgan, 1987; Godfrey & Kalache, 1989; Nzimiro, 1985; Ityavyar, 1985). Also during wartimes, relief services can be attacked (Crocker, 1987), food production halted and basic services disrupted (Ajavon-Cox, 1991; Cliff & Noormahomed, 1988). These wartime occurrences which affect health care increase a population's death rate and heighten rates of morbidity and disabling conditions. This is the situation in Liberia where, because of the war, health care in Monrovia is marginal, at best, leading to an increase in the incidence of diseases (Ajavon-Cox, 1991). With the exception of Phebe Hospital, the rest of the country has very little or no medical/health services (Liberian Coalition, 1991).

In addition to the preceding, health care is affected when, during war, under the threat of war or under military rule, military spending is increased precipitously at the expense of other social sectors, especially health. For example, it has been shown that in 1985 alone, because of wars, threats of war and conflicts, the world spent more than 940 billion dollars on militaries. This was more than the gross national products of China, India and all of sub-Sahara Africa (Sevard, 1987).

Wars, insurrections and other forms of violence also produce "internal" and "external" refugees; viz., people are displaced in their country or forced from their homes into other countries. Whether displaced at home or forced out, refugees suffer death, disease, hunger, stress and more (African Refugees, 1983). Yet, even with the best intentions, the needs of refugees are difficult to meet adequately because of the large numbers involved. Since 1960, for instance, the number of refugees in Africa has doubled every five years (OAU, 1984).

The problems refugees face are aggravated further by their living conditions; this includes poor housing, squalid camps, inadequate medical services, insufficient food and more (African Refugees, 1983; OAU, 1984; Godfrey & Day, 1989). These conditions increase the incidence of death, morbidity and disability. For example, the crude death rate among Eritrean refugees in the Sudan was estimated as 105 deaths per thousand. Malnutrition was about fifty-two percent. Children under five were less than 80% in weight per standard height (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989). Similar problems were found in refugee camps in Zambia and Angola (Christensen, 1978). Reports of Liberian medical teams and individuals who have visited Liberia and Liberian refugee camps in neighboring countries indicate similar suffering among Liberians inside and outside their country (Liberian Coalition, 1991; Ajavon-Cox, 1991; Hayden & Price, 1991).

As the poor living standards of refugees are compounded by many other difficulties, a wide variety of diseases, physical, psychological and neurological problems have been found among refugees in Africa and other parts of the world. These include stress and anxiety related complications, high suicide rate, septic abortions, nutritional problems (including beriberi and kwashiorkor), pregnancy complications, and communicable diseases. Likewise, varied disabling conditions have been found among refugees, including visual loss because of vitamin deficiency, ambulatory problems, hearing deficits, amputeeism and mental handicaps (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989; Godfrey & Kalache, 1989; Christensen, 1978).

The Case of Liberia: Since December 24, 1989, Liberia has experienced one of the most devastating civil wars in the history of the human race. This is evidenced by the incredibly high death toll, the scars left on the bodies and minds of the people, and by the relics left on the face of the nation. Statistical data

convey only a part of this grim picture. For example, on July 17, 1993, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that the four-year war in Liberia left more than 150,000 people dead. Although possibly, the real death toll could be one-and-a-half or two times this amount, the loss of 150,000 lives is mind-boggling for a country of 2.4 million people prior to the war (World Tables, 1984). This was three times the number of Americans who died in Vietnam in ten years.

Another devastating impact of the war in Liberia is the displacement of thousands of people. For example, by November, 1990, 1.28 million Liberians were displaced with 780,000 in other countries (Ruiz, 1991). The largest numbers of these people were in Guinea and the Ivory Coast which respectively had 409,000 and 250,000 Liberian refugees. Similar numbers of refugees were in Sierra Leone although, initially, estimates were difficult to reach for the entire country. To illustrate, one region of the country originally occupied by 25,000 people saw the influx of 126,000 Liberian refugees. Similarly, by November, 1990, 25,000 Liberians sought refuge in Ghana and that number soared by December of the same year (Ruiz, 1991). As the war persisted, these numbers increased sharply. This was especially true following the October 15, 1992 attack on Monrovia by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in "Operation Octopus."

The flight of Liberians from their homeland was not their only plight in sight. As reported by eye witnesses and international relief agencies (Ruiz, 1991; 1992) Liberians lived—and continue to live—under the most strenuous and deplorable conditions at home and abroad. This lamentable situation has increased the number of deaths as well as physical and mental illnesses, some irreversible. Visits by Liberian medical teams (Liberian Coalition, 1991), representatives of religious groups (Hayden & Price, 1991) and individuals (Ajavon-Cox, 1991) to Liberian refugee camps confirm these grim findings and give even grimmer pictures. Yet, the war continues in one form or another characterized by senseless murders, campaigns of murderous revenge, unthinkable horrors, unspeakable bestiality, and mind-boggling callousness especially for the sacrosanctity of human life. Thus, it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of a quick and lasting end to the war.

Looking Ahead: As the search for lasting peace and national unity continues, farsighted individuals, groups and development pundits are considering methods and the trajectory of reconstruction. Considerations along these lines doubtlessly center on rebuilding the infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, and restructuring the political and socioeconomic systems in a convalescing Liberia. Projects are envisaged in agriculture, health, education and community development. Missing from these considerations is the importance of special education and rehabilitation in post-war reconstruction.

In brief, special education is a specially designed instruction aimed at meeting the unique and individual needs of exceptional children and youth (Lewis and Doorlag, 1992). However, special education is not limited to mere

instruction. It aspires to meet the general needs of individuals with disabilities. Hence, it has related services: counseling, therapy, orientation and mobility, transportation, etc. This is why rehabilitation is a major part of this service provision. In a nutshell, rehabilitation is the directing or redirecting of energy and ability. It is the training or retraining of an individual to perform at his or her highest level possible.

In modern times, the two-part process of special education and rehabilitation has been a major aspect of post-war resettlement. For example, services in these areas increased sharply in the United States following the two world wars (Roberts, 1986; School, 1986). Similarly, after the Korean war, there was a sharp increase in the number of schools and rehabilitation centers for persons with disabilities. Before the war, South Korea had only one school for the blind; after the war, eleven additional schools were built (World Council, 1978).

Following the Nigerian-Biafran war, the then Head of State of Nigeria, General Gowon, embarked on a campaign of reconciliation and reconstruction. This campaign, of 1970-1975, included renovation of hospitals and clinics. Two programs emanating from this campaign were the Basic Health Services Scheme, BHSS, and Universal Education, UPE, both of which targeted the rural and urban poor (Ityavyar & Ogba, 1989). Special education and rehabilitation became major parts of these programs as evidenced by the increase in the number of institutions for persons with disabilities. In addition, the funding of services for such persons became a major aspect of the government's annual plans (Federal Republic, 1970-1988). Based on these experiences, when the lasting peace and unity which presently elude Liberia become a reality, it is crucial that reconstruction plans include special education and rehabilitation services.

Justifications: The inclusion of special education and rehabilitation services in post-war plans in Liberia can be justified on several grounds. First, a large number of people will most likely sustain physical, mental and psychological disabilities as a consequence of the war; this is usually the case after such a devastating war. For example, according to a UNICEF worker I interviewed, following the war in Ethiopia, rehabilitation workers found 45,000 people with disabilities in the province of Tigre alone. Such large numbers can be expected in Liberia as exemplified by the casualty figures reported after only one attack, namely, the October 15, 1992 attack on Monrovia by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in Operation Octopus. The Voice of America, citing World Health Organization sources, reported that within two weeks of fighting in that operation, more than three thousand people were killed with more than eight thousand injured.

The number of deaths and disabling conditions occurring in Liberia is also likely to increase precipitously not only because of injuries sustained among fighters "in the war" but also as a consequence of conditions both "during the

war" and "because of the war". Put differently, far beyond normal time rates, conditions surrounding the war will skyrocket the incidence of disabilities. To clarify, the United Nations reports that, under normal conditions, at least one-tenth of every population in the world has one form of a disability or another (Hammerman & Maikowski, 1981). In both the developing world and the underdeveloped areas of the developed world, this figure is increased sharply because of the impact of poverty and its corollaries, including malnutrition, inadequate sanitation, insufficient medical and health services, limited preventive measures, etc., (Hammerman, 1981; Acton, 1981); Malakpa, 1992). In wars and natural disasters, the situation is exacerbated further.

If the preceding truism does not alter in the Liberian situation—and that seems unlikely—the "unfavorable conditions" which cause disabilities will not only continue "during the war" but will be aggravated as a direct consequence of the war. For example, disabling conditions are inevitable in the face of massive suffering in refugee camps both within and outside the country (Ruiz, 1991; Liberian Coalition, 1991; Ajavon-Cox, 1991). Disabilities can also be linked directly to the war in light of hazards, traumas, inadequacies, worries and inhumane treatments associated with the war. Moreover, when these difficult times are superimposed upon critical periods such as pregnancy and early childhood, the likelihood of disabling conditions increases sharply.

The need for special services is further justified by the relevance of counseling and other related areas of special education in post-war Liberia. To illustrate, in Monrovia area alone, there are at least eleven orphanages and three night shelters for boys. There are other orphanages in Bong and Nimba counties. In addition, there are reports of unaccompanied children both in Liberia and in Liberian refugee camps (Ajavon-Cox, 1991). These children and many adults will need special help. This is because trauma, the loss of loved ones and everything one owns, witnessing or participating in gruesome activities, etc., do leave scars on the mind which require long term psychological counseling. This is particularly true for young children and adolescents who fought in the war, the "small soldiers" (Tokpa, 1992).

The concern for children is not limited only to children who fought in the war but also to those who witnessed atrocities. For instance, in April 1991, a UNICEF worker surveyed 518 street children in Monrovia and found that 88 or 17% had witnessed the deaths of their parents. Other children, initially reluctant to speak, later spoke of their roles as combatants (Ruiz, 1992).

In addition to the foregoing, while humanitarianism and social welfare generally underlie special education and rehabilitation services, such services can be justified within the realm of economics (Braddock, 1976, Hammerman & Maikowski, 1981; Malakpa, 1992; Lewis, Bruininks, Thurlow, & McGrew, 1988). Indeed, educating, training and integrating people with disabilities are viable

economic undertakings which aim at developing needed human resources. Without such undertakings, would-be tax payers become dependent on the rest of society. When this happens, the socioeconomic cost of not establishing special education services far exceeds the cost of the services themselves. Put directly, in the absence of special education programs which foster independence and economic productivity, people disabled either during or because of the war in Liberia will be forced to depend entirely on the rest of the population within an ailing economy.

Beyond economics, providing for persons with disabilities is emphasized because it is a mark of the African tradition. A Congolese proverb lucidly conveys this conviction: "No big, strong, healthy or wealthy individual is two persons. Likewise, no small, weak poor or disabled individual is a half person." Thus for the nation's economy, the unity of the country, the African tradition and indeed, for the individual needs of the people affected, it is actively impelling that special education and rehabilitation services be provided extensively in post-war Liberia.

General Suggestions: Often, advocacies for the inclusion of special education and rehabilitation services in national plans, post-war reconstruction arrangements and the like are countered by arguments about cost, the dearth of resources and the alleged lack of instant or viable results (Ogbue, 1981). Unfortunately, the concern about cost is generally deepened by the misconception that only expensive western or northern equipment and ideas can be utilized for such services (O'Toole, 1988). Thus, this misconception must be dispelled as a first step toward the establishment of appropriate and cost-effective programs.

Equally important is the fact that, to establish and continue viable special education programs in any country and under any circumstances, there must be genuine political will to do so. Often, this will is missing or negligible. This is partly because planners, administrators and key decision makers still do not fully understand the educability, trainability and potential economic productivity of persons with disabilities. Hence, it behooves key decision makers to consider the merits and justifications of providing the services needed for people with disabilities to become independent and major contributors to their communities and the nation as a whole.

A strong political will must be juxtaposed and enhanced by technical knowledge regarding the methods and processes of establishing and continuing successful programs. To this end, one general suggestion is that alternative approaches be utilized. For example, instead of focusing exclusively on western equipment, ideas, etc., local materials should be used alongside the few affordable equipment from the west. Likewise, local personnel should be prepared as trainers in this area.

In light of the dearth or nonexistence of resources, it is also important that services be channelled through various government agencies, profit and non-profit institutions, and other establishments. For instance, various services can be channelled through existing or reconstructed programs in education, health, community initiatives and traditional social systems. Through such a multi-sectoral approach, no one agency will singly be responsible for providing resources for the varied areas in special education. However, while the multi-sectoral approach makes economic sense, it is likely to affect efficacy as agencies will tend to be focused narrowly on small segments of a large program. Besides, when every agency is only partly responsible, none will be wholly responsible for the success of the entire program. Thus, a specific agency, bureau, or the like should be established to oversee and /or enhance inter-agency cooperation.

Finally, it is important that the provision of special education and rehabilitation services be regarded as a genuine means of developing valuable human resources and an important economic process which yields both intangible and tangible benefits. Failure to see special education in this light turns same into social welfare and humanitarian ventures pursued under the umbrella of pity and sympathy. Such ventures stifle independence, impede potential socio-economic contributions, and above all, ignore the needs, aspirations and dignities of persons with disabilities. In short, programs colored by sympathy and pity benefit no one.

In sum, the history of the human race is replete with numerous incidents of wars, coup d'états and other forms of violence. More than the destruction of infrastructure, institutions and systems, wars aversely affect human lives as they cause countless deaths, stressful displacements, ble suffering and permanent disabilities. It is therefore unfortunate that within the last three decades, the number of wars and other forms of political violence has increased precipitously in Africa. Because of their cataclysmic effects, these wars are generally followed by massive reconstruction campaigns. Regrettably, such campaigns do not heavily emphasize special education and rehabilitation services although wars leave thousands of people with physical, psychological, emotional and mental disabilities. As this neglect breeds many negative consequences, it is recommended that following the devastating war in Liberia, plans and policies for reconstruction and resettlement give more than a token attention to special education and rehabilitation services. Such a provision will be crucial for the personal needs of the individuals involved as well as for both socioeconomic development and the African tradition.

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**A Brief History of the Lutheran Church in Liberia:
From Dependency to Interdependence
1860-1965**

Robert L. Bradford

Although the Biblical St. Paul was not a Lutheran, Lutheran mission work in Liberia has always been associated with the St. Paul—the St. Paul River, that is. For it is within a corridor approximately sixty miles wide running on a SW-NE axis, roughly following the St. Paul river from near Monrovia on the coast to the interior town of Zorzor near the Guinea border that Lutheran mission work has been carried out for 105 years, that is from 1860 to 1965 when a fully autonomous Lutheran church in Liberia came into being. Looking downstream with one's back to the Guinea border, one sees that the right hand portion of this corridor is inhabited by the Loma people and the left hand portion of the corridor is the area of the Kpelle, Liberia's largest ethnic group. With one small and recent exception, Lutheran mission work has been confined exclusively to these two population groups. The Lutheran church in Liberia today has approximately 30,000 members, which means that it is *not* among the largest Christian denominations in the country. To paraphrase the words of one of its prominent contemporary members, it is a "respectable" church, but does not rank among the most prestigious or politically influential in Liberia. It has some features that make it distinctive from other mainline denominations in Liberia. But, in its 105-year journey, it has also shared certain similarities and developed the same kinds of warts as other missionary enterprises did as they made the somewhat painful transition from dependence, marked by expatriate domination, to interdependence based on equality and partnership.

The Lutheran journey began in 1860, on a shoestring and without fanfare, on the lower St. Paul River, about twenty miles upstream from Monrovia, at a spot given the unlikely name of Muhlenberg, in commemoration of the first German missionary of the Lutheran faith to North America. The Lutheran mission at Muhlenberg began under the leadership of a single white American clergyman, the Rev. Morris Officer of Ohio. He had one assistant, also American. Lest we chastise the Rev. Officer too severely for the very un-African name of his first mission site, we must remember that Muhlenberg was two miles above Millsburg and just across the river from Harrisburg—both being names that remind us that the Liberian coast and its immediate hinterland were occupied by the Americo-Liberian settlers' group. Muhlenberg was located on what was then the leading edge of the Americo-Liberians' settlements behind the coast. But the Lutheran mission did not seek to attract Americo-Liberians into its

community. Having no roots at all among slaves or freed slaves in the United States, the Lutheran denomination had no standing within the Americo-Liberian population. It still doesn't, a century and a quarter later.

This fact points to the first distinctive characteristic of Lutheran mission work in Liberia—that is, from the outset, the mission thrust leap-frogged *over* the Americo-Liberian communities along the coast and concentrated exclusively upon indigenous peoples of the interior. After the original mission station at Muhlenberg was placed on a solid footing by the long tenure of the Rev. David Day (1874-1897), the Lutheran missionaries and the Lutheran evangelists and teachers they trained at Muhlenberg advanced in a series of moves involving two steps forward and one step backward up the St. Paul River, achieving their deepest penetration into the interior with the opening of a mission site at Zorzor in 1923. The drive inland was governed as much by practical reasons as by the principle of "civilizing interior tribes." In the first place, there was always a multitude of churches of many denominations in the coastal regions. Secondly, the higher elevations inland were seen as healthier in terms of climate. Without roots among the Americo-Liberian colonists as the Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and various Episcopalian groups had, without so much as a single black American pastor to recruit for the new Liberian mission "field," Lutherans had but little choice other than to move inland to "the neglected people of the interior."¹

The march inland was hampered by ethnic group wars and unrest, government restrictions on travel into the interior, lack of personnel and finances, lack of roads and other transport problems, and much sickness and death among the late 19th century missionaries. Once among the interior Kpelle and Loma peoples, missionaries found the great distances between stations, the high cost of transport, and poor communications had at least one beneficent effect—conditions forced them to commit themselves to intensive language study which soon led to extensive literacy work. Missions on the coast could use English as their medium of instruction. Lutherans in the interior needed to learn Kpelle and Loma. In 1914, the Lutheran church engaged the noted philologist, Dr. Diedrich Westerman of the University of Berlin to go to Liberia to analyze the Kpelle language and to prepare a grammar and lexicon.² When he left in 1916, his advice to the mission was to require Kpelle language study of every missionary going to that area. The mission responded by establishing a language school at Kpolokpelle where a minimum of one year full-time language study was available. Dr. Wesley Sadler of the USA did a similar study of the Loma language in the 1940s and a Loma language center was established in the village of Wozi, near Zorzor. Both language centers were set in very small isolated villages which forced the missionaries to focus very intently upon their linguistic studies. These centers, later equipped with printing presses, turned out vast quantities of religious and secular literature in both Kpelle and Loma

as well as English. This literature was an important tool used to advance a significant part of the mission's work in Liberia—viz. the promotion of adult literacy. Over the years, the Lutheran church has won much respect for its strong promotion of literacy in indigenous languages as a vehicle to help preserve the local cultures, even though this same church has been strongly criticized for its efforts to destroy other aspects of indigenous cultures. The Lutheran mission was, in fact, at the forefront of the literacy movement in Liberia and one of its Muhlenberg graduates (the Rev. Byron Traub) became the first Director of Literacy for the Liberian government, serving in that capacity for nearly twenty years in the 1950s and 1960s.³

In addition to concentrating its work upon indigenous peoples in the interior rather than the Americo-Liberians along the coast, the second distinctive feature of Lutheran mission work was its three-fold approach to the mission task that placed or tried to place equal emphasis upon evangelism, education, and medicine. Again, this three-fold emphasis was only "in part the conscious choice of the missionaries."⁴ In large measure, the emphasis was dictated by the situation at hand when mission work began at Muhlenberg in 1860.

Upon arrival at Muhlenberg, the Rev. Officer had no one to whom to preach. Americo-Liberians in the area already had their congregations. Indigenous adults in the area were too strong in their commitment to traditional religious beliefs to be converted easily. Officer's plan, therefore, was to entice indigenous parents to surrender their children to the mission which would "establish a school as soon as possible; to take . . . so many children of the heathen as the company [of missionaries] could well keep in their families and have them attend school and labor with and for the families. This I believe to be the most successful way to civilize and Christianize these children. They must be brought into civilized places [i.e., the mission], and, if possible, into families."⁵ The contradiction in all this was that the Rev. Officer sought to take children away from their natal African families and bring them into the mission station where both he and his American helper were without family. Officer had left his wife and daughters in Ohio and Mr. Henry Heigerd was a bachelor!

But the Gola and Dey families in the immediate area of Muhlenberg station refused to part with their children, thus dooming the Rev. Officer to begin Lutheran mission work in Liberia with 40 Congolese children (20 boys and 20 girls) liberated in Monrovia from a Spanish slave ship that two U.S. cruisers had captured near the mouth of the Congo River. The children, it was reported, were stricken with terror "not sure that they were not being led away to slavery by this strange white-man[sic]."⁶ A month later, eleven of the boys ran away from Muhlenberg, intending to make their way back to their homeland. They were found near Careysburg after several days and taken back to the mission.

In relating this pathetic story, the point I want to make is that evangelism and education were seen by early Lutheran missionaries to go hand in hand. The Muhlenberg Mission's main effort for many years was education. As the Mission moved inland, "schools were started before any congregation existed in the villages at all."⁷ Support from America, local resources, and the time and talents of most missionaries until well into the 20th Century went primarily into schools. Some missionaries objected to this imbalance of education over evangelism. "But the prevailing body of opinion . . . was the mission should work primarily through the young people in the schools."⁸ People should be brought to the Mission rather than the Mission reaching out to the villages. Once upcountry in Kpelle and Loma areas, the Mission found that it had to pay a dash to chiefs to get them to part with the village children so they could attend the Mission's boarding schools. That this smacked of some kind of indentured servanthood bothered some missionaries, but they saw no alternative. The first 13 converts from among the Congolese children were baptized in 1864.

In 1902, the Mission decided to break out of its original Muhlenberg station whose congregations and schools had been put on a very strong foundation by the Rev. David Day (1874-1897). The move into the interior, up the St. Paul River, again illustrated how schools marched ahead of evangelism. Dozens of schools were opened in towns and villages, the teaching staff being recruited from among the graduates of the Muhlenberg Mission school. Limited finances, limited missionary supervisors, limited governmental authority in the hinterland and tribal warfare forced the closing of many of these schools, but the point here is that mission expansion should take place "primarily through the young people in the schools."⁹ The schools emphasized manual training for boys and domestic training for girls. Boarding schools were preferred over day schools, partly reflecting "the feeling that the child could best be won for Christ by being separated from his 'heathen' environment."¹⁰ The Liberian government also mandated that all mission stations must operate a school as a condition of their franchise. Thus, a combined educational and evangelistic program was a necessity.

Missionaries also saw medical work as a critically important vehicle for evangelism, in addition to being vital for their own state of physical health. Not until the turn of the century did the first missionary arrive who had substantial medical training. And not until 1916 was the first proper hospital opened at Muhlenberg. Phoebe Hospital served many people from Monrovia and the whole coastal area, in addition to training young Liberian women as nurses. The first dispensaries opened in interior towns like Kpolokpelle, Sanoyea, Bellefanai, Salayea, and Totota beginning in 1921. And a second hospital opened, this one in Zorzor in 1924. Phoebe Hospital and Nurses Training School were moved from Muhlenberg to Zorzor in 1945 and a new Phoebe Hospital built near Cuttington College in 1965 with the financial help of the Episcopal and Method-

ist churches. The number of patients served soared over the 50,000 mark by 1950, making medical work the largest method by far of ministering to the needs of the indigenous, interior populations. Again, the focus was exclusively upon the Kpelle and Loma people.

The "triple approach" to planting the Lutheran church in Liberia, emphasizing evangelism, education, and medicine was not without cost. The slow pace of the church growth was disappointing to many missionaries. They complained that evangelistic work and the founding of congregations suffered because personnel was siphoned off into schools. Schools, dispensaries, and hospitals were the expensive parts of a mission enterprise and required large subsidies from home mission boards. Mission concentration on school children had little immediate impact upon village life because school children were not the determiners of policy in Liberian villages. Missionaries in teaching and in medical work did not have the incentive to study an indigenous language since their work was conducted in English. All these things were detrimental to evangelism and the planting of the church in the villages.

The "triple approach" had its advantages, however. Many school children became baptized Christians. Mission education and medical work drew children away from traditional education ("bush schools") and drew adults away from the traditional medicine men, both of which were viewed by the early missionaries as requisites to building a modern society along Christian lines. Through years of debate about the proper "balance" between evangelism, education, and medicine, the final judgment was that the three had to go hand in hand in a "holistic" approach to church growth.

In some respects, Lutheran mission work in Liberia was *not* distinctive from other denominations active in Liberia or in the rest of Africa. Lutherans got caught up in the same dilemmas and contradictions as other missionaries. While on one hand promising to leave undisturbed all African customs and traditions that were consistent with Christianity,¹¹ nearly all Lutheran missionaries nonetheless launched frontal attacks on almost every aspect of traditional African life—including ancestor reverence, use of charms and fetishes, belief in a pantheon of spirits, traditional bush schools, traditional medicine men, divination, trial by ordeal, and polygyny. Traditional music, dance, festivals, rituals, secret societies, and even the tendency toward nakedness were discouraged. Rev. Officer made it a point to clothe the Congolese children he picked up in Monrovia before walking them to Muhlenberg in 1860!¹² In their fervor to introduce Christianity, early Lutherans fell into the same trap as most other missionaries. They proselytized on behalf of Western culture in addition to Western Christianity. Missionary pastor David Day reported in 1855 that missionaries would have to "break up the whole social fabric and literally create a new civilization."¹³ Mrs. Thelma Traub Awori, a Liberian national raised in the Lutheran church, has written bitterly about the "civilizing mission" pro-

moted by pre-1945 missionaries. In degrading and denouncing nearly all aspects of African culture, missionaries, said Mrs. Awori, were "making us [into] little black Anglo-Saxon Protestants". At the same time, she praised those few missionaries who respected indigenous Liberian culture, who lived in traditional houses, and encouraged the use of traditional music and musical instruments.¹⁴ Such missionaries, among the Lutherans, were few.¹⁵

I referred earlier to "warts" on the Lutheran mission enterprise. By this, I mean instances of attitudes and behavior that we would see today as reprehensible, shameful, and utterly demeaning. A few examples will suffice. The practice of giving familiar American names to Liberian converts began with the Rev. Officer in 1860 at Muhlenberg. To identify the 20 Congolese boys on whom the Mission was founded, Officer wrote the names of twenty prominent American Lutherans on cards, hung the cards around the boys' necks, pointed to the cards and repeated their names frequently until the boys learned their new identity. The roots of Lutheran mission work in Liberia thus go back to these students with such famous names as William A. Passavant, Charles P. Krauth, and Samuel S. Schmucker.¹⁶

In the 1940s, Mrs. Awori remembered running around the schoolyard in Muhlenberg playing "little racist games" and she strongly condemned the Lutheran mission's treatment of her own father, a mission employee, discriminating against him and others in pay, transportation, and housing.¹⁷

A final sore point with the Liberian Lutherans was that white missionaries from North America and the church's foreign mission board in the United States dominated the decision-making processes of the mission. This paternalism reached its zenith in the first half of the 20th Century and continued even after 1947, when the mission was transformed into the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Liberia. An American wrote the constitution of the new church without consulting a single Liberian pastor. That constitution provided for a "Mission Conference" made up of American missionaries. This conference exercised effective control over the new church. Here then, "after 87 years of Lutheran work in this country," said a Liberian clergyman, the new church was still dominated by expatriate missionaries.¹⁸ It was not until 1965 that still another constitution was written, creating the Lutheran Church in Liberia and finally placing control in the hands of indigenous Liberians. Thus, after 105 years, a national autonomous church came into existence, although it continued to require heavy subsidies from the Lutheran Church in America for another fifteen years beyond 1965.

After 1965, under the leadership of its first indigenous bishop, the Rev. Roland Payne, the LCL continued to minister primarily to Kpelle and Loma groups in the central interior. But it also launched urban ministry work among the Kpelle, Loma, and other communities in and near the sprawling city of

Monrovia; and, in 1975, it took initial steps to establish a Lutheran presence in the Pallipo chiefdom of the Grebo people, still along the historic, threefold mission lines of the last century (evangelism, education, and medicine).¹⁹

At the same time, in keeping with the concept of greater self-sufficiency and self-reliance inherent in interdependence, the number of American missionaries began to decline in the years following 1965. As more nationals acquired theological training, the number of expatriate missionary pastors declined, leaving the smaller missionary presence to consist largely of nurses, doctors, teachers, literacy experts, mechanical engineers, hospital administrators, pharmacists, and, after 1953, an airplane pilot. Even in the medical field, the number of American personnel began to decline, both as a result of Liberian nurses and doctors taking over the work and in anticipation of increased funding of Curran and Phoebe hospitals by the Liberian government.

Most importantly, missionary attitudes changed after 1965. Missionaries evidenced far greater understanding and appreciation of indigenous African culture. They became much more supportive of the use of African musical forms in worship and adopted a more tolerant attitude toward traditional customs such as polygyny. The old master/servant relationship moved rapidly toward a partnership paradigm between equals.²⁰ Church operated schools abandoned the early mission focus on manual and industrial training in favor of a broader, more academic oriented curriculum. Church-related hospitals gradually moved away from being centralized medical institutions to more preventive medicine oriented institutions which took medical teams into rural villages.

The change from dependence to interdependence was not painless. Declining subsidies and fewer missionary personnel from North America led some in the LCL to lament that the church was "catching hard time." After 1965, the LCL sought to fill the void created by declining North American financial grants with new ties to Lutheran groups in Scandinavia and in Germany. Fortunately for the LCL, the Liberian government under President William A. Tolbert, Jr. (1971-80) became the major source of funding for the two church-related hospitals. This turned out to be a short-term blessing. The fiscal crisis for the two hospitals returned in the 1980s when government subsidies began to arrive late and eventually withered away completely.

However, even amid the pains and disappointments of the early years of interdependence after 1965, the Lutheran Church in Liberia showed a remarkable resiliency.²¹ In its new status and under its own leadership, one had only to attend a 2¹/₂ hour worship service at St. Peter's in Monrovia to sense the joy and vibrancy permeating the Lutheran community—grown by 1965 to 25,000 members.

Meanwhile, old Muhlenberg had fallen silent (since 1945)—the relic of an earlier era. Its history represented both the best and the worst of the mission

enterprise of the 1860-1965 period. By 1994, of course, the church had fallen victim to the disastrous civil war of 1989-94—a subject that will need to be explored by this or another writer in a subsequent essay.

Endnotes

¹ Whetstone, Harold V. *Lutheran Mission in Liberia* ([New York]: Board of Foreign Missions of the United Lutheran Church in America, 1955), p. 219.

² Cason, John W. "The Growth of Christianity in the Liberian Environment" (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), pp. 286-287.

³ Awori, Thelma, "The Revolt against the 'Civilizing Mission': Christian Education in Liberia" in Edward H. Bremen (ed.) *African Reactions to Missionary Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1975), p. 120.

⁴ Whetstone, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹¹ See the policy statement of 1927 as quoted in Whetstone, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹² Whetstone, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹³ Cason, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

¹⁴ Awori, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁶ Whetstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ Awori, *op. cit.*, pp. 122.

¹⁸ From the preliminary draft of a new history of the LCL currently being written by Bishop Emeritus Roland Payne and retired American missionary Margaret Miller, p. 227.

¹⁹ Payne-Miller draft, pp. 266-269.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-265.

The American Background of Recurrent Themes in the Political History of Liberia

Amos J. Beyan

The themes of Liberian political history can be generally divided into two main groups: those that indict Liberia and the ones that defend the West African Republic. The main sources of such opposing interpretations can be traced to the American background of Liberia and the African social environments which influenced the evolution of that country. The American Colonization Society (ACS) that founded Liberia in 1822 was greatly influenced by the simultaneous development of slavery and democratic values in independent America. The foregoing contradiction not only influenced the ACS but it also affected the interpretations of the ACS, colonial, and post-colonial Liberia. This essay is therefore an attempt to examine the American background of the contradiction and why it continues to influence scholarship on Liberia.

It can be argued that the origin of the contradictory interpretations in question could be traced to the era of the American Revolution. It was during the Revolution, when Founding Fathers such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and others emphasized that the British had not only imposed slavery on the American colonists but were also responsible for its continuation in the American colonies. The accusation was later spelled out in the American Declaration of Independence, thus:

... He [King George III] has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people ... carrying them into slavery. ... He [King George III is] determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislature attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce.¹

This charge was not a departure from the American Revolutionary theme of freedom and equality for all or that "all men [and women] are created equal."²

But the Second Continental Congress later erased the charges against the King from the Declaration. This was due to the pressure of those states that opposed the abolition of slavery in the United States. It was partly against this background that the following compromises were made over slavery at the Constitutional Convention held in Philadelphia in 1787. The Founding Fathers agreed that slaves were both property and human beings: a slave was to be counted as three-fifths of a freeman for representation and taxation purposes;

and the transatlantic trade, and not slavery in the United States, could be abolished before 1808.³

While the compromises helped to ease the evolving tensions between politicians from the slaveholding and non-slaveholding states, they were obviously a victory for southern politicians because they indirectly endorsed their slave system. But the continuation of slavery in the South was a clear contradiction of the theme of the Declaration of Independence. Against this background, modified pro and anti-slavery schools of thought were reemphasized. Southern politicians such as Jefferson and others argued that blacks were genetically inferior to whites, and therefore, political, economic, and social accommodations would not make them equal to the latter. This argument was a justification for the simultaneous promotion of slavery and democracy in America. Proslavery argument was to influence the newly evolving popular American culture. The portrayal of blacks as "savages," "child-like people," and "sub-human beings" who would never be assimilated in America was an attempt by proslavery writers to deny black Americans their rightful place in America.⁴

But the attempt to alienate blacks politically, economically, and socially did not continue unchallenged. The challenge, of course, was heavily influenced by the democratic principles that had been emphasized by American leaders during the Revolutionary War. Blacks and their white allies were to remind America that the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights were merely rhetoric as long as slavery and the social isolation of blacks continued. Indeed, the unsuccessful slave revolt led by Gabriel Prosser in Virginia in 1800 was another reminder that the slaves were not content with their enslavement as proslavery intellectuals argued.⁵ The opposition to the subjugation of blacks clearly showed that the problem over slavery that had been addressed at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 was far from over. In fact, the problem was increasingly dividing America into two opposing camps. And because of this, alternative solutions to the problem were recommended. Among the solutions suggested was the colonization of blacks outside the United States.⁶

Early in the nineteenth century, southern politicians such as Jefferson, Madison, James Monroe, and others advocated colonization of blacks outside white America. Their support for colonization was reinforced by the abortive slave insurrection in 1800 and the presence of many free and enslaved blacks in their state.⁷ Such a support for blacks' colonization was to influence the formation of the ACS in 1816 and the reorganization of that movement in 1817 to carry out the colonization ideal.⁸

The first prominent leaders of the ACS included Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington (a nephew of President George Washington), Henry Clay, John Howard, Samuel Smith, John Smith, John Taylor, John Mason, William Phillips, Henry Rutgers, Robert Ralston, and Samuel Bayard.⁹ Justice Bushrod

Washington served as the first president of the ACS, and the others served as that body's first group of vice presidents. An evaluation of the power structure of the ACS clearly shows that nearly all the significant positions of the ACS were held by southerners.¹⁰ The initial members of the Board of Managers whose main functions were to develop and implement the policies of the ACS were, for example, mostly southerners.¹¹

Southern leaders became interested in the colonization of blacks because they were the ones most affected by the issue of slavery. Although their power and wealth came from the exploitation of their slaves, southerners, especially the leading slaveowners, were fearful of the risk inherent in slavery and the possibility of its abolition. Such a fear was reinforced by the abortive slave revolt in 1800. As planters and slaveholders, or supporters of the status quo in the South, most of the founders of the ACS were strongly committed to the protection of slavery in the South, and among the main reasons for founding the ACS was to prevent further slave rebellions and safeguard slavery. The colonization scheme was therefore in its early history directed against the emancipated blacks, because it was commonly held by southerners that they were the main source of slave revolts.¹²

The desire to colonize the free blacks in Africa was justified in contradictory ways. Indeed, most of the arguments put forward in defense of the colonization scheme were similar to the ones emphasized by American intellectuals and leaders who supported slavery and freedom in America. While John Randolph, Henry Clay, and Gerrit Smith, all prominent members of the ACS, maintained that the ACS was established to spread the gospel in Africa, they later pointed out that the organization was not intended to abolish slavery in America.¹³ Bishop William Meade, a key advocate of colonization of blacks in Africa, argued that although they would not be good Christians in America, the free blacks would be so in Africa. He, therefore, suggested that emancipation of slaves should be followed by their colonization in Africa. Robert G. Harper, a leading southern slaveholder, declared that the ACS would enhance the interest of America since its main goal was to get rid of those who were unwelcomed in America.¹⁴ Justice Bushrod Washington, who served as the first president of the ACS, pointed out that the ACS would "wipe from our political institutions the blot which stains them."¹⁵ Indeed, nearly every early prominent member of the ACS held the belief that the emancipated blacks were unwanted in America, but they would spread the gospel if sent to Africa. Such a view was emphasized by Clay at the first meeting of the ACS, thus:

Of all the classes of our population, the most vicious is that of the free colored, it is the inevitable result of their moral, political and evil degradation. Contaminated themselves, they extended their vices all around them to the slaves, to the whites every emigrant to Africa is a missionary carrying the credential in the holy cause of civilization religion and free institution.¹⁶

These contradictory arguments were to influence the interpretations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the ACS and the Liberian colony which the movement founded. The influence became evident when pro-colonization intellectuals began to conceptualize that the colonization movement was an attempt at humanization of American slavery.¹⁷ Of course, the argument that slavery was a benevolent institution was emphasized during the eighteenth century by American writers.¹⁸ The colonizationists, however, shifted the emphasis to support their African colonization scheme in the nineteenth century.¹⁹ They argued that while the moral characters and material conditions of the free blacks could not be improved in America, these would easily occur in Africa, the place they were to be sent. This positive characterization of American slavery, that was now associated with the ACS, was to be linked with the ACS' "civilizing mission" in West Africa. Robert Finley, a theologian from New Jersey and one of the leading proponents of the colonization scheme, justified his position thus:

... Every thing connected with their condition including their colour is against them. Nor is there much prospect for their state can ever be greatly meliorated while they shall continue among us. Could not the rich and benevolent devise means to form a colony on some part of the coast of Africa similar to that of Sierra Leone Could [the free blacks] be sent back to Africa, a threefold benefit would arise. We should be clear of them; we should send to Africa a population partly civilized and Christianized for its benefit—and our blacks themselves would be put in a better position. . . .²⁰

It must be pointed out that the ACS tried to be all things to all people in the United States. While it preached "free soil" in the West, and anti-slavery and Christian moral values in the Northeast, the ACS maintained in the South that its colonization scheme would enhance slavery in that region. The *African Repository*, a journal that published nearly all the official views of the ACS, expressed the foregoing point in its editorial in 1825:

The objective of the Colonization Society commends itself to every class of society. The landed proprietor may enhance the value of his property by assisting the enterprise. The patriot may contribute to the immortal honour of his country by generously relieving those whose degradation and misery in the midst of us, though a reproach, seems inevitable. . . . And what is more in character with the Christian profession than to enlighten the dark minds to labour for the substantial and renown of one's country, and by deeds noblest and most extensive charity to break the shackles of superstition and by conferring on civilized nations the freedom which is in Christ prepares for an eternity. . . .²¹

Such an emphasis as the one noted above was employed by the ACS to win the support of every segment of American society. While the strategy won new recruits for the ACS in the West, South, and Northeast, it also led several leading members of that organization to defect. The inconsistency of the ACS, especially its pro- and anti-slavery posture, was among the reasons given for the defection.²²

The proslavery stance of the ACS precipitated counterresponse from anti-slavery leaders and later anti-colonization writers.²³ One Daniel Raymond, a lawyer from Baltimore, for example, was not only against slavery but was also against the colonization of blacks in Africa. While he condemned slavery for moral reasons, he opposed the colonization scheme because he believed that it was not practical. He argued that the ACS did not have the resources to send all blacks to Africa. He described slavery as a "curse" and therefore recommended that its cure should be abolition. Raymond added that emancipation should be followed by some provisions for the newly freed blacks.²⁴ Other anticolonization writers argued that the colonization scheme was an attempt to return to slavery since it was designed to remove the free blacks who were said to be the natural allies of the enslaved blacks.²⁵ They emphasized that: "the colonization scheme violated the professed American principles; it sought to stigmatize the free Negro population, and it countenanced the perpetuation of human bondage. . . ."²⁶

Opponents also denounced those free blacks who supported the colonization movement. They were described as opportunists or a "few obscured and dissatisfied strangers . . ." among the free blacks.²⁷ At the gathering of three thousand blacks in the Bethel Church at Philadelphia in 1817, opponents of the colonization movement argued:

. . . This is our home. . . Beneath its soil lie the bones of our fathers; for it some of them fought, bled, and died. Here we were born, and here we will die. . . No grandiose schemes for alleged Christianity of Africa, . . . would deter us from maintaining a steady campaign to gain political recognition and abolition of slavery in the United States.²⁸

Similar oppositions to the colonization movement occurred in places such as Pittsburgh, Boston, New Haven, Richmond, and New York. Once again, the free blacks emphasized during these meetings that their " . . . ancestors . . . were the first successful cultivators of the wilds of America . . . [and they, their] descendants [were therefore] entitled to participate in the blessings of her luxuriant soil. . ."²⁹ They pointed out that any attempt to remove them from America "would not only be cruel, but would also be a direct violation of those principles which have been boasted of this Republic. . . ." The free blacks also declared that they would never deliberately "separate" themselves from the enslaved blacks.³⁰

The blacks who supported or who were developing an inclination to support the colonizationist scheme justified their position by declaring that America could never accommodate them as full citizens. They argued that the country was too racist to allow for black accommodation. They cited as an example the general base support for slavery among white Americans to sustain their argument. They, therefore, repeatedly emphasized that the colonization movement was the only and best solution to the problems blacks were facing in America. Like their white counterparts, pro-colonization blacks pointed out that the ACS scheme would not only bring true freedom to blacks, it would also promote Christianity and civilization in West Africa, the designated place for colonization. Among the first group of blacks who held the above views were the Rev. Daniel Coker, the Rev. Lott Carey, Elijah Johnson, Samuel Wilson, Perry Lockes, Thomas Camaraw, Nathaniel Peck, Nathaniel Brander, Edward T. Wigfall, and Francis Creecy.³¹

Despite the differences among blacks concerning the motives and objectives of the ACS, the colony that became known as Liberia was established on the West African coast in 1822. But this did not mean that the antitheses that had developed over the ACS came to an end. In fact, the debates intensified as a result of the establishment of the Liberian colony. The opposing arguments were inherited by those who began to examine colonial and independent Liberia, though with shifting emphasis. In the colonial period, 1822-1847, the "civilizing mission" now associated with the Liberian colony became the dominant theme of pro-colonization writers. Indeed, every attribute of the Liberian colony that served as an affirmation of colonizationists' concept of civilization was emphasized. This included American ways of worship, architectural designs, educational, social, economic, and other American institutional values the Liberian settlers mimicked.³² Jehudi Ashmun who served as a governor of Liberia from 1824 to 1829 described how the American settlers and the indigenous people in the Liberian colony were being civilized:

They have so far walked as regenerated children of God. . . .
From lovers of sin and the world, they have become lovers of
God and his people. Bad husbands, wives, children, and sub-
jects are charged affectionate, industrious, sober, and useful
citizens. . . .³³

He maintained that a stone house and two churches were under construction in the colony. In a report sent to the leaders of the ACS in Washington, D.C., Ashmun pointed out that: "To the lasting honour of the American Colonization, it has founded a new empire on . . . [the African] continent, of which the basis is Christianity, intelligence, and rationale liberty."³⁴ Indeed, Ashmun and all the governors who succeeded him argued that the "civilizing mission" which was one of the paramount objectives of the ACS was being realized in the Liberian colony. Pro-colonization writers such as Frederick Freeman, Thomas

Hodkins, Ralph R. Gurley, Joseph J. Roberts, and Archibald Alexander emphasized the "civilizing mission" in their respective publications.³⁵ Obviously, the described theme was emphasized to give legitimacy to the Liberian colony the ACS had established.³⁶

On the other hand, the anti-colonization writers continued to condemn not only the ACS but also the Liberian colony which that movement had established. To them, the continuation of the slave trade on the coast of Liberia, the suffering of the settlers, the inability of the colony to sustain itself, the series of wars fought between the settlers and indigenous people, the first Liberian coup in 1823, and the totalitarian or paternalistic system imposed on the settlers by the ACS were illustrations of the failure of the Liberian colony. In fact, the preceding argument became the dominant theme of anti-colonization writers such as Edmund Ruffin, Samuel Cornish and Theodore S. Wright, William Jay, William L. Garrison, Charles Stuart, etc.³⁷ They pointed out that the "civilizing mission" associated with the ACS was far from being accomplished in Liberia.

The shifting antithesis that now emphasized the illegitimacy of the Liberian colony also stressed the insolvency of independent Liberia, especially the leadership of that country.³⁸ It was argued that Liberia could not claim legitimacy, since its government was corrupt, oppressive, incompetent, and it represented only a small segment of its population. This theme was emphasized in the late 1880s and 1900s.³⁹ Authors such as Henry F. Reeve, Arthur Hayman, and Harold Preece condemned every aspect of the Liberian leadership. Reeve argued that the Liberian leadership was a complete failure, and he therefore recommended that it be placed under British colonial rule. He cited the wars of 1912 and 1915 fought between the settlers and indigenous Liberians as examples of the inability of the Liberian leaders to govern their country. He maintained that the oppression of the indigenous people by the settlers' dominated leadership was the main cause of the wars.⁴⁰ Cuthbert Christy, a member of a commission established by the League of Nations to investigate the Liberian labor crisis in the early 1930s,⁴¹ emphasized the "illegitimate theme." He argued that Liberia would not develop because it was under black leadership. He therefore recommended that Liberia should be placed under white control.⁴²

Obviously Christy's argument was influenced by racism. Indeed, the preceding statement could be applied to nearly all the Europeans and white Americans who questioned the legitimacy of the Liberian leadership. In this sense, they were not moved by the sufferings of the indigenous people as their arguments implied. In fact, the labor policies of the French, the British, the Germans, and the Portuguese, in their respective African colonies were, in most cases, more oppressive than that of Liberia.⁴³

It could be argued, however, that there were people who condemned the Liberian leadership mainly because of its failure to accommodate socially and politically a large number of the Liberian people. These people were mostly

Liberians with indigenous or Congo backgrounds. The former group included Dihdwo Twe, F. W. E. Morais, Al-Haj Massaquoi, and F. E. Besylow, and the latter group composed of Doughba Carranda and Abayomi Karnga. They, especially Twe and Morais, were to condemn Liberian labor policy in the early 1930s that victimized the Kru ethnic group of Liberia.⁴⁴

The position of George Schuyler, a black American journalist who visited Liberia during the labor crisis, was similar to a large degree to that of Morais and Twe. He, for example, condemned the labor policy of the Liberian leadership because he felt it was oppressive. He further accused the leadership of black Americans for its refusal to protest against the oppressive labor policy of the Liberian leadership. Schuyler's criticism of W. E. B. Du Bois for his silence on the Liberian labor policy was harsh:

Are we not to expect the Negro colonists who are so excessively religious and shout the Love of Liberty Brought Us Here will be more human to their black native wards than would white colonists? Right is right and wrong is wrong regardless of the color of the individuals or groups involved. . . . Admiring you immensely as I do for your courage and tenacity in persistently championing the cause of the colored peoples, I am sorry that you have permitted your belligerent and commendable Negrophilism to warp your vision in the case of the Liberian racketeers.⁴⁵

Schuyler also criticized the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) for their defense of Liberia during the labor crisis.⁴⁶

Although he was moved by the oppression of the indigenous people, Schuyler's solution to the Liberian crisis was not much different from that of the Europeans. Schuyler recommended, for example, that Liberia should be placed under "American supervision for about 20 or 25 years until the [Liberians] are competent of administering the country, which clearly they are not at present. . . ."⁴⁷

Schuyler's solution and criticism of the Liberian elites and their black American supporters did not, however, go unchallenged. George Padmore, a West Indian, who became a communist and then a leading PanAfricanist was among those who challenged Schuyler's solution to the Liberian labor crisis. But Padmore not only condemned Schuyler's solution, he also rebuked the labor policy of the Liberian elites. He argued that if Schuyler's solution were carried out, it would only reinforce the exploitation and the underdevelopment of Liberia and further, it would undermine the sovereignty of that country. Padmore declared that if Liberia became a colony, it would not only be a blow to the leaders of that country, but it would also be a setback for all black people.

He therefore recommended that the sovereignty of Liberia should be kept at all costs. But he also pointed out that there was a need for changes in Liberia's political, economic, and social systems. He believed that such changes would be brought about if the indigenous people would organize themselves into a labor union.⁴⁸

Like Padmore, Pan-Africanists such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Walter F. Walker, and African nationalists like Nnamdi Azikiwe, argued that the sovereignty of Liberia must be protected at all costs. While the Pan-Africanists believed that if Liberia were placed under imperial control it would be humiliating for the entire black race, the nationalists reasoned that it would be used as an excuse by the colonial powers to slow down the struggle for independence that was taking place in most African colonies. Such feelings were spelled out by Walker and Azikiwe during the Liberian labor crisis. Walker, who was then the Liberian consul in New York, maintained that European imperialists and white Americans were employing the "divide and rule" system in Liberia, and that the system was already having an impact on some educated indigenous Liberians such as Morais and Twe. Walker added that the system "... is an old trick practiced by dominant powers to break racial solidarity and political understanding and to have people commit hari-kari. . . . It was the orchestral accompaniment of American slavery to prevent uprisings among the slaves."⁴⁹ A similar charge was made against Morais who went to Geneva in 1931 to bring to the League of Nations' attention the treatment of his Grebo ethnic group by the Liberian leadership. Azikiwe, the critic of Morais, maintained:

The cause exposed by Dr. Morais is a worthy one, but his method of approach is rather crude, and it completely destroys the sincereness . . . of his mission. No useful purpose can be served by a direct approach to the League of Nations, because it is an international organization, and only political entities are recognizable before it as members. . . . It is therefore painful to see this great son of Grebo who was ably commanded by the Chief Justice of Liberia and who occupies an important position to strengthen the link between the government and aborigines by enlightened leadership fall into a miasma of partisan politics.⁵⁰

As illustrated by the above explanations, the defenders of Liberia were more concerned about protecting the independence of Liberia than addressing the oppression of the indigenous people. To them, an exposure of such an oppression would have only made the sovereignty of Liberia vulnerable. This explains why even a prominent Pan-Africanist such as W. E. B. Du Bois would justify the oppression of the indigenous people. He maintained, for example, that "it was absolutely necessary for the [Liberian] government to take a high hand with them [the indigenous people] in order to assure them that it really

was a government; otherwise the tribal chiefs would take matters into their own hands."⁵¹ Du Bois later admitted, however, that the labor policy of the Liberian leadership was not much different from the brutal colonial policies of "... the Americans in the Philippines, the English in Ireland, and the French everywhere. . . ." ⁵²

The debates that developed over the Liberian labor crisis in the 1930s emphasized the theme of legitimacy and that of illegitimacy. In this sense, the debates were a continuation of the antitheses that had characterized Liberian scholarships before the labor crisis. Of course, the defenders of Liberia, like the indictors of that country, had different reasons for their respective positions. For the defenders, the sovereignty of Liberia was to be maintained at any cost, since according to them, the contrary would be a blow not only to the leaders of Liberia but also to black peoples' struggle for political, social, and economic justice world-wide. On the other hand, the indictors of Liberia argued that if the sovereignty of that country were maintained at the expense of the indigenous people who made up a majority of the population, then such a sovereignty would be meaningless.⁵³

In a way, the antitheses that stressed "American freedom" and "American slavery" were similar to the debates that characterized the Liberian labor crisis of the 1930s.⁵⁴ In other words, the arguments put forward by American scholars on the coexistence of American slavery and American democracy up to the end of the American Civil War in 1865 were similar to the ones emphasized by Liberianists concerning the simultaneous maintaining of the sovereignty of Liberia and the continued subjugation of the indigenous people of that country. However, unlike the antislavery arguments which were continually emphasized until slavery was abolished in America, criticisms of the Liberian leadership's policy toward its indigenous population were brought under control long before the labor conditions of the indigenous people were improved.

Such criticisms were contained because the Liberian leadership had the capacity to accommodate or to punish (if inducement failed) those who challenged it. Indeed, this was what happened to Morais and Brownell who brought the oppression of the indigenous Liberian people to the attention of the League of Nations in 1932 at Geneva. Immediately after their arrival from Geneva in 1932, Morais was apprehended for allegedly causing insurrection, and he was demised from the Liberian legislature. He was then imprisoned at Bella Yella, the most notorious prison in Liberia. On the other hand, Brownell, who had accompanied Morais to Geneva, was appointed as an attorney general of Liberia by President Edwin Barclay. Brownell was therefore forced to renounce his support for the indigenous people. Hence, Morais was to follow Brownell's example. In 1934, he decided to abandon the struggle for the rights of his people. In fact, he informed Liberian leaders that he was prepared to work with them.⁵⁵

The preceding outlined compromise was in a way a betrayal of the indigenous people by their educated sons such as Morais and Brownell. But it can be fairly argued that Morais and Brownell had few choices taking into consideration the tremendous power of the Liberian leadership. Adding to their problem was the unwillingness of Pan-Africanists and African nationalists to support their struggle for the rights of the indigenous Liberians. Support of this kind would have exposed Liberia's contradictions that Pan-Africanists and African nationalists felt were not in the interest of their struggle against racism and colonialism. And, of course, Europeans and white Americans could not afford to go to an extreme in their condemnation of the policy of the Liberian leadership toward the indigenous people, since their policies toward their non-white populations were in some cases more oppressive than that of the Liberian leadership.⁵⁶ This was among the reasons why the British and American leaderships never took seriously the appeals made to them by Twe and Morais concerning the oppression of the Grebo and Kru ethnic groups in Liberia in the 1930s.⁵⁷

The experiences of Morais, Brownell, Twe, and others during the Liberian labor crisis, clearly showed that the Liberian leadership would go to any length to discourage people, especially indigenous educated Liberians, from criticizing it. Against this background the glorification of Liberia, especially the leadership of that country, became the dominant theme of studies done on Liberia by authors like John P. Mitchell, Nathaniel R. Richardson, Charles M. Wilson, Ernest J. Yancy, James C. Young, Doris Banks Henries, and Reginald Townsend from 1936 through the 1960s.⁵⁸ The glorification theme that also emphasized the legitimate thesis, however, was challenged mostly by foreign Liberianists who included M. B. Akpan, J. Gus Liebenow, Robert Cole, Stephen S. Hlophe, and Dwight Seyfert, Richard West, Wolfe M. Schmokel, and Yekutieli Gershoni. Their theme was that the Liberian State was not democratic, that its political, economic, and social institutions were dominated by the Americo-Liberians or the descendants of the African-Americans who settled in the area that became Liberia in 1822. Their argument also implied that the Liberian leadership was illegitimate since it represented only the interests of a few Liberians.⁵⁹

The argument that emphasized the illegitimacy of the Liberian leadership also became the dominant theme of progressive Liberian intellectuals and activists such as Togba-Nah Tipoteh, Amos Sawyer, Anthony J. Nimley, Albert Porte, Dew Tuan-Wleh Mayson, and Baccus G. Matthews in the late 1960s and the 1970s.⁶⁰ Indeed, by the 1970s the effect of the "illegitimate argument" on the Liberian masses, especially Liberian high school and university students, market women, and urban dwellers, was considerable. They were persuaded by the argument put forward by the progressives and activists because substantial concrete evidence was provided to sustain it. It would be no exaggeration to

maintain that the "illegitimate argument" was among the forces that rallied the people of Liberia against the Liberian leadership in the late 1970s, and the violent overthrow of that leadership in a military coup led by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe on April 12, 1980.⁶¹

The military coup was to influence the dominant antitheses that have characterized most works on the political history of Liberia since the early 1800s in an ironic way. Those very progressive intellectuals and activists who had indicted the Liberian leadership during the pre-coup period now stressed the legitimacy of the new Liberian leadership that came to power immediately after the coup.⁶² This emphasis was heavily influenced by their mistaken assumption that the new leadership was a radical departure from the past. On the other hand, the conservatives who had defended the Liberian leadership before the coup now argued that the post-coup Liberian leadership was illegitimate.⁶³

The progressives, activists, and conservatives had, however, one serious deficiency in their arguments: they failed to take into consideration that the leaderships of Liberia from 1822 through the present have been products of the Liberian superstructure or synthesis of Liberian economic, political, social, and religious institutions. The preceding statement could be applied to the enduring capacity of the institutions in question.⁶⁴ Although the leadership of President William R. Tolbert, Jr. was violently overthrown in 1980, the Liberian social, economic, and political systems that had produced that leadership were not eliminated. Indeed, the leadership of President Samuel K. Doe that replaced the one led by President Tolbert was a manifestation of the synthesis of Liberian economic, political, social, and religious systems.⁶⁵

It must be maintained, however, that the opposing arguments⁶⁶ examined in this paper reflect Liberia's contradictions such as the support for sovereignty of the Liberian State by the Liberian elites and their opposition to popular democracy, or their promotion of the liberty of some Liberians at the expense of other Liberians. This argument could be well applied to America from 1783 to 1865. The coexistence of American slavery and American democracy from 1783 to 1865 bears testimony to this. Indeed, America did not extend its popular democracy to American women and to most black Americans until the twentieth century. Taking the above arguments into consideration, together with the fact that Liberia was established by Americans, it is reasonable to conclude that the studies of Liberia and of the United States have much in common.

Endnotes

¹ Quoted in Matthew T. Mellon, *Early American Views on Negro Slavery from the Letters and Papers of the Founders of the Republic* (Boston, 1934), pp. 97-98. See these works for detailed treatments of the Declaration of Independence: *Journal of the Continental Congress*, Vol. IV, p. 60; Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Indepen-*

dence: *A Study in the History of Political Ideas* (New York, 1922); Julian P. Boyd, *The Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text* (Princeton, 1945); and Duman Malone, *Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the Virginian*, Vol. I. (Boston, 1948).

² Quoted in Mellon, *Early American Views on Negro Slavery*, P.V. This theme is treated in detail in these works: Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*; Boyd, *The Declaration of Independence*; and Malone, *Jefferson and His Time*.

³ Mellon, *Early American Views on Negro Slavery*, p. 84; Becker, *The Declaration of Independence*, pp. 212–216; and Malone, *Jefferson and His Time*, pp. 215–231.

⁴ For the details of this argument see these works: George Livermore, *An Historical Research Respecting the Opinions of the Founding Fathers of the Republic on the Negroes as Slaves and Citizens and as Soldiers* (Boston, 1808), p. 93; H. A. Washington, ed.; *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. III (New York, 1904); Henry N. Sherwood, "Early Negro Deportation Projects," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, II (1916), pp. 484–495; Gaylord Hunt, ed. *The Writings of James Madison*, Vol. III (New York, 1910), pp. 135–136; Thomas Dew, *Lectures on the Restrictive System* ((Richmond, 1849); "Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832" in *Pro-Slavery Argument* (Philadelphia, 1853), pp. 451–461; Vernon Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of American Literature from the Beginning to 1920*, 3 vols. (New York, 1930); David B. Davis, *From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American Culture* (New York, 1986); and William L. Van Deburg, *Slavery and Race in American Popular Culture* (Madison, 1984); and Larry E. Tise, *Proslavery: A History of the Defense of Slavery in America. 1701–1840* (Athens, Georgia, 1987).

⁵ Sherwood, "Early Negro Deportation Project," pp. 484–495.

⁶ Thomas Jefferson had supported the colonization of blacks outside America possibly in Africa or the West Indies in the 1770s. For the details of this, see the following works: Philip Slaughter, *The Virginian History of Colonization* (Richmond, 1855), Chapter 4; Paul L. Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1892–1898), V. 1, pp. 67–68; V. 3, pp. 243–244; and Katherine Harris, *African and American Values: Liberia and West Africa* (Lanham, 1985), pp. xv–xvi; and Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia* (New York, 1781), p. 64. There were others who also supported the colonization of blacks in Africa in the 1780s and 1790s. For the details of this argument see these works: Carter G. Woodson, *The Negro in Our History* (Washington, 1941), p. 260; Gerald W. Mullin, *Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia* (New York, 1972), pp. 42–44; Theodore Draper, *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism* (New York, 1970), pp. 15–16; Sherwood, "Early Negro Deportation Project," p. 506; and Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill, 1971), pp. 546–551.

⁷ Harry Ammon, James Monroe, *The Quest for National Identity*, (New York, 1971), pp. 166–190; and Harris, *African and American Values*, p. 6.

⁸ For a detailed treatment of the origins of the ACS, see the following works: Sherwood, "Early Negro Deportation Project," pp. 484–495; "The Formation of the American Colonization Society," *Journal of Negro History* II (1917); Frederic Bancroft, "The Colonization of American Negroes, 1816–1865," in Jacob E. Cook, ed., *Frederic Bancroft Historian* (Norman, 1957), pp. 147–191; Charles I. Foster, "The Colonization of Free Negroes in Liberia, 1816–1835," *Journal of Negro History*, XXXVIII (1953); Early L. Fox, *The American Colonization Society 1816–1840* (Baltimore, 1919); Kent P. Opper, "The Minds of White Participants in the African Colonization Movement, 1816–1840," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1972); Eli Seifman, "A History of the New York Colonization Society," (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1965); Phil Sigler, "The Attitude of Free Blacks Toward Emigration to Liberia," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1969); Philip Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement 1816–1865*, (New York, 1961); Charles H. Wesley, "Lincoln's Plan for Colonization of the Emancipated Slaves," *Journal of Negro History*, IV (1919); Werner Wickstron, "The American Society and Liberia: An Historical Study in Religious Motivation and Achievement," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Hartford Seminary, 1949); Tom W. Shick, *Behold the Promised Land: A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth Century Liberia* (Baltimore, 1980); Harris, *African and American Values*; Lawrence J. Friedman "Purifying the White Man's Country: The American Colonization Society Reconsidered, 1816–1840," *Societas*, Vol 6 (1976), pp. 1–24; David M. Streifford "The American Colonization Society: An Application of Republican Ideology to Early Antebellum Reform," *Journal of Southern History* 45 (1979), pp. 316–341; Amos J. Beyan, *The American Colonization Society and the Creation of the Liberian State: A Historical Perspective, 1822–1900* (Lanham, 1991); Issa V. Brown, *Biography of the Reverend Robert Finley of Basking Ride NJ* (Philadelphia, 1857), pp. 93–99; and *Origin Constitution and Proceeding of the American Colonization Society*, Vol 1 (1816), pp. 1–9.

⁹ See Note 6.

¹⁰ *First Annual Report of the ACS* (1818), p . 5 .

¹¹ See Note 8.

¹² Frederic Bancroft, "The Colonization of American Negroes, 1816–1865"; Archibald Alexander, *A History of Colonization on the West Coast of Africa* (Philadelphia, 1846), p. 87. It must be pointed out that there were prominent non-Southern members of the ACS. Most of them were not, however, antislavery or abolitionists. For the details of this, see the following work: Tise, *Proslavery*; Fox, *The American Colonization Society*, pp. 46–125. See also Note 13.

¹³ J. Tracy, *A View of Exertions Lately Made for the Purpose of Colonizing the Free People of Color in Africa or Elsewhere* (Washington, 1817), pp. 4, 30; *African Repository*, Vol. 5 (1828), pp. 277–278, Vol. 9 (1833), p. 358; Alexander, *A History*, pp. 778 2; and William Jay, *Miscellaneous on Slavery* (New York, 1853), pp. 97–99. It was also emphasized by prominent members of the ACS that their movement would enhance slavery in America. For this emphasis see: Sherwood, "The Formation of the American Colonization Society," p. 213; *African Repository*, Vol. 1 (1825), p. 176, Vol. 3 (1827), pp. 67, 197, 201, and 202, Vol. 4 (1828), pp. 274, 344, Vol. 9 (1833) p. 59, and Vol. 11 (1835) p. 14; and Jesse Torrey, *A Portraiture of Domestic Slavery in the United States: With Reflection on the Practicability of Restoring the Moral Rights of the Slaves without Impending the Legal Privilege of the Possessors*. . . (Philadelphia, 1817), pp. 9, 10 and 69.

¹⁴ *First Annual Report of the ACS* (1818), p. 30.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Tenth Annual Report of the ACS* (1826), pp. 21–22.

¹⁷ The term intellectuals is used here to describe all those who have published on the ACS and Liberia.

¹⁸ For details of this argument see the following works: Lawrence W. Towner, "The Seward-Saffin Dialogue on Slavery," *William and Mary Quarterly* Vol. 21 (1964), pp. 40–52; William Knox, *Three Tracts Respecting the Conversion and Instruction of Free Indians and Negroes in the Colonies*. . . (London, 1768), pp. 28–30, 31–41; Richard Nisbet, *Slavery Not Forbidden by Scripture*. . . (Philadelphia, 1773), pp. 1–111, 1–30; Milton Cantor, "The Image of the Negro in Colonial Literature," *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 36 (1963), p. 453; and Theodore Parsons and Eliphalet Pearson, *A Forensic Dispute on the Legality of Enslaving the Africans Held at the Public Commencement in Cambridge, New England, July 2, 1773*, (Boston, 1773) p. 4. There were, however, others who argued that slavery was not a benevolent institution even during this period. For details of this argument see these works: John Hepburn, *The American Defense of the Christian Golden Rule* (New York, 1715), pp. 1–10, 14–15, 18; Thomas E. Drake, "Elihu Coleman, Quaker Antislavery Pioneer of Nantucket," in Howard H. Brinton, ed., *Byways in Quaker History*, (Wallingford, 1944), pp. 111–136; Benjamin Franklin, ed., *Benjamin Lay All Slave-Keepers that Keep the Innocent in Bondage, Apostates* (Philadelphia, 1737), pp. 64, 67–70, 74–78, 88–94; John Woolman, *Some Considerations on Keeping of Negroes: Recommendation to the Professor of Christianity*. (Philadelphia, 1754). Henry Johnson, ed., *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay* (New York, 1891), pp. 340–344; William Jay, *The Life of John Jay* (New York, 1833), p. 235; and Elihu Coleman, *A Testimony Against that Antichristian Practice of Making Slaves of Men in 1729–90* (Boston, 1733).

¹⁹ See Notes 6 and the following works for this shifting emphasis: Robert Walsh, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the United States of America*, (Philadelphia, 1819); Calvin H. Wiley, *A Safer View of the Slavery Question by a Citizen of the South* (n.d.); Friedman, "Purifying the White Man's Country," pp. 1-24; and Streifford, "The American Colonization Society," pp. 201-220.

²⁰ See Notes 6 and the following works for this shifting emphasis: Robert Walsh, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the United States of America*, (Philadelphia, 1819); Calvin H. Wiley, *A Safer View of the Slavery Question by a Citizen of the South* (n.d.); Friedman, "Purifying the White Man's Country," pp. 1-24; and Streifford, "The American Colonization Society," pp. 201-220.

²¹ Quoted in the *African Repository*, Vol. 1, (1825) p. 67. See also Note 13 for the proslavery position of some of the leading members of the ACS.

²² Quoted in the *African Repository*, Vol. 1, (1825) p. 67. See also Note 13 for the proslavery position of some of the leading members of the ACS.

²³ There were some who turned against slavery and the ACS because they believed that everything associated with them was morally wrong. For the position of these people see these works: Sigler, "The Attitude of Free Blacks Toward Colonization"; Samuel Cornish and Theodore S. Wright, *The Colonization Scheme Reconsidered in its Rejection by the Colored People*, (Newark, 1840); Jay, *Inquiry into the Character and Tendency* William L. Katz, ed., William Lloyd Garrison: *Thoughts on African Colonization* (New York, 1968); G. B. Stebbins, . . . *Origins Character and Influence of the American Colonization Society . . .* (Boston, 1853); and *The Resolution of the People of Color . . .* (New York, 1831). There were others, however, who opposed the ACS for mainly economic reasons. They argued that ACS was a threat to the very foundation of the economy of the South since according to them, its objective was to create a situation which would finally lead to the abolition of slavery in the South. For the above position, see the following works: Dew, "Review of the Debate in the Virginia legislature of 1831 and 1832"; Tise, *Proslavery*, pp. 65-74; and Zephaniah Kingsley, *A Treatise of the Patriarchal or Co-System of Society as It Exists in Some Government and Colonies in America and in the United States under the Name of Slavery, with its Necessity and Advantages*, 2nd ed. (n.p., 1829), pp. 11-111 and 5-10.

²⁴ Daniel Raymond, *The Missouri Question*, (Baltimore, 1819), pp. 3-9, 18-23, 25-26, and 27-29.

²⁵ These included Jay, *An Inquiry into the Character and Tendency*; Katz, ed., William Lloyd Garrison, Stebbins, *Origins Character and Influence of the American Colonization Society . . .* (Boston, 1853); *Resolution of the People of Color . . .*; and Cornish and Wright, *The Colonization Scheme Reconsidered*.

²⁶ Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790–1860* (Chicago, 1961), p. 25; Sigler, "The Attitude of Free Blacks Toward Emigration," and David Walker, *An Appeal* (1830), p. 50.

²⁷ Quoted in William Lloyd Garrison, *Thoughts on African Colonization* (Boston, 1832) pp. 9–10.

²⁸ Cornish and Theodore, *The Colonization Scheme Reconsidered*; and Garrison, *Thoughts on African Colonization*. For the few blacks who supported the ACS movement, see Carter G. Woodson, ed., *The Mind of the Negro as Reflected in letters Written during the Crisis 1800–1860* (Washington, D.C., 1926), pp. 1–158, and Sigler, "The Attitude of Free Blacks Toward Emigration."

²⁹ Quoted in Stebbins, . . . *Origins Character and Influence*, pp. 194–195.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ They were also among the first groups of African-Americans who sailed from America to West Africa in 1820s. It must be pointed out that the African-Americans who supported the ACS were in the minority. Indeed, only about 12,000 African-Americans actually settled in the area that became Liberia during the 148 years of existence of the ACS. For the details of this argument, see the following works: Woodson, ed., *The Mind of the Negro*, pp. 1–158; Sigler, "the Attitude of the Free Blacks Toward Emigration"; Floyd Miller, *The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Colonization and Emigration 1787–1863* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 54–90; G. Joseph Wachter, "Early Negro Colonization and America's West African Settlers of 1820–1822" (M.A. Thesis, Morgan State College, 1972); Fox, *American Colonization Society*; Shick, *Behold the Promised Land*; Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement*; and Slaughter, *Virginia History of African Colonization*.

³² Charles W. Thomas, *Adventure and Observations on the West Coast of Africa*. . . (New York, 1860); Frederick Freeman, *Yaradee: A Plea for Africa in Familiar Conservation on the Subject of Slavery and Colonization* (Philadelphia, 1836); Alexander, *A History of Colonization*; and Early Fox, *The American Colonization Society* (Baltimore, 1919); and Ralph R. Gurley, *Life of Jehudi Ashmun Late Colonial Agent in Liberia* (Washington, 1835); S. C. Armstrong, *Emigration to Liberia* (Washington, 1879); Jehudi Ashmun, *History of the American Colonization of Liberia from the Authentic Records of the Colony* (Washington, 1826); and *Memoir . . . of the Rev. Samuel Bacon* (Washington, 1822).

³³ Alexander, *A History of Colonization*, p. 218.

³⁴ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³⁵ See the following works for this argument: *Ibid.*; Freeman, *Yaradee: A Plea for Africa*; Fox, *The American Colonization Society*; Thomas, *Adventure and Observation*; and Joseph J. Robert, *The Republic of Liberia* (Washington, D.C., 1869);

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³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Cornish and Wright, *The Colonization Scheme Reconsidered*; Jay, *An Inquiry into the Character and Tendency*; Edmund Ruffin, *The African Colonization Unveiled* (n.d.); Stebbins, . . . *Origins of Character and Influence*; Garrison, *Thoughts on the African Colonization*; and Charles Stuart, *A Memoir of Granville Sharpe* (New York, 1836).

³⁸ John Hargreaves, "Liberia: The Price of Independence" in *Odu: A Journal of West African Studies*; Arthur Hayman and Harold Preece, *Lighting Up Liberia* (New York, 1943); Henry Reeve, *The Black Republic: Its Social and Political Conditions Today* (New York, 1923); Raymond L. Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival* (Philadelphia, 1947); Elizabeth J. D. Furbay, *Top Hats and Tom Toms* (Chicago, 1943); Reginald C. F. Maugham, *The Republic of Liberia* (London, 1920); Lady Dorothy Mills, *Through Liberia* (London, 1926).

³⁹ Hayman and Preece, *Lighting Up Liberia*; Reeve, *The Black Republic of Liberia*; and M. B. Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1822–1964" in the *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. VII (1973).

⁴⁰ Reeve, *The Black Republic of Liberia*, p. 54.

⁴¹ Liberia was accused by the League of Nations, Britain, and the United States in the late 1920s and the early 1930s of practicing domestic slavery. The charge became one of Liberia's most serious crises. Liberian President, Charles D. B. King and other leading members of his government were forced to resign as a result of the crisis. Indeed, Liberia would have lost its sovereignty to European powers as a result of the crisis had it not been for the outbreak of the Second World War and the renewed U. S. interest in that country. For an excellent evaluation of the crisis see I. K. Sundiata, *Black Scandal: America and Liberian Labor Crisis 1929–1936* (Philadelphia, 1980). See also my review of the above book in the *Liberian Studies Journal* XI, 1 (1986), pp. 93–94.

⁴² Sundiata, *Black Scandal*, pp. 85–86.

⁴³ A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonization* (Baltimore, 1987); E. D. Morel, *The Black Man's Burden* (London, 1920); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 1974); and Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Los Angeles, 1981).

⁴⁴ Sundiata, *Black Scandal*, p. 147.

⁴⁵ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 152

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵⁰ Nnamdi B. Azikiwe, *Liberia in World Politics* (London, 1935) p. 136.

⁵¹ Cited in Sundiata, *Black Scandal*, p. 151.

⁵² Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵³ For the Defense of Liberia see these works: Azikiwe, *Liberia in World Politics*; "In Defense of Liberia" *Journal of Negro History*, XVII, (1932), pp. 30–50; Edwin Barclay, "The Case of Liberia" *The Crisis*, XLI (1934), pp. 880–882. And for the condemnation of Liberia, see these works: Buell, "The Liberian Paradox" *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, VII (1933), pp. 161–175; Schuyler, *Slavery Today* (New York, 1931); and F. W. E. Morais, "The Liberian Natives Tell Their Story" *The Crisis* XLI (1934), pp. 272–273.

⁵⁴ Edmund Morgan, *American Freedom American Slavery*, (New York, 1975); "Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox" *Journal of American History*, LIX (1972); and Mellon, *Early American Views of Negro Slavery*.

⁵⁵ Sundiata, *Black Scandal*, pp. 147–148.

⁵⁶ See Note 43. See also the following works about the treatment of non-whites in the U. S. during the period before the 1960s: Ronald Takaki, ed., *From Different Shores: Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America* (New York, 1987), pp. 43–65, 83–93, and 105–125; *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th Century America* (New York, 1990) pp. 11–15, 42–54, 80–92, 108–109, and 175–181; Leonard Dinnerstein, Roger L. Nichols and David M. Reimers, *Natives and Strangers Blacks. Indians and Immigrants in America* (New York, 1990), pp. 5–10, 13–20, 30–32, 45–48, 64–68, 80–82, 196–197, and 199–208; Frank Tannenbaum, *Darker Phases of the South* (New York, 1924); Donald G. Nieman, *Promises to Keep: African-Americans and the Constitutional Order 1776 to the Present* (New York, 1991); Mary F. Berry and John W. Blassingame, *Long Memory: The Black Experi-*

ence in America (New York, 1982); and Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Boston, 1983).

⁵⁷ Sundiata, *Black Scandal*, pp. 127–155.

⁵⁸ See the following works for the details of this argument: Hanna A. B. Jones, "The Struggle for Political and Cultural Unification in Liberia, 1847–1930," Ph.D. Dissertation, (Northwestern University, 1962); Richard A. Henries, *Liberia: The West African Republic* (New York, 1958); John P. Mitchell, ed., *Changing Liberia: A Challenge to Christians* (Geneva, 1959); Nathaniel R. Richardson, *Liberia's Past and Present* (London, 1959); Charles Morrow Wilson, *Liberia*, (New York, 1947); _____, *Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm* (New York, 1971); Ernest Jerome Yancy, *The Republic of Liberia* (London, 1959); _____, *Historical Lights of Liberia Yesterday and Today* (Tel-Aviv, 1967); James C. Young, *Liberia Rediscovered* (New York, 1934); Doris Banks Henries, *The Liberian Nation* (London, 1967); Ernest Eastman, *A History of the State of Maryland in Liberia* (Monrovia, 1956); and Reginald Townsend, ed., *President Tubman of Liberia Speaks* (London, 1959).

⁵⁹ For the details of this argument see these works: Buell, "The Liberian Paradox"; M. B. Akpan, "Black Imperialism"; Parthenia Norris, "The United States and Liberia: The Slavery Crisis 1929–1935." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1961); Robert E. Cole, "The Liberian Elite as a Barrier to Economic Development," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1967); Dihdwo Twe, "Liberia: An American Responsibility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282 (1952); J. Gus Liebenow, "Liberia," in Gwendolyn M. Carter, ed., *African One-Party States* (Ithaca, 1962); Dwight Seyfert, "The Origins of Privilege in Liberia: Liberian Merchants, 1822–1847" *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. 18 (1975), pp. 109–125; Robert W. Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and A. A. Walters, *Growth Without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia* (Evanston, 1966); Furbay, *Top Hat and Tom-Toms*; J. Gus Liebenow, *The Evolution of Privilege* (Ithaca, 1969); and Jo Sullivan, "The Kru Coast Revolt of 1915–1916," *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. XIV (1989), pp. 51–71; and Yekutiel Gershoni, *The Americo-Liberians Scramble for the Hinterland* (Boulder, 1985).

⁶⁰ For a detailed explanation of this argument see these works: Anthony J. Nimley, *The Liberian Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Environment Structure and Functions* (Washington, 1977); Tuan Wreh, *The Love of Liberty: The Rule of President William V. S. Tubman in Liberia 1944–1971* (London, 1971); Stephen S. Hlophe, *Class, Ethnicity, and Politics in Liberia: A Class Analysis of Power Struggles in the Tubman and Tolbert Administrations from 1944–1975* (Washington, 1979); and Albert Porte, *Thinking About Unthinkable Things the Democratic Way* (Monrovia, 1967); Dew Tuan Wleh Mayson and Amos Sawyer, "Labour in Liberia" *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 14 (1980), pp. 3–15; and H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr., *The Diplomacy of Prejudice: Liberia in International Politics 1945–1970* (New York, 1985).

⁶¹ For the details of this argument see Liebenow, *Liberia: The Quest for D* (Bloomington, 1987); Joseph E. Holloway, *Liberian Diplomacy in Africa: A Study of Inter-African Relations* (Washington, D.C., 1981); and D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, *Liberia: A National Polity in Transition* (Metuchen, NJ, 1988).

⁶² Liebenow, *Liberia*, especially Part Two and Part Three.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Amos J. Beyan, "The American Colonization Society and the Origin of Undemocratic Institutions in Liberia in Historical Perspective," *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. XIV (1989), pp. 140150.

⁶⁵ For the details of this argument see Notes 60, 62; Beyan, *The American Colonization Society*; and Lawyers Committee, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York, 1986).

⁶⁶ It must be pointed out that there are works on Liberia's political history which cannot be correctly placed in the "legitimate or illegitimate" thesis category. D. Elwood Dunn's main emphasis has been on Liberia's foreign policies or foreign policy objectives in Africa. Recent studies by Professor George Kieh, Jr. deal with Liberia's diplomatic relations with other African countries and Israel, especially during the administration of President Samuel K. Doe. Professor Hassan B. Sisay's work treats Liberian/U.S. relations, especially during the period from 1923 to 1950. His main theme is similar to that of Professor Christopher Williams. For the details of the foregoing arguments see the following works: D. Elwood Dunn, *The Foreign Policy of Liberia During the Tubman Era 1944-1971* (London, 1979); "Vorster Visit to Liberia: Implications for Free Africa's Relations with Pretoria" *Liberian Studies Journal*, Vol. X (1982/1983), pp. 37-54; George K. Kieh, Jr., "The Conduct of Liberia's Foreign Policy during the Tolbert Administration: An Examination of the Instruments" *Liberian Studies Journal* Vol. X (1984-1985), pp. 39-51; "An Analysis of Israeli Repenetration of Liberia" *Liberian Studies Journal* Vol. XIV (1989), pp. 117-129; Hassan B. Sisay, *Big Power and Small Nations: A Case Study of United States-Liberian Relations* (Lanham, 1985); and Christopher Williams, "United States Relations with Liberia, 1940-1960," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1976). For a different perspective on Liberian political historical themes, see Clarence E. Zamba Liberty's "Growth of the Liberian State: An Analysis of Its Historiography," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1977. 320pp.

A Perspective on Psychological Disorders of Liberia *

Boikai S. Twe

At the crossroads of unity and disunity in Africa, African social scientists are morally obligated to help diagnose the psychosocial "dis-eases" contributing to disunity and self-destruction among Africans. This complex task can not be thoroughly dealt with in a single paper or form a single perspective, however this paper will attempt to contribute a limited psychological analysis of this complex problem. The paper is based on my personal and professional observations as a guidance counselor with the Urban Youth Council in Monrovia (1971-72), home visits and interviews in Monrovia during December 1979 and July 1986, and a recent trip to Freetown and Monrovia in December 1990 during a lull in the Civil War.

I believe that the majority of Africans are striving for a sense of self-unity, family-unity and national unity, yet social and mental disorders pervade Liberia and other regions of Africa today. It is my goal to demonstrate briefly how individuals in groups can gradually construct a social order which exists in their collective consciousness and in history. The perspective I adopt draws upon ancient African tradition of self-understanding and self-mastery which has been inscribed on the temples of Egypt¹ and the African World View which uses each African as the center and subject of African history².

I believe there are some lessons to be learned about the complex ethnic make-up of Liberia, the historical and psychological forces behind the cleavages, self alienation, anti-African feelings and self-destructive behaviors which came out in the open during the brutal civil war. Are our ethnic and national values today contributing to psychosocial disorders within and among ourselves? To correctly answer this question, we must retrieve our precolonial and preenslavement value systems and history which helped us to establish the great Western Sudanic Civilizations rooted in morality.³ How have enslavement and colonialism changed our ethnic values and national consciousness? Our history shows that Liberians have taken on a Euro-American consciousness and value system which have suppressed their sense of morality, national consciousness and self-determination.

Edward W. Blyden (1857) observed during the early development of Liberia that Liberians have a two-fold consciousness which has been shaped by indigenous African traditions and the legacy of enslavement. This two-fold consciousness of Liberians has never been adequately balanced because greater psychological identification was made with the cultural and economic interests of enslavement than with African traditions. This is a common psychological

defensive strategy of “blaming the victim” of social crimes and identifying more with the aggressor.⁴ This misidentification continues to undermine the mental health and behaviors of many Africans and Liberians specifically. Fundamentally, enslavement and colonialism alienated Africans from their traditions as the major authors of human history and first builders of human civilizations.⁵ Africans are today acting and reasoning like their Euro-American enslavers instead of like themselves. I agree with Naim Akbar (1981) who suggests that the history of enslavement and colonialism has produced four major categories of disorders among Africans:

1. Alien Self-disorder: Individuals who have been socialized to be other than themselves, and whose very lives and life styles represent a rejection of their natural African dispositions.
2. Antiself Disorder: Individuals who, in addition to being socialized to be other than themselves, identify with projected hostility and negativism towards his or her group of origin.
3. Self-destructive Disorder: Individuals who engage in self-defeating attempts to survive in a society that systematically frustrates normal efforts for natural human growth; out of an urgency for survival, these individuals have chose personally and socially destructive ways to alleviate immediate wants, despite the fact that these ways are often destructive and detrimental to one’s self and one’s community.
4. Organic Disorder: Individuals afflicted with conditions that are the result of physiological, neurological, or biochemical malfunction.

I believe that the resilience of African history and ethnicity has helped some Africans to minimize the impact of these disorders on their consciousness. However, there are many Africans who are unconscious of the cleavages and deformations in their minds resulting from Euro-American enslavement and colonialization. I will use Akbar’s classification system to discuss some of the unconscious forces and behaviors associated with each of the following disorders which I have observed among some Liberians.

Alien Self-Disorder

Enslavement and colonialism disconnected many Liberians from their traditional values and relationships. To reconnect their lives to a new sense of certainty and self-worth, many Liberians unconsciously adopted Euro-American values and view of the world, i.e., domination of others through warfare, seizure of natural resources and private accumulation of wealth. Others were voluntarily connected to Western values and economic interests as a result of missionary conversions. A gradual compliance with these dependent relationships and the desire for individualism, private property and wealth came to

dominate the thinking and behavior of many Liberians and Africans in general. This obsession with material accumulation and Western values has today become a major cause of the alien self-disorder.

In fact, Blyden (1857) observed Liberians after independence to be in a haste to be rich rather than to be faithful to collective responsibilities as citizens. This was due to a major economic objective of early Liberians, to stimulate free trade and agricultural production in order to maintain a Western-style state. This overwhelming desire to become Westernized, to be "kwii"⁶ and anti-African in life styles and values is still a pervasive disorder in Liberia and Africa today. This state of affairs is maintained even among indigenous groups through colonial-style education, economics and religious training in most parts of Liberia. This disorder manifests itself behaviorally in terms of disdain of manual labor, Euro-American cultural dependency, corruption, extravagance, materialism and superstitions. Such behaviors were most observable among the Americo-Liberian ruling class of the Tubman era and the Krahn-Military ruling class of the Doe era.

On the mental level, the alien self-disorder typically shows up as anxiety or panic attacks (the inability to feel safe in cooperative social situations), phobias (extreme fear of African cultural values and achievements which are reflected in indigenous languages, systems of thought, names and customs), obsessive-compulsive mental disorder (extreme reliance on magical charms and rituals), post-traumatic stress symptoms (reliving repressed traumatic memories), pain and anger associated with identity confusion. The person uses a great deal of energy and concentration to keep from dealing with past events and feelings. In fact, my observations and interviews of some Liberian government officials and University of Liberia students in December 1979 and July 1986 showed that it is difficult to become self-conscious of this disorder because people use much denial, repression and amnesia to avoid the situation.

Many Liberian elites exhibit the mind-set and behaviors associated with this disorder. In public, they will use fragments of African philosophy found in our proverbs i.e., "monkey work baboon draw" or "if you are pineapple, show your juice" without any critical thought or commitment to national responsibility and African moral traditions.⁷ In so doing, they give lip-service to African values with no personal commitments to African achievements, cultural unity and moral development. Their obsession with accumulating individual knowledge and wealth leads to a false sense of prosperity and security. The mental and physical health of these individuals are most often upheld by Western commodities, life styles, languages and religious symbols which are inconsistent with African self-development. There is paralysis, fear, trembling and sweating when they are faced with revolutionary or history-making activities. Many Liberians and other Africans are affected by the alien self-disorder which contributes to physical, mental and spiritual disunity and underdevelopment.

Antiself Disorder

The antiself disorder involves identifying with the weaknesses and negative attributes associated with one's self or group of origin. This type of disorder is based on our inhumane tendencies toward barbarism and "blaming the victim" in social conflict which have been encouraged by Euro-American established Churches and governments for the purpose of continuing mental disunity and neocolonialism. With the antiself disorder, suffering, poverty, violence and death are thought to be positive attributes of African tradition and life.

Based on my personal experience and professional observations, individuals suffering from the antiself disorder tend to be very socially conservative, highly religious and psychologically depressed. They believe they can not control outcomes or events in the future. Their thoughts are filled with self pity, feelings of inferiority and incompetence.

The effects of the antiself disorder have contributed to social hostilities in Liberia between the settlers and indigenes and in relations within each of these groups. There has been a history of hostilities between the people of Monrovia and those of other regions, between light-skin and dark-skin settlers, and between coastal and up-country indigenes,⁸ e.g., recent Krahn and Gio/Mano hostilities. This process of self-fragmentation and development of cleavages leads to further underdevelopment and disunity in African history. This disorder leads to ethnic wars, family break-ups, social exploitations and an affirmation of negative Euro-American stereotypes of Africans as "uncivilized," "tribal" and "heathen."

The internalization of the brutality and victimization of enslavement and colonialism is most evident in the mind-set of Liberian armed forces, who have been led by some of the most conceited and egotistic individuals in the world, e.g., Samuel K. Doe, Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, just to name three. Many of these Liberians have identified with the anachronistic and inhumane aspects of Liberian history.

James Baldwin (1962) correctly observed in *The Fire Next Time* that the horror of the enslavement experience has yet to be expressed in any language and has been denied or ignored in official and popular European speech. Africans, including Liberians, are crippling themselves by the uncritical acceptance of Euro-American speech and perception about who they are and what their history has been. This power of Western definition is undermining African mental health and leadership in world history. African culture, languages and sciences have been underdeveloped and in many cases rejected by many Liberians because they were defined by Europeans and Americans as "uncivilized" and "heathen." This disorder is a major obstacle to personal and national development because it promotes alienation from African history and

culture and hostility toward one's African makeup. It is not unusual to hear indigenous Liberians calling their relatives and friends "countrymen," "heathens" or "uncivilized."

In the United States, Liberian residents show greater signs of the antiself disorder which prevent them from developing strong national associations to deal with the social disunity and reconstruction they are faced with. The social and racial stratification systems in the United States seem to promote African hostilities and competition which contribute to the high rate of Black-on-Black violence. This prevents most Liberians in the USA from developing unity and identity with other Africans outside of their own social-economic status.

On a mental level this disorder shows up in terms of depression—a feeling of loss, hopelessness, meaninglessness and recurrent thoughts of death and suicide. I believe, this is the most serious disorder facing Liberians today, especially Liberian women and children. These two groups have suffered the greatest losses during the civil war, e.g., the most infamous being the 1990 Lutheran Church massacre of about 800 women and children and the 1993 Harbel massacre of about 500 women and children in a refugee camp.

Self-destructive Disorder

According to Niam Akbar (1981), in a society that frustrates normal efforts for natural human growth, out of a need to survive, individuals will choose personally and socially destructive ways to achieve their immediate wants. These self-defeating patterns of behaviors may be detrimental to one's self and one's community, i.e., ethnic and political murders, corruption and excessive abuse of drugs. Many individuals suffering from the self-destructive disorder seek outlets as criminals, armed personnel or foreign agents. The exploitation and violence against children, women and elders by those suffering from this disorder, makes this psychological problem even more tragic, e.g., the secret ritualistic killings of mostly women and children, extracting body parts from living people, washing charms in human blood to ensure victory and wealth. All of these practices came out in the open as a result of the civil war. These disordered individuals tend to be drug abusers and are more likely to engage in serious crimes against the government and innocent people. This lack of respect and value for African life and reciprocity is the current mental state of many Liberians and Africans today.

Self-destructive behaviors are the most visible signs of unresolved self-hate and feelings of hopelessness and meaninglessness. To rehabilitate these individuals, they must be placed in national rites of passage experiences and psychosocial skills development centers, where they can learn to develop themselves and their community through discipline, work habits, appropriate attitudes and relationships with traditional African authority and order. Afri-

can communities most affected by self-destructive behaviors, like Liberia, must be restructured to socialize all its citizens with selected African traditions and equitable and fair distribution of national and community resources.

Organic Disorder

Ultimately, we know from research and professional experience that psychological problems and disorders tend to contribute to physiological, neurological or biochemical malfunctions. Because of the civil war and current social instabilities in Liberia today, the increased prevalence of stress-related diseases, such as hypertension, ulcers, asthma, and migraine headaches, as well as schizophrenia, drug addiction, post-traumatic stress disorders and suicides must be expected. Additionally, the crowded and unsanitary conditions of refugee camps and Monrovia will continue to contribute to the spread of common infectious diseases including the dreaded AIDS. (The 1992 World Health Organization report suggested that 8–10% of women in Monrovia have been diagnosed as being HIV positive.)

Since the onset of the civil war, the high level of violence has resulted in more than 250,000 deaths, according to a personal report by Bishop W. Nah Dixon (1992), Vice chairperson of the first All-Liberian Conference held in Banjul, Gambia, 1990. Free unprotected sex, drug abuse and destruction of private and government institutions which sustain life have left most Liberians vulnerable to diseases and death. In this state of uncertainty, people are taking greater risks with their mental and physical health. Women and children who have been most affected by the war will need the greatest and most immediate attention by all governmental and non-governmental agencies.

Conclusion

This brief paper has attempted to identify some of the psychosocial factors involved in the Liberian Civil War and some of the common psychological disorders affecting Africans. The intention has been to contribute to a deeper understanding of how our attitudes, perceptions and actions have been shaped by African traditions and the legacies of enslavement and colonialism. The roots of the Liberian crisis are more complex than I could represent in this brief paper. However, the people of Liberia and Africa, as a whole, need to develop a more conscious social order which will ensure greater traditional balance in education, religion, resource distribution, and self-development.

I believe the development of a new psychosocial order or balance among Liberians and Africans in general will only be possible if the following preconditions have been met: 1) African economic unity and a collective defense force which are exemplified in the ECOWAS peace plan and military intervention in Liberia; 2) grassroots redistribution of African resources with the greatest

amount going to improve the health and economic conditions of African women and children; and 3) the establishment of community centers or traditional training programs in which men, women and children will be trained in indigenous arts and sciences, languages, systems of morality and selected technical skills as it is traditionally done in the Poro and Sande secret societies.⁹ Africans must be sure to engage in critical thought about their traditions so that they may select, preserve and build on the best of what Africa has achieved and produced.

Endnotes

* An essay which we hope will stimulate discussion and lead to comments in the form of "Letters to the Editor." *The Editor*

¹ See George G.M. James (1954). *Stolen Legacy*: The Greeks were not the authors of Greek Philosophy, but the people of North Africa, commonly called the Egyptians. (London, England: African Publication Society). James shows that self-knowledge and self-mastery were expressed in the ancient African doctrine of "know thy self" and are important parts of the philosophy of African redemption.

² See Cheikh Anta Diop (1989). *Cultural Unity of Black Africa*. (London, England: Karnak House). In this work Diop presents empirical evidence of an African World View as distinct from an Aryan (European) World View. Molefi Kete Asante (1989) in *Afrocentricity* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press) also argues that the African World View is the important "centerpiece of human regeneration." Both authors argue for the centrality of Africans in ancient and modern world history.

³ See Adu Boahen (1986). *Topics in West African History*. (Essex, England: Longman). In this work Boahen identifies African moral traditions which lead to the establishment and maintenance of the great Western Sudanic States and Empires.

⁴ See William Ryan (1972), *Blaming the Victim*, (New York: Vintage Book) for a good understanding of this psychological defensive attribution. This defensive thinking of blaming the victims in social crisis is associated with the common belief that we live in a "just world," where evil is always punished and good is always rewarded. Based on this "just world" belief, if you are victimized, it is believed that you are being punished for past evil.

⁵ George G. M. James (1954). *Stolen Legacy*.

⁶ The term "kwii" is used throughout Liberia to refer to the lifestyles of Westernized or educated people.

⁷ See John S. Mbiti (1969). *African Religion and Philosophy*, (London, England: Heinemann) for a good study of some of the common traditional systems of beliefs which have evolved in various societies of Africa.

⁸ See Amos Sawyer (1992). *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia*, (San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies) for a good history of how competing political groups have struggle to constitute and dominate Liberian society.

⁹ The Poro and Sande secret societies have existed as traditional institutions of authority in most Mel- and Mande-speaking societies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

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George Klay Kieh, Jr., *Dependency and the Foreign Policy of a Small Power: The Liberian Case*. San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992. xxiii, 204 pp. 57 tables, 3 figures, bibliography, index

George Kieh's book is a very interesting application of the dependency theory of interstate relations to Liberia during the Tolbert regime (1971-1980.) The reaction of readers to the work will depend in good measure on what they think of the dependency or the broader "globalist" perspectives, which although well known, are not yet considered mainstream by international relations theorists.¹ (The perspectives may be gaining ground among Africanists, however.²)

Kieh begins by looking at some of the contemporary problems in the field of foreign policy analysis, and concludes that dependency theorists such as Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank³ have a lot to offer students of small states such as Liberia. His basic thesis is that Liberia is part of the *periphery* in a capitalist world-system dominated by the core areas of the world, which engage in advanced economic activities such as manufacturing, banking, mechanized agriculture, ship-building, and the like. The periphery or dependent areas provide the raw materials and unskilled labor for the core, and are denied advanced technology if that might make the periphery country competitive with the core. Internal conditions within periphery countries such as class alliances, the structure of land tenure, and the role of the state are important in the maintenance of the entire system, with the role of an elite "comprador" or national bourgeoisie class being a pivotal one. The self-serving comprador class is allied with the core interests in North America, Europe, and Japan, and may well have more in common with the elites of the core capitalist areas than with their fellow citizens in the periphery country.⁴

Professor Kieh's work attempts to demonstrate the relevancy of the dependency paradigm to Liberia by comparing Liberia's economic dependency on specific core countries to its foreign policy behavior during the Tolbert regime with respect to the same individual countries. "Economic dependency" is measured by analyzing aid, investment, and trade patterns, and foreign policy "agreement" is measured by votes in the United Nations General Assembly during the 1970's. To set the stage for this analysis, Kieh spends three chapters reviewing the historical evolution of Liberia, its political institutions, and the "conditioning processes" through which both the comprador class and the masses are brainwashed into accepting their economic exploitation and subservience to the core areas. Kieh's perspective leads him to view every aspect of Liberian society through the prism of class struggle, leading to many provocative but to this reviewer overly simplistic assessments. (E.g., the major function of Westernbased "Christian sects" in Liberia has been to "...ensure the maintenance and survival of the capitalist system...by justifying capitalist class relations as being 'divinely ordained.'" [p. 93]; Liberian

students pursuing graduate studies in Western countries are "narcotized with Western values and norms," and thus drugged, they return home to help solidify the patron-client relationship between Liberia and the metropole [p. 102].) The author's t for ideological hyperbole also occasionally leads to internal contradictions, such as when he claims that the Liberian educational system is "one of the major superstructures" upon which the state rests, and is "essentially an arena for the reproduction of capitalist class relations" (p. 97), wherein students are "indoctrinated with capitalist values, . . . and brainwashed to believe that non-capitalist systems are alien, atheistic and undemocratic" (p. 100). Unfortunately for his t, in another section, Kieh explains low literacy rates in the country by stating that the Liberian government has a "n t attitude towards education" (p. 67).

Kieh obviously makes gross exaggerations and oversimplifications to help make his points—which are often quite valid—but the net result for this reviewer was to give the impression that the author thinks that all Liberian intellectuals, business owners and managers, ch professionals, students, etc. (i.e., anyone not in the peasant or working classes) are without exception either total puppets of the foreign "core" interests, or not intelligent enough to realize that they are indeed helpless pawns caught in the web of the all-powerful world capitalist forces.

When Kieh gets to his quantitative analysis and begins discussing the many tables of data such as foreign aid or debt, he drops most of the gratuitous simplifications and ideological claims, and makes a good case for his central thesis concerning the economic dependency of Liberia. His discussion of voting patterns in the UN is especially interesting, although counting the Peoples' Republic of China as part of the " ' bloc along with the USSR, Romania, and East Germany does seem a bit questionable. Replication of Kieh's statistical findings will be made difficult by the lack of an appendix with the raw data. Some of the many tables seem irrelevant, and there are a few factual and 'cal errors—e.g., a missing footnote on p. 190 .

Kieh indicates in his first chapter that his method of demonstrating Liberia's periphery status is one which combines quantitative and traditional/normative methodologies. He delivers on his promise, but unfortunately his book, which is a revision of a doctoral dissertation for Northwestern University, ends up with some of the drawbacks of both approaches. Still, the work reflects an enormous amount of data-gathering, is generally well written and produced, and is a welcome effort to go beyond mere description. The fact that much of the normative commentary is couched in polemical structuralist terminology unfortunately detracts from Kieh's empirically-based analysis in the latter part of the brief book.

Endnotes

¹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism Globalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 468.

² See, for example, Ralph Austen, *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1987), and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy," *African Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (April 1974): 1-26.

³ Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) and Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).

⁴ A good brief review of the dependency / globalism thesis is in Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, pp. 455-75. For a more comprehensive recent commentary, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.)

Charles W. Hartwig
Arkansas State University

Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History*. University Press, Cambridge 1992. XIII, pp. 171

Post-modernism now seems to have come to scholars concerned with oral history as Elizabeth Tonkin so elegantly portrays the new approach to eliciting the past. In sum, she advocates if I read her correctly, that since history and actors experiences are always in-flux the best elicitation is evaluation of the authority of the teller, in the context of the audience situation based on an appropriate genre. This is very much in fashion with reflexive, post-modern anthropology. In reaching this conclusion she relies heavily on her field research among the Kru of Liberia, but draws on comparative examples of orality from various parts of the world.

After indicating in the introduction that she was motivated to write the book because of the great complexity of Kru oral narratives, which westerners have too often assumed could be associated only with literacy, she goes on to show the intricate articulation of Jlaor oral literature to social structure and history. In a second chapter Professor Tonkin discusses how the tellers of tales have

difficulty in separating their own experiences from what they understand of the past, creating a personal identity inseparable from the history of the group. In chapters three and four she demonstrates, however, that the authoritativeness of the narrator depends on the genre, which she defines as "patterned expectations", and his/her contextual relationships to the audience. Moreover, the historical time presented in a narrative must be in keeping with the world view of the listeners.

It is in chapters five, six and seven that Tonkin really comes to the theoretical heart of her presentation. In a chapter concerning the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity she questions the very existence of objectivity in either recorded or oral history. Scholars of African history in general, Jan Vansina in particular, are called into question for their attempts to get at African traditions by avoiding reminiscences and attempting to establish reliability, based on eye-witness accounts of historical events. She argues, quite plausibly, that all oral accounts contain historical material, but it must be interpreted. Historians concerned only with reconstructing institutions from oral history ignore the personal dilemmas of African narrators in choosing among historical alternatives which are implicit, rather than explicit in the narrative. For Tonkin the key issue is that of the conditions evoking the memory of a narrator and the genre in which the narration is presented. Just as there is no "steady state" in social relations, so the past being acted upon by people is always in flux. Thus what constitutes history is the material that a teller is using in dialogue with an audience in the present. History, in effect, is what the teller and audience agree that it is "now" and will vary from one context, teller, and audience to another.

Tonkin admits, however, that the emphasis on the "now" raises questions about the validity of this approach in portraying the past. In chapter six she seeks to deal with the problem by relating memory to genre. Because narrators and their societies are linked, the repetition and patterning of an oral tale causes it to become a genre. This seems to mean that to the extent the two are compatible, as indicated in the audience acceptance of a narrative, the memory of the narrator is a valid representation of the past. This privileging of individual volition stands in opposition to the attempt to objectify cognition by the Durkheimian and later by Levi-Strauss. Tonkin explicitly rejects the idea of any form of collective consciousness or universal structuring of thought.

Since, however, narrators must choose from a number of alternative memories it becomes crucial for her to deal with this problem of selection. In so doing she examines the whole process of socialization of the individual. The latter, Tonkin argues, is not a mere receptacle to be filled with information by elders and others in authority, but a person actively interacting, choosing, accepting and rejecting within his/her social milieu. In fact the life cycle is a process by which the individual lives in many groups, as both subject and agent, experiencing both continuity and discontinuity in the development of cognition, personal

history, and memory. To clarify her position she draws upon Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" which refers to the individual as developing a structure of flexible dispositions which tie together past experiences, enabling one to draw analogies from the past in adapting to changing situations. In effect people recall meanings and forms which help them develop new meanings and forms in changing situations. Interacting in groups throughout the life cycle, their memories of these varying group experiences constitute a perceived history which binds them as individuals to the group. The validity of this perception is determined by the extent to which a personal historic narration is recognized as an acceptable genre, by the group as audience.

Nevertheless, it is curious to this reviewer that in the last chapter, concerned with the authenticity of these personal histories, Tonkin seems to suggest that the triadic process of cognition-history-memory should have a form of continuous flow in a "responsible" and "moral" world. The development of memory and thought processes over time is as much unconscious as conscious for non-literate peoples. And when they are forced to convert their thinking into words, by subordinating themselves to a formal educational system, they are forced to make "cognitive leaps" that are totally incompatible with their previous life experiences. But couldn't non-literate peoples, despite the incompatibilities and discontinuities of the formal learning situation, continue to draw analogies from their past experiences, so as to make sense of the change to literacy? Cultural disjuncture need not lead to the exclusion of cultural continuity. Here Tonkin might well have consulted Sahlin's recent work on the "structure of conjuncture", where he shows how quite dissimilar cultural structures may accommodate through a process of reinterpretation [1985; 1988].

In sum, Tonkin has provided an enlightening and stimulating thesis of how oral narratives are developed, rather than dealing with the problem of the extent to which they constitute reliable, historical, evidence. As she suggests in the final chapter, however, it is how oral narratives are constructed which must be understood before the content can be evaluated. Moreover, reconstructing the "distant past" was only of slight interest to her Liberian colleagues who were more concerned with variable, contemporary, historical accounts relating to political considerations. This is of course, often different from the interests of the anthropologist and historian who must seek for some consensus in oral narratives to reconstruct institutions, if they are to make any form of comparative analysis.

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John H. Hamer

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Recent Publications and Theses

Baldwin, Lindley, *Samuel Morris: The African Boy God sent to prepare our American University for its mission to the world*. Bethany House Publishers, Minneapolis, MN, 1993. (First published 1942 in the "Men of Faith" series) [Before his Christian conversion, Samuel Morris (1872-1893) was known as Prince Kaboo. A Liberian, he came to the U.S. in the 1880's for pastoral training and became a leading light at Taylor University.]

Brooks, George E., *Landlords and Strangers: Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000-1630*. Westview Press, 1993. 360pp.

Fyle, Hilton (Director), "The Liberia Tragedy" [A video that focuses the Liberian conflict, it features archival footage and interviews with Liberian and Nigerian journalists and former government officials, NPFL leader Charles Taylor, and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Bush Administration]. 1991, color, 58 minutes. Purchase: \$295; Rental \$75 (The Cinema Guild, 1697 Broadway, Suite 506, New York, NY 10019-5904).

Greenwood, Ralph, "The Presidency of William V. S. Tubman, President of Liberia, 1944-1971," Ph.D. thesis, Northern Arizona University, 1993. 272p.

Grimes, Charlotte, *The Five Martyrs of Charity* [An account of the Ministries of Roman Catholic Nurses murdered in Liberia in 1992], published by the Roman Catholic Church of Liberia, October, 1993, 45 pp.

Porter, James E., "Internal Balancing and Alignment with the U.S.; The cases of Kenya, Liberia, and Zaire", PhD John Hopkins, 93/94?

Sevareid, Peter, "The Case of the Unreturned Goat: Dispute Resolution by a Mano Court in Liberia," *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1993, pp. 61-75.

Walters, Joseph J., *Guanya Pau: A Story of an African Princess*. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 1994. 112 p. [Novel written by a Vai-Liberian who received a B.A. degree from Oberlin College in 1893.]

Applications for Editor, *Liberian Studies Journal*

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Letter to the Editor

422 Harmony Road
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January 21, 1994

Dr. D. Elwood Dunn
Editor, *Liberian Studies Journal*
Department of Political Science
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Dear Mr. Editor:

I would like to commend the four authors of the article, "Higher Education in Liberia: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", (Dr. Melvin Mason, Dr. Henrique F. Tokpa, Mr. E. Othello Gongar, and Dr. G. Ansu Mason), *Liberian Studies Journal*, xviii, 1 (1993) for their interesting contribution to much needed literature on higher education in Liberia. Their efforts are deeply appreciated, especially as their task must have been rendered difficult in view of problems connected with access to primary source material as a result of the Civil War in Liberia and its aftermath. I do, however, have several problems with the article, and as I have spent most of my professional life working in higher education in Liberia (1956-1984), at the institution at the apex of higher education in the country, the University of Liberia, I have felt that it would be amiss if I did not offer a few critical comments on the article.

A major concern of the article is "restructuring the institutions of higher learning to make them more effective in the areas in which they have the comparative advantage." (p.11) In other words, responsibility is to be apportioned among these institutions to produce graduates in varying specializations for participation in the modern sector of the nation. I consider this a restrictive role for higher education in Liberia, especially at this difficult period in the life of our country. Higher education should have a broader role, but it is not my intention to dwell on this. I have expressed my position elsewhere, admittedly for the African continent as a whole. I have indicated that the African university has the twin responsibility of fostering cultural development and achieving modernization, which means that it must interlink its traditional and modern worlds. ("The University in Modern Africa: Toward the Twenty-first Century", *Journal of Higher Education*, July to August, 1990, pages 363-385.)

For the issues I would like to discuss, let me begin with the review of higher education in Liberia, for I believe a fair assessment of education at this level in

the country is necessary to give an accurate picture of the accomplishments of higher education in the country. This would enable those concerned with higher education, especially Liberian professionals, to define its course for the future, working from realities rather than rely too heavily on direction from foreign institutions and professionals. Here the article falls short, partly because of inaccuracies and partly because it does not provide information in keeping with the relative positions of the institutions at this level.

Let me give a couple of examples. The article states that higher education "was directly under the Ministry of Education." (page 1). By law, the University of Liberia was always excepted from the direction and supervision of the Ministry of Education. Its charter provides for a Board of Trustees. In practice, steps to move this institution to autonomy were in full stride during the 1960's and the resulting gains to the institution can easily be cited. Cuttington University College also has a charter which gives it independence from the Ministry of Education and places it under an independent Board of Trustees. Public post-secondary institutions, like the Zorzor Rural Teacher Training Institute and the Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute, whose programs at this level began in the 1970's as extensions of these institutions established as secondary schools in the 1960's for training primary school teachers, were under the direction of the Ministry of Education. That is no doubt true for other institutions (Mission schools), whose post-secondary school programs developed similarly in the 1970's and 1980's from existing secondary schools, for example, Ricks Junior College, Monrovia College Junior College, A.M.E. Zion Junior College, College of West Africa Junior College (this latter short-lived tertiary education program in an earlier period having run only from about 1898-1908).

The article rightly states that the Government is the largest funding source of higher education in the country and lists as other sources tuition and fees, donors, alumni, and fund-raising campaigns (page 3). Other income-generating sources which were already being utilized by the University of Liberia, such as interest income, funds from rental of real estate and University facilities, and research are omitted, as is endowment (the University had a small one). More critical than this omission are the erroneous comparative statements regarding the financing of higher educational institutions in the country and the implications drawn therefrom. For example, based on D. Windham's "Economic and Financial Analysis of Liberian Human Resources Development" in *Liberian Education and Training Sector Assessment*, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Monrovia, 1983, the authors state that "in the early 1980's, the government provided 67% of Cuttington University College's budget and 100% of the University of Liberia's budget." (p.4). At no time has the Government provided 100% of the University's budget, as tuition and fees were always charged by the University of Liberia. I speak first-hand on this, which is corroborated in the study of William Saint of the World Bank, *Universities in Africa: Strategies for*

Stabilization and Revitalization, World Bank Technical Paper Number 194, p. 45. As stated by Saint, "The universities of Sierra Leone and Liberia have a long-standing tradition of charging fees for all university services, including tuition." In fact, governmental support of the University of Liberia declined between 1979 and 1981 even though enrollment increased, and the government's contribution to the University's recurrent budget of 1982 was less than in 1981, even as the University made operational a modern fully equipped science complex at its Fendall campus. A memorandum from the President of the University of Liberia, dated September 8, 1982, (page 2) called this to the attention of the Government of Liberia. The University was, nevertheless, able to move forward during those years because of its capacity to generate income from sources already specified. No doubt, the armed assault on the University of Liberia Monrovia campus on August 22, 1984, by the Armed Forces of Liberia, on orders of the Head of State of the then military government, caused a decline in the institution's capacity for income-generation.

Unfortunately, the article relies heavily on the 1983 sector assessment, mentioned in the preceding paragraph. This assessment was to have been carried out jointly by the USAID which provided substantial funding for it, the relevant Governmental ministries and institutions in the sector. There were problems which violated the spirit of the assessment, manifested in the altering of the higher education section of the report as originally drafted. The University of Liberia elected to disassociate itself with the report. More revealing is the fact that the higher education specialist contracted by the USAID for the assessment, Dr. Robert W. Hannah, then Vice President for Governmental Relations, Western Michigan University, disassociated himself with the report as well as the assessment. Writing from Kalamazoo, Michigan, on December 22, 1982, to Ms. Joan Claffey of the USAID, Washington, D.C., Dr. stated:

"... My original document has been shamelessly altered and bears no resemblance in format, attitude or conclusions to that I left with you in Liberia.

This letter officially disclaims *any* responsibility for it. I request in the strongest terms that my name *not* be associated with it in any manner and not appear as a member of the assessment team.

To lend my name to judgmental statements of dubious integrity; to absolutely ignorant use of comparative data on University cost and faculty/student ratio's; and to questionable conclusions, as are rampant in the current version, is beyond tolerance. . ."

Let me move to recommendations for the future, but before doing so, I must draw attention to the gender insensitivity evidenced by the use of the term,

manpower, throughout the article rather than neutral terms such as persons, graduates, or skilled personnel.

Back to recommendations, I applaud the desire for coordination of efforts at this level, but this demands more than the simple treatment it has received. A few specializations are dealt with, for example, teacher education, agriculture, vocational/technical education, law, engineering, and medicine. Also, attention is paid to five of the sixteen post-secondary education institutions listed in the appendix to the article: University of Liberia, Cuttington University College, Tubman Technical College, Zorzor Rural Teacher Training Institute, and Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute. The article is silent regarding other specializations and other post-secondary education institutions. It does make reference to Booker Washington Institute (BWI), although BWI is not included in the list of "Diploma Granting Institutions in Liberia in 1990" which appears in the appendix. Notably absent from the list also is the Tubman Institute of Medical Arts (established in 1945), the oldest of the two and three-year post-secondary education institutions in the country. Further, the article is silent with regard to the great majority of specializations being offered by the higher education institutions.

Regarding the recommendations for apportioning responsibility among the higher education institutions, I wonder what is the basis for determining comparative advantage—Faculty, students, facilities, level of offering, research capability, situation of the institution, or a combination of these? If the latter is applied to agriculture, I fail to see how comparative advantage can be taken away from the University of Liberia College of Agriculture and Forestry. Up to 1984, this College had a highly trained Faculty, a large percentage of whom were nationals whose first degree was from the College; the largest enrollment of students in this specialty; the only offerings in this specialty in the country at the Bachelor's level, and plans for beginning graduate programs at the Master's degree level; extensive laboratory facilities and an Agricultural Extension Training Center; on-going research relevant to Liberia; and proximity to the well-equipped laboratories of the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), located for years on the University of Liberia Fendall property where the College is located. There is also a Forestry section to the College which has the only Forestry Products Research Laboratory in the region of the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea). Shifting to the proposal for conversion of the College's agriculture facilities for use in engineering, there should be no need since the University had almost completed a new engineering facility by the time of the 1984 University crisis referred to earlier.

I believe the nation would be better served if appropriate relationships are established between the University of Liberia, Cuttington University College, and the other institutions at this level; if opportunities are explored for cooperative efforts on pressing problems such as peace and reconstruction; empower-

ment of the majority of the nation's people; improvement of the educational system and better articulation between the levels of the system; sharp reduction of illiteracy; improvement of the health delivery system; and the development of the agriculture sector. Indeed, opportunities must be created for cooperation among the institutions, sharing knowledge and expertise not merely for teaching and producing graduates but also for _____ and service to the nation and its people. Given the critical needs in agriculture, there should be concerted action among all the institutions equipped to contribute to agricultural development. This means that not only should the University of Liberia and Cuttington University College continue and extend their work in agriculture, but they should involve other institutions, where possible. Further, these two institutions should focus not merely on producing graduates, but also on _____ and service.

Very truly yours,

(signed)

Mary Antoinette Brown

[The writer was President of the University of Liberia, 1978-1984—Editor]

**Africa Bureau moves to 'mirror' what Clinton, Christopher want
[Excerpt from *State*, a publication of The U.S. State Department,
Sept. 1993, pp. 3-4]**

The Bureau of African Affairs has reorganized itself in a way that "mirrors the priorities of this administration," according to Assistant Secretary George E. Moose. But not just according to him. According also to Deputy Secretary Clifton R. _____, Jr., who praises "the spirit and the letter" of this restructuring while at the same time acknowledging that some bureaus might have responded differently to the challenge of "re-inventing" themselves.

Shorn of one of its deputy assistant secretaries, the Africa bureau has assigned a new set of responsibilities to the remaining three. The senior deputy, Ed Brynn, has the geographic offices (all of them) reporting to him. The two other deputies now have functional responsibilities-Prudence Bushnell having taken on a new global affairs portfolio, and a third deputy, yet to be named, to be in charge of economic matters, with emphasis on service to the American business community.

"Look, this administration has articulated a vision," Mr. Moose says. "Taking precedence now over the old cold war concerns are the global problems associated with human rights, refugees, the environment, terrorism, narcotics, and so forth. And Secretary Christopher speaks of an 'American desk' at State

to help strengthen the American economy. If we're to do justice to these priorities, then we have to find a structure that mirrors them."

The new bureau setup also aims to respond to the Christopher policy statement that decision-making authority be pushed downward in the hierarchy, with more autonomy for office directors and desk officers. "We had a situation where an increasing number of responsibilities were drifting upward to the deputy assistant secretaries, most of whom had regional responsibilities," Mr. Moose says, "and now we want to reverse that. With this new structure, there's no other way for it to go. We've told the office directors that they'll become the locus for policy development, implementation, and coordination."

"The people coming into those slots are going to be senior officers who for the most part have been chiefs of mission in the field. This should help us in inter-agency matters, too. While State doesn't have too many assets in that area, it does have at least one—which is people with the title of ambassador."

"As to the desk officers, they're the point persons. We want them to strengthen communications and consultation with the field, where most of the people of this bureau are."

"The global responsibilities that Prudence Bushnell has were never grouped together before in this bureau. It's going to be her job, too, to match our policy objectives with our resources, and she'll oversee the bureau's program plan exercise. Ed Brynn, of course, is the chief operating officer, running the day-to-day bureau operations and crisis management."

"Right now, I'm looking in the private sector to fill the third deputy assistant secretaryship. With that person having responsibility for trade promotion and outreach to the business community, I believe the deputy might have more credibility with those people if he or she has a similar background."

"We're not finished here yet. We're looking at the regional affairs office, for instance, to find ways to ensure that those folks will have a functional agenda both on the economic side and for global affairs. All this is the vision that we have—I wouldn't tell you that we're there yet."

"I think you can see that, for our bureau, the changes that we had to make were reasonably modest—really small potatoes compared with what, say, Politico-Military Affairs or International Organization Affairs has to do. I'm glad I'm not one of those bureaus."

His service on the "State 2000" task force (*State*, March), which provided a model for the Department-wide reorganization, has helped him to grapple with the issues in the Africa bureau, Mr. Moose says.

**Meeting of the Liberian Parties in Monrovia
15 February 1994
Communique**

The Liberian parties to the Cotonou Agreement of 25 July 1993 met on Tuesday 15 February 1994, in Monrovia. The meeting was facilitated by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, and the OAU Eminent Person, former President Canaan Banana. Also in attendance was a delegation from Benin representing President Soglo, current President of ECOWAS, led by Minister Theodore Holo, and the ECOMOG Field Commander, Major General John Imeager.

The following representatives of the Liberian parties were present at the meeting:

For IGNU

Mr. Roosevelt G. Jayjay	Member	of Delegation
Mr. Conmany B. Wesseh	Member	
Dr. Abdoulaye Dukule	Member	
Mr. Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.	Member	
Colonel Thomas G. S. Doeway	Member	

For NPFL/NPRAG

Mr. John T. Richardson	Member	of Delegation
Mr. Laveli Supuwood	Member	
Dr. Roland C. Massaquoi	Member	
Mr. John Cummings	Member	
Mr. Joe W. Mulbah	Member	

For ULIMO

Dr. Harry Nayou	Member	of Delegation
Gen Roosevelt Johnson	Member	
Dr. D. L. Maxwell Kaba	Member	
Mr. Isaac Bai Karlar	Member	
Mr. Isaw Quawah	Member	

The parties reached agreement with respect to the outstanding military and political issues.

Military

In accordance with Article 12 of Section K of the Cotonou Agreement, after the presentations by the ECOMOG Field Commander and the UN Chief Military Observer on the planned joint reconnaissance missions and the deployment concept and schedule for ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the parties agreed to provide within 48 hours to ECOMOG and UNOMIL the following information required for the preparation of schedules of implementation for the following: (a) numbers and locations of combatants; (b) numbers of weapons, including

artillery; (c) location of mines; (d) number of prisoners of war; and (e) designation of liaison officials. The parties also agreed to the schedule of the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG reconnaissance missions in their respective areas.

Political

The parties reaffirmed that the Cotonou Agreement provides the best framework for durable peace in Liberia. In this connection, they reiterated their total commitment to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The parties accepted IGNU's nomination of Cllr. Philip A. Z. Banks to replace Mr. Bismarck Kuyon to the Council of State. The parties also agreed that the Council of State should hold elections to select officers of the Council. IGNU informed the parties that it will appoint a replacement to fill the vacancy in the Elections Commission, created by the resignation of Dr. Patrick Seyon, Co-Chairman of the Commission and an IGNU appointee. ULIMO indicated that a second member will take up his position this week. With regard to the timetable for general elections, the parties agreed that free and fair elections will be held on 7 September 1994. Regarding the disposition of the Cabinet posts of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and Defence, the parties agreed to continue their consultations with a view to resolving this issue, while awaiting advice from ECOWAS, OAU, and the UN.

The ECOMOG Field Commander and the UN Chief Military Observer informed the parties that full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL throughout Liberia will be completed by 7 March 1994 and that they will begin the lifting of arms from the combatants. The parties therefore agreed that the installation of the LNTG will take place on 7 March 1994.

The parties stressed in particular their sincere appreciation for the efforts made by the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Nicephore Soglo; the ECOMOG Field Commander, Major-General John Inienger; the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Trevor Gordon-Somers; and the OAU Eminent Person, former President Canaan Banana, to ensure the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and the full restoration of peace in Liberia.

Done at Monrovia, 15 February 1994

SIGNED

(signed)
Mr. Roosevelt Jayjay
IGNU

(signed)
Mr. John T. Richardson
NPFL/NPRAG

(signed)
Dr. D. I. Maxwell Kaba
FOR ULIMO

WITNESSED BY:

(signed)
Hon. Theodore Holo
ECOWAS

(signed)
Prof. Canaan Banana
OAU

(signed)
Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers
United Nations

Tribute to J. Gus Liebenow*

I first met Gus in the literature!—his works on Liberia in collaboration with the late Professor Gwendolyn Carter. This was as I began graduate studies in 1967.

His benchmark study, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege* provided a good number of Liberians of my generation perhaps the first real opportunity to think critically about our country. We were a heterogeneous lot and therefore as critical of Gus's analysis as his analysis led us to put on our "thinking caps".

Twenty-six years since I met Gus (and came to know the man and the scholar), I can say that we have all been taken a giant step forward in our understanding of macro-Liberia. Of course the many micro-studies by veterans, some of whom are here present, were vital enhancers in our quest for understanding the Liberian national polity.

Gus Liebenow, the scholar and the sensitive human being, set many of us on a course of studying Liberia on which we are likely to remain engaged for the duration of our working lives. It is a course that seeks to blend scholarship with humanity, the pursuit of truth, not in a vacuum, but with concerns of elevating and making life more worthwhile for the subject of our study, the people of Liberia.

In his departure, we—all of us in the Liberian studies community and beyond—are left a challenge, a challenge not to remain wedded to his analysis of Liberia when new revelations and creativity demand otherwise, but to carry forward the cause of critical knowledge in the service of Liberia and Liberians.

This was the legacy left him by such forerunners as Maurice Delafosse, Sir Harry Johnston, Frederick Starr, and Raymond Leslie Buell, to name only a few earlier Liberianists. Gus's legacy to us is to build upon his contributions bearing in mind that the best scholarship is one that is sensitive to human needs. MAY HE REST IN PEACE!

D. Elwood Dunn
University of the South

* Statement made at special tribute session, Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston, MA, December, 1993.

**A Speech on Church-State Relations
in Liberia, and Reactions to it.**

The Socio-Political Role of the Church in Post-Doe Liberia
by Levi Zangai*

Let me, first of all, express thanks and appreciation to the senior class and the administration for inviting me as your commencement speaker.

I accept your invitation with the hope of raising more questions to stimulate critical discussions, rather than providing answers to any of the questions to be raised. For one thing, I am neither a theologian nor do I claim to know much about theology. What I do claim, however, is that I am a Christian, a Baptist, and specifically, a member of the Providence Baptist Church and a graduate of Ricks Institute.

Now that I have established the basis for my acceptance, I shall speak to you on "The Socio-Political Role of the Church in Post-Doe's Liberia." This topic reminds me of one nagging question that visitors to our country have often raised. That question is, "How do you explain the unprecedented, brutal dictatorship in this country from 1980 to 1990, given the ubiquitous presence of the Church in Liberia, and in almost all major aspects of Liberian life?" In fact, there are those who claim that "Liberia is a Christian country." If this claim is to be accepted, we must first identify the socio-political role of the church in Doe's Liberia (1980-1990), and ask Why?

The discussion of this question will lead us to a second question: What is or should be the socio-political role of the church in post-Doe's Liberia, and Why? In other words, should it be more of the same? or, should there be a contextual reorientation of Liberian Christianity to supplement our dominant tradition of separating Christianity from the socio-political environment and from institutionalized conditions within the local setting?

Intellectual honesty compels me to tell you out front that much of my discussion on these two questions benefits greatly from what Paul Gifford has comprehensively argued and demonstrated in his book entitled, *Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia*, published by Cambridge University Press in 1993. Accordingly, it would be more accurate to consider my remarks here as a partial book review that might encourage others to read the book for themselves. I strongly recommend this book to all theological seminaries and bible colleges in Liberia. It should, however, be noted, that, like many of you, I too was a participant-observer in the experiences articulated by Professor Gifford. For instance, in 1987/88, I wrote and distributed in our own providence Baptist church, a protest letter in which I raised similar issues and questions. I was also a Secretary General of the Liberia Action Party in Doe's Liberia.

Doe's Liberia, 1980–1990

The socio-political history of Liberia from 1980 to 1990 has been characterized principally by mismanagement of the economy, rampant corruption, unprecedented violation of human and constitutional rights, detention without fair trials, closure of newspapers and radio stations, harassment of journalists and opposition politicians, attacks on students, extra-judicial killings, tortures, lack of freedom of expression and the press (Decree 88-A), the lack of an independent judiciary and due process of law, among others. I shall give examples of the above-listed conditions as we continue the discussion here. Those who may need a detailed discussion of the socio-political conditions of Doe's Liberia will find the Human Right's Lawyers' Committee Report (1986/87), *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed*, very interesting reading. Chapter one of Gifford's book also provides a good s of the historical context of Doe's Liberia.

What Was The Socio-Political Role Of The Church In Doe's Liberia, (1980-1990)? And why?

In other words, how did Liberian Christianity respond to the particular socio-political issues of the Liberian society?

There may be as many answers as there are churches in Liberia. For instance, according to Paul Gifford, the mainstream churches which constitute the Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) pursued two levels of involvement in responding to the socio-political conditions in Liberia. At one level, they established and sustained educational and health institutions, including the successful Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL). At another level, some members of the clergy in the mainstream churches, either individually or collectively throughout the Council of Churches, tried many times to make position statements on crucial political or national issues.

With very few exceptions, such as the Pastoral Letters of the Catholic Bishops, *most of these position statements were short-term, knee-jerk reactions to events already taking place.*

Gifford suggests that the kind of Christianity taught, preached, absorbed, and practiced by Liberians in Doe's Liberia served (albeit unwittingly) to divert sustained commitment to any involvement in the social situation. For example, a group of clergymen willingly served Doe as "the Goodwill Ambassadors," *after* Doe had stopped the Liberian Council of Churches' mediation efforts to reconcile Doe's party and the opposition parties on the 1985 rigged elections' results. Moreover, the fact that the Liberian Council of Churches aborted its mediation efforts upon Doe's order further indicates the lack of sustained commitment to get involved. In so doing, the church tended to *undermine the efforts of the political opposition and the Liberian people in general.* This left Doe and

his collaborators unchallenged in their mismanagement, greed for power and wealth, repression, unprecedented corruption and abuse of human rights. They became a law unto themselves.

There are many reasons for *this lack of commitment to socio-political analysis and involvement by the Liberian church as a whole*. One such reason, according to Gifford, is the fact that Liberian Christianity is *one-sidedly* dominated by concerns for the spiritual life of the individual at the expense of worldly commitments. In short, Liberian Christianity defines religion as ". . . a personal relationship with God and as private as anything can possibly be."

With this *one-sided* spiritual pre-occupation, Gifford concludes that in Doe's Liberia, Liberian Christianity turned its back on any sustained socio-political analysis for involvement, and insisted on a complete separation between Christianity and politics.

He argues, however, that this presumed separation between Christianity and politics did not make Liberian Christianity non-political. *What the church in fact did was to abandon its moral and social responsibilities, and to cast a vote of confidence for the status quo*. A decision not to decide is a decision. Thus, the Church unwittingly provided support for the beneficiaries of the socio-political system. In short, to neglect involvement towards changing the social system in Doe's Liberia was the correct political posture which Doe and his collaborators wanted the Church to take. They threatened and insisted that the Church preach only personal piety, reconciliation, obedience to authority, peace, unity, and avoidance of any Christian duty which they considered to be political. The few exceptional members of the clergy who risked their lives, and intermittently confronted the ills in our society were often disparagingly referred to as "Political Christians". The silent majority of them who continue to preach and practice the presumed separation of church and state were called "Biblical Christians".

In Doe's Liberia, the Church was unable to *stand up together* to protect or guarantee the human and constitutional rights of even its own members, like the Rev. Fr. James C. Hickey, who was disgracefully deported from Liberia without a semblance of due process of law. Even ELWA, a devout Christian radio station, dismissed its own Joe Mulbah due to government pressure. The Church even rejected as a perversion, any kind of Christianity which attempted to confront the ills of the society in Doe's Liberia. There has never been, for example, any sustained efforts by the church for an independent investigation of the 1984 invasion of the University of Liberia and the Lutheran Church Massacre, among other atrocities and crimes committed against humanity. The *Episcopalian* Cuttington College (and *Divinity School?*) honored Doe with an Honorary Doctorate Degree, *after* Doe had ordered the slaughter of students, staff, and faculty of the University of Liberia on August 22, 1984.

By so doing, Liberian Christianity appears to have ignored brutal injustices, and paid little or no consistent attention to the gross abuses of human rights, *except when it was too little too late*. Thus, it undermined any demonstrated commitment to transforming the Liberian society. The Church was almost exclusively pre-occupied with transforming individuals in preparation for life after death, when they shall have died peacefully in their misery. Perhaps this explains why our own Providence Baptist Church accepted to transform Samuel Kayon Doe.

In view of the foregoing, Gifford (1993) concludes, in part, that this dominant stream or Liberian Christianity was second only to the United States Government as a major "... contributing factor in the oppression, impoverishment and destruction of an entire country."

What is or should be the socio-political role of the Church in post-Doe's Liberia, and Why?

Should the role of the Church be more of the same? Or, should there be a contextual re-orientation of Liberian Christianity to supplement (not to replace) its tradition of separating Church and State? Is there a need for balance?

To put the question this way is only meant to suggest that there is at least a possibility of other kinds of Christianity that might be more relevant to take into account the Liberian socio-political context. It does not mean that the traditional separation of Church and State is inherently inadequate or obsolete. It simply means that given what we have presented here as the role of Christianity in Doe's Liberia, there is a need to explore contextually relevant and supplementary possibilities in post-Doe's Liberia. There is a need for a balanced approach in Liberian Christianity.

Liberation Theology

One such possibility proposed by Gifford is popularly known and practiced elsewhere as Liberation Theology. The starting point for this kind of theology is an analysis of its own socio-political environment and the man-made conditions and circumstances within that local setting.

For example, in South Africa and Latin America, with their history of massive human rights abuses by repressive governments, as well as dehumanizing poverty, the local churches often ask this type of question: "In these circumstances, what does it mean to be a Christian?"

Many churches, especially the Catholics in Latin America, South Africa, Kenya, the Philippines and elsewhere, have come to the conclusion that in such circumstances, sustained commitment to human rights, accountability in public service, due process of *just law*, the *appointment of eminent persons in government* and on elections commission, as well as free and fair elections, are concerns for

Christians. These churches get involved in addressing these and other local issues by doing socio-political analysis. They get involved by using the bible as both a source of inspiration and as resource materials in their socio-political analysis for involvement.

No one is suggesting here that the Church gets involved in partisan politics. This involvement of the Church is clearly explained, for example, by the former President of Tanzania, Dr. Julius K. Nyerere in the following passages:

"... the Church should accept that the development of people means rebellion. At a given and decisive point in history, people decide to act against those conditions which restrict their freedom as people... unless we participate actively in the rebellion against those social structures and economic organizations which condemn people to poverty, the Christian religion will degenerate into a set of superstitions accepted by the fearful. Unless the Church, its members and its organizations, express God's love for human beings by involvement and leadership in constructive protest against the present human conditions, then it will become identified with injustice and persecution. If this happens it (the Church) will die, and humanly speaking, it will deserve to die—because it will then serve no purpose comprehensible to the modern world."

"The Church has to help people to rebel against their slums; it has to help people do this in the most effective way it can be done. But above all, the Church must be obviously and openly fighting all those institutions and power groups which contribute to the existence and maintenance of the physical and spiritual slums—regardless of the consequences to itself or its members... the Church must work with the people in building a future based on social justice. *It must participate actively in initiating, securing and creating the changes which are necessary.* Its love must be expressed action against evil, and for good. For if the Church acquiesces in established evils, it is identifying itself and the Christian religion with injustice by *its continuing presence.*"

In short, to redefine, preach and practice what it means to be a Christian in post-Doe's Liberia requires a contextual approach that supplements *the pretext of political neutrality in Liberian Christianity*. Liberation Theology attempts to relate Christianity to the social structures and political systems as a force for justice towards all.

According to Gifford (1993), Liberation Theology teaches its followers, for example, that "where there are justice and righteousness, there is knowledge of

Yahweh (God); where these are lacking, it is absent." And yet, in Doe's Liberia, a self-proclaimed Christian Country, justice was often delayed as well as denied. The practitioners of Liberation Theology begin with their socio-political environment and try to discover in those specific and man-made conditions, what it could mean to be a Christian or to seek God. Well known examples of Liberation Christian leaders include Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, the late Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the U.S.A., the late Bishop Romero of Latin America, and the Rev. Canaan Banana of Zimbabwe, to name only a few.

I am not proposing here that we replace mainstream theology in Liberia with Liberation Theology. For one thing, we do not seem to know much about it as yet. I am suggesting, however, that Liberation Theology becomes a part of the curricula in the theological seminaries and bible colleges in Liberia. Liberians can begin a contextual re-orientation towards Liberation Theology by studying the writings of our own Edward Wilmot Blyden on Religion. Dr. Edward Blyden was once a Presbyterian minister of the gospel. One of Blyden's primary concerns was *the relevance of religion in society*. The practice of Liberation Theology was recently introduced in Liberia in 1989 by the Christian Health Association of Liberia. I was fortunate to have attended one of its only two workshops before the civil war started. As such, it may not be as strange as it seems.

In conclusion, what I am asking Liberian students, teachers, and preachers of theology and Christianity to do, can be explained and *served* by a story of some blind persons who tried to identify an elephant. Each one described an elephant according to the part or parts he or she had the access to, and could touch. Not one of them could describe a complete picture of an elephant. However, if they combine their individual descriptions, they together may draw something closer to a real picture of an elephant. And so it also seems with theology and Christianity.

In other words, for Liberia at least, God is too great and the Bible is too complex to be understood, explained, and served only through the narrow lenses of any one theological interpretation. That one interpretation may have some blind spots, as we have seen in Doe's Liberia. Liberia is, and Liberian Christians should be, diversified enough to freely teach and practice, for example, Biblical Christianity, Political Christianity, Pentecostal Christianity, Evangelical Christianity, Born-Again Christianity, as well as Liberation Christianity. This is at least one expression of religious freedom and religious tolerance.

For the graduating class, let me remind you of a story to take with you. Once upon a time, there was a man who was seen at night desperately looking for something under a lamp-post. A police officer walked up to him and asked: "What are you looking for?" The man replied, "I am looking for my keys which

I lost over there," pointing into the darkness. "But if you lost your keys over there in the darkness, why are you looking for them here under a lamp-post?" the officer asked. "Because the light is so much better here," the man replied.

Let me suggest to you that the lamp-post represents your diploma, a symbol of your acquired knowledge of theology.

The keys represent non-partisan, socio-political analysis and Christian involvement to find *just and peaceful solutions* to the problems and issues you will encounter as Christians in post-Doe's Liberia. The keys are a symbol of perseverance.

The darkness represents Liberia and its people with all of our problems.

Now I ask you, in the words of Liberation Theologians: What does it mean to be a Christian in post-Doe's Liberia? I am confident that you graduates will help lead the Liberian Church to continue "speaking truth to power, instead of sucking up to it."

I thank you for your attention.

Endnotes

* The author is Associate Professor of Public Administration at the University of Liberia since 1984. He is former Minister of State Without Portfolio in the Presidency of the Interim Government of National Unity of the Republic of Liberia. He is also interim President of Ricks Institute. He holds a BA and MA in Political Science and an MPA and Ph.D. in Public Administration. This paper is the Commencement Address at the graduation program of the Liberia Baptist Theological Seminary; held at the Providence Baptist Church, Ashmun Street, Monrovia, Liberia; December 6, 1993. The views expressed here are personal to the author, and are not necessarily shared by the institutions with which he is affiliated.

Responses to Zangai

December 9, 1993

Professor Levi Zangai
Ministry of State for
Presidential Affairs
Capitol Hill, Monrovia
Republic of Liberia

Dear Professor Zangai,

Greetings and peace in the name of Jesus Christ, our Prince of Peace and Wonderful Counselor.

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your speech delivered to the 13th graduating class of the Liberia Baptist Theological Seminary (LBTS) on December 6, 1993. Thank you very much.

Your scholarly presentation is commendable. Since you admitted a significant portion of your speech was based on Professor Paul Gifford's book, *Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia*, I'm not sure whether the reservations I have are of your concurrence with Prof. Gifford's book, or with the views of Prof. Gifford himself. I am writing to Prof. Gifford, with whom I have a personal acquaintance, to register my observations.

Originally I intended to prepare a critique of your speech for publication in the local papers, but since you were thoughtful and generous in sending me a copy of the speech, I will share with you some of the reservations I have.

You accuse the Church, during the 1980's, of diverting "sustained commitment to any involvement in the social situation" thus making itself a collaborator, and possibly an accomplice in Doe's brutal and tyrannical dictatorship. You went further to clearly state that "the Church tended to undermine the efforts of the political opposition and the Liberian people in general" (page 5) which gave Doe and his cohort of oppressors the notion that they were "a law unto themselves." Consequently, through its nonaction, the Church neglected its vital role and removed itself from the problems of the times.

In suggesting a new approach to the role of the Church in "Post Doe's (sic) Liberia" you advance the notion that the Church needs to explore the nature and content of Liberation Theology (p. 8), build a future "based on social justice" (p. 10) and adapt "a contextual approach that supplements the pretext of political neutrality in Liberian Christianity" (p. 11). In sum, you conclude that the Church needs to be contextual, diverse and explore other kinds (forms) of Christianity.

My contention is that the Church has sought to be contextual over the years because in contextualization, no one method and approach is the same in all places. What it seems you are calling contextualization is actually confronta-

tional. The portion of Liberian history you are referring to (1980-1990) has to be seen in relationship to the whole span of Liberian history. The relationship the Church had with the state was what I term, "mutual support". Given the context in which the Church met the State, certain grants and privileges were given to the Church in exchange for socio-economic and religion development. The Church maintained a posture of "quiet diplomacy" since majority of the politicians and Statesmen were Christians and some clergy served the State. However, it is difficult to determine the success of this approach. What exactly was the Church's role in Tubman's unification policy? What did the Church do when Liberia was accused of slavery at the International Court of Justice (ICJ)? In short, this may be the Church's weakness in the nature of the relationship it has shared with the State.

There is a memorable occasion in which the Rev. John Seys, Methodist Mission Superintendent, was accused by Governor Thomas Buchanan of undermining the economy of the Commonwealth by issuing stronger bank notes. To resolve the confrontation, the Mission Board in New York recalled the Rev. Seys.

When it comes to social justice, how can one explain the role of the Church in making health care, education, agriculture, etc., available to a large percentage of the Liberian populace? Is this not social justice? or are you asking for a form of political social justice?

Actually Professor, while you are right that the Church needs to re-assess and redefine its role in the new Liberia, it can seek to be/remain contextual but not confrontational. The Church has to define its own role and can not allow politicians to fit it into a mold. With the situations of "Liberation Theology" you mentioned where the Church was more vocal, how much of a difference has been made? Liberation Theology has various shades and it does not have to be confrontational. Community development has been a part of the Church's effort. This is liberation theology.

In any case, there are odds against the Church and the Church has to carefully analyze the situation in which it finds itself and devise relevant response thereof.

I do appreciate that speech and I am grateful you sent me a copy. I look forward to meeting with you.

Thanks very much. May God bless you and prosper the work of your hands.

In Truth,

(signed)

Rev. Levi C. Williams, II

Acting Academic Dean

Gbarnga School of Theology

December 28, 1993

Dr. Levi Zangai
Ministry of State
Republic of Liberia

Dear Dr. Zangai,

Thank you for your response to my critique of your speech. Let me, in this letter, address the specific points listed in your letter.

The first point implies that the Church, having existed in Liberia since 1822, should have established itself well enough that the virtues and values of Christianity would determine the nature of the Liberian society, making it righteous and morally strict, thus avoiding the Doe era of 1980 to 1990. Are you suggesting that Christianity should have taken the form of a "state religion" or Liberia should have been something of a "theocracy"? If Christianity had become a "state religion", it seems there would be little room for religious tolerance. Where in the world can a theocracy be found? At the Vatican? In Israel? In Saudi Arabia?

In any case, as to your inquiry regarding the presence of Christianity in Liberia in relation to the level of state violence, I answer that Christianity is not a legalistic religion where morality is imposed and ritual is closely followed by the faithful. Christianity seeks to persuade, convince, influence, and encourage the believers and others to cultivate moral values, thus changing their attitudes, disposition, character, outlook and perspective for the good of not only the individual but of the society at large. Islam and Judaism are legalistic religions where the adherents have to follow the form and imminent consequences for the disobedient. In explaining the brutal dictatorship in Liberia from 1980 to 1990, it is my opinion that Doe's regime was a reactionary one in response to the political leadership from 1847 to 1979. Christianity can not be held responsible for that. Even with the active presence of the Church in Asia and Latin America, Churches are still bombed, priests are still shot, people are still dragged out of the cathedrals and killed. Violence has not really been reduced to an acceptable level in those countries where "liberation theology" is practiced. In fact, it seems liberation theology evokes a negative response from politicians and criminals. Religion is different from magic and hypnotism in that you can not quantify its effectiveness.

Your second concern centers around Liberia's description as "a Christian country". My response to your first concern is applicable here. But beyond the state religion notion and the theocracy concept, if your question is based on statistics then Liberia is an animistic country or a nation where African Traditional Religion is practiced. When you consider the level of religious influence, would you not agree that Liberia leans towards Christianity? With christian

chaplains at the Executive Mansion, at the Legislature, in the Armed Forces, the recognition of christian holidays, the open propagation of the Gospel, the effectiveness of christian social institutions, to name a few, are indications that Christianity is strongly felt and has established itself socially and religiously. But what is your understanding of the idea of Liberia being a "Christian Country"? If Liberia became an Islamic nation, Christianity would be banned.

What was the socio-political role of the Church in Doe's Liberia? It is my view that the church sought to meet the holistic (physical, psychological, social and spiritual) needs of the Liberian people through its various socio religious institutions. In naming the oppressive tactics used by Doe, you failed to mention that even the Church was harassed. Have you forgotten Doe's open attacks on the Church and its leader, yet trying to divide the Church? Do you remember Gray Allison's television attacks and Justice Minister Jenkins Scott's attempts to embarrass the United Methodist Church? When you mentioned "some mainstream Churches, either individually or collectively through the Council of Churches, tried many times to make position statements on crucial political or national issues," tell me, sir, what is your concept of the Church? Is it individual or collective? Who really speaks for the Church? Actually, Christians in Liberia, or else-where for that matter, can be put on a spectrum ranging from conservative to liberal. The conservatives argue nonpolitical involvements (whatever that means), while for many liberals, this approach is not realistic and is not practical. Even when they agree on social action, Christians are not uniform in their response to socio-political matters. What one group may consider a Christian response, may be considered un-Christian by another group of Christians. Each denomination has its position on Christian social ethics. Some Christians are absolute pacifists, others are limited pacifists, while some are nonpacifists. Who's more Christian than the other? Those clergy you called Doe's "Good-will Ambassadors" were really peacemakers. Don't forget that even during the heat of the war, Christians were constantly seeking means of mediation among the factions. Was the LCC not credited with laying the foundation for the present peace process? I disagree that Christianity's efforts were ever "too little or too late". Do you agree with Gifford in his conclusion that Christianity in Liberia was a primary "contributing factor in the oppression, impoverishment and distruction" of Liberia?

My use of the concept of "mutual support" is not synonymous with "patron-client". "Mutual support" does not mean agreement with every action of the other but constructive criticism to strengthen each other. Yet when the Church tried to point out to the government its flaws, especially during Doe's regime, the Church was threatened with the revocation of duty free privileges and the withdrawal of subsidies for its institutions. The Church has been vocally confrontational but not physically confrontational as you seem to suggest. "Quiet diplomacy" is where Church leaders met those members of

their Churches and discussed national problems. When there was no positive response, then we recall the voices of Fr. Dwalu Kimber, Rev. D. Seah Doe, Bishop Michael Francis and Bishop Arthur F. Kulah.

You suggest, according to Professor Gifford, the consideration of "Liberation Theology" as one of the options as Liberian Christianity seeks better ways of responding to socio-political problems. Again, there are brands of liberation theology as found in South Africa, Latin America and in North America among the Blacks. What form will it take in Liberia? Liberation theology analyzes "its socio-political environment and the man-make conditions and circumstances within the local setting." After that, what?

For me, the solution to people rebelling "against their slums" is community organization for development in a people-helping-people relationship where local communities are empowered to help themselves. Is this a Christian response? Is it even liberation theology? At least, it liberates!

What Christians can hope for is not uniformity of actions but a unity that calls for dialogue among Christians themselves, something which seldom happens. Through this dialogue, Christians will be able to respect the views of each other, seek clarification for reasons behind specific courses of action. Furthermore, it seems there needs to be a broader range of interaction and dialogue among social scientists, theologians and other professionals in Liberia; together we may be able to chart a positive course for Liberia rather than expecting too much from one group or blaming one area of the society. If a society is the sum total of all its parts then we, the parts, need to engage each other in dialogue.

May God bless you and prosper the work of your hands

In Truth,

(signed)

Levi C. Williams (Rev.)

Acting Academic Dean

Gbarnga School of Theology

Executive Summary

The Carter Camp Massacre

Results of an Investigation by the Panel of Inquiry Appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations into the Massacre Near Harbel, Liberia on the night of June 5/6, 1993

Panel Members

Hon. S. Amos Wako, Chairman
Mr. Robert Gersony, Member
Amb. Mahmoud Kassem, Member

Secretariat

Mr. Gianni Magazzeni

New York, September 10, 1993

I. Background

1. This document summarizes the essential elements of a 75-page report of the Panel of inquiry established on August 4, 1993 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate the massacre of nearly 600 displaced persons which occurred near Harbel, Liberia on the night of June 5/6, 1993.

2. Since it began in December 1989, Liberia's civil war has claimed the lives of between 10,000 and 50,000 innocent civilians, principally women, children and elderly persons, and has displaced an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 others.

3. The principal parties to the conflict are the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), all of which are considered to have been responsible for gross human rights violations.

4. To attempt to keep peace, in August 1990, ECOWAS dispatched an ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), including Nigerian and other West African armed troops. In October 1992, the NPFL attacked Monrovia, which was defended by ECOMOG. In the course of the struggle, to augment its forces, ECOMOG mobilized and rearmed AFL units which had previously been disarmed and confined to barracks.

5. In March 1993, some 60,000 persons displaced from Grand Bassa County in the fighting described above, were relocated by ECOMOG, the AFL and the

United Nations to a series of Firestone Rubber Plantation worker camps around the recently captured Harbel area. Just over 1,800 of these displaced persons were assigned to live in Carter Camp, one of these Firestone facilities, located just one kilometer from the center of Harbel town. ECOMOG delegated to AFL units responsibility for security in the Harbel area.

6. As about midnight on the night of Saturday/Sunday, June 5/6, 1993, armed soldiers attacked and systematically massacred and mutilated the bodies of nearly 600 Carter Camp residents, mainly women, children and elderly persons. Some 45 bags of rice and beans and other loot were removed from the camp, apparently carried by 100 or more survivors abducted by the attackers. About 1,100 terrified survivors managed to escape the massacre and fled in all directions.

7. The next morning ECOMOG security forces who visited the camp discovered a trail of rice, beans, clothing and eight bodies leading to a nearby abandoned AFL Black Beret camp adjacent to an iron bridge called Du Bridge. Following the same trail, they discovered fourteen more bodies at a place called "Camp A," three kilometers further along.

8. Within hours of its discovery, Liberia's Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), ECOMOG, the AFL, and the international media had attributed the massacre to the NPFL. By June 10, two well-known international human rights groups repeated the allegation in public statements and testimony. But strong NPFL denials, coupled with the testimony of some survivors reported in the Liberian press, raised the possibility of AFL negligence, or even complicity, in the incident. By June 6, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia had begun a preliminary investigation.

9. On June 9, the Security Council strongly condemned the massacre and requested that the Secretary-General conduct a "thorough and full investigation... including any allegations as to the perpetrators, whoever they may be." It warned that "those found responsible... will be held accountable." On August 4, the Secretary-General established an independent, neutral Panel of Inquiry to establish the facts; to examine allegations of responsibility; and to make recommendations.

II. Assessment Procedures

10. Research for this inquiry was conducted during a three-week period in August/September 1993, mainly in Liberia. The principal source of the assessment's findings were 33 individual interviews with Carter Camp survivors, who provided eyewitness accounts of events before, during and following the massacre; with five eyewitnesses to circumstances directly related to the incident; and with close to fifty national and international officials, including representatives of all the parties to the conflict, UN and other international agencies, non-governmental organizations and diplomatic missions.

11. The panel made four field visits to the Harbel area; a field visit to Gbarnga (pronounced Banga), the NPFL administrative capital; and visits to other locations where survivors might be found.

12. All parties provided full cooperation, including freedom to travel, free access to displaced persons camps, and freedom to randomly select individuals for interviews in complete privacy. Security escorts for road travel were provided only when requested by the panel and were not present during panel activities.

13. Meetings with eyewitnesses took place in offices which offered privacy from the view and hearing of others. Eyewitnesses were assured their identities would be kept in absolute confidence.

14. Survivors and other interviewees provided eyewitness and other detailed, credible accounts of their experiences; spontaneous responses to many follow-up questions; and in some cases used simple diagrams to illustrate the manner in which incidents they described had occurred. The majority of the respondents had no formal education or literacy skills. But they described effectively what they had seen and what had happened to them and these observations are the principal basis for the findings of this report.

15. The reports of the eyewitnesses in Monrovia, Harbel and Gbarnga, although they reside as many as 150 kilometers apart and live under the authority of opposing forces, were credible and consistent. The witnesses are so isolated from each other that they were not aware of whether their closest relatives had been killed in the massacre or were still alive and residing in these widely separated locations.

III. Description of Carter Camp

16. Carter Camp is located on the Firestone Rubber Plantation, whose 1,500 square miles are believed to make it the world's largest. Harbel and its environs (see map, Annex A), located 64 kilometers from Monrovia along an excellent tarmac road, can be reached by vehicle in about 45 minutes. At the far end of Harbel is a small wooden shack which serves as a military checkpoint. Civilians entering Harbel from the far side report that they are usually stopped and checked at that point.

17. The tarmac road continues past the checkpoint toward Carter Camp, which is about one kilometer further, a 10-minute walk. Carter Camp itself is comprised of four perfectly aligned rows which among them have a total of 166 small houses (see sketch map, Annex B).

18. The tarmac road continues on past Carter Camp for another 2.8 kilometers until it reaches the Du Bridge. Crossing the bridge, one encounters immediately on the right an abandoned AFL "Black Beret camp." Until they were

assigned elsewhere in May, the Black Berets were responsible for the security of Carter Camp. Thereafter, it appears that an AFL regular unit in Harbel became responsible for the area's security, although this is subject to some dispute.

19. From the Black Beret camp, some 3.6 kilometers along an unsurfaced road, is another abandoned Firestone camp called "Camp A," which is smaller but otherwise no different from Carter Camp and the Black Beret camp. The unsurfaced road is said to lead eventually to the Farmington River, a major natural demarcation line in the plantation, which also defines a section of ECOMOG's defensive lines against the NPFL.

20. On June 5, 1993, the displaced population at Carter Camp was about 1,868 principally women, children and elderly people, predominantly Bassa speakers and Christians who had lived in the camp for nearly three months when the massacre occurred. The camp population received weekly distributions of rice, beans and other basic supplies from a local Liberian non-governmental organization with foodstuffs provided by the World Food Program. They collected additional food and the firewood needed to prepare it by scavenging in the bush on the camp's outskirts.

IV. Narrative Account

21. This section of the report sets forth in a narrative manner, the Panel's assessment of relevant events preceding the massacre; the massacre operation itself; and relevant events following the massacre, based largely on credible eyewitness accounts as well as on corroborating information.

A. Events Preceding The Massacre

22. Before their displacement, most interviewees had previously resided in their homes in Grand Bassa County which had been administered by the NPFL for up to three years. In the wake of its military operations following the October 1992 NPFL attack on Monrovia, an ECOMOG/AFL assault in early 1993 dislodged the NPFL from the area. ECOMOG decided that the civilian population, to insure their protection, should be relocated to displaced persons camps selected, ECOMOG asserted, by United Nations officials. Carter Camp, with 166 small residential units and located approximately one kilometer from the center of Harbel town, was one of these camps.

23. Senior ECOMOG commanders stated that the security and protection of the displaced persons camps was not an ECOMOG responsibility but corresponded to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Nonetheless, they explained that units of the AFL were responsible for the security of the Harbel area, including Carter Camp. ECOMOG commanders and NPFL officials stated that they had previously requested that the UN relocate the displaced populations from the Harbel area to Monrovia. ECOMOG

commanders based the requests on security concerns. NPFL officials stated that they were concerned for the protection of the displaced population as long as they remained under AFL security.

24. Although the AFL/Harbel commander stated that Carter Camp did not fall within the AFL's security jurisdiction, camp residents consistently reported that AFL soldiers would appear at the camp on food distribution days. Camp residents complained that AFL personnel "were in the constant habit of harassing them."

25. Numerous survivors described an individual named Zarkpa (pronounced Zagba) Gorh, a 23 year-old AFL private, as a permanent camp commandant. When other soldiers came to the camp, they liaised with Zarkpa. Camp residents could not go into the bush to collect food or firewood without his permission. He obliged camp residents without compensating them to harvest sugar cane which he then sold, and demanded money and cigarettes of them. AFL soldiers at the Harbel checkpoint confiscated a part of whatever the Carter residents could harvest in the bush to sell in the Harbel market. In summary, the AFL presence in the area was perceived more as a threatening occupation force than as a source of security and protection against other hostile forces.

26. ECOMOG, AFL, NPFL and most organizations met by the Panel, and most written reports, asserted that the residents of Carter Camp were adherents or sympathizers of the NPFL and that at least some of their family members were NPFL combatants. On this point there was unanimity. ECOMOG and the AFL asserted that, in addition, former NPFL soldiers resided in the camp and that its residents provided food and intelligence information to NPFL combatants in the bush.

27. According to many of the survivors, on about June 3, several camp residents were preparing for a religious ceremony to be conducted that Sunday. A reverend, a young girl and her mother were walking through the bush just outside the camp, authorized to do so by Private Zarkpa. They were stopped by three AFL soldiers, two of whom raped and severely beat the girl. A camp delegation reported the incident to Major Nelson Paye, AFL/Harbel commander. One of the soldiers was arrested. Later, he returned to the camp and was said to ridicule the residents by saying, "What did you think they were going to do to me?" Another AFL soldier was reported to say in connection with the rape incident, "You Bassa people, this is the beginning of your death."

28. Throughout 1993, AFL soldiers apparently had received rice whenever it was distributed to camp residents, perhaps to compensate them for keeping order on food distribution days; because some AFL soldiers resided in the camps; or as a "humanitarian gesture," to appease the soldiers. However, in the month preceding the massacre, the quantity of rice distributed to AFL soldiers

had increased nearly tenfold, reportedly from 17 to 113 bags. On May 27, World Food Program officials decided that food distribution to AFL soldiers was to be discontinued. A June 3 report described "continuous harrassment" of food distributors by AFL soldiers and alleged that, following distribution to the displaced population, AFL soldiers were confiscating their food.

29. The food distribution at Carter Camp on Saturday, June 5, the day before the night of the massacre, was the first in the Harbel area in which soldiers would not receive anything. Almost all the survivors noticed a larger than usual number of soldiers in the camp. Eyewitnesses close to the distribution point said that the soldiers requested that the Block Supervisor give them some of the food. He replied that he had been instructed not to do so. One eyewitness alleged that the soldiers were angered by the supervisor's refusal and made vague threats. Following a 10-minute private discussion among ten of the soldiers, they ordered that distribution be suspended at once. An unusual 4:30 P.M. curfew was imposed. Some 36 bags of rice and 9 bags of beans, all intact, were stored in the camp warehouse, pending resumption of distribution the following day.

30. On that Saturday afternoon, several survivors recalled seeing Zarkpa and several other AFL soldiers they knew in the camp. They also recalled the presence of other AFL soldiers they had never seen before walking and talking together in a friendly manner with the AFL soldiers whom they recognized. Among the new soldiers, one eyewitness recalled, were two who wore ULIMO insignia (some ULIMO soldiers had in the past belonged to the AFL).

31. It appears from all reports that camp residents obeyed all instructions from AFL soldiers that day. They returned to their homes, cooked their food, and went inside. One survivor said that on late that afternoon AFL LT Kollie, who had not been seen before in the camp, addressed a group of camp residents, saying

"We suspect you people in the camp of being NPFL soldiers because we don't know the difference between you people and the NPFL soldiers. So if anything happens, we'll come and kill everyone here. If anything happens in this camp, you people will die, but we military people will know how to save ourselves."

32. Another AFL soldier reportedly said, "You are feeding and keeping the rebels . . . we shall deal with you tonight."

33. ECOMOG and AFL reported no advance indications of an NPFL attack that evening. Shortly before June 5, it appears that the AFL Chief of Staff had withdrawn AFL intelligence personnel from the area who might have provided "early warning" and "averted" the massacre, according to a Special Military Board of Inquiry conducted after the massacre.

34. Most survivors report that there was considerable moonlight that evening. One said he was surprised to hear the soldiers patrolling the camp after curfew; except for the few who lived in the camp, the rest would usually go back to Harbel after food distributions. But as midnight approached, the camp residents were said to be sound asleep.

B. Execution of the Massacre Operation

35. Camp residents were awakened at midnight by the sounds of gunfire, which soon became deafening. The massacre operation which they described was committed by armed soldiers against unarmed civilians who offered no resistance other than attempts to escape. Some of the survivors bolted from their houses as soon as they heard the first gunfire and headed toward the safety of the larger town, Harbel. Others fled toward Du Bridge and eventually arrived at Gbarnga.

36. Others thought they would be safer lying on the floors of their houses. All of the accounts are strikingly similar. Thirteen of them received from among all the interview locations, are excerpted at length in the main report.

Massacre Accounts

37. In synthesis, the survivors said they saw soldiers ordering people out of their houses and killing them when they emerged. Many said they could specifically recognize the attackers as AFL soldiers. About six said they saw or recognized the voice of Private Zarkpa leading the soldiers on their murderous route and himself ordering the people out of their houses to their death. One eyewitness reported seeing Zarkpa himself killing a displaced person.

38. One survivor asserted that he was one of those abducted from Carter Camp and marched towards the Black Beret camp carrying a 100-pound bag of rice:

"I heard a lot of shots. Other people ran out of the house. But I secured myself in the house. They shouted, 'Come outside!' in English. When I came outside, they said, 'Why you need this cap, this belt, these shoes?' and took them from me. I saw two of my children and seven others were dead in front of my house. There were many many dead all around the camp. I saw a baby with the head cut off. Some people were killed with guns, some with cutlasses. Some soldiers had guns, some had cutlasses. There were many many soldiers in the camp, more than thirty, more than forty. They were the same army soldiers that always come to the camp. Then they put a whole bag of rice on my head. To this day my neck hurts me. 'If you put this down, we'll kill you,' they said."

39. This abductee said he was at the head of the column of porters just as they crossed Du Bridge. The first guard was far enough behind so that he and another abductee dropped their bags and escaped into the bush.

Flight to Harbel

40. Five survivor accounts excerpted in the full report describe what they found as they fled to Harbel town, about 1,000 meters from where the massacre was being conducted. They noted that the checkpoint was abandoned. There was no crossfire between hostile forces. Four of them report that as they staggered into Harbel they were ordered by AFL soldiers to return to Carter Camp or the AFL soldiers would kill them right there. "Go back," ordered an AFL soldier, "Zarkpa is your God!" There was one report of an AFL soldier ordering other AFL soldiers to open fire on the survivors, an order apparently disobeyed. No AFL soldiers asked the survivors what was happening in Carter Camp. One of the survivors, detained at AFL headquarters for the night, observed that the soldiers did not appear to be on any type of alert.

41. By daybreak, the shooting had abated. It is clear from the consistent accounts of the survivors that the massacre operation, including gunfire, continued for four to five hours

Flight to Du Bridge/Journey to Gbarnga

42. With the exception of the escaped abductee described above, the remaining survivors in Gbarnga were apparently among the first to flee the camp. (Excerpts of three typical reports by survivors interviewed in Gbarnga are included in the full report.) Immediately upon hearing gunfire that night, they bolted from their doors. They did not have time to put on clothes or to grab food and personal belongings. Most of them were half-dressed. Their concern was survival. The direction from which they heard the fire persuaded them to head away from Harbel toward Du Bridge. They said that they encountered neither AFL nor NPFL soldiers along the main road which they followed.

43. From Du Bridge, they crossed right at the former Black Beret camp and headed for the Farmington River. As they proceeded, they were intercepted by NPFL units, which sometimes arrested and interrogated but eventually assisted them to reach and cross the Farmington River. They report that they were taken to a location called "Chama Camp," which they reached about June 10. On June 12, NPFL trucks arrived and took them to Gbarnga.

C. Events Following the Massacre

44. At around 7AM on Sunday morning an ECOMOG unit from Harbel Hills arrived at Carter Camp itself. After observing the situation, it is said to have followed what was called a "comfortable lead," a trail of rice, beans,

clothing and eight bodies strewn along the main road, toward Du Bridge, then past the deserted Black Beret camp to Camp A, where it discovered fourteen more bodies.

45. In Harbel at the same time, despite a daytime curfew, some observed a white pick-up being pushed down the main road in Harbel, from the direction of Carter Camp heading in the direction of Monrovia, carrying some 20 bags of rice. Four AFL soldiers jump-started the vehicle, and with three market women, drove off in the direction of Monrovia. AFL soldiers were observed pushing two wheelbarrows containing four bags of rice through Harbel from the direction of Carter Camp.

46. Some Carter Camp survivors reported that they subsequently recognized in Harbel AFL Soldiers whom they had seen participating in the massacre. Several credible sources reported that the AFL did not permit Carter Camp survivors to return to the camp for fear of provoking a "social explosion."

47. Rumors also circulated in Harbel that additional killings had been planned to begin from a swamp area behind Harbel Gardens. Unverified reports stated that an AFL soldier had disobeyed an order to open fire, apparently against Carter Camp survivors or other displaced persons; he was reported to have been killed later by other AFL soldiers.

V. The Riddle of Camp A

48. All reports agree that fourteen recently murdered adult bodies were discovered that Sunday morning at Camp A by the same ECOMOG unit which followed the trail of rice and beans which led there from Carter Camp. One person had been murdered by gunshot wounds, thirteen apparently with sharp or blunt instruments. By the time the Government Pathologist arrived on the scene on June 11, the bodies were said to be in an advanced state of decomposition.

49. The Government pathologist's report indicates that the bodies were fully dressed. He stated to the Panel that their houses showed signs of recent occupancy and that, in fact, the beds were made, the food was untouched, with no signs of looting. The report concluded that these fourteen people were Camp A residents. Fourteen chairs were said to be found arranged in a semi-circle, suggesting that a trial of some type had been conducted. A large quantity of torn Interim Government currency, called Liberty Notes, was scattered over the bodies and on the floor of some of the victims' rooms. As Liberty Notes are illegal within NPFL territory, the torn notes would have been the unmistakable signature of the NPFL.

50. The scene described by the pathologist was inconsistent with the Carter Camp massacre, where the victims had been randomly killed and found only half-clothed; and the food and houses had been looted. The Pathologist's report

concluded that NPFL soldiers had passed through Camp A *en route* to Carter Camp on Saturday, June 5. Finding residents in possession of Liberty notes, they tried and executed them, without looting their homes, then proceeded to conduct the massacre and return along the same route the next morning, leaving a trail of rice and beans behind them.

51. The AFL August 31 official report, corroborated by another credible source, contradicted the pathologist. It concluded that the fourteen persons murdered at Camp A were, in fact, abducted as porters from Carter Camp on the night of the massacre and then murdered. The Ministry of Justice report stated that the rooms found at Camp A were in "complete disarray." Furthermore, both ECOMOG and AFL commanders stated that military common sense dictated that the attacking party would not use the same route to enter and withdraw from the attack location.

52. Despite profound differences in their descriptions and interpretations of the evidence found at Camp A, all the above concluded that the NPFL conducted the massacre.

53. When the team expressed an interest in visiting Camp A, a key Government investigator who had himself visited Camp A stated that the trip from the Black Beret camp would take 1-1/2 hours by vehicle over a deteriorated road through dangerous territory. In fact, the trip took about ten minutes over a wide, 3.6 kilometer unsurfaced but otherwise excellent road. Thus, the Panel observed that Camp A was within relatively close walking distance of Carter Camp.

54. The Panel needed to determine whether the Camp A murders preceded or followed the Carter Camp massacre; whether these two incidents were conducted by different parties or the same party; the motive of the Camp A murders; and the responsible party. The Panel was able to make these determinations, which are stated in the report's conclusions.

VI. Issues

55. In the full report, this section analyzes in detail some of the information provided by eyewitnesses. It also describes assertions and conclusions reached by other investigations which conflict with those presented in this report. Specifically, it refers to investigative reports by the Ministry of Justice, ECOMOG, the AFL, and the Special Military Board of Inquiry. In the full Panel report, key passages of these reports are excerpted. This executive summary presents a synopsis of these issues.

Issue #1: Personnel Transport

56. Credible but inconclusive eyewitness testimony received by the Panel suggests the possibility of vehicle movement and/or troop transport from Harbel to or past Carter Camp, on Saturday night between 6PM and midnight.

57. NPFL and ECOMOG state categorically the NPFL could not have used vehicles to reach Carter Camp. AFL reports state that none of its sources reported any vehicle movement that night.

58. The Ministry of Justice and pathologist's report state that "some" or "most" of the survivors with whom they spoke heard a vehicle coming from the Gate 15 (presumably NPFL) direction that night.

Issue #2: NPFL/AFL Engagement

59. The AFL report and AFL/Harbel Commander Paye assert that AFL forces repelled an NPFL attack on Carter Camp that night. The AFL report states that all AFL soldiers were withdrawn from the checkpoint pending augmentation. Major Paye insists that the checkpoint was manned throughout the night.

60. The AFL report indicates "few bullets" were exchanged; Major Paye reports a significant engagement with lengthy sustained exchanges of fire which even required replenishment of ammunition. The AFL report omits Major Paye's mention of an AFL soldier killed in the engagement.

61. The Special Military Board of Inquiry found "credibility problems" with the AFL assertions concerning the engagement. The ECOMOG report reflects no engagement. No NPFL soldiers were reported killed, wounded or captured.

62. Numerous eyewitness accounts contradict all reports of an AFL/NPFL engagement.

Issue #3: NPFL Retreat Position Unprotected

63. Despite the relative proximity of ECOMOG mobile units, if the NPFL conducted this all-night attack, whether or not it utilized a vehicle, it apparently made no effort to secure a crucial route of retreat which, if cut off, could have isolated and exposed its soldiers to grave danger.

Issue #4: Duration of Attack

64. The AFL asserts that the Carter Camp massacre was conducted within a 45-minute period. However, its own reports contain information which contradicts this assertion.

65. All other reports as well as survivor testimony indicate that the incident at Carter Camp had a duration of at least three hours and probably closer to five hours.

Issue #5: Mass Movement of Undetected/Not Pursued

66. ECOMOG and AFL units knew by early Sunday morning that a major attack had been conducted at Carter Camp. By 10AM, the retreat route of a

significant number of NPFL soldiers, reportedly with hundreds of abductees carrying heavy bags of rice, was well known. This column would have had to move undetected, a day or more later through ECOMOG defensive positions.

67. Nonetheless, no efforts appear to have been made by ECOMOG or the AFL to pursue what would have been a large column moving slowly along a known, easily accessible route, to engage the enemy or rescue the hostages. But by Sunday afternoon the Interim Government had mobilized a national and international group to visit the Carter Camp and the Black Beret site.

Issue #6: NPFL Attacks Own Supporters

68. All investigations which identified the massacre perpetrator as the NPFL did not satisfactorily explain why the NPFL would have massacred and mutilated the bodies of its own former combatants and/or adherents.

69. The *ad hoc* nature of responses to the Panel's questions on this matter, and their contradiction of a fundamental fact to which all sides agreed, reinforced the Panel's view that this issue had not been given sufficient attention in previous investigations.

Issue #7: The NPFL Pattern

70. The reported NPFL pattern of atrocities in the three months prior to the Carter Camp massacre was given a significant weight by official and independent investigators. In its absence, at least one important investigator would have concluded that the AFL conducted the Carter Camp massacre.

71. Both principal organizations suspected of perpetuating the massacre had engaged in a pattern of atrocities against civilians in their areas of authority and were deemed capable of carrying out the Carter massacre. The polarized political environment of Liberia mooted the objectivity of many of those who participated in investigations of the Carter incident.

72. The AFL successfully deceived public opinion regarding responsibility for another recent atrocity by using the "pattern" argument to shift the responsibility to NPFL for an act which AFL soldiers had committed.

Issue #8: "Strange Faces"

73. The "strange" faces seen in Carter Camp on the afternoon of June 5 may have been regular AFL soldiers or some new AFL soldiers who were reported by one source to arrive in Harbel the previous Thursday for a temporary operation. Information on this subject is inconclusive.

Issue #9: Private Zarkpa: Occasional Visitor or Camp Commandant

74. Many detailed survivor accounts excerpted in the full report and gathered in widely distant locations, and other corroboration, indicated that Private Zarkpa served as a type of commandant who resided almost permanently at Carter Camp. He was reported by numerous eyewitnesses to be guiding the attackers along their murderous route and participating actively in the massacre.

75. Official reports and Zarkpa himself state that he never resided nor exercised any authority over the camp. He was an occasional weekend visitor who kept to himself. He never saw other AFL soldiers in the camp that Saturday. Like other victims, he escaped, virtually naked; ran to the Harbel checkpoint (which unlike others he found fully manned); and reported the attack to Major Paye.

Issue #10: Replenishment of Ammunition

76. Major Paye's account to the Panel of gathering 1,500 loose rounds of all varieties at his own AFL headquarters that night and sorting them out at the front line with a flashlight contradicts his June 8 written statement to the AFL and information gathered from the Ministry of Justice. ECOMOG confirms that at 2AM it provided three boxes (3,000 rounds) of ammunition to Major Paye at Robert International Airport (see map, Annex A).

Issue #11: Food as a Motive

77. The AFL command assertion that its soldiers did not require rice because they were well fed overlooked the importance of rice as a source of a significant amount of ready cash at a time when its value was doubling.

78. Distribution of WFP food to AFL soldiers had been discontinued for days before the massacre, creating tension among the soldiers. Eyewitnesses claimed to have observed on the morning after the massacre three instances of AFL soldiers conveying 24 sacks of rice from the Carter Camp direction through Harbel town.

Issue #12: Signifying Messages by Attackers

79. Eyewitness accounts received by the Panel included signifying messages spoken by the attackers during the massacre which tended to point to the participation of AFL soldiers, and in one case to the possibility of an ULIMO soldier.

80. An unspecified number of Ministry of Justice eyewitnesses were said to have heard clear, unequivocal messages in which the attackers identified themselves unmistakably as NPFL soldiers.

Issue #13: Public and Intercepted Messages

81. ECOMOG and AFL provided transcripts of what were described as four NPFL messages which they had intercepted. The messages, which could not be independently authenticated, were said to contribute significantly—perhaps conclusively—to the view that the NPFL conducted the Carter massacre.

82. Three of the four messages appeared to be unrelated to the Carter massacre. The fourth message (described in detail in the full report) is inconclusive and seemed as likely to exculpate the NPFL as to implicate it.

Issue #14: Availability of Evidence

83. Because of an early apparent assumption that the NPFL was responsible for the massacre, many kinds of important physical and other evidence were systematically ignored or overlooked by other investigations.

Issue #15: Gbarnga Evidence Not Collected

84. Interviews with survivors in Gbarnga were not conducted by other investigations. The views and reports of the party accused by these investigations (the NPFL) were not received or considered by them.

Issue #16: Interview Procedures

85. The manner in which many interviews were conducted by other investigators would not have created an atmosphere of confidence which would have encouraged eyewitnesses to provide their best and most detailed information.

Issue #17: Evaluation of Eyewitness Testimony

86. Most previous investigations discarded eyewitness accounts pointing to the AFL as perpetrator of the massacre based on “sociological/political” factors which they did not apply to testimony they reported receiving which tended to confirm the theory that the NPFL was the perpetrator.

Issue #18: Fear and Loyalty Impeach Testimony

87. The Panel concurs with previous investigations that eyewitness testimony could be perverted by fear of reprisals by the party such witnesses would identify as having conducted the massacre.

88. However, the most immediate threat to the eyewitnesses was posed by AFL soldiers in Harbel under whose authority the survivors were living and whom survivors in Harbel (as in all interview locations) identified as having conducted the massacre. Three survivors said they had seen in Harbel after the massacre AFL soldiers who they had witnessed participating in the massacre.

This underlined the courage and conviction which characterized the survivor accounts and, in the Panel's view, enhance their credibility.

89. The argument that the political loyalty of the survivors to the NPFL had not been affected by their knowledge that the NPFL had conducted the slaughter strains credibility.

Issue #19: ECOMOG vs. AFL Protection

90. A displaced representative in Harbel, while in a public commemoration service attributing the massacre to NPFL, urged the Interim Government to place ECOMOG in charge of Harbel area security. He beseeched the Government to immediately remove the AFL from the area and warned ECOMOG that its peacekeeping efforts would be undermined by that group. He said that while no one has accused the AFL of conducting the massacre, AFL soldiers had threatened the survivors who were so fearful that many had fled to Monrovia.

91. In connection with the original displacement of people from Grand Bassa County, unverified allegations suggested that able-bodied males separated from other civilians in joint ECOMOG/AFL operations in March 1993 may have been killed.

Issue #20: ECOMOG Protection Responsibilities

92. ECOMOG's assertion that it had no responsibility to protect large civilian displaced populations which it had caused to be relocated suggested the need for a review of the roles and responsibilities of ECOMOG, the Interim Government and the international humanitarian community.

Issue #21: Life-saving Actions by AFL Soldiers

93. Reports indicated that several AFL soldiers risked their lives to protect Carter survivors from their AFL peers; it was alleged that one of those who defended the survivors was killed by AFL elements after the incident.

Issue #22: Atonement and Reconciliation

94. The great majority of the Panel's interlocutors urged that its mandate be expanded to include other major atrocities committed in Liberia's recent history. Religious, human rights, trade union and other representatives and many others argued with conviction that the results of the Panel's work should be publicly disclosed.

95. Both the expansion of the mandate and disclosure of the Panel's findings were urged to insure that the true facts were established; to deter all parties from committing future atrocities; and to begin a process of healing and atonement which could lead to more durable national reconciliation.

VII. Conclusions

96. Credible, consistent and persuasive accounts received from thirty-three survivors and five other eyewitnesses in locations widely separated and isolated from each other; corroborating evidence collected in the field and from close to fifty other sources; and the results of careful analysis of other investigations conducted into the Carter Camp massacre, compelled the following conclusions:

With respect to responsibility for the massacre. . .

97. The massacre at Carter Camp was planned and executed by units of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).

98. The murders at Camp A were carried out following the Carter Camp massacre by the same party which carried out the massacre itself, the AFL. The trails of rice and the torn Liberty notes were part of a scheme of deception.

99. The NPFL, ECOMOG, and ULIMO had no role in the Carter Camp massacre and the murders at Camp A. However, evidence suggests, but is not conclusive, concerning the possibility that a few ULIMO stragglers or deserters who found themselves in Harbel may have on their individual initiative participated with the AFL soldiers in the massacre operation.

With respect to individual responsibility. . .

100. Evidence collected by the Panel points to the participation in the massacre of Major Nelson Paye, AFL Commander in Harbel; Lieutenant Kollie, who was under Paye's command; and Private Zarkpa Gorh.

With respect to the concealment of the facts. . .

101. AFL senior leadership could not have remained unaware after the event of the involvement of its soldiers in the Carter Camp massacre and the murders at Camp A. The possibility of their prior knowledge of the operation remains open.

102. There is no evidence that ECOMOG personnel had advance knowledge of the massacre. ECOMOG, however, may have suspected soon after learning of the incident what had actually happened and treated the matter as if it were not its direct responsibility.

With respect to contributing factors. . .

103. The lives and safety of the displaced families, who were considered NPFL supporters, were jeopardized when they were placed under the protection and responsibility of the AFL.

104. To the degree that the Carter Camp massacre was planned and executed at the AFL/Harbel level, and given the importance of rice as a source of income for AFL soldiers, the abrupt cancellation, during the week before the massacre, of the local practice of weekly distributions to AFL soldiers may have been a contributing factor.

With respect to current emergency survivor needs. . .

105. The survivors of Carter Camp are divided between the two major zones of security control in the country, and to some degree are distributed in different locations within each zone. They remain unaware of whether their closest relatives survived or perished in the massacre. There is no evidence that an effort has been made by any national or international organization to conduct an emergency tracing or family reunification exercise.

106. Three months after the massacre, the physical condition of many of the survivors, including children and adults, appeared perilous. Many were starving, wasted, and in some cases too weak to talk. Even in the context of the unusual international attention focused on this incident, no special effort by international organizations appeared to have been made to provide appropriate emergency assistance to insure the survival of those who were fortunate enough to escape the massacre.

With respect to other matters. . .

107. The manner in which screening and transport of displaced families has been managed during the past months may have required more careful monitoring and protection by the international agencies which participated.

108. There was no procedure in place to systematically collect and preserve readily available information concerning the massacre which could have served as a basis for future investigation.

VIII. Recommendations

With respect to individuals responsible for the massacre and related incidents. . .

109. In accordance with the June 9 determination of the Security Council to hold accountable those responsible for these actions, criminal investigations should be undertaken with a view of prosecuting those named in this report. Any other persons who may have been involved in the planning and execution of the massacre should also be prosecuted and/or disciplined in accordance with any further information which may be disclosed.

110. Similarly, an investigation should be conducted by the competent authorities into the allegation that an AFL soldier in Harbel who refused to obey an order to murder Harbel area displaced persons was in fact killed by other AFL soldiers.

With respect to further investigations in Liberia. . .

111. The Carter Camp massacre was a case of Liberians killing Liberians. That the responsibility for this particular incident has been shown to rest with the AFL does not mitigate or diminish the responsibility of the NPFL, ULIMO, and others alleged to have engaged in similar atrocities against unarmed, innocent civilians throughout the conflict.

112. The findings of this inquiry underline the need at this time for similar investigations of a number of major atrocities attributed to all parties to the conflict. This request was made strongly and with conviction by nearly all the persons whom the Panel met. The Panel agrees that this is necessary in the interests of both equity and to deter the recurrence of such actions. It agrees with many Liberians who expressed the view that the identification and disclosure of the perpetrators of such acts would lead toward atonement and reconciliation. Finally, it believes that this approach would help to construct a more solid foundation for durable peace.

With respect to protection of massacre survivors. . .

113. Units and personnel of the Armed Forces of Liberia currently assigned to and present in the Harbel area should be promptly withdrawn to Monrovia and disarmed.

114. Protection and security for the Harbel area should be provided effective immediately by ECOMOG. In particular, forthwith, ECOMOG should be held responsible for the safety and protection of all Carter Camp survivors in the Harbel area. ECOMOG should also accept responsibility for the security of all displaced persons residing in camps within its areas of operation.

115. Consultations should be conducted immediately with all concerned parties with a view to providing adequate security to all displaced persons by neutral troops and observers where necessary.

116. Appropriate UN authorities and neutral troops should take measures to monitor any screening process undertaken in connection with the displacement of populations.

With respect to emergency survivor needs. . .

117. The need for an emergency tracing and family reunification exercise for Carter Camp survivors should be conveyed to the ICRC.

118. An emergency assessment of the food, clothing, health and other survival needs of the Carter Camp survivors, in both Harbel and Gbarnga, should be conducted and assistance should be provided on an emergency basis.

With respect to development of guidelines. . .


119. The UN should develop practical guidelines and procedures for rapid, methodical collections and preservation of evidence and interviews of eyewitnesses, for use wherever such tragedies may occur.

Annex A

Annex A


Key Locations in the Harbel Area
Related to Harbel Massacre

Direction of
Jbaringa



SKETCH MAP OF CARTER'S CAMP HARBEL, DIVISION 45

Annex B



Annex B

DOCUMENT

Prepared by A C Jorgensen

**United Nations Security Council
Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia
13 December 1993**

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 866 (1993), adopted on 22 September 1993, by which the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United National Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for a period of seven months, in accordance with the timetable foreseen in the Peace Agreement signed in Cotonou by the three parties to the conflict in Liberia on 25 July 1993. In establishing UNOMIL the Security Council stipulated that the mission would continue beyond 16 December 1993 only upon review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement and other measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace. In paragraph 13 of resolution 866 (1993) the Security Council further requested me, in particular, to report by 16 December 1993 on the progress made in the implementation of the UNOMIL mandate.

2. The Peace Agreement assigns to the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) established in Liberia in 1990 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the primary responsibility for ensuring the implementation of its provisions and calls upon the United Nations to monitor the various implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial application.

3. In concluding the Cotonou Agreement, the three Liberian parties, namely, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL/NPRAG) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), agreed to observe the cease-fire, with effect from 1 August 1993. They also agreed to implement the political and military provisions of the Agreement, including disarmament and demobilization, the repatriation of refugees and the holding of free and fair elections within seven months of the signature of the Agreement, that is, by February/March 1994. The parties further undertook to unify the country under a Liberian National Transitional Government, which would be established concomitant with the commencement of disarmament. In addition, the parties agreed that, as a precondition to the start of disarmament and demobilization, the ECOMOG force would be expanded by troops from member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) outside the West Africa region.

4. In accordance with resolution 866 (1993), UNOMIL would be comprised of 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel and 45 military engineering personnel, as well as humanitarian and electoral components. Its military tasks are to: investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations of

the cease-fire agreement; monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement, including points on Liberia's borders, and, in particular, assist in the monitoring of compliance with the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia, and monitor the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. In addition, UNOMIL is required to observe and verify the election process; assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance; develop a plan and assess financial requirements for demobilization; report on any major violations of international humanitarian law; train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with ECOMOG coordinate the identification and clearance of land mines and unexploded bombs and coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of its separate responsibilities.

I. Political Aspects

5. The Peace Agreement stipulated that there should be a single Liberia National Transitional Government the mandate of which is to provide essential government services during the transitional period and to also hold and supervise general and presidential elections. The transitional government would have three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Executive authority would be invested in a five-member Council of State. The composition of these organs of state would include all of the parties signatory to the Agreement, so as to emphasize the inclusionary character of the transitional period. The transitional government was to be installed in Monrovia approximately 30 days from the date of the signature of the Peace Agreement, concomitant with the commencement of disarmament. Upon the installation of the transitional government, both the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), the governing arm of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), would cease to exist.

6. On 17 August 1993, following consultations between the Liberian parties, the five members of the Council of State were selected and its Chairperson and two Vice-Chairpersons chosen. The swearing in of the Council had yet to take place as it awaits the beginning of disarmament.

7. The Chairman of ECOWAS, President Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo of Benin, arranged for further consultations among the parties at a meeting in Cotonou from 3 to 5 November 1993. At this meeting the parties agreed on the distribution between them of 13 out of a total of 17 cabinet posts. Further talks among the parties on the remaining 4 ministerial portfolios, i.e. defense, foreign affairs, finance and justice, as well as other issues related to the installation of the transitional government, are continuing. The parties have also reached agreement on the composition of the Elections Commission, on the Speaker of the Legislature and the members of the Supreme Court.

8. The emergence of a new group in the south-east, the Liberia Peace Council, and the reported formation of another group in Upper Lofa, the Liberia Defense Force, have complicated the political scene. These groups, which are not signatories to the Cotonou Peace Agreement, have engaged in skirmishes in those areas of the country.

9. In adopting resolution 866 (1993), the Security Council welcomed my intention to conclude with the Chairmen of ECOWAS, prior to the full deployment of UNOMIL, an agreement defining the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in chapter IV of my report of 9 September 1993 (S/26422). On the basis of the informed consultations between ECOWAS and my Special Representative, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, I addressed to President Soglo of Benin, Chairman of ECOWAS, on 7 October 1993, a letter outlining the roles and responsibilities to be entrusted to UNOMIL and ECOMOG, in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in my previous report to the Council (S/26422). In a communication dated 11 November 1993, the of ECOWAS confirmed his agreement with the content of my letter. Accordingly, on 23 November 1993, I informed the President of the Security Council that this exchange of letters constituted the agreement between the United Nations and ECOWAS.

10. My Special Representative consults regularly with the parties to the Agreement, traveling throughout Liberia as required, as well as with ECOMOG, ECOWAS, representatives of OAU and States Members of the United Nations interested in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, particularly in regard to the commencement of disarmament of the Liberian parties and the deployment of the expanded ECOMOG troops. The single most important factor holding up the implementation of the Peace Agreement has been the delay in the deployment of the expanded ECOMOG. It is my hope that the discussions which my Special Representative has been conducting with the parties, ECOWAS and interested Member States will result in the initiation of disarmament in the near future. This is discussed further in the relevant sections below.

II. Military Aspects

A. General

11. On 10 August 1993, with the adoption of resolution 866 (1993), the Security Council authorized the deployment of an advanced party of 30 United Nations military observers to Liberia in order to assist in the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire prior to the full establishment of UNOMIL. The advance party began arriving in Liberia immediately thereafter and all 30 military observers arrived in the country by mid-September.

12. The Liberian parties had concurred, under the Peace Agreement, that in order to monitor and ensure against any violation of the cease-fire between the period of its coming into force on 1 August 1993 and the arrival of the additional ECOMOG troops, and the full contingent of United Nations military observers, a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee would be established in order to monitor, investigate and report all cease-fire violations. The Committee is composed of representatives of the Liberian parties and ECOMOG and chaired by the United Nations. Upon full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the Committee will be replaced by a Violations Committee. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, on 13 August 1993, the United Nations chaired its first meeting of the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee. To date, the Committee has successfully investigated and resolved 59 out of 99 alleged cease-fire violations and has been an important confidence-building instrument among the parties. Of the remaining 40 cease-fire violations, investigations have been carried out on 25 of the violations and an additional 15 are still pending.

13. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee teams are expected to travel freely throughout Liberia in order to monitor and investigate reports of cease-fire violations. They are also to be deployed at border crossings and ports of entry. At present, permanent monitoring teams have been deployed at Vahun in Upper Lofa, on the border with Sierra Leone; at Loguato, on the border with Côte d'Ivoire, and in Kakata and Buchanan (see map in the annex of the present report). The teams also patrol the front line from Kakata through Harbel along the highway to Buchanan. In addition, a monitoring team also accompanied the train carrying humanitarian assistance from Buchanan to Yekepa, in territory under NPFL/NPRAG control. Agreement has also been reached on the deployment of two teams at the Spriggs-Payne airport and the Freeport in Monrovia. These teams regularly patrol their areas of responsibility and undertake investigations of alleged cease-fire violations.

14. Initially, the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee faced logistical and administrative difficulties, as well as the effects of distrust among the parties. While all the parties encountered difficulties in meeting their obligations to attend Committee meetings and to facilitate its work in their areas of control, NPFL/NPRAG was most constrained in meeting its obligations, owing to shortages of fuel and other vitally needed supplies not readily available in areas under their control. Furthermore, the Committee has not been able to establish permanent bases at Tow Town in Grand Gedeh County, Greenville in Sinoe County, Harper in Maryland County, or to enter the south-east to investigate the activities of the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), owing to objections from NPFL/NPRAG on security grounds. Similarly, ULIMO has not permitted the establishment of a Monitoring Committee base at Zorzor in Upper Lofa County. It is my understanding, however, that on the basis of recent discussions with my Special

Representative and my Chief Military Observer, all parties are now willing to allow the deployment of United Nations military observers in their areas of control. It is expected that UNOMIL will soon be able to have freedom of movement throughout the country.

15. The Chief Military Observer, Major-General Daniel Ishmael Opande from Kenya, arrived in the country on 10 October 1993. There are at present 166 UNOMIL military personnel in Liberia from 13 contributing countries. Additional military observers are being deployed. Logistic difficulties have been encountered in deploying military observers and in ensuring that transportation and communications equipment are purchased and sent to Liberia in a timely manner. Despite these difficulties, it is expected that by the end of December, full deployment of the total authorized strength of 368 military personnel (including 20 medical and 45 engineering personnel) will have been completed.

16. In addition to regular patrolling and cease-fire monitoring through the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee, United Nations military observers have been conducting reconnaissance missions in cooperation with the parties and ECOMOG in many areas of Liberia in preparation for their deployment to these areas and in preparation for disarmament and demobilization. The military observers have also engaged in the establishment of regional headquarters and the transportation and communication units, in accordance with the UNOMIL concept of operations described in my report of 9 September 1993 (S/24622).

B. Disarmament and demobilization

17. Under resolution 866 (1993), the Security Council mandated UNOMIL to prepare a plan and to assess the financial needs of disarmament and demobilization. I am pleased to report that the planning and preparation of disarmament and demobilization which has been undertaken in consultation with the Liberian parties, ECOMOG, United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are well under way. Ten cantonment centers have been identified, although physical inspection for site preparation has been possible only in a limited number of these locations. Three of these cantonment centers are being prepared to receive combatants as soon as disarmament begins. Workshops have been organized throughout the country to urge community leaders to reintegrate ex-combatants. A public information campaign has also been launched focusing on cartoons and radio programs outlining the need for disarmament in order to consolidate the peace process.

18. It was originally foreseen that the cost of disarmament and demobilization would be met by the Trust Fund for Liberia. However, as of today, no pledges have been made to the Trust Fund for this purpose. Since disarmament

and demobilization are essential for the establishment of the transitional government, the holding of free and fair elections and, therefore, to the successful implementation of the entire peace process, I have included in the UNOMIL budget an amount of approximately \$5 million to cover only the immediate short-term needs of disarmament and demobilization. This would enable approximately 54,000 adult combatants and 6,000 children soldiers to give up their arms and return to their homes. Should contributions for disarmament and demobilization be made to the Trust Fund, the UNOMIL would be reimbursed by such contributions. It is anticipated that the other aspects of demobilization, including training and other reintegration programs to help the ex-combatants build sustainable new lives, will be included in the inter-agency appeal for humanitarian assistance to Liberia, which I expect to issue this month.

19. Planning for disarmament and demobilization has been impeded by the failure of the parties to provide vitally need information on the number and location of their combatants, weapons, and mines. This information is needed for the preparation of schedules for implementation. Although, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, the commencement of disarmament is linked to the expansion of ECOMOG, in my previous report on Liberia to the Security Council (S/26422), I called upon the parties to exercise greater flexibility in accelerating disarmament. In this connection, it should be recalled that ULIMO has consistently offered to disarm to ECOMOG as constituted. NPFL/NPRAG has, in more recent pronouncements, expressed a willingness to commence voluntary disarmament to United Nations military observers, accompanied by calls for the immediate installation of the transitional government. This proposal is being carefully examined since it would entail a revision of the UNOMIL mandate. Should the deployment of additional ECOMOG troops be further delayed, I would then present the appropriate recommendations to the Security Council in this regard. I am concerned, however, at reports which indicate that the Armed Forces of Liberia, the military arm of the IGNU, is attempting to link disarmament to pensionable arrangements. My Special Representative is continuing his dialogue with the Armed Forces of Liberia and IGNU to ensure that the Armed Forces of Liberia disarm in accordance with the Peace Agreement.

C. The expanded ECOMOG force

20. Throughout negotiations in Geneva and in Cotonou in July 1993, the expansion of ECOMOG was viewed as a crucial prerequisite for progress towards a lasting peace in Liberia. As I indicated to the Security Council in my report of 9 September, the Chairman of ECOWAS has informed me that ECOMOG would require financial assistance for the deployment of the additional ECOMOG troops. With the adoption of resolution 866 (1993), the Security Council welcomed the steps I had taken to establish a Trust Fund, under which

Member States could make voluntary contributions to facilitate the reinforcements by African States from outside the West African region to ECOMOG, assist in supporting troops of participating ECOMOG countries and also assist in mine-clearance, humanitarian and development activities, as well as the electoral process. I am pleased to report that, on 30 September 1993, the United States pledged \$19.83 million to the Trust Fund, exclusively to meet the cost of deployment, equipment and maintenance needs of the expanded ECOMOG troops.

21. During the month of October, my special Representative led a joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG reconnaissance mission to potential contributing countries to the expanded ECOMOG. As a result of discussions held during this mission, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe agreed to contribute a battalion each to the expanded ECOMOG. These three additional battalions are deemed sufficient to enable ECOMOG to carry out its responsibilities under the Cotonou Peace Agreement. During the month of November, these three countries sent reconnaissance missions to Liberia to examine the needs of their troops on the ground. On the basis of these reconnaissance missions and further discussions with ECOMOG, and in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia, a budget estimate covering the deployment, maintenance and equipment requirements of the three battalions for a six-month period has been developed. On this basis, it is my hope that the additional ECOMOG troops will soon be deployed to Liberia, thus enabling the disarmament and demobilization to commence immediately.

22. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, all three parties have committed themselves to ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches all Liberians through the most direct routes, in compliance with inspection arrangements consistent with economic sanctions and the military embargo. Similarly, Security Council resolution 866 (1993) mandated UNOMIL, *inter alia* to assist in coordinating humanitarian activities in conjunction with the existing United Nations humanitarian relief operation. Recent efforts to improve coordination mechanisms between the United Nations and the NGO community are already yielding positive results. Humanitarian relief is distributed according to the criteria of need. In view of massive population displacements within Liberia and across its borders, which resulted from the conflict, the quantities of food distributed to areas under the control of the various factions have always been a source of contention.

23. At times, security problems and logistical constraints disrupt and delay the delivery of assistance. Despite this, food and other essential assistance are reaching the most vulnerable groups either across what was the front line, or cross-border through Côte d'Ivoire and, in the case of Upper Lofa, where road conditions proved insurmountable, by airdrop. However, there remain short-

falls in the quantities of essential assistance delivered. These shortfalls are being addressed and the acute malnutrition of August is being reversed in almost all areas. Insecurity in some isolated areas such as Voinjama in Upper Lofa and the south-east has left some communities in dire circumstances.

24. The Cotonou Peace Agreement calls on the parties to adopt a policy which will create conditions to facilitate repatriation of refugees. In committing to this, the parties in turn invited the United Nations, particularly the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and NGOs, to support programmes of voluntary repatriation. In planning for repatriation, UNHCR convened a regional meeting in October 1993, to assess requirements and needs for establishing transit and reception centers in order to ensure speedy and orderly repatriation. UNHCR estimates that approximately 60 per cent of the 700,000 refugees will return to Liberia once there are clear signals that peace has been restored. UNHCR has launched an appeal for the resources to facilitate repatriation.

25. I am pleased to note the contribution of \$1 million to the Liberia Trust Fund by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, specifically to help meet the humanitarian assistance needs in Liberia.

IV. Elections

26. The Cotonou Peace Agreement provides for the holding of general and presidential elections in approximately seven months from the signature of the Accord, that is, in February/March 1994. The United Nations and the International Foundation for Election System (IFES) undertook a joint mission to Liberia in October 1993 to assess the requirements for holding elections and to evaluate the probability of maintaining the timetable set out in the Agreement. The mission concluded that this timetable was optimistic but that elections could possibly be held by May, on the assumption that disarmament and demobilization, installation of the transitional government and unification of the country were achieved expeditiously. The mission pointed out, however, that the transitional government will require financial assistance in order to hold the elections.

V. Human Rights

27. Abuses of basic human rights have characterized the civil war in Liberia. In May of this year, some 500 civilians were killed in Harbel. On 17 September 1993, I informed the Security Council of the findings of the Panel of Inquiry which I had appointed to investigate the Harbel massacre. In my letter of 17 November to the President of the Security Council. I informed the Security Council of the actions I had taken in response to the recommendations of the Panel.

28. Several other examples of human rights abuses have been recorded throughout the Liberian civil war. With the adoption of resolution 866 (1993), in particular paragraph 3 (f), the Security Council mandated UNOMIL to report to me on any major violations of international humanitarian law. Most recently, UNOMIL has received reports of alleged killings in Upper Lofa resulting from ethnic animosities. These matters have prompted my Special Representative to consult the United Nations Centre for Human Rights with a view to including a Human Rights Officer on his team in Monrovia.

VI. Financial Aspects

29. The total cost of UNOMIL for the period of its mandate, 22 September 1993 through 21 April 1994, including the costs related to the technical survey mission of August 1993 and the advance party of 30 military observers, authorized by the Security Council with the adoption of resolution 856 (1993) on 10 August 1993, has been estimated at \$43,509,200 as indicated in my report of 19 November 1993 on the financing of UNOMIL (A/48/592). This includes the amount of \$3.3 million, which the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) authorized on 20 September 1993 to meet costs of the advance party. It is my hope that the General Assembly will take prompt action to approve the budget of UNOMIL so as to avoid delays in the implementation of the UNOMIL mandate. The current civilian strength of the mission includes 32 international staff and 44 locally recruited staff.

VII. Concluding Observations

30. As I noted in my previous report on Liberia to the Security Council (S/26422), UNOMIL is the first peace-keeping operation undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case a subregional organization. The implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement is dependent not only on the ability of UNOMIL and ECOMOG to meet their obligations as outlined in the Agreement, but also on the deployment of additional ECOMOG peace-keeping troops from three new troop contributing countries, as well as financial support from yet another source for the additional troops.

31. In addition to these complex implementation arrangements, the Agreement calls for what is considered to be an ambitious timetable for its implementation. In terms of the Agreement, disarmament would have begun within 30 days of its signature, concomitant with the establishment of the transitional government, this is, by the end of August 1993. From the beginning of the peace process in Liberia, all parties have been aware that the timetable was highly ambitious, especially given the complexities in establishing the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG peace-keeping mission, including the deployment of additional ECOMOG troops. However, there is every indication that disarmament will


begin shortly and that the transitional government will soon be established. In my next report to the Security Council, I expect to be able to provide more precise information on the timetable for elections, which the transitional government should be able to hold during the first half of 1994.

32. In spite of delays in the implementation of the Agreement, there have been no major violations of the cease-fire. The Liberian parties have displayed a willingness to move the peace process forward by nominating members of the Council of State and the Elections Commission, and by agreeing on the distribution of the majority of cabinet posts of the transitional government. I have learned with satisfaction from recent reports from my Special Representative that the parties are now showing more flexibility in their cooperation with UNOMIL and ECOMOG. I urge them to continue this positive approach. As I stated in my previous report to the Security Council (S/26422), the most fundamental prerequisite for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace and stability in Liberia is that the leaders and people of Liberia should adhere to and implement faithfully the Cotonou Peace Agreement.

33. One of the hopes inspired by the signing of the Cotonou Peace Agreement was that speedy demilitarization and unification of Liberia under a single national authority would greatly enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance and set the stage for national reconstruction. Recent reports indicate the possibility of the Liberian parties soon establishing the transitional government, which would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and further rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. I invite the international community to respond generously to the inter-agency appeal for humanitarian assistance to Liberia, which will be issued this month, so as to ensure an adequate flow of resources for the important relief and rehabilitation work that is being undertaken in Liberia.

34. In view of the considerations above, I recommend that the Security Council, in reviewing the progress made in implementing the Cotonou Peace Agreement, agree that UNOMIL should continue to implement the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 866 (1993). However, as I have already indicated, it is unlikely that the original timetable for elections will be met. Should this prove to be the case, I would bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council with appropriate recommendations.

Map



**UN Security Council
Resolution 788 on Liberia**

Text of Resolution 788 passed by the UN Security Council on November 19, 1992.

The Security Council,

Recalling the statements by the President of the council on its behalf on 22 January 1991 (s/22133) and 7 May 1992 (s/23886) on the situation in Liberia,

Reaffirming its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord Of 30 October 1991 (s/24811) offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia,

Taking into account the decision of The Joint Meeting Of The Standing Mediation Committee And the Committee Of Five Of 20 October 1992 held at Cotonou, Benin (s/24735) And The Final Communique Of The First Meeting Of The Monitoring Committee Of Nine On The Liberian Conflict issued at Abuja, Nigeria on 7 November 1992 (s/24812, Annex),

Regretting that parties to the conflict in Liberia have not respected or implemented the various accords to date, especially the Yamoussoukro IV Accord (s/24811),

Determining that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly in West Africa as a whole,

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of The Charter of the United Nations,

Noting that the deterioration of the situation hinders the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections in accordance with the Yamoussoukro IV Accord,

Welcoming the continued commitment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian Conflict,

Further welcoming the endorsement and support by the Organization Of African Unity of these efforts,

Noting the request of 29 July 1992 from ECOWAS for the United Nations to dispatch an observer group to Liberia to verify and monitor the electoral process,

Taking note of the invitation of ECOWAS of 20 October, 1992, in Cotonou, Benin, for the Secretary-General to consider, if necessary, the dispatch of a group to observe the encampment and disarmament of the warring parties,

Recognizing the need for increased humanitarian assistance,

Taking into account the request made by the Permanent Representative of Benin on behalf of ECOWAS (s/24735),

Taking also into account the letter of the Foreign Minister of Liberia endorsing the Request made by the Permanent Representative of Benin on behalf of Ecowas (s/24825),

Convinced that it is vital to find a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the conflict in Liberia,

1. commends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia;

2. reaffirms Its belief that The Yamoussoukro IV Accord offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian Conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia, and calls upon ECOWAS to continue its efforts to assist in the peaceful implementation of this Accord;

3. condemns the violation of the cease-fire of 28 November 1990 by any party to the conflict;

4. condemns the continuing armed attacks against the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia by one of the parties of the conflict;

5. calls upon all parties to the conflict and all others concerned to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law;

6. calls upon all parties to the conflict to respect and implement the cease-fire and the various accords of the peace process, including the Yamoussoukro IV Accord Of 30 October 1991, And The Final Communique Of The Informal Consultative Group Meeting Of Ecowas Committee Of Five on Liberia issued at Geneva On 7 April 1992, to which they themselves have agreed;

7. requests the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a special representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible with any recommendations he may wish to make;

8. decides, under Chapter VII of The Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia until the Security Council decides otherwise;

9. decides within the same framework that the embargo imposed by paragraph 8 shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia, subject to any

review that may be required in conformity with the report of the secretary-general;

10. requests all states to respect the measures established by ECOWAS to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict in Liberia;

11. calls on member states to exercise self-restraint in their relations with all parties to the Liberian conflict and to refrain from taking any action that would be inimical to the peace process;

12. commends the efforts of member states, the United Nations System and humanitarian organizations in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Liberia, and in this regard reaffirms its support for increased humanitarian assistance;

13. requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible;

14. decides to remain seized of the matter.

***Adopted by the Security Council at its 3187th meeting,
on 26 March 1993***

2. Commends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia;

3. *Commends* the OAU for its efforts in support of the peace process in Liberia;

4. *Reaffirms* its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia, and *encourages* ECOWAS to continue its efforts to assist in the peaceful implementation of this Accord;

5. *Condemns* the violation of the cease-fire of 28 November 1990 by any party to the conflict;

6. *Condemns* the continuing armed attacks against the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia by one of the parties to the conflict;

7. *Reiterates its call upon* all parties to respect and implement the cease-fire and the various accords of the peace process, including the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991, and the Final Communiqué of the Informal Consultative Group Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five in Liberia, issued at Geneva on 7 April 1992, to which they themselves have agreed;

8. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's appointment of Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as his Special Representative for Liberia;

9. *Calls upon* all States strictly to abide by and comply with the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia imposed by resolution 788 (1992) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

10. *Demands* that all parties fully cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and ECOWAS with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991;

11. *Declares* its readiness to consider appropriate measures in support of ECOWAS if any party is unwilling to cooperate in implementation of the provisions of the Yamoussoukro Accords, in particular the encampment and disarmament provisions;

12. *Reiterates* its call on Member States to exercise self-restraint in their relations with all parties to the Liberian conflict, in particular to refrain from providing any military assistance to any of the parties and also to refrain from taking any action that would be inimical to the peace process;

13. *Reaffirms* that the embargo imposed by resolution 788 (1992) shall not apply to weapons, military equipment and military assistance destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia;

14. *Further commends* the efforts of Member States, the United Nations system and humanitarian organizations in providing humanitarian assistance

to the victims of the conflict in Liberia, and in this regard *reaffirming* its support for increased humanitarian assistance;

15. *Demands* that the parties concerned refrain from any action that will impede or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance and *calls upon* them to ensure the safety of all personnel involved in international humanitarian assistance;

16. *Reiterates its call upon* all parties to the conflict and all others concerned to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with ECOWAS, to consider the possibility of convening a meeting of the President of the Interim Government of National Unity and the warring factions, after thorough and detailed groundwork, to restate their commitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord within an agreed timetable;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to discuss with ECOWAS and the parties concerned the contribution which the United Nations could make in support of the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, including the deployment of United Nations observers;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible;

20. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

**Security Council
Resolution 866 (1993)
22 September 1993**

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 813 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 856 (1993) of 10 August 1993,

"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26422 and Add. 1) dated 9 September 1993 on the proposed establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),

"Noting that the Peace Agreement signed by the three Liberian parties in Cotonou on 25 July 1993 calls on the United Nations and the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist in the implementation of the Agreement,

"Emphasizing as noted in the Secretary-General's report of 4 August 1993 (S/26200), that the Peace Agreement assigns ECOMOG the primary responsibility of supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and envisages that the United Nations role shall be to monitor and verify this process,

"Noting that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS,

"Recognizing that United Nations involvement would contribute significantly to the effective implementation of the Peace Agreement and would serve to underline the international community's commitment to conflict resolution in Liberia,

"Commending ECOWAS for its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia,

"Commending also the efforts of the Organization of African Unity in support of the peace process in Liberia,

"Stressing the importance of full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG in the implementation of their respective mandates,

"Taking note of the deployment of an advance team of United Nations military observers to Liberia as authorized under resolution 856 (1993),

"Welcoming the establishment of the Joint Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) composed of the three Liberian parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations,

"Welcoming also the formation in Cotonou on 27 August 1993 of the five-member Council of State representing all three Liberian parties, which,

"In accordance with the peace Agreement, shall be installed concomitantly with the commencement of the disengagement process and shall be responsible for the day-to-day operation of the transitional Government,

"Noting that the Peace Agreement calls for legislative and presidential elections to take place approximately seven months after the signing of the Peace Agreement,

"1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 9 September 1993 (S/26422) on the proposed establishment of UNOMIL;

"2. Decides to establish UNOMIL under its authority and under the direction of the Secretary-General through his Special Representative for a period of seven months, subject to the proviso that it will continue beyond 16 December 1993 only upon a review by the council based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement and other measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace;

"3. Decides that UNOMIL shall comprise military observers as well as medical, engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components, in the numbers indicated in the Secretary-General's report, together with staff necessary to support it, and shall have the following mandate:

"(a) To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreement and, if the violation cannot be corrected, to report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General;

"(b) To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement, including at points on Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries, and to verify its impartial application, and in particular to assist in the monitoring of compliance with the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants;

"(c) To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement;

"(d) To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in the field in conjunction with the existing United Nations humanitarian relief operation;

"(e) To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants;

"(f) To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General;

"(g) To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and unexploded bombs;

"(h) Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally;

"4. Welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to conclude with the Chairman of ECOWAS an agreement defining, before deployment of UNOMIL, the roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOWAS in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in accordance with the concept of operations outlined in Chapter IV of the Secretary-General's report (S/26422), and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress and outcome of the negotiations leading thereto;

"5. Encourages African States to provide the additional troops requested from them by ECOWAS for ECOMOG;

"6. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund, which would facilitate the sending of reinforcements by African States to ECOMOG, assist in supporting troops of participating ECOMOG countries and also assist in mine-clearing, humanitarian and development activities, as well as the electoral process, and calls on Member States to support the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the Trust Fund;

"7. Urges the Liberian parties to commence the encampment, disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

"8. Welcomes the decision to establish the transitional government and urges also the Liberian parties to begin the exercise of that government's responsibilities concomitantly with the process described in paragraph 7 above and consistent with the peace Agreement;

"9. Calls on the transitional government to conclude expeditiously, and no later than 60 days after its installation, a Status of Mission Agreement with the United Nations to facilitate the full deployment of UNOMIL;

"10. Urges the Liberian parties to finalize the composition of the Elections Commission so that it can promptly undertake the necessary preparations for legislative and presidential elections by March 1994, at the latest, in accordance with the timetable foreseen in the Peace Agreement;

"11. Calls on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully in the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country by the most direct routes, in accordance with the Peace Agreement;

"12. Welcomes ECOMOG's stated commitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL observers and civilian staff and urges the Liberian parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNOMIL personnel, as well as of the personnel involved in relief operations, and strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

"13. Requests the Secretary-General to submit progress reports to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution by 16 December 1993 and by 16 February 1994;

"14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

Liberia**No Chance For A Lasting Peace
Without Effective Human Rights
Guarantees**

An Amnesty International Report
AI INDEX: AFR
34/01/93

13 December 1993

Summary

Amnesty International believes that there is no chance for a lasting peace in Liberia unless effective guarantees on human rights are included in the peace process. While welcoming and recognizing the significance of the recent peace agreement, signed for the first time in the Liberian conflict under the aegis of the **United Nations (UN)**, Amnesty International feels that it is seriously flawed by the omission of conditions obliging the warring factions or any future government to respect human rights or to bring to justice those responsible for killings and torture.

On 25 July 1993 the armed groups which have been contesting control of Liberia in recent years signed a peace accord in Cotonou, Benin, which provided for a UN-supervised cease-fire and for the establishment of a transitional government. It was also signed by the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** and the UN, which are responsible for ensuring its implementation, and the **Organization for African Unity (OAU)**. However, by December 1993, the armed groups had not begun to place their combatants into camps or to disarm them, and the formation of the transitional government was plagued by disagreements.

Amnesty International is concerned that the peace accord makes no recommendations about the investigation and reporting of the gross human rights violations which have been committed by all sides since the start of the civil war in December 1989, and that no effective steps have been taken to investigate even the most serious of atrocities committed in 1993. Although a UN inquiry into the massacre of nearly 600 civilians at Harbel in June 1993 called for criminal investigations with a view to prosecution of those responsible for these and other major atrocities, no investigation is known to have been conducted since by any of the warring parties or by ECOWAS.

Amnesty International is also concerned that the agreement contains no guarantees for the safety of released prisoners or specific human rights guaran-


tees, and that no mechanisms have been established to ensure continuing monitoring of the human rights situation nor the investigation and the remedy of any violations which may occur. The agreement provides for an amnesty which could include those responsible for human rights violations, war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the mechanisms for ensuring implementation of the agreement appear likely to be ineffective.

Amnesty International is therefore calling upon all parties to the conflict and the future transitional government of which they are a part:

- to end human rights abuses and provide adequate safeguards for detainees, including ensuring full access to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross;
- to exclude from any amnesty, or from any position of authority over prisoners or over armed personnel, those suspected of being responsible for human rights abuses, and bring them to justice;
- to report all human rights abuses to the appropriate authorities and to encourage the general public in Liberia also to do so;
- to ratify international human rights treaties and to amend and implement the Liberian Constitution and laws consistently with internationally-recognized human rights standards;
- to undertake steps towards long-term institution-building and reforms for the promotion of human rights, including establishing—in cooperation with the UN, ECOWAS, and the OAU—an independent judicial system and properly trained security forces.

Amnesty International is calling on the UN, ECOWAS, and OAU:

- to ensure that a human rights monitoring mechanism is established with a mandate to investigate and report human rights abuses and that it issues frequent reports and distributes them widely;
- to establish an international group of civilian advisers to assist in human rights training and amendment of the Liberian Constitution and laws, and to support local human rights initiatives;
- to maintain an international presence in Liberia for as long as may be necessary after any future elections to ensure human rights are respected.



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1. Introduction and recommendations

Amnesty International believes that there is no chance for a lasting peace in Liberia unless effective guarantees on human rights are included in the peace process. While welcoming and recognizing the significance of the recent peace agreement, signed for the first time in the Liberian conflict under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), Amnesty International feels that it is seriously flawed by the omission of conditions obliging the warring factions or any future government to respect human rights or to bring to justice those responsible for killings and torture.

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Amnesty International is concerned that the peace accord makes no recommendations about the investigation and reporting of the gross human rights violations which have been committed by all sides since the start of the civil war in December 1989, and that no effective steps have been taken to investigate even the most serious of atrocities committed in 1993. Although a UN inquiry into the massacre of nearly 600 civilians at Harbel in June 1993 called for criminal investigations with a view to prosecution of those responsible for these and other major atrocities, no investigation is known to have been conducted since by any of the warring parties or by ECOWAS.

Amnesty International is also concerned that the agreement contains no guarantees for the safety of released prisoners or specific human rights guarantees, and that no mechanisms have been established to ensure continuing monitoring of the human rights situation nor the investigation and the remedy of any violations which may occur. The agreement provides for an amnesty which could include those responsible for human rights violations, war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the mechanisms for ensuring implementation of the agreement appear likely to be ineffective.

Amnesty International is therefore calling upon all parties to the conflict and the future transitional government of which they are a part:

- to end human rights abuses and provide adequate safeguards for detainees, including ensuring full access to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross;

- to exclude from any amnesty, or from any position of authority over prisoners or over armed personnel, those suspected of being responsible for human rights abuses, and bring them to justice;
- to report all human rights abuses to the appropriate authorities and to encourage the general public in Liberia also to do so;
- to ratify international human rights treaties and to amend and implement the Liberian Constitution and laws consistently with internationally-recognized human rights standards;
- to undertake steps towards long-term institution-building and reforms for the promotion of human rights, including establishing—in cooperation with the UN, ECOWAS, and the OAU—an independent judicial system and properly trained security forces.

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- to ensure that a human rights monitoring mechanism is established with a mandate to investigate and report human rights abuses and that it issues frequent reports and distributes them widely;
- to establish an international group of civilian advisers to assist in human rights training and amendment of the Liberian Constitution and laws, and to support local human rights initiatives;
- to maintain an international presence in Liberia for as long as may be necessary after any future elections to ensure human rights are respected.

2. Background to the Cotonou peace agreement

The Cotonou peace agreement was the latest in a series of peace accords negotiated since 1990. Previous ones have failed to bring peace to Liberia in recent years.

As many as 20,000 people are estimated to have been killed following the invasion of Liberia in December 1989 by the **National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)**, a rebel force headed by Charles Taylor. Both the government army, the **Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)**, and the NPFL carried out ethnic killings on a large scale against those perceived as supporting their opponents. After failing to get the opposing sides to agree a cease-fire, ECOWAS sent a joint military force, the **ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group**—known as the **ECOMOG**—into Monrovia in August 1990. ECOMOG negotiated a cease-fire in November 1990 which was maintained for the most part until mid-1992. In Monrovia, an **Interim Government of National Unity** was established with ECOWAS support and the NPFL was prevented from seizing Monrovia, which its forces had surrounded.

After more than a year of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the warring factions to reach lasting peace agreements, ECOWAS brokered a peace accord in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, in October 1991 which was confirmed in Geneva in April 1992. It provided for the encampment and disarmament of all armed groups under the supervision of ECOMOG, to be followed by elections. However, Charles Taylor's administration, the **National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG)**, which was based in Gbarnga, Bong County, and which controlled most of the country, failed to abide by the successive peace accords, accusing ECOMOG of not being neutral in the conflict. In July and August 1992 fighters of an armed group set up in 1991 by former AFL members, the **United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)**, seized control of NPFL-held territory in western Liberia; according to Charles Taylor this was with the assistance of ECOMOG forces.

In October of 1992 the NPFL launched an attack on Monrovia. The capital was defended by ECOMOG with the support of ULIMO and the AFL, the latter reinstated as the national army in November 1992. ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo and economic sanctions on the NPFL and sought the backing of the UN Security Council. On 19 November 1992 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 788, which endorsed the Yamoussoukro agreement, condemned violations of the cease-fire and attacks on ECOMOG forces, and requested the UN Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a Special Representative to Liberia. It imposed an arms embargo on Liberia which exempted the ECOMOG forces. Subsequently the UN Secretary-General appointed Trevor Gordon-Somers of Jamaica as his Special Envoy to Liberia and the OAU appointed the Reverend Professor Canaan Banana, former President of Zimbabwe, as an Eminent Person to deal with the Liberian conflict. Both began intensive efforts to persuade the parties to negotiate. Amnesty International urged the UN Special Envoy to explore and recommend urgent measures to ensure the protection of human rights.

After several weeks of fighting around Monrovia, the ECOMOG forces took the offensive and by May 1993 had control of key installations in NPFL-held territory: Robertsfield international airport, 50 kilometers from Monrovia, the Firestone rubber plantation at Harbel and Kakata, and the port of Buchanan. Hundreds of civilians died when ECOMOG forces bombed and strafed towns and villages in NPFL areas, and thousands fled the fighting and bombing. ECOMOG made a number of air attacks on border posts in Côte d'Ivoire and on international aid vehicles. In May 1993 ECOWAS stopped all international aid organizations from entering NPFL territory from Côte d'Ivoire, accusing them of smuggling arms and fuel to the NPFL. Hundreds of civilians in NPFL territory were reported to have died from malnutrition and disease, but aid was not resumed until August.

In June 1993, nearly 600 unarmed civilians—mostly women, children, and elderly people—were brutally killed at displaced people's camps near Harbel 50 kilometers east of Monrovia. They were refugees who had fled the ECOMOG bombardment and capture of Buchanan in April 1993. Immediately after the massacre occurred the Interim Government, the AFL and ECOMOG claimed that the NPFL was responsible, despite strong NPFL denials. The UN Security Council called for an investigation into the killings and the UN Secretary-General established a panel of inquiry which visited Liberia in August.

3. The Cotonou peace agreement

In July 1993 a conference of the warring factions was convened in Geneva by the UN and on 25 July a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the Interim Government, the NPRAG and ULIMO, as well as by the UN, OAU, and ECOWAS. The Cotonou agreement provides for:

- a cease-fire;
- the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants of the warring parties;
- the release of prisoners;
- access for humanitarian assistance;
- the return of refugees;
- the establishment of a six-month transitional government to conduct free and fair elections
- an amnesty for acts during military engagements.

ECOWAS and the UN are responsible for ensuring that the agreement is implemented, but it contains no guarantees for the safety of released prisoners or specific human rights guarantees, and no mechanisms have been established to ensure continuing monitoring of the human rights situation nor to investigate and remedy any violations which may occur. The agreement provides for an amnesty which could include those responsible for human rights violations, war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the mechanisms for ensuring implementation of the agreement appear likely to be ineffective.

a. The lack of safeguards for prisoners

This agreement specifies that prisoners-of-war and detainees—but excluding “common criminals”—should be immediately released to the Red Cross for onward transmission to encampment sites.

This provision is dangerously flawed for several reasons. The agreement does not appear to extend to detainees who are being detained as dissidents by

their own side. Detainees who do not wish to be returned to the control of their own side are not protected. There is no requirement that all prisoners be identified by name, place of detention and dates of detention, or that deaths in custody be reported. Such a requirement is an essential safeguard against political killings and "disappearance" or against any failure to account for the fate of prisoners. There is no screening of prisoners to determine whether they are political or not.

b. The absence of human rights provisions

The agreement contains no human rights guarantees, despite the importance of human rights to the success of peace-keeping operations, as emphasized by the UN Secretary-General in September 1993:

*"The importance of human rights to the United Nations activities in the fields of peacemaking, peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy, and in social and economic development, was also amply demonstrated by the Vienna Conference [on Human Rights]. The inclusion of the human rights dimension in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the programmes and projects in those areas will be important to their success and to the promotion of human rights."*²

Under the peace agreement, the transitional government is to operate under the Constitution and laws of Liberia. However, although the 1985 Constitution contains an extensive list of human rights guarantees, most are subject to restriction at any time and, in case of emergency, all of them may be completely suspended. In addition, these provisions do not apply directly to the warring factions pending the installation of the transitional government, and Liberia has not ratified key human rights treaties which would provide additional safeguards.³

This agreement also contains no provisions for reconstructing the institutions of civil society which will ensure the rule of law and lasting respect for human rights. There is no requirement that the Constitution and other laws be amended to bring them into line with international standards. There are no provisions for rebuilding the judicial system to ensure that courts are competent, independent and impartial; for establishing independent prosecutors' offices; for guaranteeing the independence of the legal profession or for establishing prisons which conform to international minimum standards. There are no provisions for human rights—or any other—training of the judiciary, prosecutors, security and law enforcement officials or prison officials. The agreement fails to provide for the establishment or training of neutral armed forces or police forces under either the transitional government or after the elections.⁴

The absence of human rights provisions in the agreement gravely impeded the process of establishing a lasting peace. As the UN Secretary-General stressed in May 1993 with regard to Angola, "respect for human rights constitutes a vital, indeed a critical component, among measures to resolve, on a long-term basis, conflicts of this nature, including efforts to promote enduring conditions of peace, national reconciliation and democracy."⁵

c. Impunity for gross human rights violations and abuses

There are no provisions in the peace agreement for investigation of human rights abuses or breaches of humanitarian law obligations, for bringing those responsible for them to justice or for compensating the victims or their families. Indeed, the agreement provides for a general amnesty for acts "in the course of actual military engagements" or "in actual combat". There is a danger that this could be extended to those responsible for human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity during military engagements. This amnesty would not be extended to those responsible for the Harbel killings since, according to the UN panel of inquiry, they did not take place "in the course of actual military engagements" or during "actual combat".

Amnesty International believes that bringing people to justice is an essential component of healing the wounds in the society after internal conflicts and large-scale violations of human rights, but the pre-conviction amnesties undermine this goal. The interests of national reconciliation after a period of violence and confusion may be served by pardons after conviction: Amnesty International takes no position on this. But it does insist that the truth is revealed and the judicial process completed.

d. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms

An expanded ECOMOG Peace-keeping Force, including contingents from southern and eastern Africa recruited with the assistance of the OAU, and a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) are to supervise and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. Cease-fire violations are to be monitored by a committee representing all the factions and chaired by UNOMIL and ECOMOG.

However, ECOMOG and UNOMIL do not have an express mandate to monitor, investigate or report on breaches of human rights and humanitarian law obligations. In Amnesty International's experience, ignoring human rights violations gives a sense of impunity to armed groups which can then lead to further abuses. The UN has recognized that its personnel involved in observer missions have an obligation under the UN Charter to report violations of human rights even if the mandate of the observer mission does not expressly state this. As the UN Secretary-General stated in his report on the role of the UN Mission

for the Referendum in Western Sahara (), "while 's current military mandate is strictly limited to the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire, , as a United Nations mission, could not be a silent witness to conduct that might infringe the human rights of the civilian population."⁶ Another weakness of the monitoring mechanisms is that the peace agreement does not specify whether the cease-fire monitoring committee is to decide questions by consensus or by majority vote. If by consensus, this might allow any armed group to veto an investigation into human rights abuses by its members.

In addition, although UNOMIL will accompany ECOMOG patrols, it will withdraw if ECOMOG troops have to use force to maintain the peace. There would therefore be no independent monitoring of combat operations by ECOMOG, which in the past has been accused of human rights violations or failing to take effective action when parties to the conflict have committed human rights abuses. Amnesty International has repeatedly emphasized the necessity for international peace-keeping forces to observe human rights and humanitarian law standards and for independent monitoring of their conduct.

In view of all the flaws in the monitoring mechanisms in the agreement, it is essential that UNOMIL and ECOMOG establish appropriate human rights monitoring mechanisms which can investigate any reports of human rights violations and take all necessary steps to address these. Regular public reports on the human rights situation and the actions taken to address violations should be widely distributed.

Also, since the agreement fails to provide for international human rights assistance, it would be advisable to establish an international group of civilian human rights advisers to work closely with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and the transitional government and military or security forces which are set up. Some of these experts would have specific responsibilities to advise and train all of these forces on implementation of human rights and humanitarian law standards. Others would assist in drafting amendments to the constitution and laws to bring them into line with international human rights standards. Others would assist in rebuilding civic institutions such as the judicial system.

In light of the lengthy conflict and the high degree of distrust among the parties, it will be essential to ensure that international human rights monitoring and assistance are not abruptly withdrawn after any future elections but continue as long as may be necessary until it is clear that the new government is in a position itself to ensure respect for human rights and there is a strong legislative and institutional framework to support this. Although the agreement does not specify when the cease-fire monitoring committee will be dissolved, the UN Secretary-General has stated that UN observers will be withdrawn after

the elections take place. This contrasts with the approach in Cambodia, where the UN established follow-up mechanisms to replace the UN transitional authority after recent elections.

4. After the Cotonou Agreement

In August 1993 the Interim Government released 150 captured NPFL fighters and the 600-member UNOMIL started to arrive.

The UN inquiry into the June 1993 Harbel massacre concluded in September 1993 that it was the AFL, not the NPFL, which had planned and carried out the killings, and that there had been a deliberate attempt to implicate the NPFL and to cover up the AFL's responsibility. The panel called for a criminal investigation and prosecution of those responsible. Three AFL soldiers named in the panel of inquiry's report were subsequently detained. However, the Interim Government requested further evidence from the panel of inquiry before proceeding with any possible charges and no-one had been brought to justice by December 1993. This appears to be evidence both of a lack of will by the authorities in Monrovia to prosecute the killers and also a lack of capacity in Liberia for independent investigations.

In August and September 1993 there were reports of NPFL attacks on refugees in camps close to the border in Côte d'Ivoire or as they returned to tend their crops in southeastern Liberia. Several were reportedly killed. Some of these attacks appear to have been carried out by NPFL fighters looting for food. In October a new armed group led by supporters of former President Samuel Doe, the Liberian Peace Council, took control of parts of southeastern Liberia from the NPFL. Also in October the NPFL was accused of killing civilians in the course of conflict with ULIMO for control of Lofa and Bong Counties. ULIMO, which had carried out mass killings as it moved into Lofa County earlier in the year, lost control of several towns to another new armed group, the Lorma Defense Force, in November and December 1993.

By early December 1993 none of the warring factions had begun to disarm and cease-fire violations had occurred, including the movement of troops and obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Members of a joint transitional government had been named but it had not been installed; there have been allegations that the future transitional government included people who are unqualified or reportedly responsible for human rights abuses. ECOMOG forces had not been expanded, as planned, to include troops from southern and eastern Africa.

The full numbers of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel have not yet been deployed, apparently because of logistical and financial difficulties. The UN Secretary-General said on 9 September 1993 that "[t]he peace process in Liberia poses a special opportunity to the United Nations in that UNOMIL would be the

first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with the peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization", which would require close cooperation between the two organizations and pose some challenges, but he was confident that "this relationship will be successful and may even set a precedent for future peace-keeping missions."⁷ If the joint mission is to be successful in laying the foundation for a lasting peace in Liberia and set a solid precedent for the future, Amnesty International believes that the two organizations will have to ensure that they make the promotion and protection of human rights an essential component of their mission.

Endnotes

¹ ECOWAS is an intergovernmental organization of 16 states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo) with its headquarters in Nigeria. The aim of the ECOWAS is to promote co-operation and development and to improve the relations among member states.

² Report on the Work of the Organization from the 47th to the 48th Session of the General Assembly (A/48/1, para. 262), September 1993

³ Liberia has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but has not ratified them, the (First) and Second Optional Protocols to the ICCPR of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

⁴ Among the international standards which are relevant in the rebuilding of these institutions in a manner which is consistent with Liberia's international human rights obligations are: the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and S Executions.

⁵ UN Security Council, S/25840, 25 May 1993

⁶ UN Security Council, S/25170, 26 January 1993

⁷ UN Security Council, S/26422, 9 September 1993

**Treaty of Friendship, Offensive and Defensive,
Between Liberia and the State of Maryland, in Liberia,—
Signed at Harper, February 19, 1857.**

WHEREAS serious difficulties have arisen between the Government of the State of Maryland in Liberia and certain of the aboriginal tribes of the Cape Palmas district, and whereas the Government of the State of Maryland in Liberia—through its Executive, acting under the authority of an Act of the General Assembly of the said State of Maryland in Liberia, passed January 26, 1857—having applied to the Government of the Republic of Liberia for material aid in the supply of men and munitions of war; and whereas the Legislature of the Republic aforesaid penetrated with the necessity of affording prompt and efficient aid to a sister State, and of putting an end to the sanguinary contest which exposes the lives and property of the inhabitants of the State of Maryland in Liberia to the ravages of a savage foe, and animated by the desire of stopping the further effusion of blood and of arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have by an Act approved February 8th, 1857, authorized the President of the Republic of Liberia to adopt measures for the formation of an allied military force, offensive and defensive, of volunteers to be raised in the said Republic of Liberia in settling the difficulties now subsisting between the said State and those of aboriginal inhabitants who are hostile within its jurisdiction, and in re-establishing peace and confidence, which are called for as much by the laws of humanity as by the interests of all the civilized communities on this coast; and whereas the President of the Republic of Liberia, by the Legislative Act aforesaid, is authorized and directed to assume the expense of maintenance and payment of the troops employed, and of the munitions of war supplied to the Government of Maryland in Liberia, for the purpose aforesaid; and as a means of doing so, the President of the Republic aforesaid; being authorized so to do, has borrowed money on the faith and credit of the Government of the Republic of Liberia, which money, as far as applied to the defense of the State of Maryland in Liberia, in emoluments to volunteers, and the supply of munitions of war, is to be reimbursed to the Government of the Republic of Liberia by the said State of Maryland in Liberia:

Therefore his Excellency the President of the Republic of Liberia, and his Excellency the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia, being desirous to regulate by a formal Treaty the conditions on which the troops of the Republic of Liberia are to serve the State of Maryland in Liberia in its present emergency, as well also to settle the mode and manner by which the State of Maryland in Liberia will reimburse to the Government of the Republic of Liberia the amount of money expended or other considerations granted by the said Government for the military assistance rendered in conformity with the Legislative Act aforesaid.

The President of the Republic of Liberia has, for this purpose, named as his Commissioner Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a citizen of the Republic of Liberia, &c.; and the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia having named his Commissioner Joseph Thomas Gibson, a citizen of the State of Maryland in Liberia to conclude such a Treaty. The said Commissioners after having communicated to each other their respective powers, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ART. I. The troops of the Republic of Liberia, appointed by the President of the said Republic on the service aforesaid shall co-operate in all military operations, whether offensive or defensive. As hereinafter stipulated, with the Government of the State of Maryland in Liberia in the defense of the said State of Maryland and in bringing to just and amicable terms of peace, the aboriginal tribes now hostile to the said State of Maryland in Liberia.

II. In all cases the troops of the Republic of Liberia shall be commanded by their own regimental and company officers; nevertheless when said troops are concentrated with the troops of the State of Maryland in Liberia, and acting together in line or otherwise, the senior general, regimental, or company officer present, whether bearing a commission of the Republic of Liberia or of the State of Maryland in Liberia, shall assume the command of the whole allied force.

III. While it is understood that the individuals composing the military force supplied by the Government of the Republic of Liberia are subject to the civil laws of the State of Maryland in Liberia, and may be adjudged accordingly for any and all unlawful offenses committed by them, or any one of them, within the jurisdiction of the said State of Maryland in Liberia, it is also understood and stipulated that the said troops shall be subject to the military laws of their own Government only, and shall be tried for all military offenses by court-martial, composed of officers appointed by their own commander; and shall be punished according to the finding of such court-martial, if approved by the commander, and in no other way.

IV. The President of the Republic of Liberia, and the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia, wishing to maintain concert and harmony of action in the measures necessary to be adopted for restoring peace, and as martial law has been proclaimed and is now in force in the State of Maryland in Liberia, it is deemed desirable and is hereby agreed and stipulated, that the plans of operations against the enemy and the measures for restoring peace, shall be entrusted to a commission composed of his Excellency the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia; the commander of the forces of the Republic of Liberia; Dr. James Hall, Agent of Maryland Colonization Society, and four other gentlemen to be named respectively by his Excellency the Governor and the Commander of the Troops of the Republic of Liberia.

V. The State of Maryland in Liberia hereby solemnly pledges itself to reimburse to the Government of the Republic of Liberia all moneys or money value which may be expended or granted by the said Government of the Republic of Liberia in the defence of the said State of Maryland in Liberia in its present emergency: for the faithful performance of which, bonds shall be executed by the said State of Maryland in Liberia, signed by the Secretary of State and countersigned by the Governor, the stipulations of which shall be faithfully [sic]. As the actual amount expended or to be expended by the Government of the Republic of Liberia in the defense cannot now be ascertained, the bonds aforesaid shall be executed in the sum of 20,000 dollars.

It is further stipulated and agreed, that in case any misunderstanding shall arise between the two Contracting Parties in relation to any item or items of charge or charges against the said State of Maryland in Liberia, for the purpose of defense as aforesaid, the President of the Republic of Liberia and the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia, shall appoint each two Commissioners to consider and adjust such item or items of charge or charges in dispute.

In case of such disagreements, as to any item or items of charge or charges the said Commissioners shall be appointed without unreasonable delay, and they shall convene, as soon as practicable, in the city of Monrovia, to consider and adjust the accounts which may be submitted to them. In case of disagreement between the Commissioners in regard to any item or items of charge or charges, they shall be authorized to call in an umpire, whose decision shall be accepted as final.

As possibly the amount for which the aforesaid bonds are executed may be greater than the amount actually expended by the Government of the Republic for the purposes aforesaid, it is hereby agreed and understood that when the amount actually expended shall have been reimbursed, the bonds aforesaid shall be considered canceled.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the State of Maryland in Liberia immediately, and a certificate of such ratification shall be placed in the hands of the Commissioner of the Republic of Liberia, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Monrovia or at Harper, at the pleasure of the President of the Republic of Liberia, within the space of 12 months from the date hereof.

In witness hereof the Commissioner of the President of the Republic of Liberia, and the Commissioner of the Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia, have signed the same and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done at Harper, this 19th day of February, 1857.

(signed)
J.T. Gibson

(signed)
J.J. Roberts

**Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Indemnification,
Between Liberia, State of Maryland in Liberia, and
the Cape Palmas and Graway Tribes.
Signed at Harper, February 26, 1857.**

The following acknowledgments, declarations, and stipulations have been duly considered, and are now solemnly adopted and p by the Under- signed, that is to say:—The Governor of the State of Maryland in Liberia and the two commissioners on the part of the said State, and three Commissioners appointed by the Republic of Liberia, according to Treaty stipulations, duly entered into between the two Governments, that from and after the signing of this Treaty between the Governments of the State of Maryland in Liberia and the Cape Palmas and Graway tribes, hostilities between the several tribes and the State of Maryland in Liberia shall cease and peace and friendship shall exist. The said tribes do hereby place themselves under the protection and exclusive jurisdiction of the Govern- ment of the State of Maryland in Liberia, and that they are now and will forever remain under the aforesaid jurisdiction and protection.

1st. That the Cape Palmas people shall settle on the Hoffman River, north of Harris' house and a small Kroo town on the beach.

2nd. That the State of Maryland in Liberia pay the Cape Palmas people:

1 hogshead of tobacco	150.00	Dols c.
20 muskets	60.00	
50 ps. S. stripe	125.00	
6000 plates	37.50	
100 one-gallon jugs	25.00	
100 one-gallon iron pots	25.00	
50 pieces blue baft	125.00	
50 kegs powder	100.00	
600 wash basins		
300 pint mugs	18.75	
240 cutlasses	50.00	
Sundries	<u>50.00</u>	
	Dollars	1000.00

for their land they had occupied as town seats; the first installment in 30 days from date, the second installment the 1st of July, the third installment in four months after the second is paid, the fourth installment four months from the last installment.

3rd. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people pay for burning of Mission premises at Mount Vaughan, the amount of 200 kroos of clean rice, or equivalent in cattle, at the expiration of seven months. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people return the cannons and drums lost in the lake. The Cape Palmas people building on the Hoffman River, and the Graway people at Graway, promise not to disturb trade or any other tribe or American trading on the beach or road with trade or otherwise.

4th. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people shall not make any palavers with the Rock Town, Half Cavally, Fish Town, Middle Town, and Krebo people about this war after the Treaty is signed, but be friendly with them as with the Americans.

5th. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people shall not trespass upon the Half Cavally people's land, or go beyond the land mark set up by ex-Governor McGill.

6th. That the Graway people pay the amount of 36 dollars or equivalent in rice or bullocks, for the goods stolen from the trunk which had been detained at their house, and also fro the bullock stolen from Mr. Joseph T. Gibson; that the Cape Palmas and Graway people shall not disturb in any wise or render any protection whatever to any of the members of the various Mission schools.

7th. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people promise to submit all disputes which cannot be amicably adjusted between themselves and other tribes to be referred to the Government for settlement. The River Cavally, Barroka, Pelibo people, the friends of the Cape Palmas and Graway people shall not make war or palavar with either or all of those tribes who have fought against the Cape Palmas and Graway tribes with the Americans.

8th. That the Graway, Palmas, and River Cavally people shall not, in case of the wreck of any vessel on the beach near their towns, take, conceal, or plunder any such wreck, but in all such cases to return all goods to the captain, supercargo, or agent, as may be found or picked up, for which they may be entitled to salvage. They shall not engage in the slave trade under the penalties provided therefor by law.

9th. That the Cape Palmas people have free egress and ingress to carry away their growing crops from their farms without molestation from the Americans. The Americans shall desist from using cassada.

10th. That the Cape Palmas and Graway people cease from burying their dead on Russwurm Island from the signing of this Treaty.

In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our names, the 26th day of February, at Harper Md. in Liberia.

	their		their
Pedah Neh alias Yellow Will	X	Saba alias King of Graway	X
Simle Belle alias Bill Williams	X	Peh Gikparmo alias King Palm	X
Neh Weah	X	Bar Nymiah	X
Tano Queah alias Black Will	X	Greba Dweh	X
	marks.		marks.
B. J. Drayton; J. J. Roberts			

Wintesses:

J. W. Livingstone, Com. U.S. Ship *St. Louis*
J. B. Phillips

Joseph T. Gibson
Anthony Wood

H. W. Erskine

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

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