

**LIBERIAN STUDIES
JOURNAL**

Edited by:

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Boston University

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MISSISSIPPI IN AFRICA:

SETTLERS AMONG THE KRU, 1835-1847¹

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INTRODUCTION

Mississippi in Africa, sponsored by the Mississippi Colonization Society and founded by 37 men and women from the Natchez area of Mississippi, began a precarious existence on the Kru Coast in 1838. The colony was small, had few resources, and received little support from Monrovia, the American Colonization Society, or the Mississippi Colonization Society. For the first ten years of its existence, the settlers had to concentrate on survival in an alien climate.

Compared with immigrants elsewhere in Liberia, the Sinoe settlers were at a great disadvantage. The Sinoe settlement was the smallest colony, the most underfinanced, and remains today the least developed of the coastal counties.

MISSISSIPPI COLONIZATION SOCIETY


Concern about the threat of insurrection and the presence of a growing free black population motivated the founders of the Mississippi Colonization Society. The free Afro-American population of Mississippi was never large, but the majority were concentrated in the southwestern part of the state. Most of the founders and contributors to the Mississippi Society came from this area, where slaves outnumbered whites.² While some owners promoted colonization to solve the problem of the presence of free blacks, others initiated legislation to force all adult free Negroes to leave the state.³

Planters saw colonization as the best solution for Afro-Americans and Euro-Americans alike. Colonization would provide freedom and self-government for people of color, and reinforce the institution of slavery.⁴ In June, 1831, the Mississippi Colonization Society was adopted. According to its constitution, the purpose would be the colonization of free people.⁵ The early years of the Society were spent in forming auxiliary societies within Mississippi, fundraising, decrying the state of free Afro-Americans, and publicizing the efforts of the American Colonization Society and the colony in Liberia.⁶

Afro-Americans in the Natchez area also expressed interest in colonization. In early 1832, free Afro-Americans held a meeting in Natchez to discuss emigration to Liberia. They collected money to send Gloster Simpson, a Methodist preacher, and Archy Moore to Liberia to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of colonization.⁷ They arrived in Monrovia in June, 1832, and spent three weeks in the colony. Upon their return,

Map 1

SINOE RIVER VICINITY c. 1835



they made a glowing report. They had visited several settlements near Monrovia and reported favorably on the sense of freedom, educational and religious fervor, and agricultural possibilities.⁸

In 1835, the Mississippi Colonization Society sponsored its first group of immigrants to go to Liberia. Because the Mississippi Society did not have a colony of its own in Liberia, all of the immigrants were landed at Monrovia: most of them settled in Millsburg. Seventy-one people, all but two from Mississippi, sailed from New Orleans on March 4, 1835, on the brig Rover. Two were born free, eighteen bought their freedom, and the others were slaves emancipated by Judge James Green or Mrs. Mary Bullock of Adams County, Mississippi.⁹

Several immigrants were men of means. Gloster Simpson and Archy Moore were the two freemen of the expedition. They had been prevented from going to Liberia earlier because their families were still slaves. Simpson reportedly owned a farm of 150 acres and was worth \$2000. David Moore, brother of Archy Moore, also joined the group. He owned a 280-acre farm and paid \$7000 for his family's freedom before departing for Liberia.¹⁰

ESTABLISHMENT OF MISSISSIPPI IN AFRICA

Influenced by the Maryland Society's effort to establish a separate colony in Africa, the Mississippi State Society decided to form its own colony in Liberia. At a meeting of the Mississippi Society in March, 1836, it was resolved to begin a separate colony and purchase territory. Through the governor of Liberia, the Mississippi Society purchased land from the Sno, a subgroup of the Kru, on the right bank of the Sinoe River on the Kru Coast.

It was two years, however, before the society sent a group of immigrants. On the 16th of January, 1837, the society appointed Robert Finley as their agent to raise funds for an expedition and resolved to send an expedition from New Orleans as soon as possible. The colony would have its own governor, but would be under the instructions of the governor of Liberia, until a more specific agreement could be made between the state society and the American Colonization Society. The colony was to be called Mississippi in Africa and the major town, Greenville, after the late Judge James Green of Adams County. His large bequest to the society had enabled the first group of emigrants to leave on the Rover.¹¹

Financing the colony proved more difficult. The Society had no funds for such an expedition. It was Finley's job to raise the funds for the passage and support of immigrants.¹² The society planned to raise food-stuffs for the colonists in Liberia and to encourage commercial farming with cotton, sugar, and coffee. As with many other colonization schemes, they also foresaw regular commercial trips between the United States and Africa.¹³

Preparations were finally made to send an expedition. In February, 1837, Agent Robert Finley reported that fifty emigrants in the Natchez area were prepared to go to Liberia. The Mississippi Society appointed Josiah Finley, brother of Robert, agent for the society in Liberia and Dr. J.L. Blodgett as physician. Blodgett and Finley departed for Liberia in April, 1837, on the schooner Oriental to prepare for the new settlers.¹⁴

Prior to the settlers' arrival, Daniel Johnston, a Monrovia settler, had purchased land and had begun work clearing the land for a town.¹⁵ In

1837 Josiah Finley as Governor and Dr. Blodgett as Lt. Governor replaced Johnston and continued the preparations with the assistance of Liberian settler laborers. Financial support was meager because the Mississippi Society had few funds, but by 1838 they had planted "Rice, cassada, potatoes, and other African vegetables." Farm and town lots were laid out, land cleared and cultivation begun. Houses for the immigrants were almost finished upon their arrival.¹⁶

The preparations were not easy; poor health and difficulties with Africans caused problems for Finley. In order to prevent dependence on the United States for food supplies, Finley began a public farm. The farm was several miles from Greenville and the laborers were less willing to work there because of distance and fear of local people. Finley reported that Fishmen, whose town was on the beach at Greenville, had plundered the crops of vegetables as soon as they ripened.¹⁷

The origins of this hostility at such an early date are difficult to determine. Later references indicate that the Sno and Kabor (Fishmen) were hostile to one another. Because the settlers purchased their land from the Sno and maintained a friendly alliance with them, the Kabor may have viewed the settlers as enemies. On the other hand, the close proximity of the settlement and the town on the beach may have encouraged suspicious relations from the start. Kabor fishermen were traders and carriers of goods coming from the interior. They were familiar with the settlements at Monrovia, Bassa, and Cape Palmas, and the implications of the newcomers for the inhabitants of the Kru Coast. The settlers were a potential threat to Kru trade independence.


Mississippi in Africa became a reality in 1838 with the expedition of the brig Mail. Thirty-seven emigrants departed from New Orleans at the end of March, 1838. The Mail arrived in Greenville July 9, 1838. The voyage took longer than usual because of a one-month delay in the Cape Verde Islands to obtain work animals for the settlement.¹⁸

When the Mail departed at the end of July, 1838, the colony appeared off to a good start. Houses were being constructed; all were in good health except for Robert Leiper, the oldest of the group. According to Finley, two men of leadership potential had emerged. Finley depended on William Bonner, a foreman for his owner, Mr. Anketell, and Edward Morris, a manager of his owner's plantation in Adams County.¹⁹ In accordance with the will of the late James Green, the immigrants from the Rover were given the opportunity to remove from Millsburg to the Sinoe Colony. It is not known how many came to Greenville, but in 1843 there were four families of the Green estate who are recorded: Delaney, Dickson, Williams, and Jackson. Rev. Gloster Simpson and his family, although not of the Green estate, re-located in Greenville.²⁰

The Mississippi Society had great hopes for the success of their colony in Sinoe. The agricultural and commercial prospects appeared good. Public and private farms had begun. Agent Finley believed that if he were supplied with enough goods to trade with Greenville's African neighbors, he could send thousands of bushels of rice and thousands of gallons of palm oil, camwood, and ivory to the United States. The society encouraged the building of schools and the establishment of missions for both the settlers and the indigenous Liberians.²¹ The greatest need and concern of the society that first year was, however, for more immigrants. Although they did not want more than could be supported properly, and they discouraged settlers who were not from Mississippi, the 37 who arrived in 1838 were not enough to become a prosperous and secure colony.²²

Map 2

GREENVILLE AND ENVIRONS c. 1842



Difficulties plagued the settlement. Its small size, lack of communication with other settlements, little support from the American Colonization Society and the Mississippi Society, lack of knowledge of the human and physical environment, and sporadic hostility from African neighbors hampered progress. Nevertheless, during the period from 1838 to 1847, the Sinoe settlement grew in numbers, began agriculture for consumption and export, traded with African neighbors and European traders, and began to expand geographically.

From 1838 until 1844, the colony had no local official leader. Fishermen murdered Governor Josiah Finley in 1838, leaving the Sinoe settlement leaderless. R.E. Murray, an immigrant from Charleston, South Carolina, arrived in Liberia in 1833 and moved to Greenville in 1844 to become the agent and governor for the Sinoe colony. For the years in between, the governor at Monrovia was nominally in charge of the Sinoe settlers, but was not on the spot.²³

The Sinoe settlement grew by immigration and began to found farming settlements outside Greenville. There were only seventy-nine Afro-Americans resident in Greenville in 1843, but between 1843 and 1845, about 240 immigrants arrived in the area to increase their small numbers. These new arrivals on the Maripose, Renown, and Lime Rock were interested in promoting agriculture and settled further up the Sinoe River, forming such settlements as Readsville, Louisiana, and Lexington.²⁴

Farming and small-scale trade formed the basis of the Sinoe settler economy in the early years. Although only one resident of Greenville listed his profession as farmer in 1843, most settlers engaged in some farming. The Mississippi and Louisiana people who settled outside Greenville promoted agriculture. With their arrival in 1843 and 1844, the planting of food crops increased during the second half of the 1840s. R.E. Murray believed agriculture was the strength of the settlement and encouraged farming among the immigrants. Visitors praised the work of the up-river settlements and commented on the fertility of the soil.²⁵ The Readsville community grew corn, potatoes, cassava, beans, watermelon, cucumbers, cantalopes, pineapples, bananas, and plantains. This work was accomplished by hand with agricultural tools. Horses and oxen brought earlier did not survive.²⁶

Convincing settlers to put their time and energy into cash crops was difficult. R.E. Murray reported in late 1844 that most of the colonists were more interested in raising food crops for their own consumption than in producing for a foreign market: "They are generally afraid to plant for the benefit of posterity; anything that will yield a present supply, will do for them."²⁷ Two immigrants, Robert Leiper and Edward Morris, grew coffee for export, but the majority made a practical choice in raising foodstuffs. Even with the new immigrants, labor and capital did not exist to establish large-scale farming. The immigrants of 1843 and 1844 were mostly women and children. They came with few or no tools, and farm animals were not available. Planting many acres of crops that take several years to mature was a risk that few immigrants were willing to take. More than half the inhabitants of the settlements had been in Greenville for less than a year. Food and housing were their first priority.

In comparison with other Liberian settlements, Sinoe had the smallest amount of trade. From 1838 to 1843, 13 vessels anchored at Greenville for landing trade items. Most of the goods imported from Europe and the United States were satin strips, crockery, iron wares, powder, sheeting, and flour; the items correspond to those imported for other settlements. In 1842 and 1843 approximately \$8,200 worth of goods were imported into Greenville.²⁸

The products traded by settlers to the European traders were the ones predicted by the earliest reports from Greenville: camwood, ivory, turtle shell, and palm oil. The total value of these exports for the five years was \$8,411.51.²⁹ It is doubtful that any of the settlers were collecting these products for sale, since the Africans in their vicinity had already been trading in these items for some time. The settlers, on a small scale, entered the camwood and oil trade as middlemen.

Although some did prosper from the trade at Greenville, the majority did not trade nor farm on a large scale until more immigrants arrived to settle up river. The small numbers in comparison with their neighbors and the lack of support from the Mississippi Society made progress difficult.

The Mississippi immigrants in Sinoe arrived at a time when Liberia was struggling for an identity as it expanded. Immigrants formed separate enclaves strung out along the coast from Monrovia to Cape Palmas. Bassa Cove, Maryland, and Sinoe were considered separate colonies and communications between them were difficult and infrequent. Settlements outside Monrovia had to contend with their distance from the political and commercial center, Monrovia.

In addition, the legal relationship of Sinoe to Monrovia was ambiguous. In 1839 the Mississippi Society resolved to join the American Colonization Society and adopt its constitution. In 1841 the Mississippi Society approved a plan of union in which Mississippi in Africa became part of Liberia. The MCS, however, retained control over the appointment of agents for Sinoe and chose Thomas Buchanan, Governor of Liberia, as acting agent. Buchanan reluctantly took control of the Sinoe settlement in July, 1841; he disapproved of the plan because of the colony's ambivalent status. The settlement would have representation and the rights and privileges of other settlements within the Commonwealth, yet the MCS retained final control over the appointment of an agent. If Sinoe were to be a full part of the Commonwealth, Buchanan believed its government should be controlled from Monrovia.³⁰

From 1838-1844, Sinoe floundered with few settlers and no official to take charge. After the death of Governor Finley, Sinoe had no agent until Buchanan in 1841, and no agent on the spot until 1844 when R.E. Murray arrived. Buchanan reported that Sinoe was in poor condition:

Mr. McLain informs me that the Mississippi Society are dissatisfied with my management of their affairs at Sinoe. I must say that such a censure from that Society is unjust and ungrateful. In the first place they threw upon my hands without consulting me, the burden of their colony taken in a most wretched and forlorn condition. They furnished me with no means and with no instructions and I was compelled in order to save the place from destruction to draw from the funds of the American Colonization Society large supplies for the payments of old debts and the support and defence of the people. Without the use of a vessel, it was impossible for me to attend in person to the direction of affairs at Sinoe....³¹

The ambiguous status of Sinoe affected early Kru-settler relations. Few in number, poor, isolated, and not part of a larger political structure, the Sinoe settlers were vulnerable to Kru resistance.

SETTLER RELATIONS WITH THE KRU

Relations between the settlers and the Kru were based on assumptions bound by the cultural prejudices of the parties involved and by competing political and economic goals. The settlers did not question the assumption of their superiority as civilized Christians. Their notions of property, ownership, and transference differed from those of their African neighbors. Many Kru did not expect the settlement to be permanent. Some settlers intended to farm land that they had purchased, while others intended to enter the coastal trade as middlemen, an occupation already engaged in successfully by Kru Coast people.

The Sinoe settlers used various strategies in their relations with the Kru. In general, they attempted to sign treaties with and purchase land from as many coastal groups as possible. On an individual basis, settlers incorporated some Kru into their family structures.³² In dealing with specific dake (dako, sing., the largest political entity with which Kru identify), the settlers tried to form alliances with some dake at the expense of others. When alliances and treaties failed, the settlers sought removal of dake they considered hostile or a threat to their existence.

Kru reactions to the presence of the immigrants varied. Some dake made early alliances with the settlers in the hopes of gaining trade, protection, or political leverage against their enemies. Dake not immediately adjacent ignored the settlers. Some dake, such as the Kabor, were hostile from the beginning. Their role as fishermen, traders, and canoeists for landing cargo on the coast brought them into competition with commercially-minded settlers and enabled them to resist settler control.

From 1843 to 1847 Liberian settlers sought treaties along the Kru Coast to regulate relations among the settlers, the Kru, and foreign traders. They hoped that treaties of alliance and the purchase of land would alleviate the bad relations between settlers and Africans and secure good trading benefits.³³

Colonists traveled the length of the Kru Coast to obtain treaties. In 1841, Samuel Wilkeson purchased the territory from Blue Barre to Little Kru.³⁴ In March of that year, Thomas Buchanan negotiated a settlement with Fishmen of Bassa Cove. They agreed to pay an indemnity of \$1000 for the death of Governor Finley and to give the American Colonization Society land rights between Bassa Cove and Tobacconee. The Fishmen also agreed to be under the jurisdiction of the colony, and to end their participation in the slave trade.³⁵ The leaders of "Kroo Country" agreed in 1844 not to sell or give away their territory, unless to the Liberians. They agreed not to engage in the slave trade, and to submit their conflicts to the arbitration of the Governor.³⁶

The most extensive agreement was made with the Sno/Jalo in the neighborhood of Greenville. On February 24, 1845, an agreement was signed with the leaders of the Sno. On the 27th, J.J. Roberts paid the remaining money due the Sno for land purchased in 1836 and formally signed a deed for all the Sno territory around Greenville.³⁷ During January and February of 1846 and 1847 Liberian commissioners signed purchase agreements with all the coastal dake from River Cess to Sasstown with the exception of Settra Kru.³⁸

In the light of later denials that they sold land forever to Liberians, it is clear that the agreements had a different meaning for the Kru from that understood by the settlers. Kru leaders saw the treaties as agreements

for the use of land. European traders and Kru towns had entered into agreements which allowed firms to build factories on Kru territory and use nearby coastal land for trading purposes. The settlers believed that the Kru had relinquished all rights to the land, whereas the Kru only transferred the temporary use of the land. Kru oral traditions state that it was Kru representatives who requested an American settlement in their midst. This was to facilitate Westernization in the form of education and commerce with Europe and the United States. In Kru oral traditions, coastal groups frequently assert that "we brought _____ here," for example, the Sno, Nuohn Point, Bolloh, or Diu. This meant that the interior group owed its coastal position to the dako claiming responsibility for them. The claim that the Kru brought the settlers to Sinoe has a similar meaning. From the Kru point of view, the settlers owed their existence in Sinoe to the Kru, owners of the land and the ultimate authority.³⁹

Sinoe settler relations with their Sno and Kabor neighbors provide the best examples of settler-Kru relations for this period. During the early years of the settlement, interaction with the Kru was with these two groups. They were the most immediate neighbors of the Sinoe settlers; relations with them exemplified Kru-settler relations in Sinoe for the next hundred years.

The area immediately around Greenville had a mixed population. The right bank of the Sinoe River was occupied by the Sno/Jalo who lived from the peninsula of that bank to several miles inland in four or five villages.⁴⁰ On the beach adjacent to the Sno was a settlement of Kabor fishermen. On the opposite bank of the river lived the Blue Barre of the Matro group. They lived in small village groups from the Sinoe River as far west and inland as the Plahnsen River. Among the Blue Barre, where the Greenville port is today, were another group of Kabor; their settlement was called Jidiwa.⁴¹ West of the Greenville Kabor Fishtown were Butaw settlements; east of Blue Barre were the Five Towns (See Map 2).

The settlers made their first legal arrangements for land with the Sno, although the Kabor claim to have brought the settlers to Greenville. The settlers could have made their arrangements with the Sno because they were the owners of the land as agriculturalists and able to negotiate for its use. On the other hand, if the Kabor and Sno did not get along, which is indicated in the sources, then the Sno may have been more willing to welcome the settlers in the hope of gaining some leverage with their neighbors, the Kabor.⁴²

Settler relations with the Sno were better than with many other dake on the coast, but they were not always smooth. Sno and settler informants agreed that the Sno occupied the entire area that forms the point on which Greenville is today located. The first immigrants lived among the Sno, in various quarters. The sacred house of the Sno, the jiwon, was located where Mississippi Avenue is today. With settler expansion, the Sno gradually moved inland, leaving the coastal area to the settlers and Kabor.⁴³

Most evidence points to hostility between the Sno and Kabor. Governor Roberts stated that the Sno were troubled by the Fishmen and that the Sno would be glad to have the Kabor community gone. Since the governor and the settlers wanted to remove the Kabor from their spot on the beach, they may have exaggerated the desire of the Sno to see the Kabor gone.

In 1845 incidents occurred to indicate that there was tension between the Sno and the colonists at Greenville. The settlers purchased land in 1836, but in 1845 half the money promised to the Sno had not been paid. This may have caused bad feeling among the Sno. In 1845, the settlers

accused the Sno of stealing from them. At this time a British trader, Captain Tasko, trading in the vicinity of Greenville, attempted to get the local people to defy customs laws. He refused to credit them goods unless they told the Americans to land his goods free of duty. When the settlers refused, Tasko urged the Sno to make demands for the payment of the rest of the purchase money for their territory. Tasko landed goods at Fishtown, defying the colonists' demands for duties.⁴⁴

Governor Roberts settled the differences in February, 1845. The Sno leaders complained of the hardships they had suffered by not receiving their full payment and stated that they no longer could protect the settlers from acts by the Fishmen against settler cattle and farms. Roberts agreed to pay the remaining \$500, by which the kings and chiefs ceded all their rights to the Sno territory to the American Colonization Society. In exchange the following agreements were made. The Sno agreed to pay compensation for goods stolen, they agreed to become a part of the Commonwealth, and to have all disagreements between themselves and colonists resolved by Greenville authorities, subject to appeal to the governor of the Commonwealth. The colonial authorities agreed to protect the Sno from aggression by other tribes, to employ Sno as laborers, and to permit the Sno to trade with Africans, Americans, and Europeans without obtaining a license. Duties had to be paid on all imported goods. Thus, the Sno began their long-term alliance with the Sinoe settlers.⁴⁵

Settler relations with Kabor Fishmen at Greenville and on the coast fluctuated from hostility to cooperation, but maintained a mostly hostile character throughout the nineteenth century. Even before the Mississippi immigrants arrived in Greenville, Fishmen harassed the group making preparations for the new colony.⁴⁶ There were several reasons for this. While the Kabor resented the cooperation of their neighbor and enemy, the Sno, they also realized that a settlement would harm their trade and middlemen activities on the coast. Their coastwide network of settlements and communications made them aware of the settlements at Monrovia and Bassa Cove and the consequences of immigration. The colonists at Greenville resented a large community in such proximity and coveted the land the Kabor occupied at Greenville and Blue Barre point. This desire for Kabor land combined with early Kabor actions, inclined the Greenville settlers to assume a hostile attitude toward the Kabor. Settlers desired the removal of the Kabor community at Greenville at an early date:

The Fishmen might probably be induced to quit the country for a small remuneration, if thought advisable.⁴⁷

Attempts to drive the Kabor from Greenville were repeated again and again in Sinoe history.

The second murder of a Greenville settler involved Fishmen. In 1842 Nifu Kabor murdered James Shuman on his way to Settra Kru.⁴⁸ Governor Roberts and the settlers were unable to execute the murderers because they lacked the strength to do so:

...the natives of Sinou /Sno/ as well as their own people were opposed to their being executed, but wished that their country people might be permitted to pay a stipulated amount. To this I was very loth to agree, but finding that the whole country was determined to resist such a measure, and in consequence the settlement would be very much exposed, and in probability (being in such a defenceless condition, and so remote from other settlements) be destroyed.⁴⁹

Because Greenville was small and distant from Monrovia, Roberts had to use diplomacy. He hoped for the eventual removal of the Fishmen:

Notwithstanding such offenders should receive the sentence of the law, in this matter, I think we shall gain much. The probability is, they will not be able to pay the amount within the time specified. If not, we shall be able to remove them from the vicinity of Greenville, a population of about one thousand persons -- all Fishmen, who have been, and continue to be, not only an annoyance to the colonists, but to the Sinoe natives.⁵⁰

Hostile neighbors and competitors for trade and political influence had to be removed.

Relations between settlers and Kabor worsened in 1843, and provided the Greenville settlers with a chance to destroy the Kabor town and remove it from the Greenville beach. A Captain Burke of the American vessel Edward Burley had paid Jack Dandy from the Greenville Fishtown in advance for some trading that Dandy was to do for Burke. Dandy disappeared with the payment. On his return to Greenville, Burke told Fishmen working for him that he would not pay them until they brought Dandy or reimbursed Burke for the advance payment. The Fishmen seized boats from the ship and would not return them. Greenville colonists, when informed, obtained the boats and had them returned to the ship. Still angered, however, Burke sent his mate and some men in a boat to attack Fishmen returning from the sea in their canoes. Fishmen from Blue Barre point and Greenville attempted to assist their brothers and in the melee killed the mate and one other man from the Edward Burley.⁵¹

Governor Roberts, using assistance from the American naval squadron in a show of force, settled the matter personally in November, 1843. The Macedonian, under the command of Mathew Perry, arrived in Greenville to settle the dispute between the Fishmen and the American crew. With the presence of dignitaries on board the vessel and a show of military force, Roberts and Perry hoped to intimidate the Fishmen into a settlement favorable to the colonists.⁵² Roberts and Perry decided against Captain Burke but used the occasion to rid Greenville of the Fishmen. Horatio Bridge, an American with Perry, believed that the colonists wanted the land occupied by the Kabor. Weak in numbers and badly supplied by the Mississippi Society, the settlers had been unable to evict them previously. The recent arrival of the Maripose people doubled the number of immigrants and strengthened their resolve to remove the Kabor:

Considering themselves now adequate to act on the offensive, they determined to drive off the Fishmen. In this purpose they were confirmed by the Monrovia government; and it was part of the governor's business, at the palaver, to provide for its execution.

Roberts urged the Sno to support him in the removal and to maintain the departure of the Fishmen. This issue of the removal was separate from the murder, and the Fishmen attempted to distinguish between the two, but Roberts took advantage of the presence of the naval squadron:

By this ingenious policy, the Bushmen were induced to promise their aid in ridding the settlement of its troublesome neighbors; while the Fishmen, overawed by the presence of a force friendly to the colonists, submitted to their expulsion with a quietude that could

not under other circumstances have been expected. Doubtless, they had forfeited their claim to the land by non-observance of the conditions on which they held it; yet, in some points, the affair had remarkably the aspect of a forcible acquisition of territory by the colonists.⁵³

This is supported by the earlier statements of Blodgett and Roberts reflecting the views of the Greenville colonists. The occasion had come when they could drive the Fishmen from Greenville.

The evacuation did not prove difficult. Upon the first arrival of dignitaries and soldiers at Greenville, half the inhabitants of Fishtown fled their homes. Roberts gave the Kabor one day for the remaining residents of Fishtown to take their belongings before the town would be burned. The Sno wanted to burn the entire town, but Roberts allowed them to burn only the homes of the leaders and the homes of the family of the accused murderer. Roberts suggested that the remainder become houses for the Sno.⁵⁴

The colonists tried to prevent the Kabor from returning to their beach settlement, but were unsuccessful. A group called Little Cesters Fishmen were allowed to stay near Greenville, because they were not hostile to the settlement. Several Kabor families were also permitted to stay.⁵⁵ During 1844 Kabor individuals returned to Greenville to take up residence again at the Kabor Fishtown. The colonists resented this action and asked the American naval squadron to threaten the Fishmen again. Perry did threaten them and refused to return John Smith, son of the Kabor leader, and two other hostages taken during the mate incident. Perry admonished the Sno and Blue Barre for allowing the Fishmen to return to their homes, and suggested that the colonists take more action in their own defense.⁵⁶ The hostages were released to Governor Roberts in Monrovia, who promised to keep the men in custody until he deemed it safe to release them.⁵⁷ The fate of these men is not known, but Fishmen were located near Greenville again in 1845. Whether these people were Gbeta or the Kabor who had fled is not known, but they were involved in the illegal landing of goods by Captain Tasko in 1845.⁵⁸ Throughout the nineteenth century, sources mention the location of a Fishtown on the Greenville side of the river. Many of those who fled in 1843 probably established themselves at Blue Barre point where there were other Kabor settlements.⁵⁹

The Greenville settlers never really got rid of their Kabor neighbors, who gradually returned to the town which they had occupied before the arrival of immigrants from the United States. The need for outside force and the eventual return of the Kabor are evidence of the weakness of the Sinoe settlers in comparison with the Kru in general and the Kabor in particular.

CONCLUSION

During the Commonwealth period of Liberia's history, the Sinoe immigrant settlement experienced great difficulties. Because of Sinoe's small size, lack of support, and location among large Kru commercial towns, its position was even more precarious than that of the other Liberian settlements. Until late 1843, there were only 79 immigrants at most. Agriculture and trade increased in the late 1840s, but Sinoe remained the smallest and weakest of the settlements. Relative difference in size and economic resources prevented the settlers from competing successfully with their Kru neighbors. The settlers made alliances with some neighbors,

notably the Sino, but repeated hostilities, some ending in death, occurred between settlers and the Kabor. Although Sinoe expanded after 1847 and settler-African relations became more complex, the pattern of Sinoe's relations with the Kru was established during this period. Settlers and some Kru groups attempted alliances to advance trade and their political position on the coast, but competition for trade and hostility characterized relations with most coastal groups throughout the nineteenth century.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper is based on research carried out in Liberia and the U.S. during 1974-1976, assisted by a travel grant from the African Studies Center of Boston University.
2. Charles Sydnor, "The Free Negro in Mississippi before the Civil War," American Historical Review, XXXII (July, 1927), 769-788.
3. John Ker to Isaac Thomas, July 25, 1831, in Franklin L. Riley, "A Contribution to the History of the Colonization Movement in Mississippi," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, IX (1906), 350. See also Charles Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi (Baton Rouge, 1966), 203-237.
4. The original intention was not to involve or to interfere with slaves. Ker to Thomas, July 25, 1831, in Riley, "Colonization," 348-351; Ker to R.R. Gurley, July 21, 1831, in Riley, "Colonization," 347.
5. "Constitution," in Woodville Republican, August 6, 1831, printed in Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, 206-207.
6. "Mississippi," AR, VIII, 2(April, 1832), 61; "Prospects in Mississippi," (May, 1832), 93; "Circular published by the State Society of Mississippi," VIII, 4(June, 1832), 115-17.
7. "Liberia," AR, VIII, 8(October, 1832), 249.
8. Ibid., 249, 250-251.
9. Tom W. Shick, Emigrants to Liberia, 1820-1843. An Alphabetical Listing (Newark, Del., 1971).
10. For a description of the departure, see AR, XI, 4 (April, 1835), 123-124.
11. "Mississippi State Colonization Society," AR, XIII, 2 (February, 1837), 63-64.
12. They hoped to raise \$20,000 in Mississippi and another \$20,000 through the Louisiana Society, which planned to assist them in planting a colony on the Sinoe River, AR, XII(1836), 63.
13. "New Colonial Settlement," AR, XII, 6 (June, 1837), 190-191.
14. "Ninth Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the MCS," AR, XV, 3 (March, 1839), 71.

15. "Ninth Annual Report," 72. The land purchased was much less than expected. For the money allotted, Johnston only obtained about half a mile of beach. AR, XIII (1837), 1921.

16. American Colonization Society, "Ninth Annual Report," 72.

17. "Ninth Annual Report," 73. See the author's dissertation, "Settlers in Sinoe County, Liberia and Their Relations with the Kru, c. 1835-1920," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1978), 28-35, for more on who the "Fishmen" are.

18. American Colonization Society, "Ninth Annual Report," 71-72; Shick, Emigrants to Liberia; 1843 Census, 150-151.

19. "Ninth Annual Report," 74.

20. Ibid., 74, 88. United Methodist Annual Conference Report, 1838, United Methodist Records, Monrovia, Liberia.

21. "Ninth Annual Report," 75, 86; "Colony of Mississippi in Africa," AR, XIV, 11 (November, 1838), 339-340.

22. "Ninth Annual Report," 75. Edward Morris to James Railey, July 17, 1838, AR, XV, 3 (March, 1839), 79.

23. Governor Buchanan to ACS, May 17, 1839, quoted in Charles H. Huberich, The Political and Legislative History of Liberia (New York, 1947), I, 612; Theodore Canot, Captain Canot, or Twenty Years of an African Slaver, edited by Brantz Mayer (New York, 1854), 320-328.

24. Their number nearly doubled the population of Greenville, 1843 Census, 150-151; Horatio Bridge, Journal of An African Cruiser, edited by Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York, 1853), 63.

25. Auld to McLain, AR, XX, 285.

26. Ibid., 286.

27. R.E. Murray to McLain, December 11, 1844, AR, XXI, 11 (November, 1845), 336.

28. 1843 Census, 398-399.

29. Ibid., 401.

30. Thomas Buchanan to ACS, May 17, 1839; Huberich, Political and Legislative History, I, 613.

31. Ibid., 614.

32. Murray to McLain, December 11, 1844, AR, XXI, 11 (November, 1845), 337.

33. Huberich, Political and Legislative History, I, 747.

34. LGA, Correspondence Colonial Agents, February 24, 1841. Roberts to Legislative Council, April 4, 1842, in Huberich, Political and Legislative History, I, 741.

35. Whether these Fishmen were Kabor, Gbetaor a mixture of both is not known. Both dake had a network of settlements along the entire coast. From later nineteenth century sources, it would appear that they were Gbeta. Huberich, Political and Legislative History, I, 703-704.
36. In this reference it is not clear to whom "Kroo country" refers. The leader of the Sno was included among those who signed. "Articles of Compact," AR, XX, 6 (June, 1844), 165-166. In later Liberian sources, Kroo country means the area southeast of the Sinoe River called the Five Towns.
37. "Despatches from Liberia," Government House, March 18, 1845, AR, XXI, 7 (July, 1845), 215-216; "Purchase of the Sinoe Country," AR, XXI, 7 (July, 1845), 222.
38. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, American Colonization Society Papers, Incoming Correspondence /hereafter ACS/, Series VI, vol.1, Reel 300; vol. 5 Reel 304; "Gov. Roberts' Letter," AR, XXII, 6 (June, 1846), 187; "Late from Liberia," AR, XXII, 9 (September, 1846), 276-277.
39. Interviews Murraysville, October 9, 1975; Butaw, December 13, 1975; Greenville, December 4, 1975.
40. Blodgett to Lawrence in AR, XIV, 340-342; Interview, Murraysville, October 9, 1975.
41. Interviews, Blue Barre, June 13, 1976; Greenville, December 12, 1975; March 26, 1976.
42. Africans near Monrovia sought similar alliances. See Svend Holsoe, "A Study of Relations between Settlers and Indigenous Peoples in Western Liberia," African Historical Studies, IV, 2 (1971), 331-356.
43. Interviews, Greenville, December 16, 1975; Murraysville, October 9, 1975.
44. J.J. Roberts, March 18, 1845, AR, XXI, 7 (July, 1845), 214-216.
45. "Purchase of Sinoe County," AR, XXI, 222.
46. Blodgett to Lawrence, AR, XIV, 340-342.
47. "Ninth Annual Report," AR, XV, 78.
48. AR, XVIII, 10 (August, 1842), 254.
49. Ibid., 254.
50. Ibid., 255.
51. "Government House, April 25, 1843," AR, XIX, 8 (August, 1843), 230; "Government House, December 23, 1843," AR, XX, 5 (May, 1844), 133.
52. Assembled with the Americans were the leaders of Grand Butaw, Sno, and Blue Barre.
53. Bridge, African Cruiser, 63-64. See also Roberts, December 23, 1843, in AR, XX, 133-136.
54. Bridge, African Cruiser, 64; Roberts, AR, XX, 135.

55. AR, XX, 135.

56. Mathew C. Perry to Davis Hesham, Secretary of the Navy, U.S.S. Macedonian off Sierra Leone, January 15, 1844, U.S. Navy African Squadron, M 89, Roll 101, vol. 105, U.S. Government Archives. Roberts did not mention the taking of the three Kabor hostages, perhaps because it seemed harsh in the light of the decision in favor of the Kabor.

57. Perry to Roberts, January 3, 1844, U.S.S. Macedonian off Monrovia, African Squadron, M 89, Roll 101, vol. 105, U.S. Government Archives.

58. "Government House, March 18, 1845," AR, XXI, 7 (July, 1845), 214-217.

59. Roberts, AR, XX, 135. Interviews, Greenville, December 17, 1975; May 10, 1976; March 26, 1976; Blue Barre, June 20, 1976.

MATERIALS FOR A HISTORY OF LIBERIA: KAI LUNDU, MBAWULUME
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERIOR RULE IN WESTERN LIBERIA

Andreas Massing

The recorded history of northwestern Liberia - the area of the present Mende, Kissi and Bande chiefdoms - begins with Kai Lundu's campaigns into Liberia. Since 1880, Kai Lundu had united the kafu¹ of Luawa and Guma and was recognized as paramount ruler by the Kissi chiefs of Wonde, Kama, Tengi, Tongi, Tengi and Luankoli.² His campaigns into the Bande and Bonde countries in pursuit of Mbawulume have been the subject of two recent articles by Kenneth Wylie and Andreas Massing.³ The oral historical sources of the Luawa chiefdom consulted by Wylie document a military campaign into Liberia made by Kai Lundu in pursuit of his enemy Mbawulume and during which the Bande chief Fobewuru was killed. Massing attempted to date these events and concluded that Mbawulume took refuge twice in Liberia in order to escape his enemies, once in 1889 and again in 1896, and remained permanently in Liberia thereafter.⁴

Since writing the comment on Wylie's article I discovered further references to Mbawulume's role in Liberian history which clarify the background of his feud with Kai Lundu and Fabunde. This background as well as the catalytic role Mbawulume played in the establishment of Liberian interior rule form the subject of this paper.

WAR LORDS IN THE HINTERLAND OF THE GUINEA COAST: KAI LUNDU AND MBAWULUME


According to Wylie, Mbawulume had been a minor warrior chief of Dawa's in the latter's fight against the rising Kai Lundu.⁵ But after Dawa had been defeated, around 1880, by Kai Lundu, Mbawulume abandoned his former lord and established his own fortified village at Giehun in Guma kafu. After Kai Lundu became the established ruler over Luawa chiefdom - having ejected Dawa from the territory of chief Bondo of Ngiyehun⁶ who presented him with the chiefly title - he also sent word of his claim over Guma to Mbawulume.⁷ However, his campaigns into the Kissi districts of Wunde, Mafisa and Kama prevented him from taking immediate action against Mbawulume who, in turn, raided Luawa, destroyed Nyangahun, and killed chief Bondo.⁸ Having completed his Kissi campaigns Kai Lundu assured himself of the loyalty of the chiefs of Dia, Malema, Mando, and Upper Bambara and invaded Guma. With the help of the other Guma chiefs, Mbawulume's village was destroyed and he had to flee to Vassa country among the Bande where he was given asylum by chief Teye in Kumolahun (Kamolahun).⁹ Whereas Wylie dated this campaign to 1889, Governor Cardew who visited Luawa in 1895 and spoke with eyewitnesses of Kai Lundu's exploits stated that Mbawulume was driven from Guma some fifteen years ago.¹⁰ However, 1880 was the year of the Kpove war between Kai Lundu and Dawa, and it is unlikely that this war occurred in the same year as Kai Lundu's Kissi raids, Mbawulume's rebellion, and his escape to Bande country. Therefore, some date

between 1880 and 1889 seems likely for Kai Lundu's first campaign into Liberia, which I will henceforth call the Bande campaign. During the course of this campaign Kumolahun and the entire Vassa country were laid waste by Mende warriors so that Mbawulume fled to the neighboring Yaniassu (Yawiazu) country where he found protection in chief Foberwuru at Jenne. When Fobe was asked by Kai Lundu to deliver Mbawulume he refused and was later killed. The two traditions of his death are discussed elsewhere.¹¹ According to Wylie's informants and certain Liberian traditions, Fobe was besieged at Jenne and finally killed there by Kai Lundu's warriors. According to another tradition, he was captured and killed near Kolahun, perhaps by Bande chief Momo Bahomi, an ally of Kai Lundu's against Mbawulume and the chiefs of Pandemai.¹²

In fact, after his second escape from Yaniassu, Mbawulume settled in Belle country where he founded the town of Looma, "resting place". From his stronghold in Belle country, Mbawulume made himself new allies who were to help him to reconquer Guma country. First, he allied himself with chief Momo Dukori of Pandemai, the latter himself a sworn enemy of Kai Lundu and a host to Samori's Sofa warriors, who remained loyal during the Kouranko revolt against Samori (1888-1893).¹³ At the same time, Mbawulume apparently assisted the Malinke traders from Musardu and Bopolu in their raids on the Gola and Tewo districts in the hinterland of Cape Mount.¹⁴ In seeking out the Malinke and Samori as allies, Mbawulume joined the only serious opposition to Kai Lundu's expansion. While there is no proof yet that Kai Lundu supported the Kouranko rebellion against Samori, his interests in the Kissi region were such that he could only gain from the elimination of Samori's influence in that area. Also, one of his Kissi subchiefs, Kafura, had twice revolted against him since 1891 and had joined the chief of Pandemai from where he directed operations against Kai Lundu.¹⁵ Around 1893, when Kai Lundu's alliance with the Bande paramount chief Momo Bahomi ended, Mbawulume immediately supported the latter. At the same time he turned against the chief of Pandemai and continued independent operations against both Luawa and Pandemai.¹⁶ It is conceivable, however, that Mbawulume joined the Sofas from Pandemai in 1894 when they, under the direction of Kissi Kafura, entered Bande country and killed three Bande sub-chiefs who were followers of Kai Lundu.¹⁷ During the following year, however, Mbawulume and Momo Bahomi employed chief Kaba Sei of Forahun in their efforts to effect a reconciliation with Kai Lundu. They followed his invitation to Vahun where they were to meet the Sierra Leone Governor Cardew, who was to negotiate between them and Kai Lundu.¹⁸ Mbawulume and Momo Bahomi met Cardew at Vahun in February 1895 but Kai Lundu failed to appear. He apparently was dissatisfied with the British unwillingness to intervene on his side against his enemies. He secretly threatened to cut the food supplies to the Sierra Leone Frontier Police and reclaim his country if he obtained no British assistance against his Pandemai enemies.¹⁹ Cardew made another attempt to bring the chiefs together but Kai Lundu seemed to be more concerned about the Sofas from Pandemai than about the two chiefs.

One month after Cardew's visit at Kanre Lahun, Kai Lundu died in his father's village Dukono (April 7, 1895) and was buried there with his speaker Fabunde officiating at the funeral.²⁰ Fabunde was selected Kai Lundu's successor by the subchiefs of Luawa chiefdom and was recognized as such by the British in 1896.²¹

In the meantime, Mbawulume travelled to Monrovia with a letter by Governor Cardew in which the Liberian government was asked permission to let him return to Guma after fifteen years of residence on Liberian territory.²² The answer of the Liberian government to this request is not known but Mbawulume, encouraged by chiefs Kaba Sei and Koi Gbatta of Vahun, returned



to Vahun in the early days of July 1896 with a following of about two thousand warriors.²³ He sent a message to the commander of the Frontier Force explaining his peaceful intentions and the invitation by Kaba Sei to protect Vahun from the raids of Fabunde's people.²⁴

For unknown reasons, however, Mbawulume's warriors destroyed Giema as well as several other villages in August 1896, upon which Fabunde complained to the Sierra Leone Governor against Mbawulume and the rebellious chiefs who assisted him.²⁵ When six more villages were destroyed and Fabunde had suffered the loss of more warriors, he sent a letter to Cardew requesting British military protection. The commanding officer of the West African Frontier Force stationed in Luawa chiefdom decided to proceed to Kanre Lahun in order to protect it from an eventual attack.

Mbawulume had made camp in Vahun and prepared to attack the neighboring villages of Bomaru, Dodo, Juru and others which had opposed Kaba Sei's mediation in favor of Mbawulume.²⁶ The commanding officer of the Frontier Force, Captain Fairtlough, proceeded towards Vahun where the road had been closed with stockades behind which were encamped Mbawulume's warriors. The Frontier Force detachment was attacked in the rear until it succeeded in entering Vahun with the help of rocket fire and dispersed the warriors from the town. In the skirmish, which took place on Sept. 4, 1896, Koi Gbatta was killed, while Mbawulume and Kaba Sei escaped. The latter, however, was turned in later by one of Fabunde's chiefs.²⁷

Following this defeat Mbawulume and the remainder of his 'warboys' remained in the fortified village of Gopebu until February 1897, when Fabunde and chief Nyagwa launched an attack on Bande country in which they destroyed Gopebu and Kolahun.²⁸ Mbawulume escaped once more across the Lofa river, but he was abandoned by most of the sofa warriors, and the chief of Pandemai offered to the Frontier Force to capture him and hand him over to the British.²⁹ In November of the same year, however, Mbawulume was again reported in the neighborhood of Kanre Lahun where he made war on a Kissi chief named Toreh.³⁰ Thereupon the Sierra Leone Governor requested permission from the British Foreign Office to allow the Frontier Force to pursue Mbawulume on Liberian territory and prevent attacks on villages in Fabunde's chiefdom. This apparently was granted.

In the following year the Frontier Force decided to march on Kolahun where Mbawulume was reportedly encamped with a strong force of Sofas whom he had bought from one of Samori's lieutenants named Pakara.³¹ The commanding officer of the Frontier Force who led this expedition to Kolahun between January 18 and January 23, 1898 was Captain Blakeney who gave the following report of his activities:

I marched from Kanre Lahun at 6:30 A.M. on Tuesday the 18th with 61 non-commissioned officers and privates of the Frontier Police; . . . I should mention that we were accompanied by about 400 of Fa Bundo's warboys who rendered us great assistance. . . on the 22nd, . . . we suddenly came out into an open country at the foot of a rocky hill about 300 feet high. One of our spies now came in and informed us that the enemy were on the other side of the hill, so, extending the men at the foot of the hill with a reserve in charge of the ammunition, we all crept slowly up. As soon as we got near the crest I halted the men and, accompanied by Corp. Clements, I went on cautiously to the top, where I obtained a good view of the surrounding country. I could distinctly see Koroun about two miles away. . . . I now sent about 200 of Fabundo's men for our

advance, as it was one mass of thick bush, not even a track. They had not proceeded far when the Sofas attacked them, some of them being killed and taken prisoners; however the majority of them came rushing back pursued by the Sofas, which enabled us to get two good volleys and one rocket into the enemy; they then retreated. I now decided to advance leaving a small party with about 200 native warriors in charge of the baggage. Advancing very slowly and with great difficulty for about 1 mile when a small patrol which I had sent along the road came running in to say that there was a large body of the enemy lying in the bush close to us, so I fired three volleys which cleared them out. We now came into a fairly open space, and, hearing firing in our rear, I halted. Just at that moment a native came to tell us that a body of Bandis were attacking the baggage guard, so I sent back 15 men with orders to bring the baggage up at once. These men came suddenly on the Bandis flank scattered them killing several of them. As soon as the baggage came up we advanced and in about half an hour we came into an open country, commanded by some low hills on our left which were then occupied by the enemy. I halted here, and, ordering the men to keep a sharp look-out, I proceeded, accompanied by Lance Corporal Thomas, to reconnoitre the enemy's position which was very strong surrounded by eight fences, with a deep ditch in front, with stakes driven in, but seeing that the position was commanded by a slight rise in the ground on their left, I decided to attack it from this point next morning at daybreak. It was now about 4:30 P.M. and having rejoined the main body I decided to drive away the enemy from our left and occupy it myself. Advancing in extended order the men firing very steady volleys, we drove the enemy away and occupied the hill. It was now getting dark so I placed the men all around the crest of the hill, ordering everyone to be on the alert, and both Sub Inspector Taylor and myself spent the whole night round the men to see that they were all awake. The night was very dark and all was quiet until 2:00 A.M., when the enemy suddenly opened fire on our position. This did us no harm as their bullets all flew over our heads. We replied with several volleys and a rocket; there must have been a large body attacking us, as we saw a lot of bodies lying at the foot of the hill in the morning. At daybreak we advanced to attack the position, with a line of men in front as skirmishers and the rest of the men divided into two columns, with the head of each column resting on the skirmishers' flank, forming as it were, three sides of a square, the ammunition in the centre, the baggage with the native warriors in the rear. I marched in this formation as it enabled us to resist a sudden attack from any side; so we advanced keeping under cover and from the view of the enemy who had all retired inside their stronghold till we reached the small hill commanding their position on their left. Just as we came in rear of the slope, we found we had to cross a swamp, but everybody plunged in without hesitation, and we were all up the other side and in position without the enemy knowing where we were. The advance was made without the slightest noise or confusion, the men behaving remarkably steady. I now fired a volley at them which so took them by surprise that they commenced firing in all directions; we now gave them a second volley, which added to the confusion; after this I ordered volleys to be fired by sections under their own commanders while I laid the rocket trough and fixed it in position, and handed it over to private G.B. Davies who actually

fired it. This rocket fell right into the midst of a house, setting fire on it. There was now a general rush, to put the flames out, but a volley from one of the sections knocked several of them over. The flames now spread rapidly, and, fanned by the breeze, the whole town was soon in flames. Their position now getting too hot for them, they all sallied out of the town and opened fire on our left flank. I now changed our front, and with our right flank protected by the burning town, and our left by our native warboys, I ordered the men to advance - when they saw us advancing with a few volleys, they all broke and fled in all directions, our native warriors going in pursuit. Half an hour after their stronghold was destroyed and they were all scattered. . . I understand that the late chief of Koroun had a treaty with the British Government but the Sofas came down, murdered the chief, and have ever since made it a stronghold from which they sally forth to lay waste to the surrounding country.³²

Following the attack on Kolahun by the British no further news on Mbawulume can be obtained from the Frontier Force until 1903. The Hut Tax War of 1898, the most serious revolt of the Mende against British authority in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, and another revolt of Kissi Kafura kept the Frontier Force occupied within the Sierra Leone borders. It is likely, however, that Mbawulume was in contact with Kafura who in 1899 crossed the Makona river into Liberian territory. From there he attacked Fabunde's villages. Since Fabunde had remained loyal to the British in the rebellion of the Mende, Kafura apparently joined with some of the dispersed forces of chief Nyagwa of Panguma, one of the principal Mende leaders in the rebellion, and assisted Wonnie Fumba, Nyagwa's former head warrior, in raids on Fabunde's territory.³³

In January 1903, when the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission travelled through Mende and Gola country, they were told that the country had recently been troubled by the raids of a marauding chief named Barome (Mbawulume).³⁴ The entire area to the south of the Bewa (Mano) river which was known to form the boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia was in a state of turmoil due to these raids, and the local chiefs complained bitterly about the inability of the Liberians "to help them against the raids of Barome, a marauding chief, who was driven out of the Sierra Leone Protectorate into Liberia some five years ago."³⁵ In this area, which was not effectively occupied by Liberia, Mbawulume seems to have been the main force to reckon with, checking the neighboring Gola, Bande and Mende areas with his war parties which mainly operated from Looma. William Lomax who travelled through the Liberian interior as an envoy of President A. Barclay to the interior chiefs, made contact with Mbawulume in 1901. Mbawulume apparently helped him to reach Kanre Lahun. Even though Lomax seemed to have been at the mercy of Mbawulume, the fact that he established the first Liberian garrison at Looma points to the good relations which he maintained with the founder of Looma.³⁶ Mbawulume, who was in direct contact with Kafura, also was instrumental in supplying him with guns and powder via the Malinke traders at Bopolu whose commercial networks extended into the Cape Mount and Gallinas areas. From there war materials flowed northward to fuel the Kissi rebellion which continued until 1907.³⁷ Mbawulume apparently died at Looma in 1905 and was succeeded by his son Kutubu.³⁸

THE FIRST LIBERIAN INTERIOR SERVICE AND THE LOSS OF LUAWA CHIEFDOM

William Lomax who styled himself Lieutenant du Cercle Interieur³⁹ had

obtained his commission from President A. Barclay with orders to conclude treaties with the chiefs of the interior and thereby secure the interior for Liberia. After his first trip to Kanre Lahun in 1901, he made a second tour to the interior in 1904 and began his tour of office in 1906.⁴⁰ He left with a detachment of Liberian Frontier Force and a number of Liberians who were to work as interior commissioners. His duty was to preside over the election of new chiefs and to confirm existing chiefs, as well as to have them sign deeds of cession by which they gave their territory to the Liberian government. In addition, he was to plant the Liberian flag in Kanre Lahun, which the border commission had established to lie on Liberian territory. His itinerary led him through Zoi and Vahun, where he presided over the election of chief Bagba as Mende paramount chief (Dec. 31, 1907), to Kanre Lahun where he arrived on January 9, 1907.⁴¹

There, his request for quarters for himself and his troops led to an immediate quarrel between the Sierra Leone and the Liberian Frontier Force men. Fabunde, a British treaty chief under the protection of the Sierra Leone crown colony, was fined £25.00 by Lomax who also interfered in local disputes between Fabunde and his sub-chiefs.⁴² During their stay at Kanre Lahun, Liberian Frontier Force men began looting of villages, beating of Sierra Leone Frontier Force men and taxing kola traders crossing the border. The Acting Governor of Sierra Leone finally requested Lomax to withdraw from Kanre Lahun until the occupation of Kanre Lahun had been decided through the diplomatic channels in Monrovia and London. Thereupon Lomax withdrew to Dodo, a few miles to the north of Kanre Lahun, where he was well received by Gandi, one of Fabunde's opposing sub-chiefs.⁴³ Throughout the spring of 1907 Lomax' soldiers, who had not received pay or rations for several months, were reported looting and stealing in villages of Luawa chiefdom.⁴⁴ In addition, Lomax charged Fabunde with detaining in Luawa men and women from Vahun who had been captured ten years ago in the attack on Mbwulume, and he demanded that 77 people and £50.00 in property be restituted to Liberia.⁴⁵ Fabunde sent a letter of complaint about Lomax and the insubordination of his sub-chief Gandi to the Sierra Leone Governor and demanded British protection which was promised him in his treaty of 1896.⁴⁶

The British government intervened with President Barclay who had Lomax recalled from the frontier. As he was also threatened with arrest from the Sierra Leone Frontier Force if he should enter the twenty-five mile radius of Kanre Lahun, Lomax withdrew to Kamatahun in Vassa chiefdom.⁴⁷

At Kamatahun, Lomax built a garrison for his soldiers who for the rest had to live on the land as they received neither pay nor rations. By pursuing his policy of interfering in local affairs between rival chiefs Lomax contributed to increased violence and general unrest in Bande country.

In the meantime, the Liberian government had sent civil administrators to Kanre Lahun who appeared in August 1908 in the persons of Commissioners Lamandine and Nichol. They threatened Fabunde with a punitive expedition should he fail to swear allegiance to the Liberian government.⁴⁸ Following the strong remonstrances of the commander of the Frontier Force, the British Colonial Office requested from Monrovia the withdrawal of these two officials from Kanre Lahun.⁴⁹ Since the British feared that the abandonment of Luawa coupled with the inability of Liberian officials to administer the chiefdom peacefully would result in a French invasion of the vacant area, they proposed to the Liberian government the exchange of the triangle between Mano and Morro river for the Luawa chiefdom, the area which recognized Fabunde as main chief.⁵⁰ At first, the Liberian government rejected the proposal because it considered the vast forest triangle less valuable than the populous, taxable Luawa chiefdom. But the additional offer of a cash payment by Britain and the threat of being charged with the cost of the recent Kissi wars, which

amounted to £11,396, made Liberia accept. The financial situation of Liberia in 1910 when it had to default on the repayments of a British loan did not leave much room for negotiation.⁵¹ On the other hand, the insistence of chief Fabunde on British protection against the depredations of the Liberian Frontier Force had sufficient weight in the colony to press the Colonial Office for intervention on Fabunde's behalf. Thus Fabunde probably was among the few African rulers who had a major influence on the British colonial power to adjust a border according to his own interests.

LOMAX, MAMBU AND BOMBO KOLLI: MYTH AND REALITY OF THE KOLAHUN MASSACRE

Peace did not come immediately, neither to Fabunde's chiefdom now within British boundaries, nor to the Bande and Kissi territories on the Liberian side. Chiefs who once had paid tribute to Kai Lundu and had remained loyal to his successor, such as Bagba of Guma, Dawa from Tengea, as well as other chiefs from Bande and Luankoli, continued to cross the border with presents and asked Fabunde to be allowed to "sit down" with him. Throughout 1908, chiefs sent presents or referred legal disputes to Fabunde as their paramount chief but the British government discouraged the government of the colony to lend any protection to the Liberian chiefs.⁵² In January 1909, several chiefs attacked the Liberian commissioners Sims and Wilkie in Kamatahun and for the remainder of the year, local war parties opposed the Liberian troops in the Vassa and Tengea countries.⁵³ J.B. Cooper, a former clerk of Lomax - who is still remembered in Kamatahun as Johnny Cooper⁵⁴ - commanded the Liberian soldiers in their attempt to reoccupy Kamatahun. Cooper had secured the assistance of Mambu, a Komendi sub-chief of the Bande paramount chief Bombo Kolli, who in return for his assistance to the Liberians hoped to become recognized as paramount chief. In December 1909, Cooper and his troops destroyed the villages of Bandewuru and Kanga, a few miles from the British border, and Liberians were noticed looting across the frontier.⁵⁵ It is likely that Cooper and Mambu were in league with Fabunde's old enemy Gandhi from Dodo, and that Mambu's warriors were encouraged by Cooper to slip across the border and assist Gandhi in creating unrest in Luawa chiefdom.⁵⁶

In the meantime, the Liberian and British governments were negotiating concerning the border when Liberia became increasingly hostile to Britain. This followed what was considered an attempted coup by Major J.F. Cadell, a British officer who had been hired to reorganize the Frontier Force.⁵⁷ Only in January 1911 when the frontier agreement had been ratified by the Liberian Senate, did the joint Anglo-Liberian boundary commission proceed with the demarcation of the border. On March 27, 1911, the British flag was hoisted in Kanre Lahun and the British Frontier Force began to evacuate Tengea chiefdom.⁵⁸ A few months later, a Franco-Liberian boundary convention was signed by Liberia which resulted in the handing over of the territory north of the Makona to France.⁵⁹

In November 1911, the Liberian commissioner on the Anglo-Liberian frontier Williams was sent home on request of Lomax and replaced by J.B. Cooper.⁶⁰ Following Cooper's arrival in the Tengea chiefdom, several Kissi villages were raided and destroyed by Liberian soldiers, followed by several attacks on villages now considered within the borders of Sierra Leone.⁶¹ Apparently, the Tengea chiefdom was in open revolt against the regiment of Cooper and his marauding Frontier Force men. This revolt continued at least until 1913 under the leadership of the Kissi chief Kangaranya.

In the meantime Sierra Leone officials had effected a recall of Cooper and Lomax to Monrovia, which the latter failed to follow until May 1912, and

the appointment of a new border commissioner. Didwo Twe, a Kru man who had been educated in Sierra Leone, arrived at Freetown in February 1912 in company of the Liberian Secretary of State C.D.B. King.⁶² Twe, the new commissioner for northwestern Liberia and temporary border commissioner, took up his work while C.D.B. King travelled the Liberian interior to investigate the causes of the disturbances and effect the return of Lomax and Cooper to Monrovia.⁶³ The latter had withdrawn to other military garrisons within Liberia, Lomax to Zigida and Cooper to Zoi, and stayed there until June when the British government threatened to suspend the border demarcation and charge Liberia with all costs involved in the delay.⁶⁴ Sierra Leone officials further insisted that Lomax and Cooper be tried for the murder of nine Bande chiefs, apparently committed in October 1911 near Kolahun, and gathered witnesses and evidence to be presented at the trial.

On the basis of this evidence as well as on oral accounts from Bande and Kissi informants an approximate picture of events between 1910 and 1912 can be formed. At Cooper's arrival (end of 1909) Mambu, a Malinke chief from Waimatahun to the northeast of Kamatahun⁶⁵, hoped to carve out a chiefdom with the help of Liberian troops which was to include parts of Kai Lundu's old territories as well as parts of Kissi and Bande country. His goal was apparently to become one of the Paramount Chiefs which the Liberian Frontier Force created from the ranks of allied interior chiefs. He induced commissioner Cooper to assist him in his military exploits by giving him two of his daughters and perhaps by supplementing the Frontier Force with his own warriors.⁶⁶

As a result of the internal wars of Mambu's, a large amount of captives, mostly Bande, were taken who became slaves. During 1910 Mambu apparently became the principal collaborator of the Liberians and as such was charged with the collection of rice and provisions for the Liberian troops whose headquarters was now at Kolahun.⁶⁷ Here, however, resided Bombo Kolli who had been recognized by W. Lomax as the Bande paramount chief of the Kolahun (Worahun) section.⁶⁸ If we can believe the genealogical information of present Bande informants, Bombo Kolli was Mambu's mother's brother who, therefore, according to the legal rules of the Bande, could hope one day to follow in Bombo Kolli's footsteps. Mambu, in fact, had become the "civilized" chief, the chief who had the ear of the Liberians, while Bombo Kolli remained the traditional ruler. Apparently at Christmas 1910, J.B. Cooper declared an end to intertribal warfare and invited the Bande chiefs to Kolahun in order to hold a council and settle past disputes. The chiefs and crowds of their followers came with food, cattle and ivory to Glima near Kolahun. Here, however, they were surrounded by Cooper's Frontier Force men while they were eating and were disarmed and made prisoners. Cooper turned over the chiefs to Mambu to guard them while the remainder of the people were enslaved by Mambu or killed on the spot.⁶⁹ Many men and women were sold into slavery. It is unclear whether Bombo Kolli had not come to Kolahun or whether he managed to escape, but he was seriously offended at this breach of faith and reflected on means of revenge.

The chiefs were held at Kolahun until September 1911 when Lomax returned from an excursion into Kissi country. As he considered that the chiefs if released would again turn against the Liberian officials he advised for their execution. According to some witnesses he himself shot the first prisoner leaving the others to some of his soldiers and Mambu. One of his clerks, Sandi Mani alias Boima Massaquoi, who was later to become an important interior official, distinguished himself for his particular ruthlessness in the massacre at which nine chiefs were slain.⁷⁰

Bombo Kolli then went to Monrovia to complain to President D. Howard

about Mambu's quest for power and the Kolahun massacre. Apparently, the Liberian President told Bombo Kolli to take things into his own hands since he was the officially recognized chief. Moreover, he despatched a new commissioner, the above mentioned D. Twe, and a special commissioner, a certain Dr. Abayomi Cole, to Kolahun.⁷¹ Twe apparently had instructions to have the slaves of Mambu released and to rebuild the villages destroyed by Cooper and Mambu. Cole who arrived some nine months later, in November 1912, had in addition to similar instructions received £60 for a suitable funeral ceremony for the murdered chiefs. On his arrival at Kolahun, however, Mambu presented Cole with gifts of money, cattle and ivory and gave him two of his daughters as consorts. Thereupon, Cole not only did not order Mambu to return his slaves but continued to permit the dealing in slaves and spent the money for the funeral on feasting with Mambu. Both also conspired to get rid of Commissioner Twe who had refused to accept any of Mambu's gifts and had publicly declared that he would not have any dealings with Cole. In February 1913, Cole wrote to Monrovia requesting the President to remove Twe from office and Mambu was sent to carry the letter personally. In the meantime Lomax and Cooper had been tried in Monrovia for murder, but the trial ended with their acquittal - in September 1912 - before the Bande witnesses arrived at Monrovia and could make their statements. As they were relatives to Bombo Kolli and the murdered chiefs, they returned home embittered and decided to take revenge on Mambu whom they blamed for the murders. When Mambu, on his way to Monrovia, tried to cross the Mano river he was ambushed by Bombo Kolli's warriors and carried to Glima (March 5, 1913). Mambu's escort of Frontier Force men, which had been given him by commissioner Twe, was apparently without ammunition and fled when Mambu was seized. At Glima, Mambu was put in chains and severely beaten - the indigenous punishment for treason - so that he died on March 10, 1913.⁷²

Cole sent for 100 Frontier Force men and three officers from different districts when he could not find Mambu, and accused Twe of conspiring to the latter's murder. He also attacked Twe and the boundary commission and attempted to send Twe to Monrovia. From some of the evidence, however, it becomes clear that Cole wanted to rid himself of Mambu as he feared the latter might report details of his misconduct to Monrovia. Bombo Kolli and his followers, who remained for a few months at Kolahun, fled into Sierra Leone when it became clear that Cole and the Liberian Frontier Force under Captain Hawkins attempted to capture him and mete out the same fate to him as to Mambu. The British authorities treated Bombo Kolli as a political refugee and resisted any requests by Liberians for his extradition.⁷³ Apparently, Kolahun only became settled again several years later under Commissioner Garnett and Bombo Kolli's nephew who transferred the remains of his uncle back to his home town.

The story of Bombo Kolli and Mambulu as it appears in the archival sources rings differently, however, in oral history. Several versions which are edited in the appendix exist but none clearly mentions the role of Liberian officials. Clearly, the fact that most of the living informants only have their information from hearsay rather than being eyewitnesses may be as much a source of distortion as the fear of making direct accusations against Liberian officials, officials who were closely related to important Liberian families.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the interests of the informants involved play a role in the presentation of history: for example, the accounts of the descendants of Bombo Kolli differ considerably from those of Mambu's Malinke descendants.⁷⁵ It is all the more regrettable if research projects on the history of the Liberian interior fail to comment on and carefully interpret their informants' statements.⁷⁶ Under these circumstances, a worthy effort will result in a product which is neither history nor fiction but an unfortunate mixture of stories without historical value.

APPENDIX I: ACCOUNTS OF BOMBO KOLLI AND MAMBULU

Informant: Boimai Kamara, Weimatahun⁷⁷

"According to Oldman Boikai (sic) Kamara, after the Kamaitahun Conference, the Gbandis on the other side of the Kaihai River from Kolahun (referred to as Kaihaivons) refused to accept submission to the central government. The chief spokesman of the Kaihaivons was one Momokollie. There were, nevertheless, other chiefs e.g. the chief of Bolahun and of Tahamba. Those sections of the tribe which had already surrendered themselves to the Liberian Government requested the Kaihaivons to do likewise. But Chief Momokollie replied they would not be forced into submission. The Liberian contingent, apparently, and its newly won friends among the Gbandis attacked the Kaihaivons. Obviously, the Kaihaivons were defeated. It was then that they realized that the 'civilized' people were very strong.

As a result of their defeat, the Kaihaivons sent a representative, Chief Momokollie, to Kolahun to apologize for them. Momokollie told Mambru that they had reconsidered their decision and would accept the authority of the Liberian Government. Mambru told Momokollie to call all his chiefs together at Kolahun so he could talk with them. Mambru assured Momokollie that the chiefs should have no fears as nothing would befall them. From here on there are two versions of what occurred between Mambru and the Kaihaivon chiefs...

According to Oldman Kamara, when the chiefs gathered as Mambru had wished, they did so armed. Their coming thus armed convinced Mambru and his people that the Kaihaivons had not really come in peace. Mambru therefore told them that if they had seriously come to beg pardon they would not have come armed. He therefore ordered them disarmed. As soon as they were disarmed, Mambru had them arrested. This again resulted in a war between the main divisions of the tribe. While the war raged on, Mambru sent a messenger to Monrovia to President Howard (1912-1920) The President sent up one Doctor Cole to adjudicate the dispute.

Ostensibly dissatisfied with the trend of things, Momokollie left for Monrovia to make a personal report to the President. On the way, he was mistakenly shot by a Gola man. His journey was therefore delayed until he had recovered from his wound. When he recovered, Momokollie resumed his journey to Monrovia where he met President Howard. Momokollie is reported to have told the President that he had been unjustly wronged, and except for respect for His Excellency, he would have retaliated. The President thanked Momokollie and told him that Mambru would be called to Monrovia and an investigation into the matter undertaken. Momokollie returned home. Mambru was sent for by the President. But as Mambru was travelling he was waylaid by Momokollie's men and killed. Immediately thereafter, Momokollie attacked Mambru's people. It was only after President Howard had sent up one Captain Hutchins that Momokollie was forced into releasing the people."

Informants: Town Chief Bondor and Oldman Bongue Borlie, Old Kolahun

When the Liberian contingent first arrived in an effort to settle boundary disputes with the British, Garbor was an important chief in the area. When Garbor died he was succeeded by Bomba, his brother. (It was this same Bomba who had represented Kolahun at the Kamaitahun Conference). Bomba and Mambru were ruling in the area concurrently. Mambru was the civilized chief and Bomba the native chief. In other words, Mambru, because

of his personal relationship to the civilized people, was regarded by the Liberian boundary commission as the highest ranking chief in the area. But because of Bomba's personal and military exploits, he was regarded by the inhabitants of the area as the highest ranking chief.

Mambru, it is reported, attempted to extend his authority over Kolahun, for now that he was rich, he apparently loathed ruling only over Weimatahun. Bomba, on the contrary, saw no reason why he should play second fiddle to Mambru. 'In those days,' claimed Chief Bondor, 'there was no peace in this land.' While the power struggle continued, Bomba became ill. He was taken to Dayu in Sierra Leone, to undergo an operation. He is said to have died on the operating table. With Bomba off the stage, Mambru continued his ambitious pursuit of power. The state of affairs became such that the Gbandis fled Gbandiland for Sierra Leone, Guinea and other areas in Liberia.

It must be said for Mambru that his attempt at extending his authority was not without justification. When Mambru first came into the area, he used to reside at Kolahun. Before his arrival, however, the inhabitants of the town and the inhabitants of surrounding villages were distrustful of each other. For this reason, Kolahun had been strategically fortified. If anyone attempted to enter the town by climbing over the fence, the act was tantamount to a declaration of war. And this declaration was usually readily accepted.

Mambru, a lineal uncle to the people of Kolahun and the adjacent town, told the people to look up to him for conciliation of their mutual distrust. Then Mambru moved to Weimatahun (sic), where he became a wealthy chief. It was then that he forewent his conciliatory role for the ambitious role of tribal leadership. It was during this time that a misunderstanding cropped up between Kolahun and another town, apparently Harribo Town.

A soldier from the other town, attempting to enter Kolahun town, climbed up the fortification fence, and then called down to the people to open the door and let him in. The guard on duty replied that he would shoot the stranger if he climbed down into the town. Sensing the danger awaiting him in the town, the stranger hurried down on the other side of the fence and ran home. When he arrived in his town, he told his people that Kolahun was prepared for war against them. As a result, relations between Kolahun and Harribo Town and Weimatahun (sic) became greatly strained.

Against this background of tension, the inhabitants sent for one Bomba (not the one who died at Dayu) of Kumbatahun, lineal brother to the inhabitants of Kolahun.⁷⁸ Bomba was one of the most courageous soldiers the people of Kolahun relied upon. Bomba left Kumbatahun for Kolahun via Nyewrelihun and Harribo Town. Thus from Kumbatahun (sic), Bomba travelled first to Nyewrelihun before going to Harribo Town. When he arrived in Harribo Town, Bomba was forbidden to leave Harribo Town by the inhabitants of the town. The inhabitants of Harribo Town village bound Bomba on the ground (sic) that 'he had travelled via Nyewrelihun'. The inhabitants of Harribo, ostensibly, suspected Bomba of trying to persuade the inhabitants of Nyewrelihun into an alliance with Kolahun. Whatever the case, when the news reached Kolahun of the action the people of Harribo had taken in regard to Bomba, the inhabitants of the town went to rescue Bomba....

According to Gbandi customs, the capture of a chief is tantamount to the capture of his town. Against this traditional background, the kinfolk of chief Bomba (who had allegedly died on the operating table in Dayu, Sierra Leone) began to claim (in such a time of chaos and confusion) that it was

Bomba's enemies who had caused his death. The kinfolk claimed that Bomba's enemies had written to the British requesting them to kill Bomba. Consequently, Bomba's kinfolk now wanted revenge."

"According to Chief Bondor, after Mambru had requested Momokollie to persuade his people to gather at Kolahun, and Momokollie had done so, Mambru not only disarmed the chiefs but had them murdered as well.⁷⁹ (The inhabitants of Kolahun had pinned their hopes on one 'Willie' to defend the justness of their cause. But when Willie came - apparently from another town - he went straight to the compound-barracks complex of the 'civilized' people. It was thereafter that those nine chiefs who were killed were sent for, one at a time, and murdered. Willie, the Kolahun people's hope, was finally discovered to be a collaborator of Mambru, the Kolahun people's arch enemy. It is in this regard that Chief Bondor claimed that it was 'Mambru who caused all the wars that destroyed Kolahun'.) This act of Mambru injured Momokollie. Momokollie is said to have told Mambru that the treatment meted out to the Kaihaivon chiefs was highly unjust. But what pained Momokollie most was the deception Mambru had employed to get him, Momokollie, to lead his fellow chiefs to their untimely death. These chiefs, nine in all, were buried in one big grave dug by Gbandi prisoners held by the Liberian contingent over in their barracks....

Chief Bondor from there on agreed essentially with Oldman Kamara in respect to Momokollie's journey to Monrovia....According to Chief Bondor, as Mambru was preparing to travel to Monrovia, he had Momokollie's men disarmed. Probably, Mambru intended by that act to assure that nothing would flare up during his absence. Whatever his reason, Momokollie demanded the return of his people's arms. Mambru refused saying that the people should wait until he returned from Monrovia. Mambru, through such authoritarian methods, had added pain and insult to injury, without his knowing it. It was thus that Momokollie decided to act immediately, and hence the waylaying of Mambru. When the Liberian Government finally took over the direct administration of the area, Momokollie was told to produce Mambru. Momokollie escaped to Sierra Leone where he died."

Informant: Ahma Jawajei, Gola resident of Masambolahun, former boy of Mambulu; February 1969(Kissi Fieldnotes, A. Massing)

Saa Morlu (Samori?) was a Mandingo chief who drove all people down in a 'rolling war' (kli kli ko). Bombo Kolli, Mbawulume and Taiwi (Towe⁸⁰) fought all in the same war against Saa Morlu. At that time Mambulu was small. Mbawulume was driven from Kailahun by Kai Lundu who followed him to Jenne. At that time there was no boundary. Mbawulume made war against the government all the way down to Monrovia. The government sent Willie Lomax, President Howard's son, to negotiate with Mbawulume in Brewersville. Afterwards he went up country to Looma.

The first government representatives, John Cooper and Mambu, went to Kamatahun to build barracks there. Later Mambu escorted W. Lomax from Looma down to Monrovia.

At the time Mambulu was chief he fought against Kpengbanama from Koniando, and Kanganya from Kpamgbaini. The war started because of taxation. The Kissi came to Gelehun and Tawulahun on the Foya Customs road. Mambulu won the war with Sergeant Carr on his side.


Mambulu and John Cooper asked the people to be one and come to Koidahun (Kolahun). All chiefs went there. The Liberians hid the soldiers in the bush. They told Bombo Kolli that they wanted peace. When they all

were eating a cow, the Liberians blew the whistle and all soldiers came out of the bush catching every chief. Only Bombo Kolli jumped into the bush. They took the chiefs and jailed them in Glima. After a few months they transferred them to Pandemai and later to Voinjama. Then Willie Lomax returned and opened a prison at Kolahun. One night Lomax and Cooper sent for Mambulu and went to the barracks. They told him that they wanted to kill the prisoners. They explained that if they were freed they would again start war. Mambulu agreed and they killed eight chiefs with their guns. The chiefs were buried in a mass grave on the right side of the road from Kolahun to the Kaiha creek.

Bombo Kolli, Mbawula and Kolilei had fled to Sierra Leone. Commissioner Tueh, a Kru man, was sent to Sierra Leone to bring them back. The British Government delivered them and sent them back to their homes. Bombo Kolli returned to Glima. The Liberians called him and said 'let us make a feast for the people we killed at Kolahun'. After the feast he returned to Glima. But Mambulu and the District Commissioner recalled him. When he refused to come, and they wanted to fetch him by force, he fled. They shot at him and broke one of his ribs. Nevertheless he escaped and ran to Monrovia to ask revenge from the President. The latter gave him guns and powder. Bombo Kolli returned and gathered all Gbandi chiefs. Mambulu also wanted to go to Monrovia but he was warned that Bombo Kolli had designs on his life. Mambulu sent a messenger to Bombo Kolli asking whether he intended to capture him. But Bombo Kolli denied this. Then Mambulu went to Pasolahun, to Yomatahun and Sambatahun, but everywhere he heard the same warning. However, he did not heed the warnings and went to Kolahun from where he left for Monrovia. Since at the time he had quarreled with Commissioner Tueh, the latter gave him twenty four soldiers as escort but instructed them to run away in case Bombo Kolli's men came to arrest Mambulu. When Mambulu reached a four-way road crossing, Bombo Kolli's warriors jumped on him while his escort ran away. The warriors ordered him to walk to Glima but he was unable because he had been severely beaten. Therefore, he was carried to Glima in a hammock where he was jailed for two days. Bombo Kolli asked the Gbandi people there whether he should release Mambulu but they all rejected the suggestion. Thereupon he was killed. He was not buried, his right hand was cut off as well as his head. On his head, all people took an oath, while a messenger was sent with his hand to all villages to inform them of Mambulu's death.

Thereafter, the President sent Momofa Massaquoi with soldiers to capture Mambulu. Massaquoi asked for Mambulu's wives and property and everything was given to him. He was also told that Mambulu would be produced on the next day from Mbawuluhun. Captain Hawkins arrived the same day with 300 soldiers and did not want to wait another day. Therefore they left during the night. At 5 a.m. they climbed the hill toward Mbawuluhun. When the people saw the soldiers coming, they and their chiefs all ran away and crossed into British territory. But Mambulu's people caught many of them on the way. Then there was no more war because the country was empty."

APPENDIX II

THE CHIEFLY LINEAGE OF KOLAHUN⁸¹

FOOTNOTES

1. Kafu denotes a traditional political area among the Malinke; it may either be the area controlled by a lineage or several such areas united by common agreement of the lineage elders. The term seems appropriate to denote the political units in the area under discussion.

2. Wonde or Wende now in Guinea; Kama, Tengi and Tongi in Sierra Leone (see map).

3. K. Wylie, "Notes on Kai Lundu's Campaign into Liberia in 1889," Liberian Studies Journal, III, 2 (1970-71), 167-172; A Massing, "Chiefdoms in Western Liberia: Kai Lundu and Mbawulume," Liberian Studies Journal, VI, 2 (1975), 87-91.

4. A. Massing, "Chiefdoms," 88, 91.

5. K. Wylie, "Innovation and Change in Mende Chieftaincy 1880-1896," Journal of African History, X, 2 (1969), 302.

6. Ngiyehun = Giehun, between Kailahun and Pendemu.

7. K. Wylie, "Innovation," 302.

8. K. Wylie, "Notes," 170; Nyangahun cannot be identified on present maps.

9. Ibid.; Kamolahun can no longer be identified on present maps.

10. British Colonial Office, Confidential Print (Hereafter cited as C.O.), 879/42,481 no. 95A, Governor Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 1, 1895.

11. A. Massing, "Chiefdoms," 89.

12. Samuel Morlu, Masambolahun, April 1969; during the 1880's, the Bande were still allied with Kai Lundu while this alliance shifted during the 1890's. The constellation of power as it existed during the late nineteenth century in the Liberian interior was certainly determined, to a certain extent by the oppositions between Malinke and non-Malinke, Muslims and non-Muslims as well as between Samori followers and Samori enemies. Thus it is likely that Kai Lundu resisted the penetration of Islam in the person of Samori and his lieutenant Kissi Fode on the Kissi frontier, as well as that of the Malinke traders on the Gbandi frontier. On the other hand, the Toma and particularly the Bunde of Pandemai were solid allies of Samori who, even though a Malinke, curbed the expansionary tendencies of the Malinke into the Toma sector. Moreover the chiefdoms along the trade route from the interior to the coast had been brought under Samori's influence in order to secure the supplies of arms shipments to Samori's armies. Therefore, Mbawulume's retreat into the Belle area which was situated strategically between Bopolu, a center of Malinke commerce, and the fringes of the forest - such as the Toma chiefdoms of Pandemai, Bakemai, Ziemai et al. - which formed the outposts of Samori's empire, must be considered as a skillful move. From here Mbawulume could control the caravans of goods and arms from the coast and gain considerable influence as a middleman. He also seems to have supplied arms to Kai Lundu's Kissi enemies.

13. A. Massing, "Materials for a History of Western Liberia: The Belle," Liberian Studies Journal, III, 2 (1970-71), 189-94; C.O. 879/42 481 no. 95A, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 1, 1895; Y. Person, Samori

Une Revolution Dyula (Dakar, 1968), vol. I, 565, 584 n. 52.

14. C.O. 879/42 481 no. 95A, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 1, 1895.
15. C.O. 879/39 no. 152 Encl. 2, Feb. 1, 1894; C.O. 879/39 no. 167 Encl. 3, May 6, 1894.
16. C.O. 879/42 481 no. 95A, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 1, 1895.
17. C.O. 879/39 no. 167, Encl. 3, May 6, 1894.
18. C.O. 879/42 481 no. 95A, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 1, 1895.
19. Ibid.
20. W.R.E. Clarke, "The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom," Sierra Leone Studies N.S. VIII (1957), 245-55.
21. C.O. 879/49 533 no. 15, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, Mar. 10, 1896.
22. C.O. 879/42 481 no. 95A, Mar. 1, 1895.
23. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 152 Encl. Fabunde to Cardew, July 29, 1896; Cardew to Chamberlain, Aug. 4, 1896.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 152 Encl. 2, Captain Fairtlough to Inspector General, Frontier Police, Aug. 20, 1896.
27. Ibid. Captain Fairtlough to Acting Inspector General, Frontier Police, Sept. 18, 1896.
28. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 166 Encl., Captain Fairtlough to Inspector General, Frontier Police; no. 208 Encl. Captain Fairtlough to Colonial Secretary, Feb. 13, 1897.
29. Ibid. no. 208 Encl. Captain Fairtlough to Colonial Secretary, Feb. 13, 1897.
30. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 259, Encl. 1, Captain Blakeney to Colonial Secretary, Nov. 25, 1897.
31. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 261, Encl. 1, Captain Blakeney to Colonial Secretary, Dec. 20, 1897.
32. C.O. 879/48 522 no. 268, Encl., Captain Blakeney to Inspector General, Frontier Police, Jan. 31, 1898.
33. C.O. 879/59 589 no. 54 Encl. Major Stuart to Lt. Colonel Cunningham, Feb. 12, 1899.
34. C.O. 879/80 722 no. 78 Encl. 1 Procès Verbal Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission; no. 79 and no. 79 Encl. 1.

35. C.O. 879/80 722 no. 79 Encl. 1; the spelling of Mbawulume's name varies; thus we find Barome, Marome, Baromah, Baurumeh.

36. C.O. 879/88 no. 1 Encl. Major Anderson, D.C. Panguma, Nov. 27, 1904: "In 1901 I had a letter from a Mr. Lomax who signed himself Lieutenant de Cercle Intérieure (sic), and written from a town south of Kanre Lahun. I found out afterwards that he was a prisoner and had been carried there by chief Baromah."; with regard to the 'garrison' I have only been able to obtain oral references while the evidence from archival sources is circumstantial: in 1906, Looma was the residence of an agent of the Liberian Rubber Corporation. It is likely that a European agent would only have established his residence in the interior with a guarantee of military protection by the Liberian government. In fact Mandingo traders who traded on account of Lomax were seized near Looma in 1906. C.O. 879/88 no. 95 Encl. B. Wallis to Sierra Leone Governor, April 3, 1906; no. 102 Encl. J. Braham to B. Wallis, May 22, 1906.

37. See C.O. 879/88 and C.O. 879/96; the events of the Kissi wars will be discussed in a paper which is in preparation by this author.

38. When visiting Looma in 1907, W. Volz stated that Mbawulume had been dead for some years, W. Volz, "Reise durch das Hinterland Liberia im Winter-1906-07 (bearbeitet von R. Zeller," Jahresbericht der Berner Geographischen Gesellschaft, XXII (1911), 217-18; the last reference to Mbawulume is made in 1903 by the Anglo Liberian Boundary Commission -C.O. 879/0 722 no. 79 and Encl. - while the first reference to his son as chief of Looma is made in 1906 -C.O. 879/88 no. 102 Encl. Therefore his death occurred some time between those two years.

39. C.O. 879/88 no. 1 Encl., Report Major Anderson, D.C. Panguma, Nov. 27, 1904.

40. While Lomax' first trip to the interior is documented by the British Major Anderson see note 36, his second trip of 1904 is only scantily documented. He seems to have participated in the Gola campaign of President Coleman, see United States, Despatches of U.S. Ministers to Liberia 1863-1906 (Hereafter cited as U.S. Ministers), Roll 14, no. 109. For Lomax' third mission in 1906-07, see his own report in C.O. 879/101 22039 no. 28 Encl. 1.

41. C.O. 879/101 22039 no. 28 Encl. 1.

42. Ibid.

43. C.O. 879/96 no. 66 Encl.; C.O. 879/96 no. 25; C.O. 879/96 no. 67.

44. Ibid.

45. C.O. 879/96 no. 71 Encl., June 18, 1907.

46. C.O. 879/96 no. 93 Encl. 3, Aug. 1907.

47. C.O. 879/96 no. 81, Aug. 7, 1907; C.O. 879/101 6931 Feb. 12, 1909.

48. C.O. 879/96 no. 150 Encl., Sept. 4, 1908.

49. C.O. 879/96 no. 154 Encl. 2, no. 157 Encl., no. 163 (Oct. 8, 1908; Oct. 9, 1908; Nov. 7, 1908).

50. C.O. 879/96 no. 26, no. 109 Encl.; C.O. 879/101 518.
51. C.O. 879/96 no. 164 Encl.; C.O. 879.96 no. 124; C.O. 879/101 no. 64 Encl.1 no. 96 Encl 3.
52. C.O. 879/101 2025; C.O. 879/101 6931 Encl. 2.
53. C.O. 879/101 6931.
54. C.O. 879/101 no. 56 Encl. 10; A. Massing, Fieldnotes Kamatahun, Dec. 1968.
55. C.O. 879/101 no. 48 Encl. 1; no. 56 Encl. 13; no. 59 Encl.
56. C.O. 879/101 no. 59 Encl. Statement by Corp. Summanah Makka, S.L. Battalion.
57. A good report of the Cadell affair is given in Great Britain, Foreign Office 367, 160 no. 51, Customs Receiver to Consul General Wallis, Dec. 21, 1908, 142ff.
58. C.O. 879/107 no. 4; no. 22.
59. C.O. 879/107 no. 87.
60. C.O. 879/110 no. 2Encl. 1.
61. Ibid., Encl. 1, Encl.2, Encl. 3, Encl. 5.
62. C.O. 879/110 no. 8 Encl. 1; no. 14; no. 38.
63. C.O. 879/110 no. 18 Encl. 1; no. 19 Encl.; No. 30 Encl.
64. C.O. 879/110 no. 32; no. 38 Encl. 2.
65. C.O. 879/101 no. 48 Encl.; Kamatahun (vassa); Waimatahun cannot be identified on present maps. Mambu is elsewhere referred to as Komendi i.e. Malinke chief.
66. C.O. 879/107 no. 124 Encl.
67. Liberian Educational and Cultural Research Project, The Gbandis Vol. I, 2nd ed. (Monrovia, 1971), 208.
68. Report by Major Lomax, C.O. 879/101 22039 no. 28 Encl. 1.
69. See genealogy in Appendix II; C.O. 879/107 no. 124 Encl.; no. 146.
70. C.O. 879/107 no. 124 Encl.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.; C.O. 879/107 no. 146.
73. C.O. 879/107 no. 138.
74. Commissioner Cooper was a stepson of ex-President A. Barclay's and W. Lomax was considered a close personal friend of the Barclay family. Ex-President Barclay himself defended Lomax while Barclay's son-in-law defended Cooper.

75. Compare the first and second account of Mambu's death in Appendix I.

76. Liberian Educational and Cultural Research Project, The Gbandis, 205-213; this represents a careless collection of several accounts by different informants which have been intermingled in such a way as to make the contribution of each informant almost impossible. It contains serious inconsistencies in spelling of names which are likely to thoroughly confuse the reader who is unfamiliar with the subject matter.

77. After: "The Gbandis"; Boimai or Boikai Kamara is a descendant of Mambu, member of the Kamara clan which has colonized the forest fringe for the Malinke since several hundred years. The other informants are descendants of Bombo Kolli, if the genealogical information contained in the report is correct.

78. It appears that Bomba is identical with Bombo Kolli since Bonkoli (=Bombo Kolli) was said to have lived with his older brother Kumbah in Kumbah-town, while his younger brother Yekeh Gwalah lived in Kolahun. The Bomba who supposedly died in Sierra Leone is probably also identical with Bombo Kolli; however, the informants or interviewers probably confused some of the facts.

79. In the following, the text is somewhat rearranged so as to follow the logical order of events.

80. Towe or Toweï, also called Siafa, was chief of Tengia at the time of Kai Lundu's death. He was the predecessor of chief Dawa.

81. After "The Gbandis," 205-06; from there it appears that Mambu's father, a Malinke, created a family alliance in the usual way by marrying into Bombo Kolli's family. The relationship mother's brother-sister's son is of great importance in the cultures of Western Liberia.

SIKLIPO DAKO:

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE KRU COAST

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
INTRODUCTION

The following paper provides a brief description of Coastal Kru political organization and shows how two traditional socio-political behaviors -- clan bifurcation and sodality action -- are used in the cause of social development. Today, both clans and voluntary associations provide the rationale and structure through which the modern Kru exert control over both village political figures and administrators of the Kru Coast Territory.

Clan bifurcation into sections sets the stage for a developmental cycle that is represented in its final form by prowaki (Lit. town divides). Historically, Kru towns built outlying dependent villages composed of one or two clan togi (clan sections) and in many cases, particularly among the Sikliipo Kru of Grand Cess, these villages absorbed the parent village because of their defensive and economic advantage. This settlement pattern has been developmental and of long standing; the modern town of Grand Cess -- in which the Municipality section is absorbing the original village of Big Town -- must be understood in the light of economic and political adaptation.

Prowaki: Village adaptation is a group term for the adaptation of individuals to ongoing material wants and needs. In the case of Sikliipo, these needs are translated into action by both kinship groups and sodalities. Traditionally clans (panton) divided into two parts (panton togi) under several interlocking conditions: 1) a need for outlying defensive garrison, 2) a need for new agricultural land and garden space brought about by population growth, and 3) conflict between clans or powerful men within the same clan. This village splitting frequently led to competition between the villages and, if the defensive village survived economically and militarily, the gradual abandonment of the parent town. This pattern was particularly true among groups moving down the rivers of Liberia toward the coast. After settlement of the coast, and the adaptation to ocean fishing was complete, Kru villages became more geographically stabilized, but the process of prowaki, while slowed perhaps, is still a part of Kru social structure and psychology.

Sodalities: Historically sodalities have played an important part in Kru social development, providing as they do a means to cross-cut and support the interests of clans which are today quite independent, and were historically fully autonomous groups. The Kru traditionally organized political, religious, recreational and economic societies. Today, with the rise in population and extensive labor migration, sodalities continue to play an important part not only in the structure of the traditional Big Town, but also in the Municipality where societies act as both an aid and a brake to internal and external political forces.



Map 1: The Kru Coast

SUMMARY OF PRIOR RESEARCH:

The Coastal Kru of Liberia are a maritime people of long standing who, having moved down the coastal waterways from the interior, are now situated from the Cestos River in the North West to Garraway in the South East. (See Map 1). The inland boundaries of their language proper have not been clearly defined but overlap with the Bassa, Grebo, and Kran. These groups share more cultural and linguistic similarities, than any one of them does with any of the other sixteen or so ethnic groups in Liberia. There is a striking similarity between these groups in level of technology, lack of political centralization, and world view. (Hendrickson, 1970 and McEvoy, 1971). The Kru, Kran, and Grebo are speakers of the Kru branch of the Kwa linguistic subfamily of the Nigritic stock (Greenberg, 1966); this branch, along with the West Atlantic and Peripheral Mande, shows a close enough affinity with the Senegambian languages further north to indicate that these groups, with perhaps the coastal Kru in the forefront, spread down into the rain forest prior to the rise of the Malinke empire in the 16th century.

It is clear that southeast Liberia is a reservoir area of less powerfully organized groups where hunting, fishing and gathering played and continue to play a major role in their subsistence. Warren d'Azevedo (1962) has argued that the coastal Kru adopted dry rice farming, a Sudanic development, within the last 150 years, and the Siklipo Kru support this contention by claiming not only that fishing and hunting are more prestigious than farming, but that the beginning of dry rice cultivation was within the memory of elderly men's fathers; prior to that, women grew small gardens within the confines of the town.

There is substantial evidence to show that the coastal Kru were well enough adapted from riverine to ocean fishing by the beginnings of the maritime slave trade in West Africa, around 1600, to have established themselves in the literature surrounding the slave trade in the successive centuries. Especially important are: Barbot (1732), Cowley (1928), Dalby and Hair (1964), Dapper (1686), Ludlam (1825-1826), Martin and Spurrel (1962), and Snelgrave (1705).

These works impressively establish the maritime abilities of the Kru, a people who were integrally involved in the slave trade in all levels from deck hands to mercenaries and who frequently made the entire voyage from Africa to the New World with their cargo. With the cessation of the slave trade the Kru men continued to work on European vessels unloading cargo from Liverpool to the Congo; and, while they less frequently were involved south of the Bight of Biafra, there were impressive numbers of Kru men involved in inland trade from the Niger River as far north as the Gambia.

The two most complete studies of expatriate Kru communities in this century are Banton (1957) and Fraenkel (1964). Fraenkel's work, an excellent analysis of the structure and administration of Liberian ethnic communities in Monrovia, provides some information on traditional Kru sociopolitical organization. Information gaps on traditional Kru social structure motivated her short visit to Grand Cess in 1958, where she laid the ground work for her 1966 paper "Social Change on the Kru Coast of Liberia". This paper, largely devoted to a description of the traditional political system of the town of Grand Cess, was incorporated into Ronald Davis' thesis, "Historical Outline of the Kru Coast of Liberia, 1500 to the Present" (1968).

Of particular importance in understanding the Kru, Kran and Grebo culture area are McEvoy's "History, Tradition and Kinship as Factors in

Modern Sabo Labor Migration" (1971), a meticulous study of a Grebo community and its relation to labor migration, and Hendrickson's "Kinship, Achievement and Social Change in Tribal Societies" (1970). Hendrickson contrasts in detail the Kru, Kran and Grebo cluster in southeast Liberia with other, more centrally organized Liberian groups, in respect to achievement and modernization values. Importantly, this southeastern cluster strongly supports values associated with national development and democratic political processes, including support for competency based -- as opposed to kinship or sex based -- criteria for educational and political advancement; and, traditional emphasis on social action.

KRU SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Coastal Kru communities (which rarely exceed 2000 in population) are organized into localized exogamous patrilineal clans (panton) which share common names, taboos, and history. Succession to political and religious offices within the town groups (dako, sing; dakwe, pl.) is dependent upon specific clan membership, particular offices being identified with specific clans or clan sections (togi). Succession to office within the clans depends more upon ability than age.

The degree of diversity in politico-religious offices held within clans varies considerably throughout the Kru Coast, and each town prides itself on its special variant of the basic system. That system included named warrior age grades, two supervisory councils (composed of clan heads and priests -- Bulio; and village "old men" -- the Defwedio), and a village chief whose work was facilitated through the supervision of the age grades, the councils, priests and judicial figures chosen within the clans. Kru towns with great political complexity attribute it to growth and development and claim that those without it are backward; those with less complexity explain that they have kept more to the traditional path and that all others are revisionists.

Village groups on the Kru Coast are not only competitive but, until the last several years, have been militarily hostile. Today, each town has its own special form of dress and behavior and sees it as necessary that their beliefs differ from those of other surrounding village groups. The men of Picnicness, for example, wear beards and jokingly claim that the Siklipo do not because they are not men enough to grow them. The Siklipo, on the other hand, assiduously avoid facial hair, claiming that it makes men look degenerate.

Much of the open competition between Kru towns today stems from disputes over land. Over several hundred years the economic and military fortunes of towns have varied radically and boundaries between them were only in effect if they could be held by force. Most present boundaries between farming areas have been reset by the Liberian government after drawn out land dispute cases and, from observation at the boundary sites, the government has generally chosen boundaries equidistant from the claimants. An uncultivated "no-man's-land" exists between most of the villages on the Kru Coast.

Only infrequently in the past have Kru town groups established alliances with other towns. In every known case the cause was war with encroaching groups that threatened both towns simultaneously. Because of their position on the coast and the access to maritime wealth that it affords, this encroachment was frequent and the Grand Cess Kru indicate that they

were able to take and hold their present position only after the utter devastation of weaker people whom they displaced toward the Southeast.

VILLAGE ECONOMY

Dry rice and cassava are co-staples on the Kru Coast and a variety of secondary crops are grown. The women usually plant vegetable gardens if space near the home permits; most typical in order of caloric value are: coleus, sweet potato, sugarcane, okra, peanuts, various greens, red peppers, and ginger.

The farming cycle begins during the month of December after land for the current year has been demarcated, and both men and women begin to cut down the high bush preparatory to burning in February. The rice fields are planted in either late February or March and sacrifices are made to Cra Sikli -- the most powerful god of Siklipo -- so that the rains will not hit in earnest until the crops are well established. Rice harvest usually comes when the ground dries somewhat in October. Cassava is planted between the rows of rice during harvest and will bear from six months to a year after it is planted. For the Kru, rice planting is a tenuous affair, and contrary to Davis' statement (1968:23) that the soils of the Kru coast are "varieties of red and red-brown tropical soils somewhat better suited to agriculture (than laterites) and more typical of the savanna lands of the Western Sudan than the interior of southern Liberia," the Kru must fallow their soils at least ten years before fertility has been restored to farmable levels. As long as men can remember, the coastal towns have traded fish into the interior for rice to tide them through the hungry season that invariably arrives in July and August.

During December, January, and February, when the rains and therefore the winds are most pacific, the vast majority of fish that are traded inland are caught and cured. Because the harvest coincides, the fishing season is a time of plenty. Grand Cess traders make numerous trips to the interior to trade, and visits to Grand Cess by distant kinsmen increase the chance of parties, gossip, and news from the hinterland.

The Coastal Kru that have pushed down to the ocean are consummate fishermen and, while they do not catch enough fish to last through the hungry months, fishing families are notably more healthy and stretch their rice supply throughout the yearly cycle because of the debts that they have built up in their favor. During the hungry season very few people are hungry for anything but rice because there is always, except in rare famine years, enough cassava to go around. Men are forced to go further afield to get palm nuts and other forest products, even though it is both uncomfortable and dangerous to stay out all day in the driving rains that flood the forests.

Even though months of time and tremendous effort are invested, farming accounts for no more than one half of the daily caloric intake of the Coastal Kru. Fully one half is derived from tree crops, hunting, fishing, and gathering. Coconuts, palm nuts, breadfruit, plantains, bananas, mangoes, paw-paw, oranges, coffee, cocoa, and kola are -- in that order -- the major tree crops grown. Baskets are set to catch river shrimp and small fish; traps are set for large and small game and ten percent of the men own shotguns with which they have held the population of larger game animals to a size that the farms are not frequently threatened. Today wild pigs pose the worst threat to the farm and can break through any but the strongest forest fence.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The oral history of each coastal Kru settlement elaborates the theme of settlement, land exhaustion, warfare and re-settlement ever and ever closer to the coast. Village historians can identify the sites of their old towns and talk about the process of town fission (prowaki) and settlement of new lands as a regular process of development. Even though the present coastal towns of Sasstown, Picnicess, Grand Cess, Po River, Setta Kru, Greenville, and River Cess are now blocked in their territorial expansion by the Liberian government, each town has begun the development of outlying semi-autonomous coastal villages. Grand Cess is a notable example of this process and the actual process of prowaki will be more fully developed in a discussion of the Siklipo dako.

Political authority in Kru dakwe is allocated according to a complex system of checks and balances that are seen as necessary to assure the proper equilibrium of power throughout the town group. It is through the conception of equilibrium that the Kru justify the development of several administrative and religious councils that not only act as checks on the personal power of the chiefs whom they select but which augment the settlement of an entire range of public and private conflicts and the development of group goals.

The dako chief or Krogba is selected from any of the long standing clans of the town by the concerted action of the Defwedio -- the older men's group (those with a wide experience in the migration labor force) and frequently referred to as the "house of representatives" because of its large size -- and the Brumbo -- made up of the panton Nyefwe (clan heads) together with the major village priests. The Brumbo is often called "our senate" and is composed only of men who have been rotated out of the active warrior age grades. The active warrior age grades (the gbau) and their leader (the Gbaubi) act as a further review of village politics; but, because the Gbaubi is a young man of warrior grade, the gbau has no direct representation on the Brumbo. Therefore, they usually send their leader to sit in while the Defwedio talk over issues. It is important to note that in Grand Cess the Krogba is selected traditionally from an age set called gbaujje (literally gbau eyes) whose members are too young to participate in Brumbo matters, and he is restricted from doing so.

Meetings of the Brumbo are usually private and the speech patterns used are arcane, filled with proverbs from antiquity and often, according to its members, seemingly spurious. Even were meetings held in public, Brumbo members claim that very few would actually understand the import of the conversations. Important men enhance this conception by conveying resolutions through intermediaries.

When issues involving the town arise, the Brumbo calls on the Krogba and his speaker to present the issue; they then meet secretly and make a policy decision with several alternatives. The Krogba then presents his personal position and negotiations take place. A compromise is reached. The Defwedio (director of the "palava yard," or open court room) and the Tewulio (town speaker or judge) are summoned to present the decision of the Defwedio members and the gbau and further recommendations are made. The Brumbo retires once more and returns what is viewed to be a consensus vote.

While this legislative process may seem complex, decisions can be reached and implemented over several hours. Issues requiring full legislative action include: 1) war, 2) major court cases involving disputes between clans and difficult cases between individuals -- especially those involving

witchcraft, 3) naming of major days in the farming cycle -- burning, planting, and harvest, 4) problems involving the ancestors and the gods, and 5) implementation of edicts from the national government of Liberia such as the collection of taxes.

In 1972, the Liberian government began a policy of "uniform treatment" of village chiefs which will bring in more revenue for chiefs and, supposedly, will insure that a new chief is selected every four or eight years by "popular vote". At present, chiefs of the smaller villages in the dakwe are called "clan chiefs" in state matters and their "unpaid" positions are filled by traditional means. The effects of the new charter may be to further enhance the position of the Brumbo because of its control of the selection machinery for chiefs.

GRAND CESS


The Siklipo people, or members of the god, Crasiklis'dako, are among the most famous and best described of the Coastal Kru (See Mekeel, 1937, 1939; Fraenkel, 1966; Davis, 1968) and they make up the inhabitants of the present towns of Grand Cess (Big Town and Municipality), New Cess, Tukro, and Kpagbo (See Map 2). The Kru see it as both natural and necessary that a dako divide and new settlements are established not only for the orderly social development of the mother town but for military and economic reasons as well. Thus, most of the Kru dakwe (Fraenkel, 1964:76) are represented by several closely contiguous settlements (infrequently more than four) and rarely are towns ever in such social harmony that outlying settlements are not in the process of taking on the character of complete socio-political units.

Grand Cess proper, then, is separated physically into two distinct social units, called Big Town and Municipality by Kru residents, and residence is felt by them to entail adherence to different values, especially religious beliefs and economic orientation. Residents of Big Town are organized in traditional pantons or localized patrilineal clans, whereas residents of the Municipality -- those in town center -- live in individual houses located along surveyed streets. The two sections are divided from one another by a three-acre rectangle of land given by the town to the Catholic Mission. If asked to explain the differences between them, a Kru man will frequently say that Big Town kneels to the Kroba, and that Municipality dwellers kneel to the church.

The Municipality is, moreover, the center for the administration of the Kru Coast Territory and all of the territorial officials live in Grand Cess Municipality. These paid positions, together with those of the local teachers who also live in the Municipality, bring wealth to the town differentially because most of it is spent where it is earned. A school girl asked to compare Big Town and the Municipality once observed that Big Town lived by work, and the Municipality lived by checks.

Alongside differences in economic and political systems, the two primary towns of Grand Cess are divided by competition between kin groups and by the presence of intrusive Christian churches protected by political leaders within the administration of the territory. However, the Siklipo see it as desirable and natural that their town exert a controlling influence over the rest of the Kru Coast and all Siklipo work toward that end.

The hierarchy of political offices within Grand Cess Big Town (though traditionally more complex than most) follows the general pattern of other



Map 2: Siklipo Dako

coastal Kru towns. One is left with the impression that, while there is a putative power of officials over the functioning of the dako, the system runs in a very egalitarian fashion, that decisions that are likely to affect the entire dako may be challenged by an able bodied man in the town, and that each man who can persuasively argue his case will not only be heard but will be listened to.

Traditionally, the Siklipo dako was organized into highly autonomous localized clans where possession of common name, ancestry, land rights, food taboos, and marriage proscriptions were deemed so much more important than bonds based on contiguity that there is no name for the members of one clan living within what has been called in the west a "nuclear" family. It is not seen as a building block to the clan because it has no independent function within the larger unit. "Men and women make up clans, not houses," is a statement used by the Kru when pressed to explain the absence of structural subdivisions below the level of panton togi. Educated Kru adopted the word "family" but it is ambiguous in conversation whether the word indicates members of one household, a man and his wives, or a man and one wife living in the principal house; it is used interchangeable at all levels.

Kru men claim that, ideally, all clans are politically equal and traditionally each clan had important political and religious offices. However, fortunes of each clan have changed drastically over time in both manpower and wealth. Because of their long history of wage labor and their present commitment to it, migration to the centers of work in Liberia have taxed the manpower of each clan to the utmost and the town is characterized by the absence of young to middle-aged men.

In 1966 Fraenkel described the political-social system of Siklipo Big Town in the following way:

The Koloba and gbaubi are today the only officials who have duties other than ceremonial ones because they alone have roles and receive rewards laid down by the Republican administration. In the past, selection for any of the titled offices conferred not only prestige and authority, but also economic advantages. For, while mystical prohibitions prevented most of the office-holders from farming, fishing, and traveling, the young men were expected to provide them with rice, fish and cassava, and returning migrants brought them cloth and other goods from abroad. Today, young men feel that their paying of taxes has replaced the traditional obligation to make such gifts. The formerly much sought after posts are now difficult to fill since their holders, still debarred from fishing, farming, and migration for work, cannot make a living. The palaver yard is overgrown and the elders no longer take their places there to hear cases, which go instead to the house of the koloba. The ji mwau is closed and crumbling into decay, and only the oldest people guess at the meaning of the ancient and neglected, but still revered, objects within it -- the large drums which called the Siklipo together, the various forms of kpunga or medicine which protected them against evil doers, and the heavy bronze rings which the ancestors are thought to have brought with them on their long journey from the interior. The fire which burned continuously in the ji mwau has long been extinguished, and Municipality people now refer to the crumbling building as "our museum". It is generally accepted that, with continued migration into the Municipality, the Big Town and the way of life it represents will likewise wither away. The integration of Siklipo

into Liberian political and administrative institutions is taking place, not by development within the traditional community, but rather through its gradual replacement by its offshoot, the Municipality, which has long been administratively as well as geographically separate from it. Fraenkel (1966: 161)

While Fraenkel's description of the shrinking of Grand Cess Big Town is accurate for the most part, it is not true that "the way of life it represents" will wither away. Rather, that way of life has been removed to the Municipality, shorn of much of its traditional ceremonial trappings. Even in the face of strong church pressures to conform to Christian beliefs and non-Kru political values, immigrants from Big Town and traditional leaders continue to alter the meaning and structure of Municipality housing patterns, sodality membership, economic focus, and political administration.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A) Settlement Patterns

The development of Grand Cess Municipality out of prior villages of the Siklipo is a long standing pattern in which military, economic and political factors have been involved. The original Siklipo peoples settled behind the present Big Town across the Bwalitan swamp at Kenkien. Ambitious clans moved across the stream onto the present site of Tukro (see map 2) and over a period of several generations Kenkien was vacated. Soon, because of Tukro's more vulnerable position near the coast, the fortified settlement of New Cess (Matiye) was established by Chienpo panton on a high rise about one mile south of town. Kpagbo was established several years after Matiye was settled, as the Siklipo people moved ever closer to the sea; Tukro and Kpagbo have died away in importance (now represented by several families) and are viewed as parts of Big Town which replaced and absorbed them more than one hundred years ago.

During the early part of the 1900s, a fishing village, Tubwecra, was built behind the island which affords canoe access to the ocean (see map 2) and now has been absorbed by the Municipality. At that time the harbor was controlled by pantons with fishing interests who were also responsible in assisting the Brumbo in supplying men to work on the ships that anchored there. The original 'customs' house where vessel landing fees were collected was located there and was operated by a Grand Cess man in partnership with a Dutch merchant after the establishment of New York.

New York was established behind Tubwecra at the instigation of several Christian men who were banished from Big Town for religious reasons; over time their families and converts applied for the original municipal charter that gave national recognition to their township status. It was not only their religious preference that set them apart from other Siklipo, according to personal accounts by older Siklipo, but also their interest in recruitment of young men for ships and the sale of European trade goods into the interior.

While Grand Cess Municipality was surveyed and the lots given to individual applicants and later sold at a nominal fee after township status was conferred, only the center of town actually remains divided; the periphery is being slowly structured into clan neighborhoods -- fenced house groups with enclosed garden spaces and a central court yard. Aggregates of clan members are pulling together in many places where space allows. Doors that

once opened onto streets are less frequently used as central court yards become the scene of increased daily activity. At present around one-third of the Municipality is physically structured into clan neighborhoods, and residents often refer to them as clan togi. Whether these aggregates will eventually form completely independent togi remains to be seen.

Clan offices have multiplied because of the division into Big Town and Municipality togi. While powerful members of clans from the Municipality cannot, according to tribal law, become panton Nyefwe, the issue is far from settled. The oldest members of the transplanted clans consider themselves capable of settling disputes and regularly do so, calling themselves panton nyepra, or panton 'old men'. This institutionalized position, while it confers no rights in the Brumbo, gives status in the Defwedio, or house of representatives. Thus, municipality togi are steadily becoming more politically functional in important ways, particularly in keeping civil disagreements out of the municipality and township courts and in the panton where they traditionally belong. Labor migration, county tax collection, and the traditional mechanisms for clan and village bifurcation have set the stage for new panton togi to take on full responsibility for their members.

In Big Town, tribal offices have been merged because of the shortage of men to fill the positions and the proscriptions, as Fraenkel noted in 1966, against leaving the town to perform economic tasks. To say, however, that tribal office no longer confers economic privilege is to underestimate the resourcefulness of tribal officials. In order to be heard on legal, political, and farming matters, the Krogba must share his tax revenue with the Brumbo. Moreover, members of the Brumbo and the Defwedio collect taxes from their pantons and usually remove a portion before the final accounting. Court cases, while they are less frequently held outside in view of the entire town but now held in the Krogba's house, still require the attendance of the Brumbo, the Gbaubi, the chief's speaker and lesser officials, including: the chief priest, the judge or Tewolio and the owner of the palava yard -- the Defwedio. One is left with the impression that the tribal system has been streamlined to meet current demands on time and energy rather than decayed.

The Siklipo have traditionally been and continue to be pragmatic in their decisions about living in the Municipality as opposed to remaining in other settlements. They appear to be gradually adjusting the Municipality political structure in ways that give them decision-making parity with outside administrators sent into the Kru Coast through the following pressure mechanisms: 1) marriage ties, 2) tax collections, 3) court suits and 4) voluntary associations.

Soon after appointment to Grand Cess, most administrators establish sexual liaisons with women in the town. These ties are encouraged by residents and often lead to either marriage or semi-permanent, socially accepted living arrangements. Grand Cess women pressure their expatriate "husbands" to conform to Kru patterns of behavior, to protect members of their panton and to participate in panton affairs.

No outside administrator can collect taxes without the cooperation of the current township political leaders who actually collect and forward the money. Marriage into a panton or the establishment of fictive ties with kinship groups speeds up the tax collection process without which no administrator could maintain his position.

Many administrators are paid for their interest in the town and their

settlements of court suits. Funds are collected by voluntary associations, of which the administrator is a member, to augment their salaries. Many of their social activities -- hosting village heads from other areas of the Kru Coast -- are paid for by their fictive kin and their association members who spread the costs out over the town.

Voluntary associations are powerful socio-political units in Grand Cess and membership and participation in them is necessary in the formation of a political base within the Kru Coast. It would be surprising to the Kru if administrators sent to them were not members of the Masons, the Odd Fellows, or the Brotherhood of Friends, secret societies based in Monrovia. After settlement, administrators usually join a recreational society and a church society to widen their political base. A syncretism usually occurs in which powerful men move the societies and in which their power is structured and directed by society interests.

B) Voluntary Associations

In Western culture, voluntary associations or sodalities rarely take on the responsibility of resolving major life crises or provide long term, daily financial, emotional or recreational support for their members. While they are important, membership is rarely life long and active participation in them does not include the majority of their members or a majority of the public.

Quite the contrary in Grand Cess, sodalities are integral to the member's conception of himself and his town. They serve to organize his time, facilitate his effectiveness within his kinship group, provide a self-esteem base in the face of financial trouble, a network of like-minded men and women in foreign towns where the labor market may send him, and a base to launch him into the afterlife in case of death.

For Kru men and women the development of a sense of physical and psychological well being is dependent upon integration into panton and sodality. Achievement in these domains, which is competency based, vastly overshadows economic considerations and the Kru concept of success entails the redistribution of economic resources through the panton and the voluntary society. Wealthy men are those who have exhausted themselves in the service of their kin, their friends, and their association colleagues.

While church membership is important to many Kru, church contingents or traditional "burial societies" are more important, more personal and more functional in meeting day to day life crises. Burial societies reformulate Christian doctrine to fit their way of life and their prior beliefs about the world; moreover, each society has its own special view of life and the afterlife and sees that view as a natural product of their organization. Thus, concepts of the afterlife vary from society to society today in much the same way that these concepts diverged traditionally.

The traditional Kru did not have a single unifying religion prior to contact with the West, but, rather, each panton viewed itself as under the special protection of spiritual forces that emanated from places, objects, and symbolic artifacts that signified their origin and character. Today, sodalities are tied to saints, prophets and heroes in the same way and vary considerably in their views about the afterlife and the value of participation in the Christian church.

Important societies among the Kru include church related burial societies, recreational societies, tumbwa or neighborhood betterment groups,

secret societies -- usually associated with outside administrators -- and friendship groups. In 1970 there were over fifty functioning sodalities in Grand Cess and few individuals belong to and participate actively in less than two. Economic or credit societies do not exist in Grand Cess, but women's church and recreational societies have taken on a minor lending function, providing help to members during times of stress, divorce, bereavement or financial hardship. While both men and women do some revolving farm labor, societies are not organized specifically for that purpose; recreational societies routinely donate some time each year to help members who lack labor.

Young men and women are active participants in established associations and frequently begin societies to serve their special recreational needs and wants. Two friends may begin a society to foster a particular dance or song, to discuss and work to solve a particular social issue or simply to give a name to their special friendship relationship.

Today, the warrior age grade has taken on the character of a sodality. It fields a soccer team, organizes town clean-up programs, provides quasi-military training for young men, and serves as a local militia in confrontations with other Kru towns and confrontations with the National Guard located in Grand Cess to both protect and carry out edicts of the Superintendent of the Kru Coast Territory. National Guardsmen are usually non-Kru and, like administrators, are meshed into village life through contacts with Kru panton and recreational societies. Overtly aggressive Guardsmen are forced from Grand Cess by a combination of avoidance, gossip, and threat of or actual violence.

Few important members of the True Whig Party are not also members of the Masons -- the most powerful secret society in Liberia -- and the Superintendent of the Kru Coast is no exception. His power base in the overall structure of Liberian politics is contingent upon his action within the Masons, his acceptance of extra-legal ties with Americo-Liberians whose economic base depends on their manipulation of the political structure to their best interests. Because Grand Cess, and the Kru Coast generally, is not linked to Monrovia by road, local administrators perceive themselves as cut off from political growth and this perception is reinforced by the Kru who see their best interest served by local control.

Several retired Kru administrators who live and work in Grand Cess are also members of the Masons and have prior supportive contacts with Americo-Liberians in both Cape Palmas and Monrovia. Through meetings of the Masons in Grand Cess, these men are able to exert influence on the quantity and quality of rules and procedures that are developed through the office of the Superintendent; moreover, they exert a great deal of force in the settlement of legal issues pertaining to Siklipo in land disputes, taxation cases, labor migration and voting rights. Thus, the power of secret societies -- traditionally abhorred by the Kru -- are channeled through village action because the views of Siklipo's Masons are formed by the structure and meaning of local political beliefs, particularly egalitarianism, self-reliance, and local autonomy. Local Masons, who are also heavily involved in other sodalities, would find it impossible to live in Grand Cess if they did not serve the interests of their town first and their secret society second.

Sodalities cross-cut panton lines, bringing together men and women in a non-kin setting in which issues can be discussed and resolved throughout all age groups and sexes. These sodalities -- recreational, religious, and political -- serve to circumscribe the power of external administration while teaching the importance of group action in social management. Sodality

members are trained in democratic processes through the election of a large number of officers who are responsible for the life of the society, and through the open discussion of both political and individual problems by members who see the primary function of all societies as providing the platform for village and individual development. From a psychological standpoint, sodalities in Grand Cess serve to reaffirm member's self-esteem through the ascription of value placed on service, office holding, and public speaking.

CONCLUSION

Grand Cess provides a proper model for an understanding of Kru commitment to modernization values found by Hendrickson in his study of labor migrants (1970) because those values include an emphasis on democratic processes that are deeply engrained in Kru culture -- especially, desire for equality in political decision making, nonkinship based social action groups, and support for the political plurality represented by the social and physical bifurcation of towns. Siklipo clans represented in Monrovia are connected by integral kinship and sodality ties with the parent town and are viewed as proper instances of prowaki. While there is little doubt that the Kru have a great deal to learn about political action, they also have much to teach as their contact with the new political regime of Liberia develops.

The modern Siklipo, who are today represented by a growing number of well trained, educated workers in the national government and who exert a growing force on the political structure of the Kru Coast, have come from complex socio-political traditions outlined in this paper. These traditions include a clear conception of village development growing out of prowaki, and individual development and social responsibility growing out of voluntary association action. These traditions are important factors in an understanding of social change in Grand Cess, but also in the Kru Coast Territory as a whole, exerting, as they do, a guiding force on that change.

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PLANNING CHANGE
IN AFRICAN URBAN FOOD RETAILING INSTITUTIONS:
A LIBERIAN PERSPECTIVE*

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INTRODUCTION

Today, the bulk of Africa's urban population is supplied with food not by national and multinational corporations, farm factories, and supermarkets, but by non-commercialized farm households and by tiny, one-person firms run by manager-entrepreneurs working out of crudely constructed shelters in market places. The widespread importance of market-place distribution systems is one of the most striking incongruities in the modern world, and is one which poses dilemmas of major importance. Changes in food production technologies now underway in Africa imply alterations in the context of trade, and adjustments in marketing facilities and practices. Moreover, the interdependence of production and exchange systems implies that the design and success of agricultural development programs be linked to distributive systems that perform efficiently and responsively, and that these systems either change or be changed in ways and at times appropriate to changes in agriculture. But whereas the role of agricultural change in economic development is clearly delineated, the role of marketing change frequently is obscure.

The role of market-place distribution is especially ambiguous. Characteristically, market places appear simply to be crude agglomerations of equipment and haphazardly organized personnel. Understandably, market-places tend to be viewed less as important in understanding economic development than symptomatic of an undeveloped distributive system. Even granting that such systems usually are responsive and efficient,¹ the apparent intensity and atomistic quality of competition suggests that there are stringent limits on capital accumulation and firm growth that actually impede development.² From this perspective, urban planners might be well-advised to encourage the growth of supermarkets or other types of fixed-premium firms and the elimination of the daily markets from which most food purchases currently are made. By demonstrating that the limitations to food retailing development stem not from competition among firms but from the demand factors to which they must cater, data from Monrovia, Liberia suggest both the conditions under which such changes in retail structure can or cannot be efficiently accomplished, and an economic indicator of when in particular cases such change might be successful.

METHODOLOGY

Data were collected by personal observation, participation in market-places and other sites at which food was purchased, informal conversations, and intensive interviews with consumers, market sellers, store-merchants, shop-merchants, peddlers, and others involved in marketing, and from four major surveys: (1) a representative sample of c. 1.6 percent of households in the lower and middle income brackets, and the lower levels of the upper income bracket in Monrovia (N = 293);³ (2) systematic enquiries concerning the history, structure, physical facilities, and commodity flows at market places and other exchange sites;⁴ (3) a 25 percent probability sample of firms working in market places (N = 595);⁵ and (4) a 5 percent representative sample of shoppers (N = 980).⁶

FOOD RETAILING INSTITUTIONS

In 1970 Monrovia was a sprawling city of about 125,000 whose ethnically heterogenous population had nearly tripled since the mid 1950s. Marketing channels exhibited the tri-partite structure characteristic of tropical Africa. A series of specialized channels moved such commodities as iron, rubber, diamonds, cocoa, and coffee to world markets. Imports moved through a three-tiered system in which Euro-American firms dominated import and national wholesale functions, Lebanese firms dominated middle-level wholesale and retail functions as store-merchants; and African firms were clustered in low-level retailing as shop-merchants, hawkers, and market sellers. Food moved to Liberian consumers through a system of market places. Seven-day periodic markets functioned as places where farmers could purchase a variety of imported wares and foodstuffs less expensively or on better terms than at stores or shops with the money they received from produce sold at the markets to bulkers.⁷ Produce collected at these markets was channeled to daily markets in towns, concession sites, and cities. In towns and smaller concessions, a single daily market functioned as the only bulk-breaking and retailing center. The larger, more dispersed populations in the capital, Monrovia, and such large concessions as the Firestone Plantations Company site at Harbel, were served by a more complex system of markets.⁸

In Monrovia, consumers could buy the principal dietary items of rice, palm oil, peppers, vegetables, and fish, meat or chicken, together with many other foods, from many kinds of retail forms in many locations: hawkers, house-sellers, clusters of petty traders, shops, stores, and the paramount food retailing institutions, supermarkets and market places. Two major supermarkets offered a wide variety of domestic produce and perhaps 1,000 different imported foods, ranging from California wines, Danish hams, Swiss emmenthaler, Australian lamb, New York City ice cream, to--tucked into one corner of the frozen food display case--Hostess Snow Balls. Nine major market places and two incipient markets offered every variety of domestic produce, craft items, and perhaps 200 varieties of imports, including foodstuffs, cloth, clothing, jewelry, and sundries.

The food retailing firms in Monrovia had to compete with one another for reliable supplies of good quality, low cost produce, and for consumers who consciously sought to minimize shopping costs.⁹ With one exception - the functional differentiation of market places - the varied dimensions of consumers' minimizing strategy largely explain the commercial structural variation in Monrovia.

RETAIL COMPETITION

Within income constraints, consumers have consciously sought to minimize both the time and money spent shopping. But depending on the shopping purpose, consumers have made a trade-off between the time spent shopping and the money spent for food. Generally, for small and non-recurrent purchases consumers have opted for short trips to a neighborhood firm: from hawkers, house-sellers, clusters of petty traders, shops, or stores, depending on the commodity sought.¹⁰


However, for their major daily purchases of food, consumers purchased either in supermarkets or from the c. 2,500 tiny firms (monthly net income, $\bar{X} = \$23.92$, $s = \$8.60$) working from market places (see Fig. 1). Both market places and supermarkets catered to a generalized demand for foodstuffs, and relative to the other food retailing firms and sites, made available to consumers a considerably wider selection of fresher produce at lower prices, canned goods, and, at some markets, cloth, clothing, and household wares. Hence, in addition to quality and price, market places and supermarkets offered another form of minimized costs: convenience.

COMPETITION AMONG MARKETS

At existing trading sites competition among sellers has meant minimized trading margins and the systematic elimination of inefficient managers.¹¹ However, the premium set on traders' management abilities and imagination has had implications far beyond minimizing marketing costs in a stable marketing environment. There has been an alternative to price competition: "Take your market to where the people are plenty and the goods are scarce". One can sell items other traders do not, and one can sell at sites other traders visit infrequently if at all. From 1822 through much of the 20th century, the residents of Monrovia grew small quantities of vegetables and purchased the bulk of their food either from general-purpose fixed-premises firms which imported some food and handled rice and palm oil principally for export, or from peddlers who walked up the hill from the migrant Kru community that had grown up on the bank of the Mesurado River below the settler community. As Monrovia grew, its population spread further and further from the town center, along Bushrod Island and along the Monrovia peninsula. The history of market places in Monrovia is one in which traders who frequently began as house-sellers initially clustered at strategic locations, grew in size, were forced to re-locate, and eventually organized themselves into legitimate market places. The market at Water-side appears to have been in existence at least since 1940. But until about 1950 it was the only market in the city. The BTC market originated in the early 1950s, situated first at the old Chief's Compound on Camp Johnson Road, later moving to the site of the Baker market, and in the mid 1960s, moving to its site in a former playground across the street from the Barclay Training Center. The remaining markets have become formally constituted only since 1960, three of these sites becoming legitimate markets only since 1968. Since 1970, Monrovia has seen the emergence of one additional market, the forced relocation of another, and the displacement of still another by one of the former incipient markets.

Catering to equivalent demand factors, markets had to compete directly with one another. Markets located close together would be competing in the same service area for the same people at the same time. One can expect initiators of new markets to attempt to find a marketing site quite distant

FIGURE 1.



from existing markets. Through mistaken decisions or changing circumstances, markets may be situated relative to other markets at inconvenient locations. Such markets would be eliminated as consumers attended the market that was more conveniently situated. Such competitive-selective processes "push" markets apart. The spatial pattern following from these processes is a uniform dispersion of markets meeting on the same day.

The limited data now available documents the effect of such processes - a predominantly linear dispersion of markets corresponding with the physical restrictions on the city's dimensions, and with constraints on retail trading areas of about 20 minute walking times.¹²


Of course, not everyone walks to market. The overall patterns of movement to Monrovia markets reveals a more significant differentiation among these markets - that between Central and Neighborhood markets. The in-town neighborhood markets consistently are visited only by people making use of the least expensive of the available modes of transport - their feet. People shopping at the outskirts markets of Logantown and Old Road regularly utilize the next most expensive means of transportation, buses, a change explained by the more dispersed residential pattern around the Logantown and Old Road markets. Residential dispersion, however, cannot explain the striking change in movement patterns characteristic of the Central markets: the use of substantial proportions of shoppers of the most expensive means of transportation: taxis and private vehicles. Whereas neighborhood markets' trading areas were localized and largely restricted by walking times, the Central markets' trading areas encompassed the entire city.

Better quality, variety and prices explain why eleven percent of the households in the consumer survey reported visiting the Central markets daily despite the fact that those were not the markets closest to their homes, and nearly all consumers visited the Central markets periodically, especially on Saturdays. The better quality, variety and prices available at the Central markets was an effect of the functional differentiation among markets.

FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION AMONG MARKETS

Not only does competition explain the spatial and temporal properties of markets, it also has led to the functional differentiation among markets in Monrovia. Irrespective of time or place market places function primarily as channels for foodstuffs. Daily markets serve retail functions almost exclusively. But where the aggregate demand for foodstuffs is relatively low (as, e.g., in a small town) or where aggregate production in adjacent farm regions is particularly high, such markets tend to be linked directly to farmers. As was the case of the Liberian coastal cities of Robertsport, Buchanan, Greenville, and Harper, the supply region condenses transport costs to the point that farmers find it more lucrative to carry produce directly to town rather than to deal with intermediaries. However, where urban areas are particularly dense or where urban settlement is dispersed, one can expect the prevalence of retailing intermediaries and the emergence of a hierarchy of daily markets. Although, as in Monrovia, food still may be taken directly to the urban center by producers, specialized redistributing, bulk-breaking markets emerge.

Market firms not only must compete for buyers, they must compete for supplies of produce and attract farmers and bulking intermediaries seeking to maximize their return from produce sales. One can expect farmers and



intermediaries to attempt to dispose of their produce at the sites which can absorb all of the supplies they bring to town. But the ability of a site to absorb stocks will be a function of the capital the purchasing firms have to bring to the task, and the quantity of produce. In Liberia, the purchasing firms were small and had little capital, and large numbers of producers and bulking intermediaries brought substantial amounts of produce to town daily. In situations such as that in Monrovia in which the sizes of markets were principally functions of the consuming population they served, there were restrictions on the produce any one market could absorb at any one time. In the presence of many competing suppliers, the probability was low that a farmer's or bulking-intermediary's produce could be totally absorbed at any one market.

The marketing costs of suppliers are minimized by specialized bulk-breaking sites, for by attracting large numbers of purchasers, these sites minimize the risk of having to pay additional transport fees and to spend time searching for buyers at several different markets. The vast majority of the produce brought into Monrovia was broken down and sold to retailers from the bulk-breaking locations at the Waterside and BTC markets, sites which assumed their competitive advantages by virtue of their earlier origin and their central location.

Hence, the retailers working in the Central markets normally had lower operating costs than did retailers working the Neighborhood or incipient markets. They offered consumers fresher produce at lower prices. Consequently, in addition to a normal complement of people shopping for the food consumed daily, the Central markets also attracted (1) selling producers bringing foodstuffs directly to Monrovia, (2) retailers working in markets, from doorsteps or from clusters elsewhere in the city, and (3) additional consumers seeking fresher produce at lower prices. These additional demand crowds - particularly the farmers whose demand for imports was made effective by produce sales - attracted retailers of imports, firms handling items for which aggregate demand was not high (e.g., country medicines), and vastly larger numbers of foodstuff retailers offering consumers a much greater variety of foods than any one Neighborhood market could offer,

The Central and the Neighborhood markets constituted qualitatively different shopping environments. The Neighborhood markets were almost exclusively foodstuff markets whose variety of stocks ranged from 50-75 sold by no more than 200 firms to a maximum daily service population of about 7000. By contrast, the Central markets were huge. At these markets 700-1,000 firms sold in aggregate 200-300 different commodities - including Liberian produce, imported food, cloth, clothing, sundries, and indigenously-crafted goods such as mortars, pestles, brooms, chairs and pots - to a daily service population of c. 23,000-33,000 people.

COMPETITION BETWEEN MARKETS AND SUPERMARKETS

The two large supermarkets in Monrovia duplicated the primary foodstuff inventory of market places. Moreover, they offered a vastly superior selection of imported foods. Nonetheless, supermarkets' retail functions largely were restricted to Monrovia's large expatriate and diplomatic community, and wealthy Liberians; or to an occasional petty trader seeking an exotic item for her stocks, and the small clusters of traders seeking to sell carvings, other craft items, clothing, cloth, and fresh fruit to supermarket shoppers. Excepting two specialized stores at which consumers regularly purchased rice by the hundredweight, fixed-premises firms played only a minor

role in the retail distribution of food to the residents of Monrovia. Nearly everyone bought food in market places at least occasionally. But about ninety-three percent of the households in the lower and middle income brackets and the lower levels of the upper income bracket purchased food regularly only from market places.

Supermarkets suffered by comparison with market places in that they charged higher prices for a limited variety of produce whose quality was not well cared for. Factor costs possibly explain part of the cost differential, but there are indications that supermarkets pointedly avoided catering to the c. 65 percent of Monrovia's population that regularly purchased at markets. First, Liberian produce comprised only a small proportion of the produce racks in supermarkets. Instead, apples, celery, lettuce and other produce not part of the diet of most Liberians was flown in from the United States, Lebanon, the Canary Islands and elsewhere. Second, Liberian produce was not purchased at the sites where the most favorable prices could be obtained, the bulk-breaking centers at Waterside and BTC market. Instead, supermarkets purchased Liberian produce from a few small-scale commercial vegetable farmers whose crops were oriented toward serving this narrow market and included green onions, lettuce, sweet corn, cabbage, cucumbers, and the like, or from hawkers who purchased at the markets and carried pans of produce to restaurants and supermarkets. Third, supermarkets did not feature much variety in Liberian produce and they frequently did not have staple foods even when they were widely available at the market places. It is possible that the price differential between market places and supermarkets merely reflected a desire to discourage any but expatriates and wealthy Liberians from shopping in supermarkets. But even if they wanted to, supermarkets could not compete for the business of most of Monrovia's population because they could not cater to one further dimension of consumer demand: the services of large numbers of tiny firms.

Predominately, the residents of Monrovia saw themselves as having a relatively precarious subsistence base. Although consumers wanted sufficient amounts of good quality produce at low prices, normally they had to search for food with little money. Unanticipated expenditures created periodic income deficits. Consumers were acutely sensitive to price variations and sought out low prices. But it could be very difficult to determine the lowest price in the larger markets, and typically there was neither the time nor the transportation money to compare prices at different markets. In practice, uncertainties about minimizing marketing costs implied the importance of balanced, reciprocal personal relationships with traders.¹⁴ Consumers purchased from their friends and relatives whenever possible. Moreover, consumers themselves frequently took the lead in establishing personal ties with traders. Sixty-nine percent of the consumer sample expressed a demand for such ties.

Consumers rarely purchased from their friends and kinsmen from what were expressed as moral obligations. Moreover, although consumers were aware that traders expected services from them, the vast majority (87 percent) of the reasons given for preferring to purchase on the basis of personalized economic relationships, and for preferring to purchase from friends rather than at what might be, at the time, the lowest price, pointedly expressed consumer self-interest. Hence, these relationships were brittle. The trader who did not "consider" you consistently was no friend. If one trader did not offer sufficient savings, buyers looked elsewhere. In the long run, consumers with marginal incomes had more confidence in saving money by buying from their friends and relatives. In the short run, they could get credit.

In short, there was a substantial demand not for the services of

supermarkets, but for cost-saving personal services.¹⁵ This quality implied low limits on the number of such ties any one trader could maintain ($\bar{X} = 4.9$ households, $s = 2.1$). Hence, there was a demand for large numbers of firms. The demand for large numbers of firms implied restrictions on the size any one firm could attain, and the tiny size of the firms implied rather consistent limitations on both the number of "good customers" to whom one could grant credit at any one time ($\bar{X} = 2.7$ people, $s = 1.1$ people), and the amount of money that could be tied up in credits at any one time ($\bar{X} = \$1.44$, $s = \$0.91$). These limits fed back to bolster the demand for larger numbers of tiny firms. Even under the conditions of sharp price competition in Monrovia markets, the ratio of food retailing market sellers to households was exceptionally high: in 1970, this ratio was in the neighborhood of about 10 households per market seller for the sector of population regularly purchasing at market places.

PLANNING IMPLICATIONS

Commenting on marketing systems generally, William O. Jones observes that:¹⁶

Participants in the market not only transmit throughout the system the effects of changes that may occur in any part of the economy, but they themselves initiate changes. The very nature of exchange requires that buyers and sellers . . . seek out new sources of supply, new customers, and new products. The participants themselves, and particularly the merchants (middlemen), become agents of change, responding. . . to new opportunities and frequently creating them.

One gathers the impression that economists, planners, anthropologists, geographers, and marketing specialists alike tend to discount marketing dynamics of this sort. Even if acknowledged intellectually, these dynamics have been ignored as political ideology, ignored as irrelevant in light of the primitiveness of the observed marketing institutions, or simply misunderstood in other ways. We have failed to appreciate the nature of the competitive problems faced by non-Western retail firms, and have neglected to examine in detail the structural, spatial, temporal, and functional attributes of firms, or to enquire in sufficient depth about how, why, and with whom firms compete. Consequently we have identified as an impediment to development an attribute - "atomistic competition" - that not only is centrally responsible for the existing responsiveness and cost-efficiency of retailing, but which, in being specifically an attribute of market places, merely reflects the lack of development in other sectors of the economy.

In competitive circumstances, the relative efficiency of different kinds of firms and exchange sites is established by the context within which traders must conduct business. Competition and selective processes result in complementary variation in exchange sites and firm types. Change the context and one changes the relative efficiency of firm types and their spatial, temporal, and functional relationships. It follows that market places cannot be symptomatic of an undeveloped distributive system. On the contrary, market places must be symptomatic of a marketing environment and system of production in which, for certain commodities, only certain kinds of firms can efficiently carry out the tasks of distribution. That marketing environment is currently sustained by the world industrial system. Those firms are the tiny ones whose lack of physical and capital requirements create and maintain market places.

The market place distribution system in contemporary African urban centers probably are best viewed as based on a principal of parsimony, the outcome of evolutionary processes of competition and selection for relative cost-efficiency. In competitive and responsive systems such as that in Liberia, changes in retailing institutions cannot be undertaken efficiently without prior changes in the effective demand dimensions to which retail firms must cater. If and when, but not before, the discretionary incomes of Monrovia consumers rise appreciably, one can expect diminished demand for personalized economic ties with retailers. When, and only when, such demand diminishes it might be reasonable to expect, and for planners to encourage, the replacement of market places by supermarkets or other fixed-premises firms. But without substantial increases in discretionary income the demand for large numbers of tiny firms that sustains daily markets in Monrovia, and possibly in most other African cities, will be maintained. Consumers will continue to seek personal ties with traders and will continue to purchase their food at market places.

But this is not to say that these systems are either perfectly efficient or perfectly responsive to environmental change. Nor is this to say that these systems will change automatically in ways and at times to vacillate increased agricultural productivity and higher urban living standards. Although it would be inefficient, if not foolhardy, to attempt to change food retailing institutions prematurely, it would be equally erroneous not to imaginatively consider alternatives and anticipate the marketing changes that may be necessary at particular times and places. In Monrovia, and possibly in most other African cities, planning processes should monitor variations in consumers' demand for personal economic ties with retailers. This demand is likely to be an accurate indicator of when, in particular cases, change in retail institutions may be carried out successfully.

FOOTNOTES

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SOCIAL PRESTIGE AND PERSISTENCE

IN TEACHING IN LIBERIA¹

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INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the perception by teachers of the value attributed to their profession, the social prestige accorded them as teachers, and the influences of these on their desire to persist in or withdraw from teaching. Since the pioneering studies of Elton Mayo and his associates,² social scientists have gradually moved away from the constraints of the scientific management school of Frederick Taylor and its emphasis on monetary rewards in inducing persistence in work, to a fuller consideration of the social factors both internal and external to the work situation. This move has generated a whole spate of literature from A. Zaleznik and his associates to Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form.³

The contention of this paper is that the value attributed to a profession by society and the prestige accorded members of such a profession in the society are nonmonetary rewards that can have serious consequences for persistence in a profession. This is predicated on the premise that value and prestige enhance the self-image of individuals in a profession and thus compensate them for their contribution to society. The argument is that if value and prestige are perceived to be lacking to a profession while the members of the profession feel that the profession should be accorded these, the discrepancy will predispose them to withdrawing from the profession to seek more rewarding professions. This will occur precisely because the disequilibrium leads to a defraction from the professionals' self-conception and also makes them feel that their contributions to society are not appreciated.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Source of Data

This study was conducted in the Republic of Liberia from November 1968 to January 1969 and covered 153 teachers from 21 randomly selected high schools in all the nine counties of the country. Twenty-eight schools were originally selected for the study, but due to inaccessible roads and lack of cooperation from some principals, only 21 schools were finally covered. The 21 schools account for about 58% of all high schools in the country and the 153 teachers account for about 35% of all the high school teachers.

It was the original intention of the study to obtain responses from all the teachers in the sample, but this was not possible due to certain unforeseen factors. Three main factors accounted for this. One was the expressed

skepticism on the part of some teachers as to the benefits that would accrue to them if they filled out the questionnaires. Another was a general fear that the study might have political implications, even though the non-political nature of the study was fully explained to them. And finally, for some unknown reasons, some principals did not encourage their teachers to participate in the study.

In analyzing the data, reliance was placed on central tendencies like means and percentages and contingency distributions, particularly the chi-square and derivative tests. In using the chi-square or its derivative tests, the .05 level of significance was adhered to.

Hypotheses and concepts

The lack of respect for and value accorded the teacher and the teaching profession is a perennial issue among teachers. Donald Burns found in his study of other African countries that, "not unexpectedly, reports were heard in one country after another of the decline in the teacher's status in society, of salary scales which were out of line with what was paid in the civil service to people of comparable education".⁴

This decline in the status or prestige of the teacher was further confirmed by a witness at the Banjo Commission in Western Nigeria. The teacher testified that, ". . . in the past. . . the teacher held an honored place in society; now only too frequently, he is looked upon as a man who cannot find anything better for himself. . ." ⁵ It is also significant to note that D.R. Howell⁶ in his article feels the need for raising the professional status of teachers, arguing that the consequence of not doing this will result in the dwindling of the teaching profession. He further stresses that since the schools are the chief agents of change, unless the status and calibre of the teachers are raised, change will be ineffective. Finally, he argues that since industry and government and other demands offer greater dividends (presumably monetary and nonmonetary) for manpower, the teachers fall prey to their offerings with a resulting high attrition rate.

The overriding hypothesis derived from the foregoing is that: the perception of value and/or prestige is related to the desire to persist in teaching. Seven specific hypotheses and their corollaries were derived from this.

1. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive prestige given him in the school in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.
2. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive prestige given him in the community in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.
3. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive prestige given him in the country in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.
4. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive value imputed to his profession by the school in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.

5. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive value imputed to his profession by the community in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.
6. There is a positive association between a teacher's perception of positive value imputed to his profession by the country in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The obverse is also true.
7. There is an association between a teacher's perception of prestige given to him by the country in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching when the value imputed to the profession by the country is controlled for.

Since the concept of prestige is a technical concept, and for our research purposes, limiting and amorphous, respect was used as an equivalent and more practical concept. So, where the concept prestige occurs, respect may be substituted. Since this study is dealing with the sociopsychological concept of perception, no attempt was made to delineate the components of respect and prestige. In order to tap the dimension of prestige, three sectors of activity were selected. These are the school, the community and the country. Three related questions were accordingly asked:

1. Do you think that in your school teachers are very highly respected, very little respected. . . not respected at all?
2. Do you think that in the locality or area or town where you teach, teachers are very highly respected. . . not respected at all?
3. Do you think that in this country, teachers are very highly respected. . . not respected at all?

In the analysis, the four categories of very highly respected to not respected at all were collapsed into two categories - very highly respected and respected forming one category, which we labeled as respected or positive respect and very little respected and not respected at all forming the other category, which we labeled as "not respected" or negative respect.

In order to tap the dimension of value, three other questions were asked: In your opinion, how does your (school, community or country) realize the value and importance of teachers? These questions also followed the same pattern as the questions dealing with prestige and were similarly collapsed.

Persistence in teaching is viewed in its behavioral dimension in terms of the expressed desire on the part of the teacher to continue or withdraw from teaching. A question was accordingly constructed to obtain this. The question was: "What do you plan to be doing five years from now?" The responses were then collapsed into two categories: those who intended to remain in teaching and those who intended to leave teaching for other occupations.

Added to these were questions on personal data and other questions to tap the reasons why some people go into teaching while others do not. Two questions were used to tap this dimension: (1) "In Liberia today, what reasons do you think some people have for not going into teaching?" and (2) "In Liberia today, what reasons do you think some people have for going into teaching?" The phrasing of these two questions was deliberate to tap the teacher's own reasons for going into teaching, and overtly, it taps the

teacher's perception of the general reasons why some people go into or do not go into teaching.

ANALYSIS

Of the 153 teachers in the sample, 55 are single, 92 are married and 6 are either divorced or separated. The mean age of the teachers is about 31 years. When age was collapsed into two categories of young (16-35 years) and old (36 and above) and correlated with persistence in teaching, the relationship was found to be significant at the .0001 level. Table 1 shows the distribution.

TABLE 1

Distribution of Age and Persistence in Teaching

Age (Years)	Persistence in Teaching		
	Will Persist	Will Leave	Total
16-35	50	65	115
36 and above	28	7	35
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 15.1$ $df = 1$ $p < .0001$ $N = 150$

There appears to be a negative relationship between age and persistence in teaching (with a Kendall's Q of about $-.68$) i.e., the older the teacher, the less his desire to persist in teaching. Intuitively, however, one would expect that the reverse would be the case since younger teachers are more likely to take risks, be desirous of change and restless. A tentative explanation of the negative relationship is that the younger teachers have just entered the teaching field and have not yet had much time to evaluate the conditions and start thinking about other possibilities. Another possible explanation may be that the older teachers might have more responsibilities at home and in the community which might make them more likely to seek out other opportunities that might enhance their positions and give them adequate resources to cope with their responsibilities. A further analysis or study is needed to tap this dimension thoroughly.

When the question about why some people do not go into teaching in Liberia was asked, the responses followed the pattern indicated by Burns⁷ in his study of other African countries.

TABLE 2

Reasons Why People do NOT go Into Teaching

<u>Reasons</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
1. Low salaries	56.0	112
2. Lack of prestige	27.0	54
3. No prospects	6.5	13
4. No interest	4.5	9
5. Heavy teaching load	2.0	4
6. Other	4.0	8
Total	100.0	200

Low salaries (a perennial complaint) and lack of prestige account for 83% of all the reasons given for why some people do not go into teaching. When lack of better prospects is added, we would have accounted for nearly 90% of all the reasons for not going into teaching.

The other side of the coin deals with the reasons, as perceived by the teachers, why some people go into teaching. Table 3 sets this out.

TABLE 3

Reasons Why People go Into Teaching

<u>Reasons</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
1. Only job they can find	35.0	56
2. Love for teaching	22.5	36
3. To help humanity	18.1	29
4. As stepping-stone	11.9	19
5. Easy job to get	7.5	12
6. Other	5.0	8
Total	100.0	160

The teachers in Liberia are virtually in agreement with the Nigerian teacher testifying at the Banjo Commission referred to earlier because, like him, they feel that the most important reason why some people go into teaching is because it is the only job that the teacher can find. As the testifying teacher in Nigeria said: ". . .now only too frequently, he (the teacher) is looked upon as a man who cannot find anything better for himself. . ."8

It is also significant that of the five main reasons given, three may be regarded as negative reasons.

The responses to these two questions set the general background for testing the various hypotheses dealing with the relationships between value and prestige on the one hand and persistence in teaching on the other. Table 4 sets out the relationship between prestige for the teacher in the school as perceived by the teacher and the desire to persist in teaching.

TABLE 4

Teacher's Perception of His Respect in the School
and his Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Respect in the School	Desire to Persist		Total
	Will Persist	Will Leave	
Respected	62	42	104
Not Respected	16	30	46
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 7.1$ $df = 1$ $p < .01$ $N = 150$

The results show a definite association between the perception of respect or prestige for the teacher and his desire to persist in teaching. The relationship is significant at the .01 level. Also, there appears to be a positive association between the two variables which indicates that when a teacher perceives that the school in which he teaches respects him, there is a high probability that he will persist in teaching. With Pearson's contingency coefficient,⁹ a .22 measure of association is obtained while with Kendall's Q,¹⁰ an association of +.43 is obtained. Thus respect or prestige for the teacher in the school in which he teaches is positively related to his desire to persist in teaching. This confirms hypothesis 1 and so we fail to reject it.

TABLE 5

Teacher's Perception of His Respect in the Community
and His Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Respect in the Community	Desire to Persist		Total
	Will Persist	Will Leave	
Respected	60	30	90
Not Respected	18	42	60
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 19.4$ $df = 1$ $p < .0001$ $N = 150$

Again, the results show a significant relationship between the teacher's perception of respect from the community in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The association between these two variables is significant at the .0001 level. The Pearson's contingency coefficient gives a measure of association of .34 while with Kendall's Q, an association of +.65 is obtained. Thus, we fail to reject hypothesis 2 and conclude that the two variables are positively related.

It is interesting to note that fewer teachers said that they are respected by the community than the respect they perceive to get from the school. It is also significant that lack of respect in the community appears to be more related to the desire to leave the teaching profession than the lack of respect from the school. This may be explained by the fact that while the teacher might feel that he has the ability to handle the school situation, his ability to handle the community situation may be very limited. He might thus feel powerless. This might have the tendency of frustrating him all the more and thereby induce him to leave.

Table 6 sets out to test hypothesis 3 with regard to the relationship between prestige in the country at large and the desire to persist in teaching.

TABLE 6

Teacher's Perception of His Respect in the Country
and His Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Respet in the Country	Desire to Persist		
	Will Persist	Will Leave	Total
Respected	49	23	72
Not Respected	29	49	78
Total	78	72	150

$$x^2 = 14.3 \quad df = 1 \quad p < .001 \quad N = 150$$

Here again, the distribution shows an association between the prestige that the teacher perceives to get in the country in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. The relationship is significant at the .001 level. There is also a positive relationship between the two variables because a measure of association of +.57 is obtained with the Kendall's Q. With Pearson's contingency coefficient, an association of .30 is obtained.

An interesting pattern that emerges is the expanding perception of lack of prestige by the teachers as one moves from school to country. While only 46 of the 150 that responded to these questions say that they are not respected in the school, 60 of the 150 say they are not respected in the community, and 78 out of the 150 say that they are not respected in the country. Thus, as we move in an expanding sphere from the school to the country, the prestige for teachers, as perceived by the teacher, dwindles. So, the teachers feel, by and large, more respected in the school than in the community and more respected in the community than in the country. Once again, hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

Finally, we turn to the perception of the teachers with regard to the

recognition of their value in the school, in the community and in the country at large. Thus, we are set to test hypotheses 4 through 6.

It is important to footnote the discussion on value and prestige by stating that the recognition of the value of a thing or service does not mean an automatic imputation of status or prestige to it. The two are different and involve different orientations and social actions.

In order to test hypothesis 4, we set up Table 7

TABLE 7

Teacher's Perception of the Value of Teachers in the
School and His Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Value in the School	Desire to Persist		
	Will Persist	Will Leave	Total
Valued	68	52	120
Not Valued	10	20	30
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 5.3$ $df = 1$ $p < .03$ $N = 150$

The distribution shows a significant relationship between the teacher's perception of the value imputed to the teaching profession and his desire to persist in teaching. The relationship is significant at the .03 level. There is again a positive relationship between the two variables. That is, the more the teacher perceives his profession to be valued in his school, the greater the probability of his persisting in teaching. With Kendall's Q, an association of +.42 is obtained while the Pearson's contingency coefficient gives an association of .18. Again, we fail to reject hypothesis 4 and thus confirm it.

Next we consider hypothesis 5 which states that there is a positive association between the teacher's perception of positive value imputed to his profession by the community in which he teaches and his desire to persist in teaching. Table 8 sets this out for testing.

TABLE 8

Teacher's perception of the Value of Teachers in the
Community and His Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Value in the Community	Desire to Persist		Total
	Will Persist	Will Leave	
Valued	60	35	95
Not Valued	18	37	55
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 12.9$ $df = 1$ $p < .001$ $N = 150$

The relationship of these two variables is significant at the .001 level. Kendall's Q gives a +.56 measure of association and with Pearson's contingency coefficient, we obtain a .28 measure of association. Hypothesis 5 is thus confirmed. Once again, more teachers say that their profession is valued by the school than those who say that it is valued by the community. A possible explanation of this might be that it is easier for the teacher to perceive the value imputed to his profession in the school where a majority of the people are involved in the educational process than in the community where some people may be apathetic, if not outright hostile, to education. This may have to be tested out in a further study.

Table 9 is set out to test hypothesis 6.

TABLE 9

Teacher's Perception of the Value of Teachers in the
Country and His Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Value in the Country	Desire to Persist		Total
	Will Persist	Will Leave	
Valued	50	52	102
Non Valued	28	20	48
Total	78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 1.2$ $df = 1$ $p < .25$ $N = 150$

In this case, the perception of value imputed to teaching in the country does not appear to be related to the desire to persist in teaching. This is the only case, so far, where these two variables have not been found to be related. It is possible to assume here that the pattern of value imputed to teaching in the country might appear so remote and amorphous that it does not make a difference to the teacher's desire to persist in teaching, since he might not be fully able to assess it. On the other hand, the value

imputed to teaching in the school and in the community might easily be assessed by the teacher since they are so immediate to him and thus make a significant difference to his desire to persist or not to persist in teaching. These, again, are possible explanations which may have to await a further study.

One is inclined to think that the more the perceived imputation of value to a social status is not correspondingly rewarded in terms of social prestige and other rewards, the more dissatisfied the incumbent of that social status will be.

Table 9 shows that more of the teachers who perceive value imputed to teaching are not desirous of persisting in teaching (52 will not persist and 50 will persist in teaching). It is possible that an intervening variable is operating here. It is also possible that those who feel that teaching is valued in the country, but not given the corresponding prestige, are precisely those who would not desire to persist in teaching because of the perceived discrepancy between the imputed value to teaching and the prestige reward structure. In order to test this, we try to control the value and see how the other variables behave. In order to do this, we must first set up a master table and then look at the specific dimensions.

TABLE 10

Master Table for Interrelating the Three Variables of Value, Respect and Desire to Persist in Teaching

Perception of Value and Respect in the Country		Desire to Persist		Total
Valued	Respected	Will Persist	Will Leave	
Yes	Yes	36	10	46
	No	14	42	56
No	Yes	13	13	26
	No	15	7	22
Total		78	72	150

$\chi^2 = 29.9$ $df = 3$ $p < .0001$ $N = 150$

The relationship is significant at the .0001 level which shows a significant relationship among the three variables. Pearson's contingency coefficient gives an association of .17. (It should be realized that this is obtained from a 2 x 4 table.) Thus, we confirm hypothesis 7. This, however, does not tell us much in terms of the relationship between prestige and desire to persist in teaching when the value imputed to teaching is controlled for. To do this, we have to set up two separate tables.

TABLE 11

Relationship Between Respect for the Teacher and His
Desire to Persist in Teaching When the Value
Imputed to Teaching is Positive

Perception of Value and Respect in the Country	Respected	Desire to Persist		Total
		Will Persist	Will Leave	
Yes	Yes	36	10	46
	No	14	42	56
	Total	50	52	102

$x^2 = 30.0$ $df = 1$ $p < .0001$ $N = 102$

As the distribution shows, there is a very highly significant relationship between respect for the teacher and his desire to persist in teaching when the value imputed to teaching is controlled for. The Kendall's Q gives an association of about +.78 which indicates a very high positive relationship. With Pearson's contingency coefficient, a measure of association of .23 is obtained. The implication is that, the greater the value and respect for teachers perceived by the teacher, the greater are the chances of his persisting in teaching. Conversely, the greater the discrepancy between value and respect for teachers perceived by the teacher, the greater are the chances of his withdrawing from teaching or not persisting in teaching. The reasoning here is that the perceived discrepancy between value and respect introduces an element of frustration inducing a withdrawal behavior.

We now look at the other side of the coin in terms of the relationship between respect and desire to persist when the value imputed to teaching is negative.

TABLE 12

Relationship Between Respect for the Teacher and His
Desire to Persist in Teaching When the Value
Imputed to Teaching is Negative

Perception of Value and Respect in the Country	Respected	Desire to Persist		Total
		Will Persist	Will Leave	
No	Yes	13	13	26
	No	15	7	22
	Total	28	20	48

$x^2 = 1.6$ $df = 1$ $p < .21$ $N = 48$

There appears to be no significant relationship between respect for the teacher and his desire to persist in teaching when the value imputed to teaching is controlled for. Kendall's Q gives an association of $-.36$ and Pearson's contingency coefficient gives an association of $.08$.

The implication here is that when the teacher feels that teaching is valued in the country in which he teaches, the pattern of respect given to him as a teacher makes a significant difference to his desire to persist in teaching. On the other hand, when he perceives that teaching is not valued, the pattern of respect given to him does not make any difference to his desire to persist in teaching.

It is proper at this stage to set up the relationships in a more systematic manner. Table 13 sets this up.

TABLE 13

Level of Association Between Respect and Desire to
Persist in Teaching When the Value Imputed to
Teaching is Controlled For

Perception of Value and Respect in the Country			Desire to Persist		
Valued	Respected	x^2	Level of Significance	Kendall's Q	ϕ (Phi)
Yes	Yes	30.0	$p < .0001$	+.78	.23
	No				
No	Yes	1.6	Not Significant $p < .21$	-.36	.08
	No				

CONCLUSION

Prestige given to the teacher and the value imputed to teaching as a profession were found to have potential implications for participative or nonparticipative behavior in terms of the teacher's desire either to withdraw from or continue in teaching. Thus, when the teacher perceives that he is respected either in the school or in the community or in the country, there is a high probability of his persisting in teaching. Also, when he perceives that teaching is valued in the school or in the community, there is a high likelihood of his persistence in teaching. On the other hand, his perception of value to teaching in the country is not related to his desire to persist in teaching. It was also found that when the teacher perceives that teaching is valued in the country, the respect given to him makes a significant difference to his desire to persist in teaching, but when he perceives that teaching is not valued in the country, the pattern of respect given to him does not make any difference to his desire to persist in teaching.

The relationships between value and respect in school, community, and country on the one hand and the desire to persist in teaching on the other, lead one to believe that these two variables, value and prestige, can off-set, to a large extent, the inadequacies of purely monetary rewards and

thus have the potential of inducing the teacher either to persist in teaching or withdraw from it. They also have implications for industrial, occupational and organizational studies.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (Boston, 1945).

3. See A. Zaleznik, C.R. Christensen and F.J. Roethlisberger, The Motivation, Productivity and Satisfaction of Workers: A Prediction Study (Boston, 1958). See also Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology: The Sociology of Work Organizations (New York, 1964), 2nd edition. An all-embracing taxonomy in matrix form designed to account for the entire matrix of influencing variables has also been suggested by Robert Merton at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in New York City, August, 1960.

4. Donald G. Burns, African Education (London, 1965), 150. See also Report on the Educational System of Eastern Nigeria (1961), Chapter IX: "The Education, Training and Status of the Teaching Profession"; and also Ministry of Education, Nyasaland, Committee of Inquiry into African Education (Zomba, 1962). For an American example, see T. M. Stinnett, "Is Teaching a Profession?" in Readings in School and Society: The Social and Philosophical Foundations of Education, eds. Carl H. Gross, Stanley P. Wronski and John W. Hanson (Boston, 1962), 529.

5. Government of Western Nigeria, Report on Mission Appointed to Review the Educational System of Western Nigeria (Ibadan, 1961).

6. D.R. Howell, "The Status of Teachers in Nigeria," Overseas Education, XXX (1958), 102-109.

7. Donald G. Burns, African Education, 150.

8. Government of Western Nigeria, Educational System.

9. The Pearson's contingency coefficient is obtained by the formula, $C = \sqrt{\frac{x^2}{x^2 + N}}$ See Hurbert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 1960), 230.

10. The Kendall's Q is obtained by the formula $Q = \frac{ad - bc}{ad + bc}$ and it is used only for 2 x 2 tables. See Bablock, Social Statistics, 231.

NYAI MENI AND KPELLE CHILDREN¹

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INTRODUCTION

Just two or three weeks after arrival in the Kpelle village where the author was planning to conduct field work, he learned of a young boy, eight or nine years old, who was lying in a semi-comatose state, apparently near death. He had already been several days in this condition. Upon inquiring what was wrong with the child, the parents and everyone else who was queried replied, "Water business" ("nyai meni"). Further inquiry elicited descriptions of "water people" (nyai-bela) and their activities; information on these beings is familiar to most who have spent time in Liberia and has been published in various sources (e.g., Gibbs 1965; Bellman 1975).

The boy's mother attributed his condition ultimately to the child's willful disobedience: "I told him and told him not to play by waterside, but he can't hear me." This latter statement was of immediate interest to the author who was beginning a year-long study of Kpelle socialization practices (see Erchak 1977 for details). It was subsequently learned that all Kpelle parents in Kien-taa,² the site of the study, discouraged their children from playing near water, especially at night. Children of course bathed and performed necessary chores at waterside, but were supposed to avoid unnecessary and/or prolonged activity near bodies of water. But why? Is the custom simply an irrational artifact of the Kpelle belief system, or does it have a practical adaptive value? The purpose of this brief report is to suggest an answer to this question.

The boy in the above case was, astonishingly, cured over a two-day period through the ministrations of an old man, a zo (medicine-man) who was sent for from a distant town. He was variously said to "know water business" and to "be a water person (nyai-nuu)" himself. He was probably a member of the Iron Society (Kɔli Sale), which among other things deals with "water business" (Bellman 1975). This affliction and apparent cure were the first indication to the author of the salience of nyai meni in Kpelle everyday life.

During the next twelve months, numerous events and conversations reaffirmed this preoccupation. A man crossing a nearby river in a canoe with his sister was, according to the sister, yanked backwards out of the canoe two or three times by an unseen force and drowned; the canoe was not overturned and the sister was rescued by passers-by. On another occasion, three men were transporting a cane mill by canoe across another nearby river when the canoe overturned. The three dove to retrieve the mill. According to the two survivors, the third man lay on the river bottom, arms outstretched, as if sleeping. They said that he did not hit his head; nor were his limbs encumbered in any way; but rather he died from nyai-meni. A ferryman at a near-by river crossing quit his job and vanished from the area one night; on his way he told the author of a frightening encounter with nyai-bela just an hour

earlier. Deaths and illnesses, particularly among local children, were frequently attributed to nyai meni among other possible causes. Finally, the author often had difficulty hiring children to transport materials from the river which marked the terminus of the nearest feeder road to Kien-taa. The reason given was invariably that the parents did not want their children to "wait too long by waterside" because of the danger of nyai meni.

NYAI MENI AND ECOLOGICAL ADAPTATION

The specific concern here is with the parental rules for children regarding nyai meni although the suggested hypothesis might well apply more generally to a wider range of beliefs and behaviors associated with the domain of nyai meni. The working hypothesis proposed here is that children are discouraged from unnecessary activity in or near bodies of water because of the many real, practical dangers of water play. These dangers include the possibility of drowning, the presence of snakes, crocodiles, and other dangerous aquatic animals, the presence of a wide variety of water-borne parasites, and perhaps most importantly, the presence of dense concentrations (compared to areas away from the water) of mosquitoes, tsetse flies, and other insects which are vectors of life-endangering tropical diseases. In other words, the proscription of unnecessary water activity is ecologically adaptive, helping to lower an already high childhood mortality rate. In the absence of a medical theory of disease, the Kpelle (and many other groups) have over the course of a generations developed a theory, the theory of nyai meni, which explains death, illness, and injury which apparently result from proximity to or immersion in water when other explanations, such as an obvious bite, are unavailable; and proscriptions and other customs have evolved along with this theory.

In recent years in social and cultural anthropology a materialist-ecological explanatory paradigm has enjoyed renewed popularity; for many theorists, it has replaced a previous mentalist-cultural paradigm. Even in the previously idealist-dominated fields of psychological anthropology and socialization studies, evolutionary and ecological analyses have grown dramatically in importance. Robert LeVine (1973) has published a well-developed and explicitly evolutionary theory of culture and personality relations; he notes how child care customs, such as that under discussion, are generally adaptive to ecological pressures in the recent past, i.e., they help insure the survival of the group. According to LeVine,

it is unlikely that members of a society are aware of the broader adaptive functions of customs assuring their survival... (generations) may be responding subliminally to selected pressures. Furthermore, as soon as the practice becomes institutionalized, it is surrounded with a protective covering of normative pressures and associated nonempirical belief which increase its incentive value and thereby insure its performance more securely than would any rational calculation of survival chances. (LeVine 1973:104; italics added)

Kpelle parents are not necessarily aware of the adaptive value of training children to avoid nyai meni; they themselves believe in "water people". This nonempirical belief provides a powerful motivation for children to avoid excessive riverine activity, an incentive far stronger than a statement such as "you might get sick" would be.

Elsewhere the author has shown that Kpelle child behavior and socialization practices are adapted to the material exigencies of life (Erchak 1977) as are Kpelle sex roles (Erchak 1979). An analysis of Kpelle religious and quasi-religious beliefs such as those discussed in this report, might reveal similarly adaptive value.

NOTES

1. Fieldwork in Liberia in 1970-71 was made possible by a Fulbright Research Grant.
2. "Kien-taa" (Pepper Town) is a pseudonym.

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Randall M. Miller, ed., "DEAR MASTER" LETTERS OF A SLAVE FAMILY. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978. 281 pp; \$15.00 cloth

In recent years new scholarship on nineteenth-century Liberia has increased substantially, providing the necessary foundation for transcending the all-too-popular stereotypes about the Afro-American experience in West Africa. Randall M. Miller's "Dear Master" Letters of a Slave Family makes an important contribution to this new scholarship. Miller has rescued from relative obscurity a most unique and precious collection of letters written by members of a Virginia slave family spanning thirty years and two continents. The original correspondence from the Skipwith family (unfortunately none of the letters they received have survived) forms a part of the extensive manuscript papers of John Hartwell Cocke in the Alderman Library at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. As Miller states in his preface, "this correspondence - probably the largest and fullest epistolary record left by an American slave family - traces the history of the planter, the freedmen, and the slaves." (p. 11)

Randall Miller has divided the volume in half. Part one contains Letters from Liberia, 1834-1861. Here are found letters from Peyton Skipwith and his children, Diana, Nash, and Matilda as well as Peyton's brother, James Skipwith. They were among John Hartwell Cocke's slaves emancipated for the express purpose of resettlement in Liberia. Part two, Letters from Alabama, 1847-1865 contains letters from George Skipwith, slave driver for Cocke on his Alabama plantation, and Lucy Skipwith, house servant. Miller has chosen to use a light editorial hand "in order to preserve the integrity and flavor of the letters and to capture any distinct Afro-American dialect" (p. 14) which at times makes understanding the printed missives difficult. This particular problem where it occurs is more than offset by Miller's rich explanatory notes that accompany the majority of the letters as well as his introductory essays that precede each section, setting the material in context and offering a reasoned interpretation of its significance. Additionally, the volume is liberally sprinkled with helpful maps, photographs, illustrations, sample reproductions of original letters, and genealogies.

Miller's editorial labors will certainly facilitate subsequent research, but fundamentally the letters themselves deserve careful study. The Liberia letters are especially instructive for what they tell us about the potential dangers to historical interpretation based on scattered or fragmentary evidence. How mightily, for example, would we be tempted to overreact to Peyton Skipwith's first letter to Cocke had only it survived. "I want you if you please to write to me by the first opportunity and let me no what terms I can come back for I intend coming back as Soon as I can" (p. 59). Fortunately Peyton's letter two years later ends any possible confusion about the meaning of his initial remark.

"The idea of being in a new country with a large family of helpless children, who could depend only on me for support, & I being so indisposed as to be of no use to them nor myself having no means and the prospect of their suffering made me feel distressed and greatly so but thanks be to God my health and sight is recovered and that day of awful gloom is gone and I feel satisfied with my present home and desire no other" (p. 61).

The continuous record of correspondence over many years by the same family allows us the rare opportunity to observe change over time in attitudes as well as circumstances. At the same time the lesson here for all researchers is clear when one encounters a solitary, albeit fascinating, document.

Along the same lines we must be careful formulating generalizations about all Afro-American settlers based on these letters. The Skipwith family was not a part of the settler elite which in the mid-nineteenth century was formed predominantly by former members of the free Afro-American community in the United States. Arriving in Liberia with very limited financial resources and beset by disease and untimely deaths, the Skipwith family experience in West Africa was especially bitter/sweet as the letters so poignantly illustrate. As Miller accurately points out it was in Liberia

"where poorer, darker former slaves lacked the wealth, skills, education, color, or connections in America to claim social and political equality with free black émigrés. In this sense the former privileged slaves like the Skipwiths stood in the middle as moderators or conduits between the two groups." (p. 50)

While the Liberia Skipwiths occupied a precarious middling position within the settler community, the Alabama Skipwiths were clearly members of the slave elite which has raised problems of interpretation for historians of American slavery. The contradictions and tensions between drivers and house servants vis-a-vis other less privileged slaves and their overseers and masters comes through within the letters of George Skipwith and his daughter, Lucy. Taken as a whole, "Dear Master" Letters of a Slave Family is a welcome addition to the growing volume of primary source documents from the Afro-American experience which includes Robert Starobin's Blacks in Bondage (1974), John Blassingame's Slave Testimony (1977), and Bell Wiley's Letters from Liberia (1980). Randall Miller and Cornell University Press have done Afro-American scholarship a real service by making the Skipwith family letters available in the present form.

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