

LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

Edited by:

Jo Sullivan
Boston University

VOLUME VIII

1978-1979

NUMBER 1

LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

EDITED BY

Jo Sullivan
Boston University

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Emphasizing the social sciences and humanities, the LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL is a semiannual publication devoted to studies of Africa's oldest republic. The annual subscription rate is \$20.00, \$12.00 for students and \$15.00 for institutions, and includes membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. Manuscripts, correspondence and subscriptions should be sent to Liberian Studies, Department of Anthropology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19711. The views expressed herein are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor or the Liberian Studies Association, Inc.

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ISSN 0024-1989

COASTAL SETTLEMENTS OF E. SINOE COUNTY TODAY

GREENVILLE

Kitatuso
 Nyapor
 Jirifa
 Wrokli (Gbeta Fishtown)
 Wètè (Settra Kru)
 Nigbi
 Nuaŋ (Nuah Point)
 Nyimbala (Nana Kru)
 Weaou (K. William's Town)

cp. (19) 5 towns
 Kru / Klao

SASSTOWN TERRITORY

Nero
 Kao
 Pete
 Sobo
 Wisépo (Grand Wappi)
 Dio
 Botra (Sanpropo to 1916)
 Tator (Nifu)
 Jilepo (Betu)

'JROH'

Jlao
 'SASSTOWN'

Bolich

SASSTOWN'S TRANSFORMATION: THE JLAO KRU 1888-1918

Elizabeth Tonkin
Birmingham University

This micro-history of Sasstown, a Kru polity in southeastern Liberia, will, I hope, contribute to the understanding of macro-processes on the coast. The fortunes of its people, the Jlaos, are not necessarily representative of the Kru ~~dakw~~, but they are certainly comparable. They also have a theoretical interest, including the composition of ethnic identity under different conditions. We can analyse the role of indigenous people in the Liberian government's absorption of an independent polity, and ask how far this was comparable to other forms of colonization in West Africa.¹

The maps and their notes show the location of Jlaos and its neighbours and discuss their recent administrative character. My account does not run beyond the period of those indigenous changes which essentially led to this structure. I hope elsewhere to describe and discuss the Sasstown War of 1931-6, which arose because of events which are catalogued here. It finally and bitterly ratified the shifts of power which had occurred twenty years before. The most recent administrative changes have been nation-wide ones, though one can say that events such as those in Sasstown contributed to their formation.

I. BACKGROUND BEFORE 1888: THE CONTEXT OF SASSTOWN'S EMERGENCE

I will not begin by scene-setting the 'traditional society' whose transformation is to be charted - 'traditional society' is an unhelpful fiction which forces its users into an untenable theoretical base. I shall assume that oral accounts of the 'traditional system' may be schemata which were and are transmitted as guides, against which to measure and evaluate current events. This documentation sometimes proves that this is so. The year 1888, like 1918, is in some ways an arbitrary point, but after it we can date new types of change and by it there is an entity composed of a trading point, territory, named people, and their occupations broadly coincident as they continued to be throughout the period I describe.

The name 'Sasstown' is a trader's one. I am not sure of its origin, but I suspect it was an addition to the 'Cess' group of names, which along with the 'Kroo' group came to categorise a section of the Grain Coast for traders and for European mariners generally. It is one of the latest such names to be recorded. Sasstown was also - and is still - said to be 'sassy'. I shall discuss only briefly here the circumstances in which 'Sasstown' emerged, insofar as they illuminate my general themes and are a necessary background to later events.

To an anthropologist a name should be a symptom, not a given, and one must always ask how far it indicates an autonomous sense of identity. Frederick McEvoy has already pointed up some of these questions for southeastern Liberia;

SASSTOWN'S NEIGHBOURS

2

ELIZABETH TONKIN

B W A H

SASSTOWN
TERRITORY

BOLLOH

JROH

JLAO
(Sasstown)

KPLEPO
(BARCLAYVILLE)

KRU COAST

TERRITORY

GBETAO
(Piknicess)

Wedabo

SIKLEO
(Grandcess)

Note :

Bolloh, Jroh and JlaO were
formerly administered as
three chiefdoms

in this paper I leave in abeyance higher levels of ethnic identity and concentrate on what makes a 'dak' level exist. By dak I simply mean a named unit whose political distinctiveness is recognised by its members and by other Kru.² 'Kru' and 'Grebo' will be used as outsiders' names, in the way, usually, the sources use them,³ and the term 'kroomen' as an occupational term of the most broad and inclusive kind. However, I shall try to decompose this term as it appears in the literature. Events along the Grain Coast after 1821 were often set in motion through the actions of the Settlers and the pressures of international trade. Because of the nature of the documentation, they are easier to see than the equally important indigenous issues, whose character is particularly muffled and indeed misconstrued through the foreigners' blanket categorising of 'the krooman'. Some of their references can be understood better with local knowledge and a proper use of oral recollection; without these no accurate or significant history of the coast will be written.

When one talks of the emergence of Sasstown one need not mean a sudden arrival of people on the seashore from far away. One is talking rather of the rise of a set of politico-economic conditions through which it became possible to join in the trading of produce and the export of labour at a particular point on the shore. This is what becoming a 'Cess'town' meant. In order for this to happen, skilled boatmen and canoeists were needed. It was therefore not possession of the sea-shore alone which ensured the opportunities for economic participation, but an ability to service the movement of labour and produce. Boatmen travelled long distances - produce was generally transshipped by surfboats. In the 1860s, small craft came down from Sierra Leone as far as Greenville to collect palm oil and kernels for British firms. Harold Taylor has a clear account of how the boats operated from Cape Palmas in the 1900s; in World War I surfboats had virtually to replace steamer stop-overs at intermediate points along the coast.⁴

In the absence of harbours canoes were necessary to link ship and shore. Up to at least the middle of the nineteenth century there was plenty of off-shore ship trading, and the great movements of Kroo labour took place after 1852, through development of steamer services. The larger the ship the further off it had to lie. Canoes could paddle out for ten or fifteen miles.⁵ The whole history of kroo recruitment turns on knowing what Kru people call 'canoe business', but not everyone had to know it - one thinks of kroomen 'down coast' as boatmen and canoeists, but increasingly they worked as labour gangs and did not need such skills at all.

What had happened was economic specialisation. Thus conflicts between groups of 'Fishmen' (often referring to the Gbeta and Kabor Kru) and between them and the 'Kroomen' (sometimes meaning the 'proper Kru', the kla of the Five Towns) turned on the control of different parts of the trading sequence. The other side of the coin is complementarity and symbiosis: a trading point in fact usually included a number of differentiated groups living side by side. The Gbeta and Kabor people lived in dispersed communities along the coast, as far west as Bassa County, fishing and transporting for their neighbours and gaining rice and palm nuts by reciprocal arrangements. The Gbeta in Pikin-ness today are divided between fishermen and farmers. The Kabor gradually gained a near monopoly of surfboat management - this brought them into that close contact with traders European and Liberian which contributed to their earlier 'loyalty' and later disaffection; and it gave them their economic clout - their 'Rebellion' included all-out strikes.

There are many instances in the anthropological literature of how ethnic identity, which is apparently sustained by language, culture and social structure, may ultimately depend for individuals on their economic specialisation. 'Krooman' itself became an occupational, not an ethnic classification. By changing his occupation, a Masai could become a Kikuyu or a Rendille turn

Samburu.⁶ The conditions under which women bridge such ethnic differentiation are manifold, though so taken for granted that the fact they demonstrate the ideological nature of 'tribes', 'clans' and the like is ignored.

These are all reasons for the subsistence of so many named groups in the Kru area, but there are further important ones to do with the level of population and the nature of its agriculture, mainly the shifting cultivation of upland rice, which requires large areas of potential farmland. When one considers that Eastern Liberia has a very low population, and that there is no evidence of its having been bigger, the fact that it came to export thousands of labourers annually seems extraordinary.⁷ In 1866 Capt. Bonnington, RN, tried to explain how the supply was sustained. A Krooman who has been to sea has a 'slave', 'pawn' or 'lad' from the interior as an apprentice to learn fishing, loading and unloading a vessel, and working small craft, 'and then takes him to sea, some take two or three, if the lad is likely to make a good kroom(an) they have a feast and mark him, and admit him to the honors of the Kroo'. On return, these lads go inland and induce two or three to come again.⁸

Although Bonnington was probably talking about the interior of Cape Palmas, Brooks has brought together many texts on similar practices among the Kru; in my experience they accord with social patterns of interaction today.⁹ Bonnington calls the result natural increase but of course it was social increase. When one considers the external demand, the structure of recruitment by individual agreements with headmen, and the boatmen/canoists' rewards for transport, one can see why despite inter-dake hostility it was often possible to embark away from home. But these patterns of accepting outsiders, though certainly significant, remain at the individual level. I have also had oral testimony that coastal groups sometimes negotiated with polities several miles inland for them to move and settle beside them. There is supporting evidence in the Sinoe Superintendents' correspondence, and it is in fact plausible, if one considers the advantages of having more people at one's command. They of course did not always wish to be at command, thus the result was often a competitive or rebellious satellite, not assimilation.¹⁰

For all these reasons, I suggest the Kru coast was characterised by extreme boundary maintenance, together with easy means for boundary crossing¹¹: it is not surprising that this is an area where "we marry where we fight". Apparently independent, named groups, sometimes very small indeed, were as numerous and as competitive as they were, simultaneously, linked both at individual and polity level. Thus their distinctiveness and divisiveness were not created by settler policies of 'divide and rule'. These simply exploited an existing situation - though they of course contributed to maintaining its contingent and volatile configuration. Indeed exploited is at first too strong a word. The tiny settlement at Greenville, for instance (internally divided too) entered this world as merely one more contestant, at best on equal terms.¹²

It might be thought that since, structurally, all Americo-Liberians were opposed to all Kru, (they competed for the same markets, for example), they would provoke an opposite and equal reaction - Kru unification. This is indeed exactly what the settlers were afraid of. The spectre of combination was raised again and again. Since in Maryland Grebo confederations did arise, and the settlers were well aware both of the relationships between the Kru and Grebo speaking peoples¹³ and of the ubiquitous opposition to their own presence, their greatest fear was that the entire area would combine. This fear was strongly felt again in 1931.

The settlers, however great their infighting, were ultimately united by their need for survival against the rest. Kru were not united in the same

way. All the features I have described kept them apart, sometimes quite literally, since they lived in small dispersed settlements, each ringed, as soon as one left the immediate coastal belt, by large areas of potential farmland - regenerating bush. Before the settlers ever came the region was markedly different from that north of the St. Paul's river as Warren d'Azevedo has pointed out; and in the main Kru areas, with no major trade routes or much in the way of high quality exports such as gold or slaves neither forest nor coastal states seem to have developed.¹⁴

II. THE MAKING OF 'SASSTOWN'

In 1865 a Protestant Episcopal missionary from Cape Palmas reported on a tour of all the Kru coastal homelands. He chose two of the settlements east of the Klao for mention, suggesting they should have mission stations: Sass-town, occupied by the Yedabo, and "Mena Sedewe or Grand Cess people", "the largest settlement on the Grain Coast, having a population of 15-20,000".¹⁵ It is perhaps significant that these two Kru settlements, major ones in the second half of the nineteenth century were equidistant from Harper and Greenville - at the farthest point from settler authority. Piknicess, which lies between them, is a considerable congeries of Gbeta towns, but it was also more involved with the settlers as I have said, and only part of the Gbetao were settled there. A Sierra Leonian observer, Esu Biyi, described Piknicess as an outpost even in the 1920s. Biyi observed that Sasstown, which he describes in some detail, was notable for having its members all resident on its one territory. It can be added that this territory was larger than most, stretching further inland and having over a dozen settlements within its boundaries, apart from several 'fishtowns' on the shore. Rev. Wilcox described the Yedabo as "a large tribe who have fought their way from the interior, where they have many towns, and occupy a place on the coast known to traders as Sassy Town". Linguistic and other evidence suggests that the interior towns were within the Jlaio/Yedabo territory. The Jlaio dialect is closest to its other Kru neighbours, it is not inland Grebo, nor are there islands of Kru speech further inland.¹⁷ The towns which the people themselves cite as the immediate precursors of their main town Filorkli, the town which significantly they say established them on the sea shore, are not far from it; they are named and identifiable sites.

In fact the town of Filorkli was not on the shore itself, unlike nearly all the other Kru chief towns. It was on a bluff a mile or so inland. It was served by 'fishtowns' actually on the beach - Klepo (kli) in Jlaowfi (speech) - and klepo can refer here as elsewhere to 'Fishmen'.

Given the need for sea transport I have described, and the common Jlaio assertion that they are a farming people who did not know "canoe business", one can see that they must not only have achieved control of a piece of land near the coastline, but some sort of alliance with sea-going specialists dwelling on it. I believe the key relations here are with their neighbours and rivals, Gbetao. There was certainly also at least one Kabor Fishtown before the 1915 rebellion, though this was not a big settlement as elsewhere. I will discuss Kabor relations again below.

Almost every early reference to Sasstown includes the description of their origin I have already quoted. In 1884, for instance, President Johnson drew the attention of the legislature to the request of the Nifu and Nana Kru tribes for Ports of Entry:

The Niffou people complain that they were the first friends and allies of the colony, landed the first immigrants accompanied us

in any military expedition by sea, and to this day have remained loyal, whereas the Sassa town people who were originally an interior tribe but usurped dominion of a part of the coast, and who have always been disloyal, and who, to this day are envious of the Niffou people, have a port of entry to the great shame of the latter. The Niffou people say they are also ready to conform to the tax law.

I have no other evidence of a Port of Entry at Sasstown before 1909, but Johnson's ensuing comments seem simply to suggest that it and River Cess were so only as the farthest points of a moribund system of inspectorship, from Harper and Robertsport respectively.¹⁸ The point to notice here, however, is that what made Sasstown 'sassy' to Nifu was their competitiveness, their increasingly successful interposition into the network of overseas trade and labour migration.

The people who are the most likely to have purveyed this derogatory stereotype of Jlaos were the Kru whom most outsiders met - the men who worked for the traders and ran the boats - which were virtually the only method of coastal transport. They also worked for the Royal Navy: the Fishmen, the Kabor and Gbetao. They were also the people most affected when arrivistes tried to join the trade. Their hostility to the Jlaos is explicitly recorded in a reference of 1842:

At a place called by the Fishmen Saucy Town, the natives from the interior fought their way down to the beach... (O) What were they? - We have no means of knowing; they are quite different from any other races that we know of; ... at this the Fishmen are exceedingly angry, as they consider that they have a title to all the trade upon the coast. They have prohibited all trade with this place, and have committed many outrages upon British vessels and others who have traded there in spite of their prohibition.¹⁹

The Jlaos were followed by other newcomers - we could say dakw for "races" - to the Klao/Gbetao/Kabor connection; at the time the novelty of such an addition made an impact. There were, I think, other novelties in Jlaos which led to their challenge and sustained it. As Bonnington's comments remind us, one can learn "canoe business" just as one can learn a krooman's work. The Jlaos - and the Sikleo at Grand Cess - say that they did so. A main way for Jlaos was by sending their sons as apprentices and their daughters as wives into the fishtowns. Today these are occupied by Jlaos from the san pãt (quarters) as the rest of the dak. Nor do the Jlaos claim to be ethnically homogeneous: when they say they are pa, this - which ordinarily means aggregate or wealth - can here imply the accretion of people from different, especially interior, groups, as part of their development into a coastal power. There are two pãt with Bwao names (i.e. from the Grebo-speaking peoples northwards), though these are not proffered on the list of twelve which ideally make up the dako - nor, except in the interior town where it is based, is gboiapo, another one whose members serviced the oracle Ku Jiropole in Cedepo some 50 or more miles inland; this oracle was active until the early years of this century and attracted many besides the Jlaos.

Sasstown, in fact, exhibits in its own territory features which elsewhere could be shared out among a number of interlocking groups. The Fishtowns are evidence that it earlier operated in this way too. The ring of satellite towns in its own interior at once defended the boundaries, provided likely young men for the "capital" - and for labour export - and were a major source of food. This last complementarity continues today, with interior farmers clearing land for their coastal quartermen's wives to cultivate in return

for cash, cutlasses, fish and above all for the school fees and 'raising' of their children, who come to the "beach" for high school education. Beyond the dako itself, food could be obtained from neighbours further inland (people still go to Bwao to buy rice) and they likewise could recruit themselves as kroomen.

All these conditions gave the Jlao opportunities for growth, and, as I shall suggest, led to increasing rewards for the exercisers of authority. But the very forces contributing to Sasstown's development, its size, its centralisation and independence, were simultaneously undermining it and leading to incorporation in the greater Liberian state. I describe how this happened in the rest of the paper.


III. 1888-1909: CHANGES IN JLAO BEFORE THE PORT OF ENTRY

In Liberia news has always travelled fast. Indeed the Kru in the later nineteenth century probably had a better information service than now, because of the boatmen's network. A canoe could easily be commissioned to carry a message swiftly to Monrovia, even, and there the Krootown was as big or bigger than the settlers' own capital.²⁰ The contemporary use of urban relationships by "home-based" Kru is actually longstanding and the Monrovia government has always turned to the Kru on its doorstep for information and for mediators.

So, although there are many Kru living now in an apparently traditional way, subsistence farmers, illiterate, monoglot in a country where English is widely used, they may be well informed about national politics, and as I hope this paper makes clear, there is really nothing "untouched" or "unchanging" about their traditionalism. By the 1880s, Jlao would have been alert to current events in their country, and they acted in the context of growing tension between the Greenville settlers and their immediate Kru neighbours; they observed the pressures on Kru groups extending eastward, toward themselves.²¹

In 1885 and 1886 the American Methodist Episcopal Bishop William Taylor visited Liberia and planned a sequence of Self-Supporting Missions along the coasts of Liberia and the Congo. In 1889 he reported a visit "last spring to Sas Town" where there were three missionaries, one of them female, and twenty-five Krumen probationers. In 1895, 383 Church members were claimed for Liberia, of whom 200 were in Sasstown, and 75 in Grand Cess. The other mission stations claimed less than 30 each.²² This high rate of conversion was probably due less to the zeal of the self-sufficient missionaries, who were literally shortlived, than to contact with missions "down coast". Most nineteenth century reporters stress the Kru's inveterate rejection of Christianity and Western education; it was certainly not true for Sasstown. These reporters generally saw kroomen aboard ship or travelling in small numbers with expatriates on the move - traders, explorers, officials.

By this period, however, there had been a qualitatively new expansion of 'kroomen' working as manual labourers in larger gangs based in one place. Many Sasstown men became attracted to Christianity in Lagos. In Monrovia itself, Mary Sharp's mission school was going strong in Krootown - Mary Sharp was a strong-minded American whose life became devoted to the kroomen. The first Customs Collectors of Sasstown and Grand Cess were raised in her household.²³ Amongst Greenville's nearer neighbours were many as well-educated as Americo-Liberians and sometimes with more worldly experience. Some of them had been wards of settler families. Such people were even more numerous in Maryland County, especially after 50 years of a thriving educational mission.²⁴



NOTE:

- 1) This sketch map (not to scale) indicates settlement relationships, not bounded areas, only the Fishtowns west of the river are spatially distinct from other settlements.
- 2) The precise location and the size of settlements change over time, e.g. Filorkli was burned 1931; there was previously a Fishtown in the Dagbeville area; Kambo Town was absorbed into Jekwikpo.
- 3) The bounds of Sasstown City (1975) are in practice the civilised areas of Filorkli (Civilised Town and Dagbeville) and of Jekwikpo (Lotekpo - the 'lot' area).

Whatever the impetus that pushed Jlaos men in large numbers to Christianity - and it is an interesting question that can only be touched on here - the pragmatic, political importance both of conversion and of literacy must have been important to some of them. Not just literacy, because membership of a Protestant denomination was a fundamental attribute of settler identity, and any claims to Liberian citizenship rested on being 'civilised' in these terms. The word 'civilised' will recur in my paper. For the moment I stress that one of the new features of the krooman-apprentice relationship I have already described was helping the junior to school. To quote my notes from one informant: "the people who built up Civilised Town were seagoing men - stewards, cooks, even labourers. They brought civilization - they hadn't knowledge but they were ambitious and they carried their small brothers to school. They only got £1.10 or £2.10 and rice ... they would say to Englishman, German man: take him to school, make him work for you. Then they coming to know light and getting small book."²⁵

Many of the older men in Sasstown today went through this experience - and more who moved on and away. It is not clear how much earlier it had started. Civilised Town was a tiny settlement which grew up outside Filorkli inspired by the Methodist Mission²⁶ so that its members could practise their own ways and need not acquiesce in all the terms of Filorkli's authority, where no mission was allowed.²⁷ Later it became settled by other civilised persons and was the base for Liberian government officials.

Civilised Town was the first concerted move outside the laws of Jlaos,²⁸ - expressed as they largely are at settlement (klu, 'town') level. But it was not the only new settlement of these years. Shortly after began a series of moves of equal consequence. Small groups crossed the small but deep river which runs by the side of the Filorkli bluff and then meanders to the sea. They established hamlets which gradually amalgamated into today's Jekwikpo. This has been etymologised to me as the place you see Europeans (kui) - an explanation suggestive of one reason for the breakaway. Traders quickly came to "New Sasstown" and the settlers, who had the advantage of being nearer the sea and the calm landing place at the river mouth, successfully developed themselves as a new trading point. They were, equally, vulnerable to attack from Pikniness, and there was little land for farming unclaimed by that dak2, by Kplepo (now 'Barclayville') further inland, or by Filorkli itself.

For Filorkli the success of "New Sasstown" was a thorn in the flesh and there was enmity between the two settlements from the start. It has turned into a relation of deadlock - in which all issues become dichotomised and no neutrality is possible. Two or three people asked me to explain the situation in Northern Ireland and then said it was like that between Filorkli and Jekwikpo. The reasons for the original breakaway are debated, there is either puzzlement at the original ill-feeling or assumption of some fundamental, secret and bitter cause.

Of course, new settlements are generally made by fission, which can be hostile: in this case the continuing survival of bitterness is less odd if one realises that the pattern is dak divisiveness writ small. It is a linked split - intermarriage has been continuous. Its character has in fact changed over time as different outside actions have been fed into it, understood through it, and acted on from it. The dialectic remains, while remembrance of things past powerfully reinforces present decisions.²⁹ Therefore, the two towns took different sides in the 1931 war, and therefore today, when competition for office and limited resources is at issue, the wartime divisions are used to justify or reject claims.

The initial expansion was not simply a matter of over-population and, though early conflicts were partly due to the successful off-shoot's challenging

the right of the senior to ultimate authority³⁰, we can see that hard choices were also at stake. They included choices about the way that Jlaos were to go - about new ways of action and ultimately about relations with the Americo-Liberians. The Jekwikpo view of history is of an epic quest for the sea, of which their town is the true culmination. There is a sense in which Jekwikpo is indeed the logical outcome of a decision to become 'kroomen' instead of 'bushmen', and this, in turn, meant actively to court change and thus to accept its dynamics. But it was not set up as a town for moderns as opposed to ancients - for there was also the separate establishment of Civilised Town, with a later counterpart for Jekwikpo. Many of the early disputes were over the abiding problems of Jlaos survival. Relations with Pikniness were critical. One Jlaos historian gave a vivid rendition of public debate in the tugbedia (palaver yard) over the proposed moves, in which a Kabor chief mocks at Jlaos' aspiration to get on that seashore where Kabor and Gbetao rule, and warns that they will be resisted.³¹ In the event, as I shall show, alliances between Jekwikpo and Gbetao were equally threatening to Filorkli.

Informants tell of two 'parties', the maniwlu and the kwiejlu - sometimes translated as 'aristocrats' and 'orphans'³² - in conflict, with the kwiejlu founding the 'New Town' settlements. In the early twentieth century two parties are reported by the SMA missionaries, the "seaboys" composed of men who had been abroad and the others, contemptuously known to their opponents as 'bushmen'. They are also referred to as "old men" or "big men", though these could be seaboys too. Here there certainly appears an awareness of "winds of change", but it is better not to assume that this was modernization - a term which in any case is waterlogged, festooned with undesirable theoretical seaweed. We can, however, plot the emergence of new men, some of whom thought of themselves as bringing in new ideas. Part of their aim, though, was the eternal one of altering the balance of power in their own favour, and it is reasonable to call their targets 'traditionalist' since a tightened conservatism was, unsurprisingly, one reaction by threatened power-holders. Yet conflict even in these terms must imply a change in the values constituting authority and legitimating bids for power. What evidence is there of this change?

The receptivity to Christianity implies at the least a difference in consciousness, though openness can also be linked with the 'sassy' drive to make and keep trading points. But one is here examining a subtle, complex dialectic for which there are as yet inadequate intellectual tools. The ideological dynamic which acts and reacts on events can be as it were supercharged in periods of acute change, mass religious conversion can be one result and therefore a consequential cause.³⁴

Certain kinds of change must flow, and others may occur from large-scale involvement in oscillating wage-labour migration.³⁵ The 'krooboy's' themselves were in a position to acquire wealth, which entails choices about allocation, and arms, which give power to their holders. There were multifarious new ideas that they might acquire, these ideas would be novel whether they appear exogenous ("modern") or indigenous ("traditional") - for a whole Krooman culture had evolved, covering behaviour at home and abroad.³⁶ The new structures of employment might suggest new organizational and political structures at home. There should be changes in the division of labour caused by the absence of so many adult males at once.

I will try to examine the available evidence in the light of these structural necessities. Set out thus in the most limited way they reveal potential for very great change. On the face of it, conditions were propitious for growth. Could some kind of trading state have grown up? I think it can be said that in the short run that was economically impossible since a community whose main export is its own labour has a poor chance of developing itself

unless there is a substantial cash return; and the inputs to Sasstown were not large. Changes occurred rather through internal and external attempts to take away from the kroomen even that which they had: most important was the Liberian government's efforts to do this by setting up a Port of Entry where customs and headmoney³⁷ could be collected.

It was in fact too late for growth in a purely Kru context. By this time there seemed to be no alternatives for the Americo-Liberians but dominance or disintegration. Faith in themselves as colonists whose duty it was to master the 'aborigines' became a necessity. Bankruptcy hovered, and a tax on the country's only big export, labour, presented itself as a solution, but physical control became inevitable too. Foreign traders simultaneously ignored government authority and held it responsible for native insubordination. Through the first years of the century the settlers were embroiled in conflict after conflict on every hand. On the coast these moved steadily from north to south towards the Jlaos and their neighbours.

Actions in Jlaos themselves then had at least a treble context, the 'Liberian' - to use the word as it was then used - the *jlowi* (lit. sea 'side' or 'down coast') and the Kru area, of intra-dak relationship, where of course all three met. But the contexts were both politically interactive and spatially distinct; they were linked by communication. Information passed freely from one to the other, as I said at the beginning of this section, and decisions taken in Filorkli might originate in Lagos.

IV. THE PORT OF ENTRY: LOCAL POWER STRUGGLES IN THE IMPOSITION OF LIBERIAN RULE

The Roman Catholic Mission was an idea from Lagos, but its initial vicissitudes tell us something of local policy disagreements. That the priests came at all, however, was due to the establishment in 1909 of a Port of Entry at Sasstown under the Receivership agreements. Since a Port of Entry meant taxes, it is at first sight surprising that Kru townsmen were anxious for them, but they also, as Sullivan has pointed out, gave you an edge on your trade competitors. Those deprived of the facilities of a Port had in earlier times suffered badly.³⁸

I cannot reconstruct what debates preceded this decision in Sasstown, but they must have existed. Early in 1897 Capt. Denton, RN, reported a correspondence with Sasstown, saying that all the Kings of the Kroo coast had met there, had sent delegations to him for (British) flags and were begging the men o' war for an English factory and traders. Joseph Chamberlain turned down the request forwarded by Denton that Sass Town and Grand Cess should be put under British protection, "as Cess Town is within the recognised limits of the Liberian Republic".³⁹

To accept a Port of Entry was to accept a measure of Liberian control - a very significant measure, as we shall see. When Fathers Kyne and Fessler of the Society of African Missions arrived in May 1909, customs organisation was invisible. They journeyed from Cape Palmas by a Woermann's surfboat, which had specially extended its usual run to Pikniness. After an initial welcome they were peremptorily sent packing and not even allowed to stay the night. One possible index of earlier disputes is Kyne's explanation of their repulse: "Depuis une année il y a quelque grief contre le gouvernement de Monrovia; il nous en croyait les émissaires".⁴⁰

After a few months, however, the priests were sent for to set up a mission which has remained there ever since, though as its activities have

spread all over Liberia, Sasstown has dwindled into an outpost. Kyne having been recalled in the interim, his successor Fr. (later Mgr.) Ogé, newly transferred after a long career in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, decided to concentrate all his personnel at Sasstown: from this initial singularity has resulted valuable contemporary documentation, though it has to be interpreted with care (See Appendix III).

There was a change of direction, evidently, to accept the mission after all, and although Kyne attributed their dismissal to savage despotism, his own account of the trip reveals nothing of the sort. He and Fr. Fessler were taken first to the "sous-chef" at New Sasstown and examined by him and "tous les hommes de poids" who evidently joined in the questioning. "They" sent the priests on to the king at Filorkli, "qui paraît-il a autorité sur tous les chefs environnants". At Old Sasstown all the "patriarches" were summoned to the king, Wisseh, by horn, the questions were repeated and then the priests were sent to a (small and decrepit) house. It was not for some time that they were called back from their walk round the town to find "une foule immense" assembled and were told by the king that "après avoir pris l'avis de ses conseillers" they must go home and if later allowed to settle, they would be informed.⁴¹

The picture is of competing views, debate among the big men, and public decision-making in a style that is noted in many other sources, including my own observations. The question of who took which decisions in the period under review is not, however, always easy to answer. Informants give a picture of the traditional government which is timeless, achronic: there are many offices distributed among the panten, but two of them are said to have been supreme, the budio and the kloba. The title budio is now usually translated as "high priest", but in the period of this paper it was 'king'. The kloba was the 'governor'⁴², but through Government appointment it became chief or Paramount Chief.

On the basis of accounts of Grand Cess, Horton suggested that Kru towns had a type of organization which "small changes in the balance of power would have ... turned into petty states".⁴³ Although many of his suggestions are insightful, they beg questions which there is not space to discuss here. His emphasis on the dispersal of offices among lineages is important, but the example of Sasstown shows that lists of offices cannot be taken simply at face value. They do indeed indicate that to the Kru, executive, temporal power and spiritual power, honour and authority are not distinguished in the way Westerners might divide them, they show how the panton and dako levels could be articulated and linked, but from the detail of oral narrative history alone, and still more with contemporary written sources, one can see that the lists are guides and charters, modified by specific historical experience certainly,⁴⁴ but not a constantly true account of it.

Some of the first Catholic missionaries wrote at some length of the kloba's powers, which they described as far ranging and tyrannical, in terms very similar to indigenous accounts. Yet their descriptions cannot have been based on observation, because at least between 1908 and 1917 there was no kloba for Sasstown.⁴⁵ A common oral tradition, not independent witness, is all we can infer. All sources, however, agree that the previous kloba, Camla Dugbe, was deposed or went into exile, c.1908, and in 1911 was brought back by Betu people, with whom he had lived, to Gmayekpo, 'Cambo town' on the 'New Town' side, and was there hacked to pieces. The implications of this are not altogether clear, but Togbor Kambo and his supporters went, with all their quarters, from Filorkli in a dispute which is linked to the Jekwi split, and which according to Mgr. Ogé, writing in January 1913, was occasioned by a plot in December 1911 to remove the king Wisseh with all the sacred 'fetishes' to Newtown,

which would have made it the capital instead.⁴⁶

Kru groups all have lists of offices, and Massing calculates that the budio is named almost universally, the kloba by 75%. Sullivan says that her informants rarely named the kloba, or treated it as a government creation.⁴⁷ In the histories of both Grand Cess and Sasstown I have collected, it is stressed that klobas were a late development. Although it seems obvious that the post is symptomatic of growing centralisation of the kind that Horton, for instance, posits, the Sasstown evidence denies this as a straight-forward conclusion. Even the apparent prominence of the budio Wisseh may be an accident - due to the missionaries' rejection and consequent recording of events. In oral sources his role is not stressed, and there seems to have been a high turn-over of office holders.⁴⁸

I have already mentioned the 'parties', kwiejlu and maniwlu, bushmen and seaboys. According to one priest, the latter elected their own governor in 1911. As Fr. John Collins notes in his diary (kept from arrival in October 1913 to departure on leave early in 1918) this official was actually called a 'James', perhaps after an English policeman in Lagos, admired for his toughness.⁴⁹ The jimise wa (wa = section, side, group etc.) ran their own police and enforced their own town laws. Collins says that the James was set up in both towns to represent shipboy interests against the 'big men' (cp. "elders") who had previously demanded 2/- of every one on return from steamer work and they got this tribute reduced to 1/-. The organisation remained important in both towns, and a key 'Big Town' man in it, whose ascent can only be glimpsed in the diary, was a man called Caesar.

Caesar was influential during a period of accentuating, unprecedented harshness for Sasstown. For clarity I will separate out some of the reasons, and summarise them. The outbreak of World War I was soon marked, ominously, by the 'Liberian boat's' failure to stop as it passed on to 'Kamerun'.⁵⁰ It was in 1915 that ships calling at Sasstown - or indeed at Liberian ports - fell drastically, and recruitment could not pick up again till the end of 1919 - before that desperation for a ship and books was such that Fr. Collins went in search to Sierra Leone, returning triumphantly with his find on 26th July 1919.⁵¹

For much of this time, then, there were extra men to feed and none of their cash to buy food with. In any case imported stores were very scarce. Furthermore, a series of crop failures brought hunger every year, with conditions of starvation in 1918 and 1919, when influenza was added to beri-beri. Also, according to the priests, because those who could got abroad during the government crackdown of 1916-7 and stayed there, there had not been enough men to brush the farms.⁵² Sickness, death, food thefts and their increasingly harsh punishment are recorded again and again in the diary of Fr. P. Herlihy (1918-21). In the face of such misfortunes people cast around for the sin or malevolence which they believed must have caused such disaster.⁵³

Tension between the old and new towns ebbed and flowed. After an outright battle over a farm in early 1913, with 4 dead and at least 17 wounded⁵⁴, there was a rapprochement, started by joint action against a threatened Gbetao raid on a Newtown farm. Later proposals of joint farms between these two, supported by one Gbetao faction in a leadership dispute with another, were met with Filorkli's intriguing to support the other candidate. In the same way a temporary Filorkli alliance with Betu (including again joint farming) and their encouragement of first a Nifu and then a Betu Fishtown (i.e. Kabor) blockade of the Port, was directed against Jekwikpo. When the British Receiver of Customs, Richard Sharpe, came to settle this dispute, he moved the Customs House from Newton to Kata, a beach settlement on the Filorkli side. There was even

action by the interior towns against those on the seashore, but their method, stopping the women from coming up for cassava, was matched by the beach's refusal of salt and tobacco, and the interior towns gave in first.⁵⁵ The integrity of Jlaos was not secure; it was in ways like this that *dakɔ* composition changed. An effect of later government attacks was to sharpen an all-Jlao identity, but not to remove old divisions - indeed new ambivalences developed.

The incident of the Betu war fleet was actually part of the Kabor unrest that erupted into full war at the end of 1915. The attacks were mainly directed against the Port of Entry officials, servants of the Liberian government.⁵⁶ The Port of Entry machinery had got under way slowly, but reasonably smoothly, perhaps due to the personality of the first Collector, Edward Sharp. He was not, significantly, an Americo-Liberian, and at least two of his first officials were Jlao - and like him Protestant.⁵⁷ Thus the authority of central government was at first mitigated or masked, and the outsiders who came - traders, preachers - were accepted as largely within the Jlao's own governance. 'Government' impinged rarely; it meant the odd detachment of soldiers who were met by force.⁵⁸

These outsiders were a mixture: German traders, agents of trading houses who were usually Sierra Leonian, the Catholic priests (all Irish after the outbreak of war except for Oge)⁵⁹ and representatives of the Methodists and Protestant Episcopalians.⁶⁰ Most of these were not 'Liberian' by birth, but they were 'civilised' - if black, they had chosen the way of 'book', of Christianity, Western clothes, speaking English and working for money, which also identified the settlers to themselves. The locals who interacted with this community most closely were trading and/or preaching too, sharing some of the same economic interests therefore, expressing themselves in part through the same culture, and likely to model themselves upon it. I have already mentioned how some of them built up Civilised Town.

On 25th November 1915 the U.S. man of war *Chester* called at Sasstown with the American Receiver aboard. By December the extent of the Kabor-Liberian conflict was well understood, but its impact was not really felt till the Liberian Frontier Force, having burnt the big Kabor Fishtown at Betu, later attacked and sacked the Jlepo town there.⁶¹ On March 5th, 1916, Lt. Roundtree was reluctantly shown round a silent Newtown by Collins. Only the *budio* made himself visible, sitting outside his house in full regalia. Later that month the *Chester* brought in President Howard as well as the U.S. Minister again.⁶² Filorkli at the beginning had offered to support the government against the Kabor but were turned down by Maj. York: "... death and destruction is (our) policy at all time till the aim of the government has triumphed or finally broken".⁶³ The style might be incoherent but the menace was not. Howard entirely supported York: "I have a copy of your letter to the Sasstown people and approve of every word of it. These Krus can't be treated with soft words nor deeds. They must be convinced now, once for all, for every one of them was in for this rebellion, except, possibly, the Deo and Borro; but you did the unexpected and now some are with us per force of circumstances".⁶⁴

Howard also told York to insist on "disarmament for all conquered tribes ... as a first step" and the delivering up of ringleaders. Collins recorded that Roundtree came back to Kata in September with 20 soldiers, and after forcing guns from Betu people, the young soldiers (i.e. the *Kafa*) gave in over 100; Filorkli, less prompt, claimed their people were on the farm. Later, "officious" collecting by the people brought in a "very large number" - 240 - in Newtown: "I think that the two parties in town watch and fear each other - and they have special zest in giving guns in order to prove themselves more obedient than Big Town".⁶⁵

Roundtree forced the guns from Betu by holding three men hostage; the soldiers' excesses and the failure of the Kabors were all swiftly known; Jlaos acquiescence in their own disarmament is understandable. I have described the other pressures building up against them. Now they were directly involved with the government and their "internal" and "external" policies were totally intertwined. The two parties had come to blows the previous month, the Seaboys trying to regain control of Newtown. Nagbe, the old men's leader, and Caesar of Big Town were enemies, and Caesar, as a leader of the seaboys, and a Filorkli influential who spoke English and knew kui ways was involved with the soldiers from the start.

In October 1916, soldiers lodged in Caesar's house, but then arrested him. Such mediators have always in Liberia been in and out of jail - and aborigine 'civilised' men were never exempt from 'Liberian' suspicion. Another Jlaoman, a trader, Robert Broh, was on this occasion let off. In the beginning of February representatives of each town were called to Greenville by the Government Commission. Caesar was made Governor for both towns, with the right to appoint a 'second' for Newtown. There was talk of his having given £100 to Cooper for this.⁶⁶

According to Collins, Caesar's appointment as 'paramount chief' was not accepted by the Filorkli people, and he ceded it to Trueh, one of the old men, on condition that he was head of the seaboys. He was nominated for Newtown as the accepted leader of their seaboys and he was appointed, apparently with more complaisance. At the same time came the news of the hangings at Sinoe, on the orders of the Cooper Commission. There had already been many stories of Frontier Force brutality and the ill-treatment of prisoners, but it was after the Commission that harassment of Sasstown and the neighbouring areas increased, with patrols moving up and down from their barracks in Pikniness. In March 1917 a shoot-up at Kambo Town was narrowly averted after a dispute over finding carriers - always a heavy and hated service. Little notice was taken of the Commission's edicts, but Caesar evidently exercised some power in conjunction with the local Lieutenant, Browne. When the latter made a new 'second' the people said nothing but afterwards begged Caesar to reinstate Ku Sieh.⁶⁷

On 1st July, 1917, both towns were shaken by rifle volleys in Filorkli. In the early morning soldiers had roused out all the 'big men', calling them to the palaver yard. They then started to shoot them down, killing four men (including the preferred rival Trueh) and injuring five others, one seriously. There had been earlier disputes over the visiting soldiers' demands; it was alleged that Browne, Caesar and Joseph (a trader) had spent the night drawing up a list of whom to kill. This list was seen in Betu. Caesar denied his participation, but later told a German trader that he would kill himself if he had courage.⁶⁸

This traumatic incident has often been put forward to me as a cause of later Jlaos intransigence and their decision to fight the Government in 1931. Reports of the event were sent to the President but he instituted no enquiry.⁶⁹ When Collins met the U.S. Minister in 1915 he reported him as saying, "in his quiet way", that "the trouble would be ended now unless dead men could cause trouble".⁷⁰ Dead men continued to cause trouble on the Kru coast.

The massacre was also the most extreme example of manipulating external force for internal ends, and though the violence on this occasion was extraordinary (and in a sense overreached itself) its particular context of 'civilised' and 'tribal' was already established in Liberia. At this time very few men in Sasstown had acquired the circumstances of civilisation as defined by the 'civilised community' there, but their numbers would increase,

the conflicts of interest in their position remain. It was they who first competed in the new political arena created by Sasstown's submission to Liberian rule.

The soldiers' intervention had from the start included civil action; the diaries and Liberian archives show they started to settle cases, especially with neighbouring dake, and even tried to bring the two towns together. By participating in these judgements, however constrainedly, the people began to legitimate this order. The Cooper Commission set up a new administration for the Kru coast, which, as we have seen, was at first ignored - and Caesar's rejection in favour of Trueh shows that a Paramount Chief was not equated with a kloba. Indeed the immediate reaction to the tragedy of 1917 was a swing back to "traditionalism". In Newtown the seaboys' power diminished at once, and the former 'old men's' leader, Nagbe, was installed ritually as Kloba. The following year it was at last decided to have a kloba for all Jlaos, at Filorkli. Boi/Mei Boka was installed also 'traditionally' though the ceremonies were muted in the prevailing circumstances of hunger and misery.⁷¹ Caesar was already dead.

But already, in September 1917, the first Commissioner for Sasstown, Mitchell, had arrived from Sinoe, to "collect debts and judge cases", attended by "only three or four policemen". He had made two more visits by the end of the year. This inaugurated direct civil control, albeit relatively occasional.⁷² Direct taxes followed, and in 1918 two local men, Robert Broh and his brother, offered themselves as sub-collectors to the Sinoe-based Collector. But it was not only such lesser Government offices to which the leading civilised men aspired: in 1919 Boka was removed and Harrison Tagbe became Paramount Chief, travelling to Monrovia for the installation of President King. After many ups and downs, however, the President agreed to another new election: under the supervision of Supt. Grigsby, Broh was chosen by 300 votes to 1. Neither he nor his successor, Dick Moore, lasted long.⁷³

After the removal of Moore, the Paramount Chieftaincy was reserved for 'tribal' men, following Government policy;⁷⁴ this simply underlined their lack of real power. The Republic's writ had run since 1917; the people could use it to remove an unwanted representative and that was all. Resentment might grow against the 'civilised' and their endorsement of 'Liberian' values. They in turn could monopolise the bureaucracy, including the administration of a Township after 1925, and above all make money - that political key - both as officials and as traders in a burgeoning economy. The conflicts of interest produced by this alignment were many, and some of them have remained in a Liberia where Jlaos now participate in national life in many spheres and at almost every level of authority. The choices of 80 or 90 years ago which I have described represented serious and honourable values on both sides. They inevitably became polarised into incompatible solutions - collaboration or warfare with the Republic. The pressures and conflicts described in this paper continued through the 1920s; in 1931 many, though not all, Jlaos chose warfare and lost.

I have tried to show in this extremely selective and limited survey how in 30 years the Jlaos' polity changed extensively from within, as well as by force of external circumstance. These changes interacted, and because there were men whom outsiders could deal with more easily - since they knew English and shared a cultural style - these men became mediators with and eventually agents of the Liberian government. They were crucial and they are most visible

to the investigator, but change cannot be explained through them alone.

Elsewhere in West Africa the processes of colonization also often depended at "point of sale" on black mediators, sometimes from other loyalised groups, or returned expatriates, like the Sierra Leonian recaptives in Nigeria. However, one also finds many indigenous social movements which took account of foreign models independent of any colonial power. They range from the trading states of Nigeria to the Gedebo Reunited Kingdom in Maryland County, and an extreme but instructive example is Abeokuta. Here Egba with very diverse experiences built up a new community by attempting to choose what they wanted of Western technology and religion and reject the rest.⁷⁵

Nothing so complete developed among the Kru,⁷⁶ but we can see how much of the change there was due to a broad base of humble innovators, many of whom felt impelled through their own experiences to amend social organization at home. It was an irony that their aims, ranging from a straightforward desire to keep more of their own wages to creating a new and godly community, should end not in a reformed Jlaio polity but submission by force of arms in 1917. Seen in this context the term collaborator as now fashionably used in colonial studies is misleading and inadequate, and must therefore be so too for those very few 'new men' who appear as leading characters in the story. They were produced out of the same conditions and they acted in the same context, but with drives and an extra dimension of experience that turned them into important political actors in the circumstance of their time. But the traditionalists turned out to be right when they saw challenges to their authority not only as challenges to a Jlaio way of life uncontaminated by Christianity and all kui ways, but also to Jlaio's autonomy itself.

The Christianising of so many Jlaio into Methodism was especially important, because it was sustained by local effort. After the self-sufficient missionaries, ordained clergy were intermittent, short-term visitors only, though Sasstown Methodists were undoubtedly galvanised by Walter B. Williams, a white American missionary who came with his wife to Nana Kru from Grand Cess in 1913 and stayed till 1931. The structure of Methodism allowed its ordinary members to run it and thus, in the broadest sense, educated them. The Catholic church structure was not only less democratic, its decision-takers were expatriates, though the priests in fact depended very greatly on their teacher-catechists, who mediated between them and the congregation, were left in charge of out-stations⁷⁷ and as interpreters both explained the Faith from their own understanding and built up a vernacular liturgy.⁷⁸ The Protestants, however, had a vital 10-15 years' start, and consequently few of the early Catholics became important men, though the SMA writers are silent about this.

Walter B. Williams and the SMA priests had nothing good to say of one another but they shared one opinion, that their efforts were continually being frustrated by migrant labour migration. In their eyes, converts vanished down coast as soon as they developed, though it was grudgingly admitted that they might continue churchgoing there. It is a telling objection. Young kroomen are seen as both the mainstay and the object of missionary enterprise, a self-fulfilling end, it must be said, and one that actually depended on labour migration to provide the experience or the ambition that facilitated conversion. And for the missionaries such people were much more approachable - they knew some English and they had a touch, however faint, of a familiar world.

Women were much more intimidating, for the same reasons - mono-lingual, working on the farms which Catholic missionaries rarely visited, boldly indifferent and accustomed to exercising sexual freedom like men.⁷⁹ They were only just beginning to go abroad, returning in Collins' eyes "walking bundles of mortal sin"; one of them told him that women ought to go instead of men, they could earn money so much more quickly.⁸⁰ Although of course some became

Catholics, and school was open to them, at this period their opportunities were greater with the Protestants. Mrs. Williams operated a girls' boarding school on the Methodist Mission, and some of her husband's most important and respected supporters were women, one of them from Sasstown.⁸¹

There is not much written evidence of how the changes in this period altered womens' consciousness or status, but they certainly had even more work to do. In the absence of able-bodied men they were porters and even climbed for palm nuts.⁸² As in other "homelands" they might bear the burden of raising a family alone - and then be cast off as old when the husband at last returned - but there were still enough men to exercise public power. Some women entered the 'civilised' world as wives, especially traders'. In the famine period women probably suffered most of all.⁸³

I have not attempted to describe most dimensions of Jiao life - if I were looking at womens' power I would have introduced a very powerful woman, the budio's consort, tap nyen. I have concentrated on those areas and conflicts which seem to me the focus of crucial change. As I have said, the men involved were citizens of Jiao, sharing many of the same assumptions and values whatever their 'party'. Sasswood remained their accepted arbiter of life and death. Conflicts were not simply between older and younger, very few men moved outside the jurisdiction of the 'town' and they all continued to exercise authority in their quarters. In a great many conflicts they stood for the interests of Filorkli or Jekwikpo rather than of 'civilised' or 'tribal'. These only became separated into near-classes later, as a second generation with formal education emerged and living in a Township or Municipality meant also political, cultural and economic choice.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, we see that though many institutions apparently remained, they were survivals in name but not in meaning - the connotations of the labels change. And it was not just the change of a chess game, where every move alters the state of play and consequently the values of the pieces; the board itself was changing and by 1918 it was no longer the same game.⁸⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. An early version of this paper was presented to the Liberian Studies Conference at Iowa, 1973. Since then I have had the opportunity of more extended fieldwork in Liberia (1975-6) and of archival work there and elsewhere. I am grateful for support from the University of Birmingham, The Nuffield Foundation and the Social Science Research Council. Apart from librarians and archivists, my debts are to the Jiao whose words lie behind all this work. Selection is invidious and I have been sparing in quoting individuals by name, since they have no responsibility for the uses to which their comments have been put. I hope very much, however, that they will recognise my account, and add their criticisms.

2. See Frederick McEvoy, "Understanding Ethnic Realities among the Grebo and Kru Peoples of West Africa," Africa XLVII, 1(1977), 62-80. My account of dak ethnicity is compatible with his. I do not here treat dak as the sum of fixed components, e.g. of pantons etc. - but as the realization of different processes. For naming in such investigation see E. Ardener's rules in "Language, Ethnicity and Population," R. Moss and R. Rathbone, eds., The Population Factor in African Studies (London, 1975), 48-56. Note that dagbe ('stranger') can be taken as the individual or specific singular of the collective noun dak (pl. dakio/dakwe).

3. In this period I believe the 'Liberians' recognised an overarching identity corresponding to the peoples now officially making up the Kru tribe; this is clear in, say, Howard's letter quoted in the text. Pace McEvoy, "Understanding Ethnic Realities." Therefore, the ethnic level of 'Kru' developed at home as well as abroad, and so did 'Grebo'. The components of these identities differed according to the holders, and as the conspiracy-theory of an all-Kru rising fed on fear and the recognition of opposed economic interests, so did a collusive British version, framed from the perspective of kroomen employers, which was transmitted by diplomatic/commercial representatives up to the present day.

4. African Repository (hereafter AR), XLI (1865) 27 - correspondence from Liberia. Harold Taylor, Jungle Trader (London, 1939). The World War I situation is clear from the SMA diaries (see Appendix III). Ports of Entry regulations also led, much earlier, to the use of boats for produce from non-Ports.

5. J. Smith, Trade and Travels in the Gulph of Guinea (London, 1851), 100-103, one of the many comparable sources cited by G. Brooks, Jr., The Kru Mariner in the Nineteenth Century (Newark, Delaware, 1972). The steamers could lessen the travelling time to shore by towing boats from a steam-launch, but canoes still took 2-4 hours to reach them.

6. R. Spencer, "Scarcity and Growth in two African Societies," 57-70 in The Population Factor edited by Moss and Rathbone; see also E. Ardener, "Language Ethnicity and Population" in the same volume.

7. For levels of population see the works of A. Massing, e.g. paper to the Liberian Studies Conference at Indiana University, 1977, "The Kru Culture Area". For recruitment see evidences in Brooks, The Kru Mariner in the Nineteenth Century. Before it exported labour, food, water and wood were obtained from the Grain Coast. In 1751 John Newton acquired in ten days over 7 tons of rice from his anchorage in St. Paul's Roads, The Journal of a Slave Trader, edited by B. Martin and M. Spurrell, London, 1962. In 1842 the interior of Cape Palmas was called the granary of Africa, F. Bacon, "Cape Palmas and the Mena, or Kroomen," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, XII (1842), 203. Rice exports, like labour exports, required alliances, a network of economic relations; they also needed labour to deploy on farming and to defend wide farm boundaries.

8. "Report on Liberia," Feb. 28, 1866, Public Record Office, London (hereafter, PRO) ADM 123/1.5.

9. Brooks, The Kru Mariner, passim. An important Jlaos relationship has been between a senior and one or more juniors of nané bi and nané ju, (lit. father and child walking (together)). This operated in many spheres including politics and war.

10. See e.g. (S.A. Ross?) to President, Liberian National Archives (hereafter LNA), Nov. 23, 1910 (unclassified) on bush people invited to Nuaoon Pt. by Gbetao; Draft letter from Howard to Johns, with letter of Jan. 29, 1915, Supt. J.J. Johns to Howard, (LNA, unclassified) re Bolloh, "I understand they are numerous and very ingenious and about the year 1908 were brought from the Bush by the (?) Shar (=Tal2?) people of Niffou." Subsequently Barclay stationed them permanently between Sanplopo and Niffou "hence I must recognise same". The Nifu-Bolloh dispute still continues.

11. cf. e.g. F. Barth, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (London, 1969).

12. J. Sullivan, "Settlers in Sinoe County, Liberia and their Relations with the Kru, c. 1835-1920," Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1978, especially chapter 4, 104-159. She points out that in Greenville 1901, there were only 265 adult males.

13. Missionary publications from Cape Palmas claimed they were of the same culture, see, as an example of one source reprinted and clearly available to settlers, Bp. Payne's account of the "Liberia Mission Field," AR, XLII (1865), 161ff.

14. W. d'Azevedo, "Tribe and Chiefdom on the Windward Coast," Rural Africana, XV (1971), 10-29. R. Horton points out "how closely, at any given period, the areas covered by the great states tally with the junctions, termini and tentacles of the major trade routes". "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa," in J.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, Vol. I (London, 1971), 116. In G. Harley's map of old trade routes, only four meet the sea south of River Cess, two converging on Greenville and two on Harper, "Roads and Trails in Liberia," Geographical Review, XXIX (1939), 447-60.

15. Rev. J.K. Wilcox, AR, XLI (1865), 98, an account summarized from Spirit of Missions.

16. Esu Biyi, "The Kru and Related Peoples, West Africa, Pts. I and II," Journal of the African Society, XXIX (1929-30), 71-77 and 181-188. This information is not necessarily reliable, however, since he places the Gbetao mainly at 'Sankwē', which is actually where the Kabor were moved after 1915. Internal evidence suggests Biyi visited Sasstown once in the early 1920s, but his knowledge of other Kru may be earlier.

17. J. Duitsman, J. Berikau and J. Laesch, "A Survey of Kru Dialects," Studies in African Linguistics, VI (1975), 77-103.

18. LNA General Correspondence Executive Mansion 1883-5, January 11, 1884, President Johnson to Senate and House of Representatives. Nifu and Betu (often earlier Battoo) are trading names. Occupied now by Talor and Jlepo respectively, they previously also contained large Kabor settlements, probably named from the nearby rivers, Nifu and Gbatu. It was the Kabor, not the Talor people, who claimed to have landed the first immigrants (S.A. Ross to President, March 11, 1911, LNA unclassified).

19. Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa, Parliamentary Papers, XL (1842), 435 - evidence of Capt. the Hon. J. Denman, RN, who was defining the Kroo coast in answer to an earlier question. He got diverted on to the Fishmen ("perfect pests...they require keeping in order very much") and did not explain the race of the Grand Cestos. However, pace Brooks, The Kru Mariner, 87, he did not say Saucy Town was south of this settlement.

20. Liberia Bulletin, VIII (1896), has accounts of both: "The fact is that Monrovia is a quiet village of perhaps 2,500 people" and it is said that number would at least double if Krootown were added in. Kroomen assured the priests of the Society of African Missions, c. 1908, that Sasstown was bigger than Krootown, cited as 3,000 inhabitants, Society of African Missions General Archives, Lyon (hereafter SMAG) Kyne to Pellet, December 14, 1908, 16828.14/81202, and they thought that this was so after their first visit, although early estimates of 20,000 dwindled steadily with experience. Ogé in 1911 claimed 5,000 in each town, Cessou clearly implies this was too high an estimate, Les Missions Catholiques, XLIII (1911), 413. Estimates of this kind

seem generally inflated (and of course were intended to justify the writer's work and encourage home interest in missions).

21. Jo Sullivan has described the growth of Kru-Settler tensions in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Sullivan, "Settlers in Sinoe County," 260-312. Events in Maryland were also watched. In 1875 Nifu claimed that "the Cape Palmas" people had told them to assist "as the Sassa town people and others". Jack Savage, Act. Liberian Consul to Supt. Maryland County, December 7, 1875, LNA Domestic Correspondence, VIII (1875-6).

22. Taylor is cited in W.C. Barclay, The Board of Missions and Church Extensions of the Methodist Church (New York, 1949), 29. (He also gives details of Ekman and Tate). 1895 figures are quoted in Liberia Bulletin, VIII (1896), 85. There are a few pathetic letters from one of these missionaries, K.V. Ekman, in the Methodist Board of Missions Archives, Riverside Drive, N.Y. After his death, October 4, 1890, Mr. and Mrs. John G. Tate came to Sasstown. Many tales are told of Tate, including that he died in a fight between Dio and Bolloh c. 1910 (or earlier?). The project did establish a formal presence for Methodism on which genuine 'self-help' churches could build, and some of the other missions in E. Liberia, e.g. at Garraway, had a long and important life.

23. When Taylor came to Monrovia he preached alternately in her and "our own church" (AR (1885), 86). AR has several references to her school. According to (Bp.) Willis J. King, History of the Methodist Church Mission in Liberia (mimeo. n.d.) her gravestone reads "Mary A. Sharp, 1837-1914. Erected to Honor the Memory of our 'Mammy' by her boys and Kroo Church". In his words, "For many years Miss Sharp maintained a more or less nominal relationship to organised Methodism in Liberia, but she chafed under institutional restraint of any kind, and so finally withdrew her mission work from the Liberia conference and launched out on her own...(55)". According to Edward Sharp's son and other informants, he and his brother, Doe Sharp, were Vai orphans; presumably they were Kru speakers by the circumstances of their upbringing. Mary Sharp's house was next to the College of West Africa and on the edge of Kroo-town, King, 54.

24. The frustrations of such men led to their fighting in Maryland County; their situation in Sinoe County is summarised in the words of Z.B. Roberts, "they are too far advanced in civilization to be kept in the rear. They own boats and can sell them - they have been shipping and know the benefit of direct trade - they can read and write and do even more than many of the Liberians born in our towns can do..." Roberts to President Cheeseman, November 8, 1894, LNA Executive Correspondence, cited by J. Sullivan, "Settlers in Sinoe County," 298-99, ftn. 65.

25. Emmanuel S. Togba, June 8, 1972. Mr. Togba said that his father was "Christianized in Lagos" and he asked there on behalf of others for a missionary. The Anglican bishop sent him on to Bp. Ferguson at Cape Palmas (i.e. for the Church Missionary Society, Liberia was accepted as the American Episcopalians' sphere of influence). He became the first lay reader, and the father of one of his wives Hannah (she had no Kru name) was the Methodist mission's cook. This is just one example of the 'civilising' of Jlaos people. See also ftn. 61 below for the 'P.E.' (Protestant Episcopalian) church in Sasstown.

26. In 1894 Tate claimed that there were 11 families, (letter to Dr. McCabe, September 5, 1894, Board of Missions) but only half a dozen or so men are remembered as founders today. The Catholic priests knew it as 'Christian Town', but it never seems to have been the major focus of Protestant action like 'New York' in Grand Cess, as described by M. Fraenkel, "Social Change on the Kru Coast of Liberia," Africa, XXXVI (1966), 154-172, though it was an

alien place to the priests as Catholic converts did not live there at this period.

27. The Catholic mission was sited on the quarter land of a supporter, but it was actually on the margin of town, with the church beside it. The Jekwikpo mission was similarly situated and landlorded.

28. Biyi describes the enterprise of two kroomen, Kofa and Jacob Tre, whose efforts to "reform their own people to a similar mode of life" (as their experience abroad) forced them to "retire to Sôrôpo, a village on an eminence five miles" away and earlier "the place of execution". Here they built up a profitable "plantation" for which Sasstown people were grateful in the famine years of the first World War, "The Kru and Related Peoples", 183-4. These men, and their exports of groundnuts, are remembered, but I do not know when they first broke away.

29. Cf. E. Ardener, "Witchcraft, Economics and the Continuity of Belief" in Association of Social Anthropologists' Monograph 9, ed. M. Douglas, Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations (London, 1970). I do not say that there are no real causes for the disputes, for they can always be found and are usually dependent outcomes of the dominant political economy. But there is a dialectic between them and the local ideology, which therefore has autonomous, initiating characteristics.

30. Although these seem obvious causes, I have not found any informant to claim them, but they are explicitly put forward by Ogé, who presumably was given them, in an early report (January 16, 1913, SMAG 16869/4/81202/1913). He describes how it was to be "Small Sasstown" but "la succursale veut devenir la grande ville". Over-population would present itself as a lack of farmland, and, since the area to be farmed each year was (and is) a town choice, an independent venture is normally a mark of secession, just as making a joint farm is one of alliance or even of unification. It is clear that the Newtown secessionists crossed the river to make farms.

31. The late Tipla Sieh (Harrison S. Jeto) with E.S. Togba, July, 1972. He also said that a krooman was ordained to start the Jekwikpo fishtown (Jeratipko) and the chosen man had learned fishing at Grand Cess. This suggests that it was hoped to operate without Fishmen, though I think that the 1915 events (q.v. in text) imply that some Kabor were there then.

32. Brig. Gen. J.N. Blamo ret'd. says (January 1978) that 'maniwlu' was the name of a cloth sold by Sierra Leonean traders and withheld from the kwiejlu by Camla Dubge (q.v. text) but worn by his supporters. Kuiejlu may be lit. children of the dead (kui). A source for these translations is A Short History of the Sasstown "Jlaoh" Tribe by (the late) G.T. Wojroh and Philip S. Broh (mimeo: Jekwikpo, 1970) known to and used by oral historians, who also knew one another, i.e. the diversity of Jlaoh sources is not prima facie evidence of independent traditions.

33. Ideally the oldest man in the quarter heads it - he is its nyɛ fuɛ and this, since fuɛ means moral quality as well as literal size, is often rendered 'big man'. Wisdom is also cumulative, so age can, but need not imply it. Wealth can also increase one's "size". As Massing says, in "The Kru Culture Area," 42, "experience" is perhaps the nearest English equivalent. Jlaoh acceptance of the principle of relative seniority is marked, but there need have been nothing new in young men exercising a sphere of authority, or in individuals competing for support or in prowess (e.g. as a warrior) giving the right to take decisions. Since these characteristics exist now, with no evidence ever of total gerontocracy, I cannot believe that the 'seaboys' brought

them about, though I do think that they attempted new organizational forms. It seems clear that experience in ship and shore gangs gave them new perceptions of order as well as creating solidarity.

34. R. Horton's model of conversion, it might be noted, fits Jlaó history very well, including his notion of Christianity as a catalyst for changes initiated before major direct contact with outsiders. R. Horton, "On the Rationality of Conversion," Parts I and II, Africa, XLV (1975), 219-235 and 373-399.

35. Although it is clear that wages were mostly either given as goods or converted into them before return, there is also evidence from Collins' diary (see e.g. text, and footnote 81) that cash was by his time also brought.

36. See McEvoy, "Understanding Ethnic Realities". Evidences of this culture are to be found in all the sources on kroomen. It is interesting that, for instance, of two kroomen who were brought by Denman to testify to the Select Committee (see ftn. 19 above), one claimed that guns to make war on his neighbours were one of his objects in working. The Liberian government feared such guns were for them, and Ports of Entry were advocated inter alia as a control on this.

37. Taxes on labour were payable by the employer or his agent, but the taxes and customs duties payable by the kroomen themselves were a constant cause of complaint. Arthur Barclay more than once recognised this as justified (see his Annual Messages of 1909 and 1910; it was presented as a Kabor grievance).

38. Sullivan, "Settlers in Sinoe County," 279-87, points out that trading points without Ports of Entry could do as well. The examples of Klaw towns losing trade when these facilities were withdrawn or interdicted were also instructive. Nifu's claims (see ftn. 18 above) were part of a claim for a Kabor Port (see ftn. 37 above) - at this time their ethnic confidence, abrasiveness and open resentment were developing together, which is perhaps why the legislature (presumably) rejected President Barclay's plea. After referring to "the operations of the Lark in connection with Sasstown" and intertribal disturbances, which had closed Nifu for 2 years, he said "I should be glad to have Niffoó excepted as a measure of grace to so faithful and loyal a tribe as the Carbors" (Annual Message (Monrovia, 1909)). It was Sasstown not Nifu which got the Port of Entry.

39. Chamberlain to Denton, April 15, 1897, and to Denton from five Kru coast rulers, including "Chief King of Cess Town" (sgd. W.F. Stowey), PRO, FO/47/30, 210 and 209. (I am indebted to Jo Sullivan for these references). In Chamberlain's letter mention is made of an earlier letter from "King Towie of Cess Town", who is then confused with King Tobey of Settra Kru who was amongst petitioners with the same theme in 1893 and 1895. Settra Kru's disloyalty led to an impotent cession from the Republic. King Towie was presumably a budio since his name is never given as a kloba - at this period Jipla Nagbe is named. But King Martin of Grand Cess in Denton's letter was a kloba, according to mine and R. Davis' informants' lists (Ethnohistorical Studies on the Kru Coast (Newark, Delaware, 1976), 154-5). The Sasstown letter was also a complaint of "the tax imposed by the Liberian Government on those who take temporary service elsewhere on the Coast".

40. L'Echo des Missions Africaines, X (1911), 51. Other explanations were put forward later e.g. that the priests were "Frenchmen", i.e. would-be imperialists. See also ftn. 38 above. In the Annual Message for 1909 it is clear that there was trouble at Grand Cess over becoming a Port (confirmed

elsewhere) and it was only settled by Controller of Customs Lamont "who personally superintended the opening and organization of the provisional port of Grand Cess".

41. Cf. Kyne's own conclusions in *L'Echo des Missions*, "dans ce pays le roi pense, parle, agit pour tout le monde et tout le monde doit penser, parler, et agir comme le roi", (52). He had to find his own way back in the rain, across flooded creeks to the boatmen, who then gave blood-curdling accounts of regal life-and-death power, which may account for this statement. It also gives a more flattering view of their failure and justifies Christian interest against such savagery.

42. The term Governor was presumably borrowed from the title of the Governor of Krootown Monrovia, and/or from the Governor of Krootown at Freetown, Sierra Leone. Was that originally a Kru analogy for 'kloba' based also on British explanations of the Governor as the King's representative?

43. R. Horton, "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa."

44. i.e. a variant of the common process of generalising from a particular instance occurs; events 'record' the stereotypes so that they describe the characteristics of the most recent or memorably recent office-holder. Accounts of the kloba's traditional end by hacking to death may only refer to Camla Dugbe's end, (see text and ftn.45 below), which was not, according to the late Tipla Sieh, the "proper" one. There was a kloba for Newtown as for other settlements. The missionaries also knew the 'governor' at Betu, and after several descriptions in *The African Missionary*, at Grand Cess.

45. References to actual governors in the diaries do not fit the stereotype account, which since a variant is given as a piece of lore acquired from Ogé by Herlihy (diary for July 12, 1918) must have become part of the mission-house tradition, so often the real source of 'what people think'. In *African Missionary* articles (VIII, July-August 1915, and XII, Mar.-Apr. 1916) Rev. P. Harrington, SMA, claimed that there had been no governor since 1905. He was by then engrossed in the new mission at Grand Cess and others of his recollections are inaccurate. It may be that opposition to Dugbe had made his tenure ineffective from this time. In the terms of all my informants 1918, not 1917, should be the next date as Caesar's appointment was never mentioned and only Boka is listed as legitimate. (See text).

Though the dates cited for Dugbe are hard to fix exactly, the sequence of actions seems clear enough (Tipla Sieh, for instance, was present at his death, but as a small boy unable to get through the crowd to see it). It is their wider political significance which is not yet fully clear to me. Evidently the years c. 1908-12 were full of crucial events which must be interconnected. According to Tipla Sieh, Camla Dugbe for instance forced the downfall of his predecessor, Jiple Nagbe, who was also opposed to the new settlements.

46. Ogé January 16, 1913, see ftn. 30 above. Kambo himself later tried to be reconciled with Filorkli and went back.

47. A. Massing, "The Kru Culture Area," 43; Sullivan, "Settlers in Sinoe County," 58.

48. The budio could be removed if it was thought his power to ensure fertility was weak, or Jlaow was suffering some failure. Collins records how the command of the oracle Jilople in 1914 to change all the budios was obeyed. The priests were soon writing dismissively about the 'kings' - but by then they had realised their spiritual domain. For Jlaow the office not the holder's personality was important, whereas the klobas are presented as individuals.

49. Collins, diary for October 25, 1914, correcting thereby Harrington (see ftn. 45 above). Gen. Blamo gave the explanation in the text; F. 'Marquis' Nagbe suggested that 'Jimmy' was a generic nickname for seamen. Memories today are of the jimis wan's sabbath-keeping and strict police rule, which contemporary sources suggest as more intense under the 'civilised' paramount chiefs of the early 1920s, but a continuity is clear. Le R.P. Cessou's observations are relevant. Stressing that the mission was largely unwelcome as "strangers", meaning he says people who would take their land, "for the women folk we were strangers for the younger generation - by far the most important - we were decidedly intruders...most of the young people were attached to the Wesleyan station or that of the C.M.S." (African Missionary 1,6 (1914), 7).

50. This was evidently a German-owned vessel that ran the coast from Monrovia to Harper monthly. See Appendix III Shipping.

51. P. Herlihy's diary gives details. See also Appendix III.

52. Annual Report to Propaganda Fide to July 1918; SMAG 16983. Such explanations, though worth noting, and reconciling with shipping evidence (See Appx. III) must always be treated cautiously. Annual reports are everywhere propaganda exercises, and here we have to take into account mission objections to the Liberian government, and the practice of oscillating migration (see text) and their own difficulties and tensions. Similarly the SMA data certainly confirm their own and contemporary oral testimony of hunger and misery, but cannot show how exceptional, how relatively severe, or indeed why it was.

53. Ogé, Annual Report to Propaganda Fide and elsewhere; this bears out oral testimony, but there is no evidence of extra-ordinary attempts to cope with the problem. After 1915 there are no records of delegations to Jilople, which bear out local historians' claims that it was thereabouts that the civilised people stopped recourse to the oracle. Although SMA opposition to sasswood ordeals meant these were hidden from them, a large-scale trial could not be hidden - indeed public openness is a validating feature of sasswood. But they could well have been ignorant of what was going on otherwise.

54. Ogé, January 16, 1913.

55. Collins' diary, December 1914, refers to the "strike" said to be against a Filorkli "young boys" law that their women running to men in the interior should be returned, the men's houses burned. The interior 'queens', (tapnyent) soon came in submission. The data are not appropriate to decide the real character of the dispute, but do suggest both Filorkli attempts to have their town's supremacy recognised and tensions in the 'interior/beach' symbiosis (see text), which always contains the uncomplementary assertion of urban superiority over 'country' ways.

56. This is clear from the details in Collins, who recorded them as they occurred without hindsight. The patterns of intrigue are complicated and allusively recorded. The first war fleet came because Jlaos refused to give up some returned Bolloh krooboyes to their enemy, Nifu (i.e. Talor in alliance with Kabor).

57. See ftn. 23 above. More than one informant has said this about Sharp. It may also be a 'personalised' contrast between the peaceable manner of this first government intervention and its subsequent forcebacked character. Sharp was a force behind church and school development (evidence of e.g. the late J.F. Karpeh, Dec. 1977). LNA sources show that the first officials appointed were not actually working - they probably remained in Sinoe, and commissions were sent from the President on August 9th, 1912, for George M.

Tallowford as Wharfinger and John Togbah as Boarding Master, with recommendations for speed to get the Customs staff complete and operative (LNA Exec. Corrsp. 1905-12, 658/12). Togbah was later promoted and went to Robertsport; for his father see ftn. 25 above. Tallowford lived to be the last surviving mission boy of Rev. Tate. It looks from the diaries as if some of the Customs officials were soon replaced from Sinoe. A persistent but undatable rumour told to me and recounted in more than one SMA source, is of the Liberian Customs official who was met with rough treatment and threats of peppering, so ran straight away; it may mean that Sharp was a second choice to placate Kru feeling.

58. Collins records two such incidents soon after arrival, but no other LFF appearances till 1916.

59. Born in Alsace in 1865 - before 1870 - Ogé was technically stateless and unable, because of his metropolitan non-residence, to get either French or British citizenship (see e.g. Harrington to Slattery, November 24, 1915, SMA Cork, letter file to 1915). The other priests from the SMA French and L'Est Provinces were called up.

60. Both churches had a series of preachers and teachers in Sasstown during the diary period; although the P.E. recommendations of 1865 were not apparently taken up (ftn. 15 above and see also ftn. 25 above) the church became active in Sasstown and a small congregation is there still. c1917/1918 a woman missionary (?Mrs. Langford) briefly operated a girls' school.

61. These actions can be reconstructed in some detail from Government documents, Walter B. Williams and Maude Wigfield Williams' autobiography Adventures with the Krus in West Africa (New York, 1955), and above all from SMA sources, since they had a station in Betu, which is an hour or so away from old Filorkli. The resident priest Fr. O'Hea was in the negotiations throughout, and stayed in the town during the LFF attack. Collins was with him. Apparently the Jlepo agreed that the Fishtown should be burned, (the inhabitants moved out beforehand, storing possessions with friends) and it was also decided that a few Kabor should remain in order that the Jlepo could have fish, yet the attack was justified on the grounds of harboring Kabor. Ogé and his confrères bombarded consular representatives and agencies like the Anti-Slavery Society with reports and demands for Liberian action, but Howard was unrepentant; see text and ftn. 64 below.

62. Collins noted March 20, 1916 that a lieutenant of the Chester told him that they had landed 500 rifles and some 100 rounds of ammunition at Sinoe. This must have been an absolutely crucial addition to the bare resources of the Republic.

63. Collins, February 18, 1916 claims this, saying that Fr. Higgins saw the reply from York. "Ignoble" Sasstown's relations with Kabor were, as I have shown, ambivalent and internally divided. Collins summarizes York, who was essentially saying that compromise positions were no longer possible and the alternatives were complete submission to or outright war with the government. The phrases quoted are said by Collins to be verbatim.

64. Howard's letter to York of March 30, 1916 (LNA unclassified) confirms the report was substantially correct. He claimed to have had "a hearty welcome" at Sasstown but "Fr. O'Hea is still smarting under what you told him about the missionaries and has written me a long complaint". The quotation in the text follows.

Dio and Bolloh were at this time allies as they were both fighting for survival on the beach (Birch to Howard, January 26, 1915 LNA unclassified). Nifu and the Kabors were then enemies.

65. He says nothing of his or other priests' recommending the disarming, though this has been claimed against him. On October 4th the Cando landed many krooboyes. Collins says they were angry to hear that the guns were given up, but expected to replace them.

66. Collins says that government officials made the accusation. In an incomplete copy of the Special Commission's report in the LNA (unclassified) - it does not include e.g. the ringleaders' sentences - "Caesar" only is written for Sasstown though both towns are specified.

67. Collins, who supported Ku Sieh, and generally seems to have sympathised with the Seaboys, describes how his officers were "very fairly and peaceably" elected - six lawyers, two for the seaboys, two for the old bush men and two for Cambotown, secretaries, sergeants and policemen.

68. Collins opens a new volume of his diary in order to write this up in great detail. The several oral accounts I have been given tally closely with his, except in one respect: the instigator in them is Nagbe Gbei Tagbe, 'Pa Harrison', who became Paramount Chief after Boka (see text). This man is also said to have been a leader of the Jimisewan. The name of Caesar was never given to me, though I have one reference to the civilised people wanting a man called Sio for kloba in 1913 (Kru 'civilised' maritime, etc., names were often chosen for their similarity to a Kru original and 1913 would have no canonical status as a date). Gen. Blamo says that Caesar was Tagbe. Herlihy's diary makes it clear that Caesar had died before his arrival (and after Collins' departure on leave), allegedly of hunger, and he has many references to Tagbe, with whom he quarrelled. Collins refers once to Tagbe and tells a story in which he is called "Brother Joseph", but it is clear that the Joseph of the list-making was a Sierra Leone trader (later he acquired Liberian citizenship) who warned his Jlaos to get away before the killing. Collins also describes how when Caesar was arrested by the soldiers and a case held, the judge was "Harrison, an ex-rebel, ex-prisoner, thief, etc." I cannot explain these discrepancies, except by guessing that Harrison Tagbe's later centrality as Paramount Chief, clearly arousing great hostility, clearly in league with the military, gave him retrospectively more importance, whereas Caesar died and became insignificant. It is possible also that Collins' informants over-stressed Caesar's importance and underplayed Tagbe's since the latter was a leader of the Wesleyan enemy, operating from their 'Christian Town'. For the issues I have tried to pick out in this paper, the problem is actually irrelevant, since Caesar and Tagbe had the same characteristics.

69. Collins is blamed by some informants for counselling peace, as he is for supporting the disarmament, so that in 1931 people realised that submissiveness had done nothing for them, and they must fight in order to avoid more such murders. The mission did send complaints to the President, and a report presumably was sent by Capt. Whisnant, who arrived shortly after from Sinoe, angry that he had not been sent for directly, and conducted an investigation.

70. See ftn. 63 above re the same occasion.

71. Herlihy describes the installation on December 3, 1918; on 5th November the King, Nyepan, came to tell the mission of their choice. A grandson of Mei Boka said to me "he was not Government, but Government was here - only it feared to come in". He said that Boka was later arrested and bound in Broh's house; his son-in-law paid the fine demanded by Supt. Tuning, who appointed Tagbe instead. Herlihy describes this on August 1, 1919.

72. Visits become less frequent after this, according to the diaries, from which I have taken the preceding details. Most later Commissioners, though not all, resided in Greenville. Obviously their clerks and the law officers - local residents - were therefore influential.

73. Herlihy's diary entries and oral testimonies tally in the overall picture of the turbulent relations between these chiefs and the traditionalists, in which issues like Sabbatarianism that had been smouldering for years became conflict points, military harassment continued, and the fiercely competing civilised men operated increasingly in Liberian political styles. But there is a significant Jlaó story about one of the main competitors, E.K. Bofford of Newtown, that when the jiwó, the budio's house there was sacked in 1919 (at the time of Boka's deposition) by the civilised people - Herlihy records a report that the soldiers threw all the "fetishes" into the sea - he stole the sacred 'ring' of the kloba, the legitimating regalia, in an unsuccessful attempt to link himself to the true authority. In the same month the jiwon at Nana Kru was "stormed" - "Victory Day" to the Williams' (Adventures with the Kru, 109).

74. Departmental Regulations Governing the Administration of the Interior, No. 28, January 21, 1921, Monrovia (University of Liberia, L.A. Grimes Collection, A960 B661A)

75. See A. Pallinder, "Government in Abeokuta 1830-1914 with special reference to the Egba United Government," thesis, Gotēborg, 1973. The striking difference between the Liberian case and British colonies can be suggested through one exemplary quotation from an administrator in Nigeria, c1900: "those that learn to read and write; those that go to other countries and return here; and especially the men who serve as soldiers and come back to their own districts, are all ready to challenge the authority of the chiefs". (Cited in C.W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and its Rulers (Oxford, 1961), 193). The policies of Indirect Rule supported the traditionalists by supporting the chiefs against the 'civilised', who were always feared as 'agitators' and long excluded from formal power, whereas in Liberia from the start they became assimilated into the ruling class. The difference was not lost on the few European observers of both scenes, who also usually shared the 'trousered ape' syndrome, with its suspicious scorn of educated blacks.

76. For an account of an apparently rather more developed 'Christian Town', New York, at Grand Cess, see M. Fraenkel, "Social Change on the Kru Coast of Liberia."

77. In the period of this paper there were few. Ogé bowed to the competition between the two towns by establishing a mission and church in each. By the end of the war he had more priests than he knew what to do with, but no money to deploy them in new missions, so that in 1918 he was getting the people of Kinekale (in Piknicess) to build a church by their own efforts. Betu was opened in 1914 and Grand Cess in 1915 with resident priests, but Topo, out-station for Grand Cess, and Nrokia, for Sasstown, were only visited by them. After this period many other local congregations built up, but mission members themselves clung for a long time to the beach towns and did not dwell in the interior.

78. Fr. Cessou seems to have started work on this as soon as he came and other priests worked with Jlaó and other Kru helpers to produce the catechism which is the mission's only publication (Lyons, 1929). Kru translated their own hymns from a very early date and all churches of all denominations could conduct services in the vernacular, except for Bible readings. None of the SMA in this period could speak Kru, except possibly B. O'Hea. According to one informant, Walter B. Williams could not do so either.

79. This, like my account of Protestant and Catholic missionary views on labour migration, is based on several remarks in the documentation. Their style suggests that to the priests women were sexually unnerving, though it must be stressed that Herlihy, when he records a proposition, specifically comments that it was unique, the woman offering herself for rice at a time of great hunger.

80. Collins, December 9, 1917, "There seems to be plenty money in town as all rush to buy rice and cloths are at last plentiful." The Egba had just brought 150 boys and "up to a dozen young women came back and walk about in great style". The sin-mass who talked to him was the former wife of the trader, Joseph, which gives an idea of the social and geographical mobility possible to women. Earlier Collins had written and later Herlihy repeated that women were not allowed to go because they would 'run' (i.e. run off with another). In the 20s women and families travelled to Ghana with their husbands.

81. Williams and Williams, Adventures with the Kru, e.g. 84.

82. Men who said that this never happened agreed, when I quoted Biyi, "The Kru and Related Peoples," 185, to the contrary, that it could happen and the diaries confirm both tasks.

83. In getting details of this kind, as I did, from informants, the dates were not always certain but the situations seem likely enough to have recurred. Herlihy commented that women and girls especially seemed to die and the rules of feeding men first, especially with protein - meat and fish - might contribute to this.

84. I hope to discuss the whole topic of being 'civilised' and how this has changed, in a separate paper.

85. The structural view of change that I put forward here, using de Saussure's analogy of the way valeurs change at each move, is, I believe, necessary but insufficient, as I try to suggest by extending the analogy. Since the paper focusses on Sasstown/Jlao and the character of actions there, I have only room to hint at wider events, and I do not discuss movements in the world economy, though I hope it is clear how powerfully they affected Jlao action. It is indeed plausible that if there was a "game" the real players were neither Jlao nor Liberians.

APPENDIX I: LANGUAGE AND ORTHOGRAPHY

1. Kru proper names are spelt either as generally found (or as their owners spell them) or, rather arbitrarily, I have chosen one of the versions current which I think is most nearly phonetic (in the Methodist orthography).

2. I use a modified version of this orthography, ignoring e.g. tone, on each introduction of a Kru word, but generally anglicize it thereafter simply for typographical ease.

3. Single quotations normally indicate Liberian English usage.

4. I have attempted to show the differing range of indigenous and official names on the maps. It is now normal to find the former used when speaking Kru and the latter when speaking English, and it appears to have been the same 1888-1918. I have found through my own experiences that it is all too easy not to realise that different organizational spans and concepts are evoked according to which language is used. Using an example from the paper, those who talked of 'Nifu' and 'Betu' then would be referring to either or both the dakw which at that time occupied the sites, but do not do so now. Once one realises the ambiguity, which would not occur in Kru, this, and many other references become clear. The outsider - nowadays even the non-Kru Liberian insider - makes this sort of mistake. But it is not just a mistake, rather there is a double-faced reality. I have tried to use 'Sasstown' and 'Jlao' to distinguish the two faces. I also use the terminology of my sources, especially where it is not certain what other terms might have been used (e.g. was 'Newtown' commonly called Jekwikpo as it is now? Jekwikpo today covers several earlier settlements. Perhaps it was 'dele kl' lit. New Town). I am sure the categorization of events was affected by the choice of medium and one must remember that all documents depended on the use of a language - English - which was a second language for Jlao and not the language in which most of the events described took place.

5. My sources do not refer to settlers or Americo-Liberians. Outsiders at that time wrote of 'Liberians', speakers today talk of 'the Government' or sometimes of 'the Americans' (also a loanword in Kru). Since these usages could confuse readers I have used terms commonly found in the literature on Liberia.

APPENDIX II: SHIPPING IN 1914-1918 AND THE ECONOMY

Since all discussions of Liberia in World War I turn on the losses to trade and revenue it caused, and these were extremely important for Sasstown, the evidence of the SMA diaries about shipping movements is of interest. The arrival of a ship was always an event in the towns, and as the priests looked yearningly for mail and supplies they recorded even passing ships and surf boats. The figures of ships calling are therefore reasonably dependable though it is not always clear whether they are going 'up' or 'down' (the coast). It did not seem worth checking the names with Elder Dempster, the main but not the only line. The priests unfortunately do not give many details of numbers embarked or disembarked, their provenance (all labourers had to go to a Port of Entry), or their type - 'boys' for contract gangs, 'shipboys' for deckhand, etc., work, 'passenger' paying to travel free-lance for work or education. I am not sure if all entries distinguish 'boats' as surfboats; 'steamers' are usually mailboats.

However, the decline in shipping is perfectly clearly marked, and is set out below. The sources, diaries of John Collins and Patrick Herlihy, do not cover the first half of 1918, so I omit it, but hardly a ship passed in the second half of 1917. Immediately before the war communications, mail and supplies seem to have been easy with the German-run 'Liberian boat' stopping monthly on a run down to Cape Palmas and back to Monrovia. I have not included this in the pre-war figure, though presumably it could have taken intending kroomen to either of these ports. Surfboats employed by the traders for produce could also take passengers.

The decline in ships stopping, therefore, did not entirely stop migration, but Sasstown was of course affected by their overall decline, and even when ships came they did not always embark - or disembark - many. If the captain needed no deckhands, carried no headmen from Freetown looking for extras, if the tax on passengers was thought too high, or customs behaviour was disliked, they might pass on. This happened twice in 1918. Captains could always stop calling and choose to patronize another Port of Entry, and at that time Grand Cess seems to have been preferred.

<u>Year</u> (reckoned from August as this fits diary and war dates)	<u>'Down'</u> <u>Coast</u>	<u>'Up' to</u> <u>Europe</u>	<u>Unclear</u>	<u>Total</u>
8 months 1913 - outbreak of war	6	12	4	22
Y/e 20th August 1915	3	11	5	19
" " 1916	1	3	-	4
" " 1917	2	3	4	9
(" " 1918	-	-	-	-)
" " 1919	1	1	1	3
" " 1920	8	3	4	15

I have not yet seen official Customs' figures for these years, but there is a Revenue Report for 1922 in the National Archives which shows a rapid recovery, in line with oral accounts of the numbers of firms busy in

Sasstown then. Monrovia is the largest Port, Sasstown one of the smallest (except for Marshall and Nana Kru). I therefore give the figures for Monrovia also for comparison. Total accuracy is unlikely, and Grand Cess is not mentioned, while Nana Kru has nil exports in 1920; Sinoe's imports (cp. Sasstown) in 1921 are \$32,000.

	1920	1921	1922 (9 mos.)
EXPORTS Mon.	578.244	396.897	357.877
S.T.	682	5.943	8.264
IMPORTS Mon.	1.241.056	764.677	688.505
S.T.	3.570 ⁵⁰	20.839 ¹¹	17.783 ³³

In this report Sidney de la Rue (Receiver of Customs and Financial Advisor) attacked the policy of restricting trade to Ports of Entry and noted a decrease in England's imports - by far the largest - in favour of Germany and Holland.

There were German traders in Sasstown until the proclamation expelling them reached Sasstown: Collins, July 10, 1917. In June he records how two of them told him that the President had told them publicly to go and privately to stay. At the beginning of the War stores closed, also Jiao boycotted them because of their rising prices. Individual Germans came and went: the last two were recruiters for Fernando Po who were said to have lured people by giving rice on credit and then enforcing the debt. Although I do not consider them men of power in the context of this paper, some of the traders were clearly influential in Sasstown, and, like the irrepressible Max Muller, might extend their connections far along the coast, where they spent many years.

APPENDIX III: SOME NOTES ON SOURCES

1. Oral sources

The paper rests on a great deal of oral data of various kinds, informally collected, interviews, personal observation etc. My finding is that wherever it can be cross-checked Jlaio oral testimony proves to be fair and accurate. It is couched in a personalised idiom, and in formal presentations - in the various modes of Jlaio history-telling - much of the day-to-day record assembled here is not proffered, though where central events of this century are concerned, it can often be recalled. One can also properly use some of the written records, especially the diaries, to contrast matters of interest and gossip then with that which is conserved now even though the writers did not speak Kru and were excluded from most key meetings either deliberately or through their ignorance. They were also isolated from Protestant - chiefly Methodist - church members, (it should be said that their hostility was reciprocated, most of all by expatriate missionaries). For these reasons they relied on their households for information. Herlihy nearly always records his source, very often cook or catechist, unfortunately Collins does not.

2. Written sources

The main sources consulted were the British Public Record Office (PRO), the Liberian National Archives (LNA), the Society of African Missions General Archives in Rome (SMAG), and the Society of African Missions Irish Provinces, Cork (SMA). I have looked at all the holdings of the latter two and discuss them briefly below. In Monrovia I have seen the Methodist Church House archives, which mainly consist of the Reports of Annual Conferences; since these usually contain the District Reports they are a source of useful local detail. I have only made a preliminary search in the archives of the United Board of Missions, Riverside Drive, N.Y.: these would repay examination, especially in relation to Walter B. Williams and the Nana Kru mission.

3. The Society of African Missions

In 1913 the young Irish Province of the SMA was awarded Liberia as its first own mission field and as Sasstown was during this period the headquarters of the mission and thus of the Church in Liberia, the Irish archives and those of the Society's headquarters in Lyons, now in Rome, contain much valuable early documentation. For the background see Edmund Hogan, "The Society of African Missions in Ireland and the Evolution of the Modern Irish Missionary Movement," M.A. thesis, University College Cork, 1973, and "Catholic Missionaries in Liberia," Ph.D. thesis, National University of Ireland, 1977 (this is not on open access but a version covering events to 1950 may be published).

Apart from correspondence, reports etc., the early issues of the Irish Province's magazine *The African Missionary* are largely devoted to Liberia, and there are also first-hand accounts in French counterparts (see footnotes). The diaries cited are all that are held at Cork, though since missionaries were obviously encouraged to keep them it is conceivable that others may exist in private hands. All sources have their biases, and many of the effects of SMA ones have been implied already, but it is perhaps worth stressing that hostility to the rival 'Wesleyans' leads to omissions and distortions even in the intimacy of the diaries.

I do not list either the Catholic or the Methodist missionaries as men of power in Sasstown at this time, because I think they were not, and had less influence than they came to believe. They were used as intercessors, and their authoritative white presence could confer some immunity on suppliants to the military, but their complaints did not affect the government. Williams worked overtly to reconcile Kru to the Republic's power; the documents rarely

say that the priests did so. Indirectly of course both missions were immensely important change-makers through providing schools and raising mission boys, who thus became qualified to change their lives, and very often to leave Sasstown.

I would like to record my gratitude for the hospitable courtesy of the archivists of the SMA and Rev. Dr. E. Hogan, who, like the people of Jlaio, are not responsible for my conclusions.

A KONOBO GROUP IN THE IVORY COAST AND CHRONOLOGY
IN THE KRU CULTURAL ZONE


Joseph J. Lauer
Michigan State University

The migration traditions of the Doo (pronounced with a "long o")¹ can be taken as a point of departure for integrating historical information from south-eastern Liberia and western Ivory Coast. Culturally and linguistically, the Doo are part of the Sapo-Kran-Guéré-Ouobé, who will hereafter be known as the Wee.² Art historians have studied Wee masks since the 1930s, but the history of this area was poorly known until the work of Günter Schröder and Alfred Schwartz.³ Unfortunately, these scholars have generally continued the pattern of neglecting information from the other side of the international frontier. Thus, although there was never any question that the Kran and Guéré formed a single group, Liberianists failed to note the Guéré-Ouobé unity being reaffirmed by Schwartz, even after Schröder demonstrated an analogous Kran-Sapo unit. And some francophone linguists misleadingly use the Cavalla as a divider of dialect groups.⁴ Because of their status as an isolated people whose closest relatives are in Liberia, the Doo and their traditions lend themselves to a study of historical developments on both sides of the Cavalla.

The Doo form a distinct linguistic, cultural, and administrative unit of about 2000 people in western Ivory Coast. Administratively, they are united in a canton ("clan" in Liberian English), which corresponds to the pre-colonial bloa that unified the related members of the different kyê (or lineages) in time of war. Until they were moved to the Guiglo-Taï road in 1934, the Doo lived in numerous hamlets along the Nzo River, about ten to thirty kilometers from its junction with the Sassandra. Although frequently identified with the Wee cantons that surround them, the Doo identify their linguistic relatives as the Kané (Kana), the Gowe (Gobo), and, to a lesser extent, the Kule (Konobo) of Liberia. These four bloa will hereafter be called Eastern Wee. The three bloa in Liberia, plus the more distantly related Twabo and Glaro, are also known as the Central Kran or Konobo.

The Doo traditions of migration and settlement along the Nzo generally take the following lines:⁵

The Doo came from behind the Sassandra, where they had lived in the present country of the Nyabwa.⁷ They decided to leave after many were killed by warriors too powerful to resist.⁸ They all left together and came towards the Nzo. When they arrived at the Nzo, they did not know how to cross in order to escape from their enemies. A "fetischer", or ba gwi o, named Di'i Gao found a large Azobe tree. He told the others to set a fire at the base of the tree. This caused the tree to fall over the river at the rapids known as Fee ko.⁹ The Doo were able to cross the river by walking on this tree. When they reached the other side, they felt safe.



According to the same sources, the Kana and Gobo crossed the Nzo at the same time and place, but fearing further attacks from the east, they continued to the southwest and eventually crossed the Cavalla. The Doo remained behind, settling around the mouth of the Ga when it became obvious that they were safe on the Nzo.

The traditions of the Liberian Kana and Gobo agree with the Doo account of a migration from the east. The Gobo report coming from Nyaya country, east of the Nzo. After an initial stop along the Nsé (?), they continued on to the Cavalla, leaving the "Dobo", or Doo, behind. The Kana are divided into three lineages: the Gbedio who had been joined with the Gobo in a group known as the "Do"; the Doai, who with the Konobo formed the Dao; and the Seiyuo who arrived last. The Konobo also relate an origin east of the Nzo, but their subsequent history was somewhat different. This is in agreement with the Doo view. The Ubi around Tai, whom the Doo consider even more different, came from the Soubré area.¹⁰

More broadly, most of the other Weë recall an eastern or northeastern origin.¹¹ This is especially true for those south of the Cavalla. Many bloa specifically cite an origin at Nya or among the Naybwa. Others record an origin in the savanna northeast of Man, but even some of these relate a migration south to the Guiglo area before turning west. These themes are not, however, universal. More than a few kyë remember only internal migrations or ones at variance with those of the bloa into which they have been integrated. One is, therefore, inclined to conclude that reports of an origin to the northeast are more than just a cliché.


The distribution of Wee dialects offers further support. While the published linguistic data is weak, enough is known to establish a major distinction with the Eastern Wee plus the Twabo and Claro on one side and all the other Wee dialects on the other.¹² If one represented this division on a map with a straight line from around Zwedru through the area just south of Guiglo, one would expect that the division from other Wee occurred somewhere along this line. In fact, Wee traditions indicate that many different groups came from an area that can be described as the northeast extension of the linguistic divide, and the subsequent migrations have led to relatively little interpenetration, except for the Tchien and Gobo. Recently developed information on the relationships between Wee and other Kru languages supports the idea of the zone east of Sassandra as a point of dispersion. The Lobo River, a tributary of the Sassandra, separates Eastern Kru languages from Western Kru languages, with the latter including Wee, Nyabwa and Oubi. On a larger scale, Kru languages are more distantly related to the Gur languages of Upper Volta and northeastern Ivory Coast.¹³ Thus, there is ample linguistic evidence for population movement from the northeast.

The numerous references to a Nya mountain, region or people as the place of origin also suggest a migration from the northeast. The Nyabwa, who call themselves "Nyabo" and speak "Nyabo-ulu", live between the Sassandra and its Lobo tributary. Further northeast, between Vavoua and Zuénoula, Nya is a common Guro ethnic and individual name, generally connected with the territory north of Vavoua. When questioned about their original homeland, Doo informants usually pointed to the region north of the present Guéssabo-Daloa road. This area lacks mountains, and while the historical Nya might well have extended further south, a possible "Mount Nya" cannot be identified.¹⁴ In fact, the name "Nya" was probably attached to a mountain only after a group of people settled in an area where peaks were significant points of orientation.

The tale of how the Doo actually crossed the Nzo is clearly a cliché. Further north, the ancestors of the Zérabaon supposedly crossed the same river on

FIGURE 1

GENEALOGICAL EVIDENCE AMONG THE DOO



Note: Generation 1 was involved in the initial crossing of the Nzo. Birth dates are approximate and for known individuals.

the backs of giant ant-eaters. Surprisingly, neither group remembers any difficulty in crossing the presumably more difficult Sassandra. The Ubi, less spectacularly, crossed the Cavalla on a rock dike at a place known as Kougbalé.¹⁵ Similar stories probably exist elsewhere, and they have more dramatic than historical value, although they do suggest that the number of people involved in any single movement was probably less than 100.

In addition to the geographical information, most traditions are also analyzed for the time of the migration. Genealogies are the most frequently used method for reconstructing the chronology of stateless societies. In four cases among the Doo, informants born in the late nineteenth century were five to seven generations after those involved in the crossing of the Nzo. (See Figure 1.) Assuming an average of thirty years between generations and an average age of 30-40 years for those participating in the initial crossing, one can date the arrival on the Nzo to the mid-eighteenth century.¹⁶


But a closer look reveals problems with this method. In three of the four cases, the ancestor present at the epic crossing was the oldest one remembered. And in the fourth case, the relative shortness of the subsequent genealogy suggests either a late arrival incorporating an older tradition or an error with the common ancestor being given credit for participation. In another two cases within the village of the most intensive research, genealogies going back seven or eight generations did not bring any indication of an ancestor involved in the crossing. Thus, the suggested mid-eighteenth century date would seem to be only a latest possible point in time.

The basic problem is that genealogies are remembered for social reasons, e.g., establishing an individual's position within a kin-group or determining the eligibility of potential marriage partners. As such, a list of ancestors is subject to both falsification and shortening or telescoping, i.e., the elimination of names between the founder's or epic hero's generation and the common ancestor of the exogamous lineage. When only five or six ancestors need be remembered in order to avoid marriage restriction, one can expect shortened genealogies. This might explain why so many migrations are dated to the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. Where the exogamous group is broader, as among the Nidru near Toulépleu, one finds 9-10 generations recorded since the founding migration.¹⁷ Others remember only 6-7 generations, but their migrations were not necessarily more recent than those of the Nidru.

A fairly recent migration apparently has the effect of expanding the number of generations remembered, but rather small exogamous units can promote shorter memories. This leads to situations such as that among the bloa between the Sassandra and the Nzo, where the presumed earliest arrivals in the area either lost all traditions of migration or only mention internal movements.¹⁸

One way to check the time-depth of the Doo migration is through an examination of the subsequent segmentation pattern. Internally, the Doo were divided into two parts: the Kyè-nyè and the Kyè-ta, or the "four families" and the "three families."¹⁹ Each of these two groups is best described as an alliance of families. The formation of these alliances is considered to be the result of a dispute in which the men of the first sought compensation for a wife of Kyè-ta origin.²⁰ Presumably, this took place after the crossing of the Nzo.

The Kyè-nyè is now divided into eight exogamous units, or lineages, known as Kyè-nu (pl., Kyè-nyay). These are further divided into yo, meaning "children." The Gié of Petit Guiglo is now composed of three yo: Kpo-yuo, Do-yuo and Go-yuo. According to one informant, the Gié were originally known as Do-yuo. This yo obviously became a kyè at about the time when the ancestors of the Sie-



gié, who formed one of the four original kyè of the Kyè-nye, divided themselves into two separate kyè. While one part of this new Gié kyè retained the name "Do-yuo", the other part became known as the Kpo-yuo, after its founder. Soon afterwards, another segment split off from the Do-yuo, when Gwa established a separate village. These splits apparently occurred before the mid-nineteenth century as both Kpoyuo and Gwa were great-great-grandfathers of the generations born around 1890.²² This, of course, assumes that the remembered ancestor was really involved in the split.

The original split between Kyè-nyè and Kyè-ta obviously preceded these divisions. How much earlier is impossible to establish, but a mid-eighteenth century date for the crossing of the Nzo does not leave much time for segmentation. This is especially so if one assumes that the original group was fairly small, with the sense of amo due, i.e., "we are the Doo", developing during the period of residence along the lower Nzo.

The reported dates for other Wee migrations are generally consistent with a mid-eighteenth century Doo crossing of the Nzo, but this support is weakened by a similar reliance on genealogies for dating. If the dates of Schwartz are adjusted to allow 30 years per generation, the Zérabaon would have arrived on the west bank of the Nzo by the early eighteenth century. Schröder suggests that the Sapo reached the Cavalla in the mid-eighteenth century and crossed late in the same century,²³ while the Eastern Wee reached the Cavalla early in the nineteenth century.²³ Most traditions record 5-6 generations since migration or the founding of a village, but the Nidru and the Seiyuo family in Liberia report genealogies of 9-10 generations.²⁴ Since there is no evidence that they moved before the others, more carefully preserved genealogies and more intensive scholarly research could explain the difference; and the mid-seventeenth century date for the Nidru arrival on the Cavalla could be equally valid for other migrations.

Closer to the coast, among the Bassa, Kru and Grebo, the recently recorded traditions are tied to genealogies of only 3-6 generations, suggesting even later arrivals in many cases. This apparently conflicts not only with pre-1800 written evidence but also with the traditions recorded in the early nineteenth century, which also reported 3-6 generations since obviously earlier migrations.²⁵ It is possible that different groups were involved, but the use of genealogies for dating is clearly weak.

If one applies glottochronology to the available lexicostatistics, one finds no contradiction with the data from Doo traditions. The Doo crossing of the Nzo came after the Konobo split from the other Eastern Wee but before the division between the Gobo and Kana. Using figures of 93 percent cognates between the last two languages and 87 percent between each of these and Konobo, these two events can be crudely dated to ca. 1650 or earlier and 1800 or earlier.²⁶ Because of the problems with this approach, the most that can be said is that the linguistic evidence gives no reason for rejecting a Doo migration in either the seventeenth or eighteenth century.

If one accepted the hypothesis of an eighteenth century Eastern Wee migration from the area east of the Upper Sassandra, one could find a possible cause either in the invasion of the Vavoua area by Kuya or Waya warriors from the Lakota-Dida region or (less probable) in the Baule expansion into the Bandama basin at the expense of the Guro. But the first appears to have occurred too far north to have affected the Eastern Wee, besides being a bit late. The Baule expansion was buffered by the Eastern Guro, and it had little or no influence on the Western Guro, much less their western neighbors.²⁷

A more convincing explanation for the southwestward movement of the Doo and others is the southward expansion of the Malinke. Seeking to eliminate mid-dlemen in the trade with the forest, Malinke groups began pushing back the Dan as early as ca. 1500; and they occupied the savanna country around Touba and Seguêla, just north of the forest, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Wee migration in the face of such pressure would have been part of the pattern of conflict avoidance that is characteristic of segmentary societies. And it might have coincided with the eastward Guro migrations of the late seventeenth century, when many Guro groups moved out of the Vavoua area. At about the same time, the Malinke were advancing along the forest margin to the Bandama River.²⁸

Pull factors must also be considered. Aside from the normal pattern of movement to less heavily populated areas, the development of trade on the coast apparently attracted in-migration over several centuries. Unfortunately, the European sources are rather weak on population movements within the Kru cultural zone. Unlike other areas which had European forts and agents stationed on shore, trade here was almost entirely in the hands of Africans, and European traders frequently did not even come ashore. The result is a general lack of knowledge about local developments.

The only significant population movement mentioned in the early sources was the Mane invasion of Sierra Leone during the second half of the sixteenth century. The Kru peoples, particularly the ancestors of the Bassa, were apparently involved in this movement as soldiers under Mande leaders. The people at the mouth of the Cess were conquered and re-conquered during the 1545-70 period, but they later regained their independence and continued as an independent state known as the Quabee-Monou. Various visitors between 1601 and 1727 reported a king living a few miles from the mouth of the river. The people in this kingdom were known as Quabee-Monou, and their use of the greetings "Aqui-o" and "Maero" suggests a Kru culture.²⁹

The existence of this state is clearly connected with the trade potential of the area. The Cess River became an important source of pepper for the Portuguese during the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century, rice and ivory rivaled pepper in importance. During the eighteenth century, this port became an important source of both slaves and provisions, especially rice, for passing ships.³⁰

Unfortunately, no direct evidence ties this coastal trade with the people of the interior. Most of the exports such as ivory, rice and pepper probably came from an area within 20 kilometers of the coast. Slaves probably came from only slightly further inland. Barbot's report of stores of kola on the lower Cess might indicate a trade with the distant interior, but the nut could very well have been brought along the coast from Sierra Leone.³¹

Despite this, the prosperity at the mouth of the Cess and along the coast to the southeast was the apparent cause of numerous migrations from the interior. Many of the coastal Kru report an origin in the northeast, and they presumably travelled through the uninhabited territory along the Cess.³² The concentration of the Wee population around Toulêpleu and the area to the northeast, in a line running towards Vavoua, supports the idea of the Upper Cess as a source of population movement.

In general, the prosperity of the coastal states was affected by the terms of trade in the European-dominated "world" economy. While exports formed only a small part of the total production of these societies, the external trade is

the only part of their economy capable of any sort of measurement. By the eighteenth century, if not earlier, slaves were the most important African export. Expanded exports were related to rising American needs for laborers to produce the tropical goods in increasing demand in a modernizing Europe. The increase in slaves landed in America was especially sharp during the 1650-1725 period when the growth rate averaged 2.2 percent per year. This rise was eventually reflected in the West African slave prices which rose steeply at the beginning of the eighteenth century, levelled off and then reached a new high around 1735-1740 before slumping again.³³

The effect rising demand had on prices for slaves at the mouth of the Cess has not been established, but high prices elsewhere did bring an increase in European trade along the "Windward Coast" (modern Liberia and Ivory Coast). Most of the "Windward Coast" slaves came from Cape Lahou or Cape Mesurado, and the Kru peoples were only marginally involved. The British were the major exporters, but no details are available on their slave exports from the Kru sector. The Dutch became active in the 1740s when they exported 10-20,000 slaves from the Cess-Cape Palmas coast. Subsequent Dutch exports from this sector declined to around 5500 during the 1750s, 2500 during the 1760s and 1770s, 1000 during the 1780s, and virtually none thereafter.³⁴ The apparent mid-century spurt in exports might have been caused by a change in demand when the Dutch restrictions against private traders were lifted, or it might have been the result of wars in the Kru zone. In any case, the increased Africa-wide trade also heightened the demand for the rice supplied by the Kru coast.

While the impact of these developments on the interior is unclear, the coastal trade can explain the direction of migrations. Most 1600-1800 sources report much more activity between Cess and Cape Palmas than along the Cape Palmas-Sassandra coast. These impressions are corroborated by a sample of slaves taken by the Dutch between 1741 and 1792, when over three times as many came from the Cess-Cape Palmas coast.³⁵ The greater economic activity in this area almost certainly attracted people who could just as easily have migrated to a more eastern zone. Thus, one has an external reason for Wee movement to the west and southwest rather than to the south or southeast.

In conclusion, the traditions gathered among the Doo in the Ivory Coast do agree with the oral and linguistic data collected by others among the Eastern Kran. Various types of information support the idea of a northeastern origin, although references to a *Nya* mountain are probably clichés, and the greater economic activity along the coast west of Cape Palmas would explain why people were drawn to the southwest. But the genealogies used to date this and other migrations to the mid-eighteenth century are suspect since most societies in the area had no reason to remember more than 6 or 7 generations of ancestors. Malinke pressure and the prosperity of the Kru coast could explain a seventeenth century migration, but there are also valid reasons for later movement and an eighteenth century date cannot be dismissed. The relationships between the Kru Coast slave trade, the apparent eighteenth century decline of a state on the lower Cess, and movements in the interior are a subject worth further investigation.

FOOTNOTES

1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 6th Annual Liberian Studies Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, May 1974.

In their own language, the Doo call themselves *Duē* (sing., *Do*). "Doo" is used throughout because it has become conventional, following usage among the northern neighbors of the Doo.

Doo traditions were gathered during research on the twentieth-century spread of economic innovations in the western Ivory Coast. This research was supported by Carnegie funds administered by the Comparative World History program of the University of Wisconsin - Madison. The usual disclaimers apply. For further details, consult Joseph J. Lauer, "Economic innovations among the Doo of western Ivory Coast, 1900-1960" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973).

2. This unit is here called Wee because at least those between the Cavalla and the Sassandra call themselves Wè or Wee-nyo. For further details, see Svend E. Holsoe and Joseph J. Lauer, "Who are the Kran/Guéré and the Gio/Yacouba? Ethnic identifications along the Liberia-Ivory Coast border," African Studies Review, XIX (1976), 143-5.

3. See especially Alfred Schwartz, Tradition et changements dans la société Guéré (Paris, 1971) and Günter Schröder and Dieter Seibel, Ethnographic survey of southeastern Liberia: the Liberian Kran and the Sapo (Newark, DE, 1974).

4. Philippe Lafage, "Les langues Kru," in Conseil International de la Langue Française, Inventaire des études linguistiques sur les pays d'Afrique noire d'expression française et sur Madagascar (Paris, 1978), 90, and Lynell Marchese, Atlas linguistique kru: essai de typologie (Abidjan, 1979), 13-16.

Exceptions to this generalization are linguists operating out of Liberia. See Frances Ingemann, "Kruan languages in Liberia," paper presented to the Mid-America Linguistic Conference, 1972, 107-113; and William E. Welmers, "The Kru languages: a progress report," in Language and Linguistic Problems in Africa, edited by Paul F. A. Kotey and Haig Der-Houssikian (Columbia, S.C., 1977), 353-62. Andreas Massing, "Economic Developments in the Kru Culture Area" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977), 27, 329-33, uses the Cavalla as a linguistic boundary, but he does integrate other developments from both sides of the frontier.

5. Lafage, "Langues Kru," 90, and Welmers, "Kru Languages," 358.

6. The most complete version was given by Bohè Julien, Ditroudra-Béoué, at Zoglo, 13 July 1971. Informants are cited by village, place of interview (when different), and date.

7. Bohè Julien called the country of origin Meno or Melo. The people there reportedly spoke Doo, Nyabwa, Wopé (Ouobé), and "Djula".

According to Schwartz, the Doo once formed part of the "Bouloulou group" with the Nyabwa, and they continue to speak the language of their country of origin, "La mise en place des populations Guéré et Wobé," Cahiers ORSTOM, sér. Sciences humaines, VI, no. 1 (1969), 16. I did not find any Doo informants who would confirm these points, and the linguistic information appears to be the hypothesis of a Northern Wee interpreter who was trying to explain why the language of the Doo was incomprehensible to him. See Andreas Massing, "Materials for a history of western Liberia: the Belle," Liberian Studies Journal, III (1970-71), 177, for the "Bouwu" as a Nya group that included the Gbobo as well as numerous other Wee and non-Wee peoples.

8. Some informants described this event as a war with the Bété or Nyabwa.

9. These rapids are a few kilometers upstream from the mouth of the Ga, near the present village of Zoglo, which is a newly created settlement of Doo who left their villages along the road.

10. Schröder and Seibel, Ethnographic Survey, 44-50; Bohumil Holas, Mission dans l'Est Libérien (Dakar, 1952), 126; Tiesse Ayemou Noé, "Monographie de la Sous-préfecture de Taï", ms. in Archives of Sous-Préfecture of Taï, 14 May 1969, 1.

11. Schwartz, Tradition, 47; Schröder and Seibel, Ethnographic Survey, 21ff.

12. See Ingemann, "Kruan Languages," 111-113.

13. Welmers, "Kru Languages," 356; Lafage, "Langues Kru," 90-91; Marchese, Atlas linguistique kru, 13-16; Pierre Vogler, "Le problème linguistique Kru: éléments de comparaison," Journal de la Société des Africanistes, XLIV (1974), 173-4; Patrick R. Bennett and Jan P. Sterk, "South Central Niger-Congo: a reclassification," Studies in African Linguistics, v. 8 (1977), 272.

14. M. de Lavergne de Tressan, Inventaire linguistique d'Afrique Occidentale Française et du Togo (Dakar, 1953), 137; Ariane Deluz, Organisation sociale et tradition orale: les Guro de Côte d'Ivoire (Paris, 1970), 123, 145, 164.

There is a "Mont Nia" some 35 kilometers west of Guiglo (or in the wrong direction for the Doo), but it is an undistinguished peak of 703 meters in an area of higher ones. Among the Klao and Sapo of Liberia, there are analagous traditions pointing to an origin near Mt. Jede. See Massing, "Economic Developments," 99.

15. Schwartz, "mise en place," (1969), 5; Noé ms., 1; Holas, Mission, 156; Ronald W. Davis, Ethnohistorical Studies on the Kru Coast (Newark, DE, 1976), 173.

16. Kati elders, 26 June 1971; Yao Jean, Gnontous, and Gahoué Leon of Petit-Guiglo, on numerous occasions; Bohé Julien, Ditroudra-Béoué, at Zoglo, 13 July 1971; Goué Gabriel, *ibid.*, 14 July 1971.

Schwartz (Tradition, p. 49n) used an average generation of 25 years, but this appears to be too low even for the twentieth century. And all informants assured me that previously marriage was even later. Other sources suggest 30-35 years for non-Muslim societies in this area. See Yves Person, "Tradition orale et chronologie," Cahiers d'études africaines, II, no. 7 (1962), 473-4; Deluz, Organisation sociale, 117-20.

17. See Schwartz, Tradition, 121, for marriage restrictions.

18. Deluz, Organisation sociale, 120-1; Schwartz, Tradition, 46-51. A Blaon informant recited, for Schwartz, 17 generations since the migration to the area, but this is exceptional.

Although Schwartz records the Niaho, Fleo and Zaha as originating in the Guiglo area, others suggest an eastern origin. See Viard, Guérés, 16n; Vouho Paul, at Guiglo, 18 August 1971.

19. The existence of similar names for basic divisions among the Gobo and the Tchien should caution against too literal an interpretation of these phrases. See Holas, Mission, 138-43; Schröder and Seibel, Ethnographic Survey, 45.

20. Bohé Julien, Ditroudra-Béoué, at Zoglo, 13 July 1971, and others. Since most wars are attributed to disputes over women, this explanation could be a cliché.

See Schwartz, Tradition, 34-5, for the tkè as a clan or major patrilineage among the Western and Northern Wee.

21. Schwartz, "Mise en place," 16; Bahié Robert and Blai François, Petit Guiglo, 20 January 1971; Gahouè Léon, Petit Guiglo, 4 May 1971.
22. Gahouè Léon, 4 May 1971; Bao Paul family, May 1971, Gouè Etienne, 29-30 July 1971; Téré Victor, 19 June 1971; Weh Jean 30 July 1971.
23. Schwartz, Tradition, 50, and Schröder and Seibel, Ethnographic Survey, 25-6.
24. Schwartz, Tradition, 50, and Schröder and Seibel, Ethnographic Survey, 51 and 57.
25. William Siegmann, Ethnographic Survey of Southeastern Liberia: Report on the Bassa (Robertsport, 1969), 4; Davis, Ethnohistorical Studies, 21, 180; James M. Connelly, "Report of the Kroo people," in United States Senate, Executive Document No. 75 (Serial No. 562), (Washington, 1850), 58; Maryland Colonization Journal, April 1844, 159-160.
26. Data from Ingemann, "Kruan Languages," 111-112. Formula of $t = \log$ of cognates over twice the log of r , with $r = .805$ and $t =$ minimum millennium of separation, from R. B. Lee, "The basis of glottochronology," Language, 29 (1953), 115. Since the various dialects continued to be in contact and the model of a perfect segmentary society implied in these calculations is false, the age of the split is probably earlier than stated. Ben Blount and R. T. Curley suggest using $t = \log C$ over $1.411 \log r$, which would increase the estimated lengths of separation to at least 240 and 450 years, "The Southern Luo Languages: a glottochronological reconstruction," Journal of African Languages, 1970, 7-8.
27. Yves Person, "Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre dans le cadre de l'histoire ouest-africaine," Bulletin de l'Institut Français de l'Afrique noire, v. 23 (1961), ser. B., 57; Ariane Deluz, "Un dualisme africain," in Jean Pouillon and Pierre Maranda, eds., Echanges et communications mélanges offert à Claude Levi-Strauss à l'occasion de son 60ème anniversaire (The Hague, 1970), 784; Deluz, Organisation sociale, 18-19.
28. Yves Person, Samori (Dakar, 1968), 74-5, 103-4; Deluz, "Dualisme," 784; Yves Person, "Le Soudan nigérien et la Guinée occidentale," in Hubert Deschamps, ed., Histoire generale de l'Afrique noire (Paris, 1970), I: 284.
29. Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545 to 1800 (Oxford, 1970), 48ff; John Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea (London, 1732), 98, 124, 128, 131; Pieter de Marees, Beschryvinghe end Historische Verhael van het Gout Koninckrijck van Gunea, edited by S. P. L'Honoré Naber (The Hague, 1912; Amsterdam, 1602), 14; Otho Friedrich von der Groeben, Voorname scheeps-togt. . . na Guinea. . . gedaan in het jaar 1682. . . (Leyden, 1710), 24; Godefroy Loyer, "Relation du voyage du royaume d'Issiny," in Paul Roussier, ed., L'Etablissement d'Issiny, 1687-1702 (Paris, 1935), 149-50; John Atkins, A voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West Indies (London, 1735; Cass, 1970), 62; Samuel Braun, Schiffarten (1624), edited by S. P. L'Honore Haber (The Hague, 1913), 39n; William Smith, A New Voyage to Guinea (London, 1744; Cass, 1967), 106; Dralsé de Grandpierre, Relation de divers voyages... (Paris, 1718; Hachette microfiche, 1972), 126ff. See also Person, "Ethnic movements and acculturation in Upper Guinea since the Fifteenth Century," African Historical Studies, IV (1971), 669-689; P.E.H. Hair, "An ethnolinguistic inventory of the lower Guinea coast before 1700," African Language Review, VIII (1969), 226-7.
30. Davis, Ethnohistorical Studies, 71-6; William Bosman, A new and accurate description of the coast of Guinea (London, 1667; Amsterdam, 1704), 482; Dralsé, Relation, 126, 159; Atkins, Voyage, 62; Johannes Postma, "The origin of

African slaves: the Dutch activities on the Guinea Coast, 1675-1795," in Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere: Quantitative Studies, edited by Stanley Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese (Princeton, 1975), 33-49.

31. Barbot, Description, 132.

Eighteenth-century slaves probably did not come from as far inland as Koelle's nineteenth century informants, who were enslaved at a time when prices were higher. For hints about their origin, see Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp, Geschichte der Mission der evangelischen Bruder auf den caraibischen Inseln S. Thomas, S. Croix und S. Jan (Barby, 1777), 344, with P.E.H. Hair, "Collections of vocabularies of western Africa before the Polyglotta: a key," Journal of African Languages, V (1966), 213ff.

32. Andreas Massing, "Socio-political relations among the Kru groups prior to integration into the Liberian state," paper presented at the 4th Annual Liberian Studies Conference, Kalamazoo, May 1972, 4-5, notes one set of traditions dated to about the seventeenth century. See also Davis, Ethnohistorical Studies, 173 and passim.

33. Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: a Census (Madison, 1969), 266-7 and passim; Richard Nelson Bean, The British Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1650-1775 (New York, 1975), 159; Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa (Madison, 1975), 331.

34. Postma, "Origin," 44-7; Adam Jones and Marian Johnson, "Slaves from the Windward Coast," Journal of African History, v. 21 (1980), 17-34.

35. Postma, "Origin," 47.

36. Davis argues plausibly that the mouth of the Cess River was closed off by sand during the eighteenth century. See Davis, Ethnohistorical Studies, 76.

MATERIALS FOR A HISTORY OF WESTERN LIBERIA: SAMORI AND
THE MALINKE FRONTIER IN THE TOMA SECTOR

Andreas W. Massing

Those who have done fieldwork in Lofa County, Liberia, could not fail to notice the large colonies of Malinke usually living in particular quarters of the villages of the original population. Those who have collected information on oral history probably have also heard the allegations that most of these Malinke immigrated into the area at the time of the 'great chief' Samori. The origin and development of the advancing frontier of the Malinke in the forest fringe inhabited by the Toma,¹ which contributes much to our understanding of later history and present social structure, shall be traced in this paper. It shall be shown that the penetration of Malinke into the Toma sector antedates the time of Samori even though his conquests and their aftermath led to an increased flow of Malinke peoples toward the south. Beside the Toma-Malinke dualism, another dualism is much older than the Samorian empire, namely that between animists and faithful Muslim. This even opposed different parts of the Malinke who are generally believed in Liberia to be believers of the Islamic faith, and accounted for some of the alliances found between Toma and Malinke.

THE TOMA AND THEIR SETTING

The Toma inhabit at the same time the edges of the Malinke plateau and the northern fringes of the great coastal forests. The population is dispersed in the mountain valleys of the headwaters of the rivers running from the Malinke plateau toward the coast and is divided into numerous territories of varying sizes and population densities. These territories are usually under the control of a dominant lineage which integrates the population into a unit with common history and cultural traditions. The political unit corresponding to such a territory is denoted as kafu among the Malinke and as zu among the Toma.²

Yves Person distinguished the following Toma territories together with their ruling lineages (-wo or -wogi, also -vogi):³

1. Northern Toma
 - 1.1 along the upper Lofa River
Wotumay: Sovogi
Ulyamay: Zumanigi
Viginamay: Onivogi at Sampuyara, Zumanigi at Beoramay
Apawarya: Onivogi at Koromai
 - 1.2 between Makona and Boya Rivers
Uzyamai: Koivogi at Krima
Orozyaro, Bayama, Zyaro, Uruzyoka
 - 1.3 Baizya sector
Zyaozu: Gilavogi
Zamazu: Gilavogi
Anamai: Onivogi

- 1.4 right bank of Makona River
Wotamai, a regroupment of Dambu, Wotuwey and Wolimey
Gerengerenka: Gilavogi at Selenka, Gwepogi at Bofoso
Dawabu
- 1.5 left bank of Makona River
Nyinibu: Zumanigi
Zyaerozu: Beavogi and Gilavogi
Mazama: Gilavogi at Bezegrega, Beavogi at Bobokoza
Fasaro or Farakoro: Zumanigi at Uruezu, Koivogi at Ndeleu
Ugbamai (or Wubomai): Koivogi
Fukuluma: Gilavogi
Varamisamai: Gilavogi
- 1.6 between Lofa and Kaiha Rivers
Beuma: Koyvogi
Koodu-Bokoni (or Kamaro)
Gbuni (or Gbunde)
2. Southern Toma
- 2.1 Ziamai (Buziê in Malinke): Gilavogi, Beavogi, Bilivogi, Koivogi
Koimai (or Waimar): Bilivogi
Vekemai: Gilavogi
Briamai
Gbunde

During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Malinke lineages from the Konian, the plateau between the Milo and Sankarani Rivers, began to infiltrate the Toma, to a greater or lesser extent. The political, as well as spiritual, center of the Konian, was Musadu which had been founded in the sixteenth century by Ferendugu Kamasi.⁴ Ferendugu Kamasi or Feren Kama was the ancestor of the twelve Kamara lineages which dispersed from Musadu over the Malinke plateau and also penetrated the forests to the south. Musadu itself was not settled by the Kamara lineages but became a religious center inhabited by Muslim traders (dyula) and teachers (marabu).⁵ One of those Muslim families, the Dolê, is reported to have ruled Musadu for the Kamara, and is further accredited with the foundation of Bopolu at the time of Zolu Duma.⁶

The other Kamara lineages, as well as lineages of the Kone and Kuruma, gradually mixed with the Toma with whom they traded products from the Sudan against forest products such as kola. During the nineteenth century, these Toma settlements were integrated into the larger political design of Malinke society which was created by such state builders as Mori Ulê and Sere Boureima Cisse or Samori Touré. The main Malinke kafu and lineages which were in constant exchange with the Toma were:

1. Mandougou (between upper Makona and Baoulé Rivers): clan of Fen Semenesi, one of Feren Kama's sons.
2. Dulama (between Makona and Maseni Rivers), which was to dominate the Toma kafu of Nyinibu and Zyaerozu.
3. Kolibirama: its ruling lineage also descended from the Fen Semenesi and mixed intimately with the Toma group of Wibaramai. Their neighbors of Fukuluma and Varamisamai are still exclusively Toma.
4. Northern Koadu (Toma: Koodu): governed by the same Fen Semenesi as the Kolibirama.

5. Western Koadu: ruled by the Minatasenesi lineages and taken from the Toma in the nineteenth century.
6. Southern Koadu: ruled by the Fandyarasi who are close relatives of those of the Buzié. The kafu is called Woniguomai in Liberia.
7. Gbuni: a Malinke enclave on Liberian territory and there referred to as Waingolomai. The Gbuni is ruled by the Fen Blemasi lineages which are also found in the northern Buzié and other kafu.
8. Kononkoro (on the headwaters of the Lofa, St. Paul and Milo Rivers): ruled by the Semamfilasi lineage. In its southern mountains, some dispersed pure Toma groups can still be found which fled there during the nineteenth century.
9. Buzié (Toma: Ziamai) on the right bank of the St. Paul (Diani): ruled by the lineage of the Fandyarasi.

Certain historical alliances existed between Malinke and Toma groupings, such as that between the Buzié and the Wibaragay. During the nineteenth century, these alliances permitted the Malinke states to penetrate the remote Toma mountains. It appears that the emerging reformers of Islam in the nineteenth century were at the origin of the renewed expansion of the Malinke. Before that time, the faithful followers of Islam had lived in Muslim villages in relative isolation from the animist masses and had confined themselves to contacts as traders or occasionally healers. These faithful Muslim in the south were among the main followers of those Malinke leaders who invoked the spirit of the holy war in order to build the territorial states which were among the foundations of the Samorian empire.

THE PRECURSORS OF SAMORI

One of these leaders, Mori Ule Cisse, founded such a small state following a holy war around 1835 in the vicinity of Madina.⁸ However, following an unsuccessful campaign in which Mori Ule lost his life, his state disintegrated quickly as the animist Malinke rejected the concept of jihad as a means of spreading Islam amongst them.

Mori Ule's son, Sere Burley, resumed his father's work expanding the state of Madina into the lands between the Dion and Milo Rivers. In his campaigns, Samori distinguished himself and was made sentigi, i.e., headman of a group of warriors. Ultimately, Sere Burley's design failed due to the continued resistance of the animist Malinke to orthodox Islam. He died during the siege of Kurukoro, Konian, in 1859 when he tried to crush a local revolt. His undefeated army returned to Madina where his brother Sere Boureima assured himself first of the support of the local Malinke groups before he turned south to revenge his brother's death. Here all the Malinke lineages had supported the revolt with the exception of Musadu where Sugba Doré, the chief, was the head of the Muslims in the Konian and the main intermediary for the Kamara. Sugba Doré sent his son Vafing Dolé - the Vomfee Dolla in Benjamin Anderson⁹ - to Sere Boureima Cisse - Anderson's Blamer Sissa and the Sissy who sent a delegation to Monrovia in 1880¹⁰ - and offered the submission of the Konian. Sere Boureima accepted to spare the population if they would pay him tribute and went to Musadu where the submission celebrations of the former rebels against his brother were held. As a political gesture toward the Kamara whom he hoped to win as allies, he married the daughter of Vafin Doré, the religious leader of the Islamized Malinke. At the same time, he swore to respect the "customs of Feren Kama" and guarantee the cultic freedom

of the animists.¹¹ Those Kamara who still remained in opposition against the Cisse were brought into submission by Samori, then a loyal vassal of the Cisse, between 1861 and 1864.¹²

With the growing local importance of Samori grew the suspicion of his overlord, however, and in 1865 Sere Boureima had Samori's fiefdom conquered and many of his people sold into captivity. The remainder escaped with their young leader into the southern mountains of the Kononkoro which were inhabited by Toma groups. On the other hand, remnants of the animist Malinke, which had not been overcome between 1861 and 1864 fled to the mountain of Gbankundo where they rebuilt their opposition to Sere Boureima under the leadership of Saghadyigi Kamara.¹³ In 1867, Saghadyigi rallied the animist Kamara while Samori expelled the Cisse troops from the Konian. At this point, the Dorè at Musadu broke with the Cisse and the entire Konian rallied with Saghadyigi.¹⁴

Several months before the Liberian Anderson made his journey to Musadu, the following affair had confronted the three parties near the Dorè capital. Samori had demanded from one of Vafin Dorè's villages the restitution of one of his female relatives who had eloped with a young man. The village had refused and had asked Vafin Dorè for assistance. Vafin Dorè, however, was beaten by Samori and hastily retreated to Musadu from where he sent an excuse to Samori, stating that he had thought to confront Saghadyigi but not Samori, a faithful believer of Mohammed. When Saghadyigi heard this, he was infuriated and laid siege to Musadu in February 1868.¹⁵ Thereupon, the Muslims of Musadu sent a delegation to Sere Boureima requesting help. Since most of Sere Boureima's troops were deployed in the Wasulu, only a small party was sent for the relief of Musadu. This party managed to enter the town but was soon thereafter also besieged by Saghadyigi's troops and had to negotiate for an escape. Saghadyigi demanded a heavy payment of tribute before he would end the siege of Musadu and the citizens of Musadu were required to collect it. Dissatisfied with the protection by Sere Boureima, who was the son-in-law of their chief, the population of the town pressed Vafin Dorè to recognize the leadership of Saghadyigi and demand his protection rather than that of the Cisse.¹⁶

When this was done, Sere Boureima whose troops had returned from the campaign in the Wasulu prepared to punish Musadu. He was expected before the town at any moment when Anderson arrived there in December 1868 and was greeted with great hopes since the citizens of Musadu counted on military assistance from the Liberians at the coast.¹⁷ Apparently, Sere Boureima did not appear thereafter, at least not as an enemy, but sent some occupational troops under his general, Da Sidi, which were to guarantee Musadu's safety.¹⁸ Only much later in 1873 did Saghadyigi return to Musadu which had asked for protection.¹⁹

In the meantime, Samori and Saghadyigi had become rivals in the Konian due to the religious affiliations of their allies: while in the Kononkoro in 1865, Samori had assisted the local chief Kane Mamfin against the chief of the Buzié, Dyankan Kamara,²⁰ who had captured Samori's brother in one of his raids of the Kononkoro. Samori had attempted to exchange his brother against some war captives from the Konian, but the local chief there refused to exchange a Moslem captive against an animist and called the Buzié chief. The latter, who belonged to the same lineage as Saghadyigi, that of Fatuma Ulé Sy, called in Saghadyigi. Both forced Samori to give up the siege of the village where his brother lived in captivity.

Around 1867, Dyankan Kamara had died and his son, Kama Tiékura had become chief of the Buzié. He at once concluded an alliance with Saghadyigi for the conquest of the Ziamas whose capital Busedu was destroyed in 1867.²¹ Tiékura could also rally to his side Vafin Dorè, who had completely broken with Sere Boureima Cisse. In the following years, the united armies of Tiékura and Vafin Dorè at-

tempted to conquer the western and southern Toma districts, the Koadu and the Koima. In the Koadu, Tiékura's successes were only shortlived; and in the Koima, where the old enemy of his father, Daoronya Bilivogi, was chief, effective occupation could only be achieved in a few places such as at Dendano, where one of Saghadyigi's cousins, Tiéba Ulé, commanded a garrison.²³ While Kama Tiékura tried to expand the Buzié into the Toma mountains, Saghadyigi conquered the Kamara districts in the eastern Konian and Samori assembled his empire in the north and northwest. Samori's attention was focused on the war against Sere Boureima whose state was finally destroyed in 1881. Only then was Samori able to turn south again where, in the meantime, new developments in the Toma sector had taken place which required his attention.

EVENTS IN THE TOMA SECTOR UNDER SAMORI

A brief overview of the political situation around 1870 will help the reader to better understand the developments in the Toma sector which took place between 1870 and 1895. Unfortunately, these twenty-five years are only poorly documented and will require additional research, in particular among the different Toma kafu in Liberia and Guinea.

In the Ziama, which was faced with recurrent Malinke campaigns from the Buzié during the 1870's, Meazey Koyvogi was the main chief. In the neighboring Koadu chief Begby,²⁴ the uncle of Bongo Morigbe, held out at Bakedu against occasional raids from the Buzié. In the Gbuni to the south, the recognized chief was the father of Vafele Koli.²⁵ For the Koima (Waimar) Daoronya Bilivogi was mentioned as the ruler who stopped the southward expansion of the Malinke. Apparently, Momolu Son tried to mediate in one of the disputes between the Toma and the Buzié when Anderson travelled through Toma country in 1868, and was escorted through the Koima by chief Daoronya.²⁶ Further to the south, in the border area of the Toma and Kpelle, the Vavala - the sectigg which formerly included the Gizima²⁷ - was ruled from Kpaye by chief Kryneseh. The Kolibirama (Wibaragai) was under the Gilavogi, whose head chief also controlled the Varamisamai and Fukuluma sections.²⁹ This chief, Kolubanya, was an ally of the Kamara of the Buzié against the southern Toma since the Gilavogi were engaged in a dispute of long standing with the Koyvogi.

When Kolubanya died in 1877, he failed to have any natural successors so that the succession in the Kolibirama had to be decided by the elders of the territory. They gave the chieftancy to Samase Kamara of the Masenesi branch of the Kamara who was an ally of the Koyvogi of Dorodugu. The Gilavogi relatives of Korubanya were infuriated at this selection, and called in Gborozye Kamara who had succeeded to the chieftancy of the Koadu in 1870.³⁰ Since the lineage of Samase had formerly been a minor branch of Gborozye's lineage, the latter aspired to the reestablishment of the old hegemony of the Fadū.³¹ When Gborozye gradually got the better of Samase Bakari Kuruma, adoptive son of Korubanya and founder of the commercial town of Macenta, he called on Samori to intervene.³²

The growing strength of the Gilavogi in the Kolibirama induced Zegbenya Koyvogi, the head of the Koodu, to strengthen his alliance with Meazey Koyvogi of the Ziama. They even threatened Kama Tiékura to take revenge for the last ten years of raids and incursions.

In 1883, Samori and Saghadyigi, whose former rivalry had developed into irreconcilable enmity, finally resolved the conflict by means of arms, and Saghadyigi was killed after several months of siege on Mount Gbankundo.³³ Immediately after the fall of his Kamara lord, Kama Tiékura rallied to Samori and requested his help against the Koyvogi of the Ziama and Koodu. While he was interested in the regulation of the succession problems in the Kolibirama, Samori eschewed any involve-

ment with Tiékura in the Toma sector. Whether Samori gratefully remembered the Toma hospitality in the Kounoukoro during his escape from Sere Boureima Cisse in 1865, or whether he wanted to take revenge on Kama Tiékura for his 'wait and see' attitude during the confrontation with Saghadyigi, he refused to support Tiékura's Toma campaigns and also left the Koima to itself.³⁴ However, he made his old ally Nyama Kamara head of the Konian and sent his son, Kyele Kamara, with a column of sofa warriors into the Kolibirama. Another column was sent there under Koto Alama, Samori's general. These devastated the Fadu and eliminated Gborozye Gilavogi and his lineage from the political scene. Even Korubanya's relatives had to recognize Samase Kamara as chief of the Kolibirama. The Koadu was subjected by Ze Asangbe and the Dylama by chief Manyan Dyiiba Kamara and his Toma allies from the Zyaerozu.³⁵

The newly reunited Kamara created strong apprehensions among their old Toma enemies, the Koyvogi of the Ziamai and the Koodu. Subagize Onivogi, nephew and successor of Zegbenya Koyvogi since 1880, formed an alliance with Meazey Koyvogi and a certain Nyenenko Koyvogi, who had established for himself the new Ugbamai (Wubomai) chiefdom between the Lofa and Makona Rivers.³⁶ Nyenenko, a native of Vonjama, built his residence at Selenka³⁷ from where he tried to unite his fragmented chiefdom which was limited in the west by the Bande and in the south by the Bonde. The Kamara under Kyele, Ze Asangbe and Bakari Kuruma tried to conquer the small chiefdom but suffered a humiliating defeat at Bokoni in 1884.³⁸ Kyele Kamara had to personally visit Samori in 1886 and pressure the almami to consent to the destruction of the Ugbamai with the assistance of his troops before sufficient reinforcements were obtained to begin a new campaign against Nyenenko. Troops from several parts of the south of Samori's empire met before Selenka. Samori's cousin Sirifaana Arama commanded Malinke sofas, Maafele appeared with Kuranko warriors, and Kisi Kaba from the Farmaya came with Kissi and Kuranko warriors. The Toma of the Koodu who opposed the Koyvogi sent a contingent under Bongo Morigbe, nephew of Begby. Despite this concentration of troops, Selenka was not taken until September 1886, when Nyenenko was given the assurance of safe conduct if he should surrender, but was later killed during the peace ceremonies.³⁹ Following the fall of Selenka several additional Toma kafu now submitted to the almami such as the Mazama under Veve Gilavogi, The Fasaro (Farakoro) under Wanigo Zumanigi, and the Dawabu on the right bank of the Makona under Koli Onivogi from Nyagezazu.⁴⁰ The Ugbamai itself became the theatre of intensive colonization by Malinke, which explains their majority in this chiefdom at the present time.⁴¹ Bongo Morigbe was rewarded for his assistance with the chieftainship of the Ugbamai. Only a few fragmented groups north of the Makona still remained independent, and the young chief, Koko Onivogi, of the Baizya, organized a fierce resistance against Kisi Kaba when he returned from Selenka.⁴²

In the meantime, Samori had taken a less drastic course against the southern Toma who continuously had revolted against the Buzié. Already in 1883, when Saghadyigi was under siege at Gbankundo, the Ziamai chiefs Yarawey Beavogi of Sondemai, Bada Bilivogi of Busedu and the latter's son Yagbo had decided to throw off the yoke of Kama Tiékura. They attacked Kuonkan, capital of the Buzié, in 1884 despite Tiékura's conversion to Samori's holy war. The attack was repelled, however, and Busedu was destroyed for the second time in twenty years.

In the Koima, Samori had contacted Daoronya and promised him protection from Kama Tiékura for his recognition of Samori's overlordship. From that time on, Daoronya Bilivogi paid tribute directly to the almami, who allowed him to rebuild the villages on the west bank of the Diani (St. Paul's River) which had been destroyed since the campaigns of Vafin Dorè against the Koima.

During the same year, the Toma of the Koodu had given up opposition so that the Malinke troops of the Kolibirama and Kounoukoro were free to join Samori's sofas who, at the end of 1884, had invaded the Vekemai and obtained the submis-

sion of Nzebela. Nzebela's warriors under the young Togba Pivi⁴³ joined the sofas in the siege of Fasangouni on the Via River. After heroic resistance against the combined armies of Samori and the Kamara, Fasangouni (Ziamai) was conquered, razed, and had its entire population deported. The chief, Suba Koiwo, an old enemy of Vafin Dorè, was killed in battle. While the siege of Fasangouni went on, Samori's troops had penetrated farther south toward Yella near Zorzor, which was also destroyed.⁴⁴ Following this, apparently the entire Ziamai submitted without further resistance.

The Gizima was then invaded from the south by Samori's sofas and Marau (Malawu), a sacred Poro village, was destroyed. This resulted in the immediate submission of the eastern Gizima under chief Kovau Beavogi at Koïama as well as of the western Gizima under the chief of Zolowo.⁴⁵ The northern Gizima had been invaded by the Kamara under Kyele Kamara when Vafele Koli named Kamara, chief of Gbuni at Bakedu, had offered no resistance and allowed the army passage of his territory. At Bakedu Kyele, Kamara crossed the Lofa River and reportedly destroyed Zinta (Zigida), Bwey (Boué) and Bukussu (Bokesa?) in the Gizima before he joined Samori's armies at Fasangouni at the beginning of 1885.

Apparently, the Toma campaigns were designed by Samori for the reestablishment of Malinke control over the trade route from the coast to the interior which had been lost following the death of Momolu Son at Bopolu in 1871. Apparently, the Bonde who destroyed Bopolu in 1872, had gained the control over the trade together with the villages of the Bluiema and Gizima sections, and the Malinke merchants of Musadu probably solicited Samori to assist them with the reestablishment of the lucrative commerce. In 1887, this was finally carried out with the help of Kama Tiékura. His brother, Manyan Sori, and his son, Mase Binye commanded the Malinke-Kamara troops which escorted a large trade caravan toward the Malinke merchant houses at Vonzua and Monrovia. The Bluiema yielded after a brief attack and the caravan proceeded to the coast where they visited several important Konianke traders among them Maliki and Seme Dolè from Musadu.⁴⁶ The itinerary of the trade caravans, which were to become a regular phenomenon until 1893, was as follows: Zigida, Ouhogeze, Zorohoulo, Barong, Goarouzou, Golela, Bouhadi, Perevuhari, Ouzite, Douroukoro.⁴⁷

When the great revolt of the Kouranko against Samori also reached the Konian, the Toma remained the most loyal allies of Samori as he had protected them from the domination of the Kamara of the Buzié. The latter, in turn, did not dare to revolt against the almami since the Toma were always ready to revolt and insist on their independence from the Buzié. Therefore, the area remained relatively tranquil until 1892, when the French wrested the Toma sector from Samori's hands.⁴⁸

PANDEMAI

The only Toma areas which remained independent throughout the Samorian period were the Baizya north of the Makona and the western Bunde who were dispersed in the Wologizi mountains. Among the independent village polities of the area Pandemai emerged as the most powerful. Its chief, Sosor, was head of a multi-tribal chiefdom whose economy was based on iron smelting, production of arms and warfare. Apparently, Pandemai had been a war town several generations before Samori.⁴⁹ Bunde, Malinke, Bande, and Kuranko formed the local population, whose male portion were mercenaries whom any chief in the neighborhood could hire. While Pandemai never became subject to Samori, his chief Sosor seems to have maintained good relations with the almami and may even have sent a contingent of sofas to Selenka in 1887.⁵⁰ Pandemai's role during the Kuranko revolt is not quite clear but since 1886, it was involved in war with the Malinke of Bopolu.⁵¹ Warriors from Pandemai also joined Mbawulume in the raids on the Tewo district between 1890 and 1892.⁵² T. J. Alldridge found Pandemai full of sofas in 1891

and fortified by nine sanye, i.e. war fences.⁵³ Since around 1891 Pandemai was also at war with the Bande and the Mende in the west. Pandemai later faced only the Mende chief, Kai Lundu, since the Bande chief changed sides and allied with Momo Dukori, the new chief of Pandemai.⁵⁴ One of Kai Lundu's sub-chiefs, Kafura, also revolted against him and allied with the sofas of Pandemai. Several military expeditions by sofas into what Kai Lundu claimed to be his territory among the Bande induced him to request the help of the British against Pandemai in 1895.⁵⁵ Kai Lundu suspected Kafura to have negotiated with the French for assistance and he feared for the future of his chiefdom. Kai Lundu was quite angry at the British for their refusal to commit troops for his war with Pandemai. He went as far as to threaten the cancellation of his treaty with the British, but a warning from Governor Cardew not to enter Liberian territory made him desist from his plans.⁵⁶

After the French had concluded the border treaty with Liberia and had eliminated Samori from the Makona region, Pandemai became a haven for disbanded warriors from Samori's armies. The Farakoro and Kamara districts north of the Makona River, which remained independent until 1910, served as passage way for all those who had fought on Samori's side and feared the retaliation of the French and their allies. When the French border commission delineated the border in 1908, large numbers of refugees from the north crossed the Makona and rallied to Bongo Morigbe as well as his sub-chief from Pandemai.⁵⁷

TOMA POLITICS TOWARD COLONIAL POWERS

In 1892, Kama Tiékura abandoned the almami Samori and joined the French. Immediately the Ziamai, Vekemai and Ugbamai kafu revolted against their Malinke overlord under the pretext of loyalty to Samori. The French, who had conquered the heartland of the Malinke and attempted to win over the forest peoples with the help of the Malinke, were identified by the Toma as friends and allies of their Malinke enemies.⁵⁸

Koko Onivogi led the revolt assisted by Bongo Morigbe of the Koodu and Ugbamai. For reasons of safety, the French obliged Kama Tiékura to reside at their military post of Diorodugu which, however, was soon after attacked and destroyed by the Toma and Samori's sofas. Kuonkan, the capital of the Buzié, remained in the hands of the Toma until November 1893, when Kama Tiékura reconquered the town.⁵⁹ For a short time, Samori was still in touch with his Toma allies through whom he obtained supplies of arms from the Liberian coast. Around 1894 the Toma continued alone with their resistance to the French encroachments. When one of the convoys from the coast was intercepted by the French near Nzapa in February 1894, the Toma attacked the French, forcing them to retreat toward their military post at Beyla and cutting off their main route at Nzebela. The Toma under Togba Pivi, or Nzebela Togba, the main leader of the Ziamai, were encouraged by their success and prepared another attack on Kuonkan. The town was again taken by the Toma in 1895 and Tiékura fled to the French post at Kerouane. In the following year, Kama Tiékura reconquered Kuonkan and forced the Toma to withdraw and gather their forces.

However, in 1897 Koko Onivogi and Togba Pivi launched an all-out war against the Buzié in which the entire Gizima took part. The French trade mission of Bailly and Pauly which had reached Zolowo and attempted to continue despite the refusal of the town was massacred in November. From Nzapa continuous raids took place against Kuonkan. In the northern part of Toma country, Koko Onivogi destroyed all villages suspected of cooperating with the French and attacked Diorodugu for a second time. French relief troops sent from Kissidugu were also attacked in 1899. Only in the following year was Diorodugu relieved by Lt. Dauvilliers who occupied Sampouyara on the main route from Beyla to Kissidugu.⁶⁰

While Koko's raids continued in the north, the Gizima villages of the south surrendered at a council of Ntosia and accepted punishment of Nzapa and Zolowo. However, as soon as Dauvilliers had returned to Sampouyara, the Ziamai resumed its war against the Buzié. Chiefs Yagbo from Busedu, Togba Pivi from Nzebela and Koi Koi from Dendano led a major attack on Kuonkan which was taken and burned to the ground. The defending Mase Binye, son of Kama Tiékura, could escape to Diorodugu where he sought French assistance for the reconstruction of Kuonkan. The French induced him to remain inactive at Beyla since they were impressed by threats of the Toma against the Malinke and were not convinced of the strict loyalty of their Malinke allies. Mase Binye, who was joined by other Malinke chiefs, remained in Beyla from 1902 until 1906. Only then was the area of Kuonkan sufficiently safe to be reoccupied.⁶¹

While the French-Liberian border of 1892 ran between Kissidugu and Beyla, new orders were given to the French officers to advance the frontier to a line connecting Bamba, Bofosso and Kuonkan. From March 1905 until March 1907, the French operated from Bofosso against the Baizya, Gerengerenka and Koodu, which were probably led by their respective chiefs, Koko Onivogi and Bongo Morigbe.⁶² Finally, the Toma were defeated in an engagement at Macenta and lost their war chief, Koko Onivogi. At the same time, in March 1907, Kuonkan was reoccupied and the road from Kissidugu to Bofosso and Macenta was permanently opened.⁶³


In their efforts to continue the road towards Gouéké, the French had attempted in February to conquer Busedu, the Ziamai stronghold, but failed. On April 1st, a new assault was made with rockets which resulted in the destruction of Busedu. Yagbo, the chief of Busedu, and his son managed to escape during the confusion and withdrew to Zinta where a Liberian garrison was encamped.⁶⁴ They later settled at Bakedu in Ziamai under the old chief, Vafele Koli.⁶⁵

Due to the refusal of the Gizima to allow the French to enter their villages, the war continued after a short surrender of the Toma in June 1907. Some villages which showed too great an opposition, such as Nzapa and Koïama, were besieged and fell in November 1909, while Nzebela Togba apparently had laid down arms already in May 1907.⁶⁶

The Franco-Liberian border commission of 1908-1909, which intended to delineate the border according to traditional political units, found that the Toma, in marked contrast to other groups of northwest Liberia, preferred to be ruled by Liberia rather than by a colonial power: Bongko Morigbe and the Koodu-Ugbamai thus came to Liberia. The Fasaro had also been ruled by Bongko Morigbe, but his chieftaincy was contested there by a certain Kisi Fode Kamara from Dulama, who indicated to the French that a former ruler, Sigbe Oulé, had been passed by when Bongko was made chief of Fasaro.⁶⁷ Following the decision to let the Fasaro be ruled by France, a large population from that kafu crossed the Makona into Liberia and decided to stay with Bongko Morigbe.⁶⁸

Farther in the south, the Gbunde chief, Vafelê Kolli at Bakedu and the Ziamai chief Yagbo at Zinta (Zigida) followed Bongko Morigbe's example. Yagbo who had just been expelled from Busedu when it was conquered by the French in 1907 apparently did not claim the entire Ziamai which according to his former chieftaincy he could have done so that the eastern Ziamai also became part of the French colonial empire.⁶⁹

In the Gizima, the French had just completed the siege and conquest of the large towns of Koïama and Nzapa, and insisted on the partition of the Gizima. In fact, the French claimed the entire Gizima until Zolowo and the Liberian commissioners could only obtain the western Gizima. Wabazao of Yella did not press any claims to the eastern Gizima even though he had become the leading Gizima chief. The chiefs of Koïama and Nzapa decided along with their people to settle at Yella where their descendants can be found today.⁷⁰



Similarly, the Vavala under chief Katta Kau at Salaye and the Faala under chief Foromagnan at Galai decided to side with Liberia. Little information is available on the Bluiema and the western Bunde sections as these fell automatically under Liberia and thus were not of interest for the boundary commission. Pandemai still was independent by 1910, and in Bluiema, Mbwolo Bignan from Weamai apparently accepted the rule of Liberia. Most of those chiefs had made their decision for Liberia on the basis of their hatred for the Malinke and their French allies, and they remained faithful to the Liberian government in the following years. However, the misuse of power by Liberian interior commissioners during the following years led to a certain amount of disaffection which found its expression at the council of Zinta in March 1918. Complaints about taxation, the abuse of the system of court fees, mistreatment of chiefs by commissioners, confiscation of property, and excessive recruitment for government work, showed that even the traditional friendship of the Toma chiefs had worn thin.⁷¹ On the other hand, the Toma chiefs came closer than any others to the idea which the Liberian government had of an African chief and, therefore, adapted best to the administrative division into chiefdoms, which was introduced during the Barclay administration. In more than a century of defensive wars against the Malinke, the kafu of the Toma had become more centralized than any of the ethnic groups to the west or south which had retained much of their segmentary organization. Toma settlements in the Ziamai, Gizimai, Bunde and Ugbamai sections were large villages with population concentrations up to 8,000 people.⁷² In order to prevent encroachments of the enemy, which in the Toma area was mostly the Malinke of the Konian and later Samori's sofas, each village was fortified and harbored a large population of warriors. Toma military organization was probably relatively complex, and Toma chiefs, even though still elected amongst the lineage heads and on the basis of mutual consent of all males, had obtained a high degree of power and independence due to their strategic role as supreme decision maker and controller of the military. They commanded large numbers of people on both the domestic and the chiefdom levels: they usually had a large number of wives, mostly daughters given in exchange by their political allies, and controlled large numbers of children and domestic slaves. Beyond their own household, they could rally the support of the other lineages and villages of the chiefdom and could muster the warriors who were either hired men or members of the chiefdom's lineages. During the early years of Liberian interior rule, they were, therefore, on an equal footing with the commissioners and were, as such, recognized by the government. It is likely that, on the basis of their loyalty towards the Liberian government, they had more weight in decisions concerning their chiefdoms.

In 1918, for example, Vafele Koli was recognized as the supreme political authority of the northern Toma, i.e., Bonde and Ugbamai. In Ziamai, chief Yagbo was still the recognized chief, while Wabazao from Gizima apparently had been replaced by Marwi Zumbo, and Mbwolo Bignan in Bluiema by chief Gundo.⁷³ For reasons of clarity, the chiefs who represented the Liberian Toma in 1918 will not be listed here but in the adjoined map of the Toma divisions as they existed during that year. It is hoped that this presentation of the political situation around 1918 will be the point of departure for more detailed research on individual Toma chiefdoms and chiefly genealogies.⁷⁴

SUMMARY

The dominant theme in the recent history of the Toma is the gradual penetration of their forest habitat by Malinke settlers and traders. In the late nineteenth century, Malinke expansionism became coupled with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the holy wars of Samori. The fact that the Malinke themselves were divided into animist and Moslem groups, determined the constellations of political alliances during the Samori period and thereafter French occupation. Among Samori's foremost opponents in the south were the animist Kamara of the Ko-

nian and the Buzie. The Toma, who were regularly the victims of invasions from the Buzie, thus became the natural allies of Samori. Despite their differences in religion, Samori protected the animist Toma against their Malinke neighbors. Political motives probably influenced this decision: the Toma controlled part of the trade route to the American settlements of Liberia on the coast, and an open trade route to the coast could become vital for Samori's state if the French succeeded in cutting off the supply routes for guns and ammunition in the North,

The Toma remained faithful to their alliance even after Samori's death, and showed prolonged opposition to the French and their Kamara-Malinke allies. Following the settlement of the border in 1912, many Toma chose to settle in Liberia outside the French boundaries, despite frequent harassment by the Liberian frontier police.

Seen in a wider historical context, the struggle for the forest trade routes between the Malinke heartland and the coast antedates the nineteenth century, since Vai oral sources state that the trade route was only re-opened by Samori. Thus, the theme of Malinke and Toma opposition has to be seen in the much wider context of relations between the interior Malinke states and the coast of West Africa.

APPENDIX I

Toma and Malinke Lineages Mentioned in Text⁷⁵

1. Lineages

<u>Toma</u>	<u>Malinke</u>	
Beavogi	Arama	Kane
Bilivogi	Cisse	Kuruma
Gilavogi	Dolè	Sao (Son)
Grovogi	Kamara	Sy
Gwepogi	Fandyarasi	Turé
Inavogi	Fen Blemasi	
Onivogi	Fen Semenesi	
Sovogi	Masenesi	
Zumanigi	Minatasenesi	
	Semamfilasi	

2. Traditional Political Units (kafu)

Anamai	Mazama
Apawaria	Nyinibu
Baizia	Oroziaro
Beuma	Ugbamai (Wubomai)
Bluiemai	Uliamai
Buzié (Ziamai)	Uziamai
Dambu	Varamisamai
Dawabu	Viginamai
Dulama	Waima (Koimai)
Fadu (included Koadu, Kolibirama Varamisamai, Fukuluma)	Waingolomai (Gbuni)
Farakoro (Fasaro)	Wibaramai
Fasaro (Farakoro)	Wibaragai (Kolibirama)
Fukuluma	Wolimai
Gbunde (Gbuni)(Bonde, Bunde)	Woniguomai (Koadu south)
Gbuni (Gbunde)	Wotamai
Gerengerenka	Wotumai
Gizimai	Wotuwai
Koadu (Koodu)	Zamazu
Koodu (Koadu)	Ziaerozu
Koimai (Waima, Wymar)	Ziamai (Buzié)
Kolibirama (Wibaragai)	Ziaozu
Kononkoro (Kounoukoro)	
Mandugu	

APPENDIX II

Personal Names Used in Text⁷⁶

Alldrige, T. J., British Interior Commissioner in Sierra Leone
 Anderson, B. J. K., Liberian Envoy to Musadu, 1868 and 1873
 Bada Bilivogi, Ziamai Chief of Busedu
 Bailly, Head of French Trade Mission (killed at Zolowo in 1897)
 Bakari Kuruma, Founder of Macenta
 Begby, Chief of Koadu around 1870
 Bongko Morigbe (Bongko Margwe), Chief of Koadu 1880-1910
 Capelih, Son of Yagbo Bilivogi
 Cardew, Governor of Sierra Leone

Daoronya Bilivogi (Dowilnyah), Chief of Koima 1868-1890
 Da Sidi, General of Sere Boureima Cisse
 Dauvilliers, Lieutenant, member of French Toma Expeditionary Force
 Dege Kova, Chief of Ugbamai around 1918
 Degura, Paramount Chief of Belle 1907-1923
 Dyakan Kamara (Jakkah Comma), Chief of Buzié 1850-1867
 Fatuma Ule Sy, ancestor of Saghadyigi on maternal side
 Ferendugu Kamasi (Feren Kama) mythical ancestor of the Kamara
 Filimamu Dolè, mythical companion of Feren Kama, first Chief of Musadu
 Foromagnan, Chief of Faala around 1909
 Gborozye Kamara, Chief of Koadu
 Gundo, Chief of Bluiema, around 1918
 Kafura, Kissi Chief from Kenema, Wende
 Kai Lundu, Paramount Chief of Luawa, 1880-1895
 Kaman Tiékura, Chief of Buzié, 1867-1910
 Katta Kau, Chief of Vavala around 1910
 Kessaleh, Chief of Vonjama (Ugbamai) around 1918
 Kane Mamfin, Chief of Kononkoro
 Koboi, Bonde Chief of Wologizimai (Pandemai?) around 1918
 Koko Onivogi (Toma Koko), Chief of Baizya
 Koli Onivogi, Chief of Dawabu
 Kisi Fode Kamara, Chief of Dulama around 1909
 Kisi Kaba, vassal and General of Samori
 Kolubanya, Chief of Kolibirama 1850-1877
 Koto Arama, cousin and General of Samori
 Kovah Beavogi, Chief of Koima around 1908
 Kryneseh, Chief of Vavala at Kpaye, around 1870
 -Kyele Kamara, son of Nyama Kamara, later Chief of Konian
 Maliki Dolè, Malinke Chief and merchant from Musadu
 Manyan Djiiba Kamara, Chief of Dulama after 1883
 Manyan Sori, brother of Kaman Tiékura
 Marwen Zumbo, Gizima Chief around 1918
 Mase Binye, son of Kaman Tiékura
 Mbawulume, Mende war chief and later Belle Chief
 Mbwolo Bignan, Chief of Bluiema around 1909
 Meazey Koivogi, Chief of Ziam around 1870
 Momolu Dolé, merchant from Musadu, reopened the trade route around 1820
 Momolu Dukori (Kikora), Chief of Pandemai
 Momolu Son (Sao), Chief of Bopolu 1866-1871
 Mori Ulé Cisse, Founder of the State of Madina around 1835
 Mulleway, Chief of Zorzor around 1918
 Nyama Kamara, ally of Samori and main Chief of the Konian
 Nyeneko Koivogi, Chief of Wubomai until 1887
 Pauly, Head of the French Trade Mission (killed at Zolowo in 1897)
 Peru, Chief of Gizima at Zolowo around 1918
 Saghadyigi Kamara, Head of the animist Malinke
 Samase Kamara, Chief of Kolibirama since 1877
 Samori Turé
 Seme Dolè, merchant from Musadu involved in the Sofa-Wars
 Sere Boureima Cisse, son of Mori Ulé, opponent of Samori
 Sere Burley Cisse, son of Mori Ulé and brother of Sere Boureima
 Sigbe Oulé, Chief of Farakoro, uncle of Bongko Morigbe
 Sirifaana Arama, cousin and General of Samori
 Sosor, Chief of Pandemai around 1890
 Suba Koivogi, Chief of Fasangouni
 Suba, Chief of Bouë in Ziamai, around 1918
 Suba Dolè, Chief of Musadu, religious leader of the Konian Muslims
 Subagize Onivogi, Chief of Koodu since 1880
 Tiéba Ulé, cousin of Saghadyigi Kamara
 Togba Pivi (Nzebela Togba), leader of Ziam resistance

Vafele Koli (Farfody Quellie), Chief of Gbunde, 1900-1930
 Vafing Dolè, son of Suba Dolè and Chief of Musadu around 1880
 Veve Gilavogi, Chief of Mazama
 Wabazao, Chief of Gizima at Yella around 1909
 Wanigo Zumanigi, Chief of Farakoro
 Welle, Chief of Zigida, around 1918
 Yagbo Bilivogi, Chief of Ziama at Busedu later at Zigida
 Yaraway Beavogi, Chief of Ziama
 Ze Asangbe, Chief of Koadu after 1883
 Zegbenya Koivogi, Chief of Koadu until 1880

FOOTNOTES

1. I have adopted the French spelling for the dental stop at the beginning of the ethnic group which has been variously written as Loma, Domar or Toma. See note 75 with regard to the spelling conventions adopted here.

2. The Malinke word kafu will be used throughout the text; however, occasionally the term section is used synonymously.

3. Yves Person, Une Revolution Dyula (Dakar, 1968), vol. I, 576-579 n. 1, n. 3, n. 6, n. 7. Here Person's spelling was retained while in Appendix I standardization according to the International Phonetic Alphabet was attempted.

4. Person, Samori I, 160; see also Y. Person, "Ethnic Movements and Acculturation in Upper Guinea Since the Fifteenth Century, Review Article", African Historical Studies, IV, 3 (1971), 679 n. 28. Feren or Faran Kamara was also one of the principal lieutenants of Sundiata Keita (1180-1250), and ruler of one of the twelve (12) Manding provinces. The Feren Kamara referred to here was the ancestor of the Kamara in the Konian which was perhaps settled in the fifteenth or sixteenth century.

5. Person, Samori I, 160.

6. H. J. Fisher, Narrative of a Journey to Musardu (New Introduction), (London, 1971), V-XXIII, reports oral traditions from Bopolu and Vonjama, which indicate the role of the Dolè clan. According to these traditions, the founder of Musadu, Fangamma (Feren Kama?) had a successor named Filimamudolay (Fili Maimu Dolè?). One of the latter's sons was Momoludolay (Momolu Dolè) who traded to the coast and was well received by Zolu Duma. Momolu Dolè was perhaps only a descendant of Fili Maimu Dolè, since Feren Kama founded Musadu in the sixteenth century, but Zolu Duma died around 1830. This telescoping of genealogies in oral traditions is nothing unusual and indicates that only the most important members of a lineage are remembered in the tradition.

7. The following after Person, Samori I, 577-579 n. 3, n. 7.

8. Person, Samori I, 161-163; the following after Person, Samori I, 164-182.

9. B. J. K. Anderson, Narrative of a Journey to Musardu (New York, 1870), 95.

10. African Repository, LVI (1880), 114; J. Büttikofer, Reisebilder aus Liberia (Leiden, 1888), vol. I, 67.

11. Person, Samori I, 184.

12. Person, Samori I, 185-6, 276-80.

13. Person, Samori I, 189-90, 282-5; Saghadyigi = Sarjee in Anderson.
14. Ibid.
15. Person, Samori I, 287-90; according to Anderson's account of 1873, Saghadyigi's campaign against Musadu did not occur until 1873 (see Fisher, Narrative, 29-30). Certain contradictions exist between Anderson's accounts and Person's report of the oral traditions which still need to be resolved.
16. Person, Samori I, 287-90.
17. Anderson, Narrative, 99.
18. Fisher, Narrative, 29-30.
19. Ibid.
20. Jakkah Comma who had received the Liberians Seymour and Ash at Kuonkan in 1858. Seymour and Ash, "Voyage to Kuonkan", Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (London, 1860).
21. Person, Samori I, 285, 434.
22. Dowilnyah in Anderson, Narrative, 71-81; see also Person, Samori I, 290.
23. Person, Samori I, 434. In Person's spelling Kyeba Ule.
24. Begby in Anderson, Narrative, 67.
25. With regard to Vafele Koli see below.
26. Anderson, Narrative, 71-81.
27. According to Schwab, the Gizima was once part of the Vavala; G. Schwab, Tribes of the Liberian Hinterland (Cambridge, MA, 1947), 21-2.
28. Fisher, Narrative, 22.
29. Person, Samori I, 559-60.
30. Ibid.
31. Fadu: apparently a former confederacy of several kafu including Koadu, Kolibirama, Varamisamai and Fukuluma.
32. Person, Samori I, 560.
33. Person, Samori I, 441.
34. Person, Samori I, 444.
35. Person, Samori I, 561.
36. Ibid.
37. Presently Selaga, one hour's march to the east of Vonjama.
38. Person, Samori I, 562.
39. Ibid.

40. Person, Samori I, 584 n. 47.
41. Ibid.
42. Person, Samori I, 564.
43. Later called Nzebela Togba.
44. Person, Samori I, 581 n. 34.
45. Person, Samori I, 563, 582 n. 35.
46. Person, Samori I, 562, 565, 581 n. 33, 584 n. 52.
47. The tentative identification of the itinerary which is quoted from Dauvilliers (Person, Samori I, 565) shows that the route is not identical with that taken by Anderson but bypassed Bopolu in the east. In fact, the only common point seems to have been Zolowo, and the fact that the 1887 route corresponds to that taken by Anderson on his second trip in 1873 may indicate that the route through Bopolu was not safe after 1871. Itinerary of 1887: Zigida, Wozi, Zolowo, Mbaloma?, Kpawuluzu?, Goleta, Boadi (Gbalein), Palakole?, Monrovia.
48. Little is known about the events during the Kuranko revolt. The archival sources on Liberia likewise contain little information on the Toma sector in the 1880s since it was too far removed from the coast, and neither the British nor French had penetrated the interior that far.
49. According to Wallis' informants, Pandemai had been a war town even before the birth of Samori's great-grandfather, B. Wallis, "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland", Geographical Journal (1910), 287.
50. Person, Samori I, 584 n. 52. Despite its remoteness, Pandemai would hardly have been spared by the Malinke if it had not cooperated in the campaign against Selenka. It probably also received a large number of refugees and sofas from the Ugbamai after the destruction of Selenka.
51. United States, Department of State, Dispatches of U.S. Ministers to Liberia, no. 7, Message of the President, 1890. This speaks of a war with the Boatswain tribes, either by Gola or Bonde.
52. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Confidential Print 879/42 no. 95A, Governor Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, March 1, 1895.
53. T. J. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland (London, 1901), 232.
54. While Alldridge still gives Sosor as the name of the Chief of Pandemai in 1891, Cardew in his dispatch of 1895 mentions Momo Dukori as Chief. Therefore, a change of chiefs in these years may be assumed.
55. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Confidential Print (hereafter cited as GBCOCP) 879/42 no. 95A, Cardew to Marquess of Ripon, March 1, 1895.
56. Ibid.
57. S. P. L'Honoré Naber, Op Expeditie Met de Fransen (The Hague, 1910), 102-4; these people were referred to as Goolies, probably from the town of Gouéléoumai in the Farakoro.
58. Person, Samori I, 584 n. 47, n. 52.

59. The following mainly after F. Bouet, "Les Tomas", Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique Française, Supplément Renseignements Coloniaux (hereafter cited as Afrique Française RC), no. 8, 9 (Paris, 1911), 185-246.

60. Bouet, "Les Tomas", Afrique Française RC, 224-33.

61. Bouet, "Les Tomas", 233-4.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Bouet, "Les Tomas", 236-41.

65. Naber, Expedition, 132.

66. Naber, Expedition 140; Bouet, "Les Tomas", 237.

67. Naber, Expedition 105-16.

68. Naber, Expedition 106; many of these were found at Pandemai and in the environment by Wallis in 1908 (Wallis, "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland").

69. Naber, Expedition 164.

70. Naber, Expedition 160-8.

71. Naber, Expedition 172-222; Proceedings of Court of Inquiry at Zigida, in: United States, Department of State, Records Relating to Internal Affairs of Liberia, 1910-1929 (hereafter cited as US DOS LIB), 882.00/591. Encl. 3 "Report of the Secretary of War and Interior on his Trip to the Hinterland Feb. 16 to May 31, 1918."

72. Naber, Expedition 105-16.

73. See US DOS LIB, Proceedings of Court of Inquiry at Zigida, 1918; however, Marwen Zumbo may be an alternate spelling for Wabazao. One also finds Mawen Zemo. Gundo or Gunu may be identical with a certain Gunuzele of Yawiazu, see S. J. M. Johnson, "The Traditions, History and Folklore of the Belle Tribe", Liberian Studies Journal I, 2 (1969), 56.

74. The following map is prepared on the basis of: S. E. Holsoe, W. L. d'Azevedo, J. H. Gay, "Chieftdom and Clan Maps of Western Liberia," Liberian Studies Journal I, 2 (1969), 24, and US DOS LIB, Report of the Secretary of War and Interior on his Trip to the Hinterland, 1918.

75. Person's spelling has been modified here in three respects: y has been replaced by i, e.g., Uziama instead of Uzyamay; ou is replaced by u, e.g., Mandugu instead of Mandougou; r as in Dorè is replaced by l. è corresponds to while é corresponds to e in the phonetic alphabet.

Names in parentheses are alternate names in the same language; names preceded by * are alternate names in the corresponding foreign language, e.g., Waima (=Koima) reads: Waima in Toma language corresponds to Koima in Malinke.

76. Here names appear in general as spelled in the source; names in parentheses are alternate names or spellings. The standardization of the spelling of Liberian historical names would be an important pre-condition for fruitful historical research. Quite often the same name is spelled very differently in different sources, which makes the identification of the bearer a sometimes tedious task, e.g., Wologizimai is spelled in one text as Wurlegisseu-ohma.

THE ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LIBERIA PAPERS

James Sanders
The Melville J. Herskovits Library
of African Studies
Northwestern University Library

Between January 1961 and August 1962, a team of researchers from Northwestern University conducted an economic survey of Liberia in West Africa. Their purpose was to "analyze the structure of the Liberian economy and measure its performance in order to suggest policies for development."¹ The project was initiated by the Government of Liberia through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA)² and was funded by a grant from the ICA. Participating in the survey were seven permanent staff members located in Liberia, four short-term consultants, and four staff members resident on the Northwestern University campus. During the period of the survey these researchers attempted to ascertain the structure of the Liberian economy by interviewing the heads of Liberian government departments, collecting official records and documents, conducting a census of economic activities, and by collecting statistics on the movement within the Liberian economy of goods, funds, people, and resources. The reports, which contain the results of the survey, were printed in one volume by Northwestern University in September 1962, under the title of Economic Survey of Liberia. A subsequent work, Growth Without Development, written by Robert Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and Alan Walters, and published by Northwestern University Press in 1966, is based on findings of the Economic Survey.

The present collection, which was received by the Northwestern Africana Library in 1962, is made up of papers generated by the project described above. These papers have been arranged in five categories: Project Administration, Project Correspondence, Project Papers, Resource Material, and Miscellany. The material in these categories warrants comment. They are annotated below.

Project Administration

These papers include the contract between Northwestern University and the ICA, financial documents concerning the budget of the project, and files on project personnel.

Project Correspondence

The correspondence of staff members associated with the project comprises this category. This correspondence has been arranged by individual. Each file contains letters received and carbon copies of letters sent by members of the staff. In general, the correspondence flowed in three directions: between the survey team in the field and the campus coordinator, between the campus coordinator and the ICA in Washington, D.C., and between the survey staff and per-

sons and institutions in Liberia. The weekly and monthly field reports required of the project by the contract are also included in this category, but the set of reports which survives is not complete.

Project Papers

These are drafts of some of the twenty-three Staff Papers which appear in finished form in the volume cited above, Economic Survey of Liberia.

Resource Material

The material in this category appears to have been collected by the survey team in the process of searching for data on the Liberian economy. Considerable amounts of information were made available to the group by the USOM/L.³ Reports concerning USOM projects in agriculture, communications, electric power, industry, public health, and roads, were given to the staff as well as copies of the minutes of various meetings of the Joint Liberian-United States Commission for Economic Development. Other resource materials include a collection of reports on agriculture, economy, education, government, and roads; two monographs relevant to the study; and files of 'Extracts' which are notes made from published works on Liberian history, ethnography, government, economy, and similar subjects.

Miscellany

Included here are financial records such as purchase orders, requisitions, travel vouchers and cancelled checks which show how the project grant was spent; memoranda of importance to the project from the American Embassy in Liberia, the Liberian Government, and the United States Operations Mission; and information on several conferences concerned with economic development.

An additional part of the collection consists of a group of about ninety pamphlets and booklets which have been arranged under topics such as agriculture, communications, economy, education, forestry, health, water projects, miscellany, and pamphlets issued by the ICA.

In concluding, it should be noted that the Economic Survey of Liberia Papers are housed in the Africana section of the Northwestern University Library. Access to the collection is not restricted. In addition to this, it should be made explicit that the collection described above represents only a part of the material gathered and produced by members of the survey team in the course of carrying out their research. Important papers which may have been separated from those discussed above are presently being sought.

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert W. Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and A. A. Walters, Growth Without Development (Evanston, 1966), v.

2. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which was a part of the Department of State, was established in June 1955. In November 1961, when the Agency for International Development (AID) was created, the ICA was incorporated into AID.

3. United States Operations Mission (USOM) is the name given to ICA offices overseas. USOM/L refers to the United States Operations Mission in Liberia.

Martin Lowenkopf, *POLITICS IN LIBERIA: THE CONSERVATIVE ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976.

Martin Lowenkopf has written a book of mixed character and usefulness. For those completely unfamiliar with Liberia, it may well be one of the best broad-gauged works available. Lowenkopf is good at explaining the many and diverse aspects of a nation, its governmental systems and sub-systems and the outlines of its economics and politics. Those familiar with Liberia or some aspect of its society, politics, economy, or ethnography, however, may well find themselves as frustrated as I was in reading this text.

While Lowenkopf is good at explanatory tasks, he is not so insightful when evaluating data and materials in a manner that might integrate all aspects of Liberian politics and life into a single, understanding framework. If this book presents a strong overview, this strength is also indicative of a basic weakness: the lack of a consistent viewpoint or thematic core judiciously upheld. Not that I need the strong viewpoint of a J. Gus Liebenow, but there needs to be a clearer presentation of key concepts and then a thoughtful follow-through in the body of the work to give a coherence to the narrative.

Lowenkopf says that his book is about Liberia in the Tubman era and about "modernization" ("exploring theories of modernization", p. 5) that may illuminate the kind of development occurring in Liberia. He says little, though, about alternative definitions of modernization -- gives only the barest of polar alternatives, mobilization versus evolution models, and evidently believes in a conclusion that says: "definitions of modernization and integration are arbitrary." (p. 12) This is not much help to a country study. Chapter six is devoted to "Political Modernization" but the only conceptual guide given is an amorphous statement that "Political modernization is, therefore, as likely to be a response to economic and social changes as it is a blueprint for change. That was the case in Liberia." (p. 108) So, in the end, there is no conceptual core, only the case study of Liberia without an anchor to give it weight. Modernization can be an action or a reaction, depending upon an "arbitrary definition." And Liberia's is a reaction. What this means, I am not sure.

The book rushes to a discussion of Liberia's modernization by outlining "sectors" of the state and describing them. He does that pretty well, but within self-imposed boundaries that limit the depth of the discussion and create a confusion of viewpoint and approach.

There is conceptual content to the book. Its Introduction is pregnant with promising evaluation tools -- even concepts. They are left still-born. I do agree with the thrust of Lowenkopf's arguments in perceiving Liberia's conservative evolution within a consensual environment, this does seem to me to be the key to evaluation and understanding of Liberia's politics in the Tubman era. Again, this theme, though, is not developed nor specifically applied to the sector analysis of the rest of the book. Indicative of this underdevelopment of the book's core is Lowenkopf's admission at the end of the conceptual introductory chapter that, "In any case, I have not sought to excise the unresolved ambiguities from this study." (p. 10) Why not? Only by finding solutions to these ambiguities can the true beginnings of thoughtful evaluation and understanding of the data and descriptions of governments and politics be undertaken.

Lowenkopf writes, "the subject of this book is the Tubman era." (p. 12) It unnerves me to read a book whose title indicates a theoretically based analysis of contemporary politics only to find that it really is a chronicle of politics during a period over five years before publication of the book. It is history more than contemporary analysis. Yet, a contemporary time sense is endemic to

the book and the illusions are consistently those of currency. I know the problem: the book was written in the late 1960s, revised for publication in 1971, but not published until 1976. What this means is that the book was out of date as contemporary analysis well before it was published. Why would Hoover Institution do this to Lowenkopf? It must be embarrassing for him to see his reference to "two contemporary studies" refer to books published in 1966 and 1969 respectively. Reference to recent works and to current practice in Liberia flow throughout the book -- but they almost invariably refer to pre-1970. Nearly all of the economic data ends with 1969 figures; most refer to the 1966-67 period. Budget data is particularly outdated (even for 1976). Census data refers to the 1962 census rather than the later 1974 census (p. 26). Still, the present tense is maintained throughout. This leads to confusion for the reader, and often to contradictions, particularly where 1971 updating is squeezed into material meant for an earlier time.

The dead giveaway for the confusion of purpose the publishing date produces is the felt need for a "Postscript" to deal with the death of Tubman (1971) and the outset of the regime of William Tolbert. Five years into his presidency, Tolbert is a postscript to a book that is 1) ostensibly about "the Tubman era"; 2) is really about Tubman 1944-1969; but 3) really tries to get us to believe it is about contemporary Liberia.

Curiously, if the text is taken as a Tubman era history, there are still reservations to be made. The chapter entitled "The Tubman Era" is one of the weakest in the book. It is confused and has no unity of time frame or theme. At its end, Lowenkopf says: "The Tubman style of rule . . . followed essentially the lines of his predecessors." (p. 58) Yet the chapter went to great pains to show how his style differed -- especially in the creation and use of new elites. Contradictions of this type pepper the book and add to the uneasiness felt by the reader.

There are other points I could make from the specialist's viewpoint: I think the politics within and of the tribal sector gets short shift from Lowenkopf, even when he writes of the adaptive character of the polity; there is a poor understanding of the inter-relationships between county leadership, tribal leadership, and the central government within the dual administrative structure still used in Liberia; and I expected a stronger chapter on the True Whig Party and its role in Liberian politics. But these are points that look for perhaps too much from a general survey of Liberian politics and government. The general harsh character of this review comes basically from the frustration felt at perceiving great potential from Lowenkopf's fundamental approach to Liberia and noting the consequent lack of fulfillment of the potential in favor of a sector by sector description of Liberia, 1969 -- the culmination point of "development" under W.V.S. Tubman.

The purpose of the book is frozen in a time and mind frame seriously divided in motivation between author and publisher. This is a serious flaw. Time is certainly needed to evaluate an administration as important as that of President Tubman's. The book had some of that time (five years, from 1971 to 1976), but it didn't take that time and use it. Even given this, however, there are still problems of focus, consistency, inter-relationship between chapters, and contradictions within the text of the sector analysis that is the foundation of the book's organization. If you are looking for a book that has digested the large

body of recent materials on Liberian life and politics within a coherent analytical framework, you will be disappointed.

Richard M. Fulton
Northwest Missouri State University

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: the Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca, 1969).

Christine Behrens, LES KROUMEN DE LA CÔTE OCCIDENTALE D'AFRIQUE. Talence: Centre d'Etudes de Géographie Tropicale, Travaux et Documents de Géographie Tropicale, No. 18, 1974. 243 Pp.

This study attempts to trace and document the evolution of maritime activities of the Kru on the West African coast, in particular the Ivory Coast. It has two parts, one historical and the other contemporary anthropological, based on fieldwork in South Western Ivory Coast in 1970.

In the light of the apparent present occupational specialization of the Kru in coastal shipping, Behrens fails to distinguish clearly between the Kru, as an ethnic group, and the Kru, as a category characterized by common employment in coastal commerce and shipping. Her book does not give attention to any other Kru but those who participate in coastal shipping and trade, even though in part two, these latter are recognized as part-time and off-farm activities of people who are still mainly farmers and fishermen. Behrens' attempt to situate the Kru in their general ethno-linguistic context does not go beyond the classifications of Westermann-Baumann and Lavergne de Tressan, and her description of traditional social structure represents excerpts from nineteenth and twentieth century sources on individual Liberian groups and is not backed by oral history sources and comparison with present social structure.

Taking as a starting point the officially recognized labor category of "Kroumen" in the Ivory Coast - those who embark in an Ivorian port on a boat going to the southern ports of the African coast in order to be employed for maintenance operations of said ship, and all operations preparatory and complementary to the forementioned operations - Behrens outlines the evolution and stages of Kru participation in coastal commerce.

She assumes that, initially, maritime activities - fishing and bartering with coastal vessels - were confined to an ethnic group at the littoral, but were later adopted by members of interior groups, first those of Kru stock and later also by those from other ethnic groups. While this is correct, her understanding of the internal dynamics of the African societies which brought this about, e.g., dissatisfaction of interior groups with the coastal middlemen who charged exorbitant prices, and disruption of the interior, remains incomplete.

The study distinguishes the following stages of Kru maritime activities with each stage overlapping, to some extent, with the earlier ones:

- the era of ship trade during which the coastal Kru bartered local goods for European imports on deck of the European trading vessels (1470 until about 1700);
- the era of slave trade during which the Kru were employed by slavers to row boats from the slave pens to the ships across the dangerous African surf (1700 until 1845);
- the era of factory trade during which the Kru worked for coastal trading factories loading and unloading cargo boats and ships and navigating the coastal waters in search for produce, e.g., palm oil, camwood, piassava (1820 until about 1940);
- a period of unsuccessful attempts by the European colonial powers and trading companies to attract the mobile Kru mariners as plantation workers in the African colonies (1900 until 1910);
- the period of Kru deckhands and stevedores during which the Kru on board the steamers from port to port had to load and unload the ship and where many

settled as permanent workers. Since 1910 wharfs and deep-water ports gradually eliminated the need for surfboats and skilled rowers, even though some were still used in the early seventies (1920 - 1970);

- the present phase, characterized by a declining demand for Kru workers due to increasing regulations by African governments against foreign workers and increasing automation of loading facilities; thus, Kru are mainly employed in their countries of origin and on ships calling at their ports, especially in log exports.

The second part deals with the present social and economic organization of Kru labor in the Ivory Coast at the end of the surfboat phase, which was reached in the sixties and seventies with the last boats used at Tabou around 1973. First, the extent and structure of the labor migrations of Kru workers is assessed in an analysis of the registration data of the shipping companies employing Kru laborers. The number of departures, their monthly fluctuations and the geographic origins of the laborers are discussed. It follows a description of the organization of laborer groups, the recruitment procedures, the embarkation process and the tasks of the workers on the ships. Estimates of the incomes earned through shipping and their utilization for consumption, and, to a minor extent, investment follow. The book concludes with a look at the other activities of the Kru workers when they are at home, since the average Kru mariner is employed in shipping for only 150 days and devotes the remainder of the year to farming. Behrens sums up that 'navigation' was the only way for the people of the South-western Ivory Coast to gain a place in the modern economy after the market for cash crops collapsed after the withdrawal of the French commercial companies during the war years. On the other hand, navigation has not led to a modernization of the domestic economy which is still dominated by subsistence production and suffers from scarcity of labor.

Like G. Brooks' *The Kru Mariner*, Behrens' book tries to clarify the social and economic reasons for the phenomenon of Kru seafaring; however, it differs from Brooks' study by having less command of the historical sources, on one hand, but adding to our understanding of the organization of the 'navigation' phenomenon, on the other hand, through first-hand contemporary field data.

Andreas Massing

Willi Schulze, A NEW GEOGRAPHY OF LIBERIA. London: Longmans, 1973. 218 Pp. \$8.50

Willi Schulze, LIBERIA. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973. 397 Pp. DM. 84.--

These two books by the same author on Liberia use two different approaches: the first, published in English, aims at the general reader who needs an introduction to the various facets of Liberian geography and at students of Liberian and West African high schools and universities. With its photographic plates, tables, graphs, and maps, it illustrates well the developments in Liberia during the Tubman era, and succeeds with its aim to be a textbook and general reference work on Liberia.

The second work, written in German, is much longer and aims at readers who have had some exposure to Liberian affairs and want to increase their knowledge about particular aspects. It presents more detail and is better documented by references interspersed in the text which are important for the academic reader but make fluent reading at times difficult.

A comparison of the contents and features of both books may make the differences in emphasis clearer:

<u>A New Geography of Liberia</u>		<u>Liberia</u>	
I	Geographical Knowledge of Liberia: Historical and Bibliographical Outline	I	Dominant Geographical Factors
II	Physical Geography, with subsections on geology, hydrography and soils	I.1	Natural: Climate Vegetation
III	Human and Social Geography, including subsections on administrative divisions, ethnic history, migrations and political developments	I.2	Human: Liberian settlers Indigenous population
IV	Economy	I.3	Economic: Iron Ore Industry Rubber Industry
V	Transportation in Liberia (by W.R. Stanley)	II	Natural Regions 1. Central 2. Western 3. Eastern 4. Social Aspects in Relation to Economic Development
VI	Regional Aspects of Liberian Geography: description of major physiographic regions	III	Dictionary of Important Geographical Names
VII	Summary and Outlook	IV	Liberia's Relations with Germany, including statistics on trade and aid
	Footnotes	Appendices:	Statistical Tables An Historical Outline Bibliography Index
	Index		
	6 Tables of Statistical Indicators		
Illustrations:		Illustrations:	
60 black and white plates dispersed throughout the text		30 black and white plates preceding text	
61 charts and maps		5 full-page color maps	
35 tables		3 full-page black and white maps numerous graphs and charts	

The strength of the English version is its concise, well-illustrated chapters which familiarize the reader quickly with the developments in each sector of Liberian affairs. The German version is more detailed and scholarly, containing numerous further references.

For those interested in Liberia, it is worthwhile to consult or own both books, as they complement each other and jointly fill the gap in works of general coverage of Liberia, which existed until the year of their publication.

Andreas Massing

