Thomas Jefferson, William Henry Harrison, and Annuities on the American Frontier

Zachary Densmore

Indiana Territory was new in 1800. The land that was deemed part of Indiana Territory by the United States government had never been referred to as such. William Henry Harrison was the first governor of Indiana territory and made his capitol in Vincennes. Shortly after Harrison's initial appointment, Jefferson became president and gave Harrison authority to create treaties with and acquire land from the Indian tribes in Indiana Territory. Harrison needed to act quickly. There were foreign threats to American security, and the success of the American experiment with Republican government rested on its ability to continue and spread. Harrison achieved many of Jefferson's goals, but his methods led to war with the Native Americans. He created numerous treaties that gained much land for the United States. The treaties' terms created Indian dependence on the American government and American goods, chiefly through annuities.

Among Jefferson's reasons for pushing for land cessions and occupying the frontier was international security. Jefferson was especially concerned with the French. France recently gained Spanish Louisiana, which included the strategic and valuable port of New Orleans.[1] Jefferson viewed this transfer as a threat. He especially feared the French occupation of New Orleans. Jefferson stressed to Harrison that he must act quickly. Jefferson wrote that the Indians, "under the hope of their [France's] protection, they will immediately stiffen against cessions

1 Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly* (University of California Press, 1994), 117.

of land to us."[2] If France established a dominant presence in that region, Jefferson feared the Indians would create alliances with France and not cede land to the United States.

Jefferson had good reason to think France's presence would jeopardize his goals. Historically, the Indians and French had good relations. As far back as 1680, the French built relationships with the Indians through the fur trade. French fur traders were active in the Illinois Country. In 1680, Illinois Country included most of the modern state of Illinois, Southern Wisconsin, and Iowa.[3] The French traders understood that "gift-giving turned strangers into allies, and access to trade goods was ensured by the settlement of French fur traders."[4] They also understood that "the exchange process was embedded in an indigenous social context and was defined by friendship and kinship."[5] The French traders understood that trade with the Indians in Illinois Country was built on strong relationships and worked to cultivate friendship with their trade partners.

French trade and relationship building was widespread and impacted the entire Great Lakes region, especially when French traders married Indian women. Intermarriage affected the Great Lakes region's ethnic diversity and "assured traders inclusion as Native allies, secured personal safety, and facilitated access to furs."[6] Trade required relationship building and the strongest relationship a French trader could have with the Native Americans was to marry a Native American Woman. This relationship would allow the trader to trade with his wife's

2 Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803. *The Papers of William Henry Harrison*. Indiana Historical Society, Reel One.

3 Susan Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes.* (University of Massachusetts Press. 2001), 14-15.

4 Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men,* 16.

5 Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men,* 19.

6 Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men,* 19.

family and other relations, extending their trade network. Intermarriage persisted into the nineteenth century and had a lasting impact on French and Native American relations.[7]

The Native Americans kept good relations with the French and fought alongside them in the French and Indian War that ended in 1763. Even though the British had Native American allies, many Native Americans believed Great Britain was a larger threat to their freedom than the French.[8] Jefferson knew this and feared that this relationship would threaten American borders.

Consequently, Jefferson needed to define American borders clearly so foreign nations would not encroach. The only effective way to achieve clearly defined borders was with a line of settlements. Settlements need people, and people will be most willing to settle in safe places. Naturally, threats must be eliminated, and to potential settlers, that meant Native Americans.[9] Jefferson wanted to push most Indians past the Mississippi River.[10] Once the Eastern Mississippi was settled, the borders could be secured from foreign interests.

Although the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 would substantially reduce the French threat, Jefferson had other interests in pursuing the frontier. One reason for Jefferson's expansion into the frontier was that he believed that Americans were culturally superior to the Indians and also everyone else. Jefferson shared this vision with Harrison since "both agreed that the American experiment in republican government was the highest form of civilization and that it must be

7 Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men,* 19.

8 R.G. Grant, *Battle: A Visual Journey through 5,000 Years of Combat*. (New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2005), 185.

9 Gail Collins, *William Henry Harrison* (Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 2012), 28.

10 Pekka Hamalainen, *Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America*. (Liveright Publishing Company, a Division of W.W. Norton & Company. 2022), 357.

protected from outside threats."[11] Basically, they believed societal progress had peaked with the young American republic—such an achievement needed to be protected from lesser forms of government. Also, since Jefferson and Harrison believed that American Republican government was the highest form of government, it would make sense to spread it over the rest of the American continent and advance human progress.

A key pillar of Jefferson's republican ideology was individual independence. Notably, "the independence accorded to the individual who came through either land holding or honest labor."[12] That independence allowed industrious individuals to sustain themselves and not depend on others for their basic existence. It allowed these individuals to enjoy a life characterized by liberty and the full pursuit of happiness and promoted Republican virtues like frugality and morality. According to Jefferson, these virtues were embodied by farmers and the artisans who supported them.[13] The Republican ideal of individual independence and the frugality and morality that came with it could not exist without individual land ownership. Consequently, it made sense that Jefferson wanted Harrison to negotiate land cessions with the Native Americans. Every acre of land Harrison acquired was an opportunity for American citizens to pursue Jefferson's Republican ideals.

Although settlers wanted the Indian threats removed, Jefferson did not think that this necessarily required military campaigns or complete displacement. Instead, the Indians could assimilate an agrarian lifestyle. The key result "of a life of agriculture and herding, rather than

11 Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison." *Journal of the Early Republic* 22, no. 3 (2002): 410-411

12 Barry J. Balleck "When the Ends Justify the Means: Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (1992): 684.

13 Balleck, "When the Ends Justify the Means," 684-685.

hunting, would be they would require less land."[14] Jefferson claimed he had the Indians' best interest in mind and was leading them to all the blessings and peace of agricultural society. However, Jefferson simultaneously planned to secure American borders by moving white settlers there as quickly as possible.[15] When the Indians required less land, white settlers could fill the previously occupied territory and help define the American border.

Jefferson wrote to Harrison in 1803 outlining some methods his administration would use on the frontier. The overall goal was to "live in perpetual peace with the Indians, to cultivate an affectionate attachment from them, by everything just and liberal which we can [do] for them within the bounds of reason, and by giving them affectual protection against wrongs from our own people."[16] At first, the policy seems kind and fair. Jefferson wanted to promote a relationship built on justice and generosity between the settlers and the Indians. The Indians would be protected against any crimes the settlers committed, and the government would treat them fairly and peacefully. However, the motivation for building goodwill with the Indians was so that they would be open to selling land. If the Indians assimilated an agricultural lifestyle, they would sell their unused land to their new neighbors. Naturally, they would want to sell to people they believed would be good neighbors.

Furthermore, Jefferson wanted to create circumstances that would motivate the Indians to sell land. One method was to encourage the Indians to go into debt. After the Indians began to assimilate an agricultural lifestyle, Jefferson wrote to Harrison, "we shall push our trading

14 Dumas Malone. *Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805*. (Little, Brown & Company, 1970), 273-274.

15 Malone, *Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805,* 273.

16 Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803. *The Papers of William Henry Harrison*. Indiana Historical Society, Reel One.

houses and be glad to see the good & influential individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts go beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands."[17] Even if an Indian tribe fully assimilated a life of farming and herding, they may not willingly part with their ancestral lands. By encouraging Harrison to allow them to accumulate large debts, the Indians would realize the only way they could hope to pay them off was to sell land. Combining high debt with goodwill would create the necessity and willingness to sell land.

Another component of introducing these trading houses would be a monopoly on the sale of American goods. Jefferson wrote that the trading houses would "sell so low merely to repay us cost and charges so as neither to lessen or enlarge our capital. This is what private traders cannot do, for they must gain; they will consequently retire from the competition."[18] Jefferson's trading houses would sell at low prices that other traders could not match. Naturally, the local consumers would buy from Jefferson's cheaper option, and all competition would be forced to shut down. Even though Jefferson's trading houses would not profit, they would drive out competition, force Native Americans to buy from businesses that would encourage debt, and then use that debt to motivate land cessions.

The territorial governor would execute Jefferson's strategy for the frontier. Jefferson appointed William Henry Harrison to this position in 1803.[19] Harrison had strong credentials for this appointment. He had served as an aide-de-camp and apprentice to General Anthony Wayne at the battle of Fallen Timbers in Ohio. Harrison earned his fellow officers' respect, who

17 Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803.
18 Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803.
19 Commission for William Henry Harrison. February 8, 1803, *Papers of William Henry Harrison*, Indiana Historical Society, Reel One.

"admired the cool courage of a man who carried General Wayne's orders into the heat of battle."[20] Harrison was also part of the treaty council that happened after the battle. He closely observed Wayne's use of spies, turncoats, threats, and bribery during the council.[21] Harrison's early exposure to Indian war and treaty-making doubtlessly influenced his own treaty-making.

William Henry Harrison had proud origins. His father, Benjamin Harrison, was the governor of Virginia twice and signed the Declaration of Independence. William Henry Harrison's grandson, also named Benjamin, would become President of the United States. His Mother was related to Martha Washington. The Harrison family suffered tragedy during the American Revolution. Their Berkeley mansion was raided by soldiers led by the traitorous Benedict Arnold. Although no one was injured and the mansion still stood, all the cattle were stolen, and the furnishings were destroyed. Consequently, by the time Harrison's older brothers were educated, there was not enough money to offer William Henry the same type of education Harrison men typically received at the College of William and Mary. Instead, he was put on a career path leading to a position as a professional physician. Even then, the money ran short, and after failing to secure a government job, Harrison began his career in the military. A military career at the time had little prestige and equally little pay.[22]

After the Indian war that climaxed with the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Greenville ended in 1795, the recently married Harrison searched for a steady source of income. He commanded Fort Washington and earned the rank of Captain and the respect of influential

20 Andrew R. L. Cayton, *Frontier Indiana* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. 1996), 174.

21 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 409-410.

22 Collins, *William Henry Harrison*, 9-13.

men in the Northwest Territory. He secured some minor public offices and resigned from the army in 1798 to become the Secretary of the Northwest Territory under President John Adams. The following year, Harrison narrowly won an election to be the Northwest Territory's delegate to Congress in 1799. While at Congress, he helped author a land bill that divided the Northwest Territory in two and created what became the Indiana Territory. Already, Harrison was affecting the frontier. President Adams appointed Harrison to be Indiana Territory's chief executive. He accepted, but only after reassurances that Thomas Jefferson would retain him if elected.[23] Jefferson did and gave Harrison his commission as governor in 1803.[24]

Jefferson had a lot of confidence in Harrison. Territorial governors were not elected—they were appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. As part of Harrison's appointment, Jefferson gave Harrison "full power to conclude and sign any Treaty or Treaties, which may be found necessary with any Indian Tribes North West of the Ohio, and within the Territory of the United States."[25] Harrison had the power to create treaties the American government had to honor. Looking at the frontier, both Jefferson and Harrison understood that "slow communications between the frontier and Washington made the territorial officer's ability to make executive decisions crucial."[26] Therefore, Harrison needed complete power--especially in the face of international threats from the French before the Louisiana Purchase. Furthermore, Harrison's presidentially appointed power had no specific time limit. The only parameters were "during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the time being."[27] So, as long as

23 Cayton, *Frontier Indiana*, 175-176.
24 Commission for William Henry Harrison. February 8, 1803.
25 Commission for William Henry Harrison. February 8, 1803.
26 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 411.
27 Commission for William Henry Harrison. February 8, 1803.

Harrison stayed on good terms with Jefferson, he was a powerful, unelected official who could shape the outcome of American and Indian relations.

The Indiana Territory of 1800 was much larger than the modern state of Indiana. In addition to the present state of Indiana, it included what are now Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Congress would gradually reduce the Indiana Territory closer to the size of the state during Harrison's twelve years as territorial governor.[28] Meanwhile, the territorial capital, Vincennes, was a rough, secluded settlement. No real roads led to Vincennes, so the twenty-seven-year-old Harrison, his wife, and three children took a long and indirect river route. They would have found roughly seven hundred settlers when they arrived in Vincennes. Most of them were French.[29] These were the foreigners that Jefferson was concerned about.

The French majority had deep roots in the area and were upset over the consequences of recent Indian wars and the unfairness of the courts. The French complained "that their rights were continually violated by the courts, in which two judges only out of five were Frenchmen."[30] Naturally, they felt underrepresented in the legal system. Furthermore, the French at Vincennes were largely uneducated. They did not have a school until the French Revolution displaced a French missionary who founded one in Vincennes.[31] Consequently, the underrepresented and undereducated French majority would have been a unique challenge for Harrison.

28 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 406.

29 Collins, *William Henry Harrison,* 27

30 John B. Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*. (Bingham & Doughty, 1859), 399.

31 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 399.

In contrast to the rugged wood-frame dwellings of the settlers, Harrison built a magnificent mansion. It was two stories tall and had thirteen rooms. There were four chimneys, a semi-circular staircase, and hand-carved woodwork. Skilled craftsmen from Ohio and Pennsylvania were hired to build the mansion. Harrison even imported glass for the windows from England. Everything about the mansion, called Grouseland, was foreign and unlike anything anyone in Vincennes had ever seen.[32] Grouseland was finished in 1804.[33] It towered over everything in sight and was a testament to Harrison's presidentially-appointed power.

The Treaty of Greenville marked the beginning of American and Indian relations after the Revolutionary War. Much of Harrison's work expanded on the Treaty of Greenville, which he watched General Wayne negotiate. The tenth article of the Treaty stated, "all other treaties made between the United States and the said Indian tribes, or, any of them, since the Treaty [of Paris] of 1783, between the United States and Great-Britain, that come within the purview of this treaty, shall henceforth be void."[34] The Treaty of Greenville marked a new era of American and Indian relations. Everything before the Treaty of Greenville was no longer in effect. Therefore, the Treaty of Greenville was the foundation for all future treaties between the United States of America and the Indians.

The Treaty of Greenville created the framework for Harrison's treaties. At the time, it did many things that a war-ending treaty would usually do. Articles One and Two ended hostilities and set the conditions for a prisoner exchange. Article Nine aimed to prevent another war by

32 Collins, *William Henry Harrison, 27.*

33 Cayton, *Frontier Indiana,* 181.

34 United States. 1826-1831. *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs: to which is added an appendix, containing the proceedings of the old Congress, and other important state papers, in relation to Indian affairs*. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, American Indian Histories and Cultures, 54.

discouraging "private revenge and retaliations" for wrongdoings and encouraging the use of the legal system.[35] Article Three contained details for land cessions.[36] The location and size of the cessions were described in painstaking detail and amounted to most of Ohio.[37] Article Four details the annuities that came with the land cessions. Twelve tribes are named in this article, and each tribe received either five hundred or one thousand dollars in cash or "domestic animals, implements of husbandry, or other utensils," amounting annually to nine thousand and five hundred dollars.[38]

Although the annuities seemed like fair compensation, they created Indian dependence on the American government. The result was that "having given annuities, Americans in the future could withhold them."[39] The annuities gave the American government influence over each tribe's economy. If a tribe did not comply with governmental policies, it risked losing its annuity. These annuities also discouraged rebellion because "as Indians became more economically dependent on American cash and goods, and their chiefs became more dependent on distributing them to maintain influence, united resistance against the whites would become increasingly difficult."[40] The amount of the annuity and, therefore, the extent of Indigenous dependence on the American government varied. The annuities created an awkward situation. If one tribe with no annuity wanted to go to war against the United States of America, those with annuities would be reluctant to join the effort and may even discourage resistance to protect their annuities.

35 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 49, 54.
36 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 50.
37 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 408.
38 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 52.
39 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 408.
40 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 408.

Annuities would be a prominent feature in Harrison's treaties and shape American policy towards the Indians.

Early in Harrison's treaty-making, he built on the foundation of the Treaty of Greenville. The Treaty of Fort Wayne in 1803 was an example of extending and clarifying the Treaty of Greenville. The first article of the Treaty of Fort Wayne addressed the Treaty of Greenville's fourth article. It stated, "it has been difficult to determine the exact limits of the said tract as held by the French and British governments" and gave specific references to prominent natural features like rivers and precise distances from these landmarks to establish where borders were laid.[41]

A fascinating factor in the Treaty of Fort Wayne was the cession of a natural resource. The Treaty of Fort Wayne involved the Miami, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Delaware, and Shawnee Tribes. Article Three states that the affected Indian tribes "relinquish and cede to the United States the great salt spring upon the Saline creek, which falls into the Ohio below the mouth of the Wabash, with a quantity of land surrounding it, not exceeding four miles square."[42] Although many of Harrison's treaties involved land, natural features like a salt spring were rarely mentioned. Additionally, while the location of the salt spring was specific, and the amount of land that came with the salt spring was quantified, the exact location of the land was not specified. The Treaty stated the land "may be laid off in a square or oblong as the one or the other may be found most convenient to the United States."[43]

41 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 57.
42 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 58.
43 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 58.

Another aspect of the salt spring was an annuity. However, this annuity would not be in cash or cattle. It would be in salt. Every year, the United States would deliver "a quantity of salt, not exceeding one hundred and fifty bushels, and which shall be divided among the several tribes in such manner as the general council of chiefs may determine."[44] As with other annuities, this salt annuity created dependence on the American government. Furthermore, this treaty also required cooperation among the six tribes involved. The general council of chiefs was responsible for distributing the salt fairly. Conflict could result from deliberations about distributing the salt and strain the tribes' relations with each other. The salt annuity could become a source of conflict among the Indians, reducing the chances of united resistance to land cessions.

In some cases, Harrison gained the approval of other tribes for land cessions to strengthen the acquisition. The treaties had articles that stated one tribe acknowledged the right of another to sell land. For example, in 1803, Harrison negotiated a treaty with the Kaskaskia Tribe in August 1803, resulting in the typical land cessions. A year later, in August 1804, Harrison conducted a treaty with the Piankeshaw Tribe. Its second article stated that "the Piankeshaw tribe acknowledges explicitly the right of the of the Kaskaskia Tribe to sell the country which they have lately ceded to the United States," followed by a geographical description of the ceded land.[45] An 1805 treaty that involved the Pottawatomi, Miami, Eel River, Wea, and Delaware Tribes did the same thing. Its fifth article read, "The Pattawatimas,[46] Miami, Eel River, and Wea tribes explicitly acknowledge the right of the Delawares to sell the tract of land conveyed to the

44 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 58.

45 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 222, 225.

46 *Potawatomi, Potawatomis, Pattawatimas,* and *Potawatimies* all refer to the same Tribe. *Pattawatimas* and *Potawatimies* are used to reflect the spellings found in the source material. *Potawatomi* and *Potawatomis* reflect modern conventions.

United States."[47] In these cases, land cessions made by one tribe would impact other tribes. Some tribes had to abide by the land cessions made by other tribes. This was especially important if these other tribes thought they had a claim to the land another tribe had sold. Therefore, in order "to make these cessions more secure, the governor [Harrison] obtained a release from other tribal claimants to some of these lands."[48] Also, at some of his large treaty councils, Harrison would invite tribes who had little to no interest in the land being discussed. Since these tribes had nothing to lose, they enthusiastically pushed reluctant tribes to reach a deal.[49] Beyond merely solidifying the acquisition among other tribes, these articles would remove any other claims to the land. If the tribes involved in these treaties had any interest in the land another tribe had ceded, they forfeited it with these treaties.

Although Harrison acquired much land from the Native Americans, he did not hate them. He sympathized with some of their problems and tried to reduce Native Americans' drunkenness. Harrison wrote to the secretary of war, "I wish I could say that the Indians were treated with justice and propriety," but they were not.[50] The primary grievances included that white juries would not convict white men of murdering Native Americans, settlers had settled past treaty lines, settlers illegally destroyed game animals on Indian lands, and the pervasive drunkenness among the Native Americans. In short, it is unsurprising that the Native Americans would like anyone better than the United States. Harrison knew this and noted these grievances to the secretary of war.[51]

47 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 64.
48 Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly,* 120.
49 Collins, *William Henry Harrison,* 31-32.
50 Collins, *William Henry Harrison,* 31.
51 Collins, *William Henry Harrison,* 31.

Harrison most actively combated the problem of drunkenness. It was common practice for white traders to sell liquor to Native Americans and, once they were drunk, cheat them out of the animal skins they had collected. Harrison issued a proclamation banning the sale of liquor to Native Americans. At the time, the territorial legislature agreed, but it would only go into effect if Kentucky, Ohio, and Louisiana did the same. They did not, and this never became a law.[52] Consequently, Harrison's efforts to prevent settlers from acting dishonestly were thwarted.

Harrison's hatred for alcohol also applied to his treaty councils. He took steps to prevent alcohol from being present or influencing these councils. Also, Harrison did not need alcohol to achieve his goals. He was too clever for that. His methods were on full display during a treaty in 1809 that was negotiated at Fort Wayne. Harrison negotiated with the Delaware, Potawatomi, Miami, and Eel River Tribes. For this treaty, Harrison made an exception to his long-held rule of banning alcohol during these negotiations, but that was not the key to his success.[53] Harrison did not need to rely on alcohol to secure land cessions.

The negotiations for the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne were complicated and featured the Potawatomi, Miami, Delaware, and Eel River tribes. The Potawatomis present were ready and willing to accept the treaty, while the Miamis were unwilling to sell. Consequently, these Tribes argued with each other as negotiations began.[54] The Miamis were particularly adamant that they be paid two dollars per acre instead of simply an individual sum for a large swathe of land. Harrison countered that suggestion by "saying that if the government purchased land by the acre,

52 Collins, *William Henry Harrison,* 31.

53 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 424, 428.

54 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 428.

they would only take the best lands, leaving the poor ones to the Indians. Large-tract purchases allowed the Indians payment for bad lands as well as good."[55] Essentially, Harrison argued that large tract purchases were better for the Indians because poor-quality lands would be sold, and they would be fairly compensated for good and bad land. Harrison explained that "anyone suggesting selling by the acre was an enemy of both the Miamis and the United States."[56] Harrison also declared that he was done waiting for their decision, and the council would end if the treaty were not signed the next day. This was significant because Harrison had not distributed these tribes' annuities yet.[57] The Potawatomis especially needed their annuities. Harrison noted, "the poverty and wretchedness of the Potawatomies made them extremely desirous of a treaty at which they expected to have their most pressing wants relieved."[58] Consequently, Harrison's tactics succeeded, and the Tribes signed the treaty. Harrison reported to the secretary of war that these cessions resulted in over two and half million acres at less than two cents per acre.[59] This starkly contrasts the Miamis' demand for two dollars per acre.

The treaty was typical of Harrison's work. Article One detailed a land cession that involved all four Tribes, Article Three created an annuity, and Article Four reaffirmed the Treaty of Greenville's annuity and hunting rights policies. However, Article Five stated, "the consent of the Wea tribe shall be necessary to complete the title to the first tract of land here ceded; a separate convention shall be entered into between them and the United States."[60] The Weas were

55 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 429-430.
56 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 430.
57 Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," 430.
58 Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly,* 119.
59 Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly,* 123.
60 Prucha, *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 71-72.

not part of this treaty council, and all four Tribes were part of the first land cession detailed in Article One. The result was that the Weas would face irresistible pressure from four Tribes to accept the land cession. Article Nine was similar. It involved a different tract of land and the Kickapoos instead of the Weas.[61] While Harrison would achieve his immediate goal of securing the land cession, his exclusion of other tribes who had claims to the land would haunt him later.

Although the Native Americans entered these legally binding treaties, these treaties were not unchallenged. While tribes like the Miami would challenge the terms during negotiations, there were hostile challenges. These challenges climaxed in the Spring of 1810 when a group of Indians who lived at Prophet's Town refused to receive their salt annuity. Furthermore, they rudely treated those who delivered the salt and called them "American Dogs."[62] This group of Native Americans decided to break off their dependence on the American government. They refused the annuities that created dependence and pushed towards their independence.

By August of 1810, the situation had intensified. Tecumseh had arrived at Vincennes with seventy-five warriors, beginning ten days of negotiations with Harrison. Tecumseh's speeches were recorded at Harrison's request. However, Harrison was skeptical of the unnamed "gentleman" he had employed to translate them. Harrison wrote to the Secretary of War, William Eustis, "the interpreter speaks very bad English, and is not very remarkable for clearness of intellect, although faithful in the highest degree, and in the knowledge of the Indian language unrivalled."[63] Harrison did not include all of Tecumseh's speeches on the first two days in his

61 *Indian treaties, and laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs,* 73.

62 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 440.

63 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 442.

letter to the Secretary of War because they "were sufficiently insolent, and his pretensions arrogant.[64]" Despite all the caveats Harrison acknowledged, the translator he hired recorded a cohesive argument from Tecumseh, whose criticisms stemmed logically from the treaties and their resulting conditions. The translator likely did accurate work or at least captured the essence of Tecumseh's speeches.

Tecumseh's speech from August 20, 1810, in Harrison's letter to the Secretary of War, cites the treaty of Greenville. The translator wrote that Tecumseh said, "since the peace [of Greenville, in 1795] was made, you have killed some of the Shawanee**s**, Winnebagoes, Delawares, and Miamis; and you have taken our lands from us; I do not see how we can remain at peace with if you continue to do so."[65] Tecumseh stated that all the land cession treaties since the Treaty of Greenville were a source of conflict. Not only was the Treaty of Greenville a turning point in American policy toward the Native Americans, but it was also a turning point for the Native Americans. Tecumseh recognized the Treaty of Greenville and what came after it as a source of conflict. Tecumseh also reports that the settlers had killed Native Americans from a variety of tribes, which should not happen following a peace treaty. Consequently, these things needed to change. Otherwise, the Native Americans and the settlers would no longer be at peace.

Later in his speech, Tecumseh argued that the sale of land to the American government was illegitimate. Tecumseh stated, "this land that was sold, and the goods that were given for it, was only done by a few. The treaty was afterward brought here, and the Weas were induced to

64 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 442.

65 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 442.

give their consent because of their small numbers."[66] Tecumseh argued that since only a few people were involved in the negotiations, it should not affect the rest of the people who had nothing to do with it. He goes on to explain that the Weas were pressured to accept it because they did not have the strength to challenge it, which resulted from Harrison's excluding them from the initial negotiations. The Weas were not the only group pressured to accept it. According to Tecumseh, "the treaty at Fort Wayne was made through the threats of Win-a-mac [the Potawatomi chief]."[67] Essentially, the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne was made through dishonest coercion and should not be honored.

Further in his speech, Tecumseh claimed that "those that did sell, did not own it...these tribes set up a claim; but the tribes with me will not agree to their claim."[68] Tecumseh reminded Harrison that one cannot sell what one does not own. Since those who sold the land did not own it, their sale was illegitimate. Tecumseh and the tribes with him refused to acknowledge the claims other tribes had on the land they sold. Consequently, those tribes had no right to sell it, and they must be restored to the Native Americans. If not, Tecumseh warned Harrison that "it will appear as if you wished me to kill all the chiefs that sold you the land. I tell you so, because I am authorized by all the tribes to do so" and went on to describe that he would do this when all the warriors met "in two or three moons from this."[69] Tecumseh told Harrison that he would kill the chiefs who sold land unless Harrison restored the land to the Native Americans. If Harrison

66 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 443.
67 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 443.
68 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 443.
69 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 443-444.

did not restore the land, it would be like he killed those chiefs himself. Tecumseh held Harrison personally responsible for all that happened in and around Indiana Territory, even though Harrison was executing Jefferson's Republican vision for the frontier.

While the situation did not worsen, it did not improve. Harrison and Tecumseh met the following two days. On August twenty-second, only Harrison and his interpreter met Tecumseh at his camp. In a calmer setting, Tecumseh reiterated his complaints. Harrison told Tecumseh that the President of the United States, now James Madison, would not acknowledge those complaints. Tecumseh said he hoped the "Great Spirit will put sense enough into his head to induce him to direct to give up the land."[70] While Tecumseh's desires did not change, if he did not already understand Harrison was accountable to the President, he did then. Tecumseh forebodingly continued, "It is true, he is so far off he will not be injured by the war. He may sit still in his town and drink his wine, while you and I will have to fight it out."[71] And that is what happened. This was only the beginning of tension that led to war and the Tippecanoe campaign, which became Harrison's claim to fame and pushed him to the presidency.[72]

In conclusion, American treaty-making with the Indian tribes in Indiana Territory was built on creating dependence on the American government and American goods, chiefly through annuities. Jefferson pursued the frontier to protect the young American Republic from foreign threats and expand his Republican ideals. Harrison's background in Indian warfare and treaty-making made him the ideal choice to govern the new territory and pursue land cessions.

70 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 446.
71 Dillon, *A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of its Territorial Government in 1816*, 447.
72 Collins, *William Henry Harrison*, 47.

Although Harrison sympathized with the Indians, his tactics were cunning. He exploited existing tensions, created new ones, and capitalized on withholding annuities. His numerous treaties gained much land for the United States and achieved many of Jefferson's goals. However, his clever but unfair tactics propelled American and Indian relations towards war. Harrison left a lasting impact on America's first frontier and shaped the Great Lakes Region, especially the modern state of Indiana, in its earliest days.

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