

Swinging for Success: How Cities Use Sports Facilities as Economic Development Tools

By Kyle W. Bell

Although the city of South Bend is divided by race, economics, education and politics, it is brought together by many civic, cultural and entertainment events. For a city of its modest size, South Bend boasts a 5,000 seat minor league baseball stadium, a nationally known College Football Hall of Fame, a convention center, two large downtown hotels, the Morris Civic Theater, Palais Royale, and East Race. The nearby Notre Dame campus serves as the city's jobs engine, the largest single employer in St. Joseph County, as well as its main attraction for outside visitors.

Official attempts to lure tourists and citizens downtown have culminated into two major projects: Stanley Coveleski Stadium and the College Football Hall of Fame. While industrial factories shuttered on the edges of downtown, city leaders looked to sports themed development as a savior for the city. However, sports-related development in downtown South Bend has proven to be less stimulative to the local economy than claimed by its advocates. Past and current mayors, local media and the corporate elite within South Bend have overstated the economic benefits of projects funded with taxpayer dollars while problems have been understated.

This paper will examine the claims made by city officials, civic boosters, and local media on the economic benefits of sports-related development. Past research has been conclusive in finding little connection between economic growth and the development of new stadiums. This paper will apply the same standards and methods on South Bend to determine whether these undertakings were worthy investments for the city to pursue on behalf of its citizens.

Much research has been done on the topic of economic development in downtowns. While the city of South Bend does not have a considerable amount of past academic research on the topic, larger cities such as Chicago, Detroit and Phoenix have all drawn the attention of political scientists. These cities have focused on reshaping their downtowns to lure in tourists and potentially new residents by building large-scale stadiums, entertainment venues, convention centers, casinos and other attractions (Eisinger 2000, 322). The leaders of South Bend have taken a similar approach on a smaller scale.

American cities were once in a position where they could provide basic services without needing to invest heavily in self-promotion and attracting major entertainment venues. Their industrial prowess and the jobs that came with it ensured a thriving cultural scene funded outside of the city's coffers. Following the de-industrialization of many American cities, public expenditures on stadium and entertainment related development skyrocketed in a hope to attract tourists. Thirteen of the cities undertaking stadium development after 1970 were actually losing population (Eisinger 2000, 320).

Spirou and Bennett (2003) argue that one strategy of attracting investment centers of entertainment, gaming and sports in downtown redevelopment (14). These "culture industries" are often publicly financed in the hope of "capturing the discretionary spending" of both local residents and tourists. Investments in physical infrastructure for the arts also serve the purpose of helping cities to compete "with communities that depend on natural amenities, such as hospitable climates or seaside locations" (2003, 15). Cities that spend money on entertainment, sports facilities and the arts have a competitive advantage over their rivals in attracting private investment.

Spirou and Bennett claim that sports facilities are similar to arts and other culture industries in that they promote social space: "Professional sports franchises have assumed a central role in expressing civic achievement, and sports arenas are the locales in which these cultural symbols are observed, packaged, marketed and purchased" (2003, 17). Sports have ascended as important cultural industries at the same time economies shifted from industrial to postindustrial. This is true in places like Chicago, as well as in smaller cities, which have lost significant numbers of manufacturing jobs.

The tangible benefits of stadium development may include the creation of social space: jobs, tax revenue from ticket sales, food purchases, hotel reservations and employee salaries and publicity for the city (Spirou & Bennett 2003, 21). There are downsides as well. Corporate ownership has meant that the once solid relationship between a family-owned team and a city are replaced with concerns about the bottom line. "Currently, more than fifty public companies own at least a portion of the 89 franchises in these three leagues (MLB, NBA and NHL), and the future is likely to bring complete corporate control of those teams" (Spirou & Bennett 2003, 18). Many of these are communication giants seeking to maximize revenue through exclusive television contracts and merchandising.

Increased corporate ownership of major league teams, as well as the strategy of cities to attract them, has led to enormous amounts of public money being spent on the construction of new stadiums. The proportion of publicly owned sports stadiums increased from 70 to 80 percent between the years of 1970 to 1990 (Spirou & Bennett 2003, 19). Between 1990 and 1998, there were 19 professional sports stadiums built and financed with at least 50 percent public money or more (Eisinger 2000, 320). "Driven by intense inter-municipal competition, huge public investments have aimed to retain or attract professional sports franchises" (Spirou & Bennett 2003, 19). Smaller cities feel the pressure as well, fearing the loss of minor league teams to cities promising new publicly subsidized stadiums.

Spirou and Bennett found that "Coalitions of city officials, civic boosters, and team owners are at the heart of the construction boom in sports facilities" (2003, 20). Much of the construction costs fall on taxpayers through increased taxes and bonds. Teams and franchise owners play cities against each other to win inducements. Rarely do voters have a direct say on whether public funds should be used for the construction of these facilities.

These coalitions acted as civic boosters in order to attract new sports franchises and have been referenced by other scholars. In "Competitive Boosterism: How Milwaukee Lost the Braves," Glen Gendzel explains how civic boosterism is ingrained in American culture: "Cities themselves played a cutthroat game in which competition for baseball franchises might be considered the ultimate World Series. That game was competitive boosterism: the active participation of local elites in luring trade, industry and investment to their own cities from elsewhere, in a zero-sum Darwinian contest (531)."

Mark S. Rosentraub compares sports teams to welfare recipients (1999, 1). The "true welfare kings and queens of America are the players and owners" of sports franchises. The existence of a welfare system for teams is due to three factors: leagues controlling the number of teams, leagues restricting the number of teams in the largest markets and the lack of revenue sharing for luxury seating, food, etc., which put smaller markets at a competitive disadvantage (5). He also criticizes the fact that cities contribute vast amounts of money to subsidize stadiums, while not receiving any ticket revenue in return (15).

Fort Wayne, a mid-sized city that acts as a recreation hub for the surrounding region, is used as an example by Rosentraub in *Major League Losers*. Would money spent at the stadium have been spent elsewhere in the city? He finds that only 11.9% of revenue from the new stadium in Fort Wayne is "real growth" for the economy (135). New tax revenue generated was only \$121,000 to \$135,000 a year (189). It would take fourteen years just to recover the cost of the original stadium.

Peter Eisinger argues that the economic effects of the developments are, at best, "highly localized" and in many cases have a negative effect on the city. "Cost overruns in the construction phase, high public subsidies for operating expenses and debt service, sweetheart deals for professional sports team owners, overoptimistic job creation projections... and the absence of evidence that new entertainment venues actually increase total regional entertainment spending mean that such projects almost never pay for themselves" (2000, 318).

Timothy W. Collins and Sara Grineski (2007) also criticize publicly financed stadium development in central cities. Studying Phoenix, Arizona, Collins and Grineski found that "private-public coalition

have sought to construct sports stadiums with local public subsidies based on the argument that revenues will spill over and generate broad-based benefits, or lead to the revitalization of declining downtown districts (2007, 24).” However, they concluded, “despite the large public investment in downtown Phoenix, redevelopment has not stimulated broad-based community development.”

My research will expand upon past undertakings by academics in the field. The same concepts can be applied to South Bend where public expenditures have paid for Coveleski Stadium and the College Football Hall of Fame. Promises of jobs, tourists and the projects paying for themselves were heard from public officials and private interests that directly benefited from the projects, just as they have been in other cities. At least in the case of the College Football Hall of Fame, these promises never materialized, as my research will show. A coalition of public officials, private developers and the National Football Foundation pushed for the public's financing of the Hall of Fame in South Bend. In that sense, South Bend falls right in line with the findings in other cities of a larger size.

Three mayors have presided over South Bend since the 1980s: Roger Parent, Joseph Kernan and Stephen Luecke. Each of them have been integral players in redevelopment decisions for downtown South Bend. Mayor Parent was involved in the planning and construction of the stadium; Mayor Kernan with the early years of the South Bend White Sox (now known as the Silver Hawks); and Mayor Luecke with securing the Silver Hawks' place in South Bend with the transfer of ownership to Former Mayor Kernan, as well as current plans for expansion of Coveleski Stadium.

Mayor Parent was deeply involved as stadium plans were revealed to the public. He worked with the franchise owners Robert and Debby Staley to bring an expansion team in the Midwest League of Professional Baseball Clubs to South Bend (Bradford 1985). Initial plans called for a 5,000-7,500 seat stadium that would cost an estimated \$5 million. It would be located across the street from the old Union Station in what was known at the time as Plaza Park.

The goal of the mayor was to open up as quickly as possible. “We're shooting for the 1986 season,” Mayor Parent told the South Bend Tribune. That would be just one year from the date that they announced plans for the stadium. The franchise owners had committed to South Bend and the city to the creation of a stadium, but no major league club had agreed to affiliate with the new minor league team at the time of the announcement.

The stadium “should be funded on at least a countywide basis since it will have regional impact and attraction. I have been seeking the food and beverage tax for economic development purposes and the Stadium project fits marvelously in this picture,” Parent said (Bradford 1985). Yet approval from the Indiana General Assembly was required in order to pass such a tax.

Financing for the stadium was not secured until 1986, which is when construction finally began. The final cost, \$11 million, was twice as much as the original estimate. Not only was the project over budget, its time line for construction was missed by a year and the start of play by two years. As discussed, this is typical of sports stadiums across the country.

The South Bend White Sox began to play at Coveleski Stadium in April 1988. There are now over 200 teams involved in Minor League Baseball across all of the classes, including teams in the United States, Canada and Mexico. The South Bend franchise is a Class-A team in the Midwest League, along with cities of similar size such as Peoria, Illinois and Davenport, Iowa.

In terms of ticket sales, the South Bend White Sox/Silver Hawks and the building of Coveleski Stadium have been a success for the city. 258,424 visitors attended games in 1994, a record setting year for the franchise (“South Bend's Coveleski Stadium”). This compares favorably to the record attendance in other cities across the Midwest League, roughly in the middle and well in line with numbers from cities of similar size (see Table 1). According to official statistics from Minor League Baseball, eight teams in the Midwest League have had higher attendance records than South Bend.

City	City Population	Metro Population	Attendance Record	Year of Record	Year Stadium Opened	Capacity
South Bend, IN	107,789	316,663	258,424	1994	1988	5,000
Davenport, IA	98,359	376,160	260,471	1994	1989*	4,024
Peoria, IL	112,936	372,487	275,673	2008	2002	7,500
Midland, MI	41,685	82,874	324,564	2007	2007	3,500
Ft. Wayne, IN	205,727	390,156	378,529	2009	2009	8,100
Geneva, IL	19,515	404,119	523,222	2001	1991	7,400
Lansing, MI	119,128	447,728	538,325	1996	1996	11,215
Grand Rapids, MI	197,800	740,482	547,401	1996	1994	11,123
Dayton, OH	166,179	848,153	593,663	2004	2000	8,000

Source: Midwest League “Attendance Records”, U.S. Census (2000)

*Major renovations of existing stadium

The table above was organized by attendance record, but as can be clearly seen, the metro population is almost in perfect order as well (other than for Midland, Michigan and Peoria, Illinois). Not only do the size of these metro areas vary, with all of them other than Midland being larger than South Bend, the capacity of the stadiums are generally larger as well. For instance, the new stadium built in Fort Wayne holds 8,100 people (“Parkview Field”). That is 3,100 more people per game that can visit a Fort Wayne Tin Caps game than can visit a Silver Hawks game.

As one would suspect, Fort Wayne achieved its attendance record in the same year that it opened its new, larger ballpark. It is not a coincidence that most of the attendance records for these teams were set within years of their stadium's opening. Three of the nine teams listed in Table 1 had their records set in the year that the stadium opened. There is a strong correlation between when a ballpark opens and when record attendance is set.

The record for both the Davenport team and the South Bend team was set in 1994, the same year of a Major League Baseball strike. While it would appear that the strike had a positive affect on attendance in these two cities, it happened on August 11 and would not likely have been the sole cause of such a spike in interest (“1994 strike”). Since 1994, however, sales have declined precipitously. The past three seasons have marked the lowest attendance in the history of the franchise.

While the attendance numbers were generally positive for the South Bend Silver Hawks throughout much of the team's history, one aspect of the original plans envisioned that have thus far failed is the supposed spillover towards economic development in the immediate area around the ballpark. Indeed, the city owns most of the land and has continued to acquire more. Most recently the city of South Bend purchased the former Gates Chevy World building, which was then promptly demolished. All that stands there now is an empty lot. Instead of bustling activity of fans flocking from the stadium to nearby attractions, Coveleski is surrounded by parking lots and parcels of land with nothing on them.

Coveleski Stadium has not been a driver of economic development in downtown South Bend to date, but plans for the future could bring change (“Coveleski Redevelopment”). The city owns 17 contiguous acres of land around the stadium. It wants “to encourage new mixed-use development near the stadium and enhance its connection with the core of downtown” (“Coveleski Redevelopment”). The goals of the city are to increase the density of downtown, expand economic activity around the stadium and strengthen the connection between the stadium and downtown, among other things.

Part of the plan calls for a new center field entrance that will make the stadium more accessible to downtown. The city envisions the “creation of a park-like entrance at the corner of Lafayette Boulevard and Western Avenue” (“Coveleski Redevelopment”). The current entrance, in the far southwest side of downtown, is on the opposite end of where

the proposed new entrance would be located. Along with the new entrance will be "a team store, concession stands and restrooms," as well as 360 degree seating.

Considering research discussed above, it would be naive to put too much weight into plans that have not yet come to fruition. However, if the city does manage to reinvigorate the area around the stadium, it certainly would go a long way in preserving the stadium's reputation as an entertainment center for the region. It could also help create an atmosphere of growth for a downtown that has been in economic decline for decades.

The College Football Hall of Fame is a completely different story from Coveleski Stadium. Centered at the heart of downtown, the Hall of Fame has taken prime real estate and a building that cost the city \$14 million dollars. The city pays \$1.6 million each year on the bonds for the building through 2017, although that figure includes expenses related to improvements that took place at the Century Center. The fact that the College Football Hall of Fame is in the process of leaving South Bend for Atlanta, Georgia is the most convincing evidence that it was a failed attempt at economic development.

South Bend was not the first city where the Hall of Fame failed to live up to its promise. As reported by United Press International on July 13, 1992: "The hall first opened in 1978 in Kings Island, Ohio, but attendance has slipped, with less than one-tenth the projected 300,000 annual visitors coming to the shrine before its close in January." The National Football Foundation, in charge of operations at the Hall of Fame, blamed the location next to King's Island for their woes in the Cincinnati region. "We're now in a location that's totally different," NFF executive director Bob Casciola said of South Bend. "We're in a college town, and a lot of people come through South Bend for a variety of reasons. You only have to draw a small percentage of them (for the hall to succeed)."

Some South Bend residents were tuned into the past failures of the NFF. Jim Cierzniak, a resident of South Bend and Notre Dame graduate, was among the most vocal critics to the Hall of Fame. Cierzniak derided the project as the "mother of all white elephants" and predicted that "we'll have an unusable building downtown and a big tax bill to pay (Klein 1992)". Ultimately, the objections of residents like Cierzniak were ignored by South Bend's elected officials.

Mayor Joseph Kernan was instrumental in bringing the College Football Hall of Fame to South Bend. He made rosy projections similar to those made at the King's Island location in Ohio while discussing the potential of a South Bend College Football Hall of Fame. In July 1992, Kernan estimated in an USA Today article that the Hall of Fame "will attract at least 200,000 visitors a year." He noted that the opening of the Hall of Fame was scheduled for the Friday before the Notre Dame-Michigan game. He also declared that "Cooperstown is great for the sports fan, but this one will appeal to everyone" (Klein 1992).

Mayor Kernan certainly did not lack bravado in his assertions. Perhaps his confidence was part of the reason why the city of South Bend was selected over 89 other cities that were competing for the rights to host the College Football Hall of Fame (Murphy 1992). This is consistent with arguments in "It's Hardly Sportin'" by Spirou and Bennett (2003), which suggests that stadium development is often driven by corporate interests playing cities against one another. While the Hall of Fame is not a stadium, it is a national sports attraction with similar public expenditures used to attract a private client.

The Hall of Fame was financed with a bond that the city council unanimously approved. "The issue was backed by a hotel-motel tax and bond guarantees from the NFF and a local support group called the Friends of the Hall of Fame (FHF), but officials hope corporate sponsors are found to underwrite much of the project," a USA Today article from August 25, 1995 reports. The coalition between city officials, the FHF and the NFF helped to make the College Football Hall of Fame a reality. South Bend put its budget on the line to guarantee that bond payments would be made. The project was underwritten by taxpayers who ultimately had no power to stop the project.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Mayor Kernan promised that

taxpayers would not be burdened with the bonds issued by the city. "People in the community have guaranteed (part of) the bonds. Individuals and companies stepped forward and said, 'We agree with the plan and the project.' We have enough layers of protection that this is not going to show up on somebody's tax bill" (Carey 1995).

The College Football Hall of Fame opened on August 25, 1995 to much fanfare and media coverage. The South Bend Tribune noted that a crowd of 1,825 gathered at the Century Center for a \$65 plate dinner celebrating the event. The dinner attracted Indiana Lieutenant Governor Frank O'Bannon, University of Michigan Hall of Fame inductee Ron Johnson and other former college football stars (Haugh 1995). The following day saw a parade and the dedication of the Hall of Fame broadcast on ESPN 2. The festivities concluded with fireworks and a laser show.

A year after it opened, one writer summarized the Hall of Fame this way: "It lost money, attendance figures were lower than expected and the corporate sponsors never materialized" (Armour 1996). Attendance was far off from the 200,000 that was promised by Mayor Kernan. "Luring the College Football Hall of Fame to a football hotbed like South Bend may have seemed a natural move four years ago, but city officials are having a harder time figuring out how to convince the rest of the country to come here and see it," Don Porter (1996) wrote in the South Bend Tribune. Only 115,000 people visited the College Football Hall of Fame in its first year in South Bend. After that, attendance plummeted. Annual attendance hovered around 60,000 visitors (Associated Press 2009).

The National Football Foundation was quick to respond to criticisms in the media. "I know people are questioning the attendance figures and the corporate sponsors. But it's too soon to question that," Bob Casciola, executive director of the NFF said. "We're not at all discouraged about anything. We think we've got a great facility, and now it's our job to let more people know about it" (Armour 1996). The pattern of promises without deliverance is a frequent occurrence with the NFF.

Corporate sponsors were slow to come to the city's rescue. Burger King made a \$600,000 contribution, while Bayer paid \$250,000 and the U.S. Postal Service \$450,000, all of them over the course of three years. As a result of the Hall of Fame's struggling attendance and corporate sponsorships, the South Bend Common Council passed a \$1 million loan by a vote of 8-1 using surplus city funds to pay for national advertising over the course of two years (Porter 1996). The NFF contributed \$1 million of its own to pay for the advertising effort, winning a waiver from city officials that would have guaranteed up to \$4.5 million in bond payments if corporate sponsorships never materialized. The city also waived a \$2.5 million bond repayment pledge from a nonprofit known as Friends of the College Football Hall of Fame in exchange for a \$500,000 donation over five years (Porter 1996).

Some city officials stated that while a balanced budget was the goal of the city for the Hall of Fame, it was unrealistic after one year. "We have to treat the Hall of Fame as a developing commodity. It's not a hot commodity right out of the box. We are in the business of selling a product, and we need a sales staff to do it," City Controller Kevin Horton told the South Bend Tribune (Porter 1996). In each year of its fifteen year history, the Hall of Fame saw red ink.

After a long 15 year stay, the National Football Foundation announced its plans at a press conference in September 2009 to build a new College Football Hall of Fame facility in Atlanta, Georgia. South Bend's Mayor Stephen Luecke responded to the news saying that he was "deeply disappointed" by NFF's decision. "The hall has been a great asset for our community. It has provided national exposure for us and it's contributed to the revitalization of South Bend," Luecke told the Associated Press. "I think they feel being in a larger city perhaps will give them better exposure." The College Football Hall of Fame is scheduled to remain in South Bend through the end of 2010.

Sports development in cities has become far more prevalent in the past thirty years. Moving from an industrialized economy to one focused, at least in part, on luring tourists has led to publicly subsidized

stadiums and attractions such as the College Football Hall of Fame. Team owners and organizations like the National Football Foundation have used taxpayer money for their own benefit, while touting economic benefits that are greatly exaggerated.

There are tangible and intangible benefits to these types of developments. Small numbers of jobs can be created and are often low paying. New tax revenue is generated, although not much, as demonstrated by Fort Wayne. In the case of the College Football Hall of Fame, tax revenue was lost due poor attendance. Perhaps the intangibles are more difficult to quantify. In 2009, Silver Hawks players spent some 200 hours in the South Bend community reading to students and visiting sick patients (Lesar 2010). Certainly this is not something that can be used to justify an \$11 million stadium, but it is a benefit nonetheless. Likewise, the stadium acts as a place for citizens to gather, enjoy a baseball game and provide their families with safe entertainment.

Another community benefit that Coveleski Stadium provides that the College Football Hall of Fame does not is that it has been used for multiple purposes other than baseball. Events like the annual Enshrinement Festival at the Hall of Fame do not deviate from the college football theme. Coveleski Stadium is seen as a community asset where residents can gather for various events, including fireworks, concerts and political rallies. Former Mayor Joe Kernan, the current owner of the South Bend Silver Hawks, introduced Hillary Clinton wearing a team jersey during an April 27, 2008 campaign rally held at Coveleski Stadium (Stephens 2008).

Rock music legends John Mellencamp, Bob Dylan and Willie Nelson excited a crowd at Coveleski Stadium on July 4, 2009. Event organizers told the South Bend Tribune that "at least 300 people from the South Bend area are working the show" (Shumway 2009). They claimed that among the jobs created were "parking, concessions, security, ticket-taking, and stage construction." While the case for temporary jobs is a weak economic benefit to the city, the July 4 concert highlights the diversity of events held at Coveleski Stadium. It clearly demonstrates how Coveleski Stadium, affectionately called "The Cove" by city residents, acts as a center for community engagement.

Meanwhile, the College Football Hall of Fame has suffered from low attendance and a lack of community support. Despite the Hall of Fame being open year-round, Coveleski Stadium routinely attracts more than double the visitors during the Silver Hawks' 70 game home season. The College Football Hall of Fame serves little community purpose. With few other tourist attractions in downtown South Bend, the Hall of Fame has struggled to attract visitors outside of the Notre Dame football season. Those that have attended have virtually no reason to pay a second visit.

Making matters worse for the city were a series of poor decisions regarding the responsibilities that the NFF and other organizations would take. Luring the Hall of Fame with a brand new building, paid for with a bond, put taxpayers on the hook for a \$14 million project. As previously noted, in exchange for a \$1 million marketing effort, the city waived \$4.5 million worth of bond payments and a similar \$500,000 donation nullified a \$2.5 million agreement with a nonprofit related to the Hall of Fame. Today, the city contemplates what to do with a building that will be empty by the end of 2010.

It is beyond the scope of this study to conclude whether Coveleski Stadium was a worthwhile investment. However, it is fair to say that the economics behind stadium development are questionable at best. This is borne out in both past research and in this research paper. However, the justifications used were not nearly as pronounced for Coveleski Stadium as they were for the College Football Hall of Fame. For the Hall of Fame, the promised attendance never materialized the sponsorships that would fund marketing and administrative purposes largely failed and the community as a whole never felt a connection to the Hall of Fame. Perhaps that is why Coveleski could be considered a success story and the Hall of Fame a disappointing lesson in mismanagement of public funds. Games and events at Coveleski Stadium are a community event while the Hall of Fame is simply a tourist trap.

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