of much present day thinking about the "imperial presidency." In this serious study of Beard's ideas on foreign policy Kennedy has succeeded in showing the contemporary relevance of a great historian.

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Contrary to accepted belief, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not make futile and bungling efforts to reshape the political philosophy of his party while he was president. Rather, as the title of this well written study suggests, he basically agreed with the philosophy of his party on domestic policies and, while he piloted the Republicans to a relatively united internationalist stance in foreign affairs, there emerged during the first two years of his administration a "return and reaffirmation of traditional Republicanism" (p. 237).

Using quantitative techniques, Reichard divides the issues of legislative history into four areas—foreign policy, fiscal and economic policy, welfare policy, and power and resource development—to ascertain the extent of Republican agreement on the Eisenhower programs. After defining the principal issues that Eisenhower either presented or endorsed, he then examines the roll call votes to determine the opposition or support by Republicans and Democrats, individually and collectively, in the Eighty-third Congress. He demonstrates rather conclusively that, although the Republicans controlled this Congress by a bare majority, Eisenhower obtained enactment of most of his programs by aggressively acquiring the support of his party leaders, the vast majority of Republican congressmen, and many southern and border state Democrats who agreed with traditional Republican philosophy. Reichard further demolishes two contradictory myths: that Eisenhower was disinterested and incompetent in politics, and thus was an ineffective party leader, and that he reshaped his party's thinking in foreign and domestic policies.
The research is thorough, both in primary and secondary sources, and the judgments are sound. One might argue that Reichard offers insufficient evidence for the implication that Eisenhower, rather than Sherman Adams, effectively used patronage to control party members (p. 226). Also, it is regrettable that the author did not analyze the issue of Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism. Surely this had a decisive impact upon the Republican party and also serves as an illustration of Eisenhower's acute political tactics and philosophy of leadership. These cavils aside, this is an important book that should do much to dispel the image of the thirty-fourth president as a politically inept general directed and controlled by personalities far stronger than he. One cannot help hoping that Reichard will make a similar study of the Democratically controlled Eighty-fourth Congress, where the leadership roles were reversed, and thus explain Eisenhower's continued political success in his first administration.

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