

Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy. By Thomas C. Kennedy. (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1975. Pp. xi, 199. Notes, appendix, bibliography, index. \$8.50.)

Charles A. Beard, who carved out a distinguished career as one of America's leading historians through a prolific outpouring of creative and often controversial writings, almost destroyed his professional reputation near the end of his life by the publication of two books bitterly attacking Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy and especially his role in the United States' entry into World War II. The author of this study attempts to show that the anti-Roosevelt polemics represented a natural, if somewhat intemperate, culmination of a lifetime of thinking and writing by the famous historian. Utilizing unpublished materials such as the surviving fragments of Beard's correspondence as well as the vast bibliography of publications written by and about him, Kennedy has drawn a credible portrait of a concerned scholar who during a long and active career developed a logical and generally consistent understanding of American civilization—one which embraced domestic social and economic reforms together with a severely isolationist stance in foreign affairs.

This broad survey of Beard's life and work reveals not only that his theory of "continental Americanism" was in large part an extension of the economic interpretation of history which he espoused for so long, but that its development was also influenced by such factors as the general disenchantment with Wilsonian internationalism after World War I, revisionist scholarship on the war guilt question, the impact of the Great Depression, the rise of fascism in Europe, and the disclosures of the Nye committee concerning the arms traffic. Perhaps Kennedy does not sufficiently stress Beard's iconoclastic temper and activist philosophy which led him to employ his historical writings as weapons in a struggle to affect American thinking on important issues, particularly in the area of foreign policy. But he indicates clearly how Beard's historical studies as well as his observations of the world produced strong convictions which he did not hesitate to express unequivocally in his books. One of these convictions, that an overbalance of presidential power *vis-à-vis* Congress in the making of foreign policy was a threat to constitutional government, seems to make Beard a harbinger

of much present day thinking about the "imperial presidency." In this serious study of Beard's ideas on foreign policy Kennedy has succeeded in showing the contemporary relevance of a great historian.

DePauw University, Greencastle, Ind. Clifton J. Phillips

The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-third Congress. By Gary W. Reichard. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1975. Pp. xv, 303. Notes, tables, appendixes, bibliography, index. \$14.95.)

Contrary to accepted belief, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not make futile and bungling efforts to reshape the political philosophy of his party while he was president. Rather, as the title of this well written study suggests, he basically agreed with the philosophy of his party on domestic policies and, while he piloted the Republicans to a relatively united internationalist stance in foreign affairs, there emerged during the first two years of his administration a "return and reaffirmation of traditional Republicanism" (p. 237).

Using quantitative techniques, Reichard divides the issues of legislative history into four areas—foreign policy, fiscal and economic policy, welfare policy, and power and resource development—to ascertain the extent of Republican agreement on the Eisenhower programs. After defining the principal issues that Eisenhower either presented or endorsed, he then examines the roll call votes to determine the opposition or support by Republicans and Democrats, individually and collectively, in the Eighty-third Congress. He demonstrates rather conclusively that, although the Republicans controlled this Congress by a bare majority, Eisenhower obtained enactment of most of his programs by aggressively acquiring the support of his party leaders, the vast majority of Republican congressmen, and many southern and border state Democrats who agreed with traditional Republican philosophy. Reichard further demolishes two contradictory myths: that Eisenhower was disinterested and incompetent in politics, and thus was an ineffective party leader, and that he reshaped his party's thinking in foreign and domestic policies.