

schools, and churches. This made the land a questionable bargain for the settler and his family. Gates argues strongly that in the last analysis the delayed development is traceable to federal land law, which through its pricing and sale system, made it easy for the speculator to acquire almost unlimited tracts but very difficult for the common man to start a family farm. His conclusion is paradoxical—on the one hand land speculators and money lenders hampered the democratic development of the areas controlled; on the other hand, they may have been the only possible vehicle for settlement of any kind.

Broader than the title indicates, the book touches on many other subjects, including southern investment in northern land, farming techniques, and systems of tenancy. It cites the effect of confusion over land titles on settlement in Kentucky to illustrate the importance of land law and follows the development of some major land holdings well into the twentieth century. Gates believes that systems developed before the Civil War on the prairies of Indiana and Illinois set the patterns for bonanza farms and cattle ranches in the West.

As with any collection of material not written as a unit there are repetitions of fact and interpretation, but these are overshadowed by the depth of research and strength of analysis. Detailed descriptions of many situations make this book useful to local historians as well as those interested in the broader aspects of American land policy. Simply as a collection of reprints, *Landlords and Tenants on the Prairie Frontier* would render a service to historians of land use, but Paul W. Gates' new comments make it a contribution to scholarship.

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Makers of American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger. Edited by Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974. Pp. xix, 728. Notes, illustrations, bibliographic notes, index. \$17.50.)

A key-figures approach gives unity to this important collection of essays on formulation and implementation of

American foreign policy. Convinced that "men, not abstractions such as Wall Street, the Eastern Establishment, or the United States" (p. xv), make this country's diplomacy, Editors Merli and Wilson selected twenty-five officials for scholarly scrutiny. These officials include obvious choices: Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James K. Polk, Woodrow Wilson, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. Other essays consider a succession of leading diplomats from Benjamin Franklin and John Quincy Adams to Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger. There are also portraits of naval officers Charles Wilkes and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Far East experts Willard Straight and Stanley Hornbeck, Soviet specialist George Kennan, and Senator John W. Fulbright among other influential second echelon figures.

In selecting contributors the editors also achieved considerable geographical, ideological, and generational balance. There are New Left revisionists as well as more orthodox realist and nationalist interpreters. Writers include prize winning young historians like John Gaddis and Ross Gregory and established senior scholars such as Robert Divine, Robert Ferrell, Norman Graebner, Lawrence S. Kaplan, and David M. Pletcher. Since both editors completed graduate work at Indiana University, it is not surprising that nine history graduates and faculty members from this school contributed essays, and all these selections conform to the same high professional standard.

Despite a diversity of subjects and divergent perspectives, Merli and Wilson successfully imposed a consistent pattern on the biographical sketches. Each is about twenty-five pages long and contains brief bibliographical notes but not full scholarly citations. In addition, illustrative cartoons and biographical sketches of the contributors add to the volume's usefulness as a teaching tool.

Naturally in an enterprise of this magnitude there are many controversial interpretations. Some readers, for example, will dispute Cecil Currey's conclusion that Benjamin Franklin was a self seeking corruptionist who gained coincidental benefits for America while pursuing his own ends. The volume as a whole also has certain understandable limitations—including an aura of academic exclusiveness. It should surprise no one that the policymakers whom professors opt

to write about are successful cerebrals—Franklin, Adams, Kennan, and Kissinger—not diplomatic dunderheads. A well rounded picture of American diplomacy might also include a few sketches of fumbling professors, bumbling political hacks, and hard nosed businessmen assigned to distant legations.

There are other shortcomings. About twenty-five per cent of the selections deal with the 1940s—a fact reflecting both the quantity of scholarly activity and the preoccupation of academics with Roosevelt-Truman policies. Finally, except for Michael Roskin, a former foreign service officer writing on Kissinger, the list of contributors apparently does not include writers with diplomatic or political experience.

In balance, this is an important volume—one certain to stimulate student interest in diplomatic history.

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The Progressive Era. Edited by Lewis L. Gould. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1974. Pp. x, 238. Illustrations, notes, index. Clothbound, \$9.95; paperbound, \$4.95.)

This collection of essays was designed first to give students a convenient introduction to the latest scholarship on the progressive period and second to give younger scholars an opportunity to present original interpretations. It succeeds admirably in the first goal; but, like any collection, several of the essays are not particularly pathbreaking. The common strand that unites them, as Professor Gould observes, is a more positive attitude toward the period's achievements than would have been likely in such a collection a few years ago.

Stanley P. Caine finds the origins of progressivism in the social traumas and new corporate and tax dodging abuses that accompanied the depression of 1893-1897. R. Laurence Moore argues that progressive intellectuals were naive and confused because they tried to merge conflicting goals such as science and morality, democracy and efficiency, environmentalism and free will, liberation and organization. Lewis L. Gould describes how conflicts between Republican leaders—and he particularly blames Theodore Roosevelt—destroyed