

sion for a navy, appear regularly but remain underdeveloped. Similarly, although he arbitrates among contemporary and postwar controversies surrounding battlefield choices, Mahon is generally unwilling to make parallel assessments of administrative decisions and decision makers. For example, Mahon confronts Henry Adams' and other historians' evaluations of Major General James Wilkinson's role in the War of 1812 but eschews involvement in the equally lively historiographical debate concerning the abilities of Secretary of War John Armstrong.

A more detailed analysis of the political controversies of the early national period would heighten the author's account of military affairs and reinforce his conclusion that only British preoccupation with European matters saved the Americans from a humiliating defeat. Still, Mahon's goal was not to supersede Henry Adams' synthesis of the military and political events of the war but to write an operational history of the War of 1812 that will be "definitive, for a while at least" (p. vii). This he has done.

*Idaho State University, Pocatello*      Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler

*The Papers of Henry Clay. Volume 4, Secretary of State, 1825.* Edited by James F. Hopkins; associate editor, Mary W. M. Hargreaves; assistant editors, Wayne Cutler and Burton Milward. ([Lexington]: The University Press of Kentucky, 1972. Pp. xii, 991. Frontispiece, notes, index. \$20.00.)

The first three volumes of the Clay papers in this excellent edition appeared at regular two year intervals in 1959, 1961, and 1963. These brought the career of "Harry of the West" to the end of 1824 when he had lost his first bid for the presidency yet held it within his power, or so it was thought, to determine which of his more successful rivals would become president. At this breathless moment the editors left readers in suspense for nine years before the fourth volume, covering the single year 1825, was published.

Volume 4 maintains the high standards of rigorous scholarship which were established by Hopkins and Hargreaves in dealing with the problems presented by Clay's earlier papers. His full scale plunge into diplomacy in 1825,

however, confronted them with new difficulties, which they have solved admirably. Rather than omit or repeat the official correspondence of the American State Department, the editors of the Clay papers have skillfully summarized most of it, although the letters written by Clay himself are reprinted in full and from the original manuscripts. Among the summarized documents, however, are the consular reports, which have not been published elsewhere and which give fascinating glimpses, from such exotic spots as Maracaibo, Port-au-Prince, Pernambuco, Valparaiso, Tangier, Trieste, Batavia, and the Sandwich Islands, of the burgeoning trade and widening interests of the new republic. Similarly, historians should be grateful for the space given to the ingenious letters of application and recommendation for federal patronage—an astonishing number of which came from Indiana. These are pertinent to the groping for new party affiliations which characterized this chaotic period.

The first two hundred pages of Volume 4 are largely filled with correspondence regarding Clay's role in the election of John Quincy Adams to the presidency by the House of Representatives. No revelations of any "bargain" or "corruption" emerge. Clay announced to his friends, even before 1825, that he had decided to support Adams in spite of their basic differences, and he adhered manfully to his decision in the face of growing evidence that it was unpopular.

The major interest in this book lies, of course, in Clay's voluminous correspondence dealing with the fascinating contemporary world of which young America was a part. Spain had been driven out of all her former American colonies except Cuba and Puerto Rico, yet she refused to recognize her losses and still leaned on the Holy Alliance for support. The United States and Great Britain had recognized the independence of the nine or ten new governments which had thus far surfaced in Latin America but were jealous rivals for trade and influence therein. Greece was also fighting for independence; Czar Alexander's death sent tremors throughout Europe; and the Bourbon monarchy was tottering again in France. There were border disputes with Indian tribes and neighbors to north and south; France refused to consider spoliation claims; and England kept her West Indian ports closed to American trade.

On the whole Clay handled these perplexing and delicate

issues surprisingly well. He put in long hours at the office, and he did his homework, seeking expert mercantile opinion on commercial matters which he did not fully understand. He strove to exert American influence positively in hemispheric problems and he maintained a reasonably liberal attitude toward other nations in the face of considerable provocation. It was certainly not his fault that most of these efforts failed to bear fruit.

Clay had the good fortune to live in simpler times, when the path of national destiny was clearer—and cheaper. It may therefore be appropriate to end this review on a note of nostalgia. Clay's proposed budget for 1826 may be found on page 814. Estimated expenditures for the entire foreign service of the nation for that year were \$336,645.

*Bloomington, Ill.*

Lynn W. Turner

*Democracy's Railroads: Public Enterprise in Jacksonian Michigan.* By Robert J. Parks. National University Publications Series in American Studies. Edited by James P. Shenton. (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972. Pp. 261. Notes, maps, bibliographic essay, appendices, index. \$12.50.)

Relationships between government and the antebellum economy have long attracted the attention of historians, from Louis Hartz and the Handlins to Carter Goodrich and Harry Scheiber. Robert J. Parks' study of public enterprise in Michigan is a useful addition to this large body of literature.

Michigan formally joined the internal improvements movement in 1837 when the legislature authorized construction of two canals and three railroads. By the mid-1840s, however, the state was in severe financial difficulty and decided to sell the uncompleted transportation enterprises to private interests. Contemporaries and some historians have concluded that Michigan's experiment in public enterprise was a serious mistake from beginning to end. Parks disagrees and argues that the internal improvements scheme was the only feasible solution to the state's transportation requirements and, moreover, that it had a reasonable chance of success. Much of his case rests on the Michigan Central