

land grants, the question which "more than any other dominated politics throughout Missouri's territorial period" (p. 83). His style, too, adopts a more temperate, straightforward approach which neither succumbs to stuffiness nor stoops to hackneyed literary devices.

The price of these excellent chapters is an attenuated discussion of the years following the War of 1812. Most surprising is the almost total neglect of the statehood movement which culminated in the momentous Missouri Compromise debates. There is a brief summary of nonpolitical developments for these later years, but references to political matters are so general they almost seem an introduction to the next volume, where it is assumed the subject of approaching statehood will be more particularly treated.

Criticisms here notwithstanding, within the parameters of the project in which Foley was engaged he has managed a great bulk of material well. The general reader, to whom the *Sesquicentennial History* is apparently directed, will probably consider this book a more than satisfactory rendering of the history of early Missouri, while the specialist can benefit from the concise overview of the subject and especially the model essay on sources.

Dayton, Ohio

Donald E. Baker

One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North. By Eugene C. Murdock. (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971. Pp. xi, 366. Notes, illustrations, tables, bibliographic note, index. \$10.00.)

In the Civil War, after the initial enthusiasm faded, the Federal government had to resort to extraordinary methods to secure men for service. Volunteering alone simply could not fill the ranks of a one million man army. Conscription became a necessity. In this well researched monograph Eugene Murdock describes the organization and the process of the draft machinery as well as the chicanery employed by those who turned the system to their profit. He also provides biographical vignettes of many of those involved.

The Civil War draft was an unpopular arrangement, riddled with loopholes. The Enrollment Act of 1863 was purposefully lenient and perhaps unintentionally ambiguous. This caused much confusion and difficulty in the administration of the law. Provost marshals scattered throughout the nation had to search out and identify men 20-45 years of age who were liable. When it called for men, the War Department then allowed several weeks for each district to provide its quota. If enough volunteered, there would be no conscription. If

it was necessary to draft, a local lottery determined those to go. Finally, it remained up to the provost marshals to serve notice on the drafted men.

Of the 776,829 men whose names were drawn, only 46,347 actually served in the army. That is an incredible statistic and well might cause one to question the effectiveness of the system. More than twenty per cent simply did not report while 315,509 were exempted for one reason or another. Two provisions greatly enhanced a man's chances of escaping service. During the first year of the draft he could pay a commutation fee of \$300 and not go; however, the next year, a ruling permitted only conscientious objectors to take this course. There still remained, nevertheless, the legal possibility of hiring substitutes whose prices went up drastically after the change in the commutation provision.

Unscrupulous men saw in the system opportunity to make money within and without the law. A large class of so-called brokers rapidly emerged to take a large cut of the monies available in the transactions between drafted men and their substitutes and in the government's payment of bounties to volunteers. The bounty jumpers (a few jumped as many as thirty times) were definitely lawbreakers. In many cases, however, the brokers controlled these men and collected the bulk of their ill-gotten bounties.

Those who attempted to administer the law not only had to cope with the brokers and their ilk but also frequently had to face hostility in their communities. This could be dangerous, and ninety-eight were, in fact, killed or wounded in the conduct of their duties. Copperheads in Indiana, Irish in New York, and others throughout the North who did not want to serve for various reasons made a formidable opposition. Many who were drafted resorted to almost any device to avoid service. Yet, the system worked well enough, and there were enough honest patriots to maintain the strength of Ulysses S. Grant's armies.

Professor Murdock makes the crucial point that the purpose of the Civil War draft was not to draft men but to use the threat of conscription to encourage volunteering. Thus the small number of drafted men who actually served was not an indication of the effectiveness of the measure. The fact that a million men were in the Union army in 1865 clearly demonstrates that, whatever the means, enough men were in the blue uniform to win the war. He also points out, on the basis of analysis of New York statistics, that the commutation and substitution provisions did not make the war "a rich man's war, poor man's fight." He found little correlation between the wealth of a district and the incidence of the reliance on these provisions.

It would have helped the reader if the texts of the draft laws

had been included in an appendix. Some more background on the evolution of the idea of military service obligation would also have been helpful; the Civil War draft was not as much of a "new departure" as Murdock emphasizes. The author chose to present the bulk of his material in a series of examples within topical chapters. By eliminating several examples, particularly in the chapters dealing with brokers and bounty jumpers, he could have avoided giving a redundant effect to what is a good, solid monograph—a real contribution to Civil War historiography.

The University of Wisconsin, Madison . . . Edward M. Coffman

The Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914.
By Roy V. Scott. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970.
Pp. xi, 362. Notes, bibliography, index. \$8.95.)

Several years ago Professor Scott staked out the history of farm institutes as his particular area of research. He has published several articles on their development and related activities in particular states. Now the entire story has been brought together in what probably will be regarded as the definitive work on the subject.

Agricultural education has been a complex development over America's entire history as a nation. The problem has been, at least in part, that leaders have developed various institutions to conduct research and encourage farmers to adopt new methods. At the same time farmers have been reluctant to adopt changes until they have been proven successful. Very simply, an ordinary farmer cannot afford to risk an entire year's crop on a chance he might gain.

In tracing the rise of agricultural education, Scott goes back to the gentlemen farmers and agricultural societies of the nation's first years. He follows with a brief review of the early agricultural press and the passage of the agrarian legislation of 1862. While important, these activities did not reach the ordinary farmer, at least in their early years. Instead, according to Scott, the farmers' institute movement, often related to the agricultural colleges and experiment stations, was the first educational activity to reach large numbers of farmers. The movement, stemming from diverse sources, began to succeed after at least a few farmers in a given state became interested. Actually, many of the first attempts failed, but, after successful efforts in New England, the movement spread.

Institute work in Ohio and Michigan stimulated developments in Indiana. However, after a beginning in 1882, no further effort was made in Indiana until 1889. In that year the legislature appropriated