

chiding response was nonscientific and unprofessional: "The object of this Division is not to bring the righteous, but sinners to repentance. Consequently, it matters little whether, botanically, the names we use are correct or not, while it is of the greatest importance that the practical men in whose hands the future welfare or destruction of the forest areas of this country must necessarily lie, should find themselves as much at home as possible in our publications" (p. 53). Though generally the spirit of the men in the Forest Service was remarkable, Pinchot found it difficult "to forget a man's mistakes or failures, and tended to deny to one who had stumbled an opportunity to make good" (p. 72). In addition to his shortcomings in personal relations, the chief often invited public opposition because he attempted too many changes at once (p. 74).

Pinkett provides an excellent analysis of the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy. The facts are carefully delineated. At the center was Pinchot's belief in a broad constitutional interpretation of executive and national authority. While Theodore Roosevelt was President, such a philosophy was supported. With the advent of William Howard Taft, a lawyer who held more conservative views, Pinchot's actions—often taken without specific statutory authority—were inappropriate. Pinkett contends that the chief forester became less and less a man of science and more and more a politician. Nevertheless, Pinchot's removal created a backlash which ultimately caused the resignation of Richard A. Ballinger as interior secretary. The reactions to the more recent firing of Douglas MacArthur and the dismissal of Walter Hickel combined would not equal the magnitude of public outburst over the Ballinger-Pinchot affair.

If there is a shortcoming in this superlative evaluation of a man and his cause, it is not in the research, writing, or interpretation. Yet the work would have been strengthened by a chapter carefully describing scientific forest management. The author refers to elements and characteristics, but an extensive treatment would have been desirable. Otherwise, this is a miniature masterpiece of historical biography. More than anyone to date, Pinkett has argued convincingly that despite many concerned predecessors, Gifford Pinchot deserves the title of founder of United States forestry and father of the American conservation movement.

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The Frontier Challenge: Responses to the Trans-Mississippi West.
Edited by John G. Clark. (Lawrence: The University Press of
Kansas, 1971. Pp. vii, 307. Notes. \$10.00.)

The ten papers in this volume were presented at a 1969 Conference on the History of the Trans-Mississippi West. They are concerned with what happened to the people who were involved in the frontier experience. Geography and environment are secondary, the authors find, to a faith in material progress and a longstanding American ethnocentricity.

The "urban dimension" of the American West is just beginning to receive analytical scrutiny by scholars. In the lead and leading essay Earl Pomeroy argues that western cities served as advanced bases for the exploitation and settlement of their hinterlands. Since the 1860s western states have been more urban than the nation as a whole. Vernon Carstensen suggests that the salmon fisheries and canning industry were very important to the urban development of the Pacific Coast from Oregon to Alaska. The technologically progressive salmon industry inspired the establishment of auxiliary industries. George Anderson establishes the considerable role of Kansas City in the development of the Great Plains. Not only did banks, railroads, and mails make it the dominant financial center of the region, but they gave the city a prominent place in the formulation and functioning of the Federal Reserve System.

Robert Johannsen puts Stephen A. Douglas in the forefront of the articulate political activists who translated the American mission into reality. Virtually all of Douglas' legislative accomplishments involved territorial expansion, encouragement of settlement, extension of organized government, and the improvement of transportation and communication.

Central in the westward movement was the problem of the Indian. Paul Gates shows through the antecedents of the Dawes Act of 1887 that the principal aim was to eliminate the Indian hurdle to white advance. Squaw men, whites married to Indians, were, as William Hagan shows, at the heart of reservation politics and factionalism. Active and energetic, they used their peculiar status to exploit both the Indians and their white benefactors. In the great upsurge of social reform in the 1840s efforts were made to better the status of the Indians that had been relocated westward as a consequence of the removal policy. Francis Paul Prucha credits the Indian commissioners, agents, and missionaries with laying a foundation upon which future reformers could build, despite the undermining factors suggested by Hagan and Gates.

The Kansas frontier is the basis for two studies. Oscar Winther examines efforts to attract English gentry, who looked upon the area as suitable for capital investment and as a sportsman's paradise, and indigent farm laborers and urban unemployed, who believed Kansas afforded them glowing opportunities. Alan Bogue investi-

gates the search for developmental capital for Kansas through promotional activity and regulatory legislation.

The Spanish-Americans in the Southwest, according to Rodman Paul, were primarily people far down on the social and economic ladders of their own societies. In the first half century under the American flag, however, they proved resourceful and resilient in meeting the challenge of the acquisitive and aggressive intruding groups of Anglo-Americans.

The Frontier Challenge shifts emphasis away from the traditional grist that has fed the romantic West of the pulp and movie westerns for generations. The particular strength of the volume is analysis.

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Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865. By Frank J. Merli. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970. Pp. xvi, 342. Illustrations, bibliographical essay, notes, index. \$7.50.)

The author of this work, an assistant professor at the City University of New York, set for himself the tasks of examining the responses of the British government to the Confederate attempts to build a navy in British shipyards and of relating his findings to the considerable body of scholarly studies in the field.

Most of the book is devoted to an in-depth study of the problems encountered by the Confederates in building the cruisers which took to sea, and the ironclads, including Number 61 in Scotland, which were never delivered to them. It is a story of legal wrangles, Confederate artifices to circumvent the Neutrality Act, the counter pressures of the federal government, and the consequent difficulties and embarrassments of the Palmerston government in coping with the situation.

The ingenuity of James D. Bulloch, who worked to build the navy against great odds, calls forth the admiration of the author; but he doubts that even if Bulloch had been one hundred per cent successful, it would have changed the outcome of the war. Not even the Laird Rams could have been used with effect for very long. But many factors and conditions doomed Bulloch's major efforts to failure including the ineptitude displayed by the Confederate government in administering the limited funds it had available.

In the British response to the Confederate shipbuilding program the writer finds a typical example of British "muddling through." It would appear that the British government really had no policy toward this form of private enterprise and simply took action on each