evidence and study. Citing the work of Katz to the effect that the Duke of Newcastle's appointments in New York were "abysmal" she suggests that a comparison of his appointees with those of the Marquis of Halifax, usually considered a superb administrator, would show that there was little difference between the governors nominated by the two ministers. But surely this is too limited a sample. Moreover whatever the quality of Newcastle's appointments for New York, what of William Shirley for Massachusetts and others?

Taken together these essays implicitly attack the notion that for most of the century there were American as distinct from imperial or English interests and that colonial political developments were institutional or ideological, occurring within the local rather than the imperial framework. They demonstrate further the extent to which American politicians sought to use English connections to advance their particular interests. In this respect the studies diverge from the imperial "school" which sees a pattern in the rise of the provincial legislatures at the expense of imperial and executive authority. Olson attempts to bridge this gap, but this reviewer is not convinced that there did indeed develop in England during the last two decades preceding the American Revolution pressure groups which reduced the chances for compromise and accommodation, or that separate English and American interest groups self-consciously began to develop by the middle of the century and so broke down the Anglo-colonial connection. The research done by Katz on the period before the outset of the Seven Years' War indeed goes far to confirm such a connection, but it can hardly be used to sustain an argument for developments after 1753. Nor does the work of Kammen on the years after 1755, published here and elsewhere, sustain the thesis as the operations of a host of agents, land speculators, office seekers, and merchants testify.

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Hannibal Hamlin was a respectable public mediocrity of the mid nineteenth century, a man for neither the best nor worst of times, a man of neither the best talents nor the worst incapacities. He was popular with his Maine constituents, and until he became vice president in 1860 and thus lost the patronage which was the prerogative of a senator, he assiduously kept his political fences mended. Indeed,
one of his two chief complaints about the vice presidency was that it rendered him unable to help his friends who, failing to understand that the prestige of his office carried no power with it, might mistake his inability to provide for them with an unwillingness to do so. His second complaint was the more traditional one of the futility of serving as a spare life—of having no responsibility, no influence on decisions, few duties, and those chiefly ceremonial and altogether boring. His attendance as presiding officer of the Senate, for example, was much inferior to his attendance record as a senator. In the latter position he had been able to participate in activities as a “working senator”; in the former he, and therefore others, regarded his presence as superfluous.

During Hamlin's early years as a politician he was a conscientious worker and a loyal party man for the Democracy, but by the late 1840s his opposition to the extension of slavery made him feel uncomfortable within his own party. Endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill by the Democratic National Convention provided the occasion for his transfer to the Republicans. In 1856 he campaigned energetically for John Charles Frémont and for himself as governor of Maine. The victorious state Republicans elected him to the United States Senate, and the rest was inevitable. As a former Democrat and a resident of an area complementary to the western locality of the presidential candidate, Hamlin was nominated to the ticket with Abraham Lincoln in 1860. By 1864 he had decided that another four years of idleness was preferable to challenging his old rival in Maine, William P. Frémont. Lincoln, however, had decided that there was a need to broaden the appeal of the administration by adding a southerner and a War Democrat to it. In spite of disappointment Hamlin campaigned faithfully and was rewarded with the collectorship of Boston. In 1869 he regained a Senate seat where his support of the Grant administration brought him a “portion of patronage loaves and fishes [that] satisfied even his hearty appetite” (p. 209). Hamlin closed his political career as ambassador to Spain during the administrations of James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur.

The book is an exceptionally thorough and a particularly well reasoned political biography. Apart from a few irritatingly clever thumbnail sketches the author writes both forcefully and unobtrusively. This was an exceptional period in the history of the United States; a biography of a most unexceptional and singularly unperceptive man provides a norm for the stabilization of judgment about how many people regarded and reacted to the affairs of their own time. The book is more factual than analytical, but the author's ar-
rangement of these facts in itself encourages additional thinking on
the part of the reader.

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*Roosevelt and World War II.* By Robert A. Divine. (Baltimore:  
index. $5.95.)

In this brief, overpriced volume Robert Divine offers four care-  
fully reasoned essays in which he attempts "to reappraise Roosevelt's  
policy in regard to World War II" (p. x). This material was origi-  
nally presented as the Albert Shaw Lectures in Diplomatic History  
at the Johns Hopkins University in April of 1968.

Divine differs sharply with the standard interpretation of Frank-  
lin Roosevelt as a Wilsonian internationalist who was forced to play  
a semiisolationist role in the 1930s in order to appease a vociferous  
isolationist majority. Not so at all says Divine; Roosevelt really was  
an isolationist, not out of political expediency but out of "genuine  
conviction" (p. 7). Not until the end of 1938, in the aftermath of the  
Munich crisis, did Roosevelt move in the direction of internationalism.

As for Roosevelt's alleged belief in Wilsonian notions of collective  
security, the author contends that Roosevelt steadily shifted away  
from the collective security beliefs he had professed up to 1920. Thus,  
Divine sees Roosevelt's disavowal of the League of Nations in 1932  
not so much as an expedient surrender to the demands of William  
Randolph Hearst but as "the culmination of Roosevelt's gradual dis-  
enchantment" with the League (p. 56). Disillusioned by the League's  
failure to act effectively in the 1930s, Roosevelt envisioned that the  
United States, Britain, Russia, and China would be the policemen of  
the postwar world. In light of the failure of the United Nations to  
keep the peace in the postwar years it is increasingly difficult to fault  
Roosevelt's judgment.

Neither right nor left—old or new versions—will like Divine's  
interpretation of Roosevelt's wartime relations with the Soviet Union.  
In the author's view, FDR was not a naive egotistical American poli-  
tician who thought he could charm Joseph Stalin into submission but  
a calculating pragmatist who throughout the war fought valiantly to  
preserve allied unity for the peace that was to come. Admittedly,  
Roosevelt failed to achieve this, but Divine maintains that Roosevelt's  
efforts "threw the onus for the Cold War squarely upon Stalin"  
(p. 98).

This reviewer finds Divine least persuasive when he says that  
Roosevelt was an isolationist in the 1930s. Even a cursory reading