

The Suspense Was Hell: The Senate Vote for War in 1812

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The "suspense we are in is worse than hell—!!!!" was Jonathan Robert's explosive view of the procrastination of the Senate on the question of war.¹ President James Madison had delivered his war message on June 1; the House of Representatives had decided in favor of war on June 4; but on June 17, 1812, the nation was still anxiously awaiting the decision of the Senate. Washington was excited by rumors circulating about the proceedings of the Senate and the prospect for war. Speculation was rampant because the proceedings of Congress were veiled by the rule of secrecy. It was said that Madison hoped the Senate would defeat the war bill; that the Navy would incite a hostile act on the part of the British to unite the country; that New York, which had nominated De Witt Clinton for the presidency on May 29, would remain neutral in case of war; that the British had incited the Indians into a mass attack in the West; and there were premature reports of the passage or defeat of the declaration of war.² Tension reached a high pitch. It was obvious to all that the Senate was dragging its feet in the march toward war.

The British minister in Washington, Augustus Foster, was convinced that "not four senators from north [of] the Potomac will vote for war."³ The Federalist leader in the Senate, James A. Bayard, observed on June 4 that "in the Senate no calculation can be made."⁴ And the semiofficial organ of the administration, the Washington *National Intelligencer*, declared on June 13 that "the public mind is yet in painful suspense, as to the result of their [the Senate's] deliberations."⁵ This expressive apprehension indicates that the real test of the issue of war in 1812 came in the Senate and not in the House.

Those who have investigated the events which led to the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States in 1812 have concentrated, for legitimate reasons, upon the activities and votes in the House of Representatives. The House better reflected public opinion, and its membership during the Twelfth Congress was especially interesting because

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¹ Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 17, 1812, as quoted in Roger H. Brown, *The Republic in Peril: 1812* (New York, 1964), 114-15.

² Bernard Mayo, *Henry Clay: Spokesman of the New West* (Boston, 1937), 523-24.

³ Augustus Foster to Viscount Robert Castlereagh, June 15, 1812, as quoted in Irving Brant, *James Madison: The President, 1809-1812* (Indianapolis, 1956), 475.

⁴ James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, June 4, 1812, Elizabeth Donnan (ed.), "Papers of James A. Bayard," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1913* (2 vols., Washington, 1914), II, 198.

⁵ Washington (D.C.) *National Intelligencer*, June 13, 1812.

of the presence of the War Hawks. Henry Clay himself had switched from the Senate to the House because he preferred "the turbulence . . . of a numerous body to the solemn stillness of the Senate Chamber."⁶ But the Constitution does require the Congress to declare war, not the House alone. The Senate's role in the vote for war has been neglected; it has been treated merely as a ratifying agency for the actions of the House.⁷ This was definitely *not* the case in 1812.

The usual treatment accorded the crucial vote in the Senate for war has been merely a statement that on June 17, 1812, the Senate voted for war by a majority of 19 to 13. Only two recent historians, Roger H. Brown and Bradford Perkins, have treated the vote in the Senate at any length. Both recognize the importance of the Senate debates on the issue of war. Brown feels that the opposition to war in the Senate was motivated primarily by honest differences with the Madison administration's foreign policy. Perkins emphasizes personal and political disputes between members of the Senate and the administration, rather than "honest differences."⁸

The Senate, whose members served six year terms and were chosen at that time by the state legislatures, was a more mature, a more independent, and a more conservative body than the House of Representatives. Therefore, it was, as intended by the authors of the Constitution, less subject to the influence of popular opinion. This situation helps explain why the resolution for war in 1812 faced its most critical test in the Senate. A thorough study of the Senate's membership, its factions, and its votes on the issues leading to war is vital to an understanding of the crisis which faced the nation in 1812.

Madison's first administration had been marred by serious division within the Republican party and by diplomatic failure to obtain concessions from Great Britain. In spite of Irving Brant's brilliant defense of Madison, the quality of the President's leadership is still questionable. Squabbles within his cabinet were common, and corrosive factionalism eroded party unity from the very beginning of his administration.⁹

⁶ Henry Clay to James Monroe, November 13, 1810, James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves (eds.), *Papers of Henry Clay* (3 vols., Lexington, Ky., 1959-1963), I, 498.

⁷ Reginald Horsman, "Who Were the War Hawks?" *Indiana Magazine of History*, LX (June, 1964), 121-36, deals almost exclusively with action in the House of Representatives and provides a convenient listing of the votes in the House on the issues of war. He ignores the Senate, however, and states on page 122 that the reporting of the debates of the Senate in the *Annals of Congress* is too meager to identify the senators who supported war.

⁸ Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 111-15, 143-47; Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812* (Berkeley, 1963), 410-15; see also Roger H. Brown, "The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LX (June, 1964), 137-51.

⁹ Brant's defense will be found in *James Madison*, 460-83. Brant is situated chronologically between the criticisms of Madison expressed in Henry Adams, *History of the United States during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison* (9 vols., New York, 1889-1891), VI, 224-26, and in Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 437, where the latter states that Jefferson and Madison "secured not one important diplomatic objective after 1803. They scarcely challenged the development of factionalism within the Republican party"

The Federalists (House, 36; Senate, 6) were united in opposition, but they were small in number in the Twelfth Congress (1811-1813). Republicans (House, 106; Senate, 28) could easily pass anything through Congress upon which they could agree, but there was little agreement within the party. The strongest center of discontent was in the Senate where Madison's foreign and judicial appointments were factiously opposed and defeated. The rechartering of the Bank of the United States and Macon's Bill No. 1 had gone down to defeat in the Senate of the Eleventh Congress (1809-1811).¹⁰ Nathaniel Macon had observed when his first bill was defeated that there was less chance of the Senate declaring war on Great Britain or France than on the Treasury, meaning Albert Gallatin and the administration.¹¹ The House of Representatives presented no real problem to the administration, for Republicans there were able to unite in sufficient number to maintain a majority, going so far as to impose the "gag rule" to end some of the endless speeches by Republican malcontents like John Randolph. When the vote for war was finally taken in the House, June 4, 1812, Republicans formed a comfortable majority of thirty in favor of war, but the Senate was an entirely different matter.¹²

The thirty-four senators in the Twelfth Congress were presided over by Vice President George Clinton until his death on April 20, 1812. The Federalists were a powerless but influential minority of six. The two Federalist members from Connecticut, Samuel Dana and Chauncey Goodrich, continued from the Eleventh Congress, as did William Hunter of Rhode Island and James Lloyd of Massachusetts. The brilliant James A. Bayard, acting in the role of minority leader for the Federalists, represented Delaware along with Outerbridge Horsey. The Federalists were sadly missing gaunt old Timothy Pickering who had been replaced with Joseph Varnum in 1811 by the newly elected Republican legislature of Massachusetts.

Republicans who supported the administration were led on the floor of the Senate by William H. Crawford of Georgia. Crawford had consistently advocated war after the *Chesapeake* incident of 1807.¹³ His colleague from Georgia, Charles Tait, joined him in support of war. Henry Clay of Kentucky had moved to the House in 1811. His successor, George Bibb, and the senators from Tennessee, George Washington Campbell and Joseph Anderson, aided Crawford in providing leadership for the administration forces during the critical debates on war. The Madison administration generally found support from Richard Brent of Virginia, Jesse Franklin and James Turner

¹⁰ For details, see Brant, *James Madison*, 126, 129, 269; Raymond Walters, Jr., *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat* (New York, 1957), 232; Ralph V. Harlow, *History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825* (New Haven, 1917), 197; *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 602-11; *ibid.*, 3 Sess., 346-47.

¹¹ Walters, *Albert Gallatin*, 232.

¹² The declaration of war passed the House by a vote of 79 to 49, *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1637.

¹³ John Shipp, *Giant Days: The Life and Times of William H. Crawford* (Americus, Ga., 1909), 78-80, 98.

of North Carolina, and John Gaillard and John Taylor of South Carolina. From New England came three reliable administration men—Jonathan Robinson, Charles Cutts, and Joseph Varnum of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts respectively. Although a few of these men had qualms about war with Great Britain, they supported the administration when it called for war.¹⁴

Among the Republican senators who were generally disaffected with the Madison administration were the Invisibles: Samuel Smith of Maryland, William B. Giles of Virginia, and Andrew Gregg and Michael Leib of Pennsylvania. This shifting, shadowy coterie was united by antagonism toward Gallatin, Madison, and the administration in general. The Invisibles, however, took a position of superior zeal in the debates over the measures of resistance to "British aggressions." There was great suspicion among the other members of Congress that their true purpose was to embarrass the Treasury and the administration and that they did not really favor war.¹⁵

Equally opposed to the administration were a few Republicans of the northern wing of the party, generally called Clintonians, who hoped to see one of the New York Clintons in the presidency in 1813. The Clintonians had called for vigorous preparations for war and negotiation from a position of strength, but their cause received two setbacks in the spring of 1812—George Clinton died in April, and the spring elections in New England and New York went badly for the Republican party. During the Senate debates on war, Clintonians called for postponement; they claimed that they desired a delay in order that the nation might be better prepared. However, many suspected the Clintonians of baser motives. Whatever was the case, the Clintonians in the Senate—Obadiah German of New York, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, and John Lambert of New Jersey—voted with the Federalists on every roll call during the Senate's debates on war.¹⁶

Finally, there were the "waverers," or, perhaps more appropriately, the "mavericks." They were the senators whose votes could be relied on by no faction. Their votes on the issues were unpredictable and almost inexplicable in some cases. Included in this group were four senators from frontier states: Thomas Worthington and Alexander Campbell of Ohio, Stephen Bradley of Vermont, and John Pope of Kentucky. Worthington and Campbell generally supported the administration, but they believed the Ohio frontier would be very vulnerable in case of war.¹⁷ Pope of Kentucky had been a

¹⁴ The vote of each senator upon the issues related to war and the war question itself is listed in two tables on pages 265 and 266.

¹⁵ The most important investigation of the Invisibles is John S. Pancake, "The Invisibles: A Chapter in the Opposition to President Madison," *Journal of Southern History*, XXI (February, 1955), 17-37.

¹⁶ Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 141-47, maintains that Clintonians honestly desired delay until the nation could negotiate from a position of strength. He observes, quite correctly, however, that there is need for further investigation of the Clintonians and their motivation.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 134.

staunch administration man and had voted for the Bank of the United States against the instructions of his state, but he drifted into opposition to the administration on the question of war.¹⁸ Bradley of Vermont eventually retired from public life, probably because of his dissatisfaction with the Madison administration and the war.¹⁹ Jeremiah Howell of Rhode Island and Philip Reed of Maryland were nominally Republican (Howell cast his vote for Madison at the congressional nominating caucus in May, 1812) but both voted with the opposition on the question of war. John Condit of New Jersey and John Smith of New York were also unpredictable, switching their votes during the debates on war on several occasions.²⁰

The recalcitrant mavericks and the kaleidoscopic factions in the Senate in 1812 made the success of a vote for war with Great Britain highly questionable. The six Federalists, the seven antiadministration Republicans (Clintonians and Invisibles), and the numerous maverick senators seemed to form a majority against the Madison administration on the issue of war,²¹ and the prospect for vigorous measures passing the Senate was certainly precarious.

With the election of 1812 approaching, the antiadministration forces in the Senate took every opportunity to denigrate the public image of the administration. Foster, the minister from Great Britain, wrote in January, 1812: "The opposition know the embarrassment of the President, and endeavor to take advantage of it by pushing for measures so decisive as to leave him no retreat. It has been told me in confidence more than once by different leaders, that if the Orders in Council are not revoked he must eventually be ruined in the opinion of the nation."²²

Prior to the beginning of the debates on the actual question of war, the Senate passed several bills in preparation for war. The President was authorized to raise six companies of frontier spies and rangers for service against the Indian threat, and he was authorized to call for fifty thousand

¹⁸ O. W. Baylor, *John Pope: Kentuckian* (Cynthiana, Ky., 1943), 82-87; Brown speculates that Pope's rivalry in Kentucky with Henry Clay might have influenced his views. Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 111. Pope challenged Clay's seat in the House of Representatives in 1816. Clay used Pope's vote against war and his previous vote for the rechartering of the Bank of the United States to pin the charge of Federalism upon Pope. It was successful and Clay was reelected. George T. Blakey, "Rendezvous with Republicanism: John Pope vs. Henry Clay in 1816," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXII (September, 1966), 233-50.

¹⁹ Bradley's son-in-law, S. G. Goodrich, declared in 1856 that Bradley had left public life because of his dissatisfaction with Madison's war policy. *Dictionary of American Biography* (21 vols., New York, 1928-1937), II, 575.

²⁰ Note that of the "maverick" senators, the four from frontier states opposed war and the four from seaboard states divided—Reed and Howell voted against and Condit and Smith voted for war.

²¹ "The truth is it begins to be ascertained that even if a declaration of war comes to be carried in the House of Representatives it would be lost in the Senate. The calculation is that there would be a division in the Senate 16 to 18, and as many as three or four of the 16 are considered as doubtful . . ." Samuel Taggart to the Reverend John Taylor, March 21, 1812, "Letters of Samuel Taggart," *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings*, XXXIII (1923), 390-91.

²² Augustus Foster to Richard C. Wellesley, January 16, 1812, as quoted in Adams, *History of the United States* . . . , VI, 173.

volunteers for militia service.²³ But the most controversial bill for war preparations was the proposal to increase the force of regulars. The administration requested the enlistment of ten thousand men, but Senator Giles of Virginia, an Invisible, called for twenty-five thousand. He was supported by the antiadministration Republicans and the Federalists.²⁴ Secretary of State James Monroe claimed that the malcontent Republicans supported the higher number "to gain credit, as being great advocates for war, and to throw discredit on the administration by implying on account of the moderation of its views that it was not in earnest . . ."²⁵

The Federalist support for the bill and for other war measures may seem strange in view of their opposition to war, but Bayard explained:

We have determined that we shall make no opposition to measures of defence. We shall therefore vote to strengthen the army and Navy and to put the nation in the attitude the President requires, and we are determined . . . to convince the country that we have no British partialities and if our opponents are resolved to fight the Islanders we will take care at least that they shall have fair play. Their swaggering and blustering about England has served their purpose long enough and the experiment may be worth what it will cost to have it determined whether we are better-off[f] in being at peace or war with her. This will nearly settle the question whether the Feds. or demos. have pursued the wiser course.²⁶

Until the question of war reached the last stages, the Federalists continued to vote for preparations, while at the same time they implied to the British minister that it was all a bluff.²⁷ And thus they frittered away their opportunities to delay the war, which possibly could have averted it in the end.²⁸

The Republican malcontents also supported preparations for war and assumed a more bellicose position than that of the administration. Monroe wrote to John Taylor of Caroline:

Mark the conduct of certain individuals in the latter body [the Senate] where every pestilent scheme has been contrived and managed since the commencement of the session. . . . These men have unceasingly circulated the report that the Executive

²³ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 32-33, 88, 102, 106, 111-12.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 29-30, 33-85.

²⁵ James Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, S. M. Hamilton (ed.), *Writings of James Monroe* (7 vols., New York, 1898-1903), V, 207.

²⁶ James A. Bayard to William H. Wells, January 12, 1812, Donnan, "Papers of James A. Bayard," II, 188.

²⁷ "It is the opinion of most of the sensible men here that this government will not be pushed into a war with us, but that their object is to secure the support of their party at the next election of a President by obtaining the credit of having forced us to a change of system by the line of conduct they have adopted." Augustus Foster to Richard C. Wellesley, December 25, 1811, as quoted in Brant, *James Madison*, 373.

²⁸ "To go to war they [the administration] dare not. To continue at peace after all their blustering and swaggering without a repeal of the orders in council, will immediately turn all who have thought them sincere in their clamour for war against them." Samuel Taggart to the Reverend John Taylor, December 28, 1811, "Letters of Samuel Taggart," 372.

did not intend to make war, and thereby deceived the people, and deceived the British government, depriving our country of the effect which that argument might have had in the British Cabinet.²⁹

If anyone must be blamed for the war, it may be the Federalists and antiadministration Republicans who failed to take advantage of their opportunities to prolong the preparations for war, taking instead a militant position for mere political advantage. As Monroe declared, they underestimated the seriousness of the administration and dinned this interpretation of events into the ears of the British minister.³⁰ If the opposition to war had attempted delay, if it had not misled the British minister, war might have been averted, assuming that news of the imminent repeal of the Orders in Council would have changed the vote for war in the Senate.³¹

On April 1, 1812, the Senate received a message from the President recommending a sixty day embargo. Henry Clay had recommended a thirty day embargo to Monroe to be followed by war. The administration had accepted his suggestion, but had requested sixty rather than thirty days to permit ample time for the return of the *Hornet* with dispatches from Europe. The Senate gave the bill two readings on April 2 with seeming victory for the administration, but on April 3 Leib of Pennsylvania, an Invisible, moved to change the bill from sixty to ninety days. The Senate accepted his proposal and passed the ninety day embargo by a vote of 20 to 13. The supporters of the administration in the Senate, joined by most of the mavericks and Gregg and Leib of the Invisibles, voted favorably. Opposed were the Federalists, the Clintonians, Giles and Smith of the Invisibles, and Stephen Bradley of Vermont.³²

Exactly what happened on this vote is uncertain. Victory for the administration's proposed sixty day embargo seemed certain on April 2, especially after a suspension of the rules which permitted two readings of the bill, but on April 3 the embargo was extended to ninety days. Madison blamed the extension on the conflict of opinion in the Senate, "local" interests that would be hurt by the embargo, and "that invariable opposition, open with some & covert with others, which have perplexed & impeded the whole course of our public measures." He went on to claim that the votes for the extension came from the united votes of those who hoped to postpone

²⁹ James Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, Hamilton, *Writings of James Monroe*, V, 208-209.

³⁰ See notes 27 and 28 above.

³¹ "You have seen from your retreat that our hopes and endeavors to preserve peace . . . have . . . been frustrated. I am satisfied that domestic faction has prevented that happy result. . . . The discoveries made by Henry [the John Henry letters] will have a salutary effect in annihilating the spirit of the Essex junto, and even on the new focus of opposition at Albany [Clintons]." Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, March 10, 1812, Henry Adams (ed.), *Writings of Albert Gallatin* (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1879), I, 517.

³² *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 186-90.

war and those who intended it as a ruse.³³ Madison's views do not explain why the supporters of the administration in the Senate, including the most warlike among them, voted for the extension. Apparently there was logrolling of which Madison was unaware. It may be that the administration men agreed to the extension to gain the support of Gregg and Leib of the Invisibles and some of the mavericks.

The administration men defended the embargo during April and May and debated with the opposition about the expediency of war. Bayard observed that there was a new sentiment in the Congress for maritime war, attributing it to the fear of southern congressmen that a land war would mean added strength for the northern tier of states:

No proposition could have been more frightful to the southern men, and it seems they had never thought of what they were to do with Canada before, in case they conquered the country The consequence has been that they now begin to talk of maritime war, and of the ocean being the only place where G. Britain is tangible. What I am now telling you is not an affair generally or publicly spoken of. It has existed but a short time and passes as yet in whispers and a semi confidential way. I am inclined to think it true and likely to produce important results.³⁴

The session had been long and arduous. Many senators desired a recess and some began to drift home, recess or no recess. On April 24 Bradley presented a resolution from the Joint Committee on Recess to the Senate. It proposed a recess of twenty days from April 29 to May 18. Pope successfully moved to strike May 18 from the resolution. He then proposed to substitute the fourth Monday in June as the end of the recess. Bradley stated that he preferred the second Monday in June, while Leib, from nearby Philadelphia, spoke for the original May 18. Anderson of Tennessee, a prowar administration supporter, stated that he preferred May 18, if any, but would prefer no recess at all. He feared that it might produce an unfavorable impression of hesitation and weakness abroad. George Washington Campbell agreed with his colleague from Tennessee: "Many misrepresentations have been already made to induce the public to believe you [the Senate] are not in earnest. An adjournment for any length of time would seem like deserting our posts."³⁵ Senator Bradley claimed that Congress could do no more in the way of war preparations—now was the time to wait and see what happened. Worthington of Ohio preferred a long recess, for many members were leaving anyway and soon the Senate would not have a quorum. Both of them were opposed to war. A vote was taken to insert June 8 as the termination date

³³ James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 24, 1812, Gaillard Hunt (ed.), *Writings of James Madison* (9 vols., New York, 1900-1910), VIII, 188. Madison had observed on the day the ninety day embargo passed that the Senate had adjourned on the prior day "about 4 or 5 o'clock without a decision. Whether this result was produced by the rule which arms a single member with a veto against a decision in one day on a bill, or foretells a rejection of the Bill I have not yet heard. The temper of that body is known to be equivocal." James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 3, 1812, *ibid.*, 186.

³⁴ James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, May 2, 1812, Donnan, "Papers of James A. Bayard," II, 196-97.

³⁵ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 211-16. Campbell's speech is on page 213.

of the recess, permitting thirty days, which passed by a vote of 18 to 13 and the resolution was sent to the House.³⁶ But the House had decided against any break in the session, and the Congress was forced to continue until July 6 without recess. Attendance gradually dropped off in the Senate until June 1 and then fell off again after the declaration of war. On May 4 and 13 the Senate was forced to adjourn for the day because of the lack of a quorum.³⁷

Republican leaders met with Madison in early May, and evidence indicates that they agreed upon early June as the date for the commencement of war.³⁸ With war in the offing, the Republican congressional caucus met and unanimously renominated Madison on May 18. But only seventeen senators were present at the caucus to cast their votes for Madison: Anderson, Brent, George Washington Campbell, Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Gregg, Howell, Leib, Pope, Robinson, John Smith, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Varnum, and Worthington.³⁹ The Clintonians and Giles and Samuel Smith of the Invisibles did not attend, but it is significant that Gregg and Leib, the erstwhile Invisibles, were present at the caucus and voted for Madison. Their support of Madison indicated that the factionalized party was beginning to reunite in preparation for the coming election.⁴⁰ But Hezekiah Niles, a Republican editor, warned the party "that a thousand such nominations will not retain the good opinion of the people in favor of Mr. *Madison*, or induct him a second time to the presidential chair, unless the country is released from the present *quasi* state of war—by an honest peace or open hostilities."⁴¹

The *Hornet* arrived on May 19 with no good news. Foster communicated with Madison and Monroe, insisting that the Orders in Council would be

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 211-16.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 225-26, 239, 9-326 *passim*, 1352-53.

³⁸ Claims that Madison was coerced into the War of 1812 by the War Hawks have been thoroughly discredited; see, for example, Brant, *James Madison*, 452-59. However, one piece of evidence has been overlooked. James Fisk of Vermont, a Republican and strong advocate of war, claimed that he had been on the committee which met with Madison to inform him that war was resolved upon, and, unless war was declared, the election might go badly; therefore, if Madison was not ready for war he would not be renominated. This might be conclusive evidence, save for the fact that Fisk related this many years after the event. Edwin Williams (ed.), *Statesman's Manual* (New York, 1846), 348. There is little doubt, however, that Madison and the Republican leaders did agree upon the date to begin hostilities. On May 12, 1812, the House of Representatives debated a motion to request the attendance of absent members "prior to the first day of June." The motion was amended to require attendance "forthwith" and passed. *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1424-27. Henry Clay wrote on May 17, 1812: "The final measure, to which all our acts have pointed, will probably be decided about the first of next month." Henry Clay to Robert Alexander, May 17, 1812, Hopkins and Hargreaves, *Papers of Henry Clay*, I, 657. Representative John A. Harper wrote to William Plumer that "The great question will undoubtedly be taken early in June." John A. Harper to William Plumer, May 13, 1812, as quoted in Brant, *James Madison*, 463.

³⁹ *Niles' Weekly Register*, II (May 23, 1812), 192; Lexington (Ky.) *American Statesman*, June 6, 1812.

⁴⁰ Especially important are the conclusions of Sanford W. Higginbotham, *The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics, 1800-1816* (Harrisburg, 1952), 255, 258-59.

⁴¹ *Niles' Weekly Register*, II (May 23, 1812), 197.

continued. The administration became convinced that further negotiations would be futile, and Madison drafted his war message, which was delivered to the Congress on June 1. The Senate referred this message to a select committee consisting of Anderson, Samuel Smith, Leib, George Washington Campbell, Howell, Lloyd, and Taylor. The committee retained the bill until June 8 while the remainder of the Senate concerned itself with routine business.

Administration supporters in the Senate took Madison's message to be a call for unlimited war with Great Britain alone. Members of the Cabinet confused the issue, however, by proposing a maritime war privately to certain members of Congress. The secretary of state wrote to Albert Gallatin: "I am convinced that it is very important to attempt at present the maritime war only. I fear, however, that difficulty will be experienced in the committee To prevent this it is important that an early communication should take place with Mr. Crawford."⁴²

As earlier indicated, the House passed a declaration of unlimited war with Great Britain on June 4 with little difficulty, 79 to 49. The war bill was delivered to the Senate on June 5, was read twice by unanimous consent, and was referred to the committee on the war message. The real test of the war proposal began.

The Federalists were now prepared to use any device which might defeat or delay the vote on war in the Senate. Bayard explained: "Much will depend upon discretion and management in giving a direction to wavering and balancing opinions. The direct question must be avoided and a good cover provided for those who are disposed to retreat."⁴³ Federalists by themselves could not hope to defeat the declaration of war; they had to have the support of at least ten Republicans. They therefore encouraged and supported amendments to substitute a maritime war or triangular war with Great Britain and France, which would provide cover for the Republican opposition to the war. Administration Republicans backed the House bill for unlimited war with Great Britain; Clintonians urged delay until the nation was better prepared; and the Invisibles and mavericks were divided between proposals for a maritime war with Great Britain, or with both

⁴² James Monroe to Albert Gallatin, June 1, 1812, Adams, *Writings of Albert Gallatin*, I, 520-21. William L. Lowndes reported in 1819 that there was an attempt by the "Executive" to substitute a maritime war for an unlimited war after the war message had reached Congress, and that every member of the Cabinet except Secretary Hamilton favored such a move. Lowndes declared that he and William Crawford led the opposition which defeated the move for maritime war. Mayo, *Henry Clay*, 522-23; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 403. Brant maintained that Madison had nothing to do with the proposal of maritime war and that it was not presidential policy. Thus Brant upheld his thesis that Madison consistently favored war from the beginning of the session, but Brant did not comment on the quality of leadership of a President who permitted his cabinet to approach the Congress and encourage the violation of presidential policy, particularly on such a vital issue. Brant, *James Madison*, 476-77.

⁴³ James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, June 4, 1812, Donnan, "Papers of James A. Bayard," II, 198.

Great Britain and France. If enough of the antiadministration Republicans could be united behind a substitute to the House war bill, with Federalist support, the war bill could be amended. After a crippling amendment had been added to the war bill, Federalists could then join the senators favoring unlimited war in opposition to the amended bill and perhaps defeat the proposed war.

Six senators were absent on June 4—Bradley, Alexander Campbell, Franklin, Giles, Hunter, and Lloyd. It was certain that the two Federalists—Hunter and Lloyd—would oppose war in any form. Bradley, Alexander Campbell, and Giles would oppose an unlimited war, and Franklin had expressed qualms about war.⁴⁴ None of the senators seemed anxious for an early vote; all feared an unfavorable result. By the time the select committee reported on June 8, all the absent senators except Bradley of Vermont and Campbell of Ohio had returned. Campbell was at home in Ohio and did not attempt to return. Senator Bradley rushed back to Washington, but did not arrive in time to cast his vote on the war bill. Federalist Samuel Taggart of the House observed: "Now it comes before the Senate [;] whether it will carry there is not ascertained. It is an unfortunate circumstance that only two Senators are absent and both opposed to war. Something will depend upon the two Senators, Smith and Giles. If they vote in favour of war it will be on purpose to destroy the administration."⁴⁵

On June 8 the real debate began. The select committee's report said that the nation was poorly prepared—an observation which surprised no one. Lloyd of Massachusetts forced this home to the senators by successfully moving the distribution of the report.⁴⁶ The Senate then adjourned to mull the situation over during the night.

Several petitions were presented on the subject of war the next day. Reed of Maryland presented a resolution from Anne Arundel County in favor of placing the "country in a state of maritime defence" and in favor of triangular war, and Hunter presented Rhode Island's petition which stated its opposition to war and asked that the embargo be lifted. John Smith entered a petition from New York City merchants which prayed the continuance of the embargo rather than war and asked retaliation against the conduct of France. Taylor of South Carolina spoke in favor of the New York petition and implied that the whole crisis was due to the "cowardly" repeal of the embargo in 1809. Anderson of Tennessee moved that the Senate form itself into the committee of the whole for the consideration of the committee's report and the declaration of war. Gaillard took the chair, freeing

⁴⁴ "We have five members absent, Giles, Hunter, Franklin, Campbell (Ohio), and Bradley. We have to regret the absence of all of them." *Ibid.* See also Franklin's statement that he hoped to avoid war, Brown, "The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth," 147.

⁴⁵ Samuel Taggart to the Reverend John Taylor, June 5, 1812, "Letters of Samuel Taggart," 403.

⁴⁶ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 266.

Crawford, the administration's floor leader, for action in the debates. There was extended debate and the Senate adjourned after Gregg of Pennsylvania moved to recommit the war bill to committee for amendment.⁴⁷

The next morning, June 10, Gregg amended his motion so as to instruct the committee to amend the bill to provide for a limited maritime war with Great Britain, authorizing United States warships to make reprisals on British shipping, and granting letters of marque to private vessels. Samuel Smith proposed the selection of a new committee, perhaps with the hope of getting a membership more favorable to his purposes. Smith's motion was defeated and the Senate adjourned.⁴⁸

Exactly what was happening, except for delay, is impossible to discern for lack of evidence. It may be safely conjectured that there were long night sessions at the boarding houses over Madeira and cigars, and that strong persuasion was applied to the waverers. Thinking that one vote might decide the issue, Foster assigned a Lieutenant Moore to provide liquid refreshment for Senator Brent of Virginia. The Virginian seems to have taken advantage of his profitable position.⁴⁹

On Thursday, June 11, some routine business was transacted, and Gregg's motion to recommit the bill to committee with instructions to provide for limited war was passed by a vote of 17 to 13.⁵⁰ Federalists, Clintonians, three Invisibles, and five mavericks united to pass it.⁵¹ The vote indicated that those opposed to unlimited war with Great Britain had a majority of one at that time.⁵²

On June 12 Gaillard presented a resolution from Charleston, South Carolina, favoring war, and Giles of Virginia presented petitions from Richmond and Manchester, Virginia, in favor of triangular war. Lloyd followed with a petition from the Massachusetts House of Representatives which declared that war against Great Britain would be "impolitic, unnecessary, and ruinous."⁵³ Lloyd also moved that Madison be required to lay

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 252-56, 266.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 257, 266-67.

⁴⁹ Augustus Foster diary, June 15, 1812, Brant, *James Madison*, 477; Mayo, *Henry Clay*, 524.

⁵⁰ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 257-58, 267.

⁵¹ Taggart's impression of the events in the Senate was that "The declaration which had passed our House . . . was submitted to the Senate and was by them referred to a committee. The committee of 5 reported the declaration without amendment 3 to 2. In course of the discussion a motion was made to call upon the War Department for information relating to the progress of the enlistments. This was carried by a majority of two, 17 to 15, and an answer has been obtained not very flattering, all the returned enlistments do not amount to enough to fill up the old army of 10,000. A motion was then made to recommit the declaration for the purpose of making an alteration in the principle, and reducing the direct declaration of war to the issuing of *letters of marque* and reprisal. This question was debated I believe for rather more than two days." Samuel Taggart to the Reverend John Taylor, June 12, 1812, "Letters of Samuel Taggart," 404.

⁵² Brent and Robinson were absent on June 11, making the actual strength 17 to 15. A change of one vote would mean deadlock and failure.

⁵³ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 259.

before the Senate all information not previously committed to it, implying that the President might be withholding some significant information. His motion was tabled and voted down the next day, 14 to 17. Finally, after delays of twelve days since the receipt of Madison's war message and seven days since the Senate received the House war bill, the select committee brought in a recommendation for a limited naval war with Great Britain. The report called for naval reprisals and the issuance of letters of marque against British shipping.⁵⁴

On the previous day the opposition to unlimited war had won a vote of 17 to 13 to instruct the select committee for a maritime war, but on June 12 the issue was clouded by Pope of Kentucky who proposed to include France in the declaration of limited war.⁵⁵ His motion was defeated, 17 to 15, by the votes of those who wished an unlimited war with Great Britain and those who wanted only one enemy at a time.⁵⁶ Federalists, Clintonians, and Giles and Samuel Smith of the Invisibles voted in favor of Pope's motion, but Gregg and Leib joined the administration forces in opposition. Both Gregg and Leib had attended the Republican congressional caucus and cast their votes for Madison. Neither favored war, but it was politically inexpedient for them to oppose the administration; they needed its support against other Republican factions in their home state. Both supported a maritime war as preferable to unlimited war, but when maritime war failed to find enough support, they voted for unlimited war.⁵⁷

June 12 was the day of decision. After Pope's motion was defeated, a vote was taken on the recommendation of the select committee for a limited naval war with Great Britain alone. On this vote there was a 16 to 16 tie, and thus the committee report went down to defeat. Leib moved to require

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 267-70.

⁵⁵ The idea of triangular war had been seriously considered all during the session. Secretary of State Monroe, in remonstrating with Sérurier, the French minister, about French depredations upon American commerce, had observed that when war against England was called for, "the federal party, reinforced by the Clinton party, the Smith party and the Republican malcontents, will rise up en masse and ask why we insist on making war on England over her maintenance of the Orders in Council, when we have such a terrible and recent proof that the French decrees are not withdrawn." Brant, *James Madison*, 424-25. Just prior to the beginning of the debates over the war bill, Madison wrote Jefferson that "To go to war with Eng^d and not with France arms the federalists with new matter, and divides the Republicans . . ." Jefferson replied that the idea of triangular war was quixotic and probably was fomented by "Anglomen and malcontents." James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 25, 1812, Hunt, *Writings of James Madison*, VIII, 191; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 30, 1812, Paul L. Ford (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (10 vols., New York, 1892-1899), IX, 353-54.

⁵⁶ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 270.

⁵⁷ For the best analysis of the position of the two Pennsylvania senators, see Higginbotham, *The Keystone in the Democratic Arch*, 237-69. Jonathan Roberts commented that "Gregg & Leib at last voted for war but [not] till they had disclosed their feelings to be fully against anything Madison might be for. Leib is I apprehend a devoted Clintonian. Gregg is fixing his cap for Snyder's chair [governor of Pennsylvania] thro' federal aid as he got his Senatorship." Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 20, 1812, as quoted in Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 115.

a roll call, perhaps with the thought that the publicity might force a change in the result. It failed, for the vote remained a 16 to 16 deadlock.⁵⁸

Had Vice President Clinton still been presiding, the War of 1812 would probably have begun as a limited war of naval reprisals, because he would have, no doubt, voted for the committee's report. The failure of the efforts of the opposition to war may be blamed on the irascible Senator Giles who had voted in favor of instructing the committee for maritime war and then voted against the committee's report to that effect. Thirty senators had voted 17 to 13 to instruct the committee for limited war on June 11. On June 12 two administration supporters—Brent and Robinson—had returned to the Senate and had voted against the committee report. Only Giles changed his vote from yea to nay to force the 16 to 16 deadlock. Perhaps this is the reason Leib called for the roll call—he had expected a 17 to 15 victory. If Bradley and Alexander Campbell had been present, the vote would have been 18 to 16 in favor of the committee's report; thus, a number of circumstances contributed to the defeat of maritime war. With the failure of the committee report, the opponents of the administration turned to the idea of triangular war.

On Saturday, June 13, Samuel Smith presented a memorial, signed by the venerable Charles Carroll of Carrollton and other citizens of Maryland, which deprecated war measures. A few minor changes in the wording of the House bill were made, which, in the end, were the only changes made by the Senate.⁵⁹ Obadiah German, Clintonian from New York, moved to postpone further consideration of the war bill until November. German may have sincerely feared that the nation was unprepared, or he may have believed that further delay without decision might have improved the chances of the Clintonians for success in the presidential election; but, whatever the case, his speech was a reasoned appeal. He admitted that Great Britain and France gave good cause for war, but maintained that Great Britain had overwhelming power; therefore, the moment was not propitious. He astutely predicted disaster for General William Hull in the West and blamed the problems with the Indians upon Governor William Henry Harrison's raid on the village at Tippecanoe—a judgment with which some historians agree. He believed the officers of the Army were ill trained and unprepared, and the Navy, he said, might be ready, but it could not ward off an invasion. Therefore he proposed to postpone the war until November.⁶⁰ But his

⁵⁸ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 270.

⁵⁹ "Great Britain and her dependencies" was changed to read "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof"; "the United States and their territories" was changed to "the United States of America and their Territories." *Ibid.*, 266, 271.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 271-83.

perceptive speech was to no avail; the administration and its supporters had determined upon action.

On Monday, June 15, there was a heavy downpour, but all thirty-two senators in Washington were present and resumed the debate. A vote was taken on German's motion to postpone until November; it failed by a vote of 22 to 10.⁶¹ Leib revived the proposal for limited war, adding the proviso that France might be included at a later date if she did not give "satisfactory and unequivocal evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they relate to the neutral commerce of the United States." Leib was attempting to unite the forces which favored a limited war with Great Britain with those who favored a triangular war. Anderson of Tennessee moved to strike the proviso that France be included at a later date, but his motion failed by a vote of 18 to 14.⁶² Giles of Virginia joined the thirteen administration men in voting against the inclusion of France. On June 12 he had voted in favor of Pope's motion for a triangular war and on June 17 he proposed a triangular war himself, but on this occasion he opposed it. Leib's original motion then came to a vote and failed, with fifteen favoring the motion and seventeen opposed.⁶³

Lloyd, Federalist of Massachusetts, then proposed to add "from and after the day of next" to the war bill, apparently hoping to sidetrack the Senate's debate from *whether* there would be war to *when* there would be war. It was a shrewd move which, if successful, might have delayed the war to a future date and certainly would have extended the Senate's debates on war, but it failed. The war bill passed to its third reading by a vote of 19 to 13 and the Senate adjourned until eleven o'clock the next day.

The Senate disposed of some routine business early Tuesday and then resumed consideration of the declaration of war. Bayard asked to postpone consideration until October 31, pleading unpreparedness and for an opportunity to get American property home from abroad before the declaration. He had doubted that war would be declared and did not believe, he said, that the President had expected war at the opening of the session, nor for a long time after. He maintained that "A menacing language was held out; but the hopes of an accommodation were far from being abandoned." With his usual asperity, Bayard observed that "Desperate as the course was which now alone remained to be pursued, they [Madison and the Republicans] supposed they were obliged to advance or become the object of reproach and scorn both to friends and foes." He pointed out that relations with

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 284.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 286.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 284-87.

Great Britain were improving and declared that not even the President believed the French decrees stood repealed, but his motion to postpone until Halloween went down to a 21 to 11 defeat. He then moved postponement until July 3, which lost 23 to 9. In desperation, he asked adjournment until Monday next. He lost again by a closer vote of 17 to 15, but the Senate did adjourn for the night.⁶⁴

Giles was prepared on June 17 with a last proposal to avert the passage of unlimited war. He called for a limited war of naval reprisals and letters of marque against both Great Britain and France. Triangular war failed for the final time by a 14 to 18 vote.⁶⁵ Horsey of Delaware called for adjournment, which also failed by a 14 to 18 vote. At last the vote for an *unlimited* war with Great Britain *alone* as proposed by the House was taken. Nineteen Senators voted for war and thirteen against war. There is some confusion about the vote of Pope of Kentucky, because the *Annals of Congress* does not list his name among the negative vote although he is needed for the total negative vote to have been thirteen. However, contemporary newspapers did include his name among the thirteen voting negatively.⁶⁶ Pope was present at the June 17 session and he would have voted negatively, even though he was instructed by the Kentucky legislature to vote for war. Since he proposed and supported triangular war on all occasions, he probably sincerely believed that war against Great Britain alone was unjustified. His reasons for his position on the issue of war are not certain. He did have an English wife and, since he had voted in favor of the Bank of the United States, he had little hope of reelection.⁶⁷ Three other maverick senators joined Pope in voting against war: Howell of Rhode Island, Reed of Maryland, and Worthington of Ohio.

Foster noted in his diary on June 17 that Lieutenant Moore, assigned to Senator Brent of Virginia, came back to the ministry inebriated and swore that he had converted the senator. Brent must have held his liquor better than the lieutenant, for he was present on June 17 to cast his vote for war.⁶⁸

The Federalists, of course, voted against war in a solid bloc. They were joined by the three Clintonians: German, Gilman, and Lambert.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 287, 289; entire discussion recorded *ibid.*, 287-96.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 296-97.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*; *National Intelligencer*, June 20, 1812; *Niles' Weekly Register*, II (August 29, 1812), 422. Pope's biographer assumes Pope did not actually vote and this was the reason for the omission of his name; however, it was probably merely an error in the printing of the *Annals of Congress* since the newspaper reports did list him among the thirteen. Baylor, *John Pope*, 82-87.

⁶⁷ See note 18 above.

⁶⁸ Augustus Foster diary, June 17, 1812, Brant, *James Madison*, 477; Mayo, *Henry Clay*, 524.

⁶⁹ Lambert was read out of the Republican party in New Jersey because of his vote against war. When he ran for reelection in 1814 he became the Federalist candidate. Carl E. Prince, *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine, 1789-1817* (Chapel Hill, 1964), 212.

The Clintonians "are a set of Malcontents, who are more intent upon making De Witt Clinton President, than they are desirous of promoting the public good," declared William Crawford.⁷⁰ His opinion was biased, but it may partially explain the votes of the Clintonians. New York was certainly divided on the issue of war; the gains of the Federalists in the spring elections of 1812 had indicated the strength in that state of the opposition to Republican policies. Clintonians protested that they were not opposed to war, but deemed the declaration to be premature. There were, however, certain political advantages to be gained by opposing the war—delay could have increased the chances of De Witt Clinton for election in the fall and voting against war could gain needed support from the Federalist party.⁷¹

The June 12 tie vote on limited war and the votes for triangular war demonstrate that most senators favored something less than an unlimited war with Great Britain. If Giles had voted for the committee report on June 12, it would have passed. If Bradley of Vermont had arrived in time (he arrived June 19), the majority coalition of Federalists and Republican dissidents might have held together. But when all alternatives were rejected except submission or all out war, the Invisibles were forced to vote for war. Monroe gloated in a letter to Taylor of Caroline that the "habitual opponents" of the administration had expected the government to favor more embargo, not war, and they had impaled themselves on the horns of dilemma: "To oppose war would be inconsistent with their past conduct . . . to join in with the views of the administration very inconsistent with their present plan [to defeat Madison]."⁷² All the Invisibles cast their votes for war. They shifted their votes only after they saw that they could not substitute an alternative.

Thus the nation was committed to an all out war for survival as an independent nation. Republicans had been seriously divided over the issue, but the political situation in 1812 was such that they no longer could tolerate, as Hezekiah Niles had put it, a "quasi state of war." Many Republicans believed that failure to declare war, after six months of oral bellicosity and preparation, would have made the party and the nation ridiculous—it would have meant disaster at the polls in the fall.⁷³ On the crucial vote for war, 90 per cent of the real, available party membership

⁷⁰ William Crawford to John Milledge, May 9, 1812, as quoted in Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 134.

⁷¹ John Quincy Adams was in Russia at the time of the decision for war in 1812, but his views on the position of the Clintonians are still interesting. He believed them to be politically motivated in their opposition to war. John Quincy Adams, *The Lives of James Madison and James Monroe* (Buffalo, 1850), 156-57.

⁷² James Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, Hamilton, *Writings of James Monroe*, V, 206.

⁷³ Elbridge Gerry, governor of Massachusetts, wrote Madison that the "opposition" increased with delay and that "by war we shall be purified as by fire." Elbridge Gerry to James Madison, May 19, 1812, Madison Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

in the House and 80 per cent in the Senate voted for war. Every vote for war was Republican.⁷⁴

The old story that if there had been an Atlantic cable in 1812, there would have been no war is probably true. A change of only three votes in the Senate on June 17 would have resulted in deadlock and defeat for the declaration of war. If news of the imminent repeal of the Orders in Council had arrived, the three votes and more would doubtless have been forthcoming from the Invisibles and mavericks. The Republican party would have been able to claim victory without war.

In the vote for war in the Senate of the Twelfth Congress, the most important factor in the voting would appear to have been party regularity and political advantage. A majority of the Senate did not prefer unlimited war as proposed by the House, but when all alternatives were rejected they cast their votes for party and for war. Certainly the senators were concerned about national honor, the vulnerability of their home states, and the future of republican institutions, but the political future was also a primary consideration.

⁷⁴ Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 410; Brown, *The Republic in Peril*, 44-45, 165-66, observes that the total vote in Congress was ninety-eight for and sixty-two against war. All ninety-eight who voted for war were Republican, and the sixty-two who voted against war included forty Federalists and twenty-two Republicans. James R. Venz, Jr., claimed that there was one Federalist who voted for war, Joseph Kent of Maryland, but Kent shortly thereafter severed his connection with the Federalist party and was a presidential elector on the Monroe ticket in 1816. James R. Venz, Jr., "Federalists in Congress, 1800-1812," (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., 1967), 321. Kent is listed as a Republican in Horsman, "Who Were the War Hawks?" 135.

⁷⁵ The votes of the senators on several key issues during the Senate's debate over the war bill, June 1-17, 1812, are listed under numbers one through eight in the table. Each number represents the following measures: (1) Gregg's motion to instruct the select committee for a maritime war. Passed, 17-13, June 11, 1812. *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 267. (2) Pope's motion for triangular war. Defeated, 17-15, June 12, 1812. *Ibid.*, 270. (3) Committee report for maritime war. Defeated, 16-16, June 12, 1812. *Ibid.*, 270-71. (4) German's motion to postpone until November. Defeated, 22-10, June 15, 1812. *Ibid.*, 283-84. (5) Anderson's motion to strike the inclusion of France at a later date. Defeated, 18-14, June 15, 1812. *Ibid.*, 286. (6) Leib's motion for maritime war, with France to be added at a later date. Defeated, 17-15, June 15, 1812. *Ibid.*, 286-87. (7) Giles' motion for triangular war. Defeated, 18-14, June 17, 1812. *Ibid.*, 297. (8) Vote for unlimited war with Great Britain alone. Passed, 19-13, June 17, 1812. *Ibid.* Yea is indicated by Y, nay by N, and absent or not voting by a blank. Alexander Campbell of Ohio and Stephen Bradley of Vermont were not present at the time of any of the votes listed, and they are entirely omitted from the table. The state each senator represented is mentioned in the text and, therefore, is omitted from the tables. In Table 1 following the name (R) indicates member of Republican party and (F) indicates member of Federalist party. Table 1 is an alphabetical listing for the convenience of the reader.

TABLE 1: KEY VOTES IN THE SENATE, TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, DURING THE DEBATES OVER WAR⁷⁵

| SENATORS | | INDIVIDUAL VOTING RECORDS | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Anderson, Joseph | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Bayard, James A. | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Bibb, George | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Brent, Richard | (R) | | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Campbell, George | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Condit, John | (R) | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |
| Crawford, William | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Cutts, Charles | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Dana, Samuel | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Franklin, Jesse | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Gaillard, John | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| German, Obadiah | (R) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Giles, William | (R) | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y | Y |
| Gilman, Nicholas | (R) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Goodrich, Chauncey | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Gregg, Andrew | (R) | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
| Horseý, Outerbridge | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Howell, Jeremiah | (R) | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
| Hunter, William | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Lambert, John | (R) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Leib, Michael | (R) | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |
| Lloyd, James | (F) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Pope, John | (R) | N | Y | N | N | N | N | Y | N |
| Reed, Philip | (R) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Robinson, Jonathan | (R) | | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Smith, John | (R) | Y | N | Y | N | N | N | N | Y |
| Smith, Samuel | (R) | N | Y | N | N | N | N | N | Y |
| Tait, Charles | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Taylor, John | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Turner, John | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Varnum, Joseph | (R) | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Worthington, Thomas | (R) | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | N |

TABLE 2: KEY VOTES IN THE SENATE, TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, DURING THE DEBATES OVER WAR⁷⁶

| SENATORS | INDIVIDUAL VOTING RECORDS | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FEDERALISTS ⁷⁷ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Bayard, James A. | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Dana, Samuel | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Goodrich, Chauncey | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Horsey, Outerbridge | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Hunter, William | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Lloyd, James | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| REPUBLICANS: ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTERS ⁷⁸ | | | | | | | | |
| Anderson, Joseph | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Bibb, George | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Brent, Richard | | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Campbell, George | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Crawford, William | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Cutts, Charles | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Franklin, Jesse | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Gaillard, John | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Robinson, Jonathan | | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Tait, Charles | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Taylor, John | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Turner, John | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Varnum, Joseph | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| REPUBLICANS: CLINTONIANS ⁷⁹ | | | | | | | | |
| German, Obadiah | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Gilman, Nicholas | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Lambert, John | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| REPUBLICANS: INVISIBLES ⁸⁰ | | | | | | | | |
| Giles, William | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y | Y |
| Gregg, Andrew | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
| Leib, Michael | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |
| Smith, Samuel | N | Y | N | N | N | N | N | Y |
| REPUBLICANS: MAVERICKS ⁸¹ | | | | | | | | |
| Condit, John | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |
| Howell, Jeremiah | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
| Pope, John | N | Y | N | N | N | N | Y | N |
| Reed, Philip | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
| Smith, John | Y | N | Y | N | N | N | N | Y |
| Worthington, Thomas | Y | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | N |

⁷⁶ Table 2 is an analysis of the vote organized by party and by faction within the party. Explanations of numbers one through eight are given in note 75.

⁷⁷ The Federalists voted as a bloc on every issue. They supported all amendments to the House war bill which would have converted the declaration of war to a declaration of a war of naval reprisal and letters of marque with either Great Britain or both Great Britain and France. That failing, they voted against war. It may be surmised that their strategy was to vote to add a crippling amendment to the war bill and, if such an amendment had passed, to join the administration Republicans to vote the bill down.

⁷⁸ Supporters of the administration voted together on every issue. They successfully defeated every proposed amendment to the House war bill, primarily because of the division among the dissident Republicans over the inclusion of France in a maritime war.

⁷⁹ Clintonians voted with the Federalists on every measure, supporting amendments to the House war bill and voting against war. They protested that they thought the declaration of war premature, but political considerations were probably foremost in their minds.

⁸⁰ The Invisibles were united only by their opposition to the administration. Leib and Gregg supported maritime war. Smith supported triangular war, and Giles voted erratically. When all proposed amendments to the war bill were voted down, they joined the administration Republicans in voting for war.

⁸¹ Maverick senators voted with apparent independence of both party and faction. Condit supported the various amendments to the war bill until June 17 when he had decided to support war. Howell supported a maritime war against Great Britain alone. Pope supported triangular war only. Reed voted with the Federalists and Clintonians against war. John Smith wavered but ended by voting for war. Worthington supported limited war against Great Britain, but opposed an all out war. Stephen Bradley of Vermont and Alexander Campbell of Ohio were absent, but would have opposed war if they had been present; hence, they may be counted as mavericks. With the latter two included, there were eight mavericks. Four of them—Pope, Worthington, Bradley, and Alexander Campbell—were from frontier states and all opposed war. The remaining four—Condit, Howell, Reed, and John Smith—were from seaboard states, and they divided on the question of war; two voted in favor and two voted against war on June 17, 1812.