daughter whose belief in her father's greatness as an engineer has now been amply demonstrated by Lewis. There is an occasional slip in grammar or documentation, and some additional updating of the bibliography would have improved the book. Similarly, the single map, the choice of illustrations, and the index bring small credit to author or publisher. But these faults, though annoying, are minor. Lewis has developed his major themes carefully, has added significant detail to the familiar outline of internal improvement development in America, and has contributed to a better understanding of the continuing debate between waterway and railway advocates prior to the Civil War.

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Despite such well known resident abolitionists and radicals as George W. Julian, Benjamin F. Wade, and Owen Lovejoy, the Midwest at the beginning of the Civil War was a stronghold of white supremacy. At the close of the conflict—after emancipation, enlistment of black troops, and the Fourteenth Amendment—midwestern attitudes toward the Negro continued to be a “blend of abstract egalitarianism and pragmatic racism” (p. 180). Voegeli's volume is an analysis of this seeming paradox.

Although many midwesterners opposed slavery and its extension into the territories, Democrats throughout the war fought against emancipation, use of Negro regiments, and even legal manifestations of equality. Republicans, too, accepted these ideas reluctantly, if at all. Part of their hesitancy was due to fear that such moves were politically inexpedient, but most midwestern Republicans refused to support full equality for the Negro chiefly because "they did not believe in it" (p. 178). Voegeli finds that there was little "unequivocal commitment to racial equality" even among radicals; and he concludes that though the Civil War may have tempered racism in the Midwest, it did not purge it (p. 182).

Voegeli assesses Lincoln as the epitome of midwestern ambivalence toward the racial question. He notes the President's moral, as well as practical, commitment to emancipation. But Lincoln's advocacy of Negro colonization, his justification of the Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure, and his plan to employ freed Negroes in the South in order to prevent a northern hegira suggest that the "Great Emancipator," like many other midwesterners, was more political pragmatist than moralist in his racial policies. Free but Not Equal also reemphasizes the importance of race in midwestern attitudes toward the war and the importance of the Midwest to Lincoln's presidential and political plans.
The author presents his subject with proper scholarly detachment based on thorough and comprehensive research. Yet his book lacks the forcefulness that selection of stronger quotations would have provided. Midwestern editors, politicians, and private individuals—as revealed in the sources consulted—were even more vehement and violent than Voegeli indicates. And the racist transformation in the Midwest was perhaps even less pronounced. Many accepted emancipation only because it was a fait accompli; given reactions to the Fifteenth Amendment a few years later and continuing legal and educational restrictions, many accepted any measure of equality not at all.

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Secession and Civil War produced strange new problems for the American people. The facts were perfectly clear; the consequences were not. Eleven southern states had declared themselves out of the Union, formed a new confederation, and created an army to defend it. A few northerners accepted their actions, but the majority, including President Abraham Lincoln, held that the Union was indivisible and secession impossible. The southern states were still in the Union. They would ultimately resume their old status.

Reconstruction, says Professor Belz, was thus a "problem of first magnitude" from the very beginning of the Civil War. It would "of necessity follow" in broad outline, "the principles of the preexisting constitutional system" (p. 2). So since there were no constitutional precedents of any kind to deal with secession, the constitutional history of the period has to do largely with a struggle between conflicting theories regarding war aims, the present status of the southern people and their states, and the responsibility for policies to be adopted.

The conflict of theories over war aims arose at once and ranged from a simple restoration of the Union as quickly as possible to complete military conquest and social reform. Demands varied with persons, parties, and regions and grew in severity as the war dragged on. The necessity for holding the border states, however, checked extremes; the recognition of the loyal Pierpoint government in Virginia and the acceptance of military rule in conquered areas represented compromise. Virginia was still in the Union; portions of the South were under the control of an army.

When Congress met in regular session in December, 1861, it was clear to all that the Union would not be quickly restored. Military reverses had intensified the bitterness against "rebels," and the demand for punishment found expression in a series of bills and debates which brought forth a new