

almost as grateful to the Iowa State University Press for publishing such a handsome volume.

In part the author has concentrated, quite properly, on the dinners themselves—their cost, the edibles and potables served, special themes or emphases, and the funds flowing to party coffers or creditors. The other major emphasis is on the speeches, particularly those of Presidents and White House hopefuls. Welcome to the reviewer was the fresh opportunity to compare Franklin D. Roosevelt's suave and at times almost nonpartisan approach with the more obviously partisan, and therefore more conventional, efforts of some other headliners. From the standpoint of things-then-to-come, accounts of the Jackson Day Dinners of 1912, 1932, and 1960 are unusually absorbing. There are also capsules of \$100-a-plate dinner speeches from 1936 through 1966; selected menus, including one for a repast planned on a 700-calorie basis; photographs, cartoons, and other illustrations.

Stinnett is both a devoted Democrat and the recipient of the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Minnesota. He serves as assistant to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who contributed the foreword and whom Stinnett describes in the dedication as "My Mentor, My Friend, My Inspiration." It should be no surprise, therefore, that regarding his subject the author is decidedly empathic. Yet a great deal of first-rate scholarship, as well as enthusiasm, is represented in this work. The bibliography is impressive; twenty-three theses and dissertations are listed. Stinnett not only culled newspapers, magazines, and books but personally interviewed numerous officials. His discussions, in the notes, of party methods and party development are particularly discerning in this reviewer's judgment. Indeed, in the long run, they may prove more valuable than some of the text itself.

Many American citizens, undertaking to introduce people from abroad to our way of life, have found it especially difficult successfully to interpret political parties to foreigners. An Eastland and a Humphrey in the Democracy? A Goldwater and a Javits in the G.O.P.? "Mais, monsieur, how can such things be?" The Stinnett volume goes far in the direction of accounting for the cement holding parties together after a fashion year after year, despite the often disparate nature of those parties' human and ideological ingredients.

University of Kentucky

Holman Hamilton

Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939. By James L. Patterson. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, for the Organization of American Historians, 1967. Pp. ix, 369. Notes, illustrations, appendix, bibliographical notes, index. \$8.50.)

The story has it that a congressman, when asked about his participation in a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans, replied:

"Sometimes I coalesce. Sometimes I don't." While historians have known in a general way that a congressional coalition formed during Franklin Roosevelt's presidency has blocked liberal programs from the Fair Deal to the Great Society, they have lacked a full-scale account of its origins. Now James Patterson offers such a study. He attempts to explain who the congressional conservatives were, what common characteristics they shared, when they formed a coalition, and how effective their opposition to the New Deal was.

Patterson proceeds by describing the New Deal proposals that called forth opposition, the arguments used against these measures, the strategy of the administration and its opponents, the reasons for enactment or defeat, and the significance of all this for conservative unity. More than three-fourths of the book is devoted to the years 1937-1939, and much more attention is given the Senate than the House. Patterson's account is based on broad research in manuscript sources, his presentation is clear and direct, and his judgments are usually sound. As a result, this is an excellent account of the reasons why various members of Congress opposed certain measures sponsored by the Roosevelt administration.

Although a few Democrats disliked the New Deal from the start and there was significant opposition to the regulation of public utilities in 1935, Patterson believes that broad congressional hostility to the New Deal did not develop until after 1937. Roosevelt's proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court, his failure to combat the recession, and his attempt to purge the Democratic party led to an erosion of his strength. At the same time, the administration's attempt to aid the urban working classes offended many senators and representatives with rural constituencies. Patterson, however, admits that an effective bipartisan coalition did not emerge during the 1930's. He shows that opponents of the administration varied from issue to issue, that the 1938 session "in no sense exposed a well-organized, monolithic conservative coalition," and that even in 1939 "the bipartisan coalition failed to function at all" (p. 247, 31) in many cases.

Unfortunately, the criteria the author adopts for evaluating "conservatism" are exceedingly arbitrary. He presumes that any vote against Roosevelt's proposals was by definition "conservative," although this was not always the case. Moreover, he considers any Democratic representative "conservative" if he voted against the administration on at least 25 percent of certain key roll calls; he considers any Democratic senator "conservative" if he cast at least 12 percent of his votes against the administration. The choice of these percentages is not explained; indeed, had the author used a slightly higher percentage very few congressmen would have qualified as "conservatives." But then, perhaps one might suggest that the formation of the conservative coalition occurred during the war years rather than the 1930's.

Cornell University

Richard Polenberg