Charles C. Tansill, in *America Goes to War* (1938), viewed United States foreign policy of 1914-1917 as a struggle between British realism on the one hand and American idealism on the other. He blamed Edward House and Robert Lansing for Wilson's blundering intervention and concluded that the foreign policy was designed to preserve the British Empire. Tansill warned that America should not intervene again for the same purpose. Barnes shouted that if the United States made war again democracy was doomed, but Millis favored a rational intervention. Shortly before the Japanese bombers rained their bombs on Pearl Harbor, Barnes wrote that American entrance into the Pacific war was "sheer national idiocy."

Cohen has done a scholarly job of presenting the controversial views of these five historians at a time when America's foreign policy is again under scrutiny. His book deserves a wide reading.

George Osborn


Fehrenbach's readable account of Roosevelt's efforts to align the United States with Great Britain is designed for a popular audience. Although it is filled with interesting, if often arguable, judgments about the American position and the policies of other major powers before Pearl Harbor, it is based entirely on published materials and adds nothing to our factual knowledge of the period.

Fehrenbach accepts the thesis that an isolationist-minded America was brought to its senses by a President who awoke earlier than most of his compatriots to the dangers the United States would face in a Hitler-dominated world, and who used his superb political skills to change America's course. In developing this thesis, Fehrenbach, like others before him, overestimates both Roosevelt's vision and the magnitude of the gap between his views and those of the public.

Roosevelt, as his wartime consensus diplomacy was to show, shared the general American aversion to power politics and failed to understand its essence. He resorted to idealistic and moralistic pronouncements about the war and America's role not because he wished to lead or to mislead the public, but quite simply because he believed them. The President was, of course, better informed than the public about events in Europe and Asia, more aware of how they might adversely affect American aims and interests, and more confident that the United States could intervene to good effect, if necessary. He recognized somewhat earlier than most that American security depended on the maintenance of Great Britain and the defeat of Hitler and he was not wedded to the concept of unilateralism in foreign affairs, but he was also not prepared to throw America's full weight into the balance at any time before Pearl Harbor.
Public opinion lagged only slightly behind that of the President and was affected more by world events than by anything Roosevelt said or did. Fehrenbach underestimates the significance of the Senate's confirmation of Stimson and Knox and the sponsorship of the Selective Service Bill by an anti-New Deal Democrat and a Republican as indicators of widespread concurrence with administration policy. He takes little account of the fact that the nomination of Willkie demonstrated the belief, even of the Republican party, that no isolationist candidate could win the presidency in 1940. Nor does he recognize the America First Committee for what it really was: a last-ditch effort to rally the opponents of Roosevelt's foreign policy in the hope of stemming the tide.

A number of overstatements and inaccuracies mar the book. For example, the cash-and-carry provisions never applied to "all buying of raw materials by foreign powers" (p. 2) and had already expired in March, 1939; Borah, Johnson, and Wheeler never served on the Nye Committee (p. 4); Roosevelt did not accept Hoover's tariff policies (p. 11); there were no "urgent pressures" for a declaration of war from either the Cabinet or the State Department in June, 1940 (p. 67); the Committee to Defend America First was formed not two days after but two months before the destroyer deal, and its name was changed to America First Committee prior to the date mentioned by Fehrenbach (pp. 163-64); and the United States-British staff talks early in 1941 produced contingency plans and not formal American commitments to specific actions (pp. 222-25).

Fehrenbach, in short, has produced an interesting, readable, but not particularly enlightening book.

Union College

R. H. Jonas

The Diplomacy of a New Age: Major Issues in U.S. Policy since 1945.

Dexter Perkins, one of the most distinguished historians of American diplomacy, has had a long and amazing professional life. He has retired from two teaching careers, one at the University of Rochester and the other at Cornell University, and since his last retirement in 1959 has kept active lecturing and writing on American foreign relations. In 1966 he was visiting professor for the Patten Foundation at Indiana University. This book is an outgrowth of his Patten Lectures.

As could be expected from a book based on lectures, this volume offers a series of essays on selected topics, such as the Marshall Plan, that are loosely connected and focused most often on United States relations with the Soviet Union. Despite the brevity of the book and the selectivity of the author, these essays do analyze or touch on most