defined chronological segments. The eleven topical chapters are all admirably reflective of thorough and well-digested research, but each bridges the century in an organizational pattern that may make the book less flexible than John Ezell's more conventional *The South Since 1865* (1963) to employ as a basic text. Finally, the introductory chapter, the three chapters that focus on biracialism, and the summary chapter on "The Evolving South" endow the book with a kind of Beethovenesque coda that lends itself to redundancy. Still, the message of the book is one of informed conviction briskly aired. While this volume will doubtless provoke some questions as to the propriety of such a reform-minded text, historians who share the authors' conviction that the South should continue to shed the more negative aspects of its historical legacy might hope that this book will be partially instrumental in accelerating that change.

Stanford University Hugh Davis Graham

Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study in American Diplomacy. By Betty Glad. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. 365. Notes, bibliography, index. $5.95.)

The period between the two World Wars was one in which many Americans misjudged the international position of the United States. Our nation, we thought, was different from others, innocent of the evils of world politics. Desiring to preserve this innocence—perhaps more illusion than reality—we tried to defy forces of history which (to paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr) were creating a potential world community and increasing the power of the United States beyond that of any other nation.

Leaders of American foreign policy in the interwar period did little to educate citizens of the nation to the reality of the changing world—that the free security of the United States was passing. Charles Evans Hughes was no exception. As Betty Glad says, "He was . . . a man of his times, an exemplar of the thought and values of the educated class of his day" (p. 1). Miss Glad, a professor of political science at the University of Illinois, examines the thought and policies of Hughes for an insight to the sources, structure, and policy consequences of the American mind intoxicated by legalistic-moralistic approaches to international problems. Her study owes much to the ideas of Hans J. Morgenthau and George Kennan. She centered her research in the Hughes papers, including the Beerits memoranda, plus printed government documents and various publications by Hughes. Apparently Miss Glad, although using the published *Foreign Relations* volumes, did not use Department of State records in the National Archives.

After discussing early influences on Hughes, including such Brown University teachers as Ezekiel Robinson and J. Lewis Diman, who emphasized moral law commanding nature and man and an evolution toward higher forms of moral faculty, Miss Glad briefly traces Hughes' early career and the development of his own social philosophy—a conservative evolutionism fused with rationalism. It was an optimistic

philosophy which equated positive law and the mores of his day with reason and justice. Hughes refused to admit that law and custom might represent the stronger interests or that position, power, or chance might dispense social rewards. Concluding that Hughes would neither innovate a philosophy nor attempt new solutions to problems, the author then examines her subject's foreign policies in light of these precepts.

In beginning her discussion of Hughes' diplomacy, Miss Glad lays down a yardstick to measure the statesman. Here emphasis is on the relationship of policy to power: "If diplomacy is to accomplish its major task . . . the diplomats must comprehend power realities which lie behind and structure their discussions" (p. 130). Miss Glad then predicts that Hughes will have difficulties along this line, and, in her examination, he does. Like most Americans, Hughes failed to assume real interest in the European or Far Eastern status quo and showed no willingness to use American power to maintain it. In the Tacna-Arica dispute the secretary was too legalistic, neglecting the political issue; other attempts for international conciliation and arbitration often failed because he did not understand that national interest depends on power as well as need. In Latin American policies Hughes was generally successful because his country's interests were geared to its power, but since he was dealing with such unequal neighbors he never fully understood why the United States never had to resort to political alliances or threaten a major war. The author's evaluation of the Washington Conference (1921-1922) hits hard at this theme. "States will not in the long run be restrained by either their own promises or abstract principles when they can secure goals they consider important with a relatively cheap expenditure of their military, economic, or political resources. They will be deterred only by the knowledge that they would run serious risks if they should attempt to overthrow the status quo" (p. 302).

Much that the author presents is not new. Others have outlined her general theme; her narrative of American foreign policy has been told elsewhere. Nonetheless, her particular analysis of Hughes is a contribution to understanding American diplomacy in the interwar period.

North Texas State University William Kamman

Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach. By Edwin Fenton. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966. Pp. xvii, 526. Illustrations, notes, tables, figures, index. $7.95.)

In the wake of restructured educational approaches to the "new math" and the "new sciences," the United States Office of Education has turned to the social studies, i.e., history and the social sciences. In 1963 it contracted with seven universities for the establishment of centers where groups of scholars, teachers, and curriculum specialists were encouraged to undertake jointly one or more of the following