Grant states that the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 provided for the payment of an annuity to the Northern Plains Indians in return for certain lands. Actually, the Indians retained ownership of the land. They simply agreed to allow emigrants to travel over the Oregon, California, and Mormon trails free from harassment and to permit the United States Army to build fortifications along the route. Grant reports that “Old Bedlam,” the famous officers’ quarters immortalized in a novel by Charles King, cost from $60,000 to $85,000 since lumber for its construction had to be hauled all the way from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Records show, however, that the lumber came from trees growing within a fifty mile radius of the post. In fact, logging still continues on nearby Laramie Peak. Grant declares that the State of Wyoming bought Fort Laramie and donated it to the federal government in 1927. In truth, the state purchased the buildings and land in 1937. It became a part of the National Park System in 1938.

Since the market for books on forts is a bullish one, it is quite possible that another author may soon supply a volume which has all of the strengths and none of the weaknesses of AmeriGan. At least let us hope so.

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John Dishon McDermott


American historical scholarship has, so it seems, exhausted the Revolution and its aftermath and has turned to the War of 1812, and the book under review is only one of perhaps a dozen volumes to appear in the past few years. Where it differs from the others is its attempt at synthesis—a short, general account of the causes of the war and the diplomacy of the peace. The author, Patrick C. T. White, cites to documents in the Public Record Office of Great Britain and to numerous writings of contemporary Americans, public and private. He contends that the Americans faced in the British Government an enemy that was almost implacable, that the British had decided that their European problems came first and that American interests had to work themselves out within the larger arrangements—such as the Orders in Council—for British national security. The author does not hold a brief for the diplomacy of Jefferson and Madison, which he remarks contained too much hope and not enough practicality. But he believes that the War of 1812 had a good result because it showed the British they could not step on the Americans, and that “the new freedom from the Old World provided the United States with an impetus for growth that might otherwise not have existed” (p. 167).

The above quotation, part of the book’s penultimate sentence, points to one of the difficulties of this volume—for White has written the book as collateral reading for college undergraduates, and no under-
graduate will go through this sort of prose with any feeling of interest not to mention enjoyment. For all its outdatedness Henry Adams is far more interesting, a much more likely source of collateral reading. None of the figures in this book comes to life: Madison, Jefferson, J. Q. Adams, Calhoun, Clay. One recalls the lament of Theodore Roosevelt before he gave his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1912, that he was going to tell the historians that history was literature and, he added, they were not going to believe it. After fifty-four years has that message still failed to get through?

The reviewer must make one other observation, in regard to sources. White has a curious method of citing only to Foreign Office documents or to collections of letters or documents or, if he cites a secondary work, it almost always is to that work as the source of a quotation. On two or three occasions he remarks the books of Adams, Burt, Horsman, Bradford Perkins, Pratt, et al., but does not use his footnotes to credit their findings. This is improper, for the notes should show White's sources; it is unbelievable that he ignored the secondary works or used them only as mines for quotations.

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There were many men who, for a variety of reasons that became increasingly murky, objected to the political artistry of the "demi-gods" of the Philadelphia Convention. They may well have been a majority, yet they have received little attention from American scholars until recently. They have been passed over, one suspects, simply because they were on the losing side; but after reading these essays it seems reasonable to conclude that their argumentation and debate, by and large, are no match for those of their opponents and that it is for this reason that they have been overlooked. Certainly these Antifederalist essays are inferior to the Madison, Hamilton, and Jay productions of 1788. There are exceptions and ironically the exceptions were the work of well-to-do and well-educated men like George Mason, R. H. Lee, and Robert Yates. Anti-Beardians have led us to suspect as much for some time. Together with Jackson Main's recent study, The Antifederalists, this collection of generally tedious and repetitious essays gives us a view in depth of just what it was that stirred the hearts and souls of the "un-Founders" of the Republic.

The Antifederalists objected to the elasticity of the Constitution, to what they could not be hoodwinked into believing was a nice balance between state and national governments, to the aristocratic overtones of a long-term Senate and a monarchical presidency, and to the tactics of opponents who would countenance talk of lifetime appointments behind closed doors and then publicly proclaim themselves Federalists. They believed that the state governments had been set on the road