how big a reservoir of manpower Britain could call upon in America remains a moot point. Smith does note the lack of consideration, and the careless and inconsistent treatment the Loyalists suffered both in and out of the service. He concludes that though Britain had many "friends" in America, many of them refused an active role in the war. After 1778 the Provincial Line never rose above an estimated 10,000, a figure Britain had hoped for earlier, but which later fell below her expectations.

After 1778, Britain's strategy was concentrated on the South, an expected center of Loyalism. With the entry of France into the war, the British were forced to consider their home defenses first. Able to spare little more for America, they had to relinquish the offensive on land in favor of defensive and naval war. Seizing and holding the Southern states with expected Loyalist support would at least maintain appearances in America for the sake of the shaky North regime. And, indeed, protection of American Loyalists became the major argument of the British administration for continuing the war. When the chimera of strong Loyalist forces to be rallied in America failed, the war could no longer be sustained.

Although the British army was at first militarily successful in the South, administrative errors aroused new revolutionary zeal, Loyalist support in sufficient amount was not forthcoming, and the army was inadequate to its task of protecting Loyalists or cowing the patriots. By 1782 even the British government had seen the futility of a war waged to protect American friends. Events had demonstrated that adequate Loyalist assistance could not be aroused because Britain had failed to provide sufficient leadership, encouragement, and support from first to last.

Smith has succeeded in providing an important new interpretation of the Loyalists in the American Revolution, emphasizing both the significant role they might have played in the limited war Britain was forced to wage in America, and their political importance to the government in prolonging the North ministry and the war.

Butler University

G. M. Waller

The Papers of James Madison, Volume 4, 1 January 1782—31 July 1782.
Edited by William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal.

Reviewers' response to the publication of the first three volumes of Papers is a mixture of praise and criticism. The editorial work is charged with having gone as far or high as such a thing could go. The footnotes, it is claimed, adequately identify every proper name, and clarify, for the general reader, unusual words and controversial questions. Bibliographical completeness is recognized. The exacting standards of superlative scholarship and the incredible industry of the editors are generally admitted. Yet the editors are charged, too, with the treatment of trivia, and pedantic and even absurd annotation. Reviewers have
accused them of having padded the first three volumes with "piddling documents laboriously glossed," and with "substituting an overabundance of industry for a sense of proportion."

The fourth volume includes two hundred eleven papers of which only thirty-five have, in whole or in part, been printed in earlier editions of Madison's writings. Ninety-three of the documents, the editors assure us, are altogether or partly in Madison's hand, and an additional seventeen record what he said or wrote. Nineteen dispatches prepared by his colleagues in the Virginia delegation to Congress were signed or otherwise approved by Madison. Fifty-two letters addressed to Madison personally, and twenty-four addressed to the Virginia delegation in Congress, are also included. The remaining items consist of motions, committee reports, and editorial comments on misdated or missing documents.

The editorial pattern set in the first three volumes continues in the fourth volume: prodigious industry persists; meticulous annotation is abundant; editorial notes are at times laborious but usually fruitful; the index, typically thorough, conveniently points the reader to documents and footnotes in this and the preceding volumes.

Absurdity, trivia, and disproportion, like beauty, are judged by the beholder—or reviewer. This reviewer, though admittedly lost at times among the documents and their annotations, accepts the intent of the editors and commends them for their success. True, no issue confronting the Continental Congress or the Commonwealth of Virginia was resolved during the seven months encompassed by this volume. Nor is the origin or culmination of any major issue revealed by the documents. But the many references to the continuous problems of western land claims, the shortage of money, illicit trade with the enemy, war debts and congressional requisitions, interstate rivalries, British peace overtures, battles and rumors of battles in the West Indies, will, when the volumes are completed, bring these issues into focus insofar as they relate to Madison. Personal observations and interesting anecdotes, sprinkled throughout the documents, lend local color and delightful detail.

This volume is no compact narrative. No new historical interpretations challenge the reader. No reader will be engrossed in its contents into the wee hours of the morning. The layman probably won't use it, nor will the professional engage his colleagues in arguments about its truth or its philosophy. And for good reason, for these are not the objectives of the Papers.

Indiana State University

Donald B. Scheick


Curry's purpose in writing A House Divided was threefold: "to determine whether earlier works on the 'disruption of Virginia' properly assess the quantum relationship between Unionists and Secessionists in