

come from the White House and the executive departments; the employment of Madison Avenue advertising firms; the analysis of feedbacks, the White House mail, and the opinion polls.

Professor Cornwell argues that the President's responsibilities today are greater than his constitutional powers to meet them, that his most important single instrument is the molding of opinion, and that a President of this era who does not learn how to use effectively the enormous and proliferating mass media techniques at his disposal is not doing his job.

A study of this kind has long been overdue. Now Professor Cornwell has done it, in a book which reveals wide and painstaking research and is systematic and analytical, and at the same time is written in a lively style replete with colorful incidents and anecdotes and devoid of technical jargon. For this reason the book will have interest for the general reader as well as great value for political scientists, politicians, administrators, journalists, and advertising and public relations people.

Historians will discover not only much material hitherto unpublished, but also examples of how this generation is rewriting history in terms of its own experience. A new "school" of historical interpretation is emerging from the technicalized society, one which is finding skill—or a lack of it—in the use of mass media techniques a key to an understanding of historical outcomes. For instance, Professor Cornwell attributes Wilson's defeat in the League of Nations fight not to the causes usually assigned but to Wilson's failure to confront and solve the public relations problem he faced (p. 56). Again, the author suggests that Hoover's misfortunes were due not so much to the depression, though this was a factor, as to his inability to cope with the mass communications side of his job (p. 99).

Some of the appraisals of Kennedy now appearing claim he will go down as a great President because of his "breakthrough to modernity" in the use of the mass media. However, it seems significant that those two "loners" and virtuosos, Wilson and FDR, brilliantly led public opinion and Congress to memorable legislative achievements during their first two years in office, whereas Kennedy—despite his video personality, his collegial use of staff, and advice from those sophisticated in the ways of opinion polls, Trendex ratings, and market research—failed to make much of a dent in the legislative log jam which had been accumulating for over a decade.

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William G. Carleton

Father Coughlin and the New Deal. By Charles J. Tull. *Men and Movements Series.* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 292. Illustrations, appendixes, bibliographical note, notes, index. \$6.50.)

This is the first serious treatment of the relations of the "Radio Priest" with the New Deal. In his search for sources the author received no cooperation from the Detroit Archdiocese; as a result, many of his judgments are tentative. But he has read Coughlin's speeches and

writings and has used to good purpose material at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park. Since Tull's purpose is not biography, Coughlin's personality remains somewhat enigmatic. The book is nonetheless adequately written, concise, and balanced in judgment.

Tull's focus is on the period from 1931, when Coughlin successfully defied the efforts of CBS to moderate his attacks upon the Hoover administration, to 1942, when the church and the government combined to silence him. The author suggests that Coughlin's original purpose in taking to the air was the simple one of building up his parish and that his later forays into political questions were efforts to introduce to America the social teachings of *Rerum Novarum*. Coughlin's break with the New Deal, Tull continues, was partly the result of Coughlin's conviction that Roosevelt was moving too slowly toward social justice, and not (as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has suggested) an effort to enlarge his radio audience. Tull also notes Roosevelt's shrewd use of Coughlin. Apparently disliking Coughlin from the start, the President nonetheless wrote him friendly letters and tacitly accepted his support so long as it helped Roosevelt's cause. Tull concludes that Coughlin, despite his talk of a corporate state, his anti-Semitism, and his authoritarian tendencies, was too "erratic" to be called a Fascist. These judgments are persuasively argued.

The author also emphasizes that Coughlin's economic theories were ill-considered and that his actions after 1935 were increasingly negative and destructive. Coughlin's revengeful and unrealistic course in the 1936 campaign receives especially critical treatment, and the author makes no effort to conceal or explain away Coughlin's anti-Semitism. He shows also that the church hierarchy considered Coughlin obnoxious as early as 1935, but was powerless to stop him until Bishop Gallagher, his immediate superior, died in 1937. Tull's point of view is objective, his tone restrained, his conclusions unflattering to his subject.

A mild tendency to overwrite (there are too many "bitter battles") and an inexplicable brevity in documentation (we are not given, for instance, the location of letters in the Roosevelt Library files) detract slightly from the book. Otherwise, this is a useful study. Tull's focus is clear; his style unambiguous; his research adequate within the means at his disposal.

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