

in despair and agree upon the novel expedient of calling a progressive a progressive.

The question arises as to how representative a sampling of six items can be. The book's title might just as appropriately encompass a ten-volume compendium as it does 149 pages. Would the effect in such a case be to suggest even greater variety, or might a visible pattern and some uniformity result? No one can question Levine's contention that different reformers held different views, but by confining his portrait to a few patently disparate figures, the author may be giving a false impression. Acknowledging differences, can we not also detect groupings or patterns? If Jane Addams had little other than Chicago in common with the Civic Federation, did not each of them illustrate certain reform values and aims common to the period in general? The founder of Hull House focused her attention upon urban ills and social justice, typifying the interests of that group of lower class reformers described by J. Joseph Huthmacher. The Civic Federation, on the other hand, is a good example of one other reform thread of the period: the continuing interest, notably among businessmen, in "good government." Granting Levine's point that reform thought was not monolithic, we must take care not to assume that its composition was as unstructured as dust. If, as he concludes on page 117, "the American intellectual landscape is neither desert nor monotonous plain," we still ought to be able to identify some topographical pattern in its various "hills, valleys, hidden caves, deserts and seas."

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Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion. By Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 370. Illustrations, tables, notes, index. \$6.95.)

Perhaps a more accurate title for this book would be: "Presidential Use of Mass Media to Influence Public Opinion and Create a Presidential Image." While the author does not entirely neglect the substantive issues and the histrionic and literary arts (there is an interesting account of how FDR achieved "the eternal simplicities" of expression), the decided emphasis is on public relations techniques. For instance, about as much space is devoted to Calvin Coolidge, under whom some significant mass media techniques were developed, as is given Woodrow Wilson, who personally thrilled the world and had an enormous impact on opinion everywhere.

The mass communications practices used by the Presidents are analyzed, and the history of their development from Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson traced. Among other things, these include the presidential press conference in all its variations; the utilization of radio and television; the activities of the presidential press secretary (with emphasis on "Steve" Early and James C. Hagerty); the operations of ghost writers; the expansion of the presidential staff and its increasing concentration on public relations; the ways of coordinating, timing, and distributing in an even flow the prodigious amounts of news which

come from the White House and the executive departments; the employment of Madison Avenue advertising firms; the analysis of feedbacks, the White House mail, and the opinion polls.

Professor Cornwell argues that the President's responsibilities today are greater than his constitutional powers to meet them, that his most important single instrument is the molding of opinion, and that a President of this era who does not learn how to use effectively the enormous and proliferating mass media techniques at his disposal is not doing his job.

A study of this kind has long been overdue. Now Professor Cornwell has done it, in a book which reveals wide and painstaking research and is systematic and analytical, and at the same time is written in a lively style replete with colorful incidents and anecdotes and devoid of technical jargon. For this reason the book will have interest for the general reader as well as great value for political scientists, politicians, administrators, journalists, and advertising and public relations people.

Historians will discover not only much material hitherto unpublished, but also examples of how this generation is rewriting history in terms of its own experience. A new "school" of historical interpretation is emerging from the technicalized society, one which is finding skill—or a lack of it—in the use of mass media techniques a key to an understanding of historical outcomes. For instance, Professor Cornwell attributes Wilson's defeat in the League of Nations fight not to the causes usually assigned but to Wilson's failure to confront and solve the public relations problem he faced (p. 56). Again, the author suggests that Hoover's misfortunes were due not so much to the depression, though this was a factor, as to his inability to cope with the mass communications side of his job (p. 99).

Some of the appraisals of Kennedy now appearing claim he will go down as a great President because of his "breakthrough to modernity" in the use of the mass media. However, it seems significant that those two "loners" and virtuosos, Wilson and FDR, brilliantly led public opinion and Congress to memorable legislative achievements during their first two years in office, whereas Kennedy—despite his video personality, his collegial use of staff, and advice from those sophisticated in the ways of opinion polls, Trendex ratings, and market research—failed to make much of a dent in the legislative log jam which had been accumulating for over a decade.

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William G. Carleton

Father Coughlin and the New Deal. By Charles J. Tull. *Men and Movements Series.* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 292. Illustrations, appendixes, bibliographical note, notes, index. \$6.50.)

This is the first serious treatment of the relations of the "Radio Priest" with the New Deal. In his search for sources the author received no cooperation from the Detroit Archdiocese; as a result, many of his judgments are tentative. But he has read Coughlin's speeches and