

was spent in establishing the Zollicoffer lines before and after General Felix K. Zollicoffer. However, to the extent that the author sheds new light and focuses increased attention upon this relatively unnoticed and little-studied battle of the Civil War, the book will appeal to the historian and to the Civil War buff.

Although secondary sources were drawn upon for much of the information pertaining to the Battle of Mill Springs, some new information has been brought forth as a result of the author's use of letters, records, and stories in the hands of private collectors. A clearer picture of the Battle of Mill Springs and the events leading up to and following the battle is presented by the author's tracing of events step by step in both the text and in Appendix D.

The Zollie Tree should be a welcome addition to any Civil War shelf and will be of particular interest to those who feel that the War really was won in the West.

Indiana Sesquicentennial Commission

Carl A. Zenor

Upton and the Army. By Stephen E. Ambrose. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 190. Illustrations, notes, bibliographical note, index. \$5.00.)

Emory Upton was an interesting and challenging subject for biography. Unusually brave, with much self-discipline and a marked craving for success, Upton graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1861, fought during the Civil War at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and elsewhere, commanded a division at age 25, observed the armies of Asia and Europe after the war, and served at West Point as Commandant of Cadets. With all these and other duties and travels he found time to complete two books, *The Armies of Asia and Europe* and *Infantry Tactics*, and to finish most of another, *The Military Policy of the United States*. Upton argued for a mass army, dominated not by civilians but by professional soldiers. The public ignored him. At age 41, after sieges of severe headaches and other physical and mental disturbances, he picked up his .45 Colt pistol and fired a bullet into his head.

Professor Ambrose had to deal with a number of problems in writing this book: how to explain to laymen Upton's complex and technical proposals for tactical and organizational reforms of the Army; how to appraise objectively, but with sympathy, Upton's highly partisan and sometimes ill-informed views of American military policy; how to assess the importance to American military development of a man who, at the end of his life, considered his work a failure; how to expose to readers the personality of a reserved and formal individual; and how to discuss the reasons for Upton's suicide.

Most of these problems Ambrose has solved very well. One of them he handled adequately, though with excessive caution. The lucid style of his book, its careful organization, and information he supplies about military developments in Europe and America enable Ambrose to explain clearly Upton's tactical and organizational proposals. With detachment, yet without hostility to his subject, he demonstrates how fatuous some of

Upton's ideas were and says that "Upton was incapable of seeing that he could not merely graft a professional army onto the American system" (p. 122). Ambrose considers the posthumous effects of Upton's tactical, organizational, and public relations work and indicates that the general's most valuable function may well have been to sustain the Army's pride and sense of purpose during its post-Civil War doldrums. Frequently citing firsthand sources, he tells a good deal about Upton's character, pointing out connections between the general's reform proposals and the personal frustrations Upton endured under systems he hoped to change. It is the difficult task of relating Upton's personality and illness to his suicide that Ambrose has not performed to the reviewer's complete satisfaction. Sensibly, he lets contemporaries of Upton try to explain his subject's demise. He might also have presented his own analysis, buttressed by psychiatric and other modern medical opinions.

A final criticism of this valuable contribution to American military history: typographical errors (pp. 95, 97, 119, 182) and a garbled paragraph (p. 142) suggest that *Upton and the Army* did not receive all the care in production it deserved.

Indiana University

Ronald Schaffer

The Higher Learning in Colorado: An Historical Study, 1860-1940. By Michael McGiffert. (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1964. Pp. xiii, 307. Tables, notes, bibliography, index, end maps. \$6.50.)

After reading this book one has the impression that the history of education in Colorado was an exercise in patience on the part of the public and on the part of the educational leaders. In spite of the dynamism associated with the West, it took a long time for the colleges and universities in this mountain state to climb to the higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness. The University of Colorado opened its doors in 1877 but it was not until after World War I that it began to achieve national recognition and another twenty-five years went by before it became a mature institution. The private colleges and technical schools also had a long, tough row to hoe, before they developed firm and lasting foundations. Some of the private schools never made it at all since the mortality rate before 1900 was rather high.

Professor McGiffert points out that although the Colorado colleges and universities were not to achieve maturity until after 1945, they had overcome by 1920 many of the obstacles to success that had plagued them for decades. After years of very small enrollments, nearly 7,000 students were attending college in the state and the exodus of Colorado students to other states had slowed considerably. McGiffert indicates that the growing recognition of Colorado's institutions was due in part to the educational statesmanship of men like James H. Baker and William Slocum. To achieve stability for their institutions, the university and college presidents had to walk a tightrope between the democratic doctrine of conspicuous public service on the one hand and administrative independence and academic integrity on the other. It is