to take it seriously; then even as it grew he continued to be overconfident of his own success in the West. For instance, he made repeated assertions in 1824 that Indiana was "certain," "firm," or "unshaken," on his behalf (pp. 630, 645, 674-75, 743, 783, 799), yet in the popular vote Jackson was an easy plurality winner over Clay and Adams. Nevertheless, correspondence between Clay and Governor William Hendricks offers considerable evidence that Indiana political leaders were much stronger for Clay or Adams than for Jackson (pp. 517-18, 551-53, 570-71, especially 552).

The worthwhileness of this series and the quality of its editing to date reflect most favorably on the editors, the University of Kentucky Press, and on the Lilly Endowment, Inc. All things considered, it is remarkable how rapidly the three initial volumes have appeared.

Indiana University

Donald F. Carmony


In the Preface the author refers to the Battle of Mill Springs, variously known as the Battle of Fishing Creek, Logan Cross Roads, Somerset, or Beech Grove, as the "first decisive Union victory of the War" which "was soon eclipsed by battles of greater magnitude and its importance, therefore, has never received the recognition to which it is justly entitled." The detailed account of the battle is an obvious attempt to convince the reader that its significance "was infinitely greater than is generally recognized." The case for attaching significance to this particular battle is a strong one for it created the first break in the long Confederate line in Kentucky, paved the way for invasion of Tennessee, bolstered northern morale, and enabled Lincoln to keep Kentucky in Union hands.

This book is more than a study of a battle. It is a study of the man whose leadership and death affected the outcome of that battle. Perhaps Robert Emmett McDowell, in the Foreword to _The Zollie Tree_, presents the best summary of General Zollicoffer when he says: "General Zollicoffer was not a military genius. In fact he was a far better politician than he was a general. However, he embodied to a marked degree both the strengths and the tragic flaws in Southern society. He belonged to that colorful romantic period when generals, scorning the hail of shot and shell, mounted their chargers and led their men into battle. And he died in the grand manner at the head of his troops in the confusion of that bloody engagement. . . ."

The second chapter, "The Noble Son of a Pioneer," which deals with most of Zollicoffer's life prior to the Civil War, gives an interesting account of social and public life in the 1840's and 50's. Zollicoffer's letters to and from his family give the reader an insight into the varied interests and thinking of this man, as well as a good picture of life in Tennessee and in the nation's capital at that time.

In some respects _The Zollie Tree_ may appeal more to the genealogist than to the historian, for a great amount of the research and writing
was spent in establishing the Zollicoffer lines before and after General Felix K. Zollicoffer. However, to the extent that the author sheds new light and focuses increased attention upon this relatively unnoticed and little-studied battle of the Civil War, the book will appeal to the historian and to the Civil War buff.

Although secondary sources were drawn upon for much of the information pertaining to the Battle of Mill Springs, some new information has been brought forth as a result of the author's use of letters, records, and stories in the hands of private collectors. A clearer picture of the Battle of Mill Springs and the events leading up to and following the battle is presented by the author's tracing of events step by step in both the text and in Appendix D.

The Zollicoffer Tree should be a welcome addition to any Civil War shelf and will be of particular interest to those who feel that the War really was won in the West.

Indiana Sesquicentennial Commission           Carl A. Zenor


Emory Upton was an interesting and challenging subject for biography. Unusually brave, with much self-discipline and a marked craving for success, Upton graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1861, fought during the Civil War at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and elsewhere, commanded a division at age 25, observed the armies of Asia and Europe after the war, and served at West Point as Commandant of Cadets. With all these and other duties and travels he found time to complete two books, *The Armies of Asia and Europe* and *Infantry Tactics,* and to finish most of another, *The Military Policy of the United States.* Upton argued for a mass army, dominated not by civilians but by professional soldiers. The public ignored him. At age 41, after sieges of severe headaches and other physical and mental disturbances, he picked up his .45 Colt pistol and fired a bullet into his head.

Professor Ambrose had to deal with a number of problems in writing this book: how to explain to laymen Upton's complex and technical proposals for tactical and organizational reforms of the Army; how to appraise objectively, but with sympathy, Upton's highly partisan and sometimes ill-informed views of American military policy; how to assess the importance to American military development of a man who, at the end of his life, considered his work a failure; how to expose to readers the personality of a reserved and formal individual; and how to discuss the reasons for Upton's suicide.

Most of these problems Ambrose has solved very well. One of them he handled adequately, though with excessive caution. The lucid style of his book, its careful organization, and information he supplies about military developments in Europe and America enable Ambrose to explain clearly Upton's tactical and organizational proposals. With detachment, yet without hostility to his subject, he demonstrates how fatuous some of