insight to his task. He is sometimes cliché-prone (more than one man "swallowed his gorge") and sometimes facile (the President brought "business" to favor intervention; he "knew in his heart" after the Maine incident that intervention was unavoidable). On the other hand his treatment of the unfortunate Mrs. McKinley, and of McKinley's relations with her, is respectable indeed, and his chapters on the McKinleys' domestic life in Washington are strong ones. McKinley's career prior to his election in 1896 gets extensive treatment (almost half the book), and throughout that period he develops as a man of great personal courage and rectitude, a moderate progressive for his day. He early became the "apostle of protection" and later accepted reciprocity less from expediency than from humanitarianism, according to Morgan; a bimetallist in the 1870's, he needed to shift but slightly to accept the 1896 Republican money plank. Mark Hanna, of course, did not "run" McKinley; rather the reverse. Yet the author recognizes that the man who entered the White House favoring reciprocity and international bimetallism ended up with the Dingley Tariff and the Gold Standard Act.

Morgan's interpretation of the outbreak of war in 1898 is essentially that the pacific McKinley did all he could to avoid intervention in the face of journalistic, public, and congressional pressure, but when Spain did not respond to his minimum demands for peace-keeping, he was forced to accept the congressional movement toward intervention. By April 10, 1898, McKinley "had lost freedom of action," and Morgan finds him guilty of a "lack of imagination" in pursuing a course which failed to provide him with escape routes when war became imminent (pp. 374, 375). On balance, Morgan finds McKinley no innovator, but an able party chief, who, if he followed as often as he led, nevertheless provided policies acceptable to the majority. He was a "transitional" President "trying through his policies of conservative conciliation to ease his country and his people into the new position their responsibilities demanded" (p. 527).

Each of these books succeeds in its intent. Although the lettering on the spine of Glad's is in silver and that on Morgan's in gold, both stress more what bound Americans together in the 1890's than what split them apart. These centripetal forces have been neglected, and a good part of the value of these books lies in their having dealt with them.

Indiana University Walter T. K. Nugent


This is the first volume of a two-volume biographical study of George W. Norris, the Nebraska Progressive. It covers his career from his Ohio boyhood until the election of 1912, when he entered the Senate after a stormy and distinguished career in the House. The author, a member of the Department of History at Connecticut College, has the
companion volume in preparation, but this one can be read as a self-contained biographical unit, since Norris' career conveniently divides into these related halves. It is the first thorough study of Norris—though Richard L. Neuberger and S. B. Kahn (1937) and Alfred Lief (1939) provide valuable interpretations—for it is the first to make intensive use of the Norris manuscripts and of the numerous secondary studies of Progressivism and New Deal politics that have appeared since his death in 1944. Norris' own Fighting Liberal, though an invaluable document, is still a personal and partisan account. Professor Lowitt's study, therefore, is to be welcomed and commended as a useful, informative addition to the historical literature of Progressivism.

Approximately a third of the book is devoted to Norris' boyhood and his early efforts to establish himself as a lawyer and businessman in Nebraska. This information is important in depicting the environment in which Norris' political ideas developed and matured—in free-swinging, agrarian country, where they raised wheat and hell as the Kansas farmers did corn, and where politics was uninhibited and independent. Norris himself was by no means an uncurried prairie radical of the Sockless Jerry Simpson stamp, but he began politics just as the great Populist crusade was ending and inherited much of its fervor and independence. Entering the House in 1903, he joined a band of so-called "insurgents" (which included such midwestern dissidents as Edmond H. Madison and Victor Murdock of Kansas, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, and Charles A. Lindbergh of Minnesota) and became known as a self-reliant thinker who voted as he wished. Norris was an incorrigible independent who happened to be a Republican but who had no qualms about disagreeing with his party. Parties, he felt, robbed a man of his freedom; "I'd rather be right than regular," he once said. He is one of the few influential politicians who operated successfully outside the strict discipline of the American party system. He said that a congressman "should be absolutely free to follow the dictates of conscience in every official action" (p. 147), and he never deviated from this principle. This first volume of his biography finds its climax in Norris' participation in the battle against Speaker Joseph Cannon in 1910 that broke the apparatus of oligarchical party control and opened the way for rearrangements of political strategies in congressional politics.

As Lowitt points out, the central meaning of Norris' early career lies in the fact that he was a key figure in one of the great shifts of political patterns in the early twentieth century: the transformation of "insurgency" into "progressivism," the translation of what was at first an issue of procedural liberalism into a substantive progressive program. The House revolt was the opening phase of the Progressive movement that involved Theodore Roosevelt, Robert M. La Follette, and eventually the whole liberal wing of American politics. Norris, who played a great part in this revolt, served his apprenticeship in Progressivism during these early years. Here the external pressures and internal growth that moved him from a parochial rural legislator into a major national representative of the strengths and weaknesses of midwestern politics are most evident. The factors that made George
Norris into what Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas called "a perambulating Declaration of Independence" can be seen plainly in this volume.

The author's portrait of Norris is careful, sound, and understanding. He neither simplifies nor complicates his subject, essentially a direct, forthright, stubborn man who was perfectly aware of the realities of the legislative process and who used that process and made no concessions to it. This volume is a distinct contribution to American political history and, with the second volume, should compose a significant one.

Michigan State University
Russel B. Nye


The author at first set out to write a history of Teapot Dome, but concluded that the origins of that famous scandal provided material enough for a book. The result is a chronicle of a struggle centering in the years of Woodrow Wilson's presidency, between individuals who wanted to conserve oil resources of western states and those who wanted to give oilmen freedom to develop lands retained by the federal government. In the van of the conservationists were eastern Progressives who thought they were continuing Theodore Roosevelt's battle against predatory businessmen wishing to take for themselves a national heritage. Conservationists received important support from the Navy, then converting its ships to oil. The Navy saw a danger of exhausting the nation's oil resources, so joined Progressives in seeking to close government oil land to private exploitation. Leading advocates of opening government land were oil companies, but equally vocal were western members of Congress, who apparently represented a widely held opinion that eastern conservationists were thwarting western growth.

Despite western determination, and the sympathy of Woodrow Wilson for the western view, conservationists and the Navy for several years managed to prevent a large encroachment on government oil land. They received help from the World War, when conserving the Navy's oil reserves became a patriotic necessity. But in 1920 came a law which opened the way for leasing government land. The author shows how the leasing of oil land influenced national politics, and points out that President Wilson's sympathy for the western view may have returned him to the White House in 1916. Bates demonstrates that oil also had a part in the 1920 national election.

Resting upon impressive research in manuscript materials, this book takes up a subject which occupied much attention in 1909-1921. Yet it appears that Bates kept too closely to his notes and found it painful to part with any piece of information. The result is a tedious book which dwells upon seemingly endless maneuvers. The book will find few readers, even among people interested in Progressivism and