

the Reverend Mather Byles of Boston, who gravely marched guard, musket on shoulder, before his own door while his official "observe-a-Tory" ran an errand for him. One also meets Americans—on both sides—who persecuted, tortured, and defiled graves.

A topic such as this is difficult to organize, and at times the reader comes away with impressions of a rambling, repetitive account; for instance, the same prominent families that were split by opposing sympathies are named on pages 92 and 101. And in view of the fact that at least a dozen books treat Loyalists and their problems, it is strange to read that "they have . . . virtually lost their place in history" (p. 35).

There are a few errors such as an incorrect reference to Lord George Germain, secretary of state for American affairs. The index is very inadequate; for example, because the individual colonies or states are not entered, it is impossible to draw together what Professor Callahan says about any one of them.

All in all, the book rounds up much information about the Tories and is especially valuable because the author has used Tory materials. The evaluations are so fair and moderate that Professor Callahan has certainly given a frequently maligned devil his due.

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Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers. By Paul A. Varg. ([East Lansing]: Michigan State University Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 316. Notes, index. \$6.50.)

In this volume Paul A. Varg surveys American foreign policy from the outbreak of the Revolution to the declaration of war in 1812. Although monographs on aspects of the period abound and there are several general surveys of only slightly smaller scope than Varg's, his volume is the first to perform this precise task. For the general reader or beginning student, *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers* will perhaps be useful as an introduction. Varg writes clearly, tells an uncomplicated story, and generally apportions his space reasonably. He describes such matters as Madison's nationalism and Jefferson's dislike of Genêt with an air of discovery that makes his treatment seem fresh. Because his fairly numerous errors concern matters of detail (Washington did not "deliver" the Farewell Address, the Tripolitarians did not "arrest" the *Philadelphia's* crew, Madison's pamphlet of 1806 does not carry the title Varg gives it), these errors will irritate the scholar rather than seriously mislead the tyro.

As original scholarship, Varg's book has little to offer. He presents few new interpretations, although in analyzing the diplomatic implications of the Constitution he plows ground too long fallow. Aside from the Madison manuscripts, he has examined almost no non-printed sources. Given the scope of his volume, this is perhaps not surprising. More upsetting is the absence of reference to the printed works of many American statesmen and to numerous important historical studies, although the text sometimes shows an awareness of material and inter-

pretations not specified in the footnotes. Still, for the period of the American Revolution alone, the reader finds no reference to Gerald Stourzh, Felix Gilbert, C. Page Smith, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Alfred L. Burt, or Vincent S. Harlow.

Varg's basic theme is the interplay of ideals and reality, particularly economic reality. The need for foreign assistance caused many reluctant Americans to favor independence in 1776, and commercial considerations played a decisive part in the formation of a new government in 1789. Thereafter, says Varg, there was a conflict between the realistic Hamiltonians, with whom the author's sympathies lie, and the "agrarian" idealists led by Madison. Washington, Adams, and to a lesser degree Jefferson, receive much less attention. The conflict became worse, he correctly observes, because each side wildly misrepresented the position of the other. Varg is less safe when he declares, commenting on the Republican regime that gained power in 1801, that "Jefferson and Madison began by rejecting existing realities and sought to implement an ideal" (p. 146), and then in succeeding passages both describes and singles out for notice the many compromises with idealism, some forced and some voluntary, made by Jefferson and Madison. War finally came in 1812, he says, primarily as a consequence of economic pressures upon a people who preferred idealism as a course of action.

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The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801-1809.

By Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1963. Pp. ix, 318. Illustrations, notes, bibliographical note, index. \$7.50.)

This volume, the second by Professor Cunningham on the Jeffersonian Republican party, will not disappoint those who awaited its appearance. It is a clearly written, scholarly study of the practical operations of the party during the Jefferson administration. It continues Cunningham's account of party operations which was terminated in the first book with the election of 1800.

The first transfer of national power from one party to another forced Jefferson and the party leaders to evolve patronage policies. The new President was more sanguine, and unrealistic, than many in his party in anticipating a Federalist-Republican amalgamation. In this spirit he wrote that he would disturb no man "for mere difference of principle" (p. 24). Those to be dismissed included officials guilty of misconduct, the Adams lame duck appointees, and federal attorneys. Uncompromising Federalist activity, however, ended any hope of a rapprochement; meanwhile party pressure compelled Jefferson to announce an expanded program of removals in his famous reply to the New Haven remonstrance. Although he later resumed a cautious policy, his own calculations revealed that the Republicans held 60 per cent of the appointive offices by 1803. Throughout his administration he was aware that his policy suited few in either party.

In discussing congressional leadership, Cunningham concentrates on the House of Representatives. A struggle for leadership marked