

The value of the papers may be divided into at least two classes. Some of the papers are such that by themselves they give the historian the answer to an important question. Such are the documents revealing the evidence of Madison's devotion to religious liberty; the evidence of his attitude on the cession of Virginia's western lands; and the evidence of his defense, in his instructions to Jay, of claiming the West up to the Mississippi and the freedom of navigation on that stream. The other value of the papers comes from reading all the documents in succession. The reader will then be impressed through the repetition of the statements of certain facts in all kinds of documents by all kinds of writers. Lack of swift and accurate communication is revealed in these documents. In the midst of Revolutionary struggle no one seemed to know accurately what was going on. Again and again rumors of military engagements, movements of armies and fleets were followed weeks later by reports that the rumors were unfounded. There was repeated mention of jealousy by one state of another, of suspicion by Americans of the motives of their allies, of rivalry between factions in Congress and in states, and of mistrust of political leaders. The reader will be impressed by the repeated references to the economic anarchy and the confusion caused by the currency. He will be amused at the lack of organization in forwarding supplies and raising recruits and then probably puzzled that no one mentions the possibility of quitting.

The editorial work has gone about as far or high as such a thing could go. The net has been spread far and wide to drag in everything written by or to Madison that can be uncovered at this time. The footnotes at the end of each item, on the average, occupy as much space in the book as the original document itself and in most cases contain many times as much information. The footnotes attempt adequately to identify every proper name, explain words and statements that might not be understood by the general reader, state the difference of views on controversial questions, and cite in bibliographical completeness the authorities for the contributions in the footnotes. The volume includes maps of Virginia giving rivers, counties, and places for the period of Madison's life. There are portraits of pertinent personalities. The index is complete and usable with cross-references that make it almost impossible to fail to find quickly anything in the writings or footnotes that is there. It is to be hoped that this work will be carried to its completion on the level on which it has been begun.

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*Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775.* By Jack M. Sosin. (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1961. Pp. xvi, 307. Maps, appendix, bibliography, index. \$6.50.)

This is a book with a thesis—or, rather, several of them. It sets out to revise, in certain important respects, the interpretation of British policy in the west between 1763 and 1776 that is set forth in C. V.

Alvord's classic *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*. . . . Mr. Sosin almost completely dismisses the possibility that ideas or theories as such had any significant impact on British colonial policy. On the contrary, "British ministers were primarily administrators who arrived at particular solutions for specific problems as they arose, although they may have phrased their decisions in the terminology of mercantilist doctrine" (p. x). Mr. Sosin does share Professor Alvord's belief that the chief concern of the British ministers dealing with the colonies in these years was the administration of territories acquired by the Treaty of Paris and not the seaboard provinces, at least until the violent colonial resistance to the ministerial and parliamentary measures with regard to the west forced the ministry to concentrate upon maintaining imperial authority. Actually, the area discussed is roughly that which came to be called the Old Northwest. Because, says the author, of the excellence of other treatments of the southern frontier, little attention is paid here to that area.

The story begins with a chapter on the issues in the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris that pertained to the west. Now that the western territories in America had been acquired "for the security of the American colonists" the ministers set out "to insure this goal"! Regular troops would protect the continent. Taxes raised in America would pay their expenses. "The decision to adopt these measures . . . was to lead to the disruption of that [the first British] Empire in the American Revolution" (p. 25). But policy was determined by practical experience.

With the unexpected outbreak of colonial resistance and violence after the Stamp Act and the renewed opposition to the measures of 1767 and 1768, the mother-country's problem became a double one. For now, in addition to the still unresolved problem of the west, the ministry was faced with a persistent and organized colonial resistance to imperial authority.

Meanwhile, the pressure of the land speculators upon the ministry was constant, varied, and very powerful. Partly in response to this pressure, partly in the hope of pacifying the Indians, and partly because of the desire to economize in the administration of the west, the ministry decided, in 1768, to revise the boundary line westward, to evacuate several of the western posts, and to return control of the Indian trade to the individual colonies. But the failure of the colonial assemblies to provide any workable administration of the western problem, coupled with the confusion in governmental circles in London, resulted in chaos on the western frontier. At last, almost in desperation, the ministry decided to turn over the problem of the frontier north of the Ohio to Quebec, "the only colony which had demonstrated an ability to get along with the native tribes" (p. 238). The Quebec Act was thus a final phase of British policy with regard to the west, one which represented an abandonment of the "imperial" policy of administration of the northwest in favor of assigning that responsibility to a single colony that could be depended upon.

It is a useful book based upon a vast reading and careful, thoughtful sorting of documentary materials; it is one written in extreme detail. The reviewer recognizes its value; but he cannot believe that there were

no statesmen, that there was no genuine theory or vision involved in the conception and execution of British policy during these years, either in America or in England. It is his belief that the broader evidence indicates otherwise.

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*The Western Journals of John May: Ohio Company Agent and Business Adventurer.* Edited by Dwight L. Smith. ([Cincinnati]: Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 1961. Pp. xii, 176. Illustrations, notes, map, bibliography, index. \$5.50.)

Here is a masterpiece of editorial sleuthing: editor Smith has solved the May manuscript mystery. For years historians have been victims of the editorial ineptitude of Reverend Richard S. Edes, grandson of the Boston merchant, John May, whose western journals Smith has restored to reputability. After editing (emasculating) for publication in 1873 his grandfather's original of the 1788 journey, Reverend Edes felt obliged to destroy the original manuscript. He also presumed to say that there was no journal for the 1789 trip. Recently the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio acquired manuscripts claimed to be the originals of both. Editor Smith has demonstrated that the 1788 manuscript by an unknown scribe was a more faithful copy than the Edes product. He has also shown that the 1789 manuscript is the original itself. There is a lacuna of a half month's entries at the end of the 1788 manuscript, caused by the failure of the copyist to complete the job. Smith has, therefore, added a patch from Reverend Edes.

The May story is an excellent account of how one easterner found the westward movement unprofitable. John May (1748-1812) was a Bostonian of affluence, a merchant, and a shipper. He "attended" the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, and was an officer in a Boston regiment during the Revolutionary War. He became a stockholder, agent, and landholder in the Ohio Company of Associates in 1787, and spent two years trying to make the venture profitable to the company and himself.

May proved to himself the hard way that in the late 1780's a Boston merchant of affluence could maintain that position better by staying in Boston than by going West. He arrived at Marietta (Ohio) on May 27, 1788, and found the "situation delightfully agreeable, well calculated for an elegant City" (p. 48). He completed the first frame house in Marietta, which he designed as a residence, a tavern, and a storehouse (p. 63). He then returned to Boston determined to come out the next year with merchandise sufficient to set up a store.

The journal of 1789 is a blow-by-blow account of a losing struggle. He shipped his goods from Boston to Baltimore where he organized a wagon train and "stood for the Wilderness" on May 11 (p. 93). A "Terrible Tornado" blocked his way a few miles east of Redstone Old Fort. About the same time the reported "Downfall of Gensang" delayed him further as he sought to confirm this disaster to his selling power (p. 138). By the time he was able to get his goods on a "Kentuc