"text" Ben Butler's dictum that "civil service reform is always popular with the 'outs' and never with the 'ins,' unless with those who have a strong expectation of soon going out" (p. ix). This reviewer does not question that there is a great deal of truth to the generalization, but, ironically, the congressional votes on the Jenckes civil service reform bill in 1867 and the Pendleton Bill in 1883 do not, in these particular cases, bear out the thesis. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence to show that those "outs" who spoke glibly for civil service reform found the spoils system not so bad after they came into power. Even President Grover Cleveland, according to Hoogenboom, disappointed many of the civil service reformers who supported him in the election of 1884.

As important as the "outs" versus "ins" pattern is the equally significant urban versus rural pattern brought out in this work. Urban areas were more likely to support this reform movement than were the rural areas.

In the judgment of this reviewer one of the chief contributions which Professor Hoogenboom has made in this volume is the study of the reformers whose persistence was important in finally bringing about civil service reform. "Most of them," says Hoogenboom, "were lawyers, editors, clergymen, professors, and businessmen whose interests were mercantile and financial rather than industrial" (p. 21). The typical reformer came from old, fairly wealthy New England (and New York) families and deplored the mass materialism of the new rich. He was likely to be an Episcopalian or a Unitarian and a Harvard graduate. Hoogenboom questions the view of Matthew Josephson that civil service reform was essentially a businessman's movement to make political parties and politicians less dependent on the political assessments of office holders and more dependent on the contributions of the businessmen whose point of view the party would have to reflect. This typical reformer supported Frémont in 1856, Lincoln in 1860 and 1864, Grant in 1868, probably Greeley in 1872, Hayes in 1876, Garfield in 1880, and Cleveland in 1884. Because of his hard money views he supported McKinley in 1896 but likely opposed him in 1900 on imperialism.

The author accepts Dorman B. Eaton's evaluation that Congress was more to blame than Grant for killing civil service reform during the latter's presidency.

Some statistical tables showing the votes for and against the Jenckes and Pendleton bills would have made it easier to visualize the party support for, and opposition to, the civil service reform movement.

The footnotes and the comprehensive bibliography of primary sources and secondary works attest to the scholarly character of this work.

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Frank B. Kellogg was not an outstanding secretary of state; the period 1925-1929 was not one of large diplomatic achievement for the United States. Yet these were not years of stagnation in American
foreign relations; there were a few important successes. And this was not a period of complete withdrawal from foreign responsibilities—rather it “was a middle period between the verdant isolationism of post-Versailles days and the aggressive insulationism of the middle thirties” (p. 232). Such is the theme which emerges from this volume which, despite the prominence given his name on the dust jacket, the binding, and the title page, does not focus upon Kellogg. It is essentially a narrative of American foreign relations during the second Coolidge administration.

Except for the specialist in recent diplomatic history or the student of specific foreign problems (e.g., Mexican self-assertion, China’s attempt to remove restrictions upon her sovereignty, war debts and reparations, naval disarmament, the Pact of Paris), the bulk of this volume will have little appeal. The narrative leads the reader through all of the tortuous details of the diplomatic maneuvering of the period—much of which was maneuver and little else.

The concluding chapter is another matter. Here, in nine pages Professor Ellis presents a brief, but lucid and penetrating, analysis of Coolidge-Kellogg diplomacy. He portrays Kellogg as an able individual who suffered from frequent comparison with his illustrious predecessor, a man who never fully adjusted to the processes of diplomacy. He describes Kellogg as one who depended excessively upon his advisers, who was cautious to a fault, who received little stimulus from a supine President. The author believes that in analyzing American diplomacy of those years the historian can point to poverty of imagination, undue emphasis upon the status quo, a maximum expenditure of energy to produce a modicum of accomplishment. Such a policy, he thinks, blended into the prevailing climate of American opinion in the late twenties. Americans did not want an assertive foreign policy and probably would not have responded to one if proffered.

In alluding to popular opinion at this point Professor Ellis points up a weakness of his volume. His study, based primarily upon State Department documents and personal papers of prominent American diplomats and politicians, seldom identifies or defines those forces and attitudes in America of which the diplomacy of the Coolidge years was a product. Foreign relations are more than a series of debates and exchanges between diplomats; yet Professor Ellis has devoted most of his volume to their argument and counterargument. As a history of foreign relations during 1925-1929, then, it is incomplete. To illustrate, the author ignores the role of the navy’s representatives at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. These men were hostile to the objectives of the conference and probably contributed to its failure. Had the author examined naval documents in the National Archives he could have ascertained the navy’s role in the Geneva debacle and at the same time added to the reader’s understanding of the American position.

While the author has no novel interpretations of Kellogg or the State Department under his tutelage, this is an important study inasmuch as it provides the best available summary of American diplomatic activity during the years 1925-1929. It will prove valuable to the historian who sets out to write a synthesis of the twenties or of modern American diplomatic history.