Indiana farmer who was a Democrat, his thinking attracted the attention of those trying to create a workable farm policy. Thus he worked under Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace in the program to promote conservation, reduce the surplus, and increase the income of farmers. When Wallace resigned in 1940, his choice for the next secretary of agriculture was Wickard. Roosevelt agreed. Thereupon Wickard became secretary of agriculture and continued in the position as long as Roosevelt lived.

Roosevelt appreciated a secretary of agriculture who had the reputation of being a successful farmer, continued the policies of Wallace, and could speak and write for the party. They agreed upon planning and full production during the war years. Roosevelt insisted, however, upon cheap food to get the labor vote and farm subsidies to get the farm vote. This policy was remote from Wickard’s vision of farmers who were the intellectual, social, and economic equals of other businessmen. Roosevelt, in the fond belief that Chester Davis could satisfy the labor-minded President in the matter of food administration, deprived Wickard of such important work that resignation was narrowly avoided. It is significant that Albertson closes the story with Wickard rejoicing in a clear conscience. There was no rejoicing because of victory for his vision. A statement in the Preface reveals Wickard’s final political defeat when in 1956 he was unsuccessful in an attempt to unseat Republican Homer Capehart from the United States Senate.

Central High School
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Darwin N. Kelley


Professor Brown, Maxwell Professor of American Civilization at Syracuse University, has in this book already put political history of the 1950's in historical perspective. His thesis—that Adlai E. Stevenson as leader of the party out of executive power exerted a more positive influence on some aspects of American opinion and policy than the administration in power—is ably presented. Certainly one must go back to Clay, Blaine, or Bryan to find a leader of a party out of power who exercised as great an influence as Stevenson; and his impact on opinion from day to day was probably greater than any of these, if for no other reason than that the president he opposed had abdicated a positive leadership.

During the campaign of 1952 and thereafter, while Eisenhower wavered on McCarthyism, Stevenson lashed out at the Great Accuser and his Inquisition, against those who would “strike freedom of the mind with the fist of patriotism” (p. 43), against those “political plungers” who have persuaded the President “that McCarthyism is the best Republican formula for political success” (p. 63). Unquestionably Stevenson, more than any other, gave courageous and eloquent expres-
sion to the best traditions of our free and open society during one of America's ugliest hours.

While Eisenhower refused to give the desegregation decisions the personal support of his prestige and popularity or the moral force of his high office, Stevenson hailed these decisions as "correct interpretations of the Constitution and the conscience of the nation" (p. 95). At the same time he exposed "state interposition" for the fraud that it is. Stevenson's attitude was moderate, however. He emphasized that progress in the South would have to be gradual, opposed cutting off federal funds for segregated schools, and urged a White House conference of southern leaders to mobilize opinion in that section for gradual and orderly implementing of court decisions. Stevenson's position was both moral and practical. It held his party together on this most delicate of issues, and had his proposals been adopted we probably would have been spared the disgrace of Little Rock.

In foreign policy, Stevenson's influence was both immediate and far-reaching. When in 1955 Eisenhower's image as peacemaker was in jeopardy, it was saved by Stevenson's brave insistence that Quemoy and Matsu were not necessary to the defense of Formosa. Before the Suez crisis of 1956, Stevenson had advocated United Nations armed patrols of the boundaries of Israel and her Arab neighbors, and this plan was adopted after that crisis. During the campaign of 1956, Stevenson urged the importance of a compact and skilled military man power as opposed to the massive one obtained through the draft, and the President's Cordiner Committee confirmed the wisdom of this proposal in its 1957 report. Also, amidst furious opposition, Stevenson proposed stopping the testing of H-bombs, and this proposal was adopted by Eisenhower in 1959.

Among the larger ideas first popularized by Stevenson and now in general currency are: the primary importance of international arms-control agreements; that beginnings toward arms-control agreements cannot be made until there is rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that this can come only by a "sensible progression"; the necessity of including Red China in any arms-control agreements; the relevance for world politics of America's "recovery of internal momentum," a sustained rate of economic growth of perhaps 5 per cent a year; a major shift of emphasis away from foreign economic aid for military support and toward economic aid for its own sake; the grave importance of remedying the long neglect of Latin America in economic aid programs.

Professor Brown emphasizes that it is one thing to win elections, another thing to give effective leadership in government. Eisenhower was so often ineffective because he stood above the battle, his popularity born of detachment from vital issues, his statements so platitudinous that they meant anything his hearers wanted them to mean. On the other hand, Stevenson, out of power, was so often effective because of his sense of involvement and his very partisanship.

There runs through Stevenson's career a strong conviction that morality and idealism in politics and disinterested citizens of dedication and selflessness in public affairs are vital in any period, but indispen-
sable today, because of America’s need to recapture a sense of purpose in a world (to use the words of A. Powell Davies) “too dangerous for anything but the truth, too small for anything but brotherhood” (p. 245) and in an age (to quote Schweitzer) when “man has learned to control elemental forces before he has learned to control himself” (p. 245).

Like Woodrow Wilson, Stevenson is idealistic, dedicated, and eloquent. But he is a more humble man, and this is usually counted in his favor. It might have been better for his country and the world, however, had Stevenson had less humility and more of Wilson’s self-assurance.

University of Florida

William G. Carleton


In the light of present public interest in the St. Lawrence Seaway, it is surprising that in recent years no major historical work has appeared dealing with recent events affecting that waterway. This lack has been remedied in part with the appearance of William R. Willoughby’s book. It is not a comprehensive study of the region. Rather, it is concerned with the “plans and proposals that have been brought forward from time to time . . . for improving the lakes and rivers for navigational purposes” (p. viii). The author pays special attention to the activities of the two national governments involved, although he also discusses how individuals, sectional differences, private pressure groups, and party politics in both Canada and the United States hindered or promoted the development of the waterway. Professor Willoughby adopts a chronological approach, beginning with the colonial period of both countries and closing his narrative in 1959. The emphasis, however, is on the twentieth century. Events since 1930, when the United States and Canada attempted to negotiate the first comprehensive agreement concerning the waterway, occupy about half the pages.

One of the most interesting results emerging from this study is the record of solid achievements in developing the waterway before Canada and the United States embarked upon their joint program in the mid-1950’s. The long series of defeats suffered by seaway proponents over a period of nearly thirty years has tended to obscure the advances made prior to 1954. These advances occurred through a piecemeal program of development undertaken by local and regional interests on both sides of the international boundary. The author provides a full explanation and even a reasoned defense of this piecemeal program.

The book also answers effectively why, when the economic advantages of regional development seemed so clear, it took so long for the two countries to agree to cooperate. The author advances a number of explanations; perhaps most prominent as a barrier were man-made political boundaries cutting through the region and creating on both sides nationalistic feelings of jealousy and mistrust.