Beyond the theory, however, there is much in the volume of interest to the historian. In her "diary of a metropolitan labor movement" Mrs. Newell discusses the surprising influence of Martin Dies and his committee on CIO attempts to organize the meat-packing industry and Mayor Kelly's reaction to the 1937 Memorial Day incident. Of equal interest is the analysis of the influence of F.D.R., the NRA, and the NLRB on the Chicago labor movement. In this connection, Mrs. Newell suggests that the New Deal may have affected metropolitan unionism in about the same fashion as it did the metropolitan political boss. Other valuable sections of the book are those dealing with "gangster unions," the teamsters, steel, and AFL-CIO relations. Other unions, ranging from the corsetmakers to the "cow-punchers" of Union Stock Yards are covered in illuminating sketches.

Mrs. Newell has utilized a wide variety of sources, including interviews. Her style, while not felicitous, does meet the minimum requirements. Documentation is adequate, but there are lapses, especially when she deals with anti-union forces and attitudes. The full history of the Chicago labor movement in the 1930's remains to be written, but Mrs. Newell has done much of the spadework, raised some pertinent questions, and offered some thought-provoking answers.

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This book has an intriguing title. It is almost using the euphuistic approach of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (p. 214) to call Claude Wickard a farmer. Wickard's father was an authentic farmer in Carroll County, Indiana. But Claude went to high school in town, graduated from Purdue University, and began to farm only with the special inducement of his father who "scratched his chin and shook his head, but ... held to his bargain that Claude should run the farm as he saw fit" (p. 31). Under these terms Wickard farmed from 1916 to 1933, although he continued to own and manage a farm where he wore overalls from time to time. His family had no strong attachment to the farm. To be sure he was honored with the Master Farmer award in 1928, but this was cherished mainly because it established him as a success in the eyes of his family. Although Wickard had the psychology of a farmer in desiring to be his own boss, physically he suffered from fatigue. Moreover, there was a strong desire for both the things purchased by the higher income in other occupations and for recognized success.

It is even clearer from the evidence that Wickard was a man of unquestioned integrity. He was elected to the Indiana Senate in 1932, and after serving one session in which he showed preference for soundness of principle to support by the political machine, Wickard received an appointment in the Department of Agriculture. Valuable to the Democratic administration because of his reputation as an
Indiana farmer who was a Democrat, his thinking attracted the attention of those trying to create a workable farm policy. Thus he worked under Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace in the program to promote conservation, reduce the surplus, and increase the income of farmers. When Wallace resigned in 1940, his choice for the next secretary of agriculture was Wickard. Roosevelt agreed. Thereupon Wickard became secretary of agriculture and continued in the position as long as Roosevelt lived.

Roosevelt appreciated a secretary of agriculture who had the reputation of being a successful farmer, continued the policies of Wallace, and could speak and write for the party. They agreed upon planning and full production during the war years. Roosevelt insisted, however, upon cheap food to get the labor vote and farm subsidies to get the farm vote. This policy was remote from Wickard's vision of farmers who were the intellectual, social, and economic equals of other businessmen. Roosevelt, in the fond belief that Chester Davis could satisfy the labor-minded President in the matter of food administration, deprived Wickard of such important work that resignation was narrowly avoided. It is significant that Albertson closes the story with Wickard rejoicing in a clear conscience. There was no rejoicing because of victory for his vision. A statement in the Preface reveals Wickard's final political defeat when in 1956 he was unsuccessful in an attempt to unseat Republican Homer Capehart from the United States Senate.

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Professor Brown, Maxwell Professor of American Civilization at Syracuse University, has in this book already put political history of the 1950's in historical perspective. His thesis—that Adlai E. Stevenson as leader of the party out of executive power exerted a more positive influence on some aspects of American opinion and policy than the administration in power—is ably presented. Certainly one must go back to Clay, Blaine, or Bryan to find a leader of a party out of power who exercised as great an influence as Stevenson; and his impact on opinion from day to day was probably greater than any of these, if for no other reason than that the president he opposed had abdicated a positive leadership.

During the campaign of 1952 and thereafter, while Eisenhower wavered on McCarthyism, Stevenson lashed out at the Great Accuser and his Inquisition, against those who would "strike freedom of the mind with the fist of patriotism" (p. 43), against those "political plungers" who have persuaded the President "that McCarthyism is the best Republican formula for political success" (p. 63). Unquestionably Stevenson, more than any other, gave courageous and eloquent expres-