

founded in 1711 on the expectation of trade with Spanish America. Engaged primarily in slaving at first, it was an economic failure. But in late 1719 and early 1720 it allied itself with the Sword Blade Company and undertook to fund the national debt. Parliament's consent followed considerable shady maneuvering. An orgy of speculation through the summer of 1720 sent South Sea shares to ten times their original value. Gambling was not confined to South Sea stock, and the collapse, when it came, was general.

The South Sea episode has seldom been treated at any length. Hitherto it has been dealt with in economic histories or as incidental in essentially political histories. *The South Sea Bubble* is a genuine contribution, for it is the first study of the South Sea Company and the political, economic, and social activities around it. This in itself is no mean task, considering the political and social implications as well as the difficulties of writing financial history, and it is done clearly and well. In addition, there is an attempt to place the South Sea Bubble in context, to determine what forces were behind it and the significance of those forces.

It is Carswell's opinion that the Bubble was far more than the "grotesque incident" it is sometimes considered, that it is attributable to great economic forces and can be understood only if those forces are understood. Consequently, the English phenomenon is set in a European background which Carswell names the "commercial revolution." This "revolution" was partly the great growth of trade between 1660 and 1720, but it should be understood above all as the widespread experimentation with credit and with money based on property and productivity rather than on metal. John Law's experiments in France illustrate this tendency perfectly, and considerable space is devoted to them. The South Sea Bubble becomes an example of the economic inventiveness and vitality of the period. Its utter and dismal failure shows that it was economic and political ineptitude which ended the "commercial revolution." Had politicians been aware of the connections between economics and politics, had the business community and the general public had enough experience to practice restraint, the "commercial revolution" might have shaded off into the industrial revolution instead of ending ingloriously and with no apparent constructive results.

Well-written, carefully organized, based on thorough scholarship, this book should serve as a rewarding and painless antidote to the tendency of many students to ignore the economic aspects of history.

Indiana University

David Adams

*The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893.* By Donald F. Warner. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, for the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1960. Pp. ix, 276. Maps, bibliographical essay, index. \$5.00.)

The conflict between the opposing forces of nationalism and particularism occupies a prominent place in nineteenth-century Canadian history. This is one major theme which runs through Donald Warner's

book, *The Idea of Continental Union*. Particularism is defined by Warner to mean class and provincial discontent which was expressed in the form of annexation movements designed to join part or all of Canada to the United States. This discontent was the centrifugal force which presented a serious obstacle to Canada's struggle for national unity. Since particularism is a psychological phenomenon usually expressed in group action and political terms, a study of its appearance (together with the form it takes) requires careful investigation and analysis. The author has accomplished both with skill and clarity.

Currents of annexationist sentiment were especially strong from 1847-1850, 1867-1871, 1884-1893. Reaction to economic depression is underlined as the common denominator in all three periods which gave substance and meaning to the idea of continental union. As Warner makes abundantly clear, however, annexationism was not exclusively the product of economic forces. Political and cultural conflicts of an inter-intraprovincial nature were important as secondary causes.

From 1847 to 1850 basic economic and political grievances set the pattern of response which dissatisfied Canadians were to follow in the future. Canadian merchants, already faced with severe economic depression, were annoyed in 1849 when the British Parliament repealed imperial preference. Their subsequent failure to obtain trade reciprocity with the United States snapped many ties of empire: "If the American market could not be gained by a treaty, they could enter it through a political union with the Republic" (p. 13). The threat of annexation proved equally useful as a weapon (but not nearly so effective) for other disgruntled Canadians besides merchants. The *Parti Rouge*, with its program of French nationalité, and English Canadians in Montreal, who feared French domination, played on the same theme to gain group concessions. The failure of these various movements for annexation is explained in detail by Warner; most important was their lack of national support.

Economic instability and political conflict from 1867 to 1871 excluded thoughts of national unity. Despite the efforts of Sir John A. Macdonald, the Dominion's first prime minister, economic depression and opposition to confederation produced a climate of discontent which in turn nourished annexation movements. "The British North American Act," writes Warner, "had combined the colonies in law but not in spirit" (p. 61). Although the scene shifted from the Maritime Provinces to the sparsely settled territory of western Canada, much the same drama was acted out. A touch of irony was provided as this sectional response to central authority turned back on itself. Thus in the east the annexation movement, "hastened the coming of confederation, and in the west it had helped to bring the union of the British Northwest with the Dominion" (p. 126).

In the years 1884 to 1893 a new wave of annexationism returned to trouble the Macdonald government. But, as Warner points out, it was destined to be the last serious threat to Canadian nationalism. As always the primary cause was economic, and once again the movement failed to gain national support. By the turn of the century, prosperity and conciliation had done much to weaken the gravitational pull of

Canada's neighbor to the south. "The Canadian election of 1911, fought on the issue of reciprocity, demonstrated that nationalism had become a major force in Canada" (p. 242).

Professor Warner has written an important book for which he was awarded the first Mississippi Valley Historical Association Prize. The petty typographical errors which frequently creep into this publication do not seriously affect the value of the contribution.

Yale University

F. Anthony Bonadio

*The Canadian Historical Review Index, Volumes XXI-XXX, 1940-1949.*

Compiled by the Editorial Department of the University of Toronto Press. (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1959. Pp. 404. \$15.00.)

This is the fifth of a series of indexes covering the *Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada* and the *Canadian Historical Review*. The two initial indexes covered Volumes I-XX of the annual *Review*, founded by George M. Wrong in 1896. The third covered the first ten years of the *Canadian Historical Review*, established in 1920, while the fourth continued the index for this quarterly to the end of 1939. The present volume covers the *Canadian Historical Review* for the decade of the 1940's. It is to be hoped that a fifth index, for the 1950's, will soon be available.

The current index includes author and subject entries for items which appeared in the *Canadian Historical Review*, 1940-1949 (Volumes XXI-XXX). In addition, it includes author and subject entries for titles which appeared in the *Review's* lists of "Recent Publications Relating to Canada." The index appears to have been competently done, and its length suggests that it has been done in a thorough manner. The items included indicate that the editors of the *Canadian Historical Review* have fortunately viewed Canadian history in a broad context. The result is a guide of substantial value to students of Canadian history. Users of the index, however, will find both advantages and disadvantages in the fact that it is divided into two parts entitled "Author Index" and "Subject Index." The latter is considerably longer than the former.

This index and its predecessors merit considerable use by students and teachers of Canadian history. Moreover, they deserve use by persons with special interest in the history of Indiana, the Old Northwest, or the United States. The relationship between the historical development of these areas and Canadian history, though much neglected, is both significant and continuous. The tendency of many persons to view state and regional history in too limited a context is undoubtedly one cause for such neglect, but American colleges and universities also bear much responsibility for it. A number of universities which have or are sprouting courses dealing with various regions and countries of the world still offer but little or even nothing concerning Canadian history. Whatever the reasons, continued neglect of Canadian history by Americans is unfortunate.

Indiana University

Donald F. Carmony