Hawaii, Far East, Germany, and Japan. Strange to say, though many are available, there are no pictures of the Russian fronts. The ter-
ribleness of the war for Russia is well described by the author. By December, 1941, Germany admitted the loss by death of 162,314 soldiers
in Russia. Five pages are given to the Stalingrad defense. “It was
unadulterated slaughter. Thousands died each day. It became impossible
to bury the dead or even to count them” (p. 303). The Russians “lost
more men at the Stalingrad than the United States lost in combat in
all theatres of the entire war. Stalingrad was one of the great turning
points not only of the war but of world history” (p. 307). But no
pictures from Russia!

There is, however, a copy of General MacArthur’s well-publicized
“I Shall Return” picture, showing him and others landing through
the water while others look on smiling. The landing at Leyte is well
described. “This was invasion in force: 600 warships, 250,000 men,
the U.S. Seventh and Third Fleets, the U.S. Sixth Army.” Said General
MacArthur, “I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces
stand again on Philippine soil . . . ” But the writer points out that
“in the classrooms at Annapolis it was attributed in large part . . .
to the United States Navy” (p. 456). Six pages are given to the
Battle for Leyte Gulf, “the greatest sea engagement ever fought.
Engaged were 166 American and approximately 70 Japanese warships,
1,280 American and 716 Japanese warplanes” (p. 457).

Space does not permit much detail. The author aims to present
the story of the war in concise form. He does it well. He aims to
eliminate much military detail in favor of a comprehensive picture of
broad military developments. The space allotted to the various campaigns
indicates that he does this well. On points where there are differences
of opinion—Pearl Harbor, Battle of Leyte, Hitler versus his generals
in Russia, and so on—he seeks to give both sides of the arguments
and does well. He aims to make his story dramatic. His pictures of
Rotterdam, battered London, Leningrad’s defense, D-Day, Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Nazi concentration camps, and Mussolini’s and Hitler’s
deaths reveal his ability to do so.

Indiana University

F. Lee Benns

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order. By Willard Range. (Athens:
$4.50.)

Willard Range, a member of the University of Georgia’s Political
Science Department, states that his book is a case study of the inter-
national thinking of a twentieth-century political practitioner. The
study, he says, attempts to answer—and it does—three questions:
(1) What was Roosevelt’s explanation for the breakdown of the world
order of his time? (2) In Roosevelt’s view, what were the implications
of that breakdown for the United States? (3) What kind of world
order did Roosevelt want to replace the former order?

Three short initial chapters deal with the first two questions; the
remainder of the book discusses Roosevelt’s world order. In discussing
the collapse of international order and its implications for the United States, Range adds little that is new. As major causes for rupture of peace Roosevelt saw the failure of the United States to join the League, economic nationalism, governments unresponsive to problems of modern society, evil leaders, the armaments race, decline in moral and spiritual fiber, and the "peace at any price" theory of the thirties. His thinking on these matters is well known.

The President's ideas on a new world order did not differ much from the hopes of anyone who desired world-wide peace and good will. The author believes that Roosevelt personified the ideas and aspirations of a considerable portion of the American people. FDR was an optimist who believed that the good neighbor concept would permeate the globe. The nations would recognize their interdependence. The President had strong faith in democracy and freedom. In a world where evil forces—mainly Fascist and Nazi—were eradicated and where colonialism would gradually disappear, free people could make great progress. Roosevelt also envisaged a global New Deal. Conservation, reclamation, economic planning would be steps toward a healthy world order. To preserve the international system Roosevelt had an idea for a big power guardianship which would aim not to dominate but to keep the peace.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order is one of the “what might have been” genre—not so much what might have been had Roosevelt lived, but what might have been if all the Allies’ postwar aims had been similar to those of the United States. Obviously they were not. For this reason one may feel that there is something futile in reading about what most of us desired but did not get. Of what importance is this recapitulation? The reason that Range offers is that perhaps in the long run Roosevelt was right. If pursued long enough, a good neighbor approach could possibly produce a good neighbor response from all except a small group of incurables. The author’s optimism is commendable—and we hope correct—but it is not too comforting to think that the “small group of incurables” may be nearly a billion strictly regimented people who never get an accurate view of our good neighborliness.

Willard Range has used extensively printed publications concerning Roosevelt and the people about him. He has also used, but to a lesser extent, materials in the Roosevelt manuscripts at Hyde Park. The book is amply footnoted; the placing of the notes at the back of the book makes reading them in conjunction with the text a test of one’s manual dexterity.

Indiana University

William Kamman

The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

This is the first volume of a new edition of Emerson’s journals and notebooks which is intended to be the “definitive” edition and, when completed, will comprise approximately sixteen volumes. Older editions (published in 1914 and earlier) were prepared by persons close to