

bit cramped by space limitations, more so in fact than by the terrain. The artillery duel of Palo Alto and the next day's engagement of Resaca de la Palma, for example, are allotted a total of only three pages. The fighting at Cerro Gordo rates a single page, while Winfield ("Old Fuss and Feathers") Scott's entire campaign from his base at Vera Cruz to the gates of Mexico City is contained in approximately three-quarters of one of the book's seven chapters. Obviously, this is not a work to be consulted by specialists intent on evaluating most or all of the military details of 1846 and 1847. But it does provide a suitable survey for persons whose interest is more general, and also a convenient introduction for those who may later turn to Justin H. Smith's *The War with Mexico* and to Robert S. Henry's *The Story of the Mexican War*.

The Singletary contribution, however, offers substantially more than what has been indicated above. Several of the most critical major battles are described with color as well as clarity. There is also sharp differentiation between the important and the less important. Quite properly, in the opinion of this reviewer, the Texas author has devoted more than half the volume to such vital topics as diplomacy, domestic politics, personality clashes, finance, and geography. "Thrust to the Pacific" is the title given to the Kearny, Doniphan, and California phases, while a valuable dimension is added in the chapter headed "The Hidden War." If "What to omit?" and "What to include?" are often problems in allied disciplines, they are especially prevalent in Clio's realm. Professor Singletary has solved his share of them with a commendable degree of concentration on causes, results, and explanations of the "Why?" instead of being content with narration pure and simple. Considering the relatively few words presented, a really remarkable amount of ground has been covered conscientiously and with superior intelligence.

The Mexican War, as delineated here, fits neatly into the pattern of *The Chicago History of American Civilization*—even though Texans and others in Mexico frequently appeared to be anything but civilized. Passing years have brought perspective to what formerly was an arena of partisanship and chauvinistic nationalism. If digging in primary source materials will long remain the historian's most serious challenge, the need for new syntheses is likewise a constant—and it is the synthesist's calm judiciousness that Singletary projects in *The Mexican War*.

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Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890.

By Carter Goodrich. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. x, 382. Map, table, notes, bibliography, index. \$7.50.)

Professor Goodrich has written an interesting and significant book. It is a study of the role of government—federal, state, and local—in relation to the building of "internal improvements" in the United States from about 1800 until the completion of the basic railway network near the end of the nineteenth century. Since "its principal concern is with the cases in which the users of the improvement were to pay

for the services rendered" (p. 5), attention is centered on canals and railroads rather than on the merchant marine, river and harbor improvements, and roads. The volume's "main theme is the relation between public and private activity in the creation of canals and railroads" (p. 5).

Piercing the Appalachian barrier was perhaps the major achievement in the development of internal improvements during the period preceding the Civil War. In fact, all things considered, this achievement was in some respects even greater than the extension of railroads across the Great Plains and over the Rockies in the generation following the Civil War. Goodrich offers a surprising amount of detail about internal improvements throughout the United States, though he indicates in the Preface that much study remains to be done. The material concerning Indiana, for instance, seems to be less complete than desirable. Unfortunately both Logan Esarey's *Internal Improvements in Indiana* (1912) and R. Carlyle Buley's *The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period, 1815-1840* (2 vols., 1950) are missing from the bibliography. These omissions are made a bit more conspicuous than they otherwise might have been by the inclusion of Ernest L. Bogart's *Internal Improvements and State Debts in Ohio* (1924), John H. Krenkel's *Illinois Internal Improvements, 1818-1848* (1958), and numerous other state and regional studies.

Shortage of local capital, meager experience with large-scale corporate enterprise, and the "developmental" character of projects approved are listed as major factors inducing governmental participation in canal and railroad building. Goodrich warns that one must be wary of sweeping generalizations about views of political parties on internal improvements. He credits, however, the Jeffersonian Republicans with providing the first important impetus to governmental support of internal improvements, and he notes that at times even certain Whigs were critical of such support. Both the Jacksonian Democrats as well as their National Republican-Whig rivals favored governmental support of internal improvements in the 1830's, Goodrich avers, but they disagreed on whether such promotion should be principally by the federal government or mainly by the state governments. Convincing evidence is offered to sustain the view that state and local governmental support of canals and railroads far outstripped federal support thereof, 1800-1890. The role of the states was especially important in the first half of the century and that of local governments in the decades following the Civil War.

Goodrich has marshaled massive data, studied it with care, and reserved most of his interpretation for his final chapter. This last chapter is a thoughtful review of the role and impact of governmental enterprise in the development of transportation facilities in the United States during the nineteenth century. The book is well organized and very readable. Some of Professor Goodrich's younger colleagues in economics who tend to overuse jargon and complicated nomenclature in speaking and writing could profitably study and follow his example.