

French War, as well as the marked reluctance which colonial legislators had shown in voting taxes for the prosecution of this critical conflict. In other words, although Knollenberg tells his half of the story remarkably well, it is still only half the story.

On this score, it is interesting to compare Knollenberg's book with Professor Lawrence Henry Gipson's contribution to the *New American Nation Series, The Coming of the Revolution*. The two historians are agreed as to when the Revolution really took place: Knollenberg devotes nearly all of his book and Gipson more than three-fourths of his to the period prior to the repeal of the Stamp Act. But otherwise there is little resemblance; Knollenberg is as critical of British policy as Gipson is apologetic for it. Their respective attitudes toward the decision to garrison Britain's newly-won empire with an army of 10,000 regulars are in startling contrast. Gipson regarded this decision as not only defensible but absolutely requisite because of the Indian menace dramatized by Pontiac's Rebellion and the colonial militiaman's inveterate prejudice against garrison duty. Knollenberg regards the decision as indefensible because it made no provision for the use of colonial troops and because the British regulars were virtually useless against Indians. Take your choice.

In spite of these *caveats*, the reviewer has thoroughly enjoyed reading Knollenberg's book, which is full of erudite scholarship, and is inclined to agree with its major premise—that the fatal policies adopted by Bute, Grenville, and Townsend fractured the British Empire. Moreover, he admires the audacity of an author who answers in five pages three of the most nagging questions still asked about the Revolution. First answer: the cession of Canada and the consequent liberation of the colonists from fear of French attack did not, as so many Englishmen believed, stimulate an already existent desire for independence. Such an idea had never occurred to the colonists (pp. 6-10). Second answer: the island and mainland British colonies which did not join the Revolution, and which outnumbered those that did, remained loyal to England for obvious reasons—economic advantage, dependence upon British protection, or sheer backwardness (pp. 10-11). Finally, the fateful decisions taken in the years 1759-1765, which so enraged the Americans, grew out of "the distracted state of British politics," the inexperience of new leaders such as Bute and Grenville, and the disturbing influence of John Wilkes. These conclusions may be very sound, but historians will welcome a great deal of additional research in these areas before the final verdict is accepted.

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*The Mexican War*. By Otis A. Singletary. *The Chicago History of American Civilization*. Edited by Daniel J. Boorstin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 181. Maps, illustrations, chronology, list of suggested reading, index. \$3.75.)

Into the restricted confines of a 162-page text, Professor Singletary, of the University of Texas, has packed a simplified but scholarly version of one of the most significant wars in the history of the Western Hemisphere. It may be objected that sometimes the combatants seem a

bit cramped by space limitations, more so in fact than by the terrain. The artillery duel of Palo Alto and the next day's engagement of Resaca de la Palma, for example, are allotted a total of only three pages. The fighting at Cerro Gordo rates a single page, while Winfield ("Old Fuss and Feathers") Scott's entire campaign from his base at Vera Cruz to the gates of Mexico City is contained in approximately three-quarters of one of the book's seven chapters. Obviously, this is not a work to be consulted by specialists intent on evaluating most or all of the military details of 1846 and 1847. But it does provide a suitable survey for persons whose interest is more general, and also a convenient introduction for those who may later turn to Justin H. Smith's *The War with Mexico* and to Robert S. Henry's *The Story of the Mexican War*.

The Singletary contribution, however, offers substantially more than what has been indicated above. Several of the most critical major battles are described with color as well as clarity. There is also sharp differentiation between the important and the less important. Quite properly, in the opinion of this reviewer, the Texas author has devoted more than half the volume to such vital topics as diplomacy, domestic politics, personality clashes, finance, and geography. "Thrust to the Pacific" is the title given to the Kearny, Doniphan, and California phases, while a valuable dimension is added in the chapter headed "The Hidden War." If "What to omit?" and "What to include?" are often problems in allied disciplines, they are especially prevalent in Clio's realm. Professor Singletary has solved his share of them with a commendable degree of concentration on causes, results, and explanations of the "Why?" instead of being content with narration pure and simple. Considering the relatively few words presented, a really remarkable amount of ground has been covered conscientiously and with superior intelligence.

*The Mexican War*, as delineated here, fits neatly into the pattern of *The Chicago History of American Civilization*—even though Texans and others in Mexico frequently appeared to be anything but civilized. Passing years have brought perspective to what formerly was an arena of partisanship and chauvinistic nationalism. If digging in primary source materials will long remain the historian's most serious challenge, the need for new syntheses is likewise a constant—and it is the synthesist's calm judiciousness that Singletary projects in *The Mexican War*.

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*Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890.*

By Carter Goodrich. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. x, 382. Map, table, notes, bibliography, index. \$7.50.)

Professor Goodrich has written an interesting and significant book. It is a study of the role of government—federal, state, and local—in relation to the building of "internal improvements" in the United States from about 1800 until the completion of the basic railway network near the end of the nineteenth century. Since "its principal concern is with the cases in which the users of the improvement were to pay