

In the years preceding 1872 the Republicans normally won a large majority of state legislative seats from the northern half of Illinois, while the Democrats held a similar advantage in the southern half of the state. This situation gave the Democrats relatively few legislative seats from the northern area, and the Republicans in the southern sector faced a comparable problem. Moreover, this peculiar distribution of seats resulted in a north-south sectionalism within Illinois based on Republican control in the north and Democratic dominance in the south.

Cumulative voting was instituted in an effort to give the Democrats from northern Illinois an increased number of seats in the state house of representatives and to give a similar increase to Republicans in the southern part of the state. "For the period covered in this study, the state was apportioned into 51 senatorial districts; one senator and three representatives were elected from each district. In the election of representatives, each voter had three votes which he could cast in any one of four ways. First, he could cumulate his votes by giving all three to a single candidate. Second, he could divide his votes equally between two candidates by giving each candidate a vote and a half. Third, he could split his votes three ways by giving one vote to each of three candidates. Fourth, he could split his votes two ways by giving one vote to one candidate and two votes to a second candidate" (p. v).

Blair clearly believes that cumulative voting has been effective in Illinois, the only state, he says, in which it has been used. He cites arguments pro and con concerning cumulative voting, but both his explicit and implicit conclusions are favorable to the system for Illinois. This reviewer, however, believes that Blair has at times ascribed results to cumulative voting which may have developed from other factors and circumstances. This study should interest Hoosiers for two reasons. First, it was originally written as a doctoral thesis at Northwestern University under Professor Charles S. Hyneman, who is now a member of the faculty at Indiana University, where he is continuing his long-term study of voting behavior and patterns in various states. In the second place, during the Civil War era Indiana also showed signs of developing a north-south sectionalism between Democrats and Republicans much like the Illinois pattern which led to the practice of cumulative voting. Apparently, however, political sectionalism was less pronounced in Indiana than in Illinois because of such factors as population origin and distribution and the nature of Indiana's economic development.

*Indiana University*

Donald F. Carmony

*Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766.* By Bernhard Knollenberg. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960. Pp. viii, 486. Appendices, notes, bibliographies, index. \$8.50.)

The title of this book is significantly singular. Bernhard Knollenberg has found *the origin* of the American Revolution, and he has done it without a single reference to the Boston Massacre, the Quartering Act, or the Declaration of Independence. George Washington is mentioned only briefly on six different pages. On the other hand, it requires

seven lines in the index to list the references to Sir Jeffery Amherst, and one finishes reading this book with the distinct impression that the British general had more to do with bringing on the American Revolution than did Sam Adams.

Knollenberg's thesis is forthrightly stated in the eleven pages of the Introduction. Americans revolted against the series of "provocative British measures" adopted between 1759 and 1765. The relationship between colonies and mother country prior to 1759 had been reasonably satisfactory and might have endured "for many generations, perhaps even to this day" had not these disastrous innovations been attempted. Knollenberg devotes the bulk of his book (fifteen chapters, pp. 12-184) to a detailed analysis of the policies which were put into effect during the seven fateful years and which drove the colonists to the brink of rebellion. Then, on page 184, he summarizes the situation in 1765 succinctly. "Hard times: British warships patrolling the American coast to break up the once flourishing trade with the foreign West Indies; British officials in the interior enforcing uneconomic and confiscatory laws against the cutting of white pine; the highest prelate of the Church of England encouraging measures alarming and offensive to colonial Dissenters; drastic steps by the Board of Trade and Privy Council to curtail home rule in the royal colonies; a British commander-in-chief embroiling a number of colonies in one of the most costly Indian wars in their history and then failing to protect the frontier settlers or even to punish the rebel Indians; and, above all, the recent acts of Parliament levying taxes towards the upkeep of a large, unrequested, and ineffective force of British troops stationed in North America and imposing new and severe restrictions on colonial trade and currency—this was the accumulation of grievances giving rise to the surge of protest by British colonists of North America, individually and through their legislatures, to which we now turn."

In six more chapters (pp. 185-237), Knollenberg describes colonial protests made in a vain effort to turn aside the threat of the Stamp Act and the virtually spontaneous decision made by Americans to nullify England's efforts to collect this "internal" tax from them. This controversy, in Knollenberg's opinion, defined the issue and virtually forecast the result. All the rest was epilogue. Indeed, "Epilogue" is the title that he gives to a final but unnumbered chapter in which he carries a fast-running account of events from the fall of Grenville's ministry to the battles of Lexington and Concord, after which "there seemed to be no alternative for either side but to fight to the bitter end—an end not reached for eight tragic years of war and mounting hatred between two peoples having so many reasons to be friends" (p. 252).

It is not until he reaches this final sentence that Knollenberg betrays his Quaker origins. Up to this point he is almost belligerent in denouncing English tyranny and defending American opposition to it. His mastery of the documents renders him very persuasive, but there are some serious omissions in the argument. Thus, in dealing with Grenville's "new" policy of rigidly enforcing the trade laws and refusing to consider a revenue voluntarily raised by colonial assemblies in lieu of stamp duties, the author ignores the flagrant violation of the Navigation Acts of which colonial merchants had been guilty during the

French War, as well as the marked reluctance which colonial legislators had shown in voting taxes for the prosecution of this critical conflict. In other words, although Knollenberg tells his half of the story remarkably well, it is still only half the story.

On this score, it is interesting to compare Knollenberg's book with Professor Lawrence Henry Gipson's contribution to the *New American Nation Series, The Coming of the Revolution*. The two historians are agreed as to when the Revolution really took place: Knollenberg devotes nearly all of his book and Gipson more than three-fourths of his to the period prior to the repeal of the Stamp Act. But otherwise there is little resemblance; Knollenberg is as critical of British policy as Gipson is apologetic for it. Their respective attitudes toward the decision to garrison Britain's newly-won empire with an army of 10,000 regulars are in startling contrast. Gipson regarded this decision as not only defensible but absolutely requisite because of the Indian menace dramatized by Pontiac's Rebellion and the colonial militiaman's inveterate prejudice against garrison duty. Knollenberg regards the decision as indefensible because it made no provision for the use of colonial troops and because the British regulars were virtually useless against Indians. Take your choice.

In spite of these *caveats*, the reviewer has thoroughly enjoyed reading Knollenberg's book, which is full of erudite scholarship, and is inclined to agree with its major premise—that the fatal policies adopted by Bute, Grenville, and Townsend fractured the British Empire. Moreover, he admires the audacity of an author who answers in five pages three of the most nagging questions still asked about the Revolution. First answer: the cession of Canada and the consequent liberation of the colonists from fear of French attack did not, as so many Englishmen believed, stimulate an already existent desire for independence. Such an idea had never occurred to the colonists (pp. 6-10). Second answer: the island and mainland British colonies which did not join the Revolution, and which outnumbered those that did, remained loyal to England for obvious reasons—economic advantage, dependence upon British protection, or sheer backwardness (pp. 10-11). Finally, the fateful decisions taken in the years 1759-1765, which so enraged the Americans, grew out of "the distracted state of British politics," the inexperience of new leaders such as Bute and Grenville, and the disturbing influence of John Wilkes. These conclusions may be very sound, but historians will welcome a great deal of additional research in these areas before the final verdict is accepted.

Otterbein College

Lynn W. Turner

*The Mexican War*. By Otis A. Singletary. *The Chicago History of American Civilization*. Edited by Daniel J. Boorstin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 181. Maps, illustrations, chronology, list of suggested reading, index. \$3.75.)

Into the restricted confines of a 162-page text, Professor Singletary, of the University of Texas, has packed a simplified but scholarly version of one of the most significant wars in the history of the Western Hemisphere. It may be objected that sometimes the combatants seem a