program. Such widespread influence might be seriously questioned. Though titular head of the opposition party for four years, Willkie was at no time its effective leader. His role was more that of a stepping-stone between two eras of Republicanism than that of a bridge as Johnson characterizes it.

In 1940 Willkie gambled upon a "me-too" program. Confident that he could hold conservative Republican voters, he set out to attract those who had supported Roosevelt four years before. To accomplish this he accepted the New Deal program in large measure, objecting only to some of the means employed to bring about the necessary social ends. The result was, as one columnist put it, a hopeless attempt to "out Santa Claus, Santa Claus." A widely accepted notion among Republicans is that Willkie lost the election because his acceptance of New Deal reforms and the Roosevelt foreign policy prevented the American people from voicing their opposition to either. When faced with the necessity of choosing between two individuals of almost identical views, the choice of the more experienced man was inevitable. Others hold that Willkie's refusal to accept the golden rule of politics—unswerving party loyalty—cost him the election. Johnson disputes these arguments, asserting that because he faced the master politician of the age in a time of growing international crisis, he was destined for defeat regardless of the course he followed.

Wendell Willkie's leadership was hailed by President Roosevelt as a decisive force during World War II and in the establishment of the United Nations. Willkie's book, One World, although it envisioned a world too full of idealism to become a reality, became the bible of internationalism and cast its author in the role of prophet. Ironically Willkie is almost universally acclaimed by Democrats today as a man of courage and vision, while many Republicans still consider him an anathema.

The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie is a well-written and satisfactorily documented volume. Although the narrative is occasionally too heavily laden with details and not always free from trivial errors, it is the work of a competent political scientist. Based primarily on secondary works, Johnson's research has, however, disclosed nothing new. There is no mention of the Willkie papers, if such exist, or of the correspondence of the Associated Willkie Clubs of America, which remains closed to public scrutiny. Perusal of both these primary sources will be essential before a truly definitive work on Willkie and the period, 1939-1944, can be written.
In the years preceding 1872 the Republicans normally won a large majority of state legislative seats from the northern half of Illinois, while the Democrats held a similar advantage in the southern half of the state. This situation gave the Democrats relatively few legislative seats from the northern area, and the Republicans in the southern sector faced a comparable problem. Moreover, this peculiar distribution of seats resulted in a north-south sectionalism within Illinois based on Republican control in the north and Democratic dominance in the south.

Cumulative voting was instituted in an effort to give the Democrats from northern Illinois an increased number of seats in the state house of representatives and to give a similar increase to Republicans in the southern part of the state. "For the period covered in this study, the state was apportioned into 51 senatorial districts; one senator and three representatives were elected from each district. In the election of representatives, each voter had three votes which he could cast in any one of four ways. First, he could cumulate his votes by giving all three to a single candidate. Second, he could divide his votes equally between two candidates by giving each candidate a vote and a half. Third, he could split his votes three ways by giving one vote to each of three candidates. Fourth, he could split his votes two ways by giving one vote to one candidate and two votes to a second candidate" (p. v).

Blair clearly believes that cumulative voting has been effective in Illinois, the only state, he says, in which it has been used. He cites arguments pro and con concerning cumulative voting, but both his explicit and implicit conclusions are favorable to the system for Illinois. This reviewer, however, believes that Blair has at times ascribed results to cumulative voting which may have developed from other factors and circumstances. This study should interest Hoosiers for two reasons. First, it was originally written as a doctoral thesis at Northwestern University under Professor Charles S. Hyneman, who is now a member of the faculty at Indiana University, where he is continuing his long-term study of voting behavior and patterns in various states. In the second place, during the Civil War era Indiana also showed signs of developing a north-south sectionalism between Democrats and Republicans much like the Illinois pattern which led to the practice of cumulative voting. Apparently, however, political sectionalism was less pronounced in Indiana than in Illinois because of such factors as population origin and distribution and the nature of Indiana’s economic development.

Indiana University                          Donald F. Carmony


The title of this book is significantly singular. Bernhard Knollenberg has found the origin of the American Revolution, and he has done it without a single reference to the Boston Massacre, the Quartering Act, or the Declaration of Independence. George Washington is mentioned only briefly on six different pages. On the other hand, it requires