such adaptations are reconcilable with the language of the Constitution" (p. 47). Within such limits the author finds occasion to be critical of the work of the Supreme Court, both for engaging too freely in the determination of questions best left to the political branches of the government (p. 281) and for an evasion of its duty in other instances by too free a resort to such shields as "political questions" (p. 154).

The American Constitution comes nearer than any recent constitutional survey to following in the tradition of W. W. Willoughby's classic commentary, The Constitutional Law of the United States, published earlier in this century. It will have a broad use.

Indiana University

Warner O. Chapman


Arnold Brecht, professor emeritus of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, has had a long and distinguished career as a scholar, political administrator, and political advisor. He was notably successful as a civil servant under the Weimar Republic, and after fleeing Germany in 1933 he began to make a series of notable contributions to the field of political science. The work under review, while not intended to be his final book, is a fitting capstone to his scholarly career, for it is a work that shows great learning and insight.

Professor Brecht is concerned with scientific political theory rather than with the crosscurrents of contemporary political and social ideologies. His objective is to provide a systematic statement of the philosophical and methodological foundations of present scientific political theory while, at the same time, tracing the genesis of the efforts to develop such a body of theory. The organization of the book entails an initial statement of the primary elements of scientific method, including a careful and extremely lucid statement of scientific value relativism. The latter statement includes a special case study treatment of the impact of scientific value relativism upon traditional theories of justice. The initial value and methodological considerations are succeeded by a rich series of essays dealing with the historical origins of present scientific orientations towards the study of man in society. This historical excursion is followed by a careful consideration of the views of contemporary critics on efforts to construct a science of politics, with particular attention given to criticisms of scientific value relativism.

This volume is to be commended upon many grounds. Professor Brecht is eminently fair in treatment of intellectual positions with which he does not agree. He does not set up any straw men, and he fully grasps the nature of the arguments which he aims to refute or modify. His own analytical ability is of a very high order, and he is particularly adept at selecting the right illustration and the appropriate phrase. The breadth of his scholarship is great. He knows the relevant literature, including minor works as well as those of major importance. (The notes to each of the chapters will provide enough references to sources to provide a decade of fruitful reading for any graduate student.)
Not only does Professor Brecht know the relevant literature, but he also has the ability to guide the reader through the tortuously tangled trail of twentieth-century philosophical and scientific controversy without leading him through unnecessarily roundabout paths. This volume is, for that reason, probably the best introduction to the origins and development of modern social sciences now in existence. All in all, this is a work of major proportions which deserves the careful attention of all social scientists, historians, and social philosophers.

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Byrum E. Carter


The difficulties in employing a comprehensive survey of history to establish any set principle or view, both in regard to the mastery of so much information and to the nearly impossible intellectual acumen required to let the facts speak for themselves rather than to the issues concerned, have frequently been illustrated before and are again shown here in Professor Shotwell's book. This work is more than a survey of facts, however, and it should be judged primarily by the validity and the accomplishment of its intent. This intent is to demonstrate that the rule of reason is the only basis upon which civilization may find true freedom and avert utter stalemate or oblivion. For Shotwell the rule of reason is more than logic since it must also account for irrational factors governing human response and activity, and because inexorable and complete logic cannot envision the compromise of conflicting interest in which justice is defined.

To document this theme the author appeals to the full scope of human history. He draws the obvious lessons that only history explains the transient present since in many ways it is the substance of the present. Shotwell goes on, however, as one of the main objectives in the book to insist that freedom defined as acceptance of responsibility is the result of man's historical emancipation from spiritual, social, and economic oppression by breakthroughs achieved in the advent of religion, the rise of politics and economics, and, ironically, the use of war. Yet, each of these emancipating factors has obviously been the instrument of further oppression in itself, except for the few creative periods when reason did temporarily prevail. Finally, mankind now faces its greatest challenge, the necessity of adjusting to the machine as we turn to a new and unique era requiring us to "think our way through rather than grapple with nature by animal strength" (p. 577).

Those of us who are unable to attempt the writing of such a book should be careful in our criticisms of it, but it seems clear that Shotwell's use of antiquity is based on an acquaintance gained in his youth and uncorrected by the voluminous later literature which could be used to challenge many of his factual assumptions about the ancient world. One example illustrating this point is his acceptance of slavery as the basis of ancient economic life. One is tempted to reveal author's and reviewer's weaknesses alike with the old cliché: he is far better in the area of his own immense scholarly contribution, modern international relations, than he is in the fields of ancient and medieval