

*The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance.* By Jay Luvaas. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 253. Illustrations, appendices, index. \$5.95.)

While the Civil War has long been of interest to the military writer and biographer in the United States that struggle has also fired the attention of foreign military students and scholars. In this superb work Mr. Luvaas traces the influence of the Civil War on European military literature and thought from the reports of "on-the-spot" observers to post-World War I writings. His general thesis is that although technological developments made during the Civil War were noted by observers at the time of the conflict, and by military staffs and students in Europe after the war, tactical and strategic lessons were disregarded because they conflicted with prevailing military doctrine or more recent lessons derived from continental battlefields.

In the case of the German General Staff, except for the idea of military use of railways, the Civil War did not have an influence on official doctrine. In the years after the Franco-Prussian War the Germans gave little official attention to the Civil War because the American experience did not give the answer to the vital strategic problem of Moltke's successors: a two-front war and the necessity for a quick victory. In the years before 1914, the French gave little serious study to the epic struggle of the American Republic because of the pervasive Napoleonic influence and the "cult of the offensive." In the case of Great Britain, we find more interest being given to the study of the Civil War in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mainly through the efforts of the famed biographer of Stonewall Jackson and noted British military mentor, G. F. R. Henderson. Luvaas, who has edited a volume of Henderson's writings on the Civil War, claims that the latter did not leave his mark on any specific tactical or other military reform but emphasized through his study of the Civil War a flexible approach to military thought in general. Paradoxically, Henderson's flexible and inquisitive attitude became the agent of a dogmatic approach to the study of the Civil War, and in the years after Henderson's death in 1903 British military writers saw only what they wanted to see from the Civil War to prove their particular point, and little emphasis was placed on objectivity toward military problems.

With the holocaust of 1914-1918 "new lenses" were provided with which to view the Civil War, and in England enthusiasm for the war was more intense than before 1914. This was the result of the work of J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart. These two brilliant military scholars gave attention to the Western theater, the campaigns of Grant and Sherman, and stressed the constant factors of warfare such as command, strategy, and psychology of leadership.

The author has performed a prodigious task in his study of French, German, and British military literature covering the years since 1861, and his work reflects his excellent knowledge of European military developments during these years. This volume is a distinct contribution to recent works on military affairs; in particular, the discussion of Henderson and his legacy to British military thought is instructive for

the student of military history. Luvaas' work is also a singular addition to Civil War historiography in the respect that the author relates or connects the war with contemporary and subsequent military affairs in Europe.

An excellent presentation of footnotes at the bottom of each page partially offsets the glaring omission of a bibliography or even a bibliographical note.

*Office of the Chief of Military History*  
*Department of the Army*

John W. Killigrew

*Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction.* By Robert P. Sharkey. *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series LXXVII (1959), Number 2. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 346. Tables, appendices, bibliography, index. \$5.50.)

In this iconoclastic study Professor Sharkey explores many aspects of the financial history of the Civil War and Reconstruction. He deals with the origin of the greenbacks and with their importance as an expedient of war finance. He analyzes the political struggle over currency contraction and inquiries into the economic rationale of bankers, manufacturers, laborers, and farmers.

At the outset Professor Sharkey argues that one must not magnify the importance of the greenbacks as a factor in financing the war, since the total net issues of legal tender notes in the years 1861-1865 accounted for less than one-sixth of the total cost of the war. Yet the author maintains that the country desperately needed an adequate medium of exchange at this time. Thus, he concludes, one can make a strong case for the "necessity" of the greenbacks.

Continuing his well-documented assault upon orthodox conceptions, Professor Sharkey contends that farmers were not duly concerned with fiscal matters in the period under consideration. He cites statistics indicating farm prosperity in the immediate postwar era and concludes that this prosperity is the reason that there is little evidence of economic discontent among farmers during that period. He says that farm prosperity contributed to the Democratic defeat in 1868—that farmers generally ignored the money question and voted Republican.

This reviewer's colleague, Professor R. C. Buley, has often asserted that on few questions is there a common business viewpoint. Professor Sharkey substantiates this position by demonstrating that business interests differed sharply on fiscal matters during the Civil War and Reconstruction era. He shows that spokesmen for manufacturers, such as Thaddeus Stevens, "Pig Iron" Kelley, and Peter Cooper strongly opposed any attempt to contract the greenbacks, while commercial and financial interests generally favored contraction.

In his conclusion the author devotes considerable space to a strong criticism of the analysis of the fiscal history of the Civil War and Reconstruction period which the Beards forwarded in *The Rise of American Civilization*. He believes that many misconceptions on the