

has not, whether the colonial press adopted the responsibility concomitant with this freedom—the responsibility to report the truth as best ascertained. Is it not relevant that the patriot newsmen deliberately misrepresented the measures and intentions of the home government? Professor Schlesinger admits (p. 34) that the stigma of “tyranny,” “oppression,” and “slavery” applied to British policy had little or no objective reality, at least prior to the Intolerable Acts of 1774. Perhaps a more balanced view of these last measures might even eliminate his qualification, but can it be said that the colonial press functioned responsibly? By the author’s pragmatic test they were justified in misrepresenting British intentions, for their actions aided the goal of independence, which was the greatest contribution of the Revolutionary generation.

Ranking second only to independence, Schlesinger concludes, was the legacy of freedom of the press. In their task of forming public opinion, the newsmen were inescapably involved in the issue of freedom of the press, since as long as Crown officials exercised effective control, the Whig journalists extolled the virtues of unfettered discussion—often unbridled license—which brought them squarely into conflict with the English common law doctrine of seditious libel. Once the patriots gained the upper hand, they inconsistently denied their loyalist opponents liberty, charging them with license in attacking popular governments. The Whig concept of license was diametrically opposed to that of the Tories, Schlesinger points out, for it meant not defiance of royal but popular authority. It may be noted, however, that the justification for free use of the press was not merely an American one for it was the great *English* Lord Chancellor, Hardwicke, who said in 1739 of the pressmen of the Glorious Revolution that when they wrote in defense of liberty “they were warrented by the law for what they wrote, and they had the sense of the nation on their side” (House of Lords, February 12, 1739: *Parliamentary History*, X, 1331-32). Were both peoples really so far apart? The American Bill of Rights and Fox’s Libel Law of 1792 both struck at the old repressive common law doctrine. Perhaps it would not be inappropriate to add to Professor Schlesinger’s conclusion that the concept of freedom of the press, as it emerged by the end of the eighteenth century, was rooted in *both* the American and English revolutions.

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Lord Aberdeen and the Americas. By Wilbur Devereux Jones. University of Georgia Monographs, No. 3. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 101. Notes, index. Paperbound, \$2.00.)

In an era of British history most frequently characterized by the bellicose Palmerston, the diplomatic achievements of the gentle Earl of Aberdeen have been somewhat obscured. His moderate and pacific policies were territorially profitable to America, and we, while recognizing that Europe’s tribulations have often been the source of our triumphs, have not been prone to admit that occasionally our glory must

be shared. As Wilbur D. Jones has analyzed Aberdeen's policy between 1841 and 1846, American success in settlement of the Maine, Texas, and Oregon questions must redound to the credit of that British Foreign Secretary who patiently worked to maintain the peace of the English-speaking peoples.

The historian who can provide the American background for himself will find in these pages welcome relief from the raucous cries of the expansionists of the 1840's. Unfortunately, save for a short Foreword by Lady Pentland, and a brief concluding estimate, Aberdeen appears only as the author of numerous soothing and diplomatically circuitous notes. Professor Jones' chief concern seems to be the full documentation of his earlier controversy with Frederick Merk over the proper evaluation of Aberdeen's motivation. Merk argued that British Opposition politics significantly affected the settlement of the Oregon dispute. Jones builds a persuasive case for Aberdeen's independence, but he avoids Merk's evidence except to reject it as a slur upon Lord Aberdeen. That is not quite convincing, and few would think less of Aberdeen if he were shown to be sensitive to bipartisan pressures in a delicate diplomatic situation. Both the diplomatic history of the period and the biography of Lord Aberdeen need further development. Judging from the real merits of this volume, what Professor Jones may say upon either subject in the future will deserve weighty consideration.

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The Guns at Gettysburg. By Fairfax Downey. (New York: David McKay Company, 1958. Pp. xii, 290. Illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. \$5.00.)

What Gettysburg enthusiast has not felt the presence of the "Guns at Gettysburg," and with the author been conscious that they have defied a century of time? Fairfax Downey has back of his writing the enthusiasm, or perhaps it might be called inspiration, of the true Gettysburg fan.

Downey is an artillerist, and consequently tends to overstress the importance of that arm and to exaggerate somewhat its destructive power. He develops the battle by describing the employment of artillery, day by day, and ends with a brief critique. He does it well, and for the Gettysburg addict who has always felt the need of a better picture of the artillery battle, *The Guns at Gettysburg* is the answer to a prayer and a guide to the field.

As might be expected, Downey is a little at a loss in explaining the employment of masses of infantry which furnished the development pattern of the battle. For instance, Hood's Division of the First Corps opened the second day's battle, attacking by brigades in echelon. Then McLaw's Division took up the movement, and Barksdale's Brigade which cracked the salient at the Peach Orchard was the last unit committed. However, Downey jumps in right here and introduces an account of the artillery masterpiece that eased the Union line back to its original position. He is probably inaccurate on the commitment of