

years in which he read less, were the years of his most irritating intellectual cock-sureness.) Intellectually, Roosevelt showed considerable capacity for objectivity and for changing his mind. In a letter to William E. Dodd, Roosevelt, always antagonistic to Jefferson, reveals a genuine interest in Dodd's favorable interpretation of Jefferson; and in Roosevelt's later life he largely rejected the racist theories of Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, theories with which in earlier life he had flirted.

Students of Indiana history will be interested in the interchange of letters between Roosevelt and famous Hoosiers like William D. Foulke, Lucius B. Swift, Charles W. Fairbanks, Will Hays, John W. Foster, and Albert J. Beveridge. There is a series of curious and impudent letters between Foster and Roosevelt. Roosevelt and Beveridge were never really close, not nearly so close as their political collaboration would seem to justify, but in the final years both men were brought closer together by their mutual distaste for Wilson, their hostility to internationalism, and Roosevelt's genuine appreciation of Beveridge's first two volumes of *The Life of John Marshall*.

The University of Florida

William G. Carleton

Confederate Agent. By James D. Horan. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954, pp. xxii, 326. Illustrations, bibliography, and index. \$5.00.)

One finishes James D. Horan's long account of his search for new material with the feeling that industry rewarded him. He had the use of the Baker-Turner Papers in the War Records Office of the National Archives, which he says were still under lock and key when he first sought access to them in 1951. While some documents dealing with the conspiracies in the North during the Civil War were published in the *Official Records* of the war, the bulk of them were not. Horan also used the papers of Thomas H. Hines, the hero of his book, that are in the Margaret I. King Library of the University of Kentucky, as well as some letters that passed between Hines and Nancy Sproule—whom Hines married during the war—that are privately owned.

Thus Horan had very important sources not used by Mayo Fesler for his basic study, "Secret Political Societies

in the North during the Civil War," that filled the September, 1918, number of the *Indiana Magazine of History*. (That excellent article is cited in Horan's bibliography but with the author's name incorrectly given as Fesley.) Nor were the two sources described open to George Fort Milton when writing his very readable *Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column*, which appeared in 1942, nor to Professor Wood Gray, whose well-documented *The Hidden Civil War—The Story of the Copperheads* was published the same year.

In view of what was previously known about the conspiracies, one reads with surprise the words, "A Discovery in History," below the title of Horan's work. He certainly did not discover Hines, for that plotter is a prominent character in both the Milton and the Gray books. Gray in fact states that Hines' "wartime exploits would merit the pen of an E. Phillips Oppenheim"—as Horan himself notes.

Horan is a newspaper man and novelist and he understands how to handle dramatic material and how to write a lively story. Immediately, however, one is forced to feel that he lacks precise background knowledge, wrote in haste, and did very inadequate checking.

The book opens in the last of April, 1861, when the "Buckner Guides," captained by Hines, rode south from Lexington, Kentucky, on the Newtown pike. About noon the little cavalcade turned into a side road, splashed across a creek, and rode up a little hill. The wind apparently being in a friendly quarter, the riders were greeted with "the savory odor of frying bacon and pork roasting over a spit." From the eminence, the camp of General Albert Sidney Johnston "spread before them." Pleasing details of the camp are given; then one reads: "'Please tell General Johnston Buckner's Guides are reporting for duty,' Hines told the orderly who greeted them."

That is pure fiction. In April, 1861, Albert Sidney Johnston was in California. He reached Nashville on September 14, and after spending some time at Columbus, Kentucky, where the Confederates erected a great work in the hopes of closing the Mississippi, he went to Bowling Green, arriving on October 28. He never had a camp near Lexington. (The biography of Johnston by his son is a standard work.)

In the section devoted to sources for the different chapters, Horan writes: "The description of Buckner's Guides,

who joined General Albert Sidney Johnston's command in April, 1861, is taken from the long, unpublished story of Hines' life by Doctor James Blanton, Cumberland County, Virginia, [written?] in 1864, hereafter known as the Blanton Mss. Much of the material was contributed by Hines, General John Hunt Morgan and a Captain Cunningham. Blanton was probably trying to sell the story to the *Atlantic Monthly*."

It looks as if the doctor compounded a strange concoction. And what about the trustworthiness of Hines, if he contributed extensively to Blanton's piece? On the copy of the *Atlantic Monthly* article for July, 1865, entitled "The Chicago Conspiracy," that is in the Hines Papers—one page of which Horan reproduces—there are marginal notes by Hines. Apparently he made no repudiating comments on the Blanton Manuscript. It may be noted that on page 78 Horan states that Dr. Blanton was a local historian of Lexington, Kentucky; so one can stop blaming Virginia.

In treating Morgan's raid, Horan says, "Indianapolis was Morgan's for the taking but for some reason he turned east from Salem." A few sentences later he says, "With pursuit hot on their trail, and no Copperhead underground army to aid them, the Confederate raiders were now averaging twenty-one hours a day in the saddle." If Morgan was trying to get away, why speak as if there were mystery in his eastward turn?

Horan says, "Only eleven hundred raw recruits answered Governor Morton's call to arms." That is not what Lew Wallace—summoned by Morton to take command of the situation—whom Horan seems to use as a source, says in his *Autobiography*. The Hoosier general states that within twenty-four hours 65,000 men responded to Morton's call "with arms," and cites the report of the Adjutant General of Indiana. As to the 1100—that was the number of men that Wallace says he entrained, with provisions, on the evening of July 10 [11?] at Indianapolis for Vernon. Wallace also points out that Morgan did not even attack General John Love and his State Legion at Vernon. He sent a surrender demand, but getting a sharp refusal, Morgan decided he had business in Ohio.

Why must we eternally have the picture of the Indiana capital saved by a quirk of the invader? Why could not Horan have elaborated on the truth, which he seems to have

seen? Of course it makes one quiver to think of the helpless Hoosier city just waiting to be plucked—almost asking for it. But there is plenty of high drama in General Hobson's splendid pursuit of Morgan with 2500 well seasoned, well armed, cavalry in blue, as well as in Love and his Legion, and in the brand new 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Infantry regiments, that did not stay to defend Indianapolis, but went to meet Morgan, and finding him gone, joined in the pursuit.

Horan gives a "Timetable" in the front of his book, as a device to help the reader. But he failed to consult a timetable himself, and he is badly confused when on page 41 he links Morgan's raid into Indiana and Ohio with his absence from the battle of Murfreesboro. That battle occurred six months before the raid across the Ohio and while Morgan was on a short raid into Kentucky. It was pursuant to General Bragg's orders, not contrary to them, that Morgan was away "when Rosecrans rolled out" (of Nashville), as Horan picturesquely puts it.

On page 79 Horan has Hines arrive in Toronto on April 20, 1864, with orders from the Confederate Secretary of War to work with the Mission to Canada. He had gone by land, and on May 29 he met Commissioners Clay (Clement C.) and Thompson (Jacob) in Montreal (page 84). The commissioners had left Richmond on May 3 and had run the blockade to Bermuda, where they took ship for Canada. Thompson went to Toronto with Hines and the latter spent considerable time rounding up escaped Confederate prisoners. Forgetting when the conspirators reached Canada, Horan says (page 88), "In the *winter* [italics mine] of 1864, when he returned to Toronto, Hines was horrified to learn how easy it was to get gold out of Thompson."

On page 83 we read: "On May 9, Morgan and his troopers had defeated the Union columns marching on Saltville, in Western Virginia. . . . That night in the bar at the Queen's in Toronto men in ragged gray lifted their glasses to toast the gallant Morgan and roar out the words of 'The Raiders Ride Tonight.'"

The Confederates did use some submarines. But it is not in the record that they had radios, and it is absurd to assume that there was a telegraphic report in Toronto of a minor action near Wytheville, Virginia, on the very day it took place.

The Federals also did some rapid communicating. According to Horan, Colonel Jeffrey Sweet, commanding the Confederate prisoner of war camp in Chicago, learned the final details about the planned liberation of prisoners about midnight of November 7-8, 1864 (page 190). The coup was to take place the next day, November 8, Hines being the mastermind in the plans. Sweet wrote a dispatch to Brigadier General John Cook in Springfield, outlining the plot and asking for re-enforcement, since he had only 800 troops to guard 8000 to 9000 prisoners. He was afraid, however, to use the telegraph, and Horan says (page 191), "Sweet sent the message to Springfield by a special courier on horseback." The courier must have made it, for we read on page 199 (the time now being the 8th), "Additional troops arrived during the morning to augment Colonel Sweet's men."

Horan not only gives the wrong volume, but the wrong series of the *Official Records* for Sweet's dispatch. It was not written near midnight on November 7, but at 8:30 P.M. on November 6. Sweet explained that he was using a messenger, partly because he was afraid of the telegraph, and partly because he could write more at length. Presumably the courier rode comfortably behind an iron horse on the Chicago and Alton R.R. General Joseph Hooker, in Sandusky at the time, had to make the final decision, and on November 7 he telegraphed Sweet, "I have directed General Cook to re-enforce you with two companies from Springfield, to join you as early as sundown tomorrow." Cook, on his part, telegraphed that the governor had directed that the militia of Chicago should be held subject to Sweet's orders, and he told Sweet to command them at once. So everything had been well provided for before Horan's messenger started his 180-mile gallop.

Horan's book will probably have more readers than those by Milton and Gray, because he has made the story vivid. He states that in the writing, it was "the novelist versus the historian," and that though he felt the "creative urge" he restrained himself; "at every step the historian would silently point to the facts." Such a statement should have obligated the author to more than ordinary care. In view of errors such as have been pointed out—and more that were passed over—the assurance that even the conversations with which the book abounds—are not "fictionized," but are based on documents of some kind, is not impressive.

Undoubtedly Horan was in possession of fresh material, and his book is made more interesting by reproductions of some of it. It is a pity that the manuscript was not carefully edited and checked, for Horan might have made a really valuable contribution. Inasmuch as the book was not adequately checked, the most appealing character in it turns out to be Colonel Sweet's midnight rider. He is a veritable Paul Revere, who shouts a warning even to a drowsy reader.

Indiana University

Kenneth P. Williams

Era of the Oath: Northern Loyalty Tests During the Civil War and Reconstruction. By Harold Melvin Hyman. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954, pp. xiv, 229. Illustrations, bibliography, and index. \$5.00.)

Throughout the Civil War the United States government wrestled with the problem of setting up tests which would prove the loyalty of its citizens, and when the war was over and the Reconstruction period set in, the problem remained as vital as ever. In the one period, loyalty and the knowledge of who was loyal were necessary to win the war; in the other, they were equally necessary to win the peace.

The authorities never got beyond the oath of allegiance in their quest for a test, but for twenty-three years, from 1861 to 1884, which might be called the "Era of the Oath" in American history, they devised one oath after another and fought over methods of applying it. By the first few months of the war, the old oath of allegiance had come to be considered insufficient, and although the executive departments had devised new oaths or had reapplied the old oaths, Congress in August, 1861, passed a law setting up a uniform new oath. The next year Congress devised an oath for jurors, but by far the most important of the oaths Congress adopted was the famous "Ironclad Test Oath," passed on July 2, 1862. This was the oath which became so important in Reconstruction times, for it not only related to present and future loyalty, but also included past loyalty.

It was this oath which became the most potent weapon in the hands of the Radicals in establishing their control over the South. It was a great political weapon in the fight between the Radicals and President Johnson. The President attempted