

was compelled to omit many of them. Although it is regrettable that funds were not available to print a larger number of these papers, the reviewer feels that under Carter's guidance the selections were made with fine historical judgment and intelligence.

The administration of the territory, as in previous volumes, is made the principal basis on which the volume is predicated. The selections made are taken chiefly from the archives of the Departments of State, Treasury, War, Post Office, and Interior, from the manuscript division of the Library of Congress, and from the House and Senate files. Many cross references are made to masses of related materials elsewhere, including secondary authorities.

The documents relating to the Federal Road and the difficulties of transportation in the territory are of especial interest. Papers relating to the Panic of 1819 indicate excessive speculation in public lands in the territory. When the credit system of land sales was abolished in 1820, Alabama had amassed a land debt of eleven million dollars, more than half the land debt of the entire country. The deposit of land revenues in the territorial banks, especially those at Huntsville and St. Stephens, promoted slack banking principles, which brought outspoken criticism from the Treasury Department in Washington.

The index to this volume is detailed and accurate. The work forms a worthy addition to the previous seventeen volumes on territorial history.

Alabama Polytechnic Institute

Malcolm C. McMillan

The Army Air Forces in World War II. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Volume III, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day January 1944 to May 1945.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. xxxix, 948. Illustrations, map, charts, glossary, and index. \$8.50.)

This volume, the third in a projected seven-volume history of the Air Forces in World War II, tends to complete one of three themes into which the editors have divided the study. Volumes one through three have as their primary consideration the air operation against the European Axis.

While the title seems to indicate that the narrative is begun with air operations in January, 1944, this is somewhat misleading. The work begins with a fairly thorough résumé of air activity in 1943, as indeed it should for clarity for the "reader whose endurance is less rugged or interest less catholic" than to undertake an examination of the completed work. Through the discussion of air operations of 1943 it is clearly shown that before any serious consideration could be given to an invasion of northwestern Europe the German Air Force would have to be destroyed. While the British were not so sure that the nature of this objective was essential to the projected OVERLORD and ANVIL—the code names respectively for the main invasion of France and of southern France—AAF thinking rested upon the assumption that this achievement was an indispensable preliminary to invasion. Thus while CBO—combined bombing operations—had been inaugurated early in 1943, with the objective of "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and undermining the morale of the German people," by November a re-evaluation had limited the project considerably. For by this time, after the Washington conference and the Quebec and Cairo meetings, it was recognized that the growing power of the German Air Force demanded an all-out attack, not only by the Eighth in England but also the Fifteenth Air Force, based in Italy. The new operation was given the code name ARGUMENT and its objective was graphically stated in a New Year's message of General Henry H. Arnold addressed to the commanding generals of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces: "Therefore my personal message to you—this is a MUST—is to Destroy the Enemy Air Force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories."

The increased tempo of air activity against German production brought to the fore, as never before, the problem of providing long-range fighter escort for the bombers. For some time it was highly questionable whether the supply of long-range escort could be provided at all, but as the range of the fighters was slowly extended the issue became less pressing. As early as August, 1943, the radius of action of the P-47 had been extended to 340 miles, but this was not nearly sufficient to cover the deep penetrations of the bombers into Germany. The hopes of the Air Force were then pinned on the P-38, the fighter already favored among the personnel

in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. With the addition of two seventy-five gallon wing tanks the P-38's could perform escort to a maximum of 520 miles, and on November 3, 1943, they saw their first combat and enjoyed their first victory in the ETO. By this time it was becoming increasingly evident that the P-51 could be developed into a more maneuverable fighter and one of longer range than the P-38. Thus, early in 1944, the principles on which allocations had previously been made between the Eighth and Ninth (a tactical unit) were completely reversed. The Eighth, a strategic unit, was to be almost exclusively equipped with P-51's, while P-38's and P-47's were to be transferred to the Ninth Air Force. To the amazement of "many seasoned observers," including Hermann Goering, American fighters were flying with bombers to Berlin and even beyond by March, 1944.

The work also devotes attention to the sometimes forgotten campaign in Italy, where the Fifteenth Air Force and Twelfth Air Force were in operation. To the Fifteenth must go much of the praise for the success of strategic air operations, even though the Eighth got most of the publicity. And while the strategic and the tactical phases of the war are the primary consideration, there is one section of the book devoted to "Supporting Operations." Such topics as "air support for the underground" and "logistical mobility" are treated fully. As far as the air war over Europe is concerned, there was no dramatic finish marked by a surrender or an armistice. There was merely a statement on April 16, 1945, declaring that "with few profitable targets left," the bomber offensive was officially finished, though several missions were dispatched thereafter.

The last chapter, entitled "Mission Accomplished," is an attempt to evaluate the contribution of the Army Air Forces toward final victory in Europe. Both the editors and the author of this chapter, John E. Flagg, seem to realize that such an appraisal is no easy task. It is encouraging to find judgments offered that seem both "fair and sober" with "overenthusiastic" claims corrected—albeit reluctantly at times. There can be little argument with the conclusion drawn that although air power did not win the war, without air ascendancy over Europe victory could not have been gained at all.

Richard Jellison

Kokomo Extension Center, Indiana University